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FIGURE I

Source: N.Z. Observer, 9 December, 1911.
"First Wowser: "Hit hard brother; let us get the thin end of the wedge in; the rest will soon follow."
THE ATTACK ON THE CITADELS
OF LIQURDOM

A study of the prohibition movement
in New Zealand, 1894 - 1914.

Anthony R. Grigg

A thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in History
at the University of Otago, Dunedin,
New Zealand.

1977
We are at the beginning of a new century,
we are laying the foundation of a new nation.
What that century will bring forth, what
that nation will become, must largely depend
on our use of our God-given talents. We
are proud of our bright young country. We
want it to be free of the terrible evils
that have compassed older lands.

_White Ribbon_, March, 1901, pp. 6-7.
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ABSTRACT

In 1893 the Liberal Government in New Zealand under R.J. Seddon introduced and passed the Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act. This marked the beginning of a new era in New Zealand's liquor licensing system and encouraged through its provision for triennial liquor polls the development of a highly organised and widely supported prohibition movement. This thesis examines the progress of this movement from the first liquor poll in 1894 to the poll of 1914 in an attempt to understand the social and political significance of the prohibition issue.

The ideology of prohibition was an expression of a late nineteenth century middle class society which adhered to particular values drawn from a puritan philosophy and adapted to a capitalist and laissez-faire economic outlook. Such an outlook placed considerable emphasis on the values of sobriety, thrift and industry as the means to self-improvement and respectability. Expenditure on alcohol was considered a major cause of poverty, disease, crime and waste which hindered a person's progress towards economic independence and social respectability. It was not surprising, therefore, that as a result of the social and economic difficulties occasioned by the long depression of the 1880s and early 1890s a large section of the dominant social, economic and political group, the middle class, should espouse such a reform programme as prohibition. This programme appeared to provide considerable economic and social advantages, especially for the working class, without necessitating any fundamental changes in New Zealand's capitalist economic and social system.
Prohibition was thus a middle class ideology, supported and led by the pietistic and non-episcopal churches and aimed at helping the unregenerate working class. It did, nonetheless, attract considerable support from the working class, especially from skilled workers aspiring to middle class respectability. The connection between the prohibition movement and the working class was thus complex throughout the 1894-1914 period. The prohibition movement increasingly opposed the developing social and political divisions which appeared to be the result of the socialist philosophy of the growing labour movement, while the labour movement became increasingly suspicious of the prohibitionists' motives and their effect on labour unity.

The emphasis within the prohibitionist ideology on the importance of the home and the mother in shaping society's values as New Zealand developed from a frontier society into a more complex, civilised and sophisticated society at the beginning of the twentieth century stressed further the middle class nature of the movement. The resulting assumption that women would be particularly interested in supporting the movement eventually had to be modified, however, as the woman's vote appeared to follow a pattern similar to that of men.

Politically the prohibition movement was believed to have considerable effect, though the nature of this effect was not understood at the time. The incessant legislative demands of the prohibitionists and the regular occurrence of the triennial licensing polls ensured, however, that the issue remained in the forefront of New Zealand's political and social life throughout this period. It was not until 1914 that this puritan attempt to dictate New Zealand's moral standards and social and economic structures appeared to be declining.
PREFACE

This thesis attempts to reveal the nature of the prohibition movement in New Zealand in the period 1894-1914: what was its ideology and aim; who supported it; what had it achieved by the outbreak of World War I; and how did it relate to the wider economic, social and political issues of this period?

By the 1890s "temperance" and "prohibition" tended to be used interchangeably to mean abstention from and the abolition of alcoholic liquor. Throughout this thesis, therefore, this meaning is attached to both these words. Where "temperance" has been used to mean the temperate or moderate use of alcohol this has been made clear in the text. Similarly "no-license" and "prohibition" have been used interchangeably as, while the practice of no-license did not mean total prohibition, the ultimate aim of the no-license movement was total prohibition. The spelling of the noun "no-license" has been kept in its original used form, though in reference to "licences" the modern spelling is adopted.

Four areas will be noticeably absent from this thesis. The first concerns the Maoris and the King Country. The King Country was not subject to the triennial liquor polls but was governed by a special arrangement between the Maori chiefs and the Government undertaken in 1884.1 Similarly the Maori members of Parliament have been excluded from the calculations concerning the attitudes of parliamentarians and political candidates to prohibition, and especially in the effect of prohibition on politics. This has been done because the four Maori

electorates were less affected by the liquor issue than the European electorates, as liquor polls were not held in them every three years. They were not, in effect, licensing districts.

Second, despite complete access to the files of the New Zealand Alliance, I could not find much manuscript material of that organisation prior to the 1920s. This seems to have been the result of a fire at the turn of the century, and possibly of several changes of headquarters for the Alliance since its establishment.

The third area lacking thorough discussion concerns the opinions of the liquor trade based on liquor trade sources such as correspondence and trade journals such as the *Licensed Victuallers' Gazette* and the *Trade Review*. It has proved impossible to track down such sources despite considerable effort by the author and by librarians throughout the country. Communications with the Hotel Association of New Zealand, the New Zealand Liquor Industry Council and the Speight family of Dunedin have also proved fruitless. Some letterbooks and minute books of the Brewers', Wine and Spirit Merchants' Association did come to hand in the last few months of research. Apart from these, however, all references to the liquor trade have been based on material drawn from pamphlets by trade supporters, from daily newspapers, and from reprinted reports of the trade's affairs in prohibitionist journals.

Finally, for two reasons no thorough statistical analysis of the various liquor polls has been included, though this was the author's original intention. First, any attempt to correlate support for no-license and prohibition, as reflected at the liquor polls, with variables such as age, sex and marital structure and religious affiliation by licensing districts has proved impossible. The data in the *Census of New Zealand* is by county and borough, which have
absolutely no relevance to electoral or licensing district boundaries. At best some broad trends based on simple percentages are possible, though inadequate. The emphasis of this thesis was, therefore, changed, and detailed analysis of liquor polls is only undertaken where sufficiently interesting and significant results occur.

There is much work yet to be done before a complete picture of the prohibition movement and its effects in this period 1894-1914 will be obtained. One element that has emerged in the research for this thesis is the importance in the prohibition campaign of local issues and local leaders in individual communities. I have no doubt as to the value of any future research at the individual licensing district level and at a regional level. The role of the Church will also bear more investigation, and again especially at the local level with concentration on a few major churches and their membership. Other aspects such as crime, drunkenness and domestic life will add to the picture of the effect of alcohol on New Zealand society, though in these fields the statistics are by no means complete. There is also still a need for a complete study of the period between 1914 and 1930 at both the national and local levels. It was not until the late 1920s that the movement showed signs of declining as a major social

2. For an excellent example see R.K. Newman, 'New Zealand's Vote for Prohibition in 1911', NZJH, 9, no. 1, (April, 1975), pp.52-71, in which the prohibition movement is analysed by this simple method in such a way that would make it difficult to better given the inadequate nature of the data available.

3. For an example of such possible research see K. Furniss, 'A Social History of the Morey Place Congregational Church', (unpublished B.A.(Hons) thesis, University of Otago, 1975).

phenomenon. The effect of World War I, the economic conditions and social and technological developments of the 1920s provide new elements that affect the nature and appeal of the prohibition movement and the churches.

In undertaking the writing of this thesis I have incurred debts to many people, not least of whom are my tutorial colleagues at Otago University during 1977. They provided those moments of levity as well as criticism in the final stages of writing. To Ann Gillies I am deeply grateful for the help she gave in the proof-reading of the final copy. To Glenn King, Pat and Allan Sargison I owe more than just thanks for their practical hospitality while I was researching in Wellington and Auckland. I also wish to thank the staffs of the following institutions for their time and help in the research stage of this thesis: Hocken Library, University of Otago Library, Dunedin Public Library, Otago Early Settlers Museum, Knox College Library, Selwyn College Library, University of Auckland Library, Auckland Public Library, University of Canterbury Library, Canterbury Museum Library, Alexander Turnbull Library, General Assembly Library, National Archives, New Zealand Baptist Theological College Library, the New Zealand Temperance Alliance Head Office, Wellington, the Women's Christian Temperance Union headquarters in Nelson, the Diocesan Office of the Anglican Church, Dunedin, Waihi Public Library, Thames Valley News Ltd., New Zealand Truth Ltd., and the New Zealand Tablet Company. I would also like to thank Miss D.H. Moss of the North East Valley branch of the W.C.T.U., Mrs J.H. Grigg, a former executive member of the N.Z.W.C.T.U., Mrs L. Ross of the Otago University Computing Centre, and my supervisor, Dr. E.N. Olssen, for his encouragement and criticism. The funding of this thesis has been made possible by scholarships granted by the Knox College Council, Dunedin, and the University Grants Committee,
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A.R. Grigg,

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<td>ALSCAct</td>
<td>Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act.</td>
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<td>JHR</td>
<td>Journal of the House of Representatives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JLC</td>
<td>Journal of the Legislative Council.</td>
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<td>L.V.A.</td>
<td>Licensed Victuallers' Association.</td>
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<td>N.C.W.</td>
<td>National Council of Women.</td>
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<td>N.Z.</td>
<td>New Zealand.</td>
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<td>N.Z.A.</td>
<td>New Zealand Alliance.</td>
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<td>NZJH</td>
<td>New Zealand Journal of History.</td>
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<td>NZO</td>
<td>New Zealand Observer.</td>
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<td>NZPD</td>
<td>New Zealand Parliamentary Debates.</td>
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<td>ODT</td>
<td>Otago Daily Times.</td>
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<tr>
<td>W.C.T.U.</td>
<td>Women's Christian Temperance Union.</td>
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cities. In New Zealand it was something different again. A young society was moving towards nationhood, albeit slowly, and a movement that had begun in response to the effects of a harsh and inhospitable colonial frontier developed into a movement to impose upon the country a set of values of a particular section of that society at a time when New Zealand was trying to decide for itself how it would develop politically, economically and socially.

The long depression of the 1880s and the early 1890s brought to the fore in New Zealand society the social and economic disparities and tensions that existed, especially in urban areas, between rich and poor, capital and labour, conservative and radical. In an attempt to overcome these disparities the professional, business and small farming sections of the community tried to encourage the poorer sections of the community to be thrifty, industrious and sober in order to improve their own economic lot. Some legislation to facilitate these moves to self-improvement was attempted, especially in the areas of land and labour, by the Liberal Government of the 1890s. Sections within this predominant economic and political group advocated other reforms as well, aimed at the moral improvement of the individual as the first step towards self-improvement. Such reforms included the abolition of gambling, Sabbath Day observance and prohibition of alcohol from use in society. The prohibition movement


4. ibid., pp. 172-188.
was the most influential of such reform movements because of the interest generated from 1894 onwards by the triennial polls on the existence of licensed bars.

The prohibitionists could see that the social and economic tensions were leading to stratification of society into distinct groups or classes, especially when a labour movement based on socialist ideas began to develop as an alternative response to the needs of the poorer sections of society. This threatened the prohibitionists' liberal concept of a unified society. Prohibition was one attempt to remove these tensions and to prevent any serious social stratification. If offered a remedy for the economic, political, social and moral problems of the period without requiring any alteration of the existing capitalistic economic structure of the country. At the same time the prohibitionists were attempting to influence the structure and values of society by having it accept their predominantly middle class, puritan, Victorian morality of sobriety, thrift, industry and self-improvement and their concept of the suburban nuclear family.

It is the fundamental thesis of this work that the prohibition movement in New Zealand at the beginning of the twentieth century was primarily an expression of a particular section of the middle class's concern with these social, economic, physical and political problems that were becoming apparent. If successful prohibition would solve these problems, which in turn would mean, or so the prohibitionists believed, the continued predominance of their middle class traditions.

values and institutions, and hence middle class leadership of society. While the prohibition movement was, therefore, an attempt to avoid serious stratification of society, it was also an expression of the division that already existed.

The concept of social class has had many definitions over the years, but it is now generally accepted that several variables are involved in providing this definition: income, source of income, occupation, residential area, and education are the most common variables offered. To these should be added language and rhetoric if the culture of a particular class is to be understood. These two variables provide a means of defining a social group's perception of itself and its relationship with other social groupings. They also offer an understanding of a group's values and attitudes on various issues, and these in turn might offer further evidence of different social groupings in society. Depending on how developed class consciousness is in a given community, a further variable in defining this consciousness may be found in political action. What, for example, does the existence of a distinct Labour party say about a group's perception of itself in relation to the whole of society, compared with a Liberal-Labour alliance, or even a Liberal-Conservative antagonism? What is the reaction of these various political groupings to issues that effect different sections of the community, issues such as labour legislation, land legislation, taxation and trade?

The emphasis throughout all this, especially in the historical context, is not on what the situation was but on what people perceived

the situation to be, how they saw themselves in relation to their neighbours and to the rest of society, and how they reacted as a result of this perception. The strength of a particular class is related to how well each individual relates to a like individual in the socio-economic scale, and how this group of individuals relates to other but different groups. The unity of interest of one group as opposed to another group will result in the development of class consciousness, or "a unity of conception of the world and society in accordance with the general class interest."

The extent of this development will depend on the structure of a social situation, economically, politically, socially and culturally, and what reactions this situation provokes.

It is argued here that in New Zealand during the 1890s and until World War I there was a growing class consciousness, not only amongst the working class but also amongst the middle class, meaning the professional and business groups in society. There was no upper or landed class large enough to act as a major separate interest group. The few owners of large estates were atypical of New Zealand society at this time and were steadily declining by the 1890s. The majority of land occupiers were small farmers whose interests were opposed to the land monopoly of the large landowners, and who found political expression firstly in the Liberal Party and later, as socio-economic interests developed and diversified, in the emerging Reform


The so-called middle class consisted of a wide range of people when it came to an economic classification. The occupations of this group included managerial roles in industry and commerce, professional, administrative and clerical work, and self-employment, usually in servicing industries. The range of income in such a group was from that of the wealthy entrepreneur to the more modest but adequate income of the lower middle class white collar worker. While such a broad range of occupations and incomes is undesirable in trying to define the middle class, such a situation is inevitable until further study of the socio-economic structure of New Zealand's population for this period is undertaken. Within the middle class certain groups were, however, numerically dominant, especially the small businessman, small farmer and white collar worker. This dominance is reflected in the support for prohibition.  

The difference between the middle and working classes lay in the type of occupation pursued, whether it was manual or non-manual. The difference between an upper working class artisan and the lower middle class clerk or businessman was often not in any difference of income but in the distinction between manual and non-manual work. Within the working class was a similar economic and social distinction between skilled and semi-skilled or unskilled workers, or artisans and general


10. See Chapter 3.
labourers and factory hands. Generally speaking this division within
the working class was as important for much of the period between 1894
and 1914 as was the difference between the middle and working classes.
The artisans, with their various craft unions, were often more closely
allied in outlook to the middle class than to the unskilled masses.
That this should have been so was to some extent the result of social
aspiration and deference to the middle class values that characterised
the prohibition movement - sobriety, thrift and industry, leading to
self-improvement and respectability. Such deference, especially of
the skilled workers, helped in the formation of the political alliance
of Liberal-Labour during the 1890s, and partly explained artisan support
for the Liberal left wing during the early 1900s. Only by the end of
the period was this deference largely overcome and greater cohesion
between the two sections of the working class achieved.11

Not only did the prohibition movement hinder the growth of a
distinct working class, but it also revealed the existence of social
class consciousness in the public mind. This movement came to promin-
ence in the early 1890s after a long period of gestation, a period
analysed by P.F. McKimmey in 'The Temperance Movement in New Zealand,
1835-1894', and summarised in Chapter One.12

11. For a discussion on working class consciousness in New Zealand in the 1890s and 1900s see E.N. Olsen, 'The "Working Class" in New Zealand', NZJH, 8, no 1, (April, 1974), pp. 44-60.

12. P.F. McKimmey, 'The Temperance Movement in New Zealand,
1835-1894', (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of
Auckland, 1968); also R.R. Scott, 'Public Control of the
Liquor Trade in New Zealand, 1840-1899', (unpublished
Chapter Two examines the ideas on which the prohibition movement based its claims of offering a thorough and necessary means of economic, social, physical and moral reform of New Zealand society. As a product of the wider social fabric of the community, these ideas were more than a mere rationale for an intolerant and self-righteous movement. They were an expression of a middle class view of society aimed at social control and cohesion. At the same time, however, the emphasis and attention given to prohibition as a means of reform at the expense of any consideration of other reform proposals helped to destroy what cohesion existed between the capitalist and labouring sections of the community. Chapter Three confirms this hypothesis - that the prohibition movement was predominantly a middle class phenomenon - by analysing the support of the movement as revealed in its leadership, in voting patterns and at the grass-roots level. Its connections with the labour movement, women and the churches are also discussed in a further attempt to show who the prohibitionists were. The strong support for prohibition from the pietistic churches helps to explain the puritan nature of the movement. These churches placed a heavy emphasis on personal salvation and adherence to a strict code of behaviour, in contrast to the liturgical denominations which emphasised the importance of the liturgy and sacraments as the means of salvation and worship.

An outline of the major prohibitionist activities between 1894 and 1914, as the movement tried to impose on New Zealand by popular vote its middle class ideas about the structure and values of society, is provided in Chapters Four to Eight. Two major areas are emphasised: the drive by the prohibition movement for changes in the licensing laws; and the agitation surrounding the triennial liquor polls. Through this
the development of the movement, both in organisational structure and in popular support, will become apparent. Particular attention is given to the roles of Seddon, Ward and Massey as they attempted to control this annoying quasi-political movement, and to the connection of women, the labour movement and the moderate voter with the licensing issue. In each case the emphasis is on the attitudes and values, concepts and expectations, that these sub-groups of society expressed through the prohibition movement, to show that within the New Zealand context prohibition certainly had a relationship with social class patterns.

The prohibitionists' evangelical enthusiasm and their belief in Divine guidance are also best portrayed by examining their actions throughout the period of study. While the prohibition movement may, in the final analysis, be portrayed as a conservative middle class reform movement aiming at social, economic and political control, the sincerity of belief of the prohibitionists in the efficacy of their reform proposal, and their dedication and moral earnestness, must not be lost. Even the apparent decline in prohibitionist support at the beginning of World War I did not dampen these moral crusaders' enthusiasm.

The nature of the connection of the prohibition movement with politics is examined in more detail in Chapter Nine. A general analysis of the success rate of political candidates and of the political affiliation of parliamentary representatives is undertaken in order to establish the exact influence of the prohibition issue on the political life of New Zealand. It will be seen as a result that the movement was predominantly an expression of the middle class capitalist establishment and was opposed to separate working class politics.
These various threads are tied together in the Conclusion, which attempts not only to evaluate the prohibition movement for the period 1894-1914, but also to suggest that New Zealand in the 1970s is no nearer to solving the problems caused by alcohol abuse than were the prohibitionists in 1914 when their popular support began to decline.
CHAPTER I

THE BATTLE BREWS

The connection of alcohol with a frontier society is a common theme in history, and nineteenth century New Zealand was no exception. For many people on the frontier alcohol offered an escape from squalor, loneliness, isolation and poverty. Those settlers who had gone on to the land found themselves isolated by distance and bush from their neighbours; those who stayed in the towns faced primitive conditions and few, if any, amenities; those who went to the goldfields found little on which to spend their new-won wealth or to console them in failure except gambling and booze. In such conditions alcohol was a friend and a solace, and was drunk in large quantities.

Alcohol was a psychological prop for many people homesick for Great Britain. They had left for New Zealand with high hopes of a new and better life, little realising all that would be expected of them and all that they would have to endure in order to create a civilised existence in New Zealand's wilderness. The loss of friends and the uncertainties of their new situation put serious strains on people, some of whom might have sought release through drink, many of whom found drink an easy way to escape new problems, at least temporarily. There were few other means of escape. Entertainment had to be self-made; the pub often became a community centre where one heard what news there was to hear, talked with one's new friends, and drank.

1 For a fuller discussion of the drink problem in nineteenth century N.Z. see McKimmey, op.cit.; also J.A.D. Adams, Early Days of the No-License Movement, (Dunedin, 1909).
This situation was only aggravated by the fact that for most of the nineteenth century New Zealand was predominantly a male society. There were not enough women for those many single men who had come to the goldfields, or to work on the public works schemes, or to become farmhands. Once again solace from loneliness was sought in the bottle.

Added to all these factors was the fact that most of New Zealand's settlers were from the lower echelons of British society, people trying to escape the drudgery of industrial labour, the inhospitable surroundings of the industrial towns, the lack of opportunity to possess one's own farm or business, the poverty from which there seemed no escape, the insecurity which was their only lot if they stayed in Britain. With them they brought the habits of their class, one of which was drinking. At home the pub had been their social life, the bottle their escape from the misery of their surroundings. It is little wonder that in a new society where conditions were so harsh even if their prospects were better, people continued to imbibe with regularity and often intensity.

All in all the problem of drunkenness is best explained by the fact that for a large part of the nineteenth century New Zealand society was unstable. It was a society where the stabilising influences of home, family and a close-knit community were at a minimum. This, of course, was inevitable in a colonial society where such influences had gradually to be built up from nothing. As the century progressed and these stabilising factors grew in importance, the incidence of drunkenness decreased.


It was in response to this problem of alcohol in nineteenth century New Zealand that the temperance movement took root. As early as 1836 a temperance society was formed under the guidance of the Church of England and Wesleyan missions at Paihia in the Bay of Islands in order to counteract the drunkenness of the sailors, traders, sealers and whalers. Its object was to encourage, by means of education, abstention from the use of "ardent spirits", that is, distilled liquors as opposed to beer and wine. This was but a natural reflection of the notion that was still general in all classes of society, that the use of alcohol in moderation was not only permissible but also beneficial. It was only as the century progressed and science offered increasingly damning proof, both real and unreal, of the harmful effects of alcohol, that the temperance movement developed into a prohibition movement for the removal of alcohol from the life of the nation.

The period from the 1840s to the 1870s was one of little advance for the temperance movement in New Zealand. Various laws were passed by the central government, mostly to control the hours of sale, the issuing of licences, and the right to operate a brewery or distillery. The Provincial Councils also passed numerous ordinances on these issues, all of which were superseded by the 1881 Licensing Act. The questions of temperance and abstinence, however, were left very much to individuals and organizations. The latter were scattered throughout the country under a variety of names, but there was little, if any, co-ordination between them. They concentrated on the moral influence they


6. McKimmey, op.cit., chapter 2; Licensing Ordinances, 1842, 1851; provincial measures: Otago, 1864; Nelson, 1867, Auckland, 1871; national measures: Licensing Act, 1873; Licensing Act, 1881.
might exert and on the holding of tea parties, lectures, concerts, debates, and garden fêtes. Their appeal was to some extent through the amusements they offered; their effect on people's desire to drink was not great, while politically the temperance movement was still too weak and disorganised to be able to make itself felt with any effect at the seat of government, be it provincial or central. Its influence continued to be moral and individualistic.

The 1881 Licensing Act repealed all the previous provincial Acts and advanced the principle of local popular control of the liquor traffic by providing that local licensing committees of five, under the resident magistrate, would be elected annually by the ratepayers. These committees could decide whether licences should be granted or not, and if an increase was recommended, a poll of the ratepayers of the district was first necessary to get popular approval. The licensing committee was to use its discretion in granting or refusing any application for any description of licence unless in the committee's opinion there was a necessity for the licence.\(^7\)

The Act proved to be a more flexible instrument of reform than expected. By a series of decisions in the courts it was ultimately settled that, provided the committees heard and determined each application on the merits and in accordance with the law it was not bound to grant a renewal of any licence. These decisions cleared the way for a local committee, acting without predetermination and after hearing the parties, to refuse each application at the annual meeting and so abolish the legal sale of liquor in its district. This was done in Roslyn, Dunedin, in 1891, and the Court upheld the decision in 1892.\(^8\)

The 1881 Licensing Act had, in practice, given the temperance movement's supporters some hope in their attempts to effect reform of the licensed trade. From this point onwards the movement began to increase in its size and influence, until in 1894 one area of New Zealand, the Clutha district, actually voted in favour of no licences. No one factor can be isolated as being the cause of this growing enthusiasm for temperance and prohibition. The 1881 Act gave people hope; the depression of the 1880s persuaded many more that something had to be done to alleviate the poverty that surrounded them.

This sentiment was important in encouraging the establishment of the New Zealand Alliance in 1886. It had been felt by such men as Sir Robert Stout and Sir William Fox that a national body was needed to co-ordinate the activities of the various temperance societies and to give a firmer lead in trying to deal with the liquor traffic, both through direct lobbying to Parliament and organisation at the local level for the rousing of public sentiment and the election of licensing committees. In this way the Alliance, which was in one respect a response to the increasing prohibition sentiment, was itself important for encouraging a continued growth of that sentiment.

The same pattern occurred with the pietistic, evangelical and non-episcopalian churches. Their increasing involvement was to some extent the result of their growing social concern, prompted by the depression, while on the other hand their involvement only helped to encourage wider support for the movement. By the 1880s most of these churches had taken to using unfermented wine at communion and were encouraging their adherents to desist from using alcohol, even in moderation. What percentage of church adherents heeded this advice from

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the pulpit cannot usually be known, but it would seem fair to assume that a reasonable proportion did and that they thus provided considerable support for the prohibition movement. ¹⁰

The growth of the women's suffrage movement in New Zealand during the late 1880s and early 1890s also encouraged the growing interest in the prohibition movement. As a result of the belief that women were the moral and social watchdogs of the community, an agitation had been growing, especially during the 1880s, to give women a say in the governing of the country. Major agitation had begun in 1885 when the New Zealand branch of the Women's Christian Temperance Union (W.C.T.U.) was formed. Its immediate objective was to obtain for all women the right to vote at the licensing committee elections, but this was quickly advanced to demands for the right of all adult females to have the vote at national parliamentary elections. As a result the women's suffrage movement and the prohibition movement had closely associated histories, at least until female suffrage was gained in 1893. ¹¹

The historical problem associated with this connection has been whether women's suffrage was part of the wider campaign to deal with liquor issue, whether it was used by the prohibitionists in the belief that women would support the prohibition movement, or whether prohibition and women's suffrage were two separate issues involving similar, and sometimes the same, people.

In her study on the women's suffrage movement in New Zealand Patricia Grimshaw disputes the interpretation stemming from W.P. Reeves that the drive for the female suffrage was an attempt by the prohibition movement to gain the female vote on the liquor issue. She shows

10. This is developed in Chapter 3, pp.69-75.
that Reeves' sinister view of the link between the prohibition movement and the drive for votes for women must be severely modified. Grimshaw also reveals Reeves' personal opposition to the prohibition movement and the corresponding attack on him by extreme prohibitionists; this attack was important for colouring his interpretation of the prohibition movement and its connection with the suffrage movement.

There is further evidence to suggest that Reeves was incorrect in seeing the suffrage movement merely as a part of the prohibition movement. For example, the N.Z.A. did not give official support to the drive for the suffrage. It was felt that the issue should be left to individual choice and not be foisted upon people who might support prohibition but not women's suffrage. As Sir William Fox wrote to Sir John Hall,

Some of our lady friends here are angry with us because we do not give the cause the support of the N.Z. Alliance, though a considerable majority of our Executive and a large majority probably of our supporters are in favour of Women's Franchise.

The establishment of Women's Franchise Leagues after 1892 was a direct result of this realisation by the prohibitionists that the two movements were distinct both in aims and support. While the Franchise Leagues were admittedly an offshoot of the W.C.T.U., the fact that temperance reformers who also favoured the suffrage could see the need for a separate and non-sectarian league clearly suggests that the drive


14. W. Fox to J. Hall, 10 Sept, 1890, Hall Papers, General Assembly Library.
for votes for women was a distinct issue from prohibition. 15

The evidence is, therefore, strongly against Reeves' view that women's suffrage was merely the outcome of prohibitionist agitation and ulterior motive. The two issues appear to have been separate in their immediate aims yet to have involved very similar people at the organisational level. These were two issues concerned with social reform, and it was but natural that social reformers should be found in both movements. The Auckland Star reported that

the movement is not a temperance movement, neither has its origins in the circle of any sect or any number of sects; it is a woman's movement, and a colonial movement, and I am happy to say that a very large number of men as well as women are most earnestly working for it.

This would seem to be a more adequate interpretation than that of Reeves' ten years later. 16

Despite the tenuous and uncertain connection of the suffrage movement with the prohibition movement, there is little doubt that the agitations for both reforms in the 1880s and early 1890s supplemented each other and helped to bring both issues to greater prominence. That they were connected in people's minds and that it was believed that any popular vote on the liquor question would involve the women's votes, if granted, on the side or prohibition, helped to increase the interest being taken in the growth of the prohibition movement. 17

During the 1880s and early 1890s the basic ideas of the prohibition movement had been widely stated and popularised, and a movement which had been primarily local in its activities had developed into a nation-


17. see pp. 97-115.
wide agitation in favour of the removal of alcohol from use in society. The powers given to ratepayers by the 1881 Licensing Act, the development of two national prohibition organisations, the New Zealand Alliance and the W.C.T.U., the increasing outspokenness of the pietistic churches in favour of prohibition, the connection of the women's suffrage movement with the prohibition agitation, and the obvious problems of poverty and social distress brought about by the long depression had all played a vital part in this development and growth of the prohibition movement.

Yet while the movement had made considerable advance during the 1880s, it was still felt that there was considerable room for improvement, especially in the area of licensing legislation. It was the realisation by the early 1890s that the 1881 Licensing Act did not give the people the direct say on licensing matters that it was thought to have provided which acted as the catalyst to the achievement of the Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act of 1893. This was the basic Act under which the triennial liquor polls for the years 1894-1914 were conducted. It was the agitation for this measure which was the focal point of the prohibition movement in 1892 and 1893, and which completed the process of changing the movement from an insignificant, localised affair into a powerful and prominent national movement offering its own persuasive programme for the economic, moral, physical and social reform of the whole country.

As a result of the Sydenham licensing case of 1891-1893, it was revealed that the 1881 Licensing Act did not give the licensing committees powers which they were thought to have under it. Consequently

further public interest in reform of the law on the subject was awakened, even amongst those who were opposed to prohibition but who did think that the local committees ought to have more power than they now appeared to possess. \(^1\) Agitation for the direct veto on the issuing or withdrawal of licences increased, and greater cohesion among the various branches of the prohibition movement resulted from their united action. \(^2\) Ultimately, after much debate and political manoeuvring in 1893, Seddon was placed in such a position that, in order to maintain his place as leader of the Liberal Party in opposition to Sir Robert Stout, he had to allow the Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Bill to pass. The licensing issue formed the basis of the first major threat and challenge to his political leadership, but by a series of adroit political moves, and by managing to frame a compromise measure such as the Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act, he was able to parry Stout's challenge and strengthen his hold on the Liberal Party. \(^3\) It is in the light of this struggle between Seddon and Stout that the compromise nature of the Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act must be viewed.

The Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Bill was given its first reading immediately after progress was reported on Stout's Licensing Act Amendment Bill on 2 August, 1893; this new Bill was Seddon's attempt to thwart Stout's attack on his leadership and his attempt to split the Liberal Party.

Liberal Party along prohibitionist-anti-prohibitionist lines. The basic provisions of the Government's Bill as passed were: the boundaries of licensing districts were to be the same as electoral boundaries; people eligible to vote at parliamentary elections were to be entitled to vote at licensing polls; licensing polls were to be held every three years; the voting paper was to consist of three issues - continuance of licences, reduction of licences, and no-licence, and the voter was to cross out two; one half of the people on the electoral roll of a district had to vote before the poll was valid; a bare majority decision was required for continuance and reduction, while a three-fifths majority was required to enact no-license. As a measure of compromise Seddon gave the prohibitionists the power of a direct veto but not the bare majority. The three-fifths vote was offered the liquor trade, who had asked for a two-thirds majority before no-license could be achieved. Compensation was not offered to those publicans who lost their licences, but the fifty per cent poll requirement made it easier for them to maintain the status quo.

When Seddon opened the debate on the second reading on 18 August, the Bill had only been in the hands of members since late on the previous afternoon. Sir John Hall and others protested at the unseemly haste shown in trying to rush the Bill through without sufficient time being allowed to consider all its provisions. Sir John also accused the Government of insincerity in that it had only introduced the Bill because of the growing agitation in the country and Parliament for some reform of the liquor traffic, and was worried that if it did nothing it would suffer the repercussions at the election. These comments were

22. N.Z. Statutes, 1893, no.34, pp. 127-140.
23. NZPD, 81, (18 August, 1893), p. 175.
in response to Seddon's claim that he hoped by this Bill to remove a non-party issue from the election campaign. 24

To this Stout had made the rejoinder that, if this Bill became law, then rather than removing the liquor question from the political arena, it would ensure that it was the question at the next general election. His strongest objections were directed at the three-fifths majority and fifty per cent poll sections. These, he argued, undermined the very foundations of liberalism, that the majority of the people must govern. The Bill was "a sham, a delusion, and a snare; and the people will be prompt to see that when it comes to the vote." 25

It was, however, Mr J.G. Harkness, member for Nelson, who detected the real threat of the Bill. The term of a liquor licence was now increased from one to three years if continuance were carried; this created a vested interest in licences by the giving of an implicit right of renewal for three years instead of only one as previously had been the case. He therefore regarded the measure as retrograde and dangerous. 26

Despite these objections the Bill passed its second reading without a division. In committee, however, Stout led a solid but small body of prohibitionists in debate every clause of the Bill, but his minority position on this issue was made apparent. It was made even more obvious when the Bill passed its third reading by thirty-five votes thirteen, but not before Stout had again threatened the House with the possible effect of this issue on the 1893 election. As the leading temperance representative in the House he asked that the Bill be defer-

24. ibid., p. 168.
25. ibid., pp. 178-179.
26. ibid., p. 193.
red until after the election so that people could give their voice on the issue. He expected that the temperance party, and in this he included the women's vote, would return members committed to "a real Bill of local control." It is possible that Stout realised that Seddon had out-maneouvred him in their power struggle, but apart from that facet of the debate, Stout was merely echoing the feeling of the majority of the temperance movement when he argued that "this Bill is entirely conceived in the interests of the licensed victuallers - entirely in the interests of the trade; and the trade knows it." 

In making his final speech on the third reading Seddon attempted to show Stout's insincerity. He argued that the Bill gave the temperance party what it wanted - the direct veto and larger licensing districts. Now they were demanding the bare majority, the removal of the fifty per cent poll, and a reduction in the size of the licensing districts. But this was mere casuistry as the prohibition party had previously agitated for the bare majority, and had not requested that licensing districts should be as large as the electoral districts; nor had they asked for the fifty per cent poll regulation. In reality Stout had been no more insincere in objecting to the Bill than Seddon had been in offering the prohibitionists some of what they wanted while also introducing measures that they did not want and which would limit the effects of those requests granted.

After a stormy passage through the Legislative Council, which included a conference with representatives from the House, the Bill was finally passed on 28 September. By this stage the whole country had

27. ibid., (30 August, 1893), p. 441.
28. ibid.
29. ibid., pp. 496-501.
been informed as to the nature of the Bill. Every effort had been made by the N.Z. Alliance to inform the colony as to the provisions contained in it and to prevent its becoming law. Large public meetings had been held, resolutions had been passed, letters and telegrams had poured into Parliament Building. Their effect on the final measure, however, was negligible. As a result, and as Stout had predicted, the licensing issue became one of the major political questions as the election approached. Candidates were asked to state whether they were in favour of altering of the new Act along the lines that the prohibitionists demanded. The temperance party's objections to the Act were numerous. They opposed the enlargement of the licensing districts; the taking of the liquor poll separately from the parliamentary elections; the fifty per cent poll requirement which would encourage stuffing of the roll, indifference about voting and wilful abstention from voting; the necessity for obtaining a three-fifths majority to carry no-license; the restriction of the powers of the licensing committees by depriving them of the ability to hear and determine objections on the ground that the licensed house was not required in the neighbourhood, and by transferring the power to grant wholesale and packet licences from one of the elected representatives of the people to the Resident Magistrate; and, finally, the creation of a vested interest in licences by giving a licence a right of renewal for two years succeeding the original grant. All in all it was felt that this Act had made it more difficult than previously to obtain the expression of the people's will in the direction of refusing licences.

Behind this large array of objections was a much more important


31. ibid., pp. 7-8.
debate concerning the fundamental principles of Liberalism. Stout had brought the matter to the fore in the debate on the second reading of the Bill when he referred to clause fifteen, which established the three-fifths majority and the need for a fifty per cent poll.

The principles of Liberalism are cast to the winds, if this clause be adopted. What is the principle that underlies Liberalism? It is that the majority must govern.

For Stout Liberalism demanded that those who did not vote had no right to have their votes counted. No man could be a true Liberal who was not prepared to vote for the direct veto by a bare majority. 32

The most effective reply to these arguments came from Reeves, who argued that the direct veto by a bare majority was a complete departure from the principles of representative government and was a resort to the referendum. 33 Earlier in the year, in the debate upon Stout's Licensing Act Amendment Bill, Reeves had shown that the election of a member of Parliament by a bare majority was a different issue from the changing of conditions in society by a bare majority. The passing of laws involved a system of checks through discussion and debate, readings and committee work, in two branches of the Legislature before being placed in the statute books. The closing of hotels by a bare majority vote would have none of these checks, and could easily result in a minority in the country forcing its will on the majority, depriving the country of income and people of property and employment. 34

For the next twenty-five years these basic arguments for and against the three-fifths majority were not to change, though the stress given to them would alter. In 1893 they were part of an attack by Stout on

32. NZPD, 81, (18 August, 1893), pp. 178-179.

33. ibid., p. 190.

34. ibid., 80, (2 August, 1893), p. 391.
Seddon in an effort to gain popular support and political advantage. By 1914 such politicking had gone, but the arguments for stability were still more influential than those for sweeping and drastic social reform.35

The licensing debate now entered the election campaign of 1893.36 The question was not whether candidates were for or against licensing reform, but whether they were for or against the repeal of the Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act. Both the temperance party and the liquor trade canvassed the various candidates as to whether they would, if elected, support the repeal of the Act or give it a fair trial. Few political candidates were able to ignore the issues of three-fifths versus simple majority, and indirect versus direct control. Issues such as compensation for licensees and state control were occasionally mentioned but were mostly to be found in the background. The majority of the community had come to accept that there should be some sort of popular reform of the licensing trade; little attention was therefore given to other possible means of reform.

The press of the colony gave considerable attention both to the issues involved in the election and to the position of the various candidates on the licensing question.37 No consensus of opinion emerged, however, as to the likely outcome of the election. It was not known whether Seddon or Stout would be Premier, whether Liberal or Conserva-

35. See pp. 309-311.

36. For the importance of the licensing issue in the struggle between Seddon and Stout in the 1893 general election campaign see Hamer, *op. cit.*, pp. 393-399.

tive would win, or whether Labour candidates would hold the balance. The situation was only aggravated by the non-party issues of prohibition and Bible-in-Schools, while the new female franchise also added to the uncertainty. Some thought women would add to the Conservative vote, some to the prohibitionist voice, and some to the Liberals.

The outcome of the elections resulted in the Liberal party being returned with a large majority and the prohibitionists having a larger voice in Parliament. Twenty-eight former members were not returned, and twenty-one of these had been opposed to the repeal of the Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act. The losses of the liquor trade were, therefore, heavy. Of the members of the new House nineteen were pledged to full repeal, fifteen to partial repeal, twenty-three against repeal, and the attitudes of thirteen were unknown. The temperance party was pleased with the result and hopeful that, with the House being sounder than its predecessor on the question of temperance, reform of the law would be achieved.

By late 1893, therefore, the prohibition movement had developed from a number of localised and loosely connected temperance and prohibition organisations into a more closely co-ordinated national movement of considerable influence and importance in both the social and political life of the country. It had through its agitation between 1891 and 1893 been able to bring about important changes in the licensing laws to give the voting public a direct say in the liquor licensing system. It hoped thereby to bring about prohibition of alcohol throughout New Zealand and to achieve, as a result, the economic, social, physical and moral reform of the whole community.

38. N.Z.A., *op. cit.*, p. 8
39. *ibid.*
national organisations to co-ordinate activities, the New Zealand Alliance and the Women's Christian Temperance Union, had been established, and the movement's aims and ideas had received considerable publicity through journals, newspapers, meetings, debates and public demonstrations. Such publicity had resulted in large scale support for prohibition and licensing law reform, and had helped to swell the fast-growing ranks of the movement. It is the nature of these ideas and the reasons for their appeal to so many people that must now be examined in order to gain a better understanding of the moral, social and economic aims of the prohibition movement.
CHAPTER II

THE DISEASE AND THE REMEDY

Prohibition was enunciated as a programme for the economic, social, physical and moral reform of society at a time when New Zealand was reeling under the impact of the long depression of the 1880s and early 1890s. The prohibitionists were amongst those who could see the social and economic problems of many New Zealanders but who were unaware of the causes of them. Focussing on the obvious evils of the "drink curse", they argued that it was the fundamental cause of all other problems.

The poverty, the misery of mind and body, that lead a poor wretch to look upon the exhilaration given by alcohol as the only bit of lightness in his life; the unnatural craving for stimulant that is the result of a gambling fever, or of impure living in either the drink victim or his ancestors; the faintness caused by improper, or lack of really nutritious, diet; the lassitude induced by unventilated, unhealthy dwellings; the weakness of body due to unsuitable clothing, and transmitted from parent to child; the absence of mental occupation, which gives rein to the mere physical appetites; the idleness of one class and the over-work of another, which alike tend to moral deterioration; the great wealth and luxury of the tens and the penury of the thousands, which make probable a life of vice; the spirit of covetousness which permeates every class of society; each and all of these, and many others, must be recognised as aides and abetors of the dread tyrant - the drink traffic.

It is clear from such a statement that the prohibitionists were perturbed by the poverty, disease, crime and destitution that surrounded them. Before any improvement could be achieved, however, they believed that man's moral regeneration had to take place. This widespread belief is summarised in an article on the social problem,

defined as the problem of poverty, discontent and misery, by the Rev. W.C. Oliver, a Wesleyan minister and editor of the Wesleyan Advocate. He stated that while there was much to be done materially and physically for the improvement of society, the basis of all successful reform was moral regeneration.

We have to admit that the root of the social problem is in moral evil. The fountain is to be made pure, and then the streams will not be corrupt. The religious and moral improvement of the inner being must continue to be our major work...We do not undervalue the immense aid to be sought in material reform from the improvement of the conditions of life, but the regeneration of man's moral being must precede the regeneration of society.2

Reform of man's moral nature was thus the underlying aim of the prohibition movement and shows its evangelical nature and the pietistic emphasis on individual spiritual conversion. From such spiritual regeneration would flow other changes in the economic and social conditions of individuals and ultimately society. As was argued throughout the period,

inculcation of righteousness is only possible by direct action upon the individual conscience. Reforms, to be real and lasting, must be born in the hearts of the multitude ere they can become part of the social fabric. Private virtue is the source of all public morality.3

What did this programme for social and economic reform through moral regeneration involve? For the churches it was a call

2. Advocate, 6 May, 1899, p. 517.

to exert themselves and employ their
influence for the suppression of the
vice of gambling, the abolition of
the totalisator, the suppression of
the drink traffic, and the extinction
of the social evil.4

Their concentration on the drink traffic was the result of the belief
that

there is not a vice, or disease, or
calamity of any kind that has not its
frequent rise in the public house;
it degrades, ruins, brutalises a
large proportion of our people...It
shuts the door of Heaven, and it opens
wide the mouth of hell; as Christians
and as patriots you are bound to come
to the help of the Lord against the
mighty!5

Alcohol was, in effect, hindering the advancement of the Gospel in the
hearts of the people, and preventing the moral uplifting of society
and the advance towards the establishment of the kingdom of God on
earth. Many believed that the abolition of alcohol would facilitate
the evangelical work of the churches, and would improve and strengthen
the moral tone of the community. Other moral reform programmes in
this campaign to "christianise" the community included attacks on
smoking, gambling, Sunday pleasure, prostitution and dancing.

The association of morality with economic and social success was
part of the Victorian middle class puritan belief that he who failed to
be successful was in some way immoral.6 Poverty was regarded as a
sign of man's moral failing and inferior ability, not of an economic

5. G.B. Inglis, sermon reported in Christian Outlook, 7 Dec,
1895, pp. 528-529.
Victorian Studies, 1, no. 2, (Dec, 1957), pp. 155-164;
J. Marlowe, The Puritan Tradition in English Life,
(London, 1956), pp. 72-86.
system which, in effect, favoured those who already had some wealth against those who did not. Within the laissez-faire economic system of nineteenth century New Zealand, the Government was not expected to protect people from the effects of a competitive, capitalist, free enterprise, economic structure. Rather the individual ought to improve his own position through his own efforts. It was the Government's duty to keep society free of restrictions so that every individual had the same opportunity for self-improvement. Self-improvement by means of sobriety, thrift, and industry were further elements in the puritan middle class ethic to which the prohibitionists subscribed. They hoped to ensure the continued existence of these values by encouraging the acceptance of prohibition by all classes in society, but especially the poor. Stout summarised the prohibitionists' basic motives when he said,

they must keep ever before even the poorest class of the community the necessity for self-respect, self-reverance and thrift. If they did not do that the people would be only weakened. It would not do to let them run away with the idea that if the State did this or that, or if such and such laws were passed, everything would be right. A man had his duty to himself and his family to perform, and ought not to rely on the State for everything he might want or require. If they trained a man to do that they would degrade him and lower his manhood.

The arguments formulated to deal specifically with the economic and social problems that faced New Zealand in the 1890s and early


1900s gave further expression to this emphasis on the need for moral reform and the acceptance of the puritan ethic. To understand fully the nature of the prohibition movement as a movement for the economic and social reform of society the importance of this moral outlook must be realised.

The economic argument of the prohibitionists was both sweeping and convincing as a means of reforming society's economic problems. They believed that drinking led to poverty and misery through waste; poverty often meant that people were susceptible to disease; in turn disease either resulted in death or inability to work, both of which meant loss of income and a further slide into the abyss of poverty. Prohibition, on the other hand, would end the waste of money on alcohol, reduce the crime rate, cut the number of people maintained by the State in gaols and lunatic asylums as a result of the effects of alcohol, lower the number of broken homes, destitute families and abandoned children, all of whom were a burden on society, and reduce disease and deformity brought about by constitutions abused by alcohol and passed on by heredity. To these negative achievements would be added the increase in the amount of money to be spent on food, clothing and other commodities; this would help boost the economy. There would also be an increase in effective manpower within the work-force from healthier bodies, a lower absentee rate through better health, and a lower death rate. Finally there would be the social benefits of happier and healthier homes and families. The effect of prohibition would, in simple terms, be to give the people the opportunity of improving themselves, and hence society, economically, physically, socially and,

9. ibid: G. Foulds, Speech Notes, ca. 1893, Foulds Papers 7/1, University of Auckland Library; Prohibitionist, 24 Feb, 1894; 5 May, 1894; H.D. Bedford, Political Fingerposts, (Dunedin, 1908), p. 122.
ultimately, morally. As was said in the annual report of the N.Z.A. for 1886-1887:

> What in all New Zealand politics, past or present, can compare for importance with the wellbeing of its inhabitants as impeded by the liquor traffic. Retrenchment, economy, and reduction of taxation are good and proper things to claim at the hands of a Government, but none of these, even in their realisation, can at all approach in economic value the gain to the country which the freeing of it from the tremendous waste consequent upon the liquor traffic implies.\(^{10}\)

Such an argument ignored two factors. First, for many the resort to the bottle was not the first step in the cycle but rather their attempt to escape, at least temporarily, the poverty and misery which engulfed them. That people's poverty was much more the result of economic liberalism than of drinking was the second factor ignored by the prohibitionist argument.

The economic loss believed by the prohibitionists to be consequent upon the use of alcohol did not stop at the individual and his family. Their loss was seen as a loss to the wider community. In a pamphlet of considerable length on the economics of drink J.W. Jago, a leading prohibitionist in Dunedin, presented a wide ranging argument as to the insidious effect of the liquor traffic on society. He argued that the money, labour, and effort used to produce and sell alcoholic beverages were a loss to the community in that these resources were not used for beneficial production.\(^{11}\) This assumed, as the prohibition movement always did, that alcoholic liquor was in itself


\(^{11}\) J.W. Jago, The Economics of Drink, (Dunedin, 1887), pp.3-4.
harmful and wrong. Jago then continued to show that apart from these direct losses to the State and the community, there were other losses to be borne as a result of the increase in disease and crime caused by alcoholic indulgence. There was a greater need for hospitals and their staff, for law courts, prisons, and a police force, all of which had to be paid for by the taxpayer.

Judges, magistrates, policemen, doctors, nurses, gaolers, warders or others similarly employed... are all supported by the products of the reproductive industries of their fellow citizens and countrymen. The money spent on their support is drawn from the labor-employing, wage-paying capital of the country... All such as are employed in the prevention, the watching, the detection and punishment of crime, the nursing and curing and tending the diseased and the insane, or the feeding and housing of paupers, and whose labour is rendered necessary by the results of the liquor trade, are a burden on the resources of the people; and this drain upon their resources is very largely consequent upon and incidental to their first expenditure on strong drink.12

These arguments again assumed that alcohol was the prime cause of much disease and crime. The possibility that these were as much the outcome of poverty due to low wages was given no consideration. The prohibitionists were generally unprepared to question the economic base of society; prohibition did not require any such questioning yet seemingly offered solutions to the numerous economic and social problems of the period. It cannot be denied, if the returns from the law courts are analysed, that drink played a considerable part in many of the crimes committed.13 Whether it caused these crimes, however,

12. ibid., p. 51.

or whether it was only one in a complex set of factors, was not considered by the prohibitionists.

Despite such arguments about the beneficial economic effects of prohibition, and despite the continual emphasis on these arguments throughout the period 1894-1914, the country as a whole seems to have been little convinced. Amongst Government and licensing trade circles the cry was always that prohibition would result in unemployment for large numbers of people involved in the liquor industry, while the country's revenue would lose about £1 million income from the tax on liquor, which would have to be found by increasing the taxes on the people. Such an argument was used by none other than Prime Minister Massey (not unfriendly to moderate licensing reform) in 1914 in a reply to a deputation from the national No-License convention. 14

Amongst the general public the influence of the prohibitionists' economic arguments seems to have been as negligible as upon the Government. Between 1894 and 1914 the amount of beer and spirits per head of population for home consumption increased substantially, while between 1894 and 1915 the per capita cost of alcoholic consumption rose from £3 1s 1d to £3 16s 8d. 15 The conclusion drawn by the Otago Daily Times as a result of these figures would seem reasonable, that

15. See Tables 1 and 2.
16. ODT, 17 March, 1911, p. 4.
### TABLE I

Consumption of Alcohol per capita, 1893-1914

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Beer Gallons</th>
<th>Spirits Gallons</th>
<th>Wine Gallons</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>7.255</td>
<td>0.656</td>
<td>0.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>6.961</td>
<td>0.611</td>
<td>0.136</td>
</tr>
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<td>1895</td>
<td>6.996</td>
<td>0.593</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>7.453</td>
<td>0.605</td>
<td>0.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>7.790</td>
<td>0.628</td>
<td>0.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>7.995</td>
<td>0.634</td>
<td>0.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>8.150</td>
<td>0.653</td>
<td>0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>8.696</td>
<td>0.684</td>
<td>0.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>8.919</td>
<td>0.726</td>
<td>0.151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>8.777</td>
<td>0.716</td>
<td>0.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>8.987</td>
<td>0.718</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8.996</td>
<td>0.729</td>
<td>0.135</td>
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<td>8.777</td>
<td>0.695</td>
<td>0.124</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>9.256</td>
<td>0.705</td>
<td>0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>9.294</td>
<td>0.737</td>
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<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>9.205</td>
<td>0.745</td>
<td>0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>9.261</td>
<td>0.793</td>
<td>0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>9.206</td>
<td>0.777</td>
<td>0.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>9.340</td>
<td>0.778</td>
<td>0.137</td>
</tr>
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</table>

1. All totals include Maoris

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>s</th>
<th>d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1893</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
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<td>2½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
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<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
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<td>10½</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1907</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1914</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The growth in the vote for no-license belied the habits of the New Zealand citizen, just as the achievement of no-license in twelve districts did not prevent alcohol being drunk in these same districts; it merely altered the pattern of drinking and the source of alcohol. It was not difficult for someone with adequate wealth to support prohibition while continuing himself to indulge in drinking alcoholic beverages. For many prohibition was to help the poor, not to restrict their own pleasures. The system of local no-license adopted in 1893, which abolished licensed bars but allowed the importation of large orders of alcohol for private consumption, was a suitable means of achieving this. 17

The emphasis of the prohibitionists on the economic effects of prohibition, and their unwillingness or inability to seek elsewhere for the causes of poverty and social distress, revealed the conservatism of the prohibition movement and its adherence to laissez-faire capitalism. As D.A. Hamer has written in his biography of Sir Robert Stout, "prohibition offered to men unprepared to question the fundamentals of capitalist economy an alternative non-economic explanation for poverty and distress among the working classes." 18 It also offered substantial economic benefits without the need to modify greatly the economic basis of the capitalist society.

Interwined with the economic argument was the emphasis on social reform that the prohibitionists hoped to achieve. The arguments involved were concerned with the strengthening of particular values of the predominant middle class relating to the home and the family by


removing the supposed insidious effect of the licensing system, of alcoholic indulgence, and of related social problems such as gambling and prostitution.

The greater emphasis on these aspects of life in the 1880s and early 1890s was partly the result of the damaging effect of the depression on home life through desertion by either husband or wife, and through the resort by desperate people to less savoury ways of earning a living, whether it be the quick shilling by gambling, the easy money of the prostitute, or the illegal gains of crime. It was also partly the result of the demands for women's suffrage which stressed that the role of woman in society was to inculcate morality in her children and act as the superior moral being in comparison with her coarser father, husband or brother. She "had the power to raise the standard of uprightness and purity of character in man".

The main function and highest calling of women in the nineteenth century middle class societies had become narrowly defined as being that of wife and mother:

The crown of womanhood is maternity...Every healthy woman who in this land lives and dies unmarried lives a life that has starved the strongest instinct and the purest passion that God has implanted within her - the desire to give her love and ministry to a husband worthy of them [sic], and to bear children, to feel their tiny arms clinging around her neck, to nestle them in her bosom, to play her part in building up a nation great because good.


Such middle class sentiments had gradually pervaded all sections of the community until the concept of the nuclear family, with the husband providing for his wife and children, had become the accepted norm. It fell to the man to add to the economic productiveness of the State and to make laws; woman, uncontaminated by the sordidness of everyday affairs, and possessing finer feelings than man, could most benefit society by providing a convivial home environment and by instilling a system of values in her children which would ensure that they became decent and "respectable" citizens. It was not long before such ideas developed so that women were believed to be responsible for the moral awareness of society generally; they were thought to be the public watchdogs for anything that might threaten the advance of society towards perfection.

Prohibitionists saw liquor as one of the biggest hindrances to the welfare of the home and nation, and as such women were expected to play a vital part in any move for its abolition. Temperance, wrote Lily M. Kirk, a leading prohibitionist,

is a subject... pre-eminently fitted for women to take up. In the home, the nursery, and the social circle her influence is still supreme, and whatever changes politics may bring, this supremacy is one which she is never likely to lose. If her power to mould the minds of the young and the social customs of the adult - a power mightier than any legislative power, because law is weaker than opinion and powerless without it - if this great power were exerted by her constantly and strenuously to promote the cause of temperance, women might... effect a glorious and bloodless revolution, the like of which the world has never seen.

22. ODT, 10 March, 1894, p. 6, letter to editor.

The role of women as moral watchdogs and the emphasis placed on the purpose of the home within the social fabric were part of the puritan middle class's concept of society. These factors were part of a broader movement to define New Zealand's social and moral development at the end of the nineteenth century. With the period of the gold rushes over, New Zealand was moving into a new phase of a more established environment. Trade, commerce, farming, education and the development of settled communities had replaced the concerns of the goldfields and the Maori wars as the major issues of the day. Attempts were now being made to transform New Zealand from being a frontier society into a more civilised, cultured and integrated community, with a sense of purpose and unity. Part of such a development involved decisions as to the basic unit of the community, that is, the family, and the role it was to play in the new society. Similarly other decisions had to be made concerning the values that were to be the social norms of the community. In both these aspects the effect of alcohol and the licensing system came under attack as being detrimental to the social welfare of the people. At a time when the civilising and stabilising influences of home and family were increasing, attacks on what were considered by sections of the community as anti-social forces also increased. In an attempt to shape the future of New Zealand society the prohibition movement, as an expression of


middle class values, came to the fore in offering its definition as to what should be acceptable social behaviour in this new country.

A further element in the prohibitionists' programme of reform concentrated on the physical welfare of the individual and the nation. The prohibition movement did not separate this aspect from their moral, economic and social arguments, but considered it an inextricable part of their proposal for the complete reform of society. The physical argument gave the movement many of the facts upon which their economic and social ideas were based. These facts were drawn from scientific evidence as to the effect of alcohol on the individual, and hence society.

From about 1860 scientific investigation in Europe and the United States began to reveal that alcohol was harmful to the body and the brain, was a depressant, and reduced rather than increased one's capacity for work, even in moderation.\(^\text{27}\) This evidence went against the traditional beliefs associated with the effect of alcohol on human beings. As this body of knowledge increased the temperance movement took up the scientific cry and urged people to give up alcohol because it was detrimental to their welfare. By the 1880s and 1890s these arguments were being used by the prohibition movement in New Zealand to convince people of the need to remove alcohol from use.\(^\text{28}\)

27. Timberlake, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-44.

The *Prohibitionist* was always quick to publish such evidence if it favoured its cause. Hence when it was argued that alcohol caused insanity an article would appear, quoting the source at length, to show that "were men with one consent to give up alcohol and other excesses...there can be no doubt that there would soon be a vast diminution in the amount of insanity in the world".29

In February 1896 a medical congress was held in Dunedin, and much attention was given at it to the question of alcohol. Reports of the findings of the congress varied. To the moderate but anti-prohibitionist *Otago Daily Times* the important result was that it was generally concluded by the congress that the moderate use of alcohol did not inevitably lead to drunkenness.30 The report of the congress in the *New Zealand Baptist*, however, stressed the argument of a paper delivered by Dr Chapple of Wellington, in which he said,

nearly every popular belief in the efficacy and virtue of alcohol was false... - that it increased the body heat, that it added strength and endurance to the muscles, that it was necessary to health, that it controlled hemorrhage [sic], that it was a disinfectant, and protected from infection - all absolutely false, and the profession knew it, and it was their duty to themselves and to the public to correct these beliefs, or at least to say that they had not their authority.31

Chapple went on to accuse alcohol of destroying brain cells, disturbing blood circulation and causing heat loss, producing cirrhotic diseases of all the tissues and organs of the body, predisposing people to other


diseases, increasing lunacy and causing physical weakness. 32

There was little that the opponents of prohibition could offer in retort to these scientific advances. Some attempt was made to show by means of a random survey that the average life span of teetotallers and intemperate drinkers differed by only nineteen days, while temperate drinkers lived an extra twelve years, but such statistics convinced few people in the light of the mass of scientific arguments against alcohol. 33 The best that the opponents of prohibition could do was to argue that the occasional alcoholic drink did no one any harm.

It is questionable whether these scientific findings had much influence in encouraging people to support prohibition. In an era when the achievements of science exacted an awesome respect for its power it might be expected that these findings had great impact. It might also be expected that the medical arguments appealed to the basic human instinct of self-preservation and thus added weight to the attraction of the prohibitionist cause. No doubt the arguments of science resulted in some converts, yet, like the increasing evidence in a later age about the harmful effects of smoking, it might have been less influential than the prohibitionists liked to believe. Drinking was to many an enjoyable social habit which had done them no apparent harm. It was the concern of the individual as to whether he drank or not, and how much. Despite this, the developments of science encouraged the prohibitionists and gave them a further source of evidence with which to condemn the use of alcoholic liquors and on which to base

32. ibid.

their economic and social arguments. That this evidence was becoming available in the latter part of the nineteenth century was significant for the growth of the prohibition movement both in New Zealand and in other countries.

In trying to help the individual the prohibitionists were also concerned with the welfare of the nation. They believed that as a result of individual development society and the race would similarly improve and advance towards the ideal, the social millennium. As one writer put it,

the hope of the temperance workers must be the moral, social and intellectual elevation of the race... to lift humanity from a lower to a higher plane of civilisation.34

The loss of the individual through drink was regarded as a loss of a productive part of the nation. The liquor trade was blamed for draining the best blood of our national life... it is more than all other causes responsible for the crime and immorality and lunacy which confront modern civilisation like huge spectres of the Brocken... To allow this to continue means eventually the destruction of all that civilisation and democracy have fought to attain. To seek to further imperil the national weal by subtle suggestions prompted only to excite human selfishness by the very institution that ought to scout such proposals of this kind as inimical and dangerous to the best interests of the commonwealth and the state, can only be regarded as proof...of the malign influence that seeks no other end than to perpetuate its own existence.35


35. Advocate, 2 June, 1900, p. 2. The spectre of the Brocken is "a natural phenomenon...in which an enlarged shadow of the spectator is thrown by the rays of the evening sun on a bank of cloud opposite him." First observed in 1780 on the Brocken in the Harz mountains in North Germany. See Oxford Companion to English Literature, (Oxford, 1967), p. 114.
Such concepts of national growth and welfare developed throughout the period prior to World War I, and continued to be developed during the war. Perhaps the major reason why prohibitionist sentiment appeared considerably strengthened by the end of the war was that prohibition of alcohol had been advocated during the war as being of benefit to the national and international struggle by maintaining people in a fit condition to defend their freedom, by preserving money necessary for the war effort, and by promoting efficiency both within the armed forces and within the political and industrial war machines. Patriotism, national security and national development had become part of the prohibitionist creed. 36

The emphasis throughout the moral, social, physical and economic arguments for prohibition was on the improvement of society in all its facets. The prohibitionists believed that the removal of alcohol from use would result in greater efficiency through the removal of waste, whether it be wasted money, wasted souls, wasted manpower or wasted lives. They wanted to eradicate these things at both the individual and the national levels. Such an emphasis was the outgrowth of an optimistic belief in the continuing development of human society and its evolution towards the perfect state.

Evolutionary theory had become widespread in most Western societies by the end of the nineteenth century and had been extended by writers such as Herbert Spencer and W.G. Sumner from being merely applicable to the biological sciences to encompass all areas of change and development in society. Originally a conservative theory supporting strict laissez-faire economics, the negative role of State

36. These had been encouraged by the recommendations of the National Efficiency Board, 1917; see National Efficiency League of N.Z. Business Men, Prohibition Pamphlet 1, (1918), Alexander Turnbull Library.
regulation, and the survival of the fittest in society, social darwinism had been developed by the end of the century to encompass most theories of progress, whether conservative or radical.\textsuperscript{37}

Such theories and ideas were as prevalent in New Zealand as elsewhere, and references to the development of society, the improvement of the race, and the advance towards the millenium were common in the press and the pamphlets on social reform. How widespread these ideas were is difficult to judge, but most writers on reform seem to have been inculcated with ideas of human progress. It is likely that most literate members of the community had been in contact with such ideas at some stage, if only because the daily newspapers carried serialised versions of such Darwinian works as Henry Drummond's \textit{The Ascent of Man}, as the \textit{Otaco Daily Times} did in 1895.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the prohibition movement should have been concerned with the advance of society towards a better world. It was reflecting aspects of the dominant sociological belief of the period. Nor was its acceptance of social darwinism as unusual as it might first appear. The predominant attitude of the prohibitionists was that the mass of the people should be encouraged to help themselves economically, socially, morally and physically. They were not advocating state interference in the habits of the people, but were merely asking that the state provide the means whereby the people could decide for themselves by means of a direct vote on the licensing question. In using prohibition as a means of economic

reform they revealed that they had no intention, if they had even given it any thought, of modifying the basic economic system of laissez-faire capitalism. As A.S. Adams, a prominent Baptist layman and legal adviser to the New Zealand Alliance, said in a public lecture in Dunedin in 1893:

> The temperance workers wanted power to say to the people: 'The improvement is in your own hands. If you find the traffic is doing injury and ruin to your homes, and is reducing you to poverty and crime and want, you have it now in your own hands to put it away, and if you don't the responsibility is on your own shoulders.'

This could hardly be termed the advocacy of state involvement in social and economic reform. As will be seen the prohibitionists were not in favour of socialism, even though a few individuals within the movement advocated Christian Socialism. The prohibition movement was basically conservative in outlook and reflected the beliefs of its members, the majority of whom accepted the economic system of the period. Yet it was not so conservative that it could not see the need for reform. Its support for laissez-faire economics was not rigid to the extent that it believed that all attempts to reform social processes were wasted efforts and that they interfered with the laws of nature.

The depression of the 1880s and the declining influence of the Church were probably the two major factors which made a section of the middle class realise that something was drastically wrong in society. Prohibition was the measure they adopted to correct this wrong with the least amount of modification of existing social and economic


39. See pp. 87-96.
practices. It was basically a moral reform of the individual; it was certainly not a fundamental reform of the structure of society. It stressed the values made popular by puritanism and Calvinism, in which the harshness of life and the impossibility of finding easy solutions for human ills had to be accepted. The puritan ethic of hard work and self-denial as the means to success was predominant. Such an ethic found acceptance both within and outside the churches by the end of the nineteenth century. The virtues associated with this ethic—personal providence, family loyalty and family responsibility—were, as Hofstadter has concluded, middle class virtues.40 The prohibitionists were products of this environment both within the puritan and pietistic churches and within the dominant theoretical economic climate of the period. They accepted the classical economic belief that poverty was inevitable in society and that it was up to the individual to struggle out of it. As the social darwinist W.C. Sumner wrote:

Poverty belongs to the struggle for existence, and we are all born into that struggle...Let every man be sober, industrious, prudent and wise, and bring up his children to be so likewise, and poverty will be abolished in a few generations.41

The acceptance of such habits was considered by the middle class to be equivalent to moral progress. The belief that they led to economic and social success resulted in the acceptance of the idea that the successful in society were morally superior, and that there was a system of predestination in the social order in which the "economically


41. cited in ibid., p. 61.
elect" or successful equalled the fittest economically, socially, physically and morally.

The prohibition movement was a major example of the existence and importance of these ideas in late nineteenth century New Zealand. It was convinced that it had the answer to society's problems. This belief in its correctness resulted in the self-righteous and intolerant nature of the prohibition movement, two characteristics which, more than anything else, have been the cause of much criticism of the "wowser" age.

Examples of such criticism are numerous, but one that contained more than mere opposition and bile emanated from the N.Z. Truth in 1908. Having argued that there were other forms of intemperance besides excessive drinking, for example gluttony, Truth went on to state that these two are merely intemperate habits of the body. What of intemperance of the mind?... These are only on a par with the individual whose ill-balanced brain will not allow him to tolerate the opinion of any but those who accept his narrow doctrine and conform to his lop-sided ideas. Thus the prohibitionist is mostly a person of weak will or an inexperienced fanatic; he will not allow that others have brains nor tolerate in them the expression of their opinion.42

Harsh words these may be, but they reveal certain undeniable aspects of the prohibition movement. Despite these, however, it cannot be denied that the prohibitionists were deeply concerned about the problems of the individual and of society. In their eyes they were not offering a negative reform but a positive solution to the social problems of their day.

Some of the articulate opponents of prohibition also argued from an evolutionary standpoint, revealing the widespread influence

42. N.Z. Truth, 8 August, 1908.
and adaptability of social darwinist theory. They argued that alcohol was one means of aiding the development of society by encouraging natural selection. The fittest would survive while the weakest would be removed as a burden on society.

Alcoholism is probably the most powerful agent in eliminating those lacking self-control, and thereby raising the moral standard of the race... This suggests that Alcohol should be considered to be a racial evolutionist, rather than a racial poison, as it is often described. It has ever been Nature’s method to sacrifice the individual for the benefit of the race.

Such a conservative and completely laissez-faire approach throws into relief the conservativism of the prohibitionists. While they were not prepared to advocate state intervention in the economy to any marked degree, nor were they prepared to advocate complete economic liberalism and social anarchy. Their advocacy of Christianity virtually forbade what would amount to a total ignoring of the poverty and distress and immorality that surrounded them. What they proposed to do by means of no-license and prohibition was to give the people the right to decide for themselves the place of the "biggest curse" in society. Having been granted the licensing poll in 1893, the prohibitionists directed their agitation of the next twenty years in two directions: to modify the law to give the people a fair say on the licensing issue, and to educate the public as to the benefits of prohibition. The idea of state-imposed prohibition was anathema as much to the prohibitionists as to anyone else.

It is in this light that the prohibition movement can be seen to fit reasonably well into the predominant political and economic

43. W.H. Symes, Prohibition a Racial Fallacy, (Christchurch, 1911), p. 5.
atmosphere of the period in New Zealand. This was a period of modified laissez-faire economics in which the Government was looked upon as the source of help in such matters as land settlement, communications, and industrial conciliation and arbitration. It was not expected, however, to take over or to nationalise any part of the economy, nor was it expected to provide anything in the way of direct social welfare. Its prime function was to help the people to help themselves. Hence to the prohibitionists and others private charity was permissible and necessary, but public charity was considered demoralising, destructive of the virtues of independence and self-control, and therefore undesirable.
CHAPTER III
WOWSERS, WORKERS AND WOMEN

Who were the prohibitionists? The fact that the values underlying the prohibitionist ideology were predominantly an expression of a middle class puritan background suggests that the prohibition movement had a strong middle class and puritan orientation. In an attempt to measure this orientation analysis of a variety of factors has been attempted. What was the relationship of prohibition to social class, to the churches, to the labour movement and to women, and how did these various factors interrelate? Voting patterns, composition of leadership and grass-roots support of the prohibition movement, and rhetoric have all been studied in order to answer these questions and show who the prohibitionists were or were not.

A study of the voting patterns at the four liquor polls taken in Auckland and Dunedin between 1905 and 1914 has been attempted to see if there were any differences in voting behaviour between different types of polling booths. The various booths were defined as wealthy or poor, depending on the predominant socio-economic status of their locational area, with two other types of booths being defined as urban fringes (incorporating rural areas on the outskirts of the city electorates) and absentee voters. The divisions of wealthy and poor are based on studies of residential patterns measured by improved property values. In Dunedin the division line between wealthy and poor was drawn at £500 and in Auckland at £600, with all those properties being

above these values being classified as wealthy in the sense of being the dwellings of office workers, professionals, businessmen and merchants; those properties below these values were the homes of the workers.

At the four polls analysed a higher proportion of the booths defined as wealthy was always in favour of no-license and prohibition than of the booths in the poorer areas. Areas on the city fringes were usually very mixed in their voting, while absentee and seamen's votes were strongly against prohibition. Table 4 shows that the popular support for no-license and prohibition was always stronger in the wealthier areas, although it also reveals that these issues were of concern in the poorer areas and that the prohibition movement did rely to a considerable extent on support from members of the working class if it was ever going to succeed. The growth of support for prohibition in the poorer areas, especially in 1908 and 1911, is partly explained by the tentative support of moderate Labour, the Trades and Labour Councils, and the Socialists for prohibition as the first step towards State control of the liquor industry.

The reliability of these figures is limited, however, in that few booths served only wealthy or poor areas. The predominant area-type

2. See Table 3. The drastic reduction in support for prohibition in all areas in 1914 is discussed in Chapter VIII.

3. This voting pattern of absentee voters may give a clue to the understanding of the liquor poll of April, 1919, when the soldiers' vote from overseas was heavily against national prohibition while the voters in N.Z. marginally favoured it. The claim that people away from home were opposed to major changes in their absence would appear to have some merit. See J.M. King, 'The Special Licensing Poll, 1919', (unpublished B.A. long essay, University of Auckland, 1969).

4. This is developed in Chapters IV - VIII.
TABLE 3

Percentage of city polling booths in Dunedin and Auckland in favour of no-license and national prohibition, 1905-1914, by socio-economic type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>POOR</th>
<th>WEALTHY</th>
<th>URBAN FRINGE</th>
<th>ABSENTEE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>51.72</td>
<td>93.33</td>
<td>66.67</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>77.14</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>80.00</td>
<td>88.88</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>42.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>45.00</td>
<td>22.22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. No-license poll
2. National prohibition poll

TABLE 4

Popular support for no-license and national prohibition in Dunedin and Auckland, 1905-1914, by polling booth type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>POOR</th>
<th>WEALTHY</th>
<th>URBAN FRINGE</th>
<th>ABSENTEE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>46.94</td>
<td>52.58</td>
<td>48.87</td>
<td>29.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>53.78</td>
<td>61.62</td>
<td>50.21</td>
<td>36.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>52.74</td>
<td>56.29</td>
<td>56.56</td>
<td>49.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>44.57</td>
<td>48.74</td>
<td>45.21</td>
<td>42.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. No-license poll
2. National prohibition poll
has been used as a means of classification, but problems exist where a booth was on the edge of one type and adjacent to the other. These figures also assume that people voted at the booth nearest to where they lived, certainly a fallacy in today's mobile age, and perhaps even at the turn of the century. Other factors are also ignored, such as religion, age and sex. Despite these qualifications, the figures do suggest that the wealthier areas, the so-called middle class areas, were more in favour of prohibition than were the poorer, working class areas.

A second factor which reveals that the prohibition movement was predominantly a middle class phenomenon is the social composition of those who formed the leadership of the movement, articulated its aims and directed its activities. A list of 844 committee members and office bearers in the various prohibitionist organisations was compiled throughout the period of research and covering the years 1894 to 1914. Of this figure the occupations of 403 of them were discovered in an attempt to ascertain the socio-economic background of the leadership of the prohibition movement. Using a six point scale of socio-economic classification based on occupation, ranging from professional administrative and executive work to unskilled repetitive work, all the occupations of those in the survey apart from one fell into the three groups which were middle class in status, income, and to a lesser extent educational achievement. This includes thirteen wives, defined by their husbands' occupation, and four retired politicians. The six farmers do not fall easily into this categorisation of predominantly

5. See Appendix A.
6. See Table 5.
TABLE 5

Leadership of Prohibition Movement by occupational status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP 1</th>
<th>GROUP 2</th>
<th>GROUP 3</th>
<th>GROUP 4</th>
<th>GROUP 5</th>
<th>GROUP 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MHR, MLC</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Journalist 2</td>
<td>Mercer 2</td>
<td>Printer 1</td>
<td>Farmer 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Proprietor Editor</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Writer</td>
<td>Tailor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor Local Government</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>School Teacher</td>
<td>Coach Works</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrister Solicitor</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Graduate 6</td>
<td>Printer 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Theological Lecturer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Insurance Agent</td>
<td>Proprietor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Manager Director</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Full-time Worker</td>
<td>University</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>Builder 1</td>
<td>Merchants 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lay Preacher</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>Merchant 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missionary</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctor</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wives of: MHR</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrister</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired MLC MHR</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>89.83</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For definition of groups 1-6 see Appendix A.
urban occupations, but, in that all six were landowners and not farm employees, they qualify as members of the wealthier section of the community, and thus have been grouped with the middle class occupations. In each instance where two or more occupations were discovered for an individual, and this was particularly the case with those involved in national and local government, the one which they followed in their private lives was chosen as a means of defining their status.

The results of the survey show overwhelmingly that the prohibition drew its inspiration from the professional and self-employed sections of the community, or the middle class. This does not, of course, merely reflect their belief in the efficacy of prohibition and the lack of interest of members of the working class. The fact that they dominated the movement by their leadership is also a reflection of their greater organisational skills, and their greater amount of leisure time or freedom to take time away from their occupations for committee meetings and the like, than would have been possible for the wage-earning and employed section of the community. Nonetheless their important role in defining the aims and actions of the prohibition movement meant that it carried the stamp of their beliefs and attitudes and values. That it did so, and that many of these beliefs were not shared by the working class, meant that prohibition appeared very much as a middle class reform directed at working class habits and poverty.

In an effort to measure the rank and file support of the prohibition movement a survey of signatures on petitions to Parliament relating to the licensing question was undertaken. Unfortunately, despite the large number of such petitions during this period, only
one seems to have survived in complete form. This was the petition of 1908 to the Legislative Council for legislation to provide that the wishes of the majority as expressed at licensing polls be carried into effect; in other words, that the three-fifths majority be replaced by the absolute, or bare, majority. The major problem in using this petition for analysis was that support for the bare majority did not necessarily imply support for prohibition. Many socialists, for example, were opposed to prohibition as an effective reform, but were prepared to support the simple majority on all questions as a democratic principle. Hence the results are not by any means definitive. The petition covered the whole of the North Island and also Blenheim, with a concentration on Auckland and Wellington provinces.

A random sample of 440 signatures out of a total of 8813 (5%) was collected, of which 286 (65%) were able to be traced through directories as to occupation. The practice was again adopted that where women's names occurred in the sample and were not listed separately in the directories, these women assumed the occupational status of the head of the household. The six point classification of occupations was again used.\(^7\)

Of the signatories 29.72 per cent fall within the first three groups, or those with middle class status. Whether the farmer group (34.62%) can be added to that is uncertain as no distinction was made between farmer and farm labourer. It seems likely, however, that a farm labourer would have been listed as a labourer rather than as a farmer, and thus would appear in group five. If this is so, then the middle class orientated proportion of the sample, including the farmer

\(^7\) See Table 6.
### Table 6

Occupational Groupings of Petition Sample, 1908, by percentage of total sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MALE OR INDEPENDENT</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8.04</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMALE OR DEPENDENT</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5.94</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9.44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>14.34</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For definition of groups 1-6 see Appendix A.

### Table 7

Occupational Groupings Petition Sample, 1916, by percentage of total sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MALE OR INDEPENDENT</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.44</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMALE OR DEPENDENT</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.91</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11.39</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9.28</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13.92</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>19.83</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For definition of groups 1-6 see Appendix A.
group, would equal 64.34 per cent. This predominance again suggests that prohibition was a middle class movement. The so-called working class groups make up 35.66 per cent of the sample, revealing support for prohibition, but not overwhelmingly so compared to the middle class. If it is true that within the artisan class (group four) many had been successful and had become independent workers and even acquired some capital, and if it is true that this type of person was not dissatisfied with capitalism and was quite prepared to adopt the predominant social mores of the middle class in an effort to improve his own social status, then the proportion of working class support for prohibition as revealed in this petition was even less, and perhaps only as much as 14.68 per cent.

In an attempt to substantiate these results a second petition was analysed. Taken in 1916 (no others for the period of study were available), this petition was in favour of six o'clock closing of liquor bars during World War I and for six months thereafter. It received a total of 34,162 signatures of which 2536 have survived; 349 (13.76%) of these were randomly selected for analysis, of which 237 (67.91%) were able to be traced. The petition list that has remained is from Wanganui and its immediate surroundings, areas that were then semi-rural (for example, Castlecliff) but are now well within the city's limits. As a result the proportion in group six (farmer) is considerably lower than in the 1908 petition. A second difference is in the proportion of female to male signatories.

8. See pp. 65-66 for discussion of rural attitudes to prohibition.

Whereas they were virtually the same in 1908 (which would suggest that prohibition was no more a woman's movement than a man's), in 1916 almost twice as many women signed the petition as men. This might be explained by the time of day when the petition was taken, with most men at work during the day, especially as it would appear that house-to-house canvassing was the means used. The effect of World War I and the number of men away from their homes and in the armed forces might also have been factors causing this heavy predominance of women signatories.

A third factor that must be borne in mind is that by 1916 patriotic enthusiasm and the willingness of civilians to make sacrifices for the war effort were increasing as a result of the defeat of the Anzacs in April and the introduction of national conscription. The temporary sacrifice of four hours drinking time as an austerity measure as well as an attempt to maintain the physical fitness of the nation's manpower was regarded as a worthy cause by people who in peacetime might have opposed such a measure as six o'clock closing and who were not supporters of prohibition.

With these limiting factors on the expression of opinion as revealed by these petition signatures, what do the actual figures reveal in relation to social class and prohibition? The figures are much closer than in 1908, with 51.05 per cent being middle class in status and 48.95 per cent being working class. Again, however, if the artisan group is left in limbo as being between classes, then the

10. See pp. 97-115.

11. See Table 7. Group 6 is included with groups 1-3 in defining the middle class group.
working class group as represented by semi-skilled and unskilled labour is only 29.96 per cent. These figures are certainly not as distinctive as in 1908, although there is still heavier weighting towards the middle class than the working class.

In all this discussion of the prohibition movement as an expression of middle class consciousness one aspect has been ignored. Class structure as defined by labour and capital is primarily an urban phenomenon, yet New Zealand at the beginning of the twentieth century was predominantly a rural society. The emphasis on class in the rhetoric of the prohibition agitation would suggest, therefore, that the prohibition movement was mainly an urban movement, and that it was not a major concern in rural areas. This is hardly borne out by the facts. Six of the twelve electorates that adopted no-license between 1894 and 1914 were farming areas containing a single major rural centre. The polling booth returns from these areas between 1905 and 1914 do not reveal that these towns dominated the surrounding area by their votes; they were not large enough to do so. R.K. Newman has shown that it was common for areas of long settlement to favour prohibition at an earlier stage than back-country booths, while later in the period, when farmers' support began to slacken, the country towns came to the rescue of the prohibition movement. The fundamental reason for this rural support of prohibition was a reflection of what has been termed the "middle class values" of industry, self-help, and self-improvement. These were as much part of the successful farmer's outlook as they were of the pietist, respectable, 


13. ibid., p. 63.
and materially successful businessman, professional and independent artisan. As Newman has written elsewhere,

> The rural ethos was therefore based upon fervent individualism. It was built up by the farmer's own experiences and strengthened by the myths of the famous pioneers, who seemed to embody the virtues through which every farmer believed he had succeeded: courage, perseverance, thrift, independence and hard work.¹⁴

Modified capitalistic laissez-faire economics was at the base of the social outlook of both the urban middle class and the independent farmer. The support of both groups for no-license was one way of strengthening this base and at the same time bringing about social reform.

There are other possible reasons why the rural areas were as interested in no-license as sections of the urban electorates. For example, no-license could be enforced more easily and would have greater effect on a person's drinking habits than in a town. The closure of a hotel in a rural village or town would as often as not mean that the nearest pub was too distant to be visited regularly. In the cities, on the other hand, the closure of a hotel might still mean that the nearest pub was only across the road or round the corner in the adjacent licensing area that had not adopted no-license. The comparison between the effects in rural and in urban areas was theoretically such that the Anglican Diocese of Canterbury could argue that,

> so far as the rural electorates are concerned, there seems indeed to be every reason for casting a No-license vote. In such districts the

method of Prohibition works with admirable results wherever it has been tried, provided that it expresses the will of the people.\textsuperscript{15}

Such a claim may have been premature if not totally erroneous, however. Liquor was always available in "dry" areas, either by legal importation or by illegal home-brewing and distillation. Nor did no-license stop some people from travelling to "wet" areas for a drink. Many people in former no-license areas can talk of the trade done by pubs at Mandeville, Georgetown and Chertsey, for example, three rural villages situated just outside the borders of the no-license areas of Mataura, Oamaru and Ashburton.

Another reason, and an immeasurable one, for the rural dweller's support of no-license might have been the irrelevancy of the public bar for many of them as a place for social intercourse. The remoteness of farms and the slowness of travel meant that there was no demand for the hotel bar as a place of relaxation away from cramped homes and unpleasant working conditions. The situation for the rural worker was less sordid than that of the urban industrial worker. For the farmer who wanted alcohol it was as easy for him to supply himself each market day for home consumption as to travel to the local hotel each night for a drink. To him the public bar may have appeared an irrelevancy which he need not support, especially if townspeople would be helped by its abolition. Perhaps, therefore, many rural dwellers' support for no-license was academic in that they were not concerned either way for themselves as to whether public bars existed or not.

The analysis of voting patterns, leadership and grassroots support of the prohibition movement suggests that the movement appealed more to groups within the middle class than it did to the working

class. At the same time, however, it can be seen that there was considerable support from working class areas for no-license and national prohibition. The problems of alcohol abuse and the desire for reform were undeniably concerns of members of the working class as well as the middle class. The prohibition movement did draw its support from all elements of the community. Its emphasis was, however, on maintaining the values and structures that were predominantly middle class in origin and which sustained the middle class in its dominant economic and political positions. Prohibition did gain greater support from middle class areas and did adhere to a class-orientated ideology directed primarily at the working class. This has been seen in the arguments espoused in favour of prohibition; it can also be seen in the wider rhetoric of the movement throughout the period 1894-1914. In offering ideas for the reform of the economic and social problems faced by the poor the prohibitionists revealed their conception of themselves as being middle class reformers. In a lucid article on social unrest by W.H. Judkins, a leading reformer in both New Zealand and Victoria throughout this period, it was stated that the prohibitionists could see how the solution of oppressive economic problems would be simplified if the masses were sober, and how the gambling and liquor evils dull the intellects of the units of the movement. And hence there is arising another movement in the middle classes, a movement within a movement, one which also has for its object the equalising of conditions, but beginning at the right place in the removal of the vices of the people. For though economic conditions be of the best, they will fail if the people are vicious, and, on the other hand, people who are sober and thrifty and intelligent and

altruistic will soon make conditions
equal. Ethical reform must lead this
great movement. 17

Here it is seen that not only did the prohibitionists view themselves
in terms of the middle class helping the poorer masses, but also that
these reformers expected their values to be adopted as a necessary
means of achieving reform. The masses needed to be guided along the
"proper" path.

The church must lay hold of this great
modern movement and turn it in the right
direction. It must not blame the masses
for moving, or scold them and weep if they
move in the wrong direction. The masses
must move or be enslaved, and the church
must direct them so that they move in the
right direction. To this end it must try
to solve economic problems, but from the
standpoint of Jesus Christ, to save men
wholly, completely, in the sense in which
He desired their salvation...This social
reform movement is a religious movement...
Though the masses may not recognise it,
"the Kingdom of God, wherein
dwelleth righteousness," is their objective... No-
where else...will equal economic conditions
ever be found. 18

Few commentaries by prohibitionists give a better idea of the
nature of the prohibition movement than does this article of Judkins.
It places the movement within the framework of a class movement in
terms of economics, social values, and morals, and it also reveals the
desire of these middle class reformers to lead society along the path
that they thought it should go. They aimed at encouraging the working
man to raise himself and to aspire to middle class respectability and
independence. It was easy for prohibitionists to argue that "if the
expenditure upon drink were reduced it would mean money to the

17. Vanguard, 12 Jan, 1907.
18. Ibid.
labouring-classes, and would enable them to come into competition with
those who employ them." Upwards mobility was not frowned upon but
rather was regarded with approval, especially by a middle class which
saw mobility by means of self-discipline, industry, independence,
thrift and sobriety leading to economic and social success as signs of
righteousness and divine favour. A working class would nonetheless
still remain. It was for the prohibitionist to

lengthen our cords and strengthen our stakes
until they reach so far over into the camp
of our bread earning brethren that ours shall
be for evermore two 'camps allied' in thought
and purpose to bring in the better day.20

Such class consciousness found increasing expression as the period
progressed and as the vocal labour movement developed into a more
consciously working class political movement. The result was to
enhance the appearance of the prohibition movement as a conservative
reform agitation with predominantly middle class support.

This middle class support for prohibition was further revealed
in the close link that the movement had with the churches that
expressed the puritan values of the Victorian middle class - the
various branches of the Methodist Church, the Baptist denomination,
the Church of Christ, the Congregationalists, the Presbyterians, the
Salvation Army and other minor sects such as the Brethren and the
Seventh Day Adventists. These Churches were not exclusively middle
class, but they were dominated by businessmen and professionals of
both large and small means. Working class people, and again
especially skilled workers, did attend these churches, but they did so

because they accepted the values of the middle class, they aspired to middle class respectability, and they often had a vertical link with more wealthy members of the congregation, usually as employees. The churches themselves reflected the opinions of those who governed them, predominantly their more wealthy and more influential members. For these pietistic churches there were two approaches to the liquor issue: its effect on the social conditions of human beings and its effect on morality. The prohibition movement was a conservative approach to social reform, but at the same time it was a forward movement by the churches in their primary task of bringing the Gospel to mankind. The Rev. T.J. Wills, an Anglican vicar in the Wairarapa and an outspoken critic of the predominant Anglican approach to the liquor issue, summarised the situation thus:

The Temperance movement...is an enterprise for the saving of humanity, and is opposed to degrading and destructive forces in the world and in the hearts of men. It recognises the actual facts of human nature—fallen, weak, tempted, handicapped, mastered. It seeks to be a handmaid to the Gospel, improving environment, breaking up, cleansing and enriching the soil, while the sower goes forth to sow and the Gospel calls to a higher life...There can be little hope of fulfilment of the Church's destiny in the matter of this great and much-needed reform until Churchmen are roused to a passionate discontent with the present condition of things, with the widespread demoralisation, irreligion, and inexpressible misery occasioned by the drinking customs of our day.


22. See pp.79-80; also T.J. Wills, Bishop Neill's Mistake, (Christchurch, 1897).

Prohibition was a means to an end whereby the witness of the Church could be more effectively brought to influence both individuals and society. The churches involved therefore devoted considerable time and energy to such a cause. But the Gospel had been preached for centuries without the removal of alcohol from use being first deemed necessary. Why had this suddenly become an engrossing problem?

First, the problem of alcohol was a very real problem for New Zealand society at this time. The threat to individuals of the possible economic and social effects of alcohol lay at the very basis of the mass support for prohibition as revealed by the liquor polls. The pietistic churches realised this and, because of their emphasis on morality underlying society's social and economic conditions, they readily supported the prohibition movement.

Secondly, the churches themselves felt threatened by the effects of alcohol in that it detracted from their moral influence on society. By the 1880s the Church in New Zealand realised that a large proportion of the population was only nominally attached to it, and that its influence on people's lives was weakening. The 1881 Census showed that approximately only twenty per cent of the population attended church. It is probable that, rather than people drifting away from the Church, they had never really been attached to it or been part of it. Most of New Zealand's citizens were lower class emigrants from Great Britain where their contact with the Church was probably minimal in the light of the 1851 religious census. This did not, however,


25. The 1851 religious census in Great Britain revealed that less than half the population ever attended church, and that a higher proportion of middle class groups than working class members attended church; see also H. McLeod, Class and Religion in the Late Victorian City, (London, 1974).
reduce the concern of the Church in New Zealand as to its declining numbers, and it did raise questions as to the moral standards of the community. How was the Church to shape the morals of the young country if it did not reach more than a quarter of the population? It was with this realisation that its influence was declining that the Church became involved in a series of attempts to impose a certain moral code on the country by means of legislation.

Liquor, gambling, Sabbath desecration, prostitution, smoking, dancing, horse racing, the playing of cards and billiards, the theatre—all these pastimes and amusements were the object at some stage between the 1880s and 1914 of attack by the Church, and especially the puritan denominations and sects. The puritanical element at the base of these churches' beliefs came to the fore and showed itself in individual asceticism and a growing intolerance of transgression of certain values held by these bodies. The pursuit of pleasure appeared to be increasing and was an attractive opposition with which the Church had to cope. Pleasure threatened the very roots in which puritanism had its foundation.

Beneath this puritanism can be detected a sense of urgent need to assert the Church's authority in society at a time when it was only too well aware that its influence was waning among a steadily increasing population. This awareness was expressed throughout the literature of the prohibition movement during the whole period, and was also noted by critics of the churches. For example the Otago Workman carried the following editorial in 1899:

Some church people...have been casting about for means to gather the people back into the church fold. They have hit upon the expedient of coercion, and imagine by this means to bring the masses back to a condition
of artificial righteousness. It is this section of the church people who are clamouring for laws to make people total abstainers by Act of Parliament, who agitate against Sunday trains, Sunday recreations, and Sunday amusements; who class horse racing and similar popular contests amongst the artificial sins created by an over-righteous Christianity.26

The pietistic churches' involvement in the prohibition movement was most obvious through the activity of their clergy. For some this meant no more than the preaching of one temperance sermon a year, or the signing of a petition to Parliament about a desired change in the liquor law. For most, however, it meant much more, at least at the local level where they were either active members of prohibitionist organisations or guest speakers at their meetings. At any prohibitionist rally or mass meeting clergymen were prominent on the platform. In a sample of 403 local and national leaders of the movement during the period 1894-1914 238, or fifty-nine per cent, were revealed to be ministers of religion.27 Of this figure only seven per cent were Anglicans or Roman Catholics. As a profession the clergy were more consistently involved than any other group in the leadership of the prohibition movement. It is little wonder that the overall membership of the churches should likewise be deeply committed.

From the early 1890s it was the practice in the various Presbyterian, Methodist, Baptist and Congregationalist churches to have one Sunday a year as a temperance Sunday, on which sermons advocating

26. Otago Workman, 29 April, 1899, p. 6; see also Otago Liberal, 9 Sept, 1905, p. 8; N.Z. Truth, 14 Oct, 1911, p.4.

27. See Table 5, p. 58.
the advantages of prohibition would be preached. In the years that liquor polls were to be taken it was not unusual for several Sundays to be given over to such sermons.28

Among such sects as the Salvation Army and the Seventh Day Adventists abstention from indulgence in alcohol was a tenet of membership; in 1899 the Primitive Methodist Conference passed a resolution to the effect that "total abstinence from all liquors be required as a condition of membership from all applicants for admission into the Primitive Methodist Church,"29 while in 1897 the Methodist Church of New Zealand reaffirmed a longstanding principle "that no person prominently connected with the drink traffic or the gambling evil should be elected to office in this Church."30

In 1902 the Methodist Church agreed to form its own Temperance Society with the pledge, "I promise by the help of God to abstain from all intoxicating drinks as a beverage, and to do all in my power to lead others to abstain".31 This, however, was atypical of the churches' involvement in the movement as they were generally prepared to work with the existing prohibitionist organisations rather than to establish their own. It is, therefore, not surprising that this Methodist experiment was discontinued in 1904 as a result of failure through lack of support.32


30. Methodist Church of N.Z., Minutes of the Annual Conference, 1897, p. 56.

31. ibid., 1902, pp. 60-61.

32. Methodist Church of N.Z., Report of the Temperance and Morals Committee, cited in Outlook, 2 April, 1904, p. 32.
Another avenue of support that the churches gave to the prohibition movement was through the thorough discussion of the issue in their various magazines. The movement had its own press, most notably the Prohibitionist and the Vanguard, but its influence was also spread by such papers as the Presbyterian Outlook, the Methodist Advocate and New Zealand Methodist Times, the Salvation Army's War Cry, and the New Zealand Baptist. Most attention was given to the various aspects of prohibition by these papers in the few months prior to a liquor poll, and all of them urged their readers to vote for no-license.

The liturgical churches - the Roman Catholics and Anglicans - took a different approach to the problem of alcoholic indulgence. This difference in outlook of the liturgical and pietistic traditions stemmed from fundamental differences in biblical interpretation and religious doctrine.

During the 1880s and 1890s it was attempted by individuals within the churches to show that the use of intoxicating liquor was regarded by the Scriptures as an evil. Much was made of the different Hebrew words for wine, and whether they meant intoxicating liquor or not. Little, however, was achieved by such arguments as no obvious pattern emerged as to Biblical usage and teaching on this issue.

As time progressed the emphasis of these arguments changed from a semantic debate to one of example and right action. The anti-prohibitionists argued that both the Old and the New Testaments supported the use of wine in moderation but condemned its abuse. Wine was regarded as a gift from God to be used wisely and moderately. The

prohibition of such, however, was considered unbiblical and against Christian teaching. Much was made of the fact that Christ had used wine and had not condemned it, though he had preached moderation in all things. One writer said that

He [Christ] did not come to bow down before the weakness of human nature. He came to strengthen and uplift it. He gave a higher example than abstinence, to wit, not to refuse the gifts of God but to use them, not after man's lusts, but as they are intended to be used and as he used them - as ordinary articles of diet, but specially suited for social and festive occasions.34

The prohibitionists were not lacking in a suitable response to such arguments. They were quick to point out that the New Testament forbade elaborate provision for carnal appetite: "Make not provision for the flesh to fulfil the lusts thereof."35 It was concluded from this that one should not set up drinking houses and the like where the sensual appetite of man was catered for. It was also stressed that the New Testament taught that one should not let one's own strengths be a hindrance to the weak. Much was made of the Pauline teaching that

all things indeed are pure; but it is evil for that man who eateth with offence. It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak.36

Self-denial and self-giving for the sake of others were regarded as truly Christian acts of service. As a result the Christian should


35. Romans, chapter 14, verse 20, King James Version.

36. ibid., verse 21.
vote for no-license as a matter of Christian duty. An editorial in the Outlook prior to the 1899 licensing poll stated the position for the Christian thus:

Our appeal is more especially to those who pride themselves on their strength, and who, truly enough, may be in no great danger - that they remember the condition of many around them - their brethren, weak and ready to stumble - and so for their sakes deny themselves of what is at best a mere luxury...For these Christ died; and our relation to Him, says someone, is determined by our attitude to the lost. If we can prevent men from falling - if we can lift men up through our abstinence from things not sinful, but fraught with danger - what Christian will for a moment hesitate as to the course of action open to him?  

This type of debate had no solution, but its effect may well have been widespread, each interested party becoming more and more convinced of the truth of its position.

These differing interpretations of biblical texts and teaching reflected the fundamental differences in the doctrinal bases of the liturgical and pietistic traditions. As a result of Luther's Reformation doctrine of justification by faith alone, and of the Calvinistic and Wesleyan emphasis on salvation of the individual by a definite spiritual conversion, there had been a movement within the non-episcopalian denominations away from the importance of the sacraments as part of the salvation experience. They now emphasised the importance of self-denial, self-discipline, self-improvement and personal piety as the means to material success and heavenly reward.

38. Outlook, 22 July, 1899, p. 4.
emphasis on correct behaviour encouraged these pietists to support such a measure as prohibition. They believed that the removal of a source of evil would help people to be more moral.

This argument was countered with the retort that people's moral sense could only be developed in the face of and resistance to temptation. A formidable opponent of prohibition who was a strong supporter of temperance, W. Thomson, argued that "temperance is the development in man of righteousness and self-control. Prohibition is the reduction of man to a position of compulsory national total abstinence enforced by a criminal law".  

He went on to state that it would be passing strange if He [Christ] who refused the aid of the sword, who declined to call fire from heaven, and who rejected a kingdom founded on force with "get thee behind me, Satan," that, in these days, His Church should wax great and become strong in numbers by means of a negative and criminal law called Prohibition. To expect it was foolish. To claim it is either a libel on human nature or to betray total ignorance of it. 

Thomson, a Presbyterian minister, was a fine example of the minority voice within the pietistic churches that was opposed to prohibition as a means of moral and social reform. Others included Dr W. Salmond, Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at the University of Otago, who caused a considerable furore in 1911 with his attack on prohibition in his Prohibition: a Blunder. The arguments of such opponents placed them alongside the liturgical churches' opposition to prohibition, and strengthened the position of those churches in the prohibition debate considerably.


41. ibid., pp. 38-39.
The liturgical churches avoided the asceticism of the pietists and its associated stress on the power of Satan and the judgement of God, and emphasised instead the love and forgiveness of God for man. The sacraments and creeds were considered of more importance in the salvation of man than any code of behaviour. This liberalism did not lend itself to any great involvement in such a negative reform as prohibition. This is not to say that these churches were unaware of some of the social and moral problems of the age; their emphasis in seeking solutions was, however, somewhat different. Morality could not be enforced by law but had rather to be taught by example, hence the emphasis on religious education of children and the advocacy of temperance and moderation, not only in the matter of alcohol but in every aspect of behaviour and reform.

The basic position of the Anglican Church was ably expressed by Bishop Nevill of Dunedin at the synod of the Dunedin diocese in 1896. He argued that the compulsory stoppage of fermented liquors would be demoralising. Firstly it would encourage the growth of deceit, hypocrisy and dishonesty within society, and secondly such action would be a departure from God's way of dealing with His people as moral agents; contact with evil was deemed necessary in order to develop moral character and awareness through the resistance to temptation. He was, however, opposed to the present system of sale of liquor, and argued for the abolition of hotel bars. This concern with the system of public sale of alcohol agitated the mind of the Anglican Church throughout this period, and saw that body urging various alternatives to the current system: a high licence fee to encourage a respectable

42. Nicholls, op. cit., p. 32.

43. Anglican Church of New Zealand, Proceedings of the Synod of the Diocese of Dunedin, 1896, President's Address.
FIGURE II

Source: Seddon Papers 3/63, p. 37, 1899.
HOW SHALL I VOTE—FOR LIBERTY OR SLAVERY?

The Fre$(er of New Zealand: "The moral elevation of the people will not be aided by Prohibition."
standard through threat of loss of licence without compensation; municipal, corporate or state control in order to avoid underhand methods to make an easy profit; or the abolition of retail outlets and the favouring of wholesale licences only. None of these schemes came to fruition, but it was apparent that a large section of the Anglican community realised that there was a need for reform of the liquor traffic though it did not see prohibition as the answer.

This approach remained the basic position of the Anglican Church, especially the High Church, throughout this period, but more and more individuals from within it became involved with the prohibitionists as the period progressed. Bishop Julius of Christchurch illustrates this development well. In 1895 he expressed to the Canterbury Synod sentiments with which Bishop Nevill was to concur the following year. His attack was not upon the use of alcohol but upon the liquor traffic; thus he would support local no-license but not national prohibition. This was still his position in 1899 though he realised that no-license would mean the abolition of wholesale as well as retail licences; on this question he would have liked to have seen the law changed. By 1909 he was willingly appearing on no-license platforms and making public statements that he would vote for no-license until he should find some better remedy for the problem of the ravages of drink. In that same year he was elected a vice-president of the New Zealand Alliance. As no other solution to the problem was forthcoming over the next few years, and as the testi-

monies, biased or otherwise, from no-license areas spoke of the social
and economic improvements brought about by the experiment, so did the
Bishop's attitude in favour of prohibition develop. In 1918 the
local no-license vote was abolished, but by this time Bishop Julius's
former disagreement with national prohibition had so far been overcome
that he could state:

"Prohibition", to use the familiar term, is
a question upon which every man must vote
according to his conscience, or whatever
stands in the place of it. Only I may re-
mind him that unless he votes for prohibition,
or makes an honest effort to promote some
drastic reform of the liquor traffic, he
becomes responsible for its continuance and
for its evil consequences.

Whatever my opinion and influence
may be worth, I wish to say that I vote for
prohibition because I will not accept re­
sponsibility for the continuance of the liquor
traffic, and have failed to discover any other
measure of reform worthy of serious consider­
ation.47

Unable to find any other means of solving the drink problem Bishop
Julius finally reached a point where, to be true to his conscience, he
had to vote for something with which he never fully agreed. Many
other Anglicans felt the same, but, so long as they were assured that
fermented wine would always be available for sacramental purposes,
they were prepared to support prohibition as a means, however
inadequate, of reform.

The Roman Catholic Church's position in the liquor debate was
similar to the Anglicans', yet it faced greater hostility from the
pietistic churches because of the growing fear and intolerance within
these churches of Popery. 48 The prohibition issue was more a factor


48. See H.S. Moores, 'The Protestant Political Association',
in encouraging this intolerance than an expression of it, though it symbolised the vast gulf between the two traditions. The prohibitionists were certainly not backward in accusing the Roman Catholic clergy of being "guilty of criminal apathy in regard to the ruin wrought by the liquor traffic among its citizens."\(^{49}\)

The stance of the Roman Catholic Church on the liquor issue was dictated largely by two factors: church membership and theology. Various studies have shown that the Roman Catholic Church drew upon a much wider cross-section of the community than did any other denomination, and that it had a particular appeal to the poorer classes.\(^{50}\) With this being the case this Church could hardly have supported a movement that was directed against one of the few pleasures of that economic group without causing serious repercussions for itself.

Not only did this reveal that people were aware that fewer working class members supported prohibition than middle class citizens; nor was the attitude of the Catholic clergy simply an avoidance of the issue; their emphasis on true temperance and abstinence by individual choice was, as with the Anglicans, based on two theological positions: morality was taught not by force but by example, and salvation was achieved through the forgiveness of God as expressed in the sacraments, especially that of the eucharist.

For both the episcopal churches celebration of communion with fermented wine was an integral part of their understanding of the communion service as being a real sharing in the death of Christ by partaking of His body and blood. They could not, therefore, treat it

\(^{49}\) Prohibitionist, 27 Oct, 1900, p. 8; see also ibid., 22 Feb, 1902, p. 6; N.Z. Tablet, 4 Jan, 1906, p. 19.

\(^{50}\) H. McLeod, op. cit., pp. 35, 72-80; M.J. Powell, op. cit., Chapter One.
merely as a memorial service of Christ's death and use unfermented wine (and later cordial) as had become the practice in the pietistic churches in New Zealand in the 1870s and 1880s. Thus although the 1910 Licensing Amendment Act, which introduced the national prohibition option, allowed for the manufacture and sale of alcohol for scientific, medicinal and sacramental purposes if prohibition were carried, it was felt by many, particularly in the Roman Catholic Church, that this was not a strong enough safeguard for one of their fundamental beliefs. An article in the *N.Z. Tablet* a few days before the poll was held argued that, as most of the religious bodies which are prominent in the agitation for prohibition already use unfermented wine for communion purposes, the present exemption in favor of the importation of fermented wine for sacramental use might, in the course of time, be withdrawn. In working to bring about such a result, the religious bodies referred to would be acting quite consistently with their principles. By them, unfermented wine is regarded as quite sufficient for their communion service... The Catholic Church, we need hardly say, takes a different view. She insists strictly on the requirements of the ordinance as instituted by our Lord Himself; and for the purpose of the Mass the fermented juice of the grape must be used...We content ourselves with saying that the bare possibility of being deprived of the Mass is a prospect which no good Catholic can regard with equanimity.51

This fear was only exacerbated when a few days later a prohibition lecturer, the Rev. B.S. Hammond, stated that after ten years of prohibition no wine even for medicinal and sacramental purposes would be allowed into the country.52 Archbishop Redwood of Wellington immediately issued a circular letter to the Roman Catholic clergy urging them to warn their parishioners against voting for national prohibition as it would eventually render the celebration of the Mass


52. *ibid.*, 7 Dec, 1911, p. 2479; *Vanguard*, 23 Dec, 1911, p. 9.
impossible. Though Hammond argued that he had been misinterpreted and that what he meant was that after seeing and experiencing the benefits of prohibition for ten years everyone, including the episcopal churches, would be in favour of a total ban on alcohol, this was not enough to repair the damage. Fears of religious persecution came to the surface at a time of growing intolerance between Protestants and Roman Catholics. Protestant intolerance was only made worse when it was felt that the loss of support for prohibition from a large section of society had possibly cost the cause greater success, if not victory. The Archbishop's letter was believed to have been sufficient to alienate enough votes to have carried national prohibition, and it was seen as altogether deplorable that he should have used the full weight of his own authority and that of his Church to buttress the body-and-soul destroying liquor traffic on a plea that is entirely false.

An examination of the voting figures for no-license for most of the period under study reveals that a large majority of the electorates at some stage came within a reasonable chance of achieving local no-license. In 1911, with a total vote in favour of national prohibition of 55.83 per cent, prohibition of alcohol appeared to be within the grasp of the prohibitionists in the near future. They argued that if all the churches supported the movement no-license would have been carried in most of the electorates and national prohibition would have been carried in 1911.

55. *ibid.*
Given that between them the Anglican and Roman Catholic denominations had a nominal adherence of over fifty per cent of the population throughout this period, it is probable that, if the leaders of these churches had officially encouraged their membership to support prohibition, local and national prohibition would have received the few percentage votes more that they needed to be carried over a wide area of New Zealand. Even in terms of active membership this supposition was probably valid. On the basis of percentage figures compiled by H. Mol in a study on church attendance in New Zealand for the census years of 1896, 1906 and 1911, it appears that the active membership of these two episcopal denominations was between ten and twelve per cent of the total population during this period. If only half this number had supported no-licence it would have been achieved over a much wider area, and national prohibition would have been favoured in 1911.

The support of the pietistic churches for prohibition developed from their awareness that poverty, squalor, unemployment, exploitation of labour and industrial strife did exist. While admitting the problems on the one hand, however, they argued on the other that it was not the Church's role to become involved with party politics in an effort to rectify that which was wrong. They did believe that they were involved in the wider political sphere, however, through their various movements for moral reform. To them politics was the application of the principles of righteousness to society. Let the people be made righteous and there would be no need for legislative reform in the social and economic spheres. "The religious and moral improvement of the inner being must continue to be our major work...The regeneration

of man's moral being must precede the regeneration of society." \textsuperscript{57}

While the Church should be free of class and party bias and be true to her mission of seeking the salvation of all, its moral influences should be exerted and in this way help to achieve those political and social reforms which aided the amelioration of the lot of the masses. \textsuperscript{58}

This was surely an idealistic approach to reform, if not simplistic and unrealistic. Yet it remained the position of the mainstream of the Church until the depression of the 1930s. Even as the socialist and labour movements grew the Church continued to argue that it need have nothing to do with party politics. Her only politics should be those which make for obedience to the Divine law, and for the application of the moral truths and principles of Christianity to the vast and manifold complexities of the modern social and economic situation in all its co-relations. \textsuperscript{59}

By adopting such an approach the Church avoided questioning the foundations of the existing order while easing its conscience about the inequalities present in that order. By drawing a distinction between moral influence and practical reform it could reason that disputes in which the Church is pressed sometimes to intervene require expert knowledge for their comprehension and settlement. The questions, whether commerce should be organised on a basis of competition or of co-operation, whether the relation of master and servant should be upon the basis of wages or profit-sharing, and some other questions that might be raised that are at times submitted to Church

\textsuperscript{57} Advocate, 6 May, 1899, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{58} Christian Outlook, 20 Feb, 1897, p. 39.

courts, seem quite clearly to be outside the Church's functions, and to be beyond her powers to decide.  

It is little wonder in the light of this ambivalent approach to social reform that the pietistic churches so readily espoused the cause of prohibition. This was an issue which directly concerned people's morality - should people drink; what would be the effect on my neighbour if I encouraged him by my example to drink and he over-indulged; what would Christ's attitude to modern stimulants be; is it right that others should suffer because of self-indulgence? These questions and others were the direct interest of the Church, and few would query its right to consider them. Here was a reform acceptable to a large part of the Church and which seemed to offer in the economic arguments for it a way of dealing with the various economic and social problems confronting New Zealand at the turn of the century. The Church could feel that it was facing up to its responsibilities in society, and yet it did not have to attack the very basis of political economy which caused so many of the problems about which the Church showed some concern.  

It can be seen, therefore, that a social gospel philosophy appeared in the New Zealand context in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This was not the type of social gospel that appeared in the United States in response to the problems of industrialisation and urbanisation and which involved an attack on and an attempt to change the capitalistic social order in that country. That was a progressive political movement with Christian principles of equality.

60. *Outlook*, 12 April, 1902, p. 22.
In New Zealand the churches were part of the capitalistic system, and rather than modify it they were trying through such movements as prohibition to alleviate some of its effects without having to restructure the country's economic base. There were exceptions, of course, but these were few. Probably the most notable was the Rev. Rutherford Waddell of St. Andrew's Presbyterian Church, Dunedin. He it was who led the attack on sweating in New Zealand in the late 1880s and early 1890s. The difference between him and his fellow churchmen was that he was a Christian socialist and they were not. He could offer a political platform for reform; they could only offer appeals to Christian responsibility and support moral reforms such as prohibition.

To most of the churches socialism, even Christian socialism, was anathema. This is not surprising when it is realised that they were to a large extent dominated by businessmen and professional people. Yet throughout this period the churches had to come to terms with a growing socialist approach to the solving of social problems, an approach that developed outside the Church primarily because the Church showed little awareness of the nature of the social and economic problems.


facing the working class.

The vocal and growing labour movement was not backward in revealing that it considered itself distinct from the pietistic middle class churches' reform programme. At first it was purely condemnatory, with the various ministers of religion and leading church members involved being accused of trying to achieve recognition through their outspokenness on the prohibition issue, and of using it as a means of filling their pews and their collection plates. One writer argued that

if your theology was as good as some of the liquor dispensed in our pubs the people would think more of the church. You are at variance among yourselves as to the right way to get to heaven, and as you are preaching different doctrines you are damning souls instead of bodies. The church of the present day is a gigantic fraud, and the whole labour of the majority of its ministers is for gold and not for souls.64

Crude though such an argument might have been, the implication was that the Church had become irrelevant to the needs of the masses.

The fact of the matter is the masses of the people look upon the modern Christian Church with contempt, if not aversion, because it lays down a high ideal of spiritual and practical life, but makes no genuinely sincere effort to live up to its profession.65

As time progressed the labour movement adopted a more iconoclastic campaign to convince both itself and the reformers that it had no sympathy with the value system of the middle class. Once again, when it came to prohibition, it was the churches that bore the brunt of the onslaught.

During the winter of 1905 a series of men's meetings were held

64. Otago Workman, 5 Dec, 1896, p. 11.

65. Ibid., 29 April, 1899, p. 6.
in the Garrison Hall, Dunedin, on Sunday afternoons. Instituted by the Rev. W.N. Sinclair and the Methodist Central Mission, their emphasis was on the relationship between the Church and Labour and Christianity. The reason for the meetings was the concern of the Church at the declining attendance of the workingman at its services, and the increasing frequency of attack by organised Labour who argued that Christ was a Socialist while the Church as it existed was not representative of Christ's teachings; the ministry was accused of being against social reform and Labour, and in favour of respectability and capitalism. Labour writers showed little sympathy for the Church and its reform campaign, but accused it instead of attempting to control the working class.

Unfortunately, too often, as we know, the Church - or rather, we should say, the churches - have wofully [sic] impeded the Reformer and the man of intellect and foresight. Respectability is too often the fetish to which the dour churchgoer bends the knee - at whose shrine he worships. How many pulpits in Dunedin are prepared to preach openly, say, the doctrines of Socialism? Might few, we fear. Spiritual remedies they are prepared to prescribe ad lib - be regular in your attendance at church above all things, subscribe faithfully to all its doctrines and its funds, make strong and loud professions of your piety and your prayers - and all will be well. The truth is that the average clergyman desires the working man to attend his church - if he desires him there at all - in order that he may get control of the horny-handed son of toil, and lead him in the straight path - as the preacher views it - to the world to come; but not in the least that these same workers shall make any use of him (the clergyman) with a view to obtaining any secular requirements of which they are in need.67


67. Ibid., 9 Sept, 1905, p. 8.
The effect of this rejection of the middle class churches' attempts at reform was that Labour increasingly regarded itself as a distinct economic group in society and revealed that it possessed a separate values system. This system rejected traditional Christianity as practised by the churches and stressed the teachings of Christ as they concerned the social and economic welfare of the poor and needy. Hence Labour leaders could argue that, "lest we be misunderstood, we have not one word to say against true Christianity".68 This position was made even clearer in 1906 after the Roman Catholic Archbishop Redwood produced an article attacking Socialism as being contrary to Christianity and not in the interests of the people.69 The labour movement, and especially the N.Z. Worker, took up the discussion and argued that Christ's teachings showed that he would have favoured Socialism and opposed private capital and ownership. If, it was argued, the churches were really sincere in wanting to help the working class, they would preach socialism. They were taunted with such challenges as

you are praying for the coming of the Kingdom of God; we are working for social conditions which would make that Kingdom possible. Here, then, we can meet on common ground, and work for the common good,

and "reform the individual by all means, but one of the best means was by improving his environment".70 The labour movement wanted the support of the churches in its drive for reform; in trying to get this support it felt compelled to attack the churches' approach to social and economic problems in order to make them aware of their presumed mission

68. ibid.

69. F. Redwood, Pastoral Letter on Socialism, (Dunedin, 1906).

in society and the desperate needs of the working class.

The antagonism between Labour and the Church over the method of reform increased throughout the period as the difference of opinion on the question of prohibition in particular became more distinct. By 1905, for example, the general tenor of labour opinion was in favour of State control of the liquor trade, not of its abolition, the reason being that the use of alcohol in itself was not considered wrong; it was the abuse that had to be fought, and in the eyes of Labour most of the abuses were to be found in the private control of the trading system.

Alcohol has its virtues. It certainly does stimulate the social instinct and cheer the heavy heart. And life, as we make it, is so lacking in its brighter aspects, that to entirely remove from thousands of our countrymen the almost solitary oasis in the desert of life, which a little alcohol really and truly creates, would be a vigorous and drastic treatment indeed. There is much to be said in favour of making a State monopoly of the manufacture and sale of alcoholic drinks. 71

This was a very different view from that of the majority of prohibitionists, who could see in alcohol nothing but misery, poverty, degradation and despair. It certainly had no "virtues". Here, then, was a fundamental difference in values on the matter of alcohol, which in turn meant a difference in morality in that the prohibitionists saw the problem of alcohol as basically a moral problem. This difference was further aggravated when the prohibition issue was placed within the wider drive for social reform. To the working class spokesman the prohibitionists' emphasis on prohibition as the means of achieving wide-reaching reform was unrealistic in the extreme.

To suppose, however, that drink is in any sense the cause of poverty is to suppose a plain absurdity. Nine-tenths of us are really poor - that is to say, we have to toil unreasonable hours for a bare subsistence, and through all our lives we are pursued by sordid care, and the necessity for stinting ourselves of what it should be our privilege to enjoy...It is our wicked and brutal industrial and economic system that keeps us poor in a world crammed full of wealth. Where wealth accumulates (as Goldsmith expresses it) men really do decay if the great mass of those who produce the wealth have no part in its enjoyment.72

This was a direct assault on the laissez-faire capitalist system to which the prohibition movement generally subscribed, although with modifications largely based on the Golden Rule. It was not the system favoured by many of the articulate groups within the labouring section of the community, who saw that its economic condition was largely a result of this capitalist system. These two varied outlooks revealed another basic difference between the labour movement and the middle class reform movement, and one which was recognised by the former as separating it from the latter. On the surface it was a difference between wealth and poverty, but beneath this was the belief of the working section of the community that it was being exploited by the more wealthy class. The result of such a belief was to increase the feeling of difference between the rich and the poor, or the employers and employees. In turn this encouraged both the distrust by the working class of middle class proposals for economic and social reform, and the growth of separate labour politics. The labour movement came increasingly to see such reforms as prohibition as being simple panaceas and stop-gap measures of the middle class which would not bring about any real change in the conditions of the working class. It is not surprising that while the middle class reformers

72. ibid.
continued to stress moral reforms the working class agitators emphasised more and more the need for drastic economic and social reorganisation. Part of their plan to achieve such reorganisation was by political action; hence the emergence of a political Labour Party.

The growing tension between Labour and the Church over the method of reform tended to strengthen class consciousness on both sides. To Labour the Church, and especially the protestant churches, appeared to be full of businessmen and landlords who depended on the capitalist, private ownership system for their livelihood, while the Church depended on them for its finance. The testimony of the lady commissioner of the N.Z. Worker after a house-to-house sales campaign stressed this view of the Church and the capitalist system.

I never dreamt, in all the years I have been in Auckland, that the condition of some of the people was so deplorable...I am convinced that no palliatives will cure the evils of society here, and we must have nothing short of a social change...I have...always in the past attributed ninety per cent. of the people's poverty to drink; but my recent travels have made me disgusted with those who rant in this strain; for I find, that the worst slums in Auckland are owned and "bailiffed" by a so-called strong prohibitionist, and one who walks to church every Sunday and sits in a front pew—a saucy-faced hypocrite. I am convinced that, although drunkenness is a curse, landlordry is the worse phase of hell that ever afflicted the people of New Zealand. Here is this man singing psalms on Sunday, prating about the curse of strong drink, and taking advantage of the people's necessities to compel them to pay an exorbitant rent for slums that are not fit to house pigs, let alone human beings.73

Unverifiable as this may be, and useful propaganda for Labour agitators as it no doubt was, it nonetheless reveals the growing tension and difference of outlook between Labour and Capital in economic and social

73. N.Z. Worker, 19 Sept, 1906, p. 2.
The awareness of such differences as expressed in the rhetoric of the Labour spokesmen served a dual purpose: it revealed the existence of a class consciousness within New Zealand, and at the same time it strengthened this consciousness by provoking and encouraging people to think in such terms. It was in organised Labour's interest to encourage the mass of the working class to forsake the traditional political, economic and social structures and support the new and solely labour-orientated organisations.

The labour movement's challenge to the churches may have influenced a few individual churchmen towards taking a more positive and realistic approach to the problems facing the working people, but the majority of the Church could continue to argue that the questions of wages, hours of labour, the regulation of manufacturing output, and kindred matters were not its concern. The Church's concern was for the moral improvement of men in order to bring about a kingdom of righteousness, or the kingdom of God. 74

Even the industrial unrest of 1912-1913 did not produce a marked shift in the Church's arguments. Aware of the growing hostility towards it of a large section of the labour movement, it tried to stand on neutral ground. It attempted to show that it neither supported capitalism nor echoed the agitations of labour, but rather that it advocated moral righteousness, decried injustice, and tried to shape the men who were to make the world what God wanted it to be. Social injustice would never be settled by violence, politics or economics alone, but by applied Christianity. 75 Support was urged for the introduction of Bible reading in schools on the conviction that "only in so far as


75. ibid., 15 Feb, 1913, p. 10.
Bible truth sinks into the childish consciousness of the nation will the present conflict between Capital and Labour come to an end".  

The Church did not seem aware that it was out of touch with the society around it, and that its pious platitudes about moral righteousness and the kingdom of God offered no immediate solution to pressing social problems. It continued to adopt an arrogant attitude, especially towards the labour movement, which only alienated that section of the community which it was trying to reach. It talked of Labour's tone of contempt for religion and its need for a dynamic ideal which the religious impulse alone could give, but failed to realise that by so talking it was showing through its arrogance a similar contempt for Labour.

The Church also failed to realise that there was considerable inconsistency in its approach to the social and economic questions that were concerning so many sections of the community. On the one hand it argued that it was not its role or duty to become involved in politics in order to achieve reform; but on the other hand it was prepared to do all in its power to achieve by political agitation and legislation the suppression of drink, gambling and other pleasures and to introduce Bible reading in state schools in order to bring about social, economic and moral reform. The justification for such a position, that these reforms were the means by which society could be made morally righteous, coupled with the Church's unwillingness to seek political reform in regard to wages, employment and the like, only strengthens the argument that the churches were unwilling to upset the existing social and economic order, and were using such reforms as prohibition to

76. Outlook, 18 Nov, 1913, p. 3.

bolster their own position in society by dictating the moral standards of the community.

Part of this attempt to influence the development of society's moral standards depended on the basic social structure of the community. It has already been seen that part of the ideology of the prohibition movement stressed the importance of the home in creating a stable environment, and that the role of woman in shaping this environment was considered to be of some importance because of her presumed superior moral nature. As a result it was believed that she had a special interest in the prohibition movement. Specific areas were singled out which presumed this interest and which further stressed the value placed on a stable home environment and the importance of adherence to a certain code of behaviour.

One such area was physical suffering of wives and children at the hands of a drunken husband or father. Claims were made, without any effort to offer proof, that many thousands of wives and daughters and sisters...have seen in grog only that which has robbed them of all the enjoyments of life...The share that they have had of the enjoyment themselves is irritability, brutality, perhaps blows. 

Wife and child bashings were frequently mentioned in prohibitionist propaganda as being the direct results of indulgence by men in intoxicating liquor. Generalised statements were preferred to specific instances; emotive language replaced reasonable logic. There was much talk of the poor broken-hearted wife, whose spirit had been crushed and broken by a series of

78. See pp. 40-42.
cruelties inflicted by one who promised to love and cherish her. The life of such an one is a long-drawn-out martyrdom, of which God only knows the end.80

Because of such violence it was believed that once women had the vote they would use it against the liquor trade in an effort to purify society and protect themselves. The liquor industry was as convinced as the prohibitionists that once the "shrieking sisterhood" had political power there would be an all-out female assault on the liquor trade.81

A second specific argument as to the reasons why women would be in favour of prohibition was an economic one. If husbands could be encouraged by the unavailability of alcohol to bring home all of their wages, then it would be much less difficult for the wife to provide the needs of the home. In the public house, it was argued, women had seen the rival of the domestic hearth; and what would have given boots to the children, and food and clothing in abundance for all, they have seen abstracted from the hardly earned and perhaps meagre wages.82

That prohibition could remedy this situation was, to its supporters at least, unquestionable. Once more it was generalised from instances of known hardship aggravated, if not caused, by a husband's indulgence in alcohol, that women would, if given the opportunity, support en masse any move towards prohibition. It was assumed that they would grab at any possibility of improving their material surroundings and of establishing for themselves and their families little havens of peace in a


81. ibid., 15 July, p. 3; N.Z. Herald, 13 Sept, 1893, p. 5, cited in Grimshaw, op.cit., p. 94; JLC, 1893, Schedule of Petitions, p. xii, nos 34, 36.

garden suburb, with mother and father at each side of the hearth and children at their knees, perhaps with a daughter playing the piano, while the family Bible was prominent on the table. A caricature of lower middle class mentality this may be, but such ideas did find expression in the propaganda of the prohibition movement. For instance the following was part of a paper about no-license in Invercargill after twelve months experience.

How does it affect the social and home life of the people? Is there increased comfort, sobriety, happiness? There can be no shadow of a doubt that these things have largely increased in many homes. Neighbours tell of the improved conditions in many homes; where formerly there was poverty, hunger, misery, there is now happiness, comfort and plenty. One case, which may stand as representative of many, may be given. A poor woman, whose husband was a heavy drinker under license, had to go, on pay day, and wait for her husband as he came out of the office with his wages, or she would scarcely get enough from him to keep the wolf from the door. The home was clean, but very sparingly furnished, and there were no curtains in the windows but a piece of muslin tacked up. Today that home has been transformed. The wife no longer has need to go on pay day to meet her husband, for he brings his wages home, merely deducting a small amount for his tobacco. The woman is neatly dressed, and the children have improved in health, and the windows have lace curtains in them; the man himself enjoying better health, and proving himself a better citizen.83

It was natural that in trying to bring about economic, social, physical and moral reform of the community, this predominantly middle class prohibition movement should see one of its goals as suburban, domestic, God-fearing bliss. The assumption that all women wished to achieve such an existence encouraged those both within and outside the movement to believe that women generally would take a special

83. White Ribbon, June 1907, p. 4.
interest in the liquor question.

A third specific area that presumed women's involvement in the prohibition movement was that of prostitution. For many women, again especially those of middle class prejudices, the licensed bar was only one step removed from the brothel, and was almost invariably on the path that led to it. It was "the centre of moral filth" in which "immorality is connived at, where drunkenness and gambling are encouraged...The licensed liquor bar, more than anything else, is the creator of the brothel, and the parent of illicit love". The consumption of alcohol had the effect of creating lustful desires and of weakening self-control, so that sexual gratification was sought in brothels and whorehouses. At the same time consumption of liquor impoverished the bar's patrons so that they could not afford to establish a home and support a wife and family. As a result it was claimed that,

thousands of women who are in every way fitted for the position of wife and mother remain unmarried. Early marriages are at once the safeguard of the man, the happiness and right of the woman, and the good of the State, and against this the saloons stand in grim array.

This problem of prostitution and alcohol was expected to attract the support of women of all social groups and involve them in the prohibition movement. Two effects would ensue: it would increase the prohibitionist ranks considerably, and would encourage at least half the community, the female half, to adopt, consciously or otherwise, certain middle class values concerning the role of women and the place of the home in society's structure.

84. ibid.
85. ibid.; also May, 1914, p. 1.
86. ibid., May, 1914, p. 1.
The employment of barmaids was another issue which was expected to interest women in the prohibition of alcohol. It was a "most degrading occupation", "degrading to women and a lure to young men".\(^87\) Not only was it believed by the prohibitionists that the presence of barmaids enticed young men into public bars and into contact with alcohol, but that the barmaid system also served as a cover-up for something little better than a brothel.\(^88\)

A fifth specific area which presumed women's support for prohibition was that of religion. It was again generally believed that women were more interested in and more susceptible to the mysterious rites surrounding the supernatural.\(^89\) This idea was partly based on the belief that men were more rational, women more emotional, and that religion involved more emotion than reason. It was also partly the cause and partly the result of the belief that women were morally superior to men, took a greater interest in the moral standards of the community, and hence had a greater interest in a religious system which expounded a definite ethical code. As there was no doubt that the prohibition movement was, in part at least, a campaign to improve the moral standards of society, and as the non-episcopalian churches in particular were conspicuously involved, it was believed that women, too, would be behind the movement in large numbers. Put crudely, it was argued that women were more susceptible to the influence of the parson or the priest, and would follow him blindly wherever he led.\(^90\)

\(^87\) *ibid.*, Sept, 1902, p. 7.

\(^88\) *NZP*, 13 March, 1897, p. 3; 25 July, 1903, p. 3; 24 Nov, 1908, p. 2; *ODT*, 8 June, 1907, p. 9; *NZPD*, 153, (14 Nov, 1910), p. 606, J.B. Callan.


\(^90\) *ODT*, 16 Dec, 1911, p. 9.
Even the women themselves, or at least the reforming zealots among them, believed that

there can be no question that as a rule women are more responsive to that sense of religious and moral duty that arises from mental development as surely as the ignoring of it hinders it...In all public questions that directly affect the highest interests of humanity we have faith in woman's verdict.91

Once again, however, the facts as available would belie this interpretation. While the census returns relating to religious affiliation show that a slightly higher proportion of all women were connected with the main Christian denominations than of men, the difference was never more than 2.1% within any denomination throughout this period.92 This does not, of course, take into account the amount of active participation of these people in church life, or the amount of nominal membership. But it does suggest that the male/female attitudes to religion were not markedly different. Secondly, if, as has been discussed in relation to the Church and Prohibition,93 the concept of prohibition was against the theology of the Anglican and Roman Catholic denominations, then the number of females who could possibly have been under the influence of the non-episcopalian minister was only 39.07 per cent of all women in the country. Even if all of these were involved in the prohibition movement, which was unlikely because of the proportion of nominal adherents and minors in this figure, there was no possibility that most women in the community were going to be influenced by the emotionalism of evangelical theology into supporting prohibition.

These five specific reasons why women were expected to support

91. Vanguard, 7 Nov, 1908, p. 12.
92. See Table 8.
93. See pp. 79-83.
### TABLE 8

Religious adherence in New Zealand by proportion of each sex, as a percentage of male and female population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DENOMINATION</th>
<th>1896 Male</th>
<th>1896 Female</th>
<th>1906 Male</th>
<th>1906 Female</th>
<th>1906 Male</th>
<th>1906 Female</th>
<th>1911 Male</th>
<th>1911 Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHURCH OF ENGLAND</td>
<td>39.89</td>
<td>40.06</td>
<td>40.67</td>
<td>40.61</td>
<td>41.32</td>
<td>41.19</td>
<td>40.72</td>
<td>40.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROMAN CATHOLIC</td>
<td>13.56</td>
<td>14.21</td>
<td>13.91</td>
<td>14.31</td>
<td>14.16</td>
<td>14.23</td>
<td>13.61</td>
<td>14.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESBYTERIAN</td>
<td>22.69</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>22.76</td>
<td>22.93</td>
<td>22.69</td>
<td>23.16</td>
<td>22.99</td>
<td>23.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER NON-EPISCOPALIANS; (WESLEYAN METHODISTS PRIMITIVE METHODOISTS OTHER METHODOISTS BAPTISTS CONGREGATIONALISTS SALVATION ARMY)</td>
<td>14.17</td>
<td>16.27</td>
<td>13.86</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>12.82</td>
<td>14.86</td>
<td>12.31</td>
<td>14.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>90.31</td>
<td>93.34</td>
<td>91.20</td>
<td>93.75</td>
<td>91.09</td>
<td>93.44</td>
<td>89.63</td>
<td>92.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census of New Zealand, 1896, 1901, 1906, 1911.
prohibition led to the popular belief that the prohibition movement was predominantly a women's movement. Yet plenty of evidence was available to show that women as a group were no more united behind the prohibition movement during this period than were men.94

Perhaps nowhere is it more starkly revealed that the prohibition movement was not a female preserve than in an examination of its leadership. In a sample of 844 committee members of local and national prohibitionist organisations, including the W.C.T.U., Sons and Daughters of Temperance, the I.O.G.T., the Prohibition and No-License Leagues, and the N.Z. Alliance, only 144 (17.06%) were women. Similarly, out of sixty-nine people who were listed in 1910 as vice-presidents of the N.Z. Alliance (a life-long appointment unless otherwise requested), only three (4.3%) were women. For a movement that had allowed women onto all its councils long before they ever had the vote at the general elections, this disparity between the roles played by the sexes is startling. It reveals that while a few women may have been to the forefront of the reform agitation of this period, most women were willing to be at best the followers of male opinion and agitation, at worst sideline spectators, appearing only to vote every three years. They were not encouraged, of course, to "unsex" themselves by appearing on the public platform, and there is little evidence to suggest that many of them tried.

The history of the W.C.T.U. further suggests the lack of active participation of women in the prohibition movement. In 1893 the membership for all of New Zealand was six hundred. By 1915 this had

risen to 3371, with a peak in 1912 of 3474. In a country with a female population of 331,945 in 1896 and 476,558 in 1911, this was hardly a reflection of a numerically active organisation. The fact that it had such an influence is a sign of the articulate ability of the women involved, an ability suggesting a higher educational achievement and a more liberal environment than was the norm for most women.

Such figures do not, of course, provide proof that women were not interested in prohibition, although such low active involvement would strongly suggest that they were no more interested than men. Certainly the strong male leadership would indicate a reasonably high proportion of male involvement. Woman's absence from the forefront of the campaign seems to be best explained by her being restricted, through the emphasis on her domestic role, in her activities outside the home, while her education regarding public affairs was largely dependent on the opinions of her husband or father. This would suggest that the female vote at the liquor poll was likely to be similar to the male vote, because of the continuing influence of male opinion in society.

The first occasion at which all adult women in New Zealand had the opportunity to use their vote was at the 1893 general election. After the stormy passage of the 1893 Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act, with which the prohibitionists were dissatisfied, it was expected that the liquor question would have a major effect on the election, and that the women's vote would swell the prohibitionist ranks. In the debates on the Licensing Bill Stout had said,

Sir, it has been said that if you get the women on the roll this Bill will practically end in the obtaining of prohibition. What

95. See Table 9.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>W.C.T.U.</th>
<th>WOMEN OVER 21</th>
<th>% OF ADULT WOMEN INVOLVED IN W.C.T.U.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>139,471</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>159,656</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>1496</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>1232</td>
<td>171,373</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1610</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>195,783</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>1220</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>1330</td>
<td>226,933</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>1471</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>1462</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>1700</td>
<td>243,504</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>2407</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>2668</td>
<td>273,208</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>3474</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>3144</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>2792</td>
<td>297,168</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>3371</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on reports in *White Ribbon*, 1895-1915; *Statistics of New Zealand*, 1893-1915.
does this mean? That the women are going to vote for temperance: is that what it means? Then, we, temperance people are willing they shall vote at the general election for temperance, and that their votes shall be cast for the return of members to this House who will give us a real Bill of local control, and not the sham Bill which this measure is... This question is going to be the question at the elections.96

Despite the fact that this was partly political manoeuvring by Stout against Seddon, it did express both the desire of the prohibitionists for a new Bill, and also the general belief regarding the female vote. As the election approached it was expected that the prohibitionist vote plus the woman's vote would swamp Parliament with temperance-orientated members in favour of amendment of the Licensing Act. The effect, as Kate Sheppard, Franchise Superintendent for the W.C.T.U., amusingly put it, was that

as the candidates came into the field they made distinct bids for the woman's vote, and some of them were most mirth-provoking with their wriggles as they were brought face to face with a large body of electors whose rightful claims they had previously opposed...Efforts were made in some quarters to organise women for the purpose of giving block votes...We felt that so far as ordinary party questions of the hour were concerned it was better that women should decide for themselves. We advised, however, that special regard should be paid to reform in the liquor laws...and that on no account should a woman vote for a man of immoral life.97

The results of the election did not reveal, however, that the female vote had any considerable effect. Rather, it was argued that

the result could scarcely be deemed doubtful, as so far as the balance of power between the two parties is concerned the woman's vote has made no important difference. We hold the opinion that...all things being equal, women would vote

96. NZPD, 81, (30 August, 1893), p. 441.

in the same direction as their male friends. Every inquiry that we have since made confirms this view. 98

As to the persuasive power of the clergy over women the results showed that the new Parliament contained a much smaller number of denomination-alists in favour of Government aid to church schools than had previously been the case. Of this the comment was made that, "we offer no opinion as to whether this is a desirable state of things or not. But it effectively disposes of the old cry that women would vote as the priests directed." 99

The 1893 election had, therefore, shown that the expectations of female dominance and prohibitionist success had not been well-founded. The reality of the situation was made apparent, as might have been expected, that women were no more a cohesive unit in society than were men. Yet the idea remained, and became even more entrenched, that women would eventually unite behind this movement of moral reform. "Laws need altering for the protection of our sex and those dear to us. On women devolves the special duty of seeing that our legislators are men who honour purity and probity more than party." 100 There was no doubt in the minds of the reformers that women were more morally aware than men, and that they had a special role to play as moral watchdogs in society. Even though the female vote had revealed no unity of action, there was hope that this would eventually be achieved as women were educated as to what was expected of them by "respectable" standards of behaviour.

There is no evidence to suggest that the support of women for no-

98. ibid.

99. ibid.

100. ibid.
license and prohibition became any more pronounced over the period to 1914 than did the support of men. While the actual figures for males and females supporting prohibition are non-existent, there is nothing in the available figures that suggests any strong connection between the female vote and prohibition as against the male vote. The percentage proportion of women voting at the liquor poll at no time exceeded that of men at the national level; in fact it was always slightly less.\textsuperscript{101} In an analysis of individual electorates this national trend is strongly mirrored. The number of voters at the liquor poll who were women was very much in proportion to the percentage of the electoral roll that equalled women.\textsuperscript{102} This would suggest that, as already argued, the liquor question did not motivate women to vote any more strongly than it did men.

If it is further considered that, while the total vote for no-license increased from 37.83 per cent to 55.83 per cent (national prohibition result) between 1896 and 1911, the proportion of active voters who were female only increased from 41.81 per cent to 45.01 per cent, then it will be seen that prohibition called upon a much wider area of support than merely the woman's vote.\textsuperscript{103} There is nothing to suggest that a greater proportion of the prohibitionist vote was female than male, nor that there was any connection between the increased support for prohibition and the gradual increase of women voters in the country. The latter increase was so small that its bearing on the much greater increase in support for prohibition could only have been marginal at best.

\textsuperscript{101} See Table 10.
\textsuperscript{102} See Table 11 and Figure III
\textsuperscript{103} See Table 12
TABLE 10

Percentage of registered women voting at liquor poll compared with percentage of registered men, for all of New Zealand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>53.84</td>
<td>43.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>76.79</td>
<td>76.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>76.45</td>
<td>74.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>78.44</td>
<td>74.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>82.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>76.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911 1</td>
<td>84.43</td>
<td>82.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914 2</td>
<td>85.43</td>
<td>83.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. National prohibition poll.
2. Sex breakdown for general election, 1914, as sex breakdown for liquor poll not available.
TABLE 11

Percentage of electoral roll, by electorate, who are women, correlated with percentage of women voters at liquor poll, giving simple correlation coefficient and significance level of simple correlation coefficient.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (r)</th>
<th>SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL (P)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>0.9588</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>0.9086</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>0.9027</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>0.9766</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>0.9834</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>0.9577</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>0.9774</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. National prohibition poll
2. Sex breakdown for general election, as sex breakdown for liquor poll not available.
3. \( r \) is highly significant at a 95% confidence level if \( P<0.01 \).
FIGURE III

Percentage of electoral roll who are women, correlated with percentage of women voters at liquor poll, by electorates, 1896-1914.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>Column 1</th>
<th>Column 2</th>
<th>Column 3</th>
<th>Column 4</th>
<th>Column 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>5.00E+01</td>
<td>4.7792E+01</td>
<td>3.6480E+01</td>
<td>3.0825E+01</td>
<td>2.5169E+01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
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1886
<table>
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<td>5.2326E+01</td>
<td>4.1761E+01</td>
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<td>3.8478E+01</td>
<td>3.1196E+01</td>
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<td>3.982E+01</td>
<td>4.633E+01</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.87E+01</td>
<td>4.5126E+01</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.037E+01</td>
<td>5.622E+01</td>
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</table>
TABLE 12

Percentage vote for no-license and national prohibition, compared with percentage of actual voters who were female, for all of New Zealand.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>% VOTE FOR NO-LICENSE</th>
<th>% OF ACTUAL VOTERS WHO WERE FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>45.57</td>
<td>39.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>37.83</td>
<td>41.81</td>
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<td>1899</td>
<td>42.07</td>
<td>42.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>48.89</td>
<td>43.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>51.28</td>
<td>44.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>53.45</td>
<td>44.18</td>
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<td>1911$^1$</td>
<td>55.83</td>
<td>45.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914$^1$</td>
<td>48.99</td>
<td>45.00$^2$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. National prohibition poll.
2. Sex breakdown for general election, 1914, as sex breakdown for liquor poll not available.
Despite the evidence available as early as 1893 the dual response to the connection of women with the prohibition movement continued throughout the next twenty years. On the one hand it was admitted that prohibition was of no greater interest to women than to men, while on the other hand it was argued that it was an emotive issue that would attract the wholesale support of women, who had the interests of the community at heart. It became one of the roles of the prohibitionist literature to persuade women that they should be interested in the prohibition movement. These arguments assumed that the middle class idea of the role of women was the norm, to which women should aspire and adhere. As a corollary of this it was implied that women who did not conform to this norm were not fulfilling their duty to society and the State.

The ideal of the women's suffrage movement had been to emancipate woman from subjection to the male in the political sphere so that she could help emancipate herself economically and socially and reform society. Part of this continued programme of emancipation was the drive for prohibition of the liquor traffic. At the same time, however, the moral and social ideas surrounding the prohibition movement were such that they encouraged the continued suppression of the female by restricting her field of desirable activity to the home, which meant economic subjection to father or husband, and often mental stagnation through stunted intellectual growth. That such was the effect either did not occur to the female reformers in the prohibition movement, most of whom had been deeply involved in the drive for the female suffrage, or did not effect them as individuals. As Grimshaw has pointed out, of the leaders of the W.C.T.U. and the women's suffrage

104. This is examined in Chapters IV-VII.
movement, a small but influential number were spinsters, and of those who were married a considerable number had married late in life, and had either small families or no families. These were the women who had time to undertake such work. Few needed to earn money, and, indeed, most of them could afford domestic help.105

The influential and articulate women involved in the prohibition and suffrage movements were not aware of their contradictory aims. They themselves were economically and socially well established and could, with the aid of domestic help and adequate family income, step outside the confines of the role of wife and mother which they were trying to impose on others. The pedestal on which the prohibition movement attempted to place woman was not the pedestal on which the active prohibitionist women were themselves confined. They did not appreciate that they found "fulfilment" outside the home as well as in it, with their involvement in benevolent organisations, interest groups, church bodies, and women's organisations. Not only was their moralistic, reforming middle class background revealed in the programme of reform adopted by their organisation, the W.C.T.U.;106 it was also shown in their failure to comprehend that their ideas would confine working class women to a life of domestic drudgery in the home. These economically less fortunate women could not afford domestic help and did not have the time to become involved in a more stimulating environment of organisations and agitations. The middle class idealistic picture of the "happy home" ignored the harsher reality that faced the working class woman in the less congenial surrounds of an often cramped and overcrowded environment. These female middle class reformers and their male counterparts could afford

106. See Appendix B.
to support the prohibition movement and all that it stood for, as in so many ways the results of such a reform would not affect them. They were trying to help their less fortunate brothers and sisters; they were also attempting to impose on the whole of society a system of customs and values the ideal of which they believed in but the reality and implications of which they did not fully understand. In their agitation they and their male counterparts assumed the support of the majority of women for prohibition. By the end of the period, however, they had to admit that their assumption had been wrong. The quantitative evidence available likewise reveals that the prohibition movement was not, as thought, predominantly an expression of female faddism.

The prohibition movement emerged in New Zealand at a time when social and economic tensions were increasing, mainly as a result of the depression of the 1880s and early 1890s. Both the empirical and rhetorical evidence suggest that it was primarily a middle class movement, drawing more heavily on both the male and female middle class section of the community for its support, and adhering to a middle class ideology. This ideology was an expression of a puritan, pietistic Christian outlook, with a heavy emphasis on the value of self-improvement and independence through industry, thrift, sobriety and self respect. The economic outlook of which these values were an expression favoured private property and capitalism with only limited State intervention.

In their journals and speeches the prohibitionists revealed that they considered themselves economically and socially superior to the labouring section of the community, to whom they offered, enthusiastically and self-righteously, prohibition as a means of social and economic advance towards independence and respectability. While
this was a sincere attempt to help the less fortunate, it was also an attempt to remove the growing social and economic tensions in society and to prevent increasing class division which threatened the existing economic, political and social structure of New Zealand, and hence its stability.

The prohibitionists regarded themselves as having an important mollifying role to play in order to prevent this increasing division between the antagonistic economic forces becoming too apparent in society. They considered themselves a separate entity, neither exploiting nor suffering as the result of exploitation, but rather acting as the moral arbiters between the two opposing economic groups. As such they hoped to influence the whole community against the liquor traffic and to break down, as a result, these growing class differences by influencing all groups to accept its interpretations of morality, social values and customs. Sir Robert Stout had this idea in mind when he said, while introducing his Licensing Bill in 1893:

I want to ask the House if they have considered why this licensing question has so come to the front. Why, it is one of the signs of the age; and what is the sign?...It means that we are approaching the solidarity of humanity; we have, practically, the feeling that there is a brotherhood of man.107

Yet the fact that so many of the prohibitionists' arguments were directed specifically at the working class and against socialism again suggests that these reformers were predominantly middle class in economic status, or aspiring to that status, and were also supporters of capitalism. Afraid of the growing and separatist voice of the working class, they believed it was imperative that prohibition be achieved to stop this separatism and the subsequent development of a

107. NZPD, 80 (2 August, 1893), p. 380.
more rigid class society in which the middle class would be much less potent. Thus, while on the one hand the prohibitionists thought of themselves as social levellers, on the other their actions, aims and words revealed and possibly strengthened the socio-economic divisions already existing within the community. With the achievement of economic, social and moral improvement and stability by means of prohibition, it was hoped that the political dominance of the middle class would be maintained, and the rejection of middle class values and leadership through the development of a separate working class political radicalism avoided. For the middle class, therefore prohibition was primarily a conservative and defensive measure in the face of growing economic, social unrest and "moral decline". It was also, however, an offensive measure in that most convinced prohibitionists strongly believed in the effectiveness of prohibition as the necessary reform to allow the existing socio-economic conditions of New Zealand to be improved while the basic structure of society remained unaltered. Thus while on the one hand the prohibition movement was concerned with the broader issues of society's economic, social and moral practices, on the other it was a sincere reform movement to help people who suffered economically, socially and morally at the hands of the liquor traffic. The problems that the prohibitionists believed stemmed from indulgence in alcohol were the problems that beset individuals in all walks of life, but especially the working class, at least in the economic sphere. Magnified from the individual level to the community level, these problems posed a threat to the stability of society in all its facets. One response to such a threat was the prohibition movement, a movement composed of individuals concerned for their own or their dependents' welfare, and, at a broader level, for the welfare of the whole community. The presumed cause of this major threat to
individuals and society was the liquor trade; the means of solution was this trade's abolition.
CHAPTER IV

LEGISLATION AND REVELATION

By early 1894 the sound of battle between Opposition and Liberal, prohibitionist and anti-prohibitionist had subsided, but not because the issue of licensing reform had had its day. The general election was over and Parliament would not meet for several months; but the licensing poll and licensing committee elections under the new Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act were to be held towards the end of March. This pause was merely a lull in the battle while the two sides organised themselves for the ensuing onslaught.

The liquor trade adopted a moderate position of non-interference in the selection of candidates for the licensing committees. In fact so moderate was its tone that it would appear that it did not really feel threatened by the forthcoming event, but was rather sheltering in the security of the fifty per cent poll requirement and the three-fifths majority stipulation. 1

The various prohibition bodies also appeared as if they were not going to turn the elections into a partisan struggle. Resolutions that committed these organisations to no official selection of temperance candidates were passed, but individual members were encouraged to take an interest in the elections. 2 This did not mean, however, that the prohibitionists were not trying to get a prohibition vote. On the contrary, people were encouraged by meeting and lecture to vote for no-license and reduction. The actual selection of a prohibitionist ticket for the licensing committees was not, however, encouraged.


2. Dunedin Prohibition League, resolution of 8 Jan, 1894, cited in ODT, 9 Jan, 1894, p. 2.
Such was the ideal, but a question such as licensing reform encouraged extreme reactions rather than a moderate approach. The liquor trade's fear for its livelihood on the one hand and the certainty amongst the prohibitionists of the righteousness of their cause on the other saw a polarisation of the two antagonistic groups. It was not long before both sides were nominating trade and temperance tickets. The appeal of newspaper editors for the election of "men of sagacity and integrity, trusted by the community and unhampered by any pledges or preconceived intentions" fell on deaf ears. The prohibitionists were attempting to procure the return of licensing committees composed of persons who would pledge themselves to take advantage of the full twenty-five per cent diminution of licences in cases where the vote showed an effective majority in favour of reduction. At the same time hotelkeepers and others involved in the liquor trade were meeting to organise support for "independent and truly temperance candidates", reportedly unpledged and independent, but known to favour continuance of the liquor trade and no reduction of licences. Moderation had been forgotten.

The prohibitionists were much better organised than the trade. This was partly to be expected as it was they who were attacking, and the object of their attack was a deeply entrenched vested interest which as yet was not fully aware of the amount of opposition it provoked. Thus there were numerous prohibitionist rallies and demonstrations immediately prior to the taking of the poll, but the trade


4. *ibid.* 25% of the number of licences in a licensing district was the greatest amount under the ALSCAct by which licences could be reduced.

did little to defend itself apart from presenting its own candidates for the licensing committee elections.

The result of the poll, taken on 21 March, 1894, revealed several interesting factors. First, there was shown to be considerably greater prohibitionist enthusiasm in the South Island than in the North Island. Thirty-five out of sixty-two electorates (56.5%) were void as a result of their not attaining the fifty per cent poll requirement. Twenty-two of these (62.9%) were in the North Island, meaning that 81.5 per cent of all North Island electorates had invalid polls compared with only thirty-four per cent in the South Island. Fourteen electorates carried reduction, but only one of these, Wellington City, was in the North Island. Within the South Island there were obvious regional differences. Eight of the thirteen electorates which carried reduction were in the Otago-Southland region, with the other five being in and around Christchurch. The West Coast, Nelson and Marlborough, however, were solidly for continuance, while one electorate, Clutha, carried no-license. Similarly there were a greater number of committee members committed to twenty-five per cent reduction the further south one went. 6

How can this southern interest in prohibition be explained? First, the temperance campaign was fought with greater enthusiasm in places such as Dunedin and Christchurch, both centres of vibrant prohibitionist bodies, and both containing leading prohibitionists such as T.E. Taylor, the Revs. L.M. and F.W. Isitt, A.S. Adams and J.W. Jago. Associated with this was a division in the national temperance bodies. One section, centred on the Auckland province,

6. See Table 20, Appendix G.
Source: Seddon Papers 3/61, p. 46a, 1894.
believed that it should have nothing to do with the odious Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act which was regarded as a measure of the liquor trade and inoperative. It was also believed that the liquor trade was much better conducted in Auckland than in the south, and that therefore there was less need for reform. Organisation and activity by temperance bodies in that area were therefore at a minimum.

The sudden upswing in support for no-license south of the Waitaki River is also coincident with a sudden increase in the number of non-episcopalian church adherents, suggesting a strong connection between the two. Likewise, in the West Coast region the number of Roman Catholics was well above the national average, and this, along with a more rugged and working class environment (mining) with a higher proportion of unmarried men than was the norm, would suggest reasons for the strong vote for continuance in that region.

The Roman Catholic Church's liberal attitude towards the use of alcohol, and the role of the public bar as a substitute for the lack of stable homes created a social environment opposed to prohibition.

The Licensed Victuallers' Association explained the prohibitionists' success by arguing that, though they had been given plenty of time to organise, "the apathy displayed by many of our people has given the opposition a measure of success that they should not have"

9. See Table 13.
10. *ibid*.
11. See Table 14.
12. See pp. 11-12, 81-83.
TABLE 13

Religious adherence in specific licensing districts, 1896, as percentage of total population of district.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Anglican</th>
<th>Roman Catholic</th>
<th>Pietists</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>AUCKLAND CITY</td>
<td>44.63</td>
<td>9.25</td>
<td>33.86</td>
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<tr>
<td>THAMES</td>
<td>40.03</td>
<td>21.29</td>
<td>34.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHINEMURI</td>
<td>43.87</td>
<td>19.86</td>
<td>31.46</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAIAPU</td>
<td>48.09</td>
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<td>31.61</td>
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<td>HAWKES BAY</td>
<td>47.58</td>
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<td>WESTLAND</td>
<td>37.41</td>
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<td>25.19</td>
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<td>CHRISTCHURCH CITY</td>
<td>49.06</td>
<td>9.28</td>
<td>35.54</td>
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<td>9.57</td>
<td>29.07</td>
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<td>INVERCARGILL</td>
<td>26.82</td>
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<td>56.87</td>
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</table>

1. Pietists includes Presbyterians, Methodists (Wesleyan, Primitive, and Others), Baptists, Congregationalists, Brethren, Salvation Army, Seventh Day Adventists.

Source: Census of New Zealand, 1896.
Unmarried males over 21 years as a percentage of total males over 21 years, and as a percentage of total population over 21 years, in specific licensing districts, 1896. Males over 21 years as percentage of total population over 21 years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Unmarried Males Over 21 as % of Total Male Population Over 21</th>
<th>Unmarried Males Over 21 as % of Total Population Over 21</th>
<th>Total Males Over 21 as % of Total Population Over 21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auckland City</td>
<td>37.53</td>
<td>18.03</td>
<td>48.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thames</td>
<td>47.46</td>
<td>30.21</td>
<td>63.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohinemuri</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>66.74</td>
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<td>Waipu</td>
<td>46.05</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>60.14</td>
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<tr>
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<td>47.23</td>
<td>28.09</td>
<td>59.48</td>
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<td>62.36</td>
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<td>33.62</td>
<td>62.75</td>
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<td>32.61</td>
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<td>46.51</td>
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Source: Census of New Zealand, 1896.
achieved. "13 Because the fifty per cent poll requirement had encouraged many trade supporters not to vote, a true portrayal of the trade's support would have to wait until the 1896 poll.

The second major factor revealed by the poll was that, as far as the prohibition party was concerned, there was need for reform of the Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act. The most obvious fault in the prohibitionists' eyes was the fifty per cent poll requirement. Thirty-five of the sixty-two polls had been void because less than half of these electorates' voting population had voted. Many believed that this worked against their cause, and in the North Island particularly this was true. But some temperance observers were, like the trade representatives, aware that it could work against the liquor trade as well. As the Christian Outlook pointed out,

It puts a risky temptation in their
[the publican party's] way - the temptation to abstain in a body from voting...
It comes to this: If the publicans stay away from the poll, they lose the advantage of the three-fourths [3/4] majority clause.14

The majority of the prohibition party, however, were convinced that they would do better without the clause, at least in the achieving of reduction, and many also argued that it was against the principle of democratic government to count uncast votes.15

There was also considerable opposition to the three-fifths majority clause. Seven electorates in the Otago-Southland area would have voted for no-license if the bare majority had been the decision.


15. newspaper clipping, 1894, no source, report of Balclutha Temperance Convention, in Seddon Papers 3/7; Christian Outlook, 31 March, 1894, p. 73.
On this issue, however, the prohibitionists were more evenly divided; many realised that a three-fifths majority gave some stability which would not be present if only a fifty per cent majority was required each time. Such stability, it was argued, would give no-license a fair trial as the large majority of people would be in favour of it and the law would be more easily enforced as a result.

Once again, however, the more extreme section of the prohibition party, and also the more vocal, was keen to achieve prohibition as quickly as possible, and the three-fifths majority appeared to be a hindrance. For others the principles of democratic government were again at stake.

A third area of reform wanted in the licensing Act concerned informal votes. In some areas there had been a large number of these because of the complicated ballot paper. The prohibitionists demanded two things: that informal votes be counted towards the fifty per cent poll requirement; and that the ballot paper be simplified. There had been three issues to be decided at the 1894 poll: the continuance, reduction or prohibition of publicans' licences, accommodation licences, and bottle licences. This meant that each voter had nine possibilities from which to make three choices, one for each type of licence. Many voters did not cast three votes, either through indecision or confusion. The prohibition party argued that the votes they did cast should be counted, while the trade argued that these incomplete votes should be invalidated.

16. These were Invercargill, Mataura, Taieri, Caversham, Dunedin City, Chalmers, Oamaru.


18. *ibid*.

decided that these votes were invalid and that they should not be counted towards the achievement of the fifty per cent poll. As a result several electorates' polls were declared void which were not thought to have been so originally. Such a situation prompted the prohibitionists to agitate for a simpler ballot paper. In this they were unanimous, but the form of ballot paper they wanted was another divisive issue for them. Some wanted the choice to be simply between continuance and no-license. Others realised the value of reduction as a means of reform and wished to have the choice between continuance, reduction and no-license of publicans' licences, with each person having two votes.

Although the prohibition movement was seen to be divided between moderates and extremists on several of these issues, it was unified in demanding that the Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act be modified. It was also at one in realising the educational value of the licensing poll. Not only had it shown the prohibitionists that they needed to be active in preparing for the poll (compare the results in Auckland with the results in Otago-Southland), but it also showed that they had considerable support throughout the country. While the voting figures had to be used with care because many prohibitionists in the North had not voted and because the trade abstained in large numbers, the fact that the prohibitionists polled 6565 more votes than those in favour of continuance of publicans' licences was a valuable asset in strengthening their demands for reform of the liquor trade. It was felt that the liquor trade had been given clear warning that

22. DDT, 28 August, 1894, p. 4; 6 Sept, 1894; Christian Outlook, 8 Sept, 1894, p. 349.
the people were not satisfied with its conduct. If it wished to be allowed to continue to exist, then the publicans had been given every inducement by the result of the poll to see that regulation of the trade was effectively carried out during the next three years. If they did not or could not effect reform, however, then the next poll would see the whole nation vote the traffic out of existence. 23

Another positive result of the poll as interpreted by the prohibitionists was that those districts which had previously experienced prohibition this time overwhelmingly supported no-license. Sydenham, parts of Oamaru, Waitaki and Waihemo that were in the old Moeraki licensing district, and the Catlins (in Clutha electorate) showed by their votes that their experience of prohibition had not disillusioned them. 24 This strengthened the prohibitionist argument that it only required a fair experiment of prohibition and people would realise the benefits to be gained by it and would not wish to revert to license. This tended to ignore, however, that prohibitionists were not inclined to question the effects and values of their experiment with unbiased eyes. Any failure to enforce a no-license law was, they argued, not because people were opposed to it but because the police were not active enough in their duties. 25 An increase in the standard of living was not a result of an upswing in the economic situation but because people had been stopped from wasting their income on liquor. 26

Non-drinkers, convinced of the righteousness of their cause, were not likely to admit to anything else but success of a prohibitionist experiment; nor were they likely to change their votes. It was,

23. Christian Outlook, 31 March, 1894, p. 73.
24. N.Z. Baptist, April, 1894, p. 56.
26. See pp. 33-34.
therefore, only to be expected that areas that contained a solid body of convinced prohibitionists would continue to support no-license or prohibition. This did not, however, prove that once tried, prohibition would not be rejected.

A final revelation of the liquor poll was that the results showed that women were no more interested in the liquor issue than were men. The realisation that the female vote at the 1893 general election had been of a disparate nature did nothing to dispel the expectation and uncertainty that surrounded that vote at the liquor poll.

The uncertain factor, indeed, in the approaching contest is the extent to which women as a body will vote for prohibition. All the probabilities are in favour of the women's vote being caste en masse on the side of temperance; and in that case the experiment of absolute prohibition will be tried in New Zealand on a scale and with a thoroughness hitherto unknown.

Once more, however, the results showed that such expectations were unfounded. The poll resulted in a low voter turnout amongst both men and women. Proportionately considerably fewer women on the roll voted (43.72%) than did men (53.84%), while the vote itself, though 6.11 per cent higher for no-license than for continuance, revealed that the country was fairly evenly divided on the issue. The fact that large numbers of supporters of continuance did not vote so that the polls would be void by not achieving a fifty per cent voter turnout would suggest that the no-license majority was artificial and that the man in the street realised, even if the prohibitionist leaders and the newspaper commentators did not, that women were just as divided on the issue as men and did not pose a major threat to the

27. See pp. 105-108.

licensing system.

After the poll the press conceded that "the entrance of the petticoat into New Zealand politics has not been the overwhelming gain to temperance that was expected". Yet it still credited prohibition with being of more interest to women than men. Considerable adverse comment was directed at these "hard-faced women" and "pert misses" by the anti-prohibitionist press. It was argued that women who seek notoriety in this way [on the public platform and in street agitation] unsex themselves. All that can be hoped is that the common sense of the community at large will assert itself and refuse to let itself be dragged at the chariot wheels of a few noisy women and female men. Let it be trusted that a wave of reason will follow the present tidal wave of hysteria.

The hope that the results of the liquor poll gave the prohibitionists plus the obvious flaws in the Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act which worked against their greater success ensured that 1894 would see considerable agitation for alteration of the law along the lines already discussed.

In April various temperance bodies throughout New Zealand held meetings to discuss the results of the liquor poll and to draft resolutions calling for specific reforms of the licensing Act. In May deputations were sent to various members of the Government, most notably W.P. Reeves and Seddon. Reeves was an outspoken opponent of prohibition, but did believe in true temperance by means of education. Speaking as a private member and not on behalf of the Ministry he stated that he favoured the removal of the fifty per cent poll require-

29. *ibid.*, April, 1894.

ment and the fixing of a minimum as well as a maximum number of licences to be reduced. His opposition to the bare majority and to the removal of the reduction issue reflected his moderate position, as did his urging of the importance of reforming New Zealand's drinking habits by education, by improving the condition of the working classes, and by providing pleasures and recreation for those "whose leisure was their temptation". Reeves had not changed his position on the licensing issue from the previous year, but his opposition to the question was not solely on matters of opinion or approach. He saw that this issue was overshadowing other measures such as land and labour reform which he considered to be more fundamental issues requiring legislation. He was also aware that the prohibitionist section in Parliament threatened to split the Liberal Party in two with Stout and Seddon as leaders. The prohibitionists, who made up a large part of the left wing of the party, were more of a threat than the mutilated Opposition after the 1893 election, and this internecine strife limited the effectiveness of the Government in its reform programme as Seddon came to rely more heavily on the conservative wing of the Liberal Party. Reeves was not hesitant, therefore, in voicing his opposition to the prohibition movement.

On 28 May a prohibitionist deputation from Otago and Southland met the Premier and requested various alterations to the licensing law: removal of the fifty per cent poll requirement, introduction of the bare majority, a decrease in the three year term of licences,

31. DDT, 9 May, 1894, p. 2.
the inclusion of club charters and railway refreshment rooms in the liquor poll, the removal of the power of the chairman of a licensing committee to grant wholesale licences, and a two-issue-only ballot paper between license and no-license. 34 Seddon promised the deputation nothing, but in the Governor's Speech at the opening of Parliament a promise was made of an amending and consolidating licensing law. It was to be a non-party question and members were to be allowed to acknowledge pledges they had made to their electorates. 35 By making it a non-party issue Seddon was showing his political pragmatism. If the measure were defeated the Ministry would not feel compelled to resign, while at the same time the Liberal Party would not face the threat of being split on the liquor issue. Seddon was aware that Stout was still something of a threat, not so much to his position as leader of the Liberal Party but as the leader of a new prohibitionist Opposition party. 36 By attempting to remove this question from party politics Seddon was making sure "that Sir Robert Stout shall not float to the Premiershipl on a cold-water wave". 37

Seddon introduced a Licensing Amendment Bill on 21 August. In doing so he said that it "would be found to please the extremists, the moderates, the trade, and the people generally". 38 In the debate on the second reading he admitted that the 1893 Act was in some respects defective, and he went on to stipulate the defects: the fifty per cent poll, the lack of a national issue, and the taking of the poll on a day separate from the general election. He attempted to refute the

34. ODT, 29 May, 1894, p. 6.
37. ODT, 23 June, 1894, p. 2.
38. NZPD, 85, (21 August, 1894), p. 52.
accusations that the new Bill was not a sincere attempt at reform, and urged members to avoid long discussions of the Bill owing to the lateness of the session. 39

It was exactly this lateness that caused the accusations that the Government did not wish to see the Bill passed. It was a very large Bill of some two hundred and twenty-five clauses which, even with the minimum of debate, would take several days to go through the committee stages. Secondly it was as much a consolidation measure as an amending measure and, according to Mr R. McNab, the Statutes Revision Committee was already overloaded with work, which meant that the chances of this Bill being passed were slim. 40 Stout had earlier made similar charges of insincerity as a result of this attempt to consolidate the law. A consolidating measure was not the way in which the law was amended. 41

Charges against Seddon of his insincerity on this issue do appear to have been justified, and not only on the grounds already mentioned. He had introduced a Licensing Amendment Bill which offered a semblance of reform but which really gave the prohibitionists very little. The vital issues that would have made the advance of no-license more likely were left untouched. The three-fifths majority was retained. The fifty per cent poll requirement was to be reduced to 25%, but it was thought that this would encourage the trade supporters to vote as well as the prohibitionists, and would again make it difficult for the prohibitionists to gain the three-fifths majority. 42

40. ibid., pp. 653-654.
41. DDT, 23 August, 1894, p. 4.
42. ibid., 28 August, 1894, p. 4.
Seddon had also introduced clauses which he knew would be opposed by the prohibitionists and would therefore delay the measure even though he urged the avoidance of prolonged debates. One such clause included the introduction of national prohibition if three-fifths of the votes at the various district polls throughout the colony were given in favour of the proposal that no licences should be granted. This had not been demanded by the large majority of prohibitionists, who so far were satisfied to have local option only. It was thought that Seddon was using this clause in an attempt to alienate the moderate vote from reduction and no-license.

There was also opposition to the proposed change in the selection of licensing committees. No longer were they to be elective, but rather to be appointed from the chairman of various other local bodies. This meant that neither the trade nor the prohibitionists would be able to elect committees pledged to full reduction or otherwise. Some objective observers thought this change in selection might be beneficial, as the 1894 poll had shown partisan selection of what were meant to be impartial judicial bodies. The majority of temperance workers were, however, outspokenly opposed to this change in the law. It was seen as an undemocratic and reactionary step. An article in the Christian Outlook argued that elective committees under the 1893 Act had for the first time allowed representatives of the class who suffered most from drink to be elected to the licensing committees. Previously those on the committees had come from a social position which enabled

44. ODT, 28 August, 1894, p. 4.
45. ibid., 23 August, 1894, p. 2.
then to live in areas away from the evil influence of the public bar. They had taken care not to issue licences in "aristocratic districts". As a result licensed houses were forced into those areas where the people, "the working class", did not have sufficient influence to keep them out. The 1893 Act had changed this by allowing representatives of the working classes to be elected to the licensing committees. To remove this power by making the committees appointive from local bodies' chairmen would result in a reversal to the original position.46 A movement which aimed at helping the working classes to improve their conditions was not likely to allow such a reversal to take place without considerable debate. It was issues such as this which made it difficult for many to believe that Seddon really wanted this Bill to pass.

The prohibition party was, however, not unappreciative of some aspects of the Bill, particularly relating to the taking of the poll, the simplification of the voting paper, and the enforcement of the licensing regulations. The executive of the New Zealand Alliance urged the holding of meetings throughout the country in support of the Bill. Seddon seems to have convinced many of the temperance party that he was offering them considerable reforms when, in effect, he was offering only a few minor alterations in the regulations governing the conducting of the polls and the enforcement of the liquor trading laws. It is little wonder that individuals such as the Isitt brothers and Robert McNab were wary of the Bill, hinting broadly that it was little more than "an insidious device on the part of a perfidious Government for leading the Temperance party into a

Divisions in the temperance party were again becoming apparent.

Within Parliament, however, there was need for unity amongst the temperance supporters if anything at all was to be achieved that session. It was therefore decided that the minority should support the majority in every decision reached, and that only one speech should be made on an amendment whenever possible. Despite such tactics the Bill made slow progress through the committee stages. The temperance party, led by Robert McNab, kept its discussion to a minimum, but even so, with one hundred amendments, some of which were dropped to facilitate progress, debate was inevitable. The opponents of temperance reform expressed disgust at the temperance party's "conspiracy of silence". It is probable that they had hoped that the temperance party would halt the Bill by long and acrimonious debates. Instead its silence forced the opponents of any change to attempt to halt the Bill by calling for progress reports at the committee stage, where the Bill lapsed in the last days of the session.

Because of the large number of amendments, because of the lateness of the session, and because of the magnitude of the whole licensing issue, the Bill did not have a chance of success from the very moment it was introduced. Seddon knew this and was thus able to appear the picture of a moderate and conciliatory reformer that the colonial press drew. His tact, diplomacy and moderate stance


during the debates brought him nothing but credit. He made sure of
his position when on 9 October, after a motion had been passed by a
small majority on 5 October, that progress be reported, he continued
with the Bill when he could easily have allowed it to lapse, or even
have had it withdrawn.51 Thus when it did lapse it was not Seddon
who received the blame.

There was no great outcry from any section of the community
over the failure of the Bill to pass through Parliament. It was
realized that there was still 1895 in which such legislation could be
passed in order to affect the 1896 licensing poll. It was also
realized that the present Bill was not entirely satisfactory. For
the prohibitionists it did not go far enough; for the trade it went
too far; and for the moderate section of the community it was too
rushed. It was a Bill that should be debated in public rather than
passed in silence; it was a Bill that affected public and private
property and should therefore not be treated lightly.52 These were
moderate and responsible sentiments, and it was to the credit of both
the trade and the prohibitionists that they did not engage in an
acrimonious exchange over the Bill's failure.

There was little doubt that the licensing issue would re-
emerge in the 1895 parliamentary session. A new factor, and one
which Seddon could not anticipate, also emerged: a more unified
prohibition party, both in structure and in aims. It has already
been seen that in the struggle for licensing reform the prohibition-
ists were not at one in what they desired. Some were in favour of
the bare majority, and some saw stability in having the three-fifths
requirement. Some were in favour of having a national prohibition

52. NZO, 20 Oct, 1894, p. 2.
option as well as a local no-license option; others did not think that the country was ready for such an experiment as national prohibition. Some were against reduction as being a divisive third issue, while others saw it as an effective means of reform. Some were in favour of elective licensing committees, while others were opposed to having to resort to politics for the appointing of a presumably impartial body. Some favoured the 1893 Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act and some did not. While they were divided over the legislative aims of their movement there was not a great deal that they could expect to achieve in the face of a hostile liquor trade and an unconvinced, if not opposing, Government. Realising this the various temperance organisations, led by the New Zealand Alliance, sought a solution.

Moves had been afoot since 1893 to affiliate the various Prohibition Leagues and other temperance organisations with the New Zealand Alliance. Nothing was achieved at that time, however, largely because the Alliance Executive had promoted its Direct Veto Bill in the name of the prohibition party but without consultation with the various branches of that party. This action had put considerable strain on the relations between the Alliance and the Leagues. In 1894 the head office of the Alliance was moved from Auckland to Wellington so as to be at the centre of the legislative action. Further attempts were made at federation of the various bodies, and a compromise allowing half of the Alliance Executive to be elected by its annual meeting and half by the other organisations was reached. All was not solved, however. The Alliance Agent, the Rev. E. Walker, caused considerable friction both within and outside the Alliance.

through his parliamentary tactics. These were considered by a large section of the party to be compromising its dignity and independence by committing it to a policy of legislative reform without first consulting the various branches throughout the country. 54

In February-April, 1895, efforts were made in the four main centres to form divisional branches of the New Zealand Alliance in order to combine all temperance organisations in more workable and influential bodies, in the hope that a united temperance party might be formed. It was hoped that before the next Parliament met,

the party would be unified throughout the colony, so that they might speak, not as Good Templars, not as members of the Prohibition League, not as the New Zealand Alliance, not as Bands of Hope or Blue Ribbon Societies or as Rechabites or as Sons and Daughters of Temperance, but as the united Temperance party of New Zealand. 55

Provincial Prohibition Councils, or Conventions, were formed, and at the colonial convention of all the temperance forces called by the Alliance in early July, these provincial bodies were given representation on the Alliance Executive in place of the various individual organisations. A committee was established to perfect the organisation of the new united Temperance party, and a plan of campaign for the ensuing parliamentary session was adopted. 56

The result was "an immensely increased and effective agitation to completely sweep away the traffic in alcoholic drinks". 57

This unification was a sensible move for the temperance workers in their drive to achieve prohibition in that it strengthened

54. ibid.

55. A.S. Adams, speaking at Otago Prohibition Convention, reported in DOT, 13 April, 1895, p. 3.

56. Prohibitionist, 15 June, 1895, p. 5.

their voice on legislative matters. It was also an obvious move to make because so many prohibitionists were to be found in two or three of the local organisations, working for the same or similar ends. It was better that these groups work in unison rather than duplicating activities by working separately. But there was an adverse effect in this move towards "strength through unity", at least for organisations such as the I.O.G.T., the Sons and Daughters of Temperance, and the Rechabites. With the emphasis on national legislation and national organisation, these smaller bodies, whose emphasis had been on education and local influence, suffered a decline in importance. In many instances their leaders, while remaining in nominal attachment, were too busy leading the national bodies to give much time to the local branch. This was the price that had to be paid if national reform were to be achieved. It was also the result of a shift from reform through education to reform by legislation.

It was a united temperance party with definite ideas as to legislative reform that now faced the Government at the opening of the 1895 session of Parliament. It was a prohibitionist party, with one eye on the next licensing poll and the hope of gaining not only more areas for no-license but the whole country for prohibition if at all possible, that now prepared to join battle with the liquor forces of New Zealand. But to make the battle fair there had to be a modification of the Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act. To this end the New Zealand Alliance had had a Bill drawn up in March by A.S. Adams of Dunedin, and explained throughout the colony by means of about 12,000 leaflets. The principles of this Bill were accepted by the new united temperance body and the Bill was introduced into the House of Representatives by R. McNab of Mataura. Its major points related
to the removal of the fifty per cent poll, the replacement of the three-fifths majority by a bare majority, the removal of the reduction issue, and the introduction of both a local and a national licensing poll. 58

The attitude of the Government to this Bill was well known even before it had been introduced. To a deputation from the N.Z.A. on 4 July Seddon stated clearly that, while he would concede the error of the fifty per cent poll requirement, he was not going to interfere with the three-fifths majority. He adopted the position that a reform such as prohibition should not be passed by a mere chance vote but should be sure of a strong and educated temperance sentiment in the community to back it up. "There was a difference between earnestness and dictation," he said. "Any reform must carry the people with it, and my Government could only pass legislation that would be supported by the people". 59

In introducing the second reading of this Licensing Act Amendment Bill McNab stressed the fact that it had found widespread support amongst temperance circles from Invercargill to Auckland. 60 He criticised the Government for promising reform at the end of the 1894 session and not having yet acted upon that promise. The Government's proposed Bill, however, was circulated that very day. While the private Bill passed its second reading on a voice vote, it was generally understood to have served its purpose in compelling the Government to act on this question. 61

59. ODT, 8 July, 1895, p. 2.
The Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act Amendment Bill of 1895 proved to be another measure on which Seddon's motives were severely questioned. As introduced by Seddon this Bill offered four choices to the electors - continuance, reduction, local no-license and national prohibition. Each elector would be entitled to vote on any one or two proposals, but on no more than two, and the voting would not be cumulative. Predictably the temperance party's reaction was that Seddon was trying to split the prohibitionist vote by giving them three options favourable to reform from which to choose. In committee this clause was changed to give each voter two or three votes, but this was still further changed by the Legislative Council which removed the national prohibition issue and allowed each voter to have two votes. Many members of the Legislative Council considered national prohibition to be a travesty of individual liberty, while the opposition in the House of Representatives thought it was in advance of public opinion. Seddon appeared determined to retain this clause in the Bill, even when, after a conference with the Council, it was obvious that it could not be achieved. His motives are open to speculation, and he was certainly attacked for trying to destroy the Bill completely by means of this clause. He was overruled by the House, however, including the prohibition supporters in it. They realised that if they could obtain the other advantages embodied in the Bill without national prohibition they would have gained something rather than nothing.

63. ibid., 88, 90, 91, (1895), passim, debates on Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Bill.
64. ibid., 91, (21 Oct, 1895), pp. 510-511, 512.
Whether Seddon really wanted the national option vote to remain on the ballot paper is not known. By first introducing this four choice ballot paper, however, and then having to sacrifice one of the choices as a means of compromise, he did ensure that the reduction issue, which sections of the temperance party had wanted to remove, was retained. This meant that those who wanted moderate reform would still have an issue which they could support without feeling compelled to vote for local prohibition.

Seddon also tried to alienate the moderate vote from no-license by moving that prohibition be complete and not just involve public bars. By doing this it was believed that temperate drinkers would vote continuance rather than reduction or no-license. This, too, was altered in committee, but was to re-emerge in 1903-1904 as the major licensing issue.

A second divisive issue in the Bill was the timing of the liquor poll. Should it be on the same day as the general election or should it be separate? The temperance party's Bill had asked for the local option poll to be taken triennially in April and the colonial option poll to be on the same day as the election. The combining of the issues in the one ballot paper precluded such an arrangement. Seddon was determined, if at all possible, to remove the licensing issue from the political arena, where it still seemed to pose a threat to the unity of the Liberal Party. He realised, however, that separating the days of the poll and election would not remove the temperance party's agitation for candidates who favoured certain aspects of licensing reform. It was preferable, therefore, that there be only one poll, and having it at the same time as the general election would prove less disruptive to the country, and

66. ibid., 88, (2 August, 1895), pp. 410-411,413; See pp.212-221.
would ensure a better expression of the people's views on the licensing issue.\textsuperscript{67} While admitting the reasonableness of this provision the temperance party also argued that the linking of the licensing poll to the day of the election threatened the regular taking of such a poll if Parliament were dissolved before its three year term was over.\textsuperscript{68} It was thus not surprising that this issue should have been voted on three times in the committee stages before it was settled in favour of Seddon's proposal.\textsuperscript{69}

The removal of the fifty per cent poll requirement was a further attempt by Seddon to separate the liquor issue from the political sphere. By granting this demand of the prohibitionists he removed one of their biggest complaints against the 1893 Act. It was not a difficult concession to make as, by connecting the liquor poll with the general election, it was considered unlikely that there would be less than a fifty per cent voter turnout. At the same time, some cynics could argue, it would encourage the liquor trade to be more active in its own defence.\textsuperscript{70}

On one issue the Government was adamant, and that was the retention of the three-fifths majority necessary to carry prohibition. That section, the majority, of the temperance party which favoured the bare majority was forced to accept this or else lose all the other improvements that this Bill offered.\textsuperscript{71} All in all the prohibitionists regarded the Bill, as it passed its third reading in the House by forty-five votes to two, as "the most advanced measure of temperance

\textsuperscript{67} NZPD, 88, (31 July, 1895), pp. 344-345; (2 August, 1895), p. 413.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 90, (27 Sept, 1895), pp. 558-561.

\textsuperscript{69} N.Z.A., Annual Report, 1895-1896, p. 5.


reform that has ever passed a legislative assembly within the boundaries of the British Empire".\textsuperscript{72} Their favourable response and the general consensus both in the House and the press that the Bill was fairly satisfactory to all parties made it seem unlikely that the Council would alter the Bill in any major way. It was certainly not expected that a nominated body would seriously attempt to thwart the wishes of the representative section of the legislature. This was, however, the period when the Legislative Council was fighting to retain its effectiveness against attempts by Seddon to render it impotent.\textsuperscript{73} It was, therefore, not against attacking a Government-sponsored Bill, and particularly one relating to a question on which it was known that the Government was not united. The N.Z.A. accused the Council of being under the influence of the liquor trade, whose influence was felt to be obvious in the amendments inserted.\textsuperscript{74} The major alteration was the removal of the colonial prohibition issue from the ballot paper. This might have been acceptable if a further change had not been made in restricting each voter to one vote on three issues. This was considered a retrogressive step even from the 1893 Act which allowed a vote for no-license to be counted in favour of reduction if no-license was not carried. The Council further attempted to protect club licences from the popular vote and to reintroduce the fifty per cent poll.\textsuperscript{75}

The temperance party both within and outside Parliament were prepared to sacrifice the whole Bill rather than to accept any of these changes.

\textsuperscript{72} N.Z.A., Annual Report, 1895-1896, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{73} See W.K. Jackson, The New Zealand Legislative Council, (Dunedin, 1972), pp. 161-165.
\textsuperscript{74} N.Z.A., Annual Report, 1895-1896, p. 6.
amendments. The Wellington Prohibition League, the Otago Prohibition Council and the Dunedin Prohibition League went so far as to resolve "to submit the question together with the radical reform of the Upper Chamber to the country at the next general election". 76

The Government, however, wanted to reach some solution, and Seddon suggested a conference between the two chambers. The extreme prohibitionists felt that it was not worthwhile as only a compromise measure at best would be obtained. Instead they urged that a firm stand be taken, but others realised that this would spell the end of the Bill for 1895. 77 This led to charges that the prohibitionists wanted the liquor question to remain undecided so as to affect the 1896 election. 78 Such charges were not justified in that the prohibition party had favoured the Government Bill as it had left the House of Representatives, but it was prepared to fight the Council's amendments at the hustings if need be rather than accept them. Counter charges were made against the Government for being insincere in having introduced a Bill which it had no desire to see passed. It was argued that it had allowed it to pass on the understanding that the Upper House would amend it in such a way that the Lower House would then reject it. 79 These, however, would appear to have been the reactions of frustrated extremists on both sides of the question. There is little doubt that the majority had been satisfied with the Government's Bill, and it had offered Seddon his best opportunity of removing the issue from politics. It was in his interests to settle the question, not to have it affecting the Government's legislative

76. DDT, 5 Oct, 1895, p. 4; 8 Oct, 1895, p. 2.
78. ibid.
79. ibid.
programme, the Liberal Party's unity and every election.

Two conferences were held with representatives of the Council. After the first, in which the Council dropped the reintroduction of the fifty per cent poll and allowed two votes to every elector, but would not allow a national prohibition poll or include clubs in the liquor poll, Seddon moved that the Bill be dropped. This was defeated, however, by the Speaker's casting vote, and a second conference was arranged. This time it was agreed to allow the 50% poll in any electorate where the seat was uncontested, to give every voter two votes, to drop the national prohibition issue, and to remove club licences from popular control. Seddon was still opposed to the removal of the clauses concerning the national issue and popular control of clubs, and he felt that their absence made the Bill worthless. Again he was accused of trying to have the Bill rejected, but in terms of his aim to remove this whole issue from the political sphere this was not a fair accusation. He could see that if these questions of national prohibition and club licences were not brought under the popular vote the prohibitionists' demands for such a change would persist. To this extent the compromise solution brought about by the Council's actions would ensure that agitation and political interference by the prohibitionists would continue, and the whole purpose of the Bill as Seddon had seen it would be defeated. Few people in either branch of the legislature were throughly satisfied with the amended Bill. Realising, however, that the end of the session was at hand, that further debate and conference would achieve nothing, and not

82. ibid., p. 590-593.
wishing to have to debate the whole issue again in an election year, both Houses finally agreed to accept the amendments and the Bill was enacted on 31 October, 1895.83

It was generally acknowledged throughout the country and in the House that this Act was an advance on the Act of 1893, yet everyone realised, as Seddon had done earlier, that it would not end the agitation from the prohibition party.84 It is not surprising to find that in 1896 the prohibitionists were agitating for the very things which Seddon had been loath to have removed from his Bill by the Council - the national prohibition issue and the control of clubs. Along with these was the unending demand for the removal of the three-fifths majority.85 Once again, however, Seddon failed to carry a Government measure to provide for a national prohibition poll and popular control of clubs because of the opposition in the Legislative Council.86

If Seddon hoped to remove the whole licensing question from his doorstep he was at some stage going to have to concede a national prohibition poll and the bare majority to the prohibitionists. The fact that before his death in 1906 he conceded neither of them is a reflection of his political ability. He had defused the issue by means of the licensing poll, and he ably maintained a balance between the

86. NZPD, 96, (1896), passim, debates on Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act 1895 Amendment Bill; W.K. Jackson, op. cit., pp. 63, 162.
extremist groups of the trade and the prohibitionists. It was an indictment of the political strength of the temperance party which at no stage could rally enough support either in Parliament or at the general election polls to defeat Seddon on these issues. While the prohibition issue encouraged outbursts of real enthusiasm for and against itself, its importance was more apparent than real in the wider life of the nation. It was not an issue on which governments would rise or fall.

The failure of the Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act Amendment Bill of 1896 guaranteed that the licensing issue would play a major part in the political campaigning prior to the 1896 general election. Meanwhile, while much energy was being concentrated on the legislative issues, efforts were also being made by the temperance party to educate people throughout the colony to vote in favour of no-license. The arguments for prohibition were expounded in the press, the pulpit, the public platform and through the post. Optimism was at a peak and, if enthusiasm and public interest were anything to go by, the prohibitionists seemed assured of considerable success. As early as January 1896 the Rev F.W. Isitt was predicting that prohibition would be carried in a large part of the area from North Canterbury to Invercargill. 87

The prohibitionists based their estimates on a number of factors. First there were the results of the 1894 poll. It was thought that there would be an advance of no-license support in all electorates, and this encouraged them to believe that any electorate which had polled over fifty per cent in favour of no-license in 1894 would achieve or approach sixty per cent in 1896. Twenty electorates, seventeen of which were in Otago, Southland and Canterbury, were therefore expected

87. DDT, 24 Jan, 1896, p. 2.
to go dry. This reasoning ignored the fact that in 1894 there had only been a 43.32 per cent voter turnout, which was hardly enough on which to base reliable forecasts. It also ignored the fact that the fifty per cent poll requirement in 1894 had encouraged many liquor trade supporters to abstain from voting. The removal of this requirement for the 1896 poll would most likely ensure that this time the trade supporters would vote in force, upsetting in consequence many of the predictions based on the 1894 figures.

The second basis for the prohibitionists' estimates was that they expected that reduction would this time be carried in most electorates as it was believed that any one who supported no-license would also vote for reduction as a second means of reform. Thirdly, the women's vote, which had not been fully expressed in 1894, was now thought to be better organised and was expected to support prohibition. Fourthly, the conduct of the trade in the last three years had not been greatly improved, and this, along with the public agitation and education carried out by the temperance party, was also expected to be to the prohibitionists' advantage. The temperance bodies had certainly not been idle. The Agent and Secretary of the N.Z.A. had between them held meetings at no less than 141 different centres by June, 1896, and many of these had more than one meeting. No less than 55,000 copies of articles stating the prohibitionist position had been distributed, while 220,000 reprints of Alliance leaflets had also been circulated. In many areas door-to-door distribution was undertaken. It would probably have been difficult to have found a person who had not heard of the prohibition issue.

The fifth reason for the prohibitionists' hopes of a favourable

poll lay with the large body of new voters (91,036), many of whom since the last poll had reached the voting age of twenty-one. The prohibitionists were quite prepared to claim these for their own, in the belief that the temperance agitation would have educated the young as to the dangers of alcohol, and that they would therefore reject it. An article in the Advocate after the 1894 poll summarised this enthusiastic optimism of the temperance party:

In the next battle for home and prosperity, we therefore look for the following gains:—
The gain from a thorough contest in every electorate; the gain from the complete enrolment of women; the gain from the coming of age of thousands of young people; and the gain from eliminating the traps for informal voting. These will represent a vast increase in the total of those going to the poll; and of that vast increase, we have not the faintest doubt to which side the large majority will belong.\(^9\)

There seems little doubt that the prohibitionists believed they would be successful in the 1896 poll. Their planning was thorough, with visiting lecturers touring the country, temperance sermons prior to the poll, house-to-house campaigning, widespread newspaper publicity and advertising, and public meetings, demonstrations and processions.

The liquor trade was slow to react to this apparent major threat to its existence. It seemed to be as convinced of its safety as the prohibitionists were of its defeat, and was certainly not prepared for any serious threat. At the provincial level were various Licensed Victuallers' Associations and Brewers' and Wine and Spirit Merchants' Associations, the latter also having a national executive in Wellington. Their activities were however, minimal, being mainly restricted to committees which made quarterly reports and

89. Advocate, 25 August, 1894, p. 139.
to a Brewers' annual conference. The national secretary of the Brewers' and Wine and Spirit Merchants' Association frequently complained that the liquor trade would not defend itself. It certainly did not approach the prohibitionists in campaigning for its continued existence. Apart from one or two paid lecturers in local areas, such as W.W. Collins in Canterbury, and the occasional retort in various newspapers, the trade's stance was one of reasonable external passiveness. It did, however, have the support of two other groups, the Liberty League and the press.

The Liberty League was established by a group of individuals in Christchurch about May-June, 1896, and quickly spread to other centres in the South Island. Its position was soon apparent when its programme revealed it to be non-political, anti-prohibitionist and pro-liberty of the individual. It quickly gained the support of the Licensed Victuallers' Association of Otago and Canterbury and also the Brewers' and Wine and Spirit Merchants Association, though the latter did not supply the League with funds. One of its paid lecturers, Mr J.D. Sievwright of Oamaru, gave a series of speeches in Dunedin in September, 1896, his theme being the fallacy of prohibition. After this, however, the League seems to have faded quietly from the scene. It could not maintain, or even attain, the level of enthusiasm and activity of the temperance party.

90. H.J. Williams to J. Wells, 28 August, 1899, MS Papers 1629, Brewers and Wine and Spirit Merchants of N.Z., vol. 8, p. 185; also vol. 7, passim, Alexander Turnbull Library.


92. ODT, Sept, 1896, passim; Christian Outlook, 19 Sept, 1896, p. 403.
The majority of the press in the colony was also against prohibition, believing that it was a trammelling upon the liberty of the people and would only result in increased breaking of the law rather than achieve any great social reform. They based their arguments on the experience of various states in the U.S.A., and also upon the two years of no-license in the Clutha electorate. Conflicting reports had been issued about the effects of no-license in that area. On the one hand the trade argued that it had proved impossible to enforce a prohibition law; on the other the prohibitionists insisted that there had been a decrease in obvious drunkenness and convictions relating to drunkenness, and that any breach of the law had been the result of inadequate laws and a corrupt police force. Such conflicting arguments probably convinced few but the already convinced; there were certainly elements of truth on both sides. As well as this the press, like the trade, also emphasised the financial loss to the colony of the revenue from licence fees and the tax on alcoholic liquors, not to mention the loss of many jobs associated with the liquor industry.

Despite these attempts to defend the trade against the onslaught of prohibition, the relative quiet of the trade suggests three possibilities. Perhaps it felt secure behind the three-fifths vote, although there was no reason why it should after the result in Clutha in 1894. Perhaps it chose to ignore the potential threat of the prohibitionist forces because it had a closer relationship with the


95. DDT, 7 Nov, 1896, p. 4; 1 Dec, 1896, p. 2.
mass of the people and their attitude to drinking. The temperance party might draw on the churches and the professions, but the mass of the population, the working class, were the main patronisers of the hotel bars, and it was with these that the trade had its contact. The vocal enthusiasm of a minority of the population might seem to pose a threat, but the relative disinterest in that enthusiasm by the mass of the people may have convinced the liquor trade that it need have nothing to fear.

Or thirdly, perhaps the trade's influence was more subtle and less public. The various prohibitionist papers and journals were not slow to accuse the trade of underhand and unscrupulous methods of influence by means of its large financial resources. Accusations were made that votes had been bought or otherwise obtained through threats and cajolery. The most remarkable claim came from the Rev. F.W. Isitt in the Review of Reviews for January 1897. Having argued that enormous efforts were made by both sides, but that on the whole the prohibitionists were better organised, he then launched into an attack on the trade's methods.

The publicans had known no scruple in the means they adopted to secure their own ends. Tradesmen had been threatened with the boycott unless they avowed their determination to vote as the publicans wished. Timid women had been frightened out of voting as they wished to do, by being told that if No License were carried it would result in a bloody revolution. Not a few men were so impressed by this 'bull-dozing' that they were heard to express a fear that a riot would result if No License were carried.

96. N.Z. Baptist, Jan, 1897, p. 9; Christian Outlook, 12 Dec, 1896, p. 545.

No such accusations were made, however, prior to the taking of the liquor poll, but were only given voice by the prohibitionists after their disappointment at the polling results. If, as they said, the trade had been very active in this direction, why had it not been obvious before the poll, and why had they not used such information to discredit the liquor party and gain further votes for their fight against this "corrupting" influence in society? It seems that these accusations came from a highly disappointed pressure group whose expectations had been so high prior to the poll that its failure to make any significant gains resulted in the grasping at any possible reason, however remote, that would justify its position and give it inspiration and hope for the future.

The results of the 1896 licensing poll were, in the light of the expectations of the prohibitionists and the press prior to the poll, revealing, unexpected, and a "rude shock", not only for the prohibition party but for the whole country. The national vote for no-license was only 37.83 per cent compared with 53.71 per cent for continuance. Not a single electorate favoured no-license, not even Clutha which had voted out all publicans' licences in 1894. Of sixty-two electorates only five polled more than fifty per cent in favour of no-license. Fifty-two carried continuance, ten no proposal as the required majorities were not reached, and none carried reduction. This was perhaps the biggest shock of the results. With two effective votes it was expected that those voting for no-license would vote for reduction as well. These votes plus those of the moderates who wanted reform but not prohibition were expected to produce a higher

99. See Table 20, Appendix G.
reduction vote than no-license vote. In no less than forty-seven electorates, however, the vote for reduction was less than the vote for no-license. The only reason for such a result seemed to be that the people did not yet fully understand the method of voting on these issues.

The N.Z.A. executive, however, was a little more astute when it argued that the moderate party, prepared to vote for a diminution in the number of licences but not for total abolition, did not exist. It therefore proposed the deletion of the reduction issue from the ballot paper, and argued that it had never been a demand of the prohibitionists to have anything more than a choice between continuance and prohibition.\textsuperscript{100} Another section of the prohibition movement argued, however, that in 1894 many moderates had voted for no-license in order to frighten the liquor trade into reforming itself. Since then temperance education had proceeded with such rapidity that these moderates had taken fright and "turned virulently against Prohibition".\textsuperscript{101}

The confusion as to the exact nature of the moderate vote was apparent, and remained so throughout the period 1894-1914. As to the reduction issue, the no-license army came to appreciate its presence when it offered them some reform where no-license proved unattainable. In 1896, however, it appeared to be a non-issue which only confused many voters.

Another major revelation brought about by the poll was that the temperance party had not the strength which it was thought to have had. It was argued that,

\textit{it may be presumed that the full strength of the prohibitionist vote has been polled, and it proves to be true - what many}

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Christian Outlook}, 12 Dec, 1896, p. 545.
suspected - that the bogey of prohibition only wanted daylight so that it might be exposed, and that the mass of the people have yet to be reached.\textsuperscript{102}

Such a situation is not surprising when it is realised that as already discussed, the estimates for prohibitionist support were based on the returns for the 1894 poll with all its incompleteness. The daily press took delight in informing the public of the weakness of the prohibitionist cause, and used it to argue against any further change in the licensing laws. The people were believed to have given an emphatic pronouncement against any further interference with individual liberty in the direction desired by the prohibitionists.\textsuperscript{103} The editor of the \textit{Otago Workman} even went so far as to talk of "the wretched, miserable, insignificant few" and its "moribund condition".\textsuperscript{104} These descriptions, while emotive and brutal, would appear reasonably justified in the light of the voting figures.

The proportion of females on the roll who voted was no greater than that of males - 76.35 per cent females compared with 76.79 per cent males. One newspaper editor wrote:

\begin{quote}
The result of the poll was to demonstrate beyond a shadow of a doubt, that the people of this colony don't want Prohibition, and that the women, whose block vote was relied upon as certain to be cast for Prohibition, proved wiser than their "spiritual guides" and loyal to their conjugalities as well as sensible.\textsuperscript{105}
\end{quote}

The ideas that most women were in favour of prohibition and that they were under the influence of men of the cloth were again revealed,

\textsuperscript{102}  \textit{ODT}, 8 Dec, 1896, p. 2.


\textsuperscript{104}  \textit{Otago Workman}, 12 Dec, 1896, p. 4.

along with the implicit approval of their subjection to their husbands' opinions.

While there was surprised approval at the outcome of the female vote at the poll, there was no change in the continued stereotyping of the female role within society and within the prohibition agitation. For the prohibition movement the basic assumption that the liquor issue was of particular interest to women did not change. They no longer assumed, however, that female support was automatic. Rather women had to be made aware of why the issue was of prime importance to them. Such a realisation amongst prohibitionists meant a change in emphasis during the next few years as they attempted to educate women to their own way of thinking. As a result greater attention was given to persuading women of the effect of liquor on their homes, their families, and society's values. They now set out to convince women of the validity of the arguments on which they had based their assumption of women's support prior to the 1896 poll. The annual report of the Dunedin branch of the W.C.T.U. saw the situation thus:

Women, who are the greatest sufferers from this accursed traffic, have certainly for some unaccountable reason traded to the lowering of humanity by their late vote for continuance of license...Have women really lost all love for their fallen and degraded sisters, not to speak of the thousands of poor starved children, through this drink traffic, and the wrecks of husbands and brothers by the same cause? Let every woman who voted in this fearful traffic look upon every drunkard as a specimen of her handiwork...In working for the abolition of the liquor traffic we are doing the work of God - we are making happier homes, and we are working for the uplifting of humanity.106

106. Cited in ODT, 3 Feb, 1897, p. 4.
More generally, the poll results revealed that the support for no-license throughout New Zealand had dropped from 45.57 per cent in 1894 to 37.83 per cent in 1896, while the vote for continuance had increased from 39.46 per cent to 53.71 per cent.

The prohibitionists had their own explanation for this reversal. The reaction of the moderate voter against prohibition and the opposition of the press and the trade had resulted in a check to the cause of reform, but, in their irrepressible way, the temperance party argued that "that is the law of Progress. God often delays it unexpectedly...God trains by delay. But delay is not defeat. It is a stage on the way to triumph". 107 For many the increase in the crude vote for no-license from 48,993 to 98,312 was sign enough that they were on the road to success and were a force with which to be reckoned. 108 The fact that the continuance vote had risen from 42,429 to 139,580 did not seem to modify their judgement. It was argued that, "at the same rate of increase during the next three years, No License will be won for the colony. Workers in this great movement have not the least cause for discouragement". 109 Such sentiments were reinforced by the Agent for the N.Z.A., the Rev. E. Walker, who wrote that the prohibitionists were still hopeful "of carrying colonial prohibition with the new century". 110 Either he was extremely optimistic or merely trying to convince the temperance party that the situation was better than it seemed.

The Rev. F.W. Isitt injected some realism into the debate,

110. ODT, 30 Dec, 1896, p. 3., letter.
however, when he wrote that the prohibitionists were keenly disappointed by the result, having confidently expected to carry no-license in at least five or six electorates and to obtain reduction in a much larger number.\textsuperscript{111} This disappointment was reflected in the dearth of material relating to prohibition activity as reported in the press columns for late 1896 and early 1897. The 1896 liquor poll seems to have been a serious blow to the movement, despite statements to the contrary. It is interesting to note, for example, that the annual meeting of the Dunedin W.C.T.U. called for 2 February 1897 had to be postponed because only six members were present, and this despite the approaching licensing committee elections.\textsuperscript{112} An air of dejection appeared to have settled on many of the prohibitionists despite the use of words to bolster their belief in the success of the 1896 poll. Even though the Liberty League in Dunedin had already selected candidates for the licensing committee elections to counter expected prohibition candidates, the monthly meeting of the Dunedin Prohibition League resolved that,

> the majority of the electors of Dunedin City having decided that the liquor traffic should continue as it is, and having thus accepted the responsibility for all the evils which will flow from the undiminished sale of strong drink during the next three years, this league resolves to leave the management of that traffic in the hands of those who are responsible for it.\textsuperscript{113}

The licensing committee might not have had the people's mandate to reduce licenses, but it did have a say in the conduct of licensed houses and was also responsible for the issuing of new licenses.

\textsuperscript{111} Cited in \textit{Star}, 18 Feb, 1897, in Seddon Papers 3/13.
\textsuperscript{112} \textit{ODT}, 3 Feb, 1897.
\textsuperscript{113} Cited in \textit{ODT}, 9 Feb, 1897, p. 2.
It was, therefore, no mere rubber stamp. Yet the prohibition party was prepared to leave it alone, in Dunedin at least. Its despondency over the liquor poll results appears to have been deeper than at first it seemed. The initial forced enthusiastic response to the polling results had given way to a realistic appraisal of the situation. The temperance party had to evaluate its position and plan ahead in the light of the lessons that the liquor poll had taught. What were these lessons?

It was argued that the interference of the prohibition party in the selection of political candidates had alienated many potential supporters in the last few weeks prior to the poll. Many people felt that the 1895 Licensing Act gave the movement ample scope and was certainly a more than satisfactory means of effecting licensing reform. But the temperance party was concerned about such issues as the bare majority, the national prohibition option and club licences. Candidates supporting reform on these issues were assured, at least verbally, of many votes from the prohibitionist body. In this way the liquor issue was forced to the forefront of the political campaign at a time when people believed that prohibition and politics should be kept separate. By polling day a strong revulsion had set in amongst the moderate section of the community in that they felt that the prohibitionists were trying to force the pace of reform against the will of the public. When the temperance party elevated its prohibitionist doctrine into a national policy to the exclusion of every other consideration and sought to dominate the political situation, then the public's opposition was aroused. 114

extremism of the prohibitionist was atypical of the average behaviour of the largely British community. The threat of revolution in habits and customs did not find favour in a society given to sober judgement rather than moral fervour. From this the temperance workers realised that it was dangerous to attempt premature coercion, but that steady missionary work against the ravages of alcohol would, in the long term, bear a more reliable and lasting result. There was a need for moderation in tone, less emphasis on legislation, and greater attention to education. As the editor of the *White Ribbon* put it,

> During the next three years we must educate, educate, and educate, morally, scientifically, and socially, assured that -
>
> Freedom's battle once begun,
> Though baffled oft, is ever won.

Education of the public was indeed deemed necessary when the prohibitionists realised that many people had baulked at supporting prohibition because they sensed injustice in its sweeping proposals in regard to property. The public mind was not able to sanction the immediate extinction of a trade which involved considerable capital, investment and commercial interest. Some further attention had to be given either to the gradual fading out of licensed hotels over a period of years or to the question of compensation to all involved in the liquor trade.

Associated with this question of property was the problem of revenue. The various local bodies drew some of their revenue from licensing fees, and it was felt that this might also have influenced

several people to vote against no-license. As the liquor traffic was a matter of national concern it was thought that no question of local revenue should be allowed to influence the electors in their decision at the liquor poll. It was therefore seen as necessary to make all revenue derived from the liquor traffic colonial instead of local, with a grant to the local bodies from the consolidated national revenue being substituted in the place of the licensing fees. On both these questions of compensation and revenue the bulk of the community felt strongly enough to vote against immediate prohibition. Changes in the law and education of the public were therefore necessary before any further advance could be made towards the achieving of no-license.

There were other reforms in the law that were still thought desirable, but only by sections of the temperance party. The reduction issue was regarded as unnecessary and confusing; the holding of the poll on the same day as the general election was seen by some as the cause for the connection of prohibition with politics; and the use of the word "prohibition" was thought to have alienated many and caused "offence to the weak". But on these questions the temperance party was not united. Many people believed that reduction could still be an effective means of temporary reform until no-license was achieved, while the removal of the poll from the day of the general election would only result in a smaller voter turnout. This might, of course, be favourable to the prohibitionists in that they would be more likely to vote than the opposition, but it could result in no-license being carried before the public was ready for it, and could

119. Ibid.
provoke a strong reaction at the next poll. The changing of "prohibition" to "abolition" was not taken too seriously as it was realised that it would have no effect on the real question at issue.

While the temperance party was busy absorbing these various lessons from the liquor poll, the liquor trade was also being made aware, largely by the moderate press, that it, too, should learn from the poll. It was quickly pointed out that though the public had not been prepared even to reduce the number of licensed houses, this did not mean that they approved of a lax administration of the present licensing laws. It was in the publicans' interest to run their houses within the limits of the law. If they did not they were threatened with the likelihood of a reaction in favour of prohibition at the next poll. Unless the trade became "tolerably respectable", there would either be an increase in the prohibition vote at the next poll, or else interference of the State in the problem by means of some form of State or municipal control to remove the viciousness associated with the system of private profit.¹²⁰

It remained to be seen whether either side in the struggle would learn from these lessons of the 1896 poll. By this time the nature of the licensing issue had been thoroughly revealed. The prohibition party had increased in strength and unity. Its heavy emphasis on legislative action except at times of liquor polls was to become the norm over the next eighteen years. The issues of the three-fifths majority and national prohibition were to be particularly important. The responses of Seddon and, later, Ward and Massey, to this agitation as they attempted to reduce its political influence were to come under

close scrutiny and criticism from both the prohibitionists and the liquor trade. Yet changes in the law were only to come slowly as the various governments, along with both interested parties, favoured legislation that would gain them the support of the so-called moderate vote, an immeasurable vote but one whose presumed existence influenced the activities of those involved in the liquor debate. The 1896 poll was a watershed which made much clearer both the positions of the various factions and the needs of the future in the way of legislative reform, public activity, and conduct of hotels. The prohibition party was brought to a confrontation with reality, and was now much more aware of the battle it had ahead if it were to achieve its aim of prohibition. The liquor trade was also made aware that the public was not overly enthused by its conduct of many of its licensed houses, but were prepared to give it a chance to improve itself voluntarily before any further penalty of the law be brought against it. The period 1897-1899 was, therefore, to be a time of testing and evaluation on the one hand, of education and organisation on the other. The 1899 poll would be the measuring stick for the success of the two opponents in the previous three years.
CHAPTER V
REORGANISATION AND REJUVENATION

From the very outset of their preparation for the 1899 poll the temperance party did not appear to have taken the lessons of 1896 to heart. At a prohibition convention in Dunedin in April 1897 it was obvious that the prohibitionists were dissatisfied with the results of the 1896 poll, but they were not prepared to understand fully why their lack of success had occurred. Rather than admit that their expectations had been unreasonably high and that their activities prior to the poll had alienated many political supporters, they preferred to lay the blame at the feet of the Seddon Government and the 1895 Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act.¹

They blamed the Government for holding the poll on the same day as the general election, something for which many of them had previously asked. It was now felt that this had caused prohibition and politics to become inextricably bound together. If, however, the temperance party had not sought candidates' opinions on the licensing law then this would not have happened. They again attacked the three-fifths majority as being undemocratic, but by so doing they showed that they did not appreciate that the public felt that this was a necessary safeguard against a chance carrying of no-license before a solid majority of public opinion was in favour of it. It was argued that there had been corruption amongst the returning officers, poll clerks and scrutineers, but it can only be asked whether these accusations would have been made if the prohibitionists had been more successful. The police force was abused for not enforcing the licensing laws

¹ ODT, 17 April, 1897, p. 2; Otago Workman, 24 April, 1897, p. 6.
adequately, but it was not questioned that perhaps it was difficult to enforce laws that were opposed by a sizeable section of the community. The various reports about court cases for sly-grogging and other offences against the Licensing Act suggest that it was very difficult to bring a successful prosecution against an offender. Witnesses would often prove to be unreliable or unwilling to inform on their neighbour on such an issue. Many cases, especially in the Clutha no-license area, were dismissed because of the lack of evidence or of conflicting evidence on vital points. Unless the police resorted to the use of unpopular traps they were unlikely to be successful.

Where liquor was wanted it would be obtained, whether the law said otherwise or not. Yet from all this the prohibitionists learnt nothing. The experiences in Clutha and the reports of the experiences of no-license in several American states should have warned them that a prohibition law might create as many problems as it tried to solve, while not effectively solving those problems at which it was directed. But their enthusiasm and singlemindedness blinded them to such possibilities, and they pressed determinedly onwards against the body of public opinion and reason.

The situation was not totally without hope. Towards the end of the year an attempt was made in Auckland through joint action of the licensed victuallers, the prohibitionists, and the Anglican Church, to suppress illicit liquor trading, especially after hours. It would appear to have had some success, for a time at least, and was a good example of what could be achieved by responsible co-operation between

2. See AJHR, 1897, H-35, 'Prohibition' in Clutha Licensing District; ODT, 17 April, 1897, p. 4.
the various interested parties. Such co-operation, however, did not last. The prohibitionists were really aiming for only one thing, the closure of public houses, and with them, the removal of alcohol from society. Co-operation with the enemy was not part of their policy. By having such a narrow outlook and single goal they failed to achieve lasting reform of the liquor trade by any other means. Alternative schemes of reform, such as State or municipal control, were mooted throughout the period but the prohibitionists effectively squashed them by means of argument, propaganda, bluster, and the backing of a large body of public support. 1897 could have been the year in which the temperance party re-evaluated its goal and methods; it proved, however, to be the year when it ignored the lessons of the 1896 poll and became firmly entrenched behind the aim of prohibition. It was the year when the various prohibitionist organisations consolidated their forces within the broad structure of the New Zealand Alliance, and prepared themselves for a prolonged struggle with the "force of evil".

In 1896 the representative system of the N.Z.A. which had been established in 1895 had been replaced by a Colonial Prohibition Executive. On paper this reduced the Alliance to being merely another prohibitionist organisation on equal terms with the other bodies; but in practice the Alliance Executive continued to dominate the situation as the Prohibition Executive proved to be a futile and unworkable body. In 1897, therefore, the question of organisation again came to the fore. It was agreed at the Colonial Convention

3. ODT, 12 Oct, 1897, p. 2; Christian Outlook, 13 Nov, 1897, p. 502.

4. See pp. 138-140.
held in Wellington in June that the various Provincial Councils, which included most of the local temperance societies, should be made the constituents of the Alliance Executive; other bodies, such as the International Order of Good Templars, with their own central organisation, should also be given representation on this Executive. It therefore came about that the executives of the Provincial Councils and the heads of the other separate organisations were to constitute a Consultative Committee of the Alliance, while the Alliance Executive would contain fifteen elected members, with at least three being representatives of the N.Z.A., and one each from the I.O.G.T., the W.C.T.U., the Rechabites and the Sons and Daughters of Temperance. In this way the Alliance Executive became, for the first time, the responsible representative organisation of the whole prohibition party. It was a natural development as a loose and localised movement developed into a strong national and political lobby which required organisation and unified policy planning to be most effective. Faced with the setback of the 1896 poll, strength through unity was seen as one means of achieving greater success at the next, and also of achieving greater success as a political and social force.

This restructuring did not come about without some friction and opposition, notably from a section of the old executive who felt that the Prohibition Leagues were trying to take control of the Alliance and turn it into a political force. Such a change was denied by the new executive and many members of the old, who restated the party's political policy: it was prepared to support prohibitionists of any political hue.

6. Evening Post, 28 July, 1897, letter to editor from late chairman and four outgoing members of N.Z.A. Executive.
so long as they were in favour of temperance reform. It was not itself a political party or aligned with any particular political party. To most people within the prohibitionist ranks it seemed only sensible that the New Zealand Alliance lost its identity as merely another temperance body and adopted the role of being the alliance of all the prohibitionist organisations in the country. In this way it could speak as the truly representative body of the prohibition movement. Its influence would thus be enhanced. There was, of course, a danger that increasing centralisation might result in a lessening of local enthusiasm, on which the movement had its foundation. This, however, did not seem likely at this stage when the movement was graced by several forceful local leaders, and while the issue at the polls was still local no-license and not national prohibition.

One element in this reorganisation of the N.Z.A. that passed virtually unnoticed in the shadow of the publicity over the split in the N.Z.A. executive was the breaking of the link between the prohibition movement and the labour movement that had existed since 1893. This link had been at its strongest in 1893-1894 when the liquor debates were frequent and virulent, and when Stout was trying to defeat Seddon as leader of the Liberal Party. Stout had a deep interest in questions concerning the working class, and he believed their interests should have a voice in Parliament. He was, however, opposed to a separate political party decided on sectional lines. Instead he preferred that the Labour members should be part of a larger and broader party. Hence he favoured the idea of a Liberal-Labour

7. Prohibitionist, 4 Sept, 1897, pp. 4-8, letter from S.G. Martin, chairman of N.Z.A. Executive, 28 August, 1897; letter from Sir R. Stout, President of N.Z.A.
The Labour members at this time were attracted to Stout because of his interest in their problems, and willingly joined in a Liberal-Labour alliance. They were further attracted to him because of his emphasis on prohibition as a means of social and economic reform for the working class. With no distinctive programme of their own and no concept of an alternative to capitalism as an economic system, prohibition offered "an alternative non-economic explanation for poverty and distress among the working classes". That such a link between Labour and Prohibition should have existed is at first glance peculiar. It does not seem likely that a movement which aimed at denying the poor man his beer should seek support from this same man. It is only in terms of the economic programme of improvement that prohibition offered that this connection makes sense. Just as the alliance of the Liberal-Labour party revealed the middle class leadership of New Zealand society, so did the Labour-Prohibition link reveal a middle class reform being accepted by sections of the working class.

It is not surprising, therefore, that in the 1893 election the Labour candidates found considerable support from the prohibitionists. In the Dunedin area, which was a centre both of strong working class political activity and strong prohibitionist activity, this link between the two groups was seen in the election of five Labourites who were also prohibitionists. Millar, Pinkerton, Earnshaw, Hutchison and Morrison all had the official support of the Workers'

9. ibid., p. 326.
Political Committee (the political arm of the Trades and Labour Council), the Temperance Political Committee, and the Knights of Labour. Two other successful Liberal-Labour candidates, W.W. Tanner (Avon), and T.L. Buick (Wairau) were also prohibitionists.

This connection between the prohibition movement and the Labour movement was symbolised by the right of the Knights of Labour to nominate one member to the New Zealand Alliance executive. On the one hand these successful artisans and lower middle class professionals with orientation towards labour were attempting to raise the working class within the predominant economic and social structures of capitalism. At the same time the middle class prohibition movement was also attempting to influence the working class by imposing its own values and practices upon them. The incorporation of the predominantly artisan body, the Knights of Labour, in the inner councils of the N.Z. Alliance was thus a gesture which symbolised the aspirations of both these sections of the community. Granted this privilege in 1893, the Knights of Labour exercised it until the re-organisation of the Alliance in 1897 saw its withdrawal. This withdrawal may have been the result of a decline in the role of the Knights of Labour, who disappeared from the New Zealand scene in 1898, but it was probably more the effect of the almost complete split between the prohibition movement and Labour's growing political aspirations.

This division was the result of several factors, not least of which was the prohibition movement's attempt to subject all other considerations to its prime target of prohibition. It showed in its actions and demands its failure to appreciate the wider concerns of


the Labour Party. After achieving modifications to the 1893 Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act in 1895, the prohibitionists went on to demand a further change in the law, again seeking a bare majority, and also a national prohibition poll as well as local no-license. These demands revealed that the prohibitionists did not understand the exact attitudes of its labour supporters. Only Earnshaw was an extreme prohibitionist. All the others were in favour of no-license by degrees and by a solid vote of the public. It is possible that some of them at least were aware that on the licensing question they were out of step with many of their constituents. Pinkerton had certainly changed his stance between 1893 and 1896 when, at a dinner to honour the president of the Licensed Victuallers' Association, he stated that he had always been opposed to prohibition and that he had no sympathy with the movement. He was prepared to let the people have the right to a say on this question but felt that they should not use that right, and that he certainly did not favour prohibition. As a result of these comments he immediately lost the support of the Dunedin Prohibition League.

What the prohibition movement had failed to realise was that, while they could gain the support of Labour members on a question of the right of the bare majority to decide an issue, they could not gain it on something as radical as national prohibition. They had failed to comprehend the nature of the Labour support. At the same time, the extreme prohibitionists had not appreciated that within Parliament the strength of the Labour members' attachment to the Liberal-Labour alliance was stronger than their links with the prohibition movement.

12. DDT, 10 June, 1896, p. 2.
13. ibid., 8 July, 1896.
This had resulted from a difference in approach. For the prohibitionist prohibition was the answer to the social and economic problems of the period. For the labour movement it was one possible solution, but they were aware that there were other methods of approach as well. They saw in the Liberal-Labour alliance more hope of reform than they saw in the Labour-Prohibition link. They may have been young in the field of political experience but they were not so naive as to believe that they would achieve more through alliance with Stout than with Seddon and the mainstream of the Liberal Party, especially when it had become obvious that Stout was not going to win the leadership of that Party. It is significant that in a no-confidence motion directed by Stout at Seddon as early as 1894, he should receive the support of only one Labour member, Earnshaw, and fifteen Opposition members.\(^{15}\)

The Liberal-Labour members, apart from Earnshaw, had realised the folly of their alliance with the prohibitionists in terms of wider social reforms. By 1896 this had resulted in a serious break between the two parties. In Dunedin the Workers' Political Committee and the Temperance Political Committee were no longer allied in their selection of candidates. The Workers' Political Committee dropped Earnshaw despite his continued appeal for labour support, but continued to support Millar, Pinkerton, Hutchison and Morrison. The Temperance Political Committee supported Earnshaw, Hutchison (Liberal rather than Labour, but with much Labour support), and an unknown Independent F.M. Lester. This choice by the Temperance Political Committee caused a split in the temperance ranks because it ignored several other prohibitionist candidates, and certainly better known ones than Lester. Most notable were A.C. Begg and A.H. Burton, two leaders in the local

\(^{15}\) NZPD, 83, (27 June, 1894), p. 84.
prohibition movement, and H.S. Fish, an Oppositionist more notorious than notable; in 1893 he had opposed prohibition and lost his seat in the process; by 1896 he had reversed his position and joined the I.O.G.T., presumably in the hope that he would regain his place in Parliament by the help of the prohibitionist vote. 16

This break between Labour and Prohibition in Dunedin was largely the result of the growing awareness by the labour candidates that prohibition was not the only means of reform. It also reflected their realisation that supporters of prohibition did not necessarily support prohibitionist candidates for Parliament, despite the Alliance's encouragement of such a policy. This was seen quite clearly in Auckland prior to the 1896 general election.

Three prohibitionist candidates had been selected by the Auckland Prohibition League: George Fowlds, a Liberal, C.E. Button, an Oppositionist, and A. Rosser, Labour. 17 (This covering of all political parties strongly supports the claim that the prohibition movement was non-partisan in its political activities). Such a means of selection brought criticism that the prohibitions were prepared to select members of Parliament irrespective of their opinions on general politics, but the voting at the polls revealed that only the extremists were that way inclined. Many more moderate no-license supporters appeared to be satisfied with the liquor poll as the means of expressing their views on this issue. As a result not one of these three candidates for Auckland City was successful.

The 1896 election revealed that the connection between the Labour vote and the prohibition movement was tenuous at best, non-

16. cf. Christian Outlook, 24 March, 1894, p. 61; Prohibitionist, 12 Jan, 1895, p. 4; ODT, 12 Jan, 1895, p. 4; 24 Sept, 1897, p. 2.
existent at worst. Where it had once been strongest - Dunedin - it had now disintegrated. Elsewhere it had had little influence on the type of candidate that had been elected. In Christchurch, for example, the two prohibitionists elected to Parliament, T.E. Taylor and G.J. Smith, were middle class radicals whose connection with the labour movement was similar to that of Stout's. They had the problems of the working class at heart, but they saw the solution within the capitalist system and greatly helped by prohibition as an economic and social reform. They also attracted considerable support because of their views on other questions - land reform by the breaking up of large estates, perpetual leasehold, greater educational opportunities, especially in the technical field, and reforms in hospitals, prisons and asylums. Neither man had official connections with any labour organisation. Their attitudes towards Labour were more fully expressed after G.J. Smith had been successful in the Christchurch City by-election in 1901. At a social given for Smith at that time, Taylor argued that though it might have appeared that Smith was running against a Labour candidate (C. Taylor), he would,

by voice and vote do as much for the workers and the interests they had at heart as would be done by any nominee from their own Labour ranks. Mr Smith would carry more influence in the House than a straight-out Labour man would carry...Prohibition was a strong working man's movement, and his party should not be severed politically from a large percentage of the wage earning class to bring about the proposed amelioration.18

Smith endorsed these sentiments, and in so doing, both men revealed their support of the idea of middle class leadership of the working class. They were, however, out of touch with a considerable proportion of labour sentiment.

18. ODT, 22 July, 1901, p. 5.
As a result of the 1896 election Labour representation in Parliament was reduced to a minimum. J. Hucheson, W. W. Tanner, A. Morrison and J. A. Millar were all drifting into the Liberal Party proper. There were no purely Labour representatives remaining. It was not until 1908 that a Labour-orientated representative was again elected to Parliament. Between 1897, when the N.Z.A. dropped the Knights of Labour from its executive, thereby symbolising the break of the prohibition movement with the labour movement, until 1908 the Labour-Prohibition connection was virtually non-existent. This situation helped to highlight the nature of the prohibition movement as being predominantly a middle class reform movement.

With the prohibitionists having organised themselves into a more effective fighting force, it was expected that they would once more enter the fray of battle in attempts to modify the licensing law and in preparation for the next poll. Their activities seem, however, to have been somewhat curtailed, or at least overshadowed, after the events of 1896-97. The newspaper coverage of their activities declined considerably. W.C.T.U. meetings and prohibitionist conventions were usually reported but in no great detail, while Prohibition League meetings went virtually unnoticed. It is possible that this was another effect of the 1896 poll, which had resulted in newspapers considering that prohibition was not a significant factor as a strong and influential reform movement. The W.C.T.U. activities received more attention because of that organisation's emphasis on other social issues besides temperance. The Prohibition Leagues were ignored because they had no other raison d'être than prohibition. There was nothing that the prohibitionists could directly aim for as there were no liquor

19. See Appendix B.
licenses to be granted or refused until after the 1899 poll, and that poll was still a long time off. The need was for the education of public sentiment in favour of no-license, but this was left to a few ardent leaders and lecturers. Half-hearted attempts at licensing law reform in 1898 came to nought. It was impossible to keep the enthusiasm of the temperance party at fever pitch with no question upon which direct action could be taken.

There was, however, one major event in 1897-1898 which, while not involving the rank and file of the prohibitionist army, did bring attention to their cause and was a direct result of attempts to deal with the liquor problem. This was the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Police Force. If people had not already heard of T. (Tommy) Taylor, member of Parliament for Christchurch after 1896, they certainly had by the time this inquiry was completed. Taylor had been prominent in the 1891-1893 Sydenham debacle, had been behind the founding of the Prohibitionist, and was a leading light in the Christchurch prohibitionist scene. In early 1896 he had entered and been defeated in the contest for the Christchurch seat vacated by W.P. Reeves when he was appointed Agent-General for New Zealand in London. In the 1896 general election he again stood for this seat and won handsomely. Like many new members of Parliament he was brash and unsophisticated, and while his tactics were somewhat refined over the next fifteen years, he never hesitated to speak out on an issue according to his conscience, no matter whom it meant he was opposing. His gift for oratory was quickly recognised, as were his sharp tongue and cutting replies. His independent Liberal stance was to prove an irritating thorn in Seddon's side; it was also to prevent him from being able to accept a Cabinet position as he knew that he could not maintain silence if he disagreed
with Government policy.  

This was the man who in 1897 forced an inquiry into the conduct of the police force. For several years there had been constant complaints that the police force in New Zealand was not as efficient as it should be, and that it was staffed by men who were corrupt and/or drunkards. Most of these charges came from prohibitionists who felt that the police force was in collusion with the liquor trade and was not enforcing the licensing laws. As a result attempts at no-license in Clutha, for example, were unsuccessful. Calls for a commission of inquiry were made in 1896, but Seddon was able to resist them. In 1897 Taylor continued the agitation within Parliament until Seddon finally agreed to allow an investigation to take place.

The commission found that sly grog selling and after-hours trading were common throughout New Zealand, but did not lay the blame on the police force. Rather it mentioned the difficulties that it encountered in enforcing the law because people were generally unwilling to give evidence against hotelkeepers. This situation was made even more graphic by the report of Mr Hawkins on the operation of no-license in the Clutha Licensing District. He discussed the difficulty of


23. DDT, 22 April, 1897, p. 2; T.E. Taylor to Kate Sheppard, 1 Oct, 1897, K. Sheppard Collection, Canterbury Museum Library; Burdon, King Dick, pp. 147-150.


bringing a conviction in such cases because of the often completely contradictory evidence. It was obvious that people were perjuring themselves in the witness box, yet juries were not willing to convict on such behaviour if it grew out of a licensing case. Because a large section of the community, even though it might be a minority, were opposed to the no-license system, defiance of the law was becoming a serious problem. "Resort to any practices is deemed justifiable to defeat what is considered an unfair attempt to deprive the public of a right". Mr Hawkins then pointed out the possible moral and social effects of such disregard for the law, and argued that,

while attempting (for they only attempt) to cast out one devil, they are bringing in several others far worse than that one. There are not only the evils I have dwelt upon, but there is dissension and ill-will and mutual distrust, and even hatred, springing up in these little townships, and growing out of this source.

A sense of irritation and injustice was increasing because it was illegal in one district to do what was legal throughout the rest of New Zealand.

This description was supported when Inspector Pardy of Dunedin appeared before the Commission of Inquiry in March, 1898. Pardy had been in charge of several attempted raids and convictions in the Clutha District, but had been almost entirely unsuccessful in preventing continued transgression of the law. To the commission he showed how difficult it was to enforce an unpopular and in some cases ill-constructed law. The editor of the Otago Daily Times asked a pertinent

26. ibid., p. 2.
27. ibid.
question when commenting on this evidence:

Would it not be wiser on Mr Taylor's part to consider whether the law has not outstripped public opinion, and imposed upon the police an impossible task? 29

A better argument for the need for no-license to be carried by a substantial majority could not have been given by those opposed to the reduction of the three-fifths majority. An area which at one stage had this majority had found that even then the law could not be adequately enforced. The majority of public opinion had not been sufficient in Clutha to make the enforcement of the no-license law an easy task.

The outcome of the Commission of Inquiry was that the police force as a whole was exonerated from any blame as to being in connivance with liquor traders against the law. Rather it was felt that it had been placed in a very unfair position in being expected to administer unworkable laws. 30

The inquiry was not, therefore, a victory for the prohibitionists, but nor was it a total defeat. While their means of bringing about social reform had been seriously questioned, their claims as to the corruption of the liquor trade had been justified. It was shown that a considerable amount of law breaking went on within the licensed trade, and that any attempt to reform the conduct of the licensing system was not unjustified. 31 The attempt to prohibit it was, however, severely discredited. It was also argued that in time this situation might bring about greater support for the prohibitionists unless reform within the trade took place. The usual cry of the moderates for the

29. ODT, 22 March, 1898.
30. AJHR, 1898, loc. cit.; ODT, 8 Sept, 1898, p. 2.
31. AJHR, 1898, loc. cit.
FIGURE V

CAXEBHAM: Come along, my young friend—you say it's boxes, I say it's time, but never mind—a drop of it'll put some sense into ye, and make a man of ye!
trade to reform itself before it was abolished by a disgusted popular vote was once again to be heard. 32

It was the discussion of and interest in this Commission which overshadowed the activities of the temperance organisations during the latter part of 1897 and all of 1898. Some attempt was made, however, to introduce further reforms in the licensing laws. Both the N.Z.A. and the L.V.A. were confident of success, though Seddon was loathe to introduce a licensing measure for fear of a prolonged debate and consequent waste of time. 33 Bills concerning the majority, national prohibition, club licences and the length of time between licensing polls were introduced by private members on behalf of both the prohibition party and the liquor trade during 1898 and 1899, but none of them passed. 34 Neither interest group had enough political influence to ensure their measures' success.

The need for further reform was, however, still recognised by responsible men not involved in either side of the issue. During the debate on the second reading of T.E. Taylor's Colonial Option Bill in 1899 W. Rolleston (Riccarton) challenged the Government to settle the issue once and for all:

"No reasonable man can deny that the prohibition movement represents largely the feeling of the country that something has to be done to remedy what are really crying evils in respect to the liquor traffic in the country. And I believe, myself, that no good proposals will be carried in this House until the Government of the country has determined what steps shall be taken to put the liquor traffic on a more equitable"

32. DDT, 22 June, 1898, p. 2.

33. Ibid., 21 May, 1898, p. 6; 24 June, 1898, p. 2; 25 June, 1898, p. 6.

I believe it has to be dealt with and controlled, and regulated; and you will merely invite greater evils if you try to effect what is impracticable, and seek to impose on the people what cannot be enforced.\textsuperscript{35}

Seddon refused to be drawn into the fray by adopting any one Bill as a Government measure.\textsuperscript{36} If he could keep the issue out of Parliament during 1899, then he might be able to weather the 1899 election without having another liquor versus no-liquor bogey affecting his chances. It remained to be seen whether such a policy could be maintained throughout the coming election campaign.

As usual the prohibition party began its campaign early in the year, with high hopes and great expectations.

The last year of the century and the year of the Local Option Poll spelt wondrous things to those of us who look out across 1899 with eyes of expectancy and hope. We dream of glorious things to come - a people rising up in their glad young strength, and casting away from them the fetters of slavery, the liquor traffic receiving another deadly blow in our midst, the putting away of our country's shame. We strain our ears to listen, and we hear songs of gladness and prayers of thanksgiving, that the damning, blighting curse of the liquor traffic is no more.\textsuperscript{37}

From such lofty sentiments they quickly came down to earth and began organising themselves. Lecture tours to cover the whole country were arranged, and the N.Z.A. appointed organising agents to be responsible for various regions within the country. Local organisations began holding special meetings, and it was unusual for an area not to have at least one meeting a week at which people were urged to vote no-


\textsuperscript{36} \textit{ODT}, 15 July, 1898, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Prohibitionist}, 7 Jan, 1899, p. 6.
license. As the poll came nearer the various church newspapers and prohibition journals increased the amount of space they allowed the prohibition issue, while in the major centres large rallies were organised. Resolutions were passed in favour of the now familiar demands - colonial option, the bare majority, the extension of the poll to include all types of licences, and the selection of parliamentary candidates favourable to licensing law reform. Much was made of the increases in visible drunkenness and in arrests for drunkenness, while allegations of after hours trading were plentiful and supported by the moderate press.  

While the moderate press urged the trade to put its business in order before it suffered the consequences at the hands of an enraged public, the anti-prohibitionist press was not so reasoned in its approach. It argued that the "prohibition fad" was merely the work of "a small coterie of generals without an army at their back". Sections of the trade went even further and urged organisation within its ranks to protect itself from assault. They claimed that prohibition in Clutha was a failure, that hotel accommodation there was inadequate, that the liquor poll was unsettling for business and good government, and that prohibition would put added strains on the country through the loss of revenue from the licensed trade. For the prohibition party the issue at the poll meant either a victory for the kingdom of God or a victory for the kingdom of evil.


39. Otago Workman, 8 April, 1899, p. 6.

In their opinion the well-being of the people, material, social and spiritual, was in the balance. For the trade the interest was pecuniary: would they find themselves without property and occupation as a result of the poll? Yet neither group would ultimately make the decision. Rather, it would be the role of the silent majority to decide the fate of the trade.

The general results of the licensing poll of 5 December, 1899, showed that the prohibition party was still out of touch with the majority of the people of New Zealand. Not one electorate carried no-license except Clutha. Only eight managed more than fifty per cent in favour of no-license, but not even these carried fifty per cent in favour of reduction. A lot of education of the voter was yet required if both avenues of licensing reform at the poll were to be utilised fully. It was also a comment on the prohibition question that in those electorates where no election was held, Hawke's Bay and Waihemo, the liquor poll was void.

It appeared that prohibition was an undesirable aim to the majority of voters; it was a threat to individual liberty and impracticable as a means of reform. As a result it was argued that it was time for putting aside the prohibition "fad" and for concentrating on more reasonable measures of licensing reform. The temperance party was urged to consolidate its ranks, and make a united effort of an educational character throughout the colony, with the end in view of inculcating habits of sobriety amongst the rising generation and the youth of the colony generally.

41. See Table 20, Appendix G.

42. ODT, 8 Dec, 1899, p. 4
The prohibitionists were naturally disappointed at the results, especially as they had hoped to carry prohibition by the end of the century. But their confidence and optimism were soon restored when they saw their proportion of the vote had increased from 37.83 per cent in 1896 to 42.07 per cent in 1899, almost entirely at the expense of the vote for continuance. They were also cheered by the increase from five to eight electorates with more than fifty per cent in favour of no-license. Such was their enthusiasm only ten days after the event that the White Ribbon was predicting that the 1902 poll would see great strides towards victory.

The poll again brought to the fore the cry for certain reforms in the licensing law. The trade was now wanting the removal of the reduction issue, while the prohibitionists clamoured for the bare majority so that at least a few electorates would adopt no-license. Such demands solicited an outburst from the press against the dominating position of the licensing question in the public life of the country. The general feeling was graphically expressed in the Otago Liberal:

What the country really wants is complete rest from the vexatious and impotent tinkering and tampering with its licensing laws. We have for years been overdosed with harrassing and humbugging tinkering with these laws, and, so far as has been seen, not the slightest benefit has resulted to the general community. The only monument erected to prohibition, so far, is the notorious sly-grog selling Clutha district...

In the interests of good government and peace it is becoming imperative that the vexed liquor question should be shelved by one act of final legislation during the ensuing Parliament which will place it beyond the

43. See Table 21, Appendix G.

power of prohibition agitators for ten or fifteen years to come to keep the country in the ferment they have done during the past ten years.45

Whether Seddon, with an increased parliamentary majority, could settle this question once and for all remained to be seen. By mid-1900 his former non-partisan stance was seriously in question, throwing doubts upon the possibility of any satisfactory solution to the licensing debate. It was claimed that at the 1899 general election the licensed trade had given its support to the Seddon Government in return for promises of changes in the law that would favour its position.46 No evidence was supplied but suppositions were plentiful. Seddon's "well-known penchant for the liquor interest", coupled with the "well-known fact of the agreement of last December", and the rumour that the new proposals of the Licensing Act Amendment Bill, 1900, would favour the liquor trade, proved to many people that Seddon and the trade were in agreement.47 If, however, any such tie did exist, the terms of the Bill when released did not fulfil the expectations of such a liaison.

Earlier in the year the liquor trade had asked that the time between the polls be extended to nine years, that licensing hours be uniform throughout the colony, and that the reduction vote be abolished.48 The extension of the period between the polls was favoured by sections of moderate press as well as by trade supporters, and also by a large part of the general population who wished to see

45. Otago Liberal, 24 Feb, 1900, p. 4.
46. ODT, 15 Dec, 1899, p. 4; Otago Liberal, 21 July, 1900, p.4.
47. ODT, 24 Sept, 1900, p. 4.
48. ibid., 6 April, 1900, p. 5.
the liquor issue's influence removed from every election campaign and legislative session. 49

Naturally the prohibitionists had other plans than these. They were opposed to any extension of the time between polls as being an unjust interference with the rights of the people. Similarly they did not favour the removal of the local option poll in favour of a colonial option poll, while any proposal to extend trading hours without the consent of the people was considered a violation of the principle of local self-government. 50

The first reading of the Bill was on 20 September, and the unusual occurrence of a debate at this stage was brought about because the terms of the Bill were not known. That Seddon had not released the details on such a controversial subject only helped to convince the prohibitionists that he and the Bill favoured the liquor trade. Seddon argued that the people generally were demanding legislation and that the issue "should be settled, and settled for a term of years", so that there would be no longer any necessity for an agitation that was "interfering with our national life". 51 Radical change in the law was therefore expected, and expected to go against the prohibitionists after Seddon stated that

during the last election the Prohibitionists from one end of the colony to the other were holding meetings, and agitating and influencing the electors in the direction they wanted the liquor question to go...The extreme

49. Otago Liberal, 21 July, 1900, p. 4.

50. Reports of meetings held 8 August, 1900, in Auckland, Gisborne, Palmerston North, Wanganui, Hawera, in ODT, 9 August, 1900, p. 6.

51. NZPD, 114, (20 Sept, 1900), p. 69.
Such a statement was not likely to go unchallenged. The response was, however, less from the prohibitionists than from the press, which argued that the vote at the liquor poll had not been a vote on whether the essentials of the licensing laws should be changed. It was believed that most people were satisfied with triennial polls and the options available, and that Seddon had no mandate to change the law except as concerned minor matters of their enforcement. 53

No sooner had these outbursts occurred than it was announced that it was not the intention of the Government to proceed with the Liquor Bill that session. It was to be introduced, circulated, and then left until the following year so that people would have time to express their opinions. 54 Such a course of action throws doubts as to just how closely tied Seddon was to the licensed trade. Also, when the details of the Bill were finally released, it was apparent that it was not entirely in the trade's interest. While it proposed to replace the local option poll with a provincial option based on the nine old provinces, and while it was prepared to drop the reduction issue (something to which many prohibitionists were not opposed), it did not propose to alter the period between the polls to nine years as the trade had requested. Rather, it was to be up to the electors to decide whether the poll were to be every three or six years. Similarly it would make clubs subject to the provisions of the Alcoholic Liquors

52. ibid., p. 80.
53. DDT, 24 Sept, 1900, p. 4.
54. ibid., 25 Sept, 1900, p. 6.
Sale Control Act, something for which the prohibitionists had been agitating for several years. When it came to licensing hours it compromised between the trade's 11 p.m. request and the prohibitionists' 10 p.m. request by suggesting 10.30 p.m. It is obvious, therefore, that while Seddon was siding with the trade in trying to undertake fundamental reforms of the system, he was not inextricably bound to their proposals. The editor of the O.D.T. asked whether the Bill, as made public, was the same Bill as debated at the first reading. The fact that it appeared to be a compromise measure suggested that Seddon had tried hard to accommodate diverse opinions.

By mid-1901 the opposition to the Bill had crystallised. The prohibitionists thought that provincial no-license would be even less enforceable than the present system. They also felt that the proposal to hold a referendum on the period of time between the polls would favour the trade in that at present the total colonial vote favoured continuance rather than no-license. It was therefore very likely that a colonial referendum would favour a longer period between polls. The holding of the suggested referendum would make it possible "for whatever party is in the majority for the time being to have undue continuance of power over their opponents". Such a move would be an abuse of democratic privilege and responsibility. Such an argument was logically correct, but it ignored the reality of democratic government.


58. *Prohibitionist*, 18 May, 1901, p. 3.
Further opposition was shown to the proposal to give the Colonial Secretary the power to grant licences in a no-license area for the convenience of the tourist trade. This, too, was seen as a means of side-stepping the will of the people, while the possibility of abuse of such power was not ignored. All in all the Bill threatened the prohibitionists' achievements of the last ten years and promised to hinder their predicted progress in the future.

The trade also opposed sections of the Bill, though it favoured the proposals to extend the time between polls and to allow tourist traffic licences. As to the provincial system, the Brewers' Association regarded it as "too risky. We can organise and fight in the cities, but we cannot do the same in the country districts". If it were carried in a province, a far greater area for trade would be lost than in a single electorate. There seemed to be more point to colonial option which the customs could control than to the unenforceable provincial proposal.

No sooner had the parliamentary session opened than the House was deluged with petitions totalling 2,696 signatures requesting that the Licensing Bill be rejected. The number of signatures, while appearing few, actually represented a far greater strength in that in many cases the petitions were signed by the chairman and secretary on behalf of an organisation's or meeting's unanimous demand. Seddon seems to have taken the hint, and when he finally introduced a

59. ibid., 1 June, 1901, pp. 3-4.
60. ODT, 2 July, 1901, p. 6.
62. ODT, 12 Oct, 1900, p. 4.
63. JHR, 1901, Schedule of Petitions, pp. xv-xxxiii.
64. N.Z. Baptist, August, 1901.
licensing measure on 20 September the clauses relating to the extension of time between polls and the changing of electoral no-license to provincial no-license were not to be seen. Battle was still bound to ensue, however, over the question of tourist licences. It was also not beyond the realms of possibility that amendments in committee might see the introduction of these more controversial clauses. Seddon was not slow to notice that there were members entertaining strong views on both sides of the licensing question who would scarcely be content to miss the opportunity that the introduction of the Bill offered them to attempt to secure an amendment to the law in the direction favoured by them.65

The liquor trade was highly indignant at the moderation of the Bill. The Trade Review, the official organ of the trade, threatened Seddon because it believed he was avoiding the question.

The trade has been very faithful to the Premier in the full expectation that he would lose no time in redeeming his pledges...He must not count on the continued support of the trade unless he is prepared to make some return for the help which he has so freely received at election time...It will be little less than a public scandal if the overwhelming Government majority in the present Parliament which the trade did so much to secure, does nothing in the direction of righting our wrongs.66

Here for the first time was evidence of a liaison between the Government and the liquor trade. The lack of any denial by Seddon of this claim at this stage suggests that there was some truth in it. Yet the fact that Seddon was not catering entirely to the demands of the liquor

65. NZPD, 118, (20 Sept, 1901), p. 646.
party would still suggest that he did not feel totally bound to their support. It is probable that he was confident of being able to maintain his own and the Government's position without, if necessary, the support of the trade. The 1899 election results had revealed how weak any opposition to his Government really was. As a result he did not need to pamper to the trade when such a move was sure to lose him the support of many prohibitionists who were also Liberal supporters. It is also questionable as to exactly how much he committed the Government to the trade's interests. It is possible that the trade promised its support in return for favours which Seddon, being the astute political manoeuvrer that he was, did not actually promise in return. Whatever the situation it was now obvious that Seddon was not obliging the trade, and the trade was annoyed as a result.

The opposition to the Bill foretold of prolonged debating on the issue if pursued in the House of Representatives. It may have been this probability which caused Seddon to let the Bill slide into oblivion. The prohibitionists took the credit for this by claiming that their petitions and agitation were so effective that "the obnoxious Bill was included in the usual massacre of the innocents at the end of the session".67

Did Seddon ever really intend that the Bill should be passed? In both 1900 and 1901 the Licensing Bills had been introduced when only three to four weeks of the session remained. In 1900 Seddon argued that he only intended the Bill as a means of obtaining public opinion through discussion, and it was not proceeded with in that session. In

1901, however, no such claim was made, and it was expected that the Bill would at least go further than its first reading. Yet again it was allowed to lapse. The 1901 Bill was much more moderate than that of 1900 as most of the controversial clauses had been removed. It might thus have been able to pass despite opposition from extremists on both sides. Seddon, however, never even allowed it to reach a division to test his strength on the issue. Two reasons suggest themselves as to why he acted in this way. He may have been upset by the trade's opposition to his measure and, because of promises already made, have decided to introduce a stronger measure the following year. Yet just how closely he was obliged to the trade has already been questioned. Secondly, the lateness of the Bill's introduction after it had been promised the year before would suggest that Seddon had no intention of having the Bill passed but that he did wish to appear as if he were trying to settle this vexatious issue. Knowing that the Bill would be opposed by both sides in the argument gave him a good excuse for not proceeding with it. Its lapse in the face of such opposition did no discredit to Seddon's public stance of wishing to settle the issue once and for all. He probably knew that such a goal would be impossible to achieve, yet attempts such as these to solve the problem would placate a large section of the community and exonerate his own position by laying, through appearance, the blame for failure at the door of one or both of the interested parties. Such action as this helps to explain why the 1901 Licensing Act Amendment Bill was allowed to fail. Its failure did not hurt Seddon or the Government, maintained the status quo, and settled the issue for another parliamentary session, and perhaps 1902 as well. 1902 meant another general election and another liquor poll. It was unlikely
that any major changes in the licensing laws would be made immediately prior to the expression of public opinion at the election and poll. It was also well-known that the Government had no desire for the prohibition issue to dominate the election campaign, which it might very well do if a Bill were introduced but not passed, or if an Act were passed which upset one or other of the factions involved.

As it turned out the prohibitionist party concentrated its attention on winning votes at the liquor poll, and it left the legislative field well alone. This proved to be regular practice for them. In the two years after an election they agitated for legislative changes in the licensing laws, leaving temperance education in the hands of individuals and local societies. In a liquor poll year, however, they focussed their efforts almost completely on educating the people as to the benefits of no-license and persuading them to "cross out the top line", that is, the continuance option. The rest of their efforts were directed at getting men elected to Parliament who favoured their cause, so that they could be assured of watch-dogs for the licensing laws and proponents of licensing reform if the occasion and demand arose. Such an approach hindered any attempt the Government might make to remove the prohibition issue from the realm of politics. As suggested, Seddon probably realised this, and considered himself successful if he could stall the issue as it arose and prevent it as much as he was able from becoming a party issue or a divisive force within the party structure.

That this was achieved for most of the period was partly his success. Overall, however, it was more a reflection of the nature of the issue of prohibition. It was primarily a moral issue which could not be confined to any party system. So long as the prohibit-
ionists aimed at only one thing, the achievement of prohibition, it would remain a non-party issue, unless they decided to form a separate Prohibition Party. This seemed unlikely, however, as the various organisations denied vociferously any plans to do so, and looked upon the idea as being anathema to their object. As recently as 1900 the N.Z.A. had shown that it did not intend to become the basis of a separate political party. At the Auckland City by-election in that year a Mr W. Richardson, an Auckland temperance lecturer, had sought the support of the Auckland Prohibition and Temperance League for his candidature. The League, however, favoured a Mr Hobbs. It was felt that to support two prohibition candidates would split the vote and enable a non-prohibitionist to win. As a result Richardson called his own meeting at which it was resolved that the N.Z.A. should be urged to undertake united political action in order to get a prohibition party into Parliament. The Alliance refused to change its policy, however, and continued to support any political candidate who was favourable to temperance reform, no matter what his political allegiance. They could see the futility of such a change, especially in the light of the failure of the Prohibition Party in the U.S.A. in the 1890s.

68. Prohibitionist, 12 May, 1900; ODT, 16 May, 1900, p. 5; Richardson stood for Parliament at the next five general elections, but without success. In 1916 he was again agitating for a separate Prohibition Party, but the N.Z.A. annual conference of that year rejected his proposal. See N.Z.A., Annual Report, 1916, p. 38.

The prohibitionists did their utmost to deny any political intentions beyond achieving an equitable licensing law which would enable the people to decide for themselves whether they wished the open bar system to continue. There were times, in fact, when they tried to minimise their political activities and increase their educational campaigns. The realisation that this side of their work was perhaps being neglected in the fight for legislation and prohibitionist politicians came about with the results of the 1899 liquor poll, when the prohibitionists made no material advance in the number of electorates favouring no-license or reduction. To remedy this situation it was decided that a greater effort would have to be made to educate the populace as to the advantages of no-license, and to capture new converts by having them sign a pledge to become total abstainers and to vote for prohibition. This was an old and trusted method of advancing prohibition sentiment. It dated from the time when temperance meetings were something like a revivalist meeting, and people were urged to decide to give up liquor at once and sign a pledge to this effort. The success of a meeting was measured by the number of signatures gained. It was found that the pledged abstainer was the most reliable and enthusiastic addition to the ranks of the prohibition army. He was opposed not only to the liquor trade but to liquor itself. 70

At its annual conference in 1901 the Primitive Methodist Church decided to resurrect this method of influence, and suggested an aim of 20,000 new signatures by the end of the year. Other churches were asked to join in the campaign, so that the whole of the Christian Church would be united in its attack on the drink evil. The campaign commenced with a lecture from J.G. Woolley, a prohibition lecturer

from the U.S.A. and Prohibition Party candidate for the American presidency in 1900. 71 Not only did the pietistic churches join the campaign, but throughout the country the various prohibitionist bodies gave prominence to pledge-taking at their meetings, and encouraged the new signatories to join the ranks of one or more temperance societies. 72 This campaign spilled over into 1902, when the increasing temperance enthusiasm with the approach of the liquor poll made the gaining of signatures that much easier.

This campaign was helped in 1901 by the visit of J.G. Woolley. It was given a much bigger boost in 1902 with the visits of several temperance lecturers from overseas: Mrs Harrison Lee, who had toured with reasonable success prior to the 1899 poll, returned; L.M. Isitt came back from a prolonged visit to England and added his voice to the growing number of platform harangues; a Mr J. Smedley arrived direct from a temperance campaign in India and toured New Zealand for a couple of months; and a Miss Florence Balgarnie, "the foremost woman speaker on the temperance platform in the world", arrived in May and remained until the poll was over. 73

Such a "flood of prohibition oratory" could not go unnoticed by its opponents. The moderate press argued that despite all temperance and prohibition activity over the past few years statistics showed that the amount spent per head of population on alcohol was increasing. This revealed that as a means of reform prohibition was absurd, and it

71. N.Z. Baptist, April, 1901, pp. 63-64; ODT, 20 August, 1901, p. 6.
72. Outlook, 10 August, 1901, p. 35; 23 August, 1901, p. 33.
73. ODT, 21 Feb, 1902, p. 5.
was time to consider other schemes for the reform of the public house such as state or municipal control.\textsuperscript{74} The anti-prohibitionist press came out strongly against the issue's effect on the general elections. "There is every prospect," it argued, "that once more the general welfare of the country will be subordinated to the lesser and disturbing question of 'Beer or no Beer'\textsuperscript{75} Political issues were being overshadowed by the liquor question so that the more important issues of labour legislation, colonial finance, and public works development were not receiving their due attention at the hustings.

The local option poll is the strongest obstacle in the way of political reform, and unless it can be disassociated from the general elections, it should not be allowed to take place oftener than once every six years.\textsuperscript{76}

The liquor trade itself was now becoming more aware of the prohibitionist threat. An article in the \textit{Trade Review} accused the trade of apathy in its own defence.

With supercilious apathy the Trade has been content with drowsily awakening from its dream on the eve of each pitched battle, fighting the triennial engagement with short-lived vigour, satisfied with anything short of absolute defeat; and immediately relapsing into somnolent indifference with an arrogance sublime in its effrontery.\textsuperscript{77}

It was expected, however, that 1902 would not see the trade victorious unless it roused itself and protected its interests. The Trade was urged to follow the example set by the enemy:

\textsuperscript{74} ibid., 27 March, 1902, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{75} NZO, 8 Feb, 1902, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{76} ibid.
\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Trade Review}, 9 Jan, 1902, cited in \textit{Prohibitionist}, 22 Feb, 1902, p. 5.
Marshal and organise your forces, and oppose tactic to tactic, so that on the day of battle you can operate usefully in concert instead of the usual meandering about like sheep without a shepherd. 78

As a result of this realisation that the trade's livelihood was at stake, several of its friends attempted to offer other means of licensing reform than prohibition. In Otago it was proposed to set up a Publichouse Trust Association which would gradually acquire hotels and bring them under its jurisdiction. These hotels would be turned into respectable houses of refreshment in which, beyond strictly legitimate requirements, drinking would be discouraged. Each shareholder would receive a maximum dividend of five per cent, and the balance would be appropriated for the establishment of a fund for the extension of the operations of the movement. 79

The proposer of this scheme was a Colonel Morris, who had the backing of the Anglican Church in Dunedin, including Bishop Nevill. The aim of the scheme was to show that it was possible to control and improve the liquor trade. It was hoped that the example set by houses in which no man was tempted to drink to excess would lead to an improvement in the conduct of other houses and to a gradual diminution in the drunkenness of the people. Publicans would be encouraged to abide by the law rather than break it. Because private profit was considered by many in the community as being largely responsible for the abuse of the licensing laws, the removal of this was expected to bring about an improvement. 80 Such a scheme found favour amongst the moderate section of the community, its sentiments being summarised thus: "Prohibition is

78. ibid.
79. ODT, 22 April, 1902, pp. 4-5.
80. ibid.
a policy of despair; the establishment of model publichouses is a policy of hope." It was hoped that such a plan of company control would be extended by its success to other parts of the country.

Initial reactions to this Publichouse Trust Scheme were varied. The moderate press welcomed it as another possible solution to the liquor problem. Other journals were, however, sceptical as to its possible success, believing that the Trust hotels would probably be unattractive to the general public. The prohibition party's reaction was both highly critical and extremely concerned. It realised that the support for prohibition was being threatened at the very time when preparations were underway for another liquor poll.

To the prohibitionists the Trust Association was a "very weak attempt to oppose no-license under the cloak of reforming the liquor traffic," and was described as impractical because publicans would not sell their publichouses. Others were less sure of its "weakness". "The question of State control may serve as a wedge to split the 'No-license' party... 'Divide and Conquer' is the motto of those who are pulling the strings."

Fortunately for the prohibitionists Colonel Morris's Publichouse Trust Association scheme did not progress into reality. While it found favour as a means of reform, particularly with moderate elements in the Anglican Church, it did not appeal to the majority of publicans,

81. ibid.
82. Otago Liberal, 26 April, 1902, p. 4.
84. DDT, 16 May, 1902, p. 3, letter.
and it needed their support to succeed. Any idea of corporate ownership of a traditionally private business was very much in advance of general opinion at this stage of New Zealand's development. Such was the lack of interest in the scheme that it did not even become an issue in the 1902 election and liquor poll campaign.

Nonetheless, some new trends did emerge with the 1902 campaign. Over the past few years the co-operation of the various pietistic churches on the liquor issue had been increasing, and by 1902 their unanimity was seen as a new and strengthening weapon in the struggle. It was expected to account for considerable increase in the no-license vote. Between 1899 and 1902 Councils of Christian Churches had been established, mainly in the chief centres, to co-ordinate and organise the churches' response to various social and moral issues. These councils had their own temperance committees, which worked with the other temperance bodies. This organisation was a breakthrough for the churches involved in that it meant a big step towards church unity in terms of action, and it increased their effective witness within the community on such issues as prohibition, gambling and Sabbath Day observance.

A second trend at the 1902 polls was the concentration on specific issues in the licensing debate, rather than, as previously, more general theories and arguments. Not only, for example, did political candidates have to state whether they favoured more licensing law reform, but also exactly what reform they desired. Did they support the bare majority, local option, abolition of barmaids and abolition of tied houses? What was their attitude to compensation for

86. *Outlook*, 15 Nov, 1902, p. 4.
87. DDT, 18 July, 1900, p. 8; *Outlook*, 20 April, 1901, p. 6.
licensees who lost their licences as a result of the poll, and what did they think of the issue of State control as a means of licensing reform? These specific issues were submitted by the New Zealand Alliance to parliamentary candidates, and it was reported that most candidates replied. Yet it would appear from the reports of political speeches that, while the liquor question was provoking considerable interest, it was receiving less attention on the public platform by these candidates. While the political approach of the prohibition party was much better organised than before, the politicians were beginning to be less scared of the issue's effect on their chances for parliamentary honours.

The reasons for such a situation are various and tentative. It may have been that after two polls and elections had been taken together it seemed apparent that the liquor issue did not alter people's political convictions enough to make them vote against the party or person they would have supported on other issues. It may also have been that the Liberal Party was complacent in its ascendancy and no longer felt any threat from the prohibitionist vote, particularly when the Opposition was not seen to be manipulating it to its own advantage. Both of these possibilities were perhaps the result of the realisation that the prohibitionists were not politically motivated and party orientated. As long as they showed no signs of forming an organised Prohibition Party they were not a threat at the general elections. As these realisations dawned on political candidates they could ignore to a greater extent than previously the liquor issue and concentrate on the real issues of government.


89. See Chapter IX.
As the day of the poll drew nearer there was a corresponding increase in activity. This activity was, however, largely one-sided. Despite the challenge and energy of the liquor trade earlier in the year, by the time of the poll its attempts to meet the prohibitionist propaganda had dwindled into insignificance. While the newspapers were full of reports of prohibitionist meetings and rallies, there was an obvious lack of any such reports in the interests of the trade, and this in a predominantly moderate and anti-prohibitionist press. It seemed that it was left to the press to discuss the folly of local no-license and to encourage people to vote for continuance.

This lack of activity by the liquor interests had its effect at the poll. For the first time the national vote for no-license exceeded the vote for continuance, by 3073 votes. The support for no-license had taken a big jump since 1899. More important, however, was that five more electorates as well as Clutha had achieved the required three-fifths majority for no-license, though over the next two years three of these electorates, Chalmers, Bruce and Newtown, would have the decision at the polls reversed by successful appeals to the Courts by the liquor trade. Nine other electorates carried reduction, while in twenty-four more continuance failed to gain fifty per cent support and so no proposal was carried. In only twenty-nine electorates, less than half the total number, was continuance carried.

These results frightened the trade and the press, which was quick to point out that if only the liquor industry would reform its conduct this support for prohibition would soon disappear. The poll

90. ODT, 24 Nov, 1902.
91. See Table 21, Appendix G.
92. See Table 20, Appendix G.
FIGURE VI

Source: Seddon Papers 3/63, p. 190a, 1902.
A Big Surprise!

Parent: Sir, Sir (amused)—Haha! Who are you?

The Giant: What, don't you know me? I'm the little bantling you brought into the world nine years ago! Since then I've grown! I'm Prohibition!
was seen as a protest of thousands of moderates who objected to the trade's disregard for the law. It was also seen as the result of a growing fear that the youth of the colony were becoming less sober than they had been, and threatened the social values of society. Hence there was a need for reform, and if reform was not forthcoming, abolition.  

Not only was the trade called upon to reform itself, but the Government was called upon to reform the licensing law. Changes were thought to be necessary to improve the conduct of hotels. If such changes were not undertaken then it could only be expected that the result would be a further increase in no-license support at the next poll. It appeared that the anti-prohibitionists were now looking to the Government to protect them from any further advance of such support. They had suddenly found themselves in a minority situation which depended solely on the three-fifths majority to stave off defeat. The pressure would now be on the Government to maintain the three-fifths clause in order to avoid prohibition.

It was expected, of course, that pressure would also be on the Government from prohibitionist sources to change the law in order to give effect to the voice of the majority. The issues of a bare majority and colonial option were expected to make a renewed and vigorous appearance in the debates for licensing law reform. Jubilant at the results of the poll, and feeling victory within their grasp in the near future, they were not likely to lie quietly until such changes were offered them on a platter. They felt filled with the righteousness of their cause; they believed they were undertaking

93. ODT, 26 Nov, 1902, p. 4.

94. Ibid., 27 Nov, 1902, p. 4.
the work of God in the physical world; they saw themselves as God's instruments in the advance towards the achievement of His kingdom on earth.

We believe that we have caught a glimpse of the ideal which God undoubtedly expects humanity to reach, and, that in so far removing the stumbling blocks from our feet we are, as a colony, taking a step towards that ideal. We know that in this respect God cannot help us without our help, and the measure of our joy is the measure of the success we hold and are promised as workers together with God. But while we realise our part in the work, while we know that our hands cast the vote, we also know by what impulse they were moved, and we cry... "Not unto us, 0 Lord, not unto us, but to Thy name be glory." 95

Such enthusiasm, such earnestness, such certainty of their position were remarkable psychological weapons to possess in such a battle. They gave the cause confidence, deafened it to any doubt about the effectiveness of its solution for social problems, and blinded it to consideration of any other possibilities of reform. They instilled fear into the heart of the trade which had no ideology except the pursuit of profit on which to depend. It could only resort to reliance on its vast financial resources and a favourable Government, while its opponents had the confidence that God Himself was on their side. Just as in times past rulers had ordered the singing of a Te Deum on the occasion of a great national event, so it was typical of the prohibition movement that it should hold thanksgiving services and meetings after the favourable polling results. 96 With their success, however, there also came the voice of realism. The victory was not yet won; a battle had been successfully fought, but the war was not over.

95. Prohibitionist, 6 Dec, 1902, p. 6.

96. ibid; White Ribbon, Dec, 1902, p. 7.
There had to be continued organisation and increasing temperance education. The Anglican and Roman Catholic churches had to be assailed and won to the cause. Voters had to be convinced of the benefits of no-license. Then, and only then, would "the reign of King Alcohol...be ended". 97

Various sections of the trade felt that if they did not undertake serious efforts to protect themselves over the next three years the result of the next poll would mean disaster for them. 98 Claims for compensation for any loss of licences were revived by licensed traders. Such claims met with instant hostility from the prohibitionists, who pointed out that licences were a privilege and not a right, that they were granted for only one year at a time with no guarantee of further renewal. Like any other business venture there was an element of risk involved, which should not be met in case of failure from the public purse. 99

A second attempt by licensees to stem the prohibitionist tide was the establishment of Vigilance Committees. This was an experiment begun in Christchurch. Various hotelkeepers signed an agreement binding themselves to observe the licensing law in its entirety. A representative committee was appointed to draw up a report and to suggest rules for the government and guidance of the trade. 100 A similar but less formalised scheme had been running in the Auckland area since the 1899 poll, and it was believed that as a result the


100. DDT, 20 Dec, 1902, p. 7.
support for no-license in 1902 had decreased slightly in Parnell, and
increased only very slightly in Auckland City. 101 In Dunedin the
effect of the poll was believed to have brought about a remarkable
observance of the law by licensees, especially as regards after-hours
trading. 102 By these schemes the trade hoped to regain the lost
moderate vote. It remained to be seen whether the schemes would
continue and what effect they would have.

A further plan to reform the trade involved the abolition of
free counter lunches. These had been provided by many hotels as a
service for their clientele, but were regarded by the prohibitionists
as devilish means to entice people into public bars to drink. More as
a means to placate public opinion than by any conviction on their own
part, the licensed victuallers agreed to abolish counter lunches. 103
The effect of this was probably slight on the trade as it reduced
another overhead cost while having no decisive effect on the number of
patrons. 104

Such were the initial measures taken by the liquor industry to
regulate its trade and to capture the moderate vote. But these
measures did not help the trade in the licensing committee elections
held in late March. Both sides put up their own candidates for these
committees pledged either to full twenty-five per cent reduction and

101. See Table 20, Appendix G.
102. ODT, 30 Jan, 1903, letter.
103. ibid., 2 Feb, 1903, p. 2.
104. It is interesting to notice the swing of the pendulum as
more hotels in N.Z. in the 1970s now provide counter
meals, and as it is realised that this is one way of
lessening the effect of the alcohol consumed.
ten o'clock closing, or minimum five per cent reduction of the number of licences and eleven o'clock closing. The results confirmed that the 1902 no-license sentiment was

no ephemeral outburst of indignation, but
the grim, hard-set decision of the majority
to grapple with and throttle the growing
evil of drunkenness fostered and catered to by the existing licensing system.\footnote{105}

In those areas where reduction had been carried temperance candidates headed the poll, and in Dunedin, Caversham, Invercargill and Waikouaiti, actually took the whole slate.\footnote{106} The threat of reduction in nine electorates found many licensees ready to pledge themselves to measures of reform for which the temperance party had been agitating for years: ten o'clock closing was agreed to, barmaids dispensed with, second bars closed, and after-hours trading wiped. The liquor industry knew that it was on trial for the next three years, at which time it would again be judged according to its deeds.\footnote{107}

The period from 1897 to 1902 had been one of testing for the prohibition movement. It had suffered a considerable setback at the 1896 poll from which it made only a marginal recovery in 1899. By 1902, however, temperance education and propaganda had borne fruit and the prohibitionists found themselves in a majority position. They had been helped by a number of factors. The growing unity of action of the pietistic churches on the liquor issue had boosted the morale, and perhaps the support, of the prohibition movement. The movement itself had been facilitated in its tasks of legislative action and temperance education by greater cohesion within its ranks after the reorganisation of

\footnote{105. \textit{Outlook}, 4 April, 1903, p. 21.}
\footnote{106. \textit{ibid.}}
\footnote{107. \textit{ibid.}, 13 June, 1903, pp. 3-4.}
of 1897. This unity had been vital in preventing the passing of any adverse legislative proposals, of which there had been many during this period. The prohibitionists did not trust the Seddon administration on this issue despite the Premier's seemingly non-committal actions. As a result the movement had to remain on the alert to agitate against and to hinder any unfavourable legislative proposals, though whether it could ultimately have prevented unfavourable legislation remains doubtful because of its political weakness.

Perhaps the biggest factor which aided the prohibitionists by 1902, however, was the recalcitrance of the liquor trade and its unwillingness to reform itself. Reform proposals, such as the Publichouse Trust Association, had found a favourable response from neither the prohibitionists nor the trade. Consequently many moderate voters appeared to have been encouraged to support no-license, boosting as a result the vote for no-license in 1902. New Zealand revealed that it would not tolerate for much longer the conditions of liquor trading that existed. If the liquor trade did not soon reform itself, then a wider prohibition experiment seemed likely to occur at the hands of voters not necessarily in favour of prohibition as the only remedy to the problems of alcohol. One thing was clear, New Zealand was not going to be allowed to retain its rough, frontier-style drinking customs as it developed into a more civilised and settled society.
CHAPTER VI

CONFRONTATION AND CONSOLIDATION

In 1903 the licensing debate entered a new phase. The lines of battle between the antagonistic groups became more marked as the liquor trade now began to fight in earnest to save itself from extinction. The demands of the prohibitionists for the bare majority and a national option, of the trade for compensation and an extension of time between the polls, and of the moderates for stricter enforcement of the licensing laws and for an option involving state, municipal or corporate control, ensured that Seddon was not going to be able to keep the issue out of the political arena. He was about to be embroiled in a battle in which "the forces of evil will contend for victory over the powers of righteousness".¹ For once, however, Seddon seemed willing to be embroiled.

No sooner had the N.Z.A. begun to make its demands than Seddon dropped a bombshell. He suggested that elective licensing committees should be replaced by boards of magistrates to decide about the renewing, withdrawing and issuing of licences. The accusation was at once made that Seddon was again working in the interests of the trade, in that his suggestion had only been prompted by the fact that temperance licensing committees had begun to be elected. The proposal was considered to be contrary to the democratic rights of popular government.² Seddon had also suggested that colonial option replace local option on the ballot paper. On this question he was also accused of acting in the trade’s interest, and was only now prepared to offer

1. Outlook, 25 April, 1903, p. 3; ODT, 5 June, 1903, p. 4.
2. NZO, 20 June, 1903; ODT, 1 August, 1903, pp. 6-7.
this option because the prohibitionists had begun to win more elector-
ates to no-license. F.W. Isitt threatened Seddon with aroused
opposition if these proposals were not withdrawn.

If he perseveres with his proposals he
may undoubtedly reckon upon such solid
and energetic political opposition as
he has never hitherto contemplated...
The indignation aroused by the proposals
of Mr Seddon is so deep and will be so
abiding that there will be no difficulty
in forming a solid Prohibition party
strong enough in all probability to
easily hold the balance of power in any
future Parliament.3

Such a threat of a separate political Temperance party was against all
temperance policy up to this time. Isitt gave no indication as to
how he intended to carry out this threat if he had to, nor did it seem
possible that a party with prohibition as its only platform would be a
viable political entity.

A few days after this storm had blown up Seddon introduced a
further contentious issue into the debate. He suggested to a
prohibitionist deputation that in no-license areas no one should be
allowed to possess liquor, even in their own homes.4 Seddon was
suggesting total prohibition in all no-license districts, and it was
not difficult to see his motive for doing so.

Under the Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act of 1893 and its
various amendments the adoption of local no-license by an electorate
had only meant that alcohol could not be sold in that electorate and
that all licensed bars were to be closed. People could still import
liquor for private consumption from adjacent licensed areas, so long
as it was in quantities of two gallons or more. Most people quickly

3. ODT, 16 June, 1903, p. 5.
4. ibid., 9 July, 1903, p. 6.
realised that this legislation would work against the poor rather than the wealthy: the poor man would be unable to spend fourpence on a glass of beer in his home town and would be too poor to be able to buy two gallons from the neighbouring licensing district.

This legislation had encouraged the belief amongst the working class that the ruling middle class felt it was all right for it to consume alcohol but that the poor should be encouraged to abstain to improve themselves economically, socially and morally. Even before the first licensing poll was taken in 1894 it was pointed out that

working men don't keep cellars and don't lay in casks of beer. It is all very well for smug persons who have means, or those who have at present plenty of credit, to talk about the drinking habits of the "lower orders"; the question is will these "lower orders" be deluded into putting on themselves the fetters as people who cannot control themselves.5

The rhetoric of economic and social class was very clear. The working class found itself an ally on this question in the N.Z. Observer, which argued that the prohibitionists

preach Prohibition for the mass of the people, and at the same time they take the precaution to assure the favoured, well-to-do classes that their privileges are not to be curtailed, and their liberty of action is not to be interfered with...There must be one law for rich and poor alike...In short, Prohibition must be absolute or not at all.6

From the very early days of this 1894-1914 period the issue of prohibition had developed into one of rich against poor, class against class.

Seddon attempted to use the ill-feeling created by this division

to defeat the prohibition movement. It would seem that he hoped by his no-license, no liquor suggestion to alienate the moderate support from the no-license vote by making it illegal to consume liquor in a no-license area. The prohibitionists had been very astute when preparing for the 1902 liquor poll in trying to convince people that it was the iniquitous open bar system which they were attacking and not the use of liquor as such. Such casuistry probably convinced few people, but it was believed that this approach had captured the sympathy of the Moderate party and had gained for them more votes than any other tactic. The moderate voter was presumed to be prepared to vote for no-license in order to achieve reform of the open bar system, if not its abolition, while not denying people access to alcohol by other legitimate means such as wholesale trading. Seddon's latest manoeuvre was a direct threat to many of these moderates' drinking habits which no-license had previously not materially altered, and would probably influence many of them against voting for no-license. As one writer put it:

Any scheme which promises to reduce drunkenness appeals to the moderate man who has less use for a tot than has a professional teetotaller; but it must be no part of any scheme that he himself shall be caught in the net of compulsory sobriety.

They were likely to seek reform by other, less drastic means. It remained to be seen, however, whether Seddon was serious with his suggestion, or whether, as some people thought, it was merely a shrewd electioneering move for the purpose of catching votes, without any

7. ODT, 11 July, 1903, p. 6.
8. NZO, 18 July, 1903, p. 3.
serious intent behind it.9

The idea of absolute prohibition was given substantial support by the liquor industry at the largest conference of representatives of the trade held in New Zealand up to that time. In a deputation to the premier from this body one of the major requests was that it be made a penal offence for persons to have alcoholic liquor in their possession in no-license districts. Other requests included a national option poll once every nine years instead of local option once every three years; compensation for licensees who lost their licences as a result of the liquor poll and reduction; the removal of the reduction issue; the substitution of magistrates for elected licensing committees; and eleven o'clock closing.10 The similarity between these requests and Seddon's earlier proposals suggests that either Seddon had discussed these things privately with the trade and then made his own announcement, or else the trade saw the value of his ideas and adopted them with rapidity. Whichever was the case, one thing was clear: Seddon was working against the prohibitionists, and hence in favour of the trade. Whether by intention or by accident did not really matter. Whether he would be successful did, however.

As a result of these proposals and as a result of the invalidation of the liquor polls in Newtown and Bruce on points of technicality, the liquor question received more attention as a political issue than it had done since 1895, except immediately prior to liquor polls. The anomalies and inconsistencies of the colony's licensing


laws that had been revealed in the court procedures which had ensued as a result of the 1902 local option polls in Bruce, Newtown, Ashburton and Chalmers, engendered a public demand for a thorough overhaul of the statutes controlling the sale of liquor. Seddon, however, appeared loathe to introduce a measure to settle these problems. By the end of September nothing had been done, and it was realised that nothing was likely to be undertaken so late in the parliamentary session. Then on 20 October, after a message from the Governor that something ought to be done to deal with the public demand for reform, Seddon introduced a Licensing Bill which, rather than simply aiming at tightening the administration of the present law, and allowing a second poll in the case of irregularities, reopened the whole major debate as to what form the licensing laws should take. Amongst its clauses were proposals to introduce total prohibition in no-license areas, to remove the reduction option, and to hold a poll as to whether the interval between the polls should be increased. It offered as a sop to the prohibitionists the introduction of a second poll if the first licensing poll was declared void, the raising of the age of liquor buying to eighteen, the inclusion of clubs under the terms of the liquor poll, and the abolition of tied houses. These had been the demands of the prohibitionists for many years, but they were not prepared to gain them by sacrificing the whole basis on which they had built up their support and achieved reasonable success in different parts of the country.

11. White Ribbon, 16 March, 1903; ODT, 17 April, 1903, pp.4-5; 12 August, 1903, p. 4; 21 August, 1903, p. 2; Outlook, 29 August, 1903, p. 3.


13. NZPO, 126, (20 Oct, 1903), pp. 625-635.
vigorou8 protest was at once made by the prohibition leaders, but it was generally thought that the Bill was so preposterous that it would not be proceeded with. According to the N.Z.A., "the protests made were rather against the Government's suggestion of such a measure than in belief that they really intended to pass it".14 Their chief spokesman in the House, T.E. Taylor, even went so far as to suggest that even the Government did not favour the terms of the Bill but were acting under pressure from the liquor trade. It was only the result of the 1902 poll,

when in nearly a third of the electorates of New Zealand no-license came within the grasp of the people, then the trade realised its danger, and it is owing to the undue pressure from the liquor interest that the Government feel they must at least make a show this session of dealing with the matter, although I believe they would be as glad to quit the whole controversy and throw it into the hands of the people as any one in this Chamber.15

As the Bill progressed it became apparent that it was clause nine, containing the "no-license, no liquor" proposal, which was really the crux of the debate. The prohibitionists argued that

we have always been careful to distinguish between what is the right of the community and what is the right of the individual citizen...Our law deals with the public sale of liquor - that is with the public system. We have, so far, placed no restrictions upon the private individual in a no-license district.16

To the opponent of prohibition this seemed to be a negation of the prohibition movement's aim. The popular vote on the public sale of alcohol had been considered as a means of allowing the local community

16. ibid., p. 629, T.E. Taylor.
to decide whether it would allow alcohol in its midst or not. The prohibitionists had been arguing for years that the consumption of alcohol was detrimental and wrong, and should be stopped. Now it appeared that, when faced with the threat of complete prohibition and the subsequent fear of losing moderate votes, they were prepared to alter their stance. Seddon knew this and was quick to make political capital out of it. Total prohibition in a no-license area, he argued,
is a logical and sound principle, and what I always thought the Prohibitionists were fighting for. Now, they practically say it is not the consumption of alcohol in which the evil arises, but in its public sale. If you interfere with one class of people, and stop the working-man from having his beer at an hotel, because he cannot afford a barrel of beer or a case of champagne, or a case of whisky in his house, or purchase the same, why should you or I be allowed to have it in our houses after no license has been carried. 17

In the debate on the second reading he made it clear that he knew he had called the N.Z.A.'s bluff and threatened them with the loss of support of those who voted local no-license but were not in favour of local prohibition. He again accused the prohibitionists of class interest by denying the working man his beer but enabling the wealthy still to obtain liquor for private consumption. 18

Such accusations came close to a true appraisal of the prohibition movement in New Zealand. It had never before been made so explicitly obvious that the prohibition movement was primarily directed towards social, economic and moral reform of the working class of New Zealand. Drinking was seen as the cause of poverty, crime, disease,

17. ibid., p. 635.

18. ibid., 127 (30 Oct, 1903), pp. 163-166.
destitution and moral degeneracy. To remove these scars from the community it was regarded as first necessary to remove the tempting and degrading influence of the liquor traffic. The prohibitionists concentrated on the public bar for two reasons. It was there that the working man spent his wages, and so became submerged in poverty and its consequent ills. Second, the wealthy or successful man was considered more morally upright, more moderate, more capable of using alcohol intelligently, and was less a frequenter of the public bar. He did not need the same encouragement to practise the virtues of sobriety, self-discipline and self-denial. It was not so vital to the welfare of the country that he be denied access to alcohol. This is not to suggest that the prohibitionists condoned the use of alcohol. They still considered it to be the root of all social and moral evil, and hoped that ultimately it might be totally removed from society. This, however, was not attainable at the present time, but local no-license that would close the public bar was. After all, it was considered that the major problems associated with the use of alcohol were to be found amongst the working class. This middle class movement to rectify society's social and economic and moral problems therefore attacked the public sale and consumption of alcohol while leaving its own socio-economic peers' drinking habits untouched. Such a situation made it easy for people such as Seddon to accuse the prohibitionists of class legislation. In many ways it was, but not consciously so. They were not attempting to suppress the working man but to help him improve his condition in life. Their altruism cannot be denied. Their efforts to mould society according to their own values and social mores can also not be denied. Seddon had come near to interpreting the deeper significance of the prohibition movement in New Zealand,
but his hostility towards it caused him to ascribe to it devious intentions of hostile class warfare, rather than allowing him to make a less passioned, less political and more objective assessment.

The prohibitionists in the House did their best to block the second reading of the Bill by means of a stone-wall debate. After an all night sitting on 30 October, however, the Bill passed its second reading on a voice vote. The immediate effect was to elicit a large number of strong protests from churches and public prohibitionist meetings. Members of the House found themselves deluged with letters and telegrams urging them to vote against the Bill. Some were reminded of the overwhelming vote for no-license in their electorates at the 1902 poll. These communications appear to have had some effect because when, on 11 November, a division was called for that the Bill go into committee, the motion was defeated by thirty-eight votes to thirty-six. This defeat was partly because of strong opposition to the Bill itself, and partly because of the lateness of the session. If the Bill had reached the committee stage its progress would have been hindered by amendment after amendment. A lengthy debate would have ensued at a time when there were only a couple of weeks of the parliamentary session left and when there were more important Bills relating to land valuation, Maori land laws and preferential and reciprocal trade to be considered.

20. N.Z.A., Annual Report, 1903-1904, p. 5; ODT, 4 Nov, 1903, p. 4; Outlook, 7 Nov, 1903, p. 25; C. Henderson to Kate Sheppard, 10 Nov, 1903, K. Sheppard Collection, Canterbury Museum Library.
22. ODT, 13 Nov, 1903, p. 3.
The licensed trade considered the fact that the Bill had actually reached its second reading as an advance for their cause, and considered its rejection as only the effect of the lateness of the session. Mr Moss Davis, a prominent Auckland brewer, argued that on clause nine, the no-license, no liquor clause, the trade had emerged as the proponents of true temperance while the prohibitionists had openly advocated the consumption of liquor. He claimed a victory for the trade and suggested that "the prohibition advocates by deserting their cause have sounded its death knell for the colony of New Zealand". 23

The prohibitionists naturally had a different opinion. They were jubilant that the Bill had been dropped, and still saw themselves as being on top of a reforming wave sweeping over New Zealand. An example of their jubilation was given by the annual assembly of the Baptist Church being held in Wellington at the time when the Bill was about to be committed. On the announcement of its defeat, "the audience clapped, cheered, rose, waved handkerchiefs, cheered again, and then, quite spontaneously, found an adequate voice for its emotion in the doxology". 24 Such enthusiasm for their cause was irrepressible, and posed a continual problem to the man who wished to remove the liquor question from its troublesome position in the political sphere. Instead of succeeding in removing the issue from politics by this Bill he had only increased demands for reform. Interest in the licensing question was felt to be keener now than ever before in the history of

23. ibid.
the movement. Convinced of the righteousness of their cause and confident of widespread support, the prohibitionists now felt that they were in a position where they might defeat Seddon and the liquor trade. They were well aware of the financial power of the liquor industry and the threat that this posed when compared with their own limited resources. With careful organisation, however, and with "the more valuable quality of moral enthusiasm," they looked forward to achieving "the greatest moral victory so far gained in New Zealand." They knew that such a victory would have to be fought for, and might require new tactics in approach. This had become apparent in the debate on the 1903 Licensing Bill, when it had been threatened that if the Bill with clause nine still in it was proceeded with a political prohibition party would be formed. Mr H.D. Bedford, member for Dunedin City, had stated in debating the second reading of that Bill that, "If this Bill is passed there is no alternative: the no-license party must become a political party pure and simple." Such a possibility was not denied by the leaders of the prohibition movement, and was given even greater emphasis when licensing legislation was in the wind for the 1904 session. In a deputation to the Premier on 30 July, 1904, this threat was reiterated at least twice by spokesmen for the party. All the prohibitionists really wanted was a law allowing for the taking of a second poll in case of any irregularities in the first poll; hence their support for the Local Elections Bill of 1904, which would allow

25. ODT, 13 Nov, 1903, p. 3.
just this. They certainly did not favour the trade's most recent demands which had not altered from 1903 and which seriously threatened the prohibition movement.

Seddon took heed of the requests of both the trade and the prohibitionists, and his Licensing Act Amendment Bill of 1904 was somewhat less extreme than the 1903 Bill. Despite this, however, the Bill as finally passed only improved the machinery measures concerning the drinking age, the King Country, and club licences; it did not settle the more contentious issues of national prohibition and the bare majority. It was, nonetheless, an important measure for a variety of reasons.

It had, for example, encouraged debate on the issue of State control as an alternative to prohibition as a means of reforming the liquor trade. Why Seddon had introduced the issue of State control is uncertain. He argued that it was demanded by the Synod of the Anglican Church, which it was, and that there had been considerable discussion of it as a means of reform over the past few years, which there had been.

Wariness as to his real motives did exist, however, and it seemed possible that he had introduced it as another attempt to separate the moderate voter from the no-license issue. State control seemed to offer a viable means of reform of the liquor trading system which the moderates desired, without having to abolish the use of liquor entirely. The proposal was that State control be added to the ballot paper and that it would be introduced when it had bare majority support. It would last initially for six years unless ten per cent

29. Prohibitionist, 13 August, 1904, pp. 9-12.

30. Trade deputation to Seddon, 21 July, 1904, reported in Prohibitionist, 30 July, 1904, pp. 4-5; ODT, 22 July, 1904, p. 3.

of the electors called for a poll on this issue. The prohibitionists in the House, notably G. Fowlds and H.D. Bedford, were opposed to the State control issue for various reasons: it had not been strongly demanded by the people, it could lead to corrupt politics, and it would only add to confusion at the polls. Other members of the House were similarly unenthused by the suggestion and in the committee stages it was deleted. It was, after all, a minor clause in the Bill, the debates on which had centred on the question of no-license, no liquor. Seddon was not prepared to abandon the question of State control so easily, and said that it would be discussed in the future. The moderates welcomed this statement and urged that specific and workable proposals be evolved on which the electors could give a definite answer. The Socialist Party likewise urged that State control be discussed further, whereupon Seddon revealed that he hoped to achieve this if the Referendum Bill then before the House were passed. One of the questions he would have submitted to the referendum would be that of State control of the liquor traffic. Unfortunately for the State control advocates the Referendum Bill did not pass. The issue did not disappear, however, but remained in the debates of the next sixteen years until it was incorporated in the liquor poll in 1920. A new threat to the prohibition movement had emerged.

A further clause in the Bill, that concerning club licences, passed with little notice in comparison with the weightier issues of

33. Prohibitionist, 5 Nov, 1904, p. 3.
34. ODT, 4 Nov, 1904, p. 4.
35. Prohibitionist, 5 Nov, 1904, p. 3.
State control, local prohibition and reduction. Yet, like the no-license, no liquor issue, the issue of club licences also gave a clue as to the nature of the prohibition movement.

Club licences were not subject to the no-license provisions as set down in the Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act, despite various attempts in 1893, 1894 and 1895 to have them treated the same as hotels. Yet it was felt that the existence of clubs in no-license areas would defeat the purpose of no-license. It was also felt that, if there were gentlemen's clubs and no working men's bars, this would not only be unfair to the working class but would also set class against class. 36

For the prohibitionists the clubs most aimed at by this proposal to bring all clubs under the provisions of the liquor poll were the working-man's clubs. They felt that these institutions for the amelioration of the condition of the working people were being undermined by the presence of alcohol on their premises. "It was to be regretted," Mr Earnshaw argued in the debate on the 1893 Act, "that these clubs, intended for the elevating of the working classes, should, through this insidious enemy, be a bar and a degradation to the persons who belonged to them". 37 No attack was made on the more numerous gentlemen's clubs, where, it is presumed, members were moderate and well-behaved, or believed to be so.

The labour movement quickly attacked the retention of club licences in no-license areas as being unfair to the working man who was less likely to be able to afford club membership fees than the more wealthy professional and business man. Once again the N.Z. Observer

36. NZPD, 88, 90, 91, (1895), passim, debates on Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Bill.

came to his aid when it became apparent that no-license did not mean no liquor, and that clubs would continue in no-license areas. Prohibition was seen as being not prohibition.

It is a law of class distinction of a most undesirable and intolerable kind... In plain English, it is a law to compel the masses to become total abstainers, and to permit the classes to drink as much as they please without even regulating restraint or police supervision.

Prohibition, in a word, stands self-confessed a fraud. It proposes to introduce into this young and democratic country the old world inequality of one law for the rich and another for the poor. The law will not affect the wealthy citizen in the slightest degree. He may go to his club, as he does now, and make a veritable beast of himself, but the law will still take off its hat to him, and the policeman will obsequiously help him into his carriage. But for the working man the law has a wholly different application. However moderate he may be in his indulgence... he is liable to punishment and even to be treated as a criminal. This is not only arbitrary - it is manifestly unjust. The fact that one man has more money than another should not entitle him to the privilege of more lenient laws.

The pertinent question was asked, when it was suggested that working men should establish their own clubs, as to

what advantage is the community likely to gain by closing the hotels and opening in their places a set of licensed clubs? No advantage whatever - on the contrary, an immense disadvantage. At the present time, the hotels discharge a useful function by accommodating travellers. The clubs would accommodate no travellers. The hotels do not allow gambling on the premises. Gambling would be carried on without restraint and at all hours of the night, in every club. Hotels are not allowed to serve customers already under the influence of liquor. In the clubs, members would get all they wanted until they lay under the table.

38. _NZO_, 2 Dec, 1899, p. 2.
Finally, hotels are under strict police supervision and may be entered by the officers of the law at any hour of the day or night. Clubs are free from police supervision. Any and every debauchery may be practised there, gambling and drinking may go on through the whole night, and the police would be powerless to interfere. 39

It is little wonder that the labour movement could show nothing but hostility to the retention of club licences while the pub was to be closed. While it was not the desire of the prohibition movement to retain the club licence, its retention, along with the attacks on the drinking habits of the working class, encouraged the labouring section of the community to consider itself as the object of the prohibition movement, and hence as a separate group in society and needing to protect itself from a hostile middle class. This consciousness of different lifestyles and outlooks suggests the reality of the concept of a class society in New Zealand at that time.

The question of clubs was settled by the 1904 Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act, which brought club licences under the same laws as hotels, and by the 1910 Licensing Amendment Act, which prohibited the use of a system of lockers in clubs in which members might store liquor for their own consumption after the club bar had closed. By this time, however, the belief amongst the labouring section of the community that the prohibition movement was an attempt by the middle class to dictate to the poorer members of society as to how they should live, what they should drink, what they should believe, and how they should behave, was such that the settlement of one issue which had contributed to this belief was hardly enough to alter people's attitudes.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the passing of the 1904

39. ibid.
Licensing Amendment Act had shown that the power of the prohibition movement was considerably increased. It had succeeded in defeating the obnoxious clauses in the Bill concerning no-license, no liquor, the removal of the reduction issue and the introduction of a State control option. In contrast the liquor trade had gained nothing substantial. There had been a time when Seddon had been able to restrict the passing of legislation favourable to the prohibitionists or unfavourable to the licensing trade. There had been a time when it was in his own interest to pay more heed to the trade than to the temperance agitation. Since the 1902 poll, however, he had had to learn that this situation had changed. The prohibitionists could point to their majority support within the country, and were prepared to use this support as a weapon in preventing any curtailing of their position. They had also shown, with the threat of forming a separate party in Parliament, that they were prepared to see their threats through to a conclusion if necessary. A new decisiveness and an increased confidence had entered their stance, and a new element had entered the licensing debate. In such a situation it was possible and likely that liquor poll campaigns would become even more incisive and bitter, as one side fought with greater certainty of its position while the other fought for its very existence. The testing ground for these new trends would be the 1905 liquor campaign and poll.

Organisation for this began immediately after the 1904 Licensing

Amendment Act became law. Local prohibition branches throughout the country began to prepare programmes of meetings, lectures, and speakers, began to enrol new members, and began to raise money to meet the costs of the fight. Special efforts were to be made to improve the no-license support in areas that had been most opposed to it up till now. Particular attention was given to the West Coast of the South Island, a stronghold of Irish Catholic miners. It was thought that the main difference between the West Coast and other parts of the colony on the temperance question was that there had not been enough public discussion of the issue. The sparseness of its population and its isolation from the main centres of activity had made it a more expensive area to cover with less lasting return. Hence it had been largely ignored while other areas had been more thoroughly cultivated.

After the 1902 poll, however, greater efforts had been made by temperance advocates on the Coast, with three central temperance organisations being established in Greymouth, Hokitika and Westport. These gave a pronounced stimulus to the prohibition cause, with subsidiary branches being established in the smaller rural towns and villages. 41

In February, 1905, a temperance convention was held in Hokitika to stimulate even further the growing temperance sentiment. Major speakers included T.E. Taylor and H.D. Bedford, both left wing independent Liberals in Parliament, and the Rev. J. Dawson, a member of the N.Z.A. executive. 42 Such was their effect that it could be reported by the middle of the year that, "Public sentiment has been largely leavened with their no-license principles, and they are certain of a

41. Prohibitionist, 4 March, 1905, p. 6.

42. ODT, 30 Jan, 1905, p. 6; 11 Feb, 1905, p. 7; 1 March, 1905, p. 5.
very much heavier poll for No-License". 43

The rest of the country was not to be ignored, however, while areas such as the West Coast were bombarded with prohibitionist propaganda. The usual run of lecturers was employed to tour the country from end to end. Mr J.G. Woolley, who had campaigned in New Zealand in 1899 and 1901, returned from the U.S.A. at the invitation of the N.Z.A. L.M. Isitt and Mrs Harrison Lee, two other well-known campaigners, also added their voices to the campaign. It was expected that a prohibition candidate would be run in every electorate, to be supported not on party lines (though it was expected that most would be independent Liberals), but solely on their attitude to the licensing law. 44

One such candidate of considerable prominence was Mr A.S. Adams of Dunedin. Adams was a prominent barrister and solicitor and a leading Baptist layman. He was currently president of the N.Z.A., as he had been in 1903-1904 during the debates on the licensing Bills of those years. As the foremost legal adviser of the N.Z.A. he had been responsible for the drafting of several prohibitionist Bills introduced to Parliament over the years. He had also been important in taking the prohibitionist side in the courtroom on any liquor poll appeal or other matter involving a conflict between the trade and the prohibitionists. It was expected that he would provide a fierce opponent for J.A. Millar, Liberal member for Dunedin City for several years, once an advocate of temperance and now a champion of the liquor traffic. 45

The prohibitionist forces were loud in their praise of Adams, but a

43. Outlook, 24 June, 1905, pp. 31-32.
44. Prohibitionist, 27 May, 1905, p. 9.
45. ibid., 24 June, 1905, p. 3.
more realistic note as to his chances was struck by the editor of the Otago Liberal, who saw his political ideas as crude, anti-labour, unoriginal, and out of touch with political developments. The clash between Adams and Millar was to show clearly that most voters did not decide their electoral voting preference solely on prohibitionist grounds.

During the 1905 campaign greater interest was taken by the prohibition movement in the connection of Labour and no-license than had been the case in 1899 and 1902, despite the fact that the policy of the prohibition movement was against supporting political candidates on anything other than their stance on the liquor issue.

After the collapse of the Labour-Prohibition link under Stout in the 1893-1896 period, neither group had taken much interest in the other. In 1899 the New Zealand Trades and Labour Conference omitted from its platform the plank in which the control of the liquor traffic by popular vote was demanded. This did not, as it was at first rumoured, mean that the "divorce between the Labour and Temperance parties has been made absolute. Individual members, especially of the Trades and Labour Council, continued to declare in their official capacity their support for no-license. They believed that "as no portion of the community suffered more from the drink than the working classes...they should interest themselves in the liquor question."

The effect at this time of these sentiments on the Labour-Prohibition connection

47. See Chapter IX.
48. ODT, 10 April, 1899, p. 4.
49. Ibid.
50. See ODT, 22 July, 1901, p. 5; 28 August, 1901, p. 3.
51. Ibid., 28 August, 1901, p. 3.
would seem, however, to have been negligible.

It was not until 1904 that any further initiative to define this connection was undertaken. In that year an Independent Political Labour League was formed, only to be regarded by the prohibition movement, or at least the Liberal members within the prohibition movement, as a "ruinous step, which can only lead to suspicion and dissension in the party of progress and triumph in the ranks of privilege and stagnation". The fear of working class independence of middle class leadership and values was seen as the writer went on to say that

the principle of forming such a third party assails Divine law; God did not create humanity in classes. Force, birth, wealth have all had their day as paramount governing principles, and all have failed. If manual labour casts itself adrift and makes for paramountcy, it will fail too.

Yet the formation of an independent political working class body was a realisation by the labour movement that it would not achieve its aims by means of the Liberal Party or middle class protest groups. One of the results of this conclusion was the severance of any official connection with the prohibition movement.

A position of neutrality on the licensing issue was now professed by the various labour organisations. In Otago the Trades and Labour Council denied a claim by a prohibitionist, Dr B.E. de Lautour, that the Labour party was allied with the liquor party. It stated that

we deem it advisable to declare our attitude on this question to be one of strict neutrality. The Legislature having provided the referendum,


and there being every opportunity for discussion and propaganda work outside of this council we see no reason for at present introducing this question into Labour politics.54

This position was further emphasised when, in issuing its platform for the 1905 election, the Independent Political Labour League left its candidates "a free hand on the liquor and fiscal questions".55 The break with the prohibition movement was complete.

Despite this break between Labour and Prohibition there was an uneasy feeling amongst many of the Labour leaders in that they realised that the working class was most affected by the loss of money spent on alcohol. Because of this the liquor question could not be ignored by them. As one Labour writer put it,

The liquor question is too indissolubly bound up with the fate of Labour to be slightly ignored...A movement which looks at the liquor question as a mere side issue...is courting its own doom...Labourism ethically is an upward movement; industrially it is a forward movement; socially, it is a fraternal movement. But neither one nor the other of these aspects of Labourism can be fittingly realised so long as it is tangled up with the liquor question...Labour and Liquor must ever be sworn enemies.56

Such an extreme position was not accepted by all in the labour movement, but the underlying belief that something had to be done found acceptance. Considerable interest was taken by labour journals in such solutions as State and municipal control.57 Despite this interest, however, the official attitude of the Labour party towards the licensing

54. Otago Trades and Labour Council meeting, 16 June, 1904, reported in Otago Liberal, 18 June, 1904, p. 9.
56. Beacon, 2 March, 1907, p. 10.
57. N.Z. Worker, 10 Jan, 1906, p.2; 17 Jan, 1906, p.7; Beacon, 12 May, 1906, p. 7.
question remained neutral. At a special conference of the Independent Political Labour League in April, 1906, two motions relating to the introduction of a vote on State control at the liquor poll were lost. 58

The prohibition movement's inability to attract definite support from the labour movement at this stage stemmed partly from its lack of understanding of Labour's position on the liquor question, a position which involved hostility to the power of the liquor trade but an acceptance of the use of alcohol. This inability to attract support also stemmed, however, from Labour's suspicions of the prohibition movement as being a class movement directed primarily at a working class pleasure. The issues of club licences and total prohibition in a no-license area, both of which were important debates in the 1905 liquor poll campaign, were particularly influential in creating these suspicions.

While the prohibitionists were busy rousing support for no-license, the liquor trade was also active. For the first time at a national level it had its own lecturers. This reflects how seriously the trade estimated its position and the possibility of an adverse poll. Their main proponent was a Rev. William Thomson, a Presbyterian minister who was prepared to go against the mainstream of his colleagues' opinions on the issue and stand out against no-license. He was convinced of the fallacy of prohibition as a means of moral, social and economic reform. At the same time, however, he was not totally in favour of the liquor trade as it existed, even though it appeared that he was in the employ of the Licensed Victuallers' Association. He campaigned widely, especially in the South Island, both from the public platform and in the press, and in September,

58. Otago Liberal, 28 April, 1906, p. 9.
1905, he established the Otago and Southland Temperance Alliance to encourage temperance (in its true sense of moderation) and moderate reform of the liquor trade. Its objects were threefold: to promote temperance, in order to protect the human body, yet allowing people to drink or abstain as they wished; to oppose prohibition as an invasion of the individual's natural and civil rights, and as something which would lower moral character and bring greater evils through contempt of the law; and to regulate the trade by removal of incapable and improper persons, by checking on all applications for licenses, and to make sure hotels were well run, without profanity, drunkenness or gambling, and that they observed the law. This organisation never came to fruition as a viable means of reform. Possibly this was because Thomson's connection with the L.V.A. made many suspect his intentions. It is more likely, however, that its lack of definite means as to the carrying out of these objects meant that it never developed beyond the theoretical idea, despite reports of a reasonably large number of signed names.

The prohibitionists' response to Thomson's campaigning was a fine example of their self-righteous intolerance. Not only did they attack Thomson's arguments as being a toleration of a very harmful trade, but they attacked the man's personality as well. Certain that they were doing the Lord's work, they did not hesitate to label their opponents as unchristian and as instruments of the devil.

About Mr Thomson they said:

In the first place he professes to be a minister of the Gospel, and wears the

It seems an insult to their intelligence to tell them that the men who thrive and grow rich by the vices and ruin of their fellows cannot in any sense be said to claim His authority or to do His work. It seems an insult to their intelligence to tell them that the men who thrive and grow rich by the vices and ruin of their fellows cannot in any sense be said to claim His authority or to do His work.

The interest in the 1905 liquor poll was described as being greater than it had ever been since the Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act had come into operation. The results of the poll did not bear out the prohibitionists' expectations of a major victory. The results of the poll did not bear out the prohibitionists' expectations of a major victory. For the first time the national vote was not at the expense of the support for continuance, which had remained proportionately the same as in 1902. The support for no-license had increased proportionally, and as a result, to pose some awkward questions for the prohibition party. The results of the poll did not bear out the prohibtionists' expectations of a major victory. The results of the poll did not bear out the prohibtionists' expectations of a major victory. For the first time the national vote was not at the expense of the support for continuance, which had remained proportionately the same as in 1902. The support for no-license had increased proportionally, and as a result, to pose some awkward questions for the prohibition party.

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Lynn, Oamaru and Invercargill, had voted in favour of no-license, the support for no-license in Mataura and Ashburton, both of which had gone dry in 1902, declined, and in Ashburton quite substantially. This may have been the effect of knowing that it was now up to the supporters of restoration to poll sixty per cent to change the situation, and that the no-license supporters could relax a little. But whereas in other no-license areas this drop in support could be measured within a margin of five per cent from sixty per cent, in Ashburton it dropped to forty-eight per cent. The argument was quickly forwarded that no-license had been shown to be less than satisfactory as a means of reform. There had been a large legal consumption of liquor in the district despite no-license, and a considerable amount of sly-grog selling, while the amount of drunkenness on the trains between Ashburton township and Chertsey, just outside the electoral boundary and containing a hotel, had caused considerable complaint. It was also regarded with surprise that the three electorates which had voted for no-license in 1902 and had then had the decision reversed by appeal, Bruce, Chalmers and Newtown, similarly failed to maintain that support for no-license in 1905; nor did any of them carry reduction.

Within the general increase for support for no-license the special temperance campaign on the West Coast appeared to have borne results. In Buller the vote for no-license increased on its 1902 result by 8.54 per cent, and in Westland by 13.0 per cent; in Grey, however, the vote dropped by 1.05 per cent, the reason seemingly being that it had advanced earlier than the other two West Coast districts, suggesting that the effect of the 1905 campaign may have been more apparent than real. In 1902 Grey's support for no-license had

increased by 13.26 per cent on its 1899 figure, while Buller and West-
land had remained static. There is no obvious reason for this as all
these areas had similar proportions of Roman Catholics and males,
single and married.64

The support for continuance may have remained stable over the
whole country, but the number of electorates favouring continuance
dropped from twenty-nine out of sixty-eight in 1902 to eighteen out of
sixty-eight in 1905, while those not gaining the required majority for
any of the proposals increased from twenty-four to forty.65 It is
interesting that the reduction issue could be carried in only four
electorates despite the decline in the number of electorates favouring
continuance. While there was this decline in the number of elector-
ates favouring continuance, there were also twenty-three electorates
whose percentage support for no-license dropped in comparison with their
1902 figures.66 Nineteen of these were in the South Island, presumed
until now to be more favourable to no-license than the North Island.

These results threw considerable confusion upon the whole no-
license issue. While there were six areas now under no-license rule,
and while the national total in favour of no-license had increased, it
appeared that there had been a swing away from its support in a large
number of electorates. The reduction issue also appeared to be less
popular than before as the number of people voting for no-license and
not reduction as well increased.

The possible explanations for this confusion are numerous. The
decline in support for no-license in many South Island electorates,

64. See Tables 15, 15a and 20.

65. See Table 20, Appendix G.

66. See Tables 20 and 22, Appendix G.
**Table 15**

Religious adherence in specific licensing districts, 1901, as percentage of total population of district.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Anglicans</th>
<th>Roman Catholics</th>
<th>Pietists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAY OF ISLANDS</td>
<td>56.29</td>
<td>12.97</td>
<td>22.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUCKLAND CITY</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>19.06</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARNELL</td>
<td>51.56</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>31.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHINEMURI</td>
<td>47.65</td>
<td>19.71</td>
<td>28.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAIAPU</td>
<td>48.19</td>
<td>15.24</td>
<td>30.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASTERTON</td>
<td>53.95</td>
<td>11.68</td>
<td>33.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAIRARAPA</td>
<td>56.15</td>
<td>8.57</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAUERA</td>
<td>39.85</td>
<td>15.27</td>
<td>38.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATEA</td>
<td>39.17</td>
<td>12.02</td>
<td>40.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAIRAU</td>
<td>50.69</td>
<td>16.63</td>
<td>27.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREY</td>
<td>35.62</td>
<td>29.76</td>
<td>26.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTLAND</td>
<td>36.92</td>
<td>32.65</td>
<td>25.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHRISTCHURCH CITY</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>10.26</td>
<td>33.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTLAND</td>
<td>58.35</td>
<td>9.82</td>
<td>28.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAITAKI</td>
<td>31.52</td>
<td>20.21</td>
<td>46.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUNEDIN CITY</td>
<td>27.63</td>
<td>10.29</td>
<td>57.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAVESHAM</td>
<td>27.81</td>
<td>14.08</td>
<td>53.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAieri</td>
<td>17.86</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>71.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEWAPEKA</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>16.36</td>
<td>56.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INVERCARGILL</td>
<td>27.11</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Pietists includes Presbyterians, Methodists (Wesleyan, Primitive, and Others), Baptists, Congregationalists, Salvation Army, Seventh Day Adventists.

Source: Census of New Zealand, 1901.
TABLE 15a

Unmarried males over 21 as percentage of total males over 21, and as a percentage of total population over 21, in specific licensing districts, 1901. Males over 21 as percentage of total population over 21.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Unmarried males over 21 as % of total male population over 21</th>
<th>Unmarried males over 21 as % of total population over 21</th>
<th>Males over 21 as % of total population over 21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAY OF ISLANDS</td>
<td>43.74</td>
<td>28.37</td>
<td>64.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUCKLAND CITY</td>
<td>39.19</td>
<td>18.84</td>
<td>48.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARNELL</td>
<td>33.78</td>
<td>15.35</td>
<td>45.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHINEMURI</td>
<td>47.55</td>
<td>30.52</td>
<td>64.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAIAPU</td>
<td>48.44</td>
<td>29.47</td>
<td>60.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASTERTON</td>
<td>38.93</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>56.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAIRARAPA</td>
<td>46.15</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>57.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAWERA</td>
<td>43.09</td>
<td>24.36</td>
<td>56.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATEA</td>
<td>45.59</td>
<td>27.12</td>
<td>59.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAIRAU</td>
<td>41.67</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>56.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREY</td>
<td>58.35</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>65.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTLAND</td>
<td>53.75</td>
<td>32.32</td>
<td>60.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHRISTCHURCH CITY</td>
<td>34.48</td>
<td>15.92</td>
<td>46.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LYTTLETON</td>
<td>34.83</td>
<td>18.06</td>
<td>51.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAITAKI</td>
<td>47.38</td>
<td>30.32</td>
<td>63.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUNEDIN CITY</td>
<td>40.48</td>
<td>18.58</td>
<td>45.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAVERSHAM</td>
<td>31.82</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>46.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAIERI</td>
<td>44.65</td>
<td>23.66</td>
<td>52.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUAPoka</td>
<td>52.09</td>
<td>31.76</td>
<td>60.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INVERCARGILL</td>
<td>36.79</td>
<td>17.68</td>
<td>48.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census of New Zealand, 1901.
especially in and around Christchurch and Dunedin, seems in some way connected with the reaction against the New Liberals after the voucher case incident involving one of Seddon’s sons during 1905. Seddon had been cleared of any blame and public opinion had as a result gone against the New Liberals, most of whom were also prohibitionists. In the electorates where New Liberal candidates stood for Parliament the vote for continuance increased. Christchurch, as the centre of the New Liberal Party, noticed the effect most.

A second possible explanation lies in the fact that the trade had spent considerably more money and campaigned to a much greater extent than it had ever done before. Its resources were so much greater than those of the prohibitionist party, so that it could be more thoroughly organised. It was noticed and commented on, especially in Auckland, that the trade had been very busy registering electors and canvassing houses. In the South Island the activities of the trade had been greatly enhanced by the activities of the Rev. W. Thomson, which might have been a further cause of the decline in no-license support there.

Overall, however, it is most likely that associated with these activities on behalf of the licensed trade went a general feeling amongst the moderate section of the community that things were improving. After the shock of the 1902 poll the L.V.A. had finally been persuaded that it was time it looked to its own defences. It had,

67. See Burdon, King Dick, pp. 309-311.
68. See Table 20; also Whitcher, op. cit., pp. 237-239.
70. ODT, 6 Dec, 1905, p. 4; 7 Dec, 1905, p. 4.
therefore, made considerable efforts to improve its conduct and to observe the law. The polling results of 1905 would suggest that this policy had paid off and that many moderate voters were satisfied with the improvements made. Hence they stopped voting for no-license as a means to bring about reform.\(^71\) Associated with this may have been the effect of the no-license, no liquor debate which had frightened some moderates who had no desire to see total prohibition introduced.

While moderate voters may have been influenced by the trade's doings, it is also probable that people were becoming disenchanted with no-license as a means of reform once they had seen it in practise. Ashburton's experience from 1903-1905 had not been an outstanding success, with considerable drunkenness, sly-grog selling and legal drinking being experienced, along with a reputed decline in Ashburton township's prosperity.\(^72\) This might explain why Christchurch and its surrounding electorates voted against no-license quite markedly. Similarly the experience in Clutha and Mataura had not persuaded people that no-license was as beneficial as its proponents claimed. Dunedin and its environs may, as a result, have been persuaded not to try the experiment. This is tentative, however, and at best only a partial explanation. It does not explain why Oamaru and Invercargill should carry no-license and Taieri reduction.

Whatever the reason, or reasons, for the setback in support for no-license, it was recognised that the licensed trade had had a minor and qualified victory. It was warned, however, that this might only be temporary and that therefore it should not relax but maintain strict vigilance as to its behaviour.\(^73\)

\(^71\) ibid., 7 Dec, 1905, p. 4.

\(^72\) Daily Telegraph, 6 Dec, 1905, in Seddon Papers 3/52; NZD., 30 April, 1904, pp. 2-3.

\(^73\) ODT, 7 Dec, 1905, p. 4; 19 Dec, 1905, p. 4.
The suspicion that the 1905 liquor poll had gone against the prohibition party was substantiated by the battle and results of the licensing committee elections in 1906. The N.Z.A. executive strongly recommended that all steps be taken by local branches to secure the election of temperance licensing committees so that where reduction had been gained it could be enacted to the maximum twenty-five per cent of hotels. Such committees would also support ten o'clock closing and the restriction on any increase of wholesale licences.

In Otago and Southland the L.V.A. seemed to be uncertain about its position, as it resolved that the licensing committee should contain an equal number of moderate men and no-license supporters. With a view to securing this the Rev. W Thomson was asked to request an interview with the leaders of the no-license party. This was a tactical blunder on the part of the prohibitionists in that the L.V.A. was offering virtually the same policy of law enforcement as themselves: ten o'clock closing and strict adherence to the licensing law insofar as it related to regulation. It was not surprising, therefore, especially after the decline in the no-license vote in Dunedin in 1905, that the prohibition party should have suffered defeat at the elections. They lost support to the L.V.A. through not being prepared to support a compromise of candidates to avoid the cost of the poll, and also because it was felt that a moderate rather than prohibitionist committee

74. *ibid.*, 7 Feb, 1906, p. 5.
76. *ibid.*, 27 Feb, 1906, p. 4.
would be more impartial in enforcing the law judicially. Not one prohibition nominee was elected to the committee. 78

These results indicated several things. First, the licensed trade had definitely stemmed the growing opposition to its existence by means of strict adherence to the law. This in turn suggested that there were a number of voters, moderate in outlook, who were prepared to switch their support from no-license to continuance if they thought reform was being achieved. Third, it revealed the possibility of a growing dissatisfaction in the prohibitionist ranks with such issues as reduction and the election of temperance licensing committees. It seems to have been felt that seeking to reform the trade by means of a favourable licensing committee was merely playing with "the greatest evil of our time"; on the one hand prohibitionists denounced the sale of alcohol, while on the other they sought to be made instruments for the administration of the law which provided for this sale. Only in a few areas could they refuse licences; otherwise they had no option but to grant them. In effect prohibitionists on licensing committees could act only as moderates would act. 79 It was possible, therefore, that several no-license supporters either did not vote at the committee elections or voted for moderates who would carry out as effectively as prohibitionists the duty of seeing that the law was obeyed. Their emphasis on principle led them to believe that

the abolitionists have only one duty to perform, and that is, not to seek to improve the conduct of those who sell the elements which they believe to be just as vicious however sold or drunk, but to concentrate all their energies

78. ibid., 14 March, 1906, pp. 2, 4.
in the noble effort to consign
those elements to the outer
darkness whence they came.\textsuperscript{80}

During 1906 the various branches of the prohibitionist party
did just this by putting forward plans to encourage the education
of people as to the value of total abstinence. This was to involve
both the use of public temperance meetings at which pledge-signing
would be advocated, and the adoption of scientific temperance
instruction in schools if the Government could be persuaded to intro-
duce such a measure.\textsuperscript{81} Such proposals reflected that, while publicly
professing victory at the 1905 liquor poll, the prohibitionists were
aware that they had not made the advances that they had anticipated.
Education of the public was still necessary if victory were to be
gained. It was especially hoped that education of all school children
as to the harmful effects of alcohol would encourage them to vote no-
license when they turned twenty-one. This was perhaps the secret
way the prohibitionists had of achieving their goal sometime in the
future. "The ultimate victory over the drink evil will, under God,
be achieved by the gradual accretion of the local option vote, hand in
hand with scientific temperance education".\textsuperscript{82}

With the incorporation of George Fowlds into the Cabinet as
Minister of Education in August 1906 the prohibitionists felt that they
would have a greater chance of achieving the introduction of temperance
instruction as a compulsory subject in schools. Fowlds was a well-
known prohibitionist representing the new no-license area of Grey Lynn.
He had been prominent on the public platform as a prohibitionist sup-
porter and had also taken a leading part, largely as a result of his
80. ibid.
82. Outlook, 8 Sept, 1906, p. 3.
FIGURE VII

A PLAGUE ON BOTH YOUR HOUSES.

King Dick: Do I sleep, do I dream, or is visions about? After all, it seems to me that the liquor in the re"l Temperance reformer.
political connections, in the councils of the N.Z.A. On his accession to office his close friend and colleague, Mr Wesley Spragg, wrote to him saying that, "We, the Temperance people, shall want to deputation-ise you re. scientific teaching respecting alcohol, its place, its uses, and its power". Soon after this a deputation met the Minister to make its request that such instruction be introduced. He gave a favourable but indefinite reply, which he reiterated early in 1907 to another temperance deputation while in Christchurch. He was anxious to find a national and effective way of imparting temperance instruction in schools, and the new syllabus then being compiled would contain more definite instructions to teachers on the subject of temperance. It would not, however, be made a compulsory subject. Fowlds was finding as a member of a responsible government that he could not exercise freely his own opinions on matters of public policy, but had instead to quieten his private convictions in the face of public opinion and demand as reflected by the majority of Cabinet and the House of Representatives.

While this emphasis on temperance education may be seen as a response to the adverse 1905 liquor poll and the accession of a prohibitionist to the education portfolio, it was also an obvious and normal activity in what would otherwise be a very quiet post-poll year. In 1906, however, this emphasis was greater than in the past for the reasons mentioned.

1906 did have its momentous issue, however, in the death of Seddon. The accession of Sir Joseph Ward to the premiership was of some interest to the prohibitionists in that Ward was a Roman Catholic


They were concerned as to what his attitude to the prohibition issue would be and what effect his accession would have on liquor legislation. It had been seen with Seddon that an astute leader of the House could influence what legislation was passed. It had also been seen that a strong leader could hold a party together against the onslaught of a fierce pressure group. The question now was whether Ward would be commanding enough to hold together a large party containing many disparate groups of all shades of liberalism. It was a situation that could easily result in splinter parties being formed and the major party being consequently weakened.

The fears of the prohibitionists regarding licensing legislation under J.G. Ward were greatly reduced as a result of the Cabinet reshuffle that occurred on his accession to the premiership. W. Hall-Jones, a moderate prohibitionist from Timaru, was retained, and two more prohibitionists, Robert McNab and George Fowlds, were included as Minister of Lands and Minister of Education respectively. The prohibition party was pleased with these appointments as they would ensure that no unfavourable licensing legislation was foisted on the people against their will. Their fears regarding Sir Joseph were also lessened when he publicly stated that he favoured the principle of local option and did not intend to alter the law in this respect.

His actions in office similarly belied these fears. First, he denied that there would be a dissolution of Parliament because of the increase in the number of electorates as a result of the Electoral

Boundary Commission of 1906. The prohibitionists feared this because the law stated that if a dissolution took place within two years of a liquor poll having been taken, no liquor poll would be held at the ensuing election. The effect of this would be to delay a liquor poll for another three years from the time of the dissolution. Ward even went so far in the 1907 parliamentary session as to try and alter the law on this subject so that it would be favourable to the prohibitionists. In a Licensing Polls Bill he proposed that, if a dissolution of Parliament should take place before it had been in existence for two years, the local option poll should be held simultaneously with the new parliamentary election, but that it should not take effect until the day on which Parliament would ordinarily have expired by effluxion of time.

The prohibitionists welcomed this proposal as "a measure of justice that could hardly be withheld by any ministry with safety, in view of the large No-License vote". But they were not really in favour of the whole Bill which also provided an extension of the city licensing districts. In 1903 the four main centres had all been divided into three parliamentary electorates instead of only one with three members. The licensing districts, however, had not been affected by this division, so that each city licensing district now consisted of three electoral districts. It was proposed by the 1907 Licensing Polls Bill to add another urban electorate to these licensing districts so that they would consist of four parliamentary electorates. It was felt that this might do away with some of the anomalies that had arisen.

88. NZO, 8 Dec, 1906, p. 3.
89. NZPD, 140, (5 Sept, 1907), p. 716.
such as a hotel on one side of a street being closed while one on the other side and in a different electorate remained open.

This proposal was not, however, favoured by the prohibitionists, or even by large sections of the public. It was argued that only colonial option could prevent all such anomalies occurring, as all four cities contained more than four electorates if their suburbs and hinterland were included. The prohibitionists felt that this proposal might also be a sop to the trade in return for the clauses dealing with the dissolution of Parliament. Several of the suburban electorates had either already voted for no-license or were approaching the required sixty per cent majority. To incorporate these into the poorer urban areas which were not so advanced in prohibitionist sentiment would only delay the gaining of several new areas for no-license, and at best mean that reduction might be achieved in the cities. The areas they were most concerned about were Grey Lynn, Newtown and Chalmers.91 As a result of lack of agreement on this issue the Bill was dropped. It had revealed, however, that Ward was not virulently anti-prohibitionist or strongly pro-trade.

A second action of the new Premier which reduced the prohibitionists' fears as to his attitude towards them was his quick response to a deputation from the N.Z.A., which had complained to him about the establishment of brewery depots just outside the boundary of a no-license area. The question had arisen because two such depots had been established at Waihopai on the outskirts of the Invercargill no-license area. These businesses were not under the regulations of the Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act, and so people could buy from them in bulk at virtually any time. Neither age nor state of intoxication had to be considered by the sellers. Within days of the prohibition—

91. ibid.; DOT, 11 Sept, 1907, p. 4.
ists' complaint that this state of affairs was defeating the determination of the electors of Invercargill, Ward had had regulations gazetted that forbade such depots being established within five miles of a no-license area.92

Actions such as these persuaded the prohibitionists that, so long as they were vigilant, they had nothing to fear from the new Premier. He seemed to be more amenable to reform than Seddon, or at least to the carrying out of the majority's wishes. By the end of 1907 the prohibition party had a neutral attitude towards him, and for the first time it seemed as if the licensing issue might be removed from an influential position in the political arena. The Vanguard summed up the situation thus:

We believe that he [Ward] is sincere in his condemnation of drink excess. We believe he sees that the whole question should be relegated to the intelligent vote of the people, and that personally he is willing to give us fair play - and that is all we ask or have ever asked for from the politician.93

By 1907 the prohibition issue appeared to have reached a stalemate. As a result of the 1902 licensing poll the liquor trade had looked to its defences both by improving its conduct and by attempting to achieve legislation detrimental to the prohibition movement in that it would hopefully have alienated the moderate voter from the no-license cause. In this the trade had been helped by Seddon who showed himself to be much more inclined to support the trade than earlier in his premiership. The prohibitionists had consequently been thrown on the defensive, having not only to prevent this hostile legislation but also having to justify their stance regarding their aims; were they...
merely trying to prevent the working class from obtaining alcohol or were they aiming at prohibition? On these questions they prevaricated, losing as a result some moderate votes and also any remaining labour movement support that had continued to exist after 1896. They likewise had to face an increasing threat from suggestions of alternative ways of reforming the liquor trade, the most notable being ideas concerning some form of State or corporate control. The 1905 poll revealed the prohibition movement's unstable position as it lost support in certain areas despite gaining it in others. Partly as a result of this, temperance education was given greater emphasis in 1906 and 1907, while major licensing legislation was ignored. The prohibitionists were attempting to consolidate their forces in the face of increased and organised opposition from the liquor trade, in the hope that the 1908 liquor poll would again favour their cause.
CHAPTER VII
ADVANCE AND REACTION

In 1908 the prohibition movement emerged from its two years of consolidation and began an organised campaign to replace the three-fifths majority necessary to carry no-license with the simple, or bare, majority. The three-fifths majority had proved to be the most effective weapon that the anti-prohibitionists had in preventing a large increase of no-license areas. At the 1902 poll the number of electorates with a bare majority or more in favour of no-license had jumped from nine in 1899 to thirty. Seddon effectively deflected any demands for change at this stage by his no-license, no liquor measures of 1903 and 1904. These occupied the prohibitionists until the 1905 poll, which revealed that forty-one electorates now had a bare majority in favour of no-license. This prompted the prohibition party to renew its demands for change after the lull in such activity since the debates on the various licensing measures of the 1890s. The 1906 Colonial No-License Convention passed a resolution in favour of the bare majority, which was followed at the end of the year by an appeal from T.E. Taylor that the prohibition party agitate to achieve it.\(^1\) His advocacy of the issue had the required effect of arousing a new interest in it, and it was not long before it was being stated that if the present Parliament did not grant it then it would become a major issue at the next general election. It was decided by the leaders of the movement that, even though it seemed unlikely that the present Parliament would grant such a change, it was best to agitate and organise thoroughly in order to educate public opinion and thus be able to influence the 1908 poll and

Two factors worked against the prohibitionists at this stage. The first was that the no-license law had proved impossible to enforce even when carried by a three-fifths vote. Clutha was used as the main example of this, especially as the Police Enquiry of 1897-1898 and the report of Mr R.S. Hawkins S.M. in 1896 had shown the ineffectiveness and the dangers of no-license. 3

As more areas adopted no-license up to 1908 further evidence was supplied as to the ineffectiveness of a prohibition law even achieved by a three-fifths vote. It was not difficult for people to ignore the law, either by importing liquor from other areas, by producing their own "sly grog", or by travelling to neighbouring licensed areas to drink. People could not be made sober by legislation. Added to this was evidence that no-license support would not necessarily increase once the benefits of the scheme were experienced. All the no-license areas except Clutha, Grey Lynn and Eden had a decreasing vote for no-license after the poll that achieved the sixty per cent majority in favour of no-license. 4 This does not prove that these areas found the no-license experiment burdensome; some of the decrease may be explained by less effort at the polls by the no-license party as it was now over to the liquor trade to achieve the three-fifths majority to enact local restoration. But it did provide the opponents of no-license with more ammunition against the prohibition party as to the success of no-license; it also supported the trade's claims that the three-fifths majority was required for stability rather than have

2. ibid., 14 Dec, 1907, p.9.


4. See Table 16.
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<th>District</th>
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1. 1911a = no-license vote
2. 1914a = no-license vote
3. 1911b = national prohibition vote
4. 1914b = national prohibition vote
the bare majority and a triennial fluctuation from no-license to license. The drastic drop below fifty per cent support for no-license in the districts of Ashburton, Masterton and Ohinemuri at the poll subsequent to their achieving no-license enhanced such arguments of the trade. 5

The second factor working against the prohibitionists on the majority question was that at no stage was the prohibition party completely united on the question. The more extreme prohibitionists had favoured from the very outset in 1893 the bare majority, while the moderate prohibitionists could see advantages in the stability offered by a three-fifths majority. The extremists tended to be the leaders of the movement, and concentrated almost exclusively on prohibition. The moderates, on the other hand, tended to be those for whom prohibition was a major interest but who were more fully occupied by their own jobs or other social movements as well. They could see the necessity for having a large majority to ensure that the experiment would have the best opportunity for success.

It is noticeable that the editors of several church newspapers that supported prohibition were not, in the early years of the agitation, in favour of the bare majority in practice, though some supported the theoretical claim that it was the essence of true liberalism. It was thought to be more expedient that the support for prohibition be built up securely, even though it be slow. As the Advocate put it:

The enemy slain by a bare majority would have a dozen lives, but the enemy slain by a three-fifths' majority is dead for good and all.
Nothing less than a three-fifths majority can

5. ibid.
resurrect him... The impossibility of reducing the Prohibition vote by two-thirds by the next election will dishearten the liquor party. But should the bare majority become law, though a few more places might carry "No-License", the liquor party would be encouraged to fight, for they would only have to secure a bare majority to reopen the closed houses.  

To this the *Christian Outlook* gave its support, and added that, by securing a large majority by means of having to attain sixty per cent of the voters' support, the prohibitionists would achieve "a majority strong enough to constitute a public conscience in enforcing the law. It is in the interest of the Temperance cause itself that we stand for the three-fifths majority".  

Such arguments were exactly the same as those of moderate opponents of prohibition, but they were not, as the editor of the *White Ribbon* suggested they were, the opinions either of those anxious to protect the vested interests of the trade or of those "who are unthinking and repeat in parrot fashion the phrases they hear from others". The opinions of these moderate temperance proponents reflected the views of that section of the temperance party which voted at various prohibition conventions against the demand for the bare majority. In one of the strongest centres of prohibition support and agitation, Otago and Southland, the 1908 annual convention of the Otago and Southland Provincial Council of No-License Workers did not come out in favour of the bare majority. The Dunedin Presbytery was also divided, with prominent

supporters of prohibition such as Revs P.B. Fraser, J. Chisholm, and R. Waddell being against the bare majority.\textsuperscript{10}

It would seem, however, that the majority of prohibitionists were prepared to follow their leaders in this demand, and agitation was underway by the middle of the year to ensure that only Parliamentary candidates who supported the bare majority would be elected.\textsuperscript{11} A large number of petitions were sent to Parliament asking that electors be given the right to decide by a bare majority all issues submitted at the liquor poll, and a similar request was made by the N.Z.A. in a deputation to the Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{12} Ward made it clear, however, that no licensing legislation was planned for the 1908 session. He also pointed out that the prohibitionists should be united on the issue before trying to get it into the Statute Books. He had already received very strong representations from people who were on the side of temperance reform yet who were opposed to the bare majority.\textsuperscript{13}

Nonetheless the annual meeting of the N.Z.A. had already decided that a Bill providing for the bare majority should be drafted and submitted to Parliament at the earliest possible date.\textsuperscript{14} It was finally left to Mr G. Laurenson (Lyttleton) to introduce the resulting Licensing Polls Absolute Majority Bill.

Many members of Parliament were considerably annoyed that this sort of pressure should have been brought to bear on them. Several argued that they were bound to pledges made prior to the 1905 election.

\begin{itemize}
\item 11. \textit{ODT}, 29 June, 1908, p. 4.
\item 12. \textit{JHR}, 1908, Schedule of Petitions, pp. xvi - xxxvii.
\end{itemize}
to maintain the present licensing legislation. These pledges had been
exacted by the prohibition party in order to prevent the passing of any
adverse legislation to its cause, such as the "no-license, no liquor"
clause of 1903 and 1904. They were not, so the prohibitionists now
argued, pledges against progressive and beneficial legislation that the
no-license party might ask for, nor were they pledges in favour of the
retention of the three-fifths majority. Such an argument naturally
aroused opposition from other sections of the community, who argued
that politicians were elected to represent the whole electorate and
not only one section of it. What was adverse legislation for one
section of the community might not be so considered by another. In
effect, therefore, the pledges of 1905 had been for a maintenance of
the existing law against all requests for change.

Other politicians gave Laurenson's Bill little chance of becom-
ing law; it was felt that, even if the Lower House passed it, it was
not likely that the Legislative Council would be so lenient. As it
turned out, however, not even the House of Representatives could be
persuaded to pass the Bill. It was apparent that the advocates of
temperance reform had made a tactical error in bringing such a measure
forward at this stage. Speaker after speaker, including such temp-
erance supporters as R. McNab, W.A. Chapple and F.M.B. Fisher, argued
that the Bill would split the prohibitionist movement into moderates
and extremists. McNab pointed out that as the number of no-license
areas increased there would be stronger demand in the community for
the bare majority, this time from the licensed trade and its support-

15. Dunedin and Christchurch United Temperance Reform Councils,
meetings, reported in ODT, 24 July, 1908, p. 4.

16. ibid.
ers, who would look to the bare majority as the only means of gaining the restoration of licences in no-license areas. It would, therefore, be unwise for the temperance party to put themselves in a position where they would be making it easier for prohibition to be overthrown. Mr Fisher, a keen temperance reformer who refused to join the N.Z. Alliance while a member of Parliament so as not to be regarded as the representative of any one section of the community, made an appeal to the bare majority advocates not to split the movement by persisting with this Bill:

It seems to me that the origin of this movement comes from the section of the No-License party that is to temperance reform what the revolutionary Socialist is to Liberalism. They want, if they possibly can, to effect a revolution in this country, and they fail to recognise...that hundreds and thousands of people in this country who recognise the reformatory advantages of no-license are going to cast their votes in the next ballot-box in the opposite direction.

It was hardly surprising in the light of such opposition even from no-license supporters that the Bill failed to reach its second reading by a vote of fifty-four to eight. Such a decisive vote against the bare majority would suggest that the issue would be left alone for awhile, but agitation for the bare majority continued, and became, along with the associated question of national prohibition, the major issue in the 1908 liquor poll campaign and an important issue in the election campaign. Candidates were supported or rejected as

17. NZPD, 144, (30 July, 1908), pp. 32-33; in 1895 McNab had voted in favour of the bare majority; why he had changed his mind is not clear, but it might well have been because he did not wish to see his electorate of Mataura go "wet" again, especially in the light of the reduced support for no-license in Ashburton after 1902; he might also have wanted to remove the question as a major influence at every election campaign, which would mean that he would be opposed by the power of the liquor trade.

18. ibid., p. 40.

19. ibid., p. 47.
worthy parliamentary candidates depending on their attitude to the passing of legislation to grant these two demands.

The 1908 campaign proved to be the most bitter that the country had seen as regards the liquor issue up to that time. This situation was brought about by the fact that the prohibitionists sensed victory while the licensed trade was very much aware that it was on the defensive. The prohibitionists expected to carry more electorates into the no-license camp, including Bruce, Wellington South (previously Newtown) and Chalmers, all of which had come close in 1902 or 1905 to going dry. They also hoped that a Parliament would be elected that favoured the bare majority and national prohibition.

Journals and newspapers throughout New Zealand carried large advertisements and articles in favour of the side of the argument they supported. It was also common for the less partisan publications to carry within the same issue advertisements advocating both sides of the issue as well as editorials calling for moderation and intelligent voting. The six existing no-license areas came under close scrutiny as to the success or otherwise of the experiment within their boundaries. The prohibitionists produced "evidence" from businessmen, ministers of religion, and court records to prove their case, while the trade produced other reports from more businessmen and residents, as well as the usual arguments of law-breaking and sly-grog selling to convince the public to vote for continuance.


21. ibid., 8 August, 1908, p. 8; 31 Oct, 1908, p. 4; NZO, 10 Oct, 1908, p. 2; N.Z. Baptist, Oct, 1908, p. 192; ODT, 5 Nov, 1908, p. 6; Outlook, 7 Nov, 1908, pp. 19, 21-22; N.Z. Herald, 12 Nov, 1908, in Fowlds Papers, 3/29, p. 24.
Much was made of the problem of enforcing no-license in an area where the adjoining licensing districts were still wet. The trade argued that this was reason enough for voting against an "unenforceable" law. The prohibitionists, on the other hand, turned the argument to use in demanding a national option vote as well, so that no-license could be given a fair trial.

Apart from the newspapers and journals, most agitation was confined to urban areas, and especially to the four main centres. Wellington appeared quieter than the other three, but in all four the battle was being keenly fought. Organisation was at a premium, and weeks before the poll all available transport was tied up to get people to the polls. Meetings were held almost every night, rallies were organised and processions undertaken. One new feature was the involvement on a much larger scale than ever before of young people, in their teens and early twenties, on the side of no-license. This could well have been the result of temperance instruction in Sunday Schools, Juvenile Temperance Societies, Christian Endeavour Unions and Bands of Hope, and which had finally come to fruition among the new, young voters.

Public meetings were packed and crowds were boisterous in their support for or opposition to no-license. In Dunedin, for example, a debate in the Garrison Hall between A.S. Adams, prohibitionist, and W. Thomson, lecturer for the L.V.A. had to be disbanded as neither person could be heard. Fire hoses had to be used to keep the crowd of a thousand or so outside from forcing entry into the already over-

22. ODT, 12 Nov, 1908, p. 6.

Children's demonstrations were another method used by the prohibitionists to gain votes. Such processions saw children carrying banners saying such things as "Give us a chance," "Me, this time, dad," and "Come to our rescue". The children also adopted resolutions pleading "with all fathers and mothers and all others who truly love us to go to the poll on November 17 and vote in our interest and for our sakes". The effect of such exploitation of children by adults for major public issues is difficult to evaluate. Some people may have fallen victim to the emotional sentiment and been persuaded to vote for no-license. It is as likely that as many would have been sickened by such crude methods and would have voted for continuance in reaction. It is just as likely that such demonstrations had no lasting, persuasive effect, but merely heightened the enthusiasm or opposition of already predisposed sides.

During this liquor poll campaign a change of emphasis occurred in the interpretation of women's connections with the prohibition issue. In early 1908 a police report stated that there appeared to be an increase in the number of women drinking in hotel bars, particularly in the Wellington and Auckland regions. The W.C.T.U. was instantly on the scene with a resolution deploiring this increase and urging that more attention be given to scientific temperance instruction for school children so that they did not start drinking once they were of age. The prohibitionists did not try to deny the police report, but used it instead for propaganda purposes to attract more voters to their cause.

24. ODT, 12 Nov, 1908, p. 8.


26. ODT, 5 March, 1908, p. 4.

27. ibid., 6 March, 1908, p. 3.
The licensed victuallers, however, did oppose the report as being a libel upon the women of New Zealand and untrue as to the real situation. The prohibitionists merely turned this outcry against the liquor industry by arguing that the industry knew that such facts about women's drinking habits would encourage people to vote for no-license. They interpreted the licensed victuallers' outburst of denial as an "old trick" in which they understood

to a nicety the amount of sincerity there is in their newfound tenderness for women's reputation, and without hesitation we characterise all such utterances from their lips as offensive and hypocritical cant... We will prove before the next Licensing Poll, that in every large centre of population in this Dominion there is, and for a long time has been, a deplorable and increasing amount of excessive drinking amongst women. 28

Such an argument revealed a considerable change of approach from the early prohibitionist agitation in the 1890s when it had been believed that women would flock en masse to the prohibitionist standard. The emphasis now was to convince people, not just women, but "every man and woman who has the welfare of this Dominion at heart", of the need for "remedial and preventive action...to stop an evil that, through the mothers, curses the young life of the Dominion, inflicting wrong upon hundreds of little ones". 29 Woman was still considered to have a vital interest in the solution of the liquor problem, but it was now realised that many women had to be persuaded that this problem concerned them. They had to be taught their social and moral responsibilities, according to the prohibitionists' point of view; they had to conform to the standards of the "respectable classes", or middle class.


29. Ibid.
By the time the 1908 liquor poll was at hand the prohibitionists were prepared to admit that "it has been a surprise to us that the No-License movement has not commanded from New Zealand women a far wider and more vigorous support than it had done". 30 The reason for this, apart from the influence of the liquor trade, was not at all apparent, but the prohibitionists concluded that

as yet woman has not sufficiently emancipated herself from the undue control her men folks have so long exercised over her thought. Taught from the outset of life that in matters outside a certain sphere it is her duty to leave thought and decision to her father or her husband, as the case may be, she has simply registered his opinions.31

The prohibition movement was still considered to be of more interest to women than men. It was now realised, however, that this interest might have to be encouraged. The prohibitionists' attempts to attract more female support partly explain the increased importance of the liquor issue in 1908.

Such was the interest in the liquor question that it completely overshadowed the parliamentary election. This was not, however, entirely the fault of the two opposing interest groups. The Liberal Government was offering little in the way of a positive political platform. It was more interested in maintaining the status quo and political equilibrium. Ward was having to walk a political tightrope between a growing radical left wing and labour movement and a more conservative small farmer-business mentality on the right. In order to avoid alienating one or the other wing he found himself forced to rest on the Government's achievements rather than to offer a progres-

30. ibid., 7 Nov, 1908, p. 12.

31. ibid.
sive legislative policy. In such a situation it was easy for a divisive issue such as prohibition to dominate the scene.

The results of the liquor poll were again neither solely in favour of one party or the other. It was first thought that eight more electorates had voted for no-license, but this was eventually to be only six after all the votes had been checked. This meant that there were now twelve dry areas in New Zealand, as none of the earlier six carried restoration. Only fifteen electorates carried continuance, a further decline on the 1905 figure of eighteen; thirty-four failed to give the required majority to any of the three proposals, and seven carried reduction. The reduction vote over the whole country was virtually unchanged since 1905, but there was a greater proportion of votes for no-license at the expense of the continuance vote. At the individual electorate level, however, twenty-three had reduced votes for no-license compared with 1905. The distribution was more even this time, with eleven scattered throughout the North Island and twelve in the South Island.

Of the no-license areas there were two particularly interesting results. Ohinemuri, predominantly a mining electorate, had voted itself dry largely on the decision of the residents of Waihi. It was not expected that miners would decide to adopt abstemious habits because of any supposed economic benefit, or because of profound religious conviction, or because they were aspiring to middle class status. The only reason which seems to explain their vote was that it was a react-


33. See Tables 20 and 21, Appendix G.
ion against the increase in the price of beer in Waihi by a penny a glass, which they refused to pay, and which refusal they enforced by their vote. The two major newspapers in the area, the Ohinemuri Gazette and the Waihi Daily Telegraph, certainly did not expect no-license to be carried, and put the result down to the price rise. Even two religious gentlemen did not claim that the result was an expression of religious fervour and conviction. Both Mr L.G. Bagnall and the Rev. J.L. Pattulls told the Auckland Presbytery that,

Prohibition would not have been carried there had it not been for the refusal to reduce the price of beer. "If I might use the word," said Mr Pattulls, "it was sheer devilment on the part of the miners." The second interesting result was that Ashburton's vote in favour of no-license had again dropped, this time to forty-six per cent. This was low, even in an area that knew that restoration needed a vote of sixty per cent before it could be carried. It was usual for prohibitionist support in a no-license area to drop below sixty per cent once no-license had been achieved, but not so low as forty-six per cent. There seemed to have been a considerable reversal of opinion against no-license after six years experience. There was certainly less unity in the reports emerging from the area as to the effects of no-license than from other dry areas, and the trade, regarding it as likely to vote for restoration, had put up a costly and desperate struggle to recapture it.

Once again the prohibitionists were everywhere jubilant about their successes, and attributed them to the growing moral fervour in the country. They argued that the "unscrupulous tactics" of the

34. Ohinemuri Gazette, 6 Nov, 1908; 18 Nov, 1908; Daily Telegraph, 16 Nov, 1908, p. 2.
35. Waihi Daily Telegraph, 9 Dec, 1908, p. 2.
36. Outlook, 19 Sept, 1908, pp. 21-22; 7 Nov, 1908, p. 21; Auckland Star, 14 Nov, 1908, in Fowlds Papers 3/29, pp.31-32.
liquor interests had helped them to victory by alienating men of all shades of moderate opinion. "Glaring falsehoods and misrepresentations" had revealed the liquor traffic "with increasing hideousness as a colossal danger to the body politic, in that it is a source of the foulest moral corruption". 37

One factor which may have had a bearing on the increased vote for no-license was the interest taken by the labour movement in the issue. During 1908 the connection of Labour and Prohibition had entered a new phase after the period of suspicious neutrality between 1897 and 1907. This new development was the result of a rumour in the middle of the year to the effect that the liquor trade was hostile to Labour and intended to take a unanimous stand against it. 38 This rumour was quickly denied by the New Zealand L.V.A., but such a denial did not halt the swing against the liquor traffic. 39 In direct response to this rumour a Labour Conference held in Wellington adopted a remit "that this conference urge the workers of the Dominion to vote No-license, with a view of placing the trade under the control of the State". 40 The various unions affiliated to the Trades and Labour Council were not, however, united on this remit. Several refused to adopt it on the grounds that it went against the rule providing for freedom of action on the part of members on temperance and fiscal questions. 41

The emphasis of Labour's position was not a belief in no-license but opposition to the liquor monopoly and its power; hence the

39. *ibid*.
40. *ibid.*, 7 August, 1908, p. 4.
41. *ibid*; also 8 Nov, 1908, p. 2.
emphasis on State control. It is impossible to tell how many involved in the labour movement supported no-license and how many were in favour of some other type of licensing reform. Certainly the reasons put forward by Labour for opposing the liquor trade were not reasons that many middle class prohibitionists would have supported, even though they may have brought the prohibition movement more votes. For example, despite no official stance on the issue by the Socialist Party, in contrast to the more moderate Independent Political Labour League, individuals within it were aware that alcohol was a major strike breaker, sapping workers' finances at a time when they could least afford it. One member argued that "he had seen such men go crawling back in abject manner and accept conditions which manly men would have spurned".42 After the liquor poll such attacks on the liquor trade and the influence of alcohol on the working class were continued, with the liquor industry being labelled as

a capitalist trick to keep labour enslaved. No fear of union or unanimity so long as a few glasses of beer causes our muscle and sinew and brawn to chuck over their mates and vote capital and slavery. It is the cheapest and easiest of capitalistic weapons to hold your noses to the grindstone.43

This was no prohibitionist argument being accepted by the labour movement. It was rather a unionist appeal to fellow workmates to "strangle the serpent that entwines and enthralls you and crushes out your heart's blood".44

The connection between the labour and prohibition movements was thus shown to be considerably weaker than it might at first have

42. ibid., 28 Oct, 1908, p. 5.
44. ibid.
appeared. For the prohibitionist the issue of no-license involved moral, social and economic arguments that would strengthen the middle class nature of society; for the labour groups it was almost entirely an economic question and was closely connected with the achievement of labour solidarity against capitalist exploitation. The claim that "the Labour Party is the only genuine opponent of the Beer Party; that, indeed, it is the only bona-fide Temperance, Party", revealed the separate nature of the prohibitionist and labour approaches to the alcohol problem. For a short time they seemed to coalesce, but only on parallel and distinct paths, not on the same path.

The long-term effect of the 1908 poll was to encourage the prohibitionists in their demands for the bare majority and national option. Fifty electorates had actually achieved fifty per cent or more votes in favour of no-license, while the country as a whole had given a 53.45 per cent vote for no-license. It seemed to the prohibitionists that they were being denied their democratic rights by the maintenance of the sixty per cent stipulation. They were certain they would be able to carry local no-license over most of the colony if only they were given the bare majority. The figures showed that this was a possibility, but what they did not reveal was that, while people knew that a sixty per cent poll was necessary to carry no-license and therefore reasonably difficult to attain, they might not be so complacent if a fifty per cent majority were instituted. It has already been seen that in many instances when the vote came close to the sixty per cent margin at one poll, it was likely to drop at the next as moderate voters trying to encourage the trade to reform itself but not desiring no-license took fright and voted either for contin-

uance or not at all. An examination of those electorates which polled more than fifty per cent at one poll shows that a much greater percentage of these had reduced support for prohibition at the next poll than the total percentage of electorates that dropped. If such a trend were a true indication of the voters' reactions at the polls, then it would appear that there was a section of the community prepared to vote for prohibition so long as it did not seem likely to be achieved, but who were the first to alter this vote if the margin of safety between continuance and prohibition were too small.

Despite such possibilities the prohibitionists were determined to push for changes in the majority. The trade, now very well aware that it was fighting for its survival, was determined to resist. The Government was caught in the middle of a very awkward situation. If agitation and antagonism reached the same level as it had done at the 1908 poll, there was a threat of a possible split in the Liberal Party or the formation of a separate Prohibition Party. The Government could not afford to have either happen. It was necessary for it to find a suitable solution in a situation which seemed to defy compromise.

The liquor trade actually took the initiative in 1909 by offering to undertake a variety of reforms such as the abolition of barmaids, the removal of private bars, and the raising of the drinking age to twenty-one. These proposals originated from a meeting of Auckland brewers, spirit merchants and licensed victuallers, but did not gain ready approval from other centres, especially Wellington. It was felt that the Auckland branch of the trade was trying to appease the

46. See Table 22, Appendix G.
47. ODT, 18 Jan, 1909, p. 2.
licensing committee in the hope that the minimum number of hotels, three, rather than the maximum of fourteen would be closed under the reduction regulations. The temperance movement was even more sceptical. While it saw these suggestions as a compliment to the purpose and strength of the no-license movement, it was sure that the trade would be slow to implement them, if at all, especially after the Auckland licensing committee elections were not all that favourable to the no-license movement. As it eventuated, none of the proposals found their way into the 1909 Licensing Amendment Bill.

Agitation for licensing legislation began with the N.Z.A. annual convention in June. After a few years' lull in any legislative advance, and after the successes of the 1908 liquor poll, it was felt by the leaders of the prohibition movement to be an opportune moment to make fresh legislative demands. Their main aim was the bare majority, with a national prohibition option close behind. All other considerations were pushed aside while effort was concentrated on achieving these big concessions. The N.Z.A. convention reportedly carried a unanimous vote affirming the policy of pressing upon the Government their demand for the bare majority. This result is interesting in that such men as Bishop Julius of Christchurch, who was an opponent of the bare majority and who was at the convention, either were not at the meeting that took this vote, or else abstained from voting. It was certainly well known that the prohibition party as a whole was not unanimously in favour of the bare majority principle.

A new element had by now entered the struggle, however. In 1908

48. *ibid.*, 19 Jan, 1909, p. 3.
it had been suggested by the Rev. James Clarke, Presbyterian minister at Palmerston, Otago, that the question be solved by a compromise of a fifty-five per cent majority. 51 This compromise was discussed the following year when the organising agent for the Dunedin United Temperance Reform Council, Mr G.B. Nicholls, suggested it as a possible solution and a step towards eventually achieving the fifty per cent limit. He was accused, and the no-license party with him, of being prepared to compromise on the party's principles. 52

Within Parliament it was generally felt that there was not the slightest chance of the bare majority being granted, George Fowlds, Minister for Education and a strong advocate of prohibition, did feel, however, that "the discussion of the question may secure a reduction on the majority required, and I believe a good many of the Temperance people would be satisfied with 55 to 45". 53

Meanwhile the prohibition party was circulating a Bill of its own design to be discussed and approved by the various prohibitionist bodies, and to be introduced early in the 1909 parliamentary session. 54 Mass meetings were held in all the main centres for this purpose, the first being in Dunedin, and soon followed by others in Christchurch, Wellington and Auckland. Each centre had packed houses with overflow meetintsts of several hundreds. 55 At the same time Mr Laurensen introduced another Bare Majority Bill along very similar lines as that of 1908. It was thought that there was more sympathy with the measure than there

51. Outlook, 5 Sept, 1908, p. 25, letter.

52. ODT, 25 June, 1909, p. 4.


had been in the previous year, though the attitude of the Government was unknown. After a large prohibitionist rally in Wellington on 22 October a deputation from the N.Z. Alliance met Sir Joseph Ward to present its legislative requests, only to discover that the Government had neither a policy on this issue nor plans to introduce a Bill, let alone allow a private Bill to pass. He did promise, however, that the Cabinet would consider the Bill during the parliamentary recess and that it would be dealt with in the 1910 session.

While these public meetings and deputations were occupying the time of the rank and file of the prohibition party, delicate negotiations had been proceeding behind the scenes between the N.Z. Alliance executive and the liquor trade representatives under the mediation of the Attorney-General, Dr J.G. Findlay. The results of these negotiations were announced by Ward on 10 November: there would be only a two issue ballot paper, containing license or no-license, with every vote for no-license to count as a vote for national prohibition as well; both local and national options were to require a fifty-five per cent majority in order to be carried; local no-license would come into effect two years after the poll, and national prohibition five years after the poll.

The negotiations had been long and arduous and compromise had been essential on both sides of the issue. The prohibition party had sacrificed the reduction issue in return for a reduced majority. The trade's representatives had agreed to a reduced majority (which might in time be to their own advantage in regaining licences in some

56. ibid., 27 Oct, 1909, p. 4.
districts) in return for a longer period of trade after a poll; in many ways, however, they appeared to have given away more than they received, especially with the introduction of the national prohibition clause, though it was possible that the linking of this more extreme measure with the no-license vote would alienate many moderate voters from the prohibition movement.

The compact was not passed into law, however, as the rank and file of the prohibition movement still favoured the bare majority and objected to the cumulative vote. Convinced that they would lose the moderate vote if the local and national options were not separated, they refused to accept this clause. As A.S. Adams, the Alliance's solicitor, wrote, "the Trade, in insisting upon this voting-paper, is demanding that the moderate party shall be disfranchised as a condition of the first importance in any proposals for reform legislation". Though this interpretation may have been correct, it did not lessen in the eyes of the public the fact that the prohibition party had broken the agreement, and to this extent they were discredited. Mr L. Myers, a leading Auckland brewer, said at a meeting of the liquor industry called to consider the new situation that the indignation and disgust of the Trade do not arise from the fact that the Trade was enamoured in any degree of the terms entered into, but from the fact that the Trade was deceived by the leaders of the Alliance who so unworthily repudiated the agreement that was entered into only after such mature deliberation.

64. *ibid.*
The prohibitionist, George Fowlds, who had helped Findlay with the negotiations, could only endorse this view by writing that "the Temperance party is discredited". 65 

The trade was not willing to alter its stance on the agreement, and argued that the prohibitionists' rejection of the cumulative vote struck at the very root of the compromise. Unless the original agreement was maintained, the trade would do all in its power to retain the three-fifths majority rather than the fifty-five per cent clause of the agreement. 66 

The power of the belief in the moderate vote had once more been revealed. With no certainty as to its existence the prohibitionists had rejected on its behalf a compromise that in so many ways was favourable to their cause. In one way this was foolishness on their part in that, despite press claims that many moderates favoured national prohibition as a fairer issue than "that hybrid, unjust prohibition" of no-license, 67 they had continued to believe in the moderate vote. On the other hand, however, there was nothing to show that there was not a large moderate vote, and general opinion certainly talked as if it were common knowledge that it did exist. 68 The assumption made by the prohibitionists therefore seemed reasonable. 

After the collapse of the 1909 agreement the two proponents of the liquor battle withdrew to former stances in their legislative demands. The prohibition party recommenced agitation for the bare majority while 

the trade reiterated its demands for the retention of the three-fifths majority. Agitation both for and against such measures ensued during the early weeks of the 1910 parliamentary session until on 7 October 1910 the Government introduced a Licensing Bill on very similar lines to the 1909 agreement. The whole debate had been reopened, though it would seem that few politicians expected the Bill to pass, or even took it seriously, in that only Ward and Massey spoke to its second reading. Why Ward had introduced such a measure is not clear. It was suggested, however, that, because the prohibitionist party was divided as to whether the 1909 compact should have been accepted or not, the Prime Minister had decided to introduce the measure in order, presumably, to force a decision. The prohibitionists could reach no agreement, however. On the one hand the N.Z. Alliance executive felt bound by the dictates of the special 1909 convention and the 1910 annual convention, which demanded

that the method of taking the vote under the bill be altered to provide for two separate voting papers - one for the local No-license vote and one for a vote for National Prohibition...That the vote upon each issue be counted and ascertained separately.

On the other hand the editor of the leading prohibitionist newspaper went into a eulogy over the Bill.

As I view it, the Bill, as a whole, holds out the promise of a marked advance towards the goal of the entire overthrow of the liquor traffic in this country...We have fought splendidly so far under the banner of No-license and we shall continue to fight with undiminished vigour if that banner should


70. ODT, 8 Oct, 1910, pp. 6-7.

71. ibid., 2 Nov, 1910, p. 7.
still lead on. But if we should see raised in front of us the banner bearing the inscription, "National Prohibition", it would, I believe, fire the fighting blood throughout our ranks to an extent that in our hottest battles we have never yet realised. A fresh wave of sentiment would sweep through the country, as the fact was more and more vividly apprehended that every voter had the chance, not simply to help to close publichousebars in his own electorate, but also to clear out the whole traffic – lock, stock and barrel, from the entire Dominion. If that ideal should be brought within sight, and the war-cry, "National Prohibition" be the call to glorious battle from the North Cape to the Bluff, the Parliamentary Session of 1910 could not desire a more splendid memorial.72

The prohibition party leaders eventually approved the Bill on condition that certain amendments be made to it, namely that the no-license and national prohibition options be placed upon separate ballot papers and polled upon separately. On going into committee on the Bill, therefore, Ward immediately submitted an amendment in favour of two separate ballot papers. At the same time, however, he reintroduced the three-fifths majority for both options, presumably as a means of placating the trade over the introduction of two ballot papers.73 This compromise, to the objective observer at least, seemed sensible, and fortunately for the success of the Bill was accepted with reasonable equanimity by both the trade and the prohibition party. The majority of the community did not seem at all upset by the retention of the sixty per cent majority; it meant stability within the community by ensuring that the tide of popular feeling was not unduly disturbing in its fluctuations. It was hoped that the liquor issue might now be given a long legislative rest.74

74 ODT, 15 Nov, 1910, pp. 6-7.
Once more the moderate voter had influenced the situation without uttering a word. The fear that they would lose his vote caused the prohibitionists to speak for him. He had, as a result, retained the right to vote for a moderate issue between two extremes, while the three-fifths majority ensured the stability of which he was the guardian. As the Vanguard said, "the 'Moderate', who has been robbed of the halfway house of Reduction, has still something like a refuge left in voting for local No-License only". Some of the prohibitionists were more hopeful than this, however. They felt that it is much more likely that the so-called "Moderate Party", having been educated up to the point of voting "No-license", will, by further education before the next poll, be induced to "go the whole hog" and vote for National Prohibition.

The results of the 1911 liquor poll, taken under the 1910 Licensing Act, were to suggest that possibly this latter hope for the moderate vote was correct.

One important aspect of the 1910 Licensing Act that was overshadowed by the debates concerning the majority and the national option concerned the employment of barmaids. From the very outset of the W.C.T.U. in New Zealand it had been one of its aims to abolish the barmaid. Little was done for several years, however, partly because of the initial emphasis on the achieving of the female suffrage, partly because of the novelty of the prohibition campaign after the granting of the triennial polls in 1893, and partly because of the many and drawnout attempts to alter and perfect the Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act of 1893. The occasional attack was made on this "most degrading occupation", but it was not until 1902 that a real effort was made.

75. Vanguard, 26 Nov, 1910, p. 12.

Source: Seddon Papers 3/64, p. 132, 1903.
THE BARMaid WINS THE DAY.

King Dick: Well, ladies, if I must choose between you, give me the barmaid.
undertaken. In July, 1902, a Miss Perkins of Eastbourne attacked the barmaid system as "degrading to women and a lure to young men". As a result it was decided by two active members of the W.C.T.U., Miss Mackay and Miss Dalrymple, to "make the barmaid question one of importance". As the campaign developed it quickly became one of the objects of the entire prohibition movement, male and female, to abolish the employment of barmaids. After several attempts between 1902 and 1910 by prohibitionists, notably H.G. Ell (Christchurch South), within Parliament to pass a measure to achieve this, a clause was incorporated in the 1910 Licensing Act, forbidding the employment of any more barmaids but allowing existing ones to register and continue in their work.

The prohibitionists' reasons for singling out barmaids were novel and interesting, and again reflected the middle class concern for the preservation of the home, the elevation of the role of the female as wife and mother, and the abhorrence of prostitution.

An attractive, pleasant-mannered barmaid (who was, so far as the prohibitionists were concerned, always young) was considered to be one way in which publicans enticed numbers of men, particularly young men, into public bars. Once there, it was but a little step for them to indulge in alcoholic refreshment. The prohibitionists made the assumption that indulgence eventually led to excess and ultimately to ruin. Such was the basic argument against the employment of barmaids, and it found continual expression from a variety of sources during the next eight years. This expression usually lacked substantial factual

77. ibid., Sept, 1902, p. 7.
78. ibid.
80. ODT, 11 Nov, 1902, p. 4.
supporting evidence, yet was even uttered in support of a legislative enactment to abolish the barmaid.\footnote{NZPD, 153,(14 Nov, 1910), p. 606, J.B. Callan.}

While this basic argument found widespread credence, it was developed by the prohibitionists and given much more sinister connotations. On the one hand it was suggested that the barmaid was an immoral woman who, with ulterior motives, enticed young men to drink. The rest remained unsaid, but the innuendo as to her immoral activities, her prostitution, was clear in the many references to "immorality", "moral filth", "lust" and the like which were to be found in prohibitionist discussions on the bar and the barmaid. As the \textit{N.Z. Observer} wrote:

\begin{quote}
The arguments for her abolition as a dispenser of liquids are many and various, more or less unsound always, often unworthy, and not infrequently discreditable and disgusting. The last named we shall not refer to further than to say that they impugn the honour of the barmaids as a class...Infamous insinuations concerning immorality are made with the greatest facility, and as they are invariably unaccompanied by any specific details of cases, it is the most difficult thing in the world to refute them. This is what makes them so infamous.\footnote{NZQ, 25 July, 1903, p. 3.}
\end{quote}

Four years later the debate was still raging with no change from wild accusations and generalised replies.

\begin{quote}
The suggestion that they are, as a class, immoral, would be scouted by anyone who has frequently been brought in association with them. They are in the main, clean-living, high-minded girls, with a capacity for business, and they are not sentimental.\footnote{ODT, 8 June, 1907, p. 9.}
\end{quote}

On the other hand some felt that it was not the drinker but the barmaid who needed protection. By abolishing this "degrading occupat-
ion" the prohibitionist reformers aimed to protect the female by removing her from such "vile surroundings" and leading her to "a higher and better life".\textsuperscript{84} This protection involved not only the avoidance of obscene language but of the amorous advances, propositions or threats of intoxicated males. Such an argument for reform found more support than did the attack on the barmaid's own motives. As one commentator said:

The stock argument is, of course, that the callow dude should be protected from the wiles of the barmaid. From our own observation, we are satisfied that there is greater reason for protecting the barmaid from the wiles of the callow dude.\textsuperscript{85}

That the barmaid received so much attention at this time was the result of an alliance between two ideas: that woman's place was in the home, and that the licensed bar was evil and should be abolished. Such an alliance was possible because both these ideas were the product of a middle class mentality. The fact that one section of the community could attempt to remove a source of employment for women showed that that group did not fully grasp the plight of people economically worse off than itself. The prohibitionists did not appreciate that barmaids were not "women of ease" but that "they are chiefly women of necessity, and choose this employment because it pays them a living wage, and not because they have any desire to be degraded or surrounded with anything vile".\textsuperscript{86} What, after all, were the alternatives? Factory work, salesgirl, or domestic servant did not provide the same attraction as the convivial atmosphere of the local pub, or probably, as good a wage. More moderate people, while they might not have liked the employment of women in bars, could appreciate that this was one

\textsuperscript{84} NZD, 13 March, 1897, p. 3, report of W.C.T.U. meeting.

\textsuperscript{85} ibid., 24 Nov, 1908, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{86} ibid.
source of occupation open to women, and that other avenues should be found for them before their present jobs were abolished. It would seem that "the strongest argument hitherto employed against any proposal to abolish barmaids has been the recognised difficulty of providing them with suitable employment." It was appreciation of this problem that encouraged the legislators to allow existing barmaids to continue as such while the employment of any new ones was prohibited by the 1910 Licensing Act.

In all this discussion about barmaids one major aspect emerges. Whether the argument attacked the barmaid or the male drinker, whether it alleged female prostitution or male depravity, the prohibitionist reformers were primarily concerned about the evil effects of the system of liquor selling upon the social structure and social values of the whole community. To the prohibitionist drinking was anti-social, undesirable, and threatening to the deeper interests of society. It therefore had to be abolished as an acceptable social habit. The issue of the barmaid was one part of this puritanical campaign. It was reputed to be an issue which would attract women of all social groups and thus involve them in the prohibition movement. Such involvement would have two effects: it would increase the prohibitionist ranks considerably, and it would encourage at least half the community, the female half, to adopt, consciously or otherwise, certain middle class pietistic beliefs and values. The prohibitionists were in fact accused of trying to gain increased support by attracting the female vote in the debate on the barmaids' clause in the 1910 Licensing Bill. Mr G.W. Russell, member for Avon, stated that "a large part of hostility of the women of this country with regard to the drink traffic

87. ODT, 11 Nov, 1902, p. 4.
is because women are engaged in the hotel-bars.\textsuperscript{88} What, however, is the evidence for such a sweeping claim that women were attracted in droves through the barmaid question, or any other question, to support the prohibition movement?

The only evidence to suggest that the job of barmaid was causing much public concern and that the demand for its abolition was attracting strong female support came from prohibitionist sources. One commentator wrote:

"Where," it is asked, "has it ever been shown that 'public opinion' is strongly against females being employed in the bars of the city hotels?" Public opinion has never expressed itself at all on the subject. The Christian Temperance Women have spoken, and the Auckland Crusaders, but public opinion never.\textsuperscript{89}

The only year in which petitions to Parliament asked that the employment of barmaids be prohibited was 1904, and even then the total number of signatories equalled only one hundred and forty-five over thirteen petitions.\textsuperscript{90} This situation did not change. It was not an election issue in 1908, and there had been no strong agitation for it in 1910 when it was incorporated in the Licensing Act. Its incorporation was rather part of a compromise between the liquor trade and the prohibition movement to achieve alterations in the form of the licensing poll.

The unity of women on the question was also an assumption based more on prohibitionist and, to a lesser extent, popular expectation than on actual results. To begin with the barmaid herself was not agitating for her own abolition. There is no evidence to suggest that she felt trapped by her environment and wanted help to break out

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{NZPD}, 153, (11 Nov, 1910), p. 587.
\textsuperscript{89} \textit{NZO}, 14 July, 1906, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{90} \textit{JHR}, 1904; Schedule of Petitions, pp. xv-1.
of it. Rather it would seem that many were worried that they might lose their employment.91

The question of the barmaid would appear, therefore, to have been created by the W.C.T.U. and the N.C.W., adopted by the wider prohibition movement, and maintained by both the men and women of that movement. It was, as part of the overall prohibitionist campaign, an agitation of a certain socio-economic group rather than a feminist agitation against a scheme of female exploitation. The question of the barmaid no more attracted wholesale support of women to the prohibition cause than did the arguments concerning the physical, economic, and moral effects of the liquor trade upon women and society generally.

Despite the passing of the 1910 Licensing Act the prohibitionists made it clear that this Bill would not mean the end of their agitation. The president of the N.Z.A., Mr Wesley Spragg, stated that

the next election will be fought out on the question of whether the votes of a pot-house loafer and his feminine equivalent are to be equal to the votes of three opponents of the liquor traffic. No candidate is likely to be elected to perpetuate what everybody knows to be opposed to democracy, fair play, and good government... The way is now clear for a fight on the simple majority - the democratic majority - at the next election.92

With the general election and liquor poll only twelve months away this was a real threat and one which the prohibition movement put into practice. Support for the bare majority was made to appear a matter of patriotism; the welfare of the nation was made reliant upon this one issue. People were urged to put this question before support of


92. Ibid., 21 Nov, 1910, p. 2.
any political party. The N.Z. Alliance annual convention in 1911 actually adopted a resolution in favour of urging electors to refuse to vote for any parliamentary candidate who supported the three-fifths majority rule.

The prohibitionists appeared to be in a position to gain considerable Labour support in this attempt to elect bare majority candidates to Parliament. Being democratically orientated the labour organisations found it easy to support the prohibitionists in their demands for the reduction of the three-fifths majority to a fifty per cent majority. It was not surprising, therefore, that in 1910 the Trades and Labour Councils of New Zealand should have included in their platform a clause stating that it was the "right of the people to restrict or abolish the liquor traffic by bare majority vote at local and Dominion polls". This involved no commitment to support prohibition, but was merely a statement of democratic principle. Politically this attitude was possibly of some benefit to the labour groups in that it might have attracted some votes for their candidates at the general election from the prohibitionist section of the community. As R.K. Newman concluded in discussing the effect of the liquor controversy on the 1911 election, "the Labour and Socialist parties, which looked on the simple majority as a democratic principle, were the only parties which could have picked up no-license votes automatically". That this might happen was a theoretical possibility, that it would happen, un-

94. ODT, 16 June, 1911, p. 4.
likely. The majority of prohibitionists were not inclined towards either the New Zealand Labour Party or the Socialist Party. They may have been aiming at the improvement of working class conditions but they were not, on the whole, in favour of separate working class parliamentary representation. To them such sectionalism was anathema. It was their aim to encourage the working class to improve its economic position by sobriety and self-help. It was not their intention to encourage socio-economic differences. They failed to realise, however, that the aims of the prohibition movement did just that by stressing the different life-styles, different attitudes and different values of the reformers and those they were trying to reform.

Members of the labour movement were aware of this difference in attitudes and goals, and there was a strong element who wished to see complete separation of Labour from the prohibitionists. This division of opinion amongst the labour ranks was epitomised in a public debate between two prominent Wellington trade unionists early in 1911. The motion of the debate was "that the inclusion of the Liquor question in the Labour Party's platform operates against the welfare of the Labour Party". W.J. Jordan argued that Labour stood for the uplifting of humanity, while liquor caused the moral, physical and mental decline of mankind; therefore the Labour party should attack the use of liquor. W. Maddison, however, believed that the prohibition party was not working in the interests of labour. He had earlier expressed this belief in a letter to the *Weekly Herald* in late 1910. In that letter he argued that the prohibition question was a "cross issue" and a "red herring" leading "the Labour hounds on a false scent" and landing them "in a cul de sac, which for the time being has stopped all progress and

rendered their efforts so far abortive". He summed up the prohibition party as being mainly conservative in interest, consisting of people who vote for the conservative ticket, and whose general interests are opposed to that of the workers. All proposed reforms which have emanated from the church have been aimed at the working classes, consequently they are making it distinctly a class question. The logic of their attitude is this: That it is not wrong for a rich man to drink or to gamble, but it is, in their opinion, decidedly wrong for the poor man to do so. Now, what is this but class distinction, in which there is to be one law for the rich and another for the poor?98

Such an attack was not entirely correct in that the prohibitionists wished to prevent all of society from drinking liquor. Their arguments, however, were directed primarily at the working class, as seen in the debates on the no-license, no liquor issue of 1903 and 1904 and club licences. The working class was, after all, least able to afford to drink.

The predominance of successful businessmen, lawyers, clerics and professional people in the ranks of the prohibition party certainly invited the conclusion that they were opposed to Labour's interests.

To men such as Maddison, therefore, the separation of Labour and Prohibition was necessary if Labour were to be removed from its economic quagmire. If the Labour party were to be politically successful then it was necessary to wipe out the prohibition question from your politics. Let there be no cross issues at the hustings, no outside vote-splitting questions in your platform...Beware of the grafter, who is out to obscure your issues, to capture your party to help himself, whilst he by his specious arguments leads you off the trail of your quest in the

98. ibid., 19 Nov, 1910, p. 5.
interests of the greater unionism soon to come.99

Despite such advice, however, the issues of the bare majority and no-license remained entangled in the minds of the majority of both the labour and the prohibition movements. Because of this the uncertain connection of the two movements continued throughout the 1910-1914 period, helping neither group to achieve its immediate and long-term aims.

Such was the agitation during 1909-1911 for various legislative proposals concerning the licensing laws that other less prominent schemes of advance that did not require legislation were lost from sight. Despite increasing demands for more social amenities to replace the public bar's social function as a place of relaxation and communication, especially for the lower socio-economic groups, the prohibition movement did nothing to meet this need. The 1909 annual conference of the N.Z.A. urged No-License Leagues to establish social clubs for young men with a view to counteract the attractions of the licensed house, but nothing positive eventuated.100 The prohibitionists seemed prepared to abolish the bar first before offering an alternative. This reflected their single-mindedness, which probably hindered their advance amongst moderates as much as their concentration on only one issue avoided any side-tracking. It was left to such organisations as the Y.M.C.A. and the Atheneaum to fill the gap, but their appeal was limited by lack of resources. The failure of the prohibitionists to appreciate fully the social importance of the bar was a reflection upon their cause's predominant middle class support and mentality.

99. ibid.

100. ODT, 18 June, 1909, p.3; 5 Nov, 1909, p.4; 11 Nov, 1909, p.6.
Temperance education also suffered at this time despite the renewed emphasis on it in 1906-1907. The result was that, while the no-license cause advanced at the polls, it had little effect on the drinking habits of the people. The liquor bill for the country continued to increase per capita, and there were reports of an increase in drunkenness amongst the youth of the country.\textsuperscript{101} The prohibitionists were aware of the situation but did little positive to rectify it. They argued instead that a vote for no-license was often from a person who did not believe that he would be affected either by moderate use of alcohol or by the carrying of no-license. If no-license were carried, he could still obtain bulk wholesale supplies of alcohol.\textsuperscript{102} Once again the middle class attitudes and situation emerge. The moderate supporter of no-license did not frequent or could afford not to use the public bar. He could afford to see its removal. This would be beneficial to the generalised working poor as it would encourage the improvement of their economic situation, which, in turn, would eventually benefit the business world and hence the community. There was no need, however, for himself to forego the moderate use of alcohol. This presumes that there were many supporters of local no-license who were not total abstainers.

A second reason offered for this increase in alcoholic consumption despite growing prohibitionist sentiment was that only in a small part of the country, twelve electorates, was no-license in force. In these areas drinking had been considerably reduced, but there was no way of encouraging the same trend in other areas, in effect most of

\textsuperscript{101} Vanguard, 7 August, 1909, p. 6; 4 Sept, 1909, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{102} ODT, 21 Sept, 1909, p. 6.
New Zealand. 103

It was also argued that New Zealand's population was growing rapidly with a large number of immigrants bringing with them the free drinking habits of the British people. As a result any advance towards no-license and prohibition was at best slow, and required continual agitation and education. 104 It was in the educational department, however, that the prohibition movement was lacking.

All temperance work for these two years was directed at the placing of the bare majority and national prohibition option on the statute book. Only after some advance in this direction had been made with the Licensing Act Amendment Act of 1910 did the movement turn its attention to convincing people as to the value of total abstinence, and this was directed towards influencing voters to support no-license and national prohibition at the 1911 poll. It was not directed at helping the individual to overcome any drink problem.

The national prohibition option injected a new source of uncertainty into the 1911 liquor poll. It was believed that more electorates, perhaps half-a-dozen, would vote in favour of no-license, and the prohibitionists were also hopeful that national prohibition would be carried. The rest of the country was more sceptical. 105 This was a new and different issue from the old system of local option. Whereas people had still been able to import liquor into no-license areas, national prohibition would forbid such importation except for scientific, medicinal and sacramental purposes. It was expected, therefore, that many mod-


104. See R.K. Newman, 'New Zealand's Vote for Prohibition in 1911', pp. 53-64.

105. Outlook, 16 May, 1911, p. 6; Vanguard, 27 May, 1911, p.12; ODT, 5 Dec, 1911, p. 16.
erate voters would vote for national continuance while still supporting local no-license on the other ballot paper. No-license was believed to encourage reform; national prohibition was considered too drastic to attract a majority of votes, let alone three-fifths. As the campaign progressed along the usual lines, however, the prohibitionists were more and more outspokenly confident about predicting their success on both issues.

The prohibition debate began with an unexpected flourish in February-March, 1911, when Professor W. Salmond, Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at the University of Otago, published an article entitled Prohibition: a Blunder. In it he adopted the moderate position that, while drunkenness was a problem in society and that while the liquor trade was full of abuses, the way to solve these problems was not by a prohibitory law. The use of alcohol in moderation was neither harmful or un-Christian. The Bible did not teach that the use of alcohol was sinful, though it did teach that excess in anything, including alcohol, was morally damaging. To remedy this required self-control and the developing of moral character, not a negative law forbidding by threat of punishment the use of alcohol. Salmond also argued that drink was not the basic cause of all the social and economic problems to be found in society, but was rather a symptom of a deeper problem stemming from exploitation of labour by capital.

This pamphlet provoked a prolonged newspaper debate between Salmond and A.S. Adams. Adams had nothing new to offer in the way of argument, but confidently reiterated the usual prohibitionist senti-

106. DDT, 2 Dec, 1911, p. 9.
108. W. Salmond, Prohibition: a Blunder, (Dunedin, 1911), passim.
ments that the use of alcohol caused waste, misery, disease and poverty, while prohibition, in the form of local no-license, had been shown to be a success.

As usual neither side really studied the other's arguments, but merely repeated the well-known ideas concerning liquor or no liquor. The effect of the debate was not that it convinced people one way or the other, but that it opened the 1911 campaign much earlier and much more vociferously than it otherwise would have been. As it was this was the only major activity until May, when the prohibitionists' activity and preparation began in earnest. At this time Messrs T.E. Taylor and C.H. Poole, both M.P.s, undertook a speaking tour of New Zealand. This was followed by a Young People's Crusade, in which the Bible Class movement undertook a campaign to influence and enrol thousands of young people throughout New Zealand in opposition to the drink traffic and in favour of national prohibition.

At the same time an all-out effort was made to convince women once and for all of the value of prohibition. Organised by Mrs Annie J.P. Driver of Dunedin, a women's crusade was undertaken. It was hoped that all women would be canvassed and all supporters registered. Meetings for women were to be organised and held in every town.

109. Outlook, 7 March, 1911, pp. 3-4; Vanguard, 18 March, 1 April, 15 April, 29 April, 13 May, 27 May, 10 June, 1911; A.S. Adams, Professor Salmond's Blunder: Prohibition an Effective Social Reform, (Wellington, 1911), passim; A.R. Atkinson, The Drink Traffic: a Blunder, (Wellington, 1911), passim.

110. DDT, May-June, 1911, passim; Outlook, 16 May, 1911, p. 6; 23 May, 1911, p. 3.

111. Vanguard, 8 July, 1911, p. 8.

112. Ibid., 10 June, 1911, p. 2.
The inaugural rally was held in Burns Hall, Dunedin, on 15 June 1911. Mrs W. Don and Mrs Driver were the speakers and they both dwelt upon the role that women had played in New Zealand for the advancement of righteousness. The campaign rapidly spread to the other main centres, and, in a manner reminiscent of Lysistrata, the motto "lips that touch wine shall not touch mine" was adopted. Co-operation from all existing women's organisations, such as the W.C.T.U., the Societies for the Protection of Women and Children, women's missionary societies, and Church gilds, was invited. The immediate response was reportedly very encouraging, with support being gained from male organisations as well. Membership figures for the crusade were not made available, however, and its success numerically cannot be measured.

Apart from these special crusades there were the usual meetings and demonstrations that had by now become familiar sights before every licensing poll.

At the end of July the cause suffered a setback in the death of T.E. Taylor, but his death may have acquired many sympathy votes for the no-license cause. Certainly it was a sympathy vote that took his close friend and colleague, L.M. Isitt, into Parliament at the resulting by-election, to sit on the crossbenches next to A.M. Myers, member for Auckland East and a leading brewer.

In September the news reached New Zealand that the state of Maine had reverted to license from no-license after fifty years as a local no-license area and twenty-seven years as a prohibition state.

113. ODT, 16 June, 1911, p. 2.
114. ibid., p. 5.
115. ibid., 24 July, 1911, p. 3; White Ribbon, June, 1911, p.1.
116. ODT, 29 July, 1911, p. 4; Outlook, 1 August, 1911, p.3; N.Z. Methodist Times, 12 August, 1911, p. 9.
117. Vanguard, 2 Sept, 1911; ODT, 18 August, 1911, p. 4.
Much was made of this news by the anti-prohibitionist forces, who argued that these experiments had been found to be undesirable and un-workable. The laws had failed because many of the inhabitants had been opposed to their enforcement. Charge and counter-charge were made in New Zealand as to the reason for the reversion to license in Maine, each side blaming the other. The issue became utterly confused and a bitter verbal battle ensued as conflicting reports as to what had happened in Maine poured in from various sources. This debate continued throughout the remainder of the campaign, and certainly influenced the whole liquor issue. It is possible that many people were persuaded to vote against no-license as a result of the Maine experiment coupled with some reports from the no-license areas in New Zealand which talked of adverse effects. Ashburton had been the best example in the past for the "failure" of no-license, with its many public protests and low no-license vote after it had been carried. In 1911 Masterton, one of the six new dry areas after the 1908 poll, was similarly in the news as to the effects of no-license. A few days before the poll was taken the trade published photos and reports to show that no-license in Masterton had brought about depression and stagnation. This seemed to be a last minute attempt by the trade to discredit no-license. What it achieved is again immeasurable, but it did provoke instant and emphatic denials by the Masterton Borough Council, by seventy-two out of seventy-six businessmen, and by the no-license party. Charges were made of false advertising and campaign-

118. ODT, Sept-Nov, 1911, passim; 7 Dec, 1911, p. 8.
119. ibid., 5 Dec, 1911, p. 8.
Apart from concentrating on the "failure" of no-license in dry areas, the trade also stressed the economic effects of no-license. Much was made of the loss of revenue from duty on liquor, and the need for taxation to be increased on property and income to make up this loss. It was argued that overseas investment and trade were likely to be reduced if liquor imports were stopped; this argument was based on a report in the Financial Times which suggested that a state with enforced prohibition was not guaranteed to create confidence among investors. The tourist industry would also be adversely affected, and many people would lose their jobs, both in the liquor and hotel industries and also amongst barley and hop farmers. To these arguments the prohibitionists had their stock replies that the loss of revenue would be compensated for by the decline in public expenditure upon gaols, legal proceedings and hospitals, and by the increase in private spending on manufactured goods, which in turn would benefit the whole economy. They crowned their case with the non-economic response that "it is a crime against humanity to apply a money test to a trade that only gains by the destruction of manhood".

Despite these clashes between the two rivals, it was generally felt, and would appear to have been the case, that the 1911 campaign was nowhere near as bitter as that of 1908. It is possible that the prohibitionists' confidence of the advance they would make meant that

120. ibid; results of survey of Masterton by prohibitionists published in Outlook, 7 Nov, 1911, pp. 16-17; 21 Nov, 1911, supplement, pp. 9-10; J. Bridges, 'Twas Won, 'Twas Well Won, 'Tis Well 'Twas Won, (Masterton, 1911), passim.

121. DDT, 7 Dec, 1911, p. 8.


123. DDT, 11 Dec, 1911, p. 6.
they could be more gentlemanly in their responses.

Such confidences were shattered when the results of the poll were known. For the first time since 1894 the support for no-license had dropped. The obvious reason would seem to be that it had suffered during the campaign because of the attention given to the new issue of national prohibition. This would suggest that the pre-poll campaign was vitally important for arousing support for an issue, and that the genuine and lasting support for an option might be lower than the polling figures would suggest.

A second reason offered for the polling results was that the trade had directed its efforts against the no-license issue in the belief that the introduction of the national prohibition option would not immediately prove a serious threat to its existence. The evidence of the campaign prior to the poll does not suggest this, however. The liquor trade's propaganda had attacked both no-license and national prohibition as unjust and illiberal measures of a bunch of "fanatical wowsers". What may have influenced some voters were the statements by one or two of the more objective newspapers which elaborated on the unfairness and ineffectiveness of local no-license in comparison with national prohibition. It was argued that people favoured national prohibition because if offered a definite solution to the liquor problem; no-license, on the other hand, was piecemeal and unfair in its effect, had proved difficult to enforce adequately, and was slow in being achieved, with only twelve districts going dry in seventeen years. For these reasons temperance reformers were presumed

124. See Tables 20 and 21, Appendix G.

to favour national prohibition. Such reasoning offers the only sensible explanation why the national prohibition option gained 55.83 per cent of the total valid vote while no-license gained only 49.75 per cent.

Other reasons offered for the vote included the argument that there had been confusion amongst some people with regard to the two prohibition issues, and they had as a result either not voted on one issue or voted incorrectly on one issue. Such an argument has no proof. It is unlikely, however, that if such confusion had existed it would have affected only one of the two issues, but would rather have spread its effect over both. There was also little reason for such confusion existing as the ballot papers were quite separate, of different colours, and clear in their instructions. Besides, the amount of publicity before the poll was so great that few people could have been unaware of the issues and format of the poll by the time it eventuated.

Whatever the explanation for the vote, the overall result was to raise doubts as to the existence of a moderate voice on the licensing issue. If there had been people prepared to vote no-license in order to encourage reform of the trade, as was commonly believed, why did national prohibition, the more radical and drastic measure, receive more support than no-license? Perhaps, as Newman argues, the moderate vote on this issue had been a myth. Perhaps, on the other hand, this vote had in the twelve months since the passing of the 1910 Licensing Act

126. NZG, 9 Dec, 1911, p. 2; ODT, 16 Dec, 1911, p. 9; Vanguard, 23 Dec, 1911, p. 8-9.

127. Presbyterian Church of N.Z., op. cit., p. 9A.

been encouraged to "go the whole hog". Or perhaps the motives of the moderates had never been properly understood and hence did not correspond with people's expectations at the 1911 poll.

The impression is left that there was no moderate vote of any sizeable proportions, but that the belief in it had been the creation of the newspapers, the prohibitionists, and the licensed trade. Ever since the 1894 liquor poll the talk had been of extremists and moderates, and most people were believed to be moderates, wishing to remove the abuses of the liquor trade but not prepared to abolish it. They had, therefore, voted for no-license and reduction as a means of encouraging the trade to reform itself.

Could such an influential idea have been merely a figment of most people's imagination? While the 1911 liquor poll would suggest this, other evidence does not. There had, for instance, been a considerable moderate press throughout the country, both in newspapers and pamphlets. In the 1890s, for example, Bishop Nevill of Dunedin had been in the forefront of the fray arguing against prohibition but for reform of the liquor trade. He had been followed by Bishop Julius of Christchurch, who openly declared that he only supported no-license because of the poor conduct of the trade. 129 At the turn of the century there had been considerable agitation in favour of State or municipal control of the liquor trade as an alternative means of reform, and while this agitation came to nothing at this stage, the idea of public control was not lost from the debates throughout the period. In 1911 Professor W. Salmond came out against prohibition as being a breach of individual liberty. He too, however, was not unconcerned about the effects of

alcohol on society; what he argued was that prohibition would not achieve lasting and beneficial reform. 130

The arguments of these people expressed the thoughts of the moderate section of the community. There seems definitely to have been such a group. The 1911 liquor poll did not prove that such a group did not exist. It did suggest, however, that the moderate voter was not voting the way he was believed to have been, that is, for no-license as a means of encouraging the trade to reform itself. Instead it appeared that he was voting for continuance. What had caused this? Had it ever been any different?

The overall national figures between 1896 and 1902 had increased by 11.06 per cent in favour of no-license. This was a considerable increase to occur at two polls, and after the 1902 poll the liquor trade began to take seriously the prohibitionist threat. It thus started to put its house in order, mainly by enforcing the legal hours of trade. For many moderates this was enough, and over the next two polls they supported continuance or did not vote at all. Thus the increase in the prohibition vote between 1902 and 1908 was only 4.56 per cent. Meanwhile the trade continued to improve its conduct, and at the same time the law relating to the conduct of the trade was tightened: by 1910 the employment of barmaids was being phased out, clubs had been brought under the liquor poll vote, the locker system had been abolished, the hours of trade had been standardised to 10.00 p.m., the drinking age had been raised to twenty-one, and the laws relating to packet licences had been strengthened. In short, the conduct of the liquor trade was very different from that of

130. W. Salmond, Prohibition a Blunder; Rational Liberty and True Temperance, (Dunedin, 1911), passim.
ten years previously. To the moderate who in the 1890s had voted for no-license there now seemed no need to continue his or her support for no-license. As a result the growth in the support for no-license at the poll was considerably slower, while, as seen, the support for no-license in many electorates actually dropped. The 1911 no-license vote was a more remarkable sign of this trend, with the national figures dropping by 3.7 per cent on the 1908 figure. 131

It cannot be denied, however, that some of those votes which switched from local no-license in 1908 to local continuance in 1911 were of those people who had seen no-license in practice in twelve districts, some of which did not have a good record of great success. It had become apparent that no-license was impossible to enforce adequately and created as many problems as it solved. It had aroused considerable opposition in areas such as Ashburton and Masterton, while in other districts its success had been limited at best. By 1911, therefore, prohibitionists as well as moderates were prepared to vote against or ignore no-license when there was another and potentially more successful issue of national prohibition to support.

Thus, a second possible explanation of the so-called moderate vote is that it had supported national prohibition so as to continue to threaten the trade and encourage it along the road of reform, while relying on the three-fifths majority requirement as a safeguard against its actually being carried. The high vote in favour of national prohibition in 1911 would now make them reconsider their position as to whether they really wanted prohibition or not. The next poll on the issue would therefore be very revealing. 132

131. See Table 21, Appendix G.

132. ODT, 16 Dec, 1911, p. 9.
What was unusual about the liquor poll in 1911 was not the support that national prohibition received, which was only a 2.38 per cent increase on 1908 and in line with the increases between previous polls; it was rather that local no-license dropped 3.7 per cent on the 1908 figure. Such a result should not have been totally unexpected.

From 1894 until 1908 the third issue on the ballot paper, reduction, had received considerably less support than either of the others, even though each voter had two votes. This would suggest that most people had definite ideas as to one of the two "extreme" measures. The moderate voter was not afraid to vote for no-license or continuance, depending on how he thought reform of the liquor trade was progressing.

Just as reduction had been neglected as the third and least option up until 1908, so in 1911 was no-license being ignored in the presence of the greater and more sweeping issue of national prohibition. The local no-license issue had been tried and found inadequate both in advance towards nationwide prohibition and in practical enforcement. Given two more thorough-going and positive measures, people preferred to commit themselves to one of these than to a piecemeal measure. If the prohibitionists had realised this in 1909 and had accepted the terms of the compact and the 1910 Licensing Bill that the no-license vote be counted for national prohibition as well in return for the fifty-five per cent majority, then it is possible that New Zealand would have been dry by 1916, five years after the 1911 poll had given a 55.83 per cent vote for national prohibition. The prohibition movement may have believed it was undertaking a divine mission but it was not guided by divine omniscience.

The other interesting factor at the 1911 poll, and one which the prohibitionists were particularly enthusiastic about, was the effect of the women's crusade. The large vote for national prohibition was
interpreted as

a significant illustration of the working
of the women's vote...Hitherto the actual
effect of the woman's franchise has been
in doubt, but a full sense of responsibil-
ity is now evidently gripping them in
regard to such an issue as prohibition. 133

A few days later the editor of the ODT wrote:

To such a result the experience of many
women of some of the evil results of a
traffic with which their sex is generally
in little sympathy, and their inclination
to be swayed by the attitude of the evang-
elical churches that aim at the abolition
of the liquor trade, will doubtless have
largely contributed,134

That the vote of women was largely in favour of national pro-
hibition was admitted to be an assumption, although a "safe" one.
As already argued, however, the voting pattern and number of women on the
electoral rolls compared with the number of votes for prohibition make
such an assumption suspect.135 A higher proportion of men (84.43%)
than women (82.47%) voted at the poll, while only 45.01 per cent of the
total votes were female, leaving a margin of 10.82 per cent which had to
be male votes in favour of prohibition even if all women voting had
supported national prohibition, a possibility that hardly seems likely.136
If the interpretation that the 1911 national prohibition vote owed its
large support mainly to women voters is accepted, then such an imbalance
of opinion between the sexes connotes a large number of domestic disagree-
ments both about opinion and outlook. Yet women themselves had admi-
itted the subjection of their opinions to their husbands and fathers as

133. Sydney Daily Telegraph, 12 Dec, 1911, cited in ODT, 13
Dec, 1911, p. 7.

134. ODT, 16 Dec, 1911, p. 9.


136. See Tables 10 and ll, Figure III, pp. 110-111.
It seems more likely that this support was mixed, involving the opinions of thousands of unified households, unified on questions of religion, morals and social ideals. If this were not the case then it must be seriously considered that New Zealand was a society of incompatible marriages, or that the prohibition issue was not one that caused friction. This latter alternative cannot but be rejected in the light of the arguments and battles between the proponents and opponents of the liquor traffic. Secondly, if the national and electoral figures for no-license support at the previous polls are studied, it is clear that there was a triennial increase in the vote in favour of prohibition of between 2.17 per cent and 2.38 per cent between 1902 and 1908. If the trend up to 1908 were to continue in 1911 then there should have been little surprise at a 55.83 per cent vote in favour of national prohibition. If a 53.45 per cent vote in 1908 had not elicited any serious suggestion that women were voting in large numbers for no-license, it seems strange that a 55.83 per cent vote three years later should. Such an interpretation would appear to have been offered only in the light of the women's crusade agitation prior to the 1911 poll. There is little else to suggest that the 1911 national prohibition vote was any more of a women's vote than previously.

It is also significant that between the 1911 poll and the 1914 poll it was still felt necessary by the leading women reformers to attempt to persuade women of the evils of liquor and its threat to the social and moral welfare of the community. They were not yet convinced that they had the women of New Zealand in the prohibition camp, 137. Vanguard, 7 Nov, 1908, p. 12; see p. 264.
nor were they satisfied that their standards were the standards of the community. They could still argue that

thousands of homes in this fair land of ours are today the scene of a tragedy, caused by drink, the cruel weight of which falls most heavily on mother, wife or daughter.\textsuperscript{138}

They still felt obliged to stress that "the home is the germ-cell of society...Every home is imperilled as long as the liquor traffic exists, and the obligation to get rid of it is as broad and deep and strong as that of humanity itself."\textsuperscript{139} The success of their agitation to convince women that their first calling was to be wives and mothers may be seen in the history of women in New Zealand in the following fifty years. Their success in convincing women that the drink traffic was the cause of most of their misery may be measured in the declining vote for prohibition after 1911, beginning with a drop in 1914 to 48.99 per cent. They could create an environment that stereotyped woman in a domestic role, but they could not create an environment that encouraged women, any more than men, to vote out the liquor traffic. The simplistic view that assumed women's involvement in the prohibition movement needs to be rejected. Prohibition was not a battle of the sexes, although women were more conspicuously involved in the prohibition movement than in any other at that time.

The period from 1908 to 1911 was of considerable significance in defining more completely the nature of the prohibition movement. During these few years it had become very apparent that the movement did not have the strength to achieve its legislative desires, especially concerning the bare majority, despite its majority support at the polls. This in itself suggested the non-political nature of the prohibition

\textsuperscript{138} ibid., 23 May, 1914, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{139} ibid.
issue. At the same time it had been revealed that the assumption that women were more inclined to support prohibition was a fallacy; such agitations as that concerning the barmaid had revealed the puritanical and middle class ideology of the prohibitionists, be they male or female. This middle class nature of the movement was made more apparent in its relations with the labour movement during these years. Labour support had been tentative at best, self-interested, and by no means prohibitionist in outlook. Likewise the anonymous moderate voter had shown that he was prepared to support prohibition though he did not necessarily believe in it as the final word on licensing reform. Certainly he, along with genuine prohibitionists, was disillusioned with the inadequate nature of no-license, and hoped for something better in using national prohibition either as his whip to encourage the trade to reform itself or as a first step in introducing some other form of liquor trading. These revelations gave a more definite and more complicated picture of the prohibition movement. It remained to be seen whether the prohibitionists would benefit from such knowledge in a way which their lack of knowledge had prevented them from doing in the negotiations about legislation in 1909 and 1910. Certainly they were now extremely confident of early success despite having achieved nothing concrete at the 1911 poll: no electorate carried no-license, the country did not go dry, and even the power to reduce licences no longer existed since the 1910 Licensing Act had abolished the reduction issue. 140 The status quo remained while the prohibitionists reflected on where their rejection of the fifty-five per cent majority compromise of 1909 had led them. Their enthusiasm carried them along, however, and they saw the result of the national prohibition poll as a

140. This affected the interest in licensing committees taken in March, 1912, when only one in three electors voted; see ODI, 9 March, 1912, p. 4; 13 March, 1912, p. 4.
superb triumph, staggering to the Liquor Party...

One thing at any rate the polling makes clear, that the doom of the traffic is sealed; as one authority pertinently puts it, "The Liquor Trade has had notice to quit".141

The prohibitionists sensed victory in the near future, and in order to hasten it along they decided that it was time for a massive temperance education and pledge-signing campaign.142 At the same time it was necessary to continue agitation for the substitution of the bare majority for the present 60 per cent requirement.143 These two campaigns were to support each other and directed the prohibition movement's course of action for the next three years.

141. *Outlook*, 12 Dec, 1911, p. 4; also *N.Z. Methodist Times*, 16 Dec, 1911, pp. 8, 9; *N.Z. Baptist*, Jan, 1912, p. 1.


CHAPTER VIII
CONTAINMENT AND CLARIFICATION

The results of the 1911 liquor poll made the prohibitionists feel more than ever the disadvantage they were at with the three-fifths majority regulation. As the editor of the Vanguard wrote,

The fact is that few people have hitherto had any worthy idea of what an iniquitous handicap this three-fifths majority really is. This National Prohibition vote will be an eye-opener to thousands, and will help them to understand why it is that we are so persistent in the demand that this galling yoke on the shoulders of free-born citizens should be removed. ¹

Their demands for change were incessant and vociferous over the next three years, but they were unable to achieve anything. The result of the 1911 poll had also increased the awareness of the trade of the danger it might be in if the majority were reduced even to fifty-five per cent. As a result it too increased its pressure on Parliament, but for the maintenance of the status quo.

In 1912 the N.Z. Alliance convention decided to undertake a pledge campaign in which no-license leagues were to be requested to take steps to secure at least one thousand voters in each electorate to pledge themselves, regardless of party, not to vote for any parliamentary candidate who would not pledge himself to support a measure to reduce the majority. A series of meetings throughout the country to inaugurate such a pledge-signing campaign was organised.²

At the same time lobbying of the Government, now under Thomas Mackenzie, was undertaken in order to encourage it to bring in legislation

¹. Vanguard, 6 Jan, 1912, p. 10.
to grant the bare majority. Not only was Mackenzie unfavourable to altering the three-fifths majority, however, but he was also opposed to any licensing legislation being introduced that session. His political position was too unstable to allow him to launch upon the sea of licensing politics. Mackenzie's negative response was not altered by threats of a new party being formed to achieve the bare majority. A N.Z.A. deputation member, W.J. Speight of Auckland, had threatened that

the gradual trend of thought with members of the Alliance was that unless the existing parties met the desires of the Alliance, it would be necessary to form an entirely distinct party, and sacrifice the existing parties.

His remarks were supported by the president of the N.Z.A., Wesley Spragg, and the other members of the deputation. There was every sign that such a move, while not desired by the Alliance, would be made if it were thought necessary.

The change of Government a few days later did not lessen this prohibitionist threat. The new Prime Minister, W.F. Massey, an Irish Presbyterian and leader of the Reform Party, was also against the introduction of licensing legislation that session, though he did say that he would not hinder the progress of a private member's Bill. This statement was acted upon with alacrity. Within a fortnight of the interview with Massey A.S. Malcolm (Clutha) introduced a Bill to reduce the required majority to fifty-five per cent on both the local and national options.

During the debates Mr L.M. Isitt (Christchurch North) gave further expression to the frustration of the prohibition party when he threatened that the N.Z.A. would go to the

260,000 who are in favour of national prohibition and say, 'We want you to help us to force this reform upon the Parliament, and the only way in which to do it is to say to these gentlemen of analytical minds and tender consciences, "Unless you can see your way out of the difficulty and find it possible to vote for the 45-55 majority upon both issues, then our conscience is so tender that we cannot vote for you."' 

The threat of a separate political party had been modified, but the implication remained and led to accusations from men such as J.G. Coates that the no-license party was trying to elect a party who were pledged to carry the bare majority and were thus making the question one of party.

Despite this, the politicians did not feel so threatened that they could not vote against Malcolm's measure. It was rejected by forty-two votes to thirty-two on the second reading, despite the fact that it had been believed that a majority in the House favoured a reduction in the necessary majority. Some parliamentarians said that they were pledged to fifty-five per cent on the national option but not on the local option, some said the opposite, but few admitted to being pledged to a reduction on both issues. By such means, therefore, the members of Parliament were able to avoid the issue. They had, perhaps unwittingly, called the prohibitionists' bluff in that they realised that it would not be to the prohibition party's

8. ibid., (8 August, 1912), p. 710.
9. ibid., p. 715.
10. ibid., p. 736.
advantage to try and form a separate political party. It was known by this time that this issue was not in the mainstream of party politics and that it did not appeal to the electors in this way. A separate Prohibition Party was more likely to alienate votes than to attract them. As a result the N.Z.A. and its supporters were forced to retreat from the position they had adopted in mid-1912. They reacted to the Government's non-committal stand on the measure by bringing charges against the Government of not wishing to change the licensing law. It had not supported the Bill but had allowed it to be introduced by a private member as being a safe way of having it killed if necessary. Massey was accused of being an opponent of true democracy. 12

The limited power of the prohibitionists was revealed, however, and no political prohibition party was formed. Rather they continued as before by interviewing political candidates as to their views on the majority question, by their deputation work to Government, by introducing more Bills to Parliament, and by concentrating on their pledge-signing campaign, which now became a reality. As the Vanguard said,

> the recent voting on Mr Malcolm's Majority Bill shows that it is high time some drastic measures were taken to send only such men to Parliament as may be trusted to give something like a fair chance to those who are fighting hard to overthrow our most gigantic social curse. 13

This pledge-signing campaign was undertaken from mid-1912 until the election and liquor poll of 1914. It had the effect of continuing agitation on the issue throughout this two year period. When legislation was considered in the 1913 parliamentary recess and the 1914


session there was no need to arouse a fresh campaign and agitation. Public demand already existed. The results, however, were nil. While such a campaign was more organised than previously, it revealed that the prohibition movement was unwilling to move outside the existing political party lines. While frustrated at their lack of success within Parliament, the prohibitionists realised that they would have even less success if they tried to form their own political party. Prohibition was a non-partisan issue, and to that extent non-political.

It became clear during all the lobbying for a reduction in the majority that the financial argument involved in the abolition of the liquor trade was of considerable concern to the Government. Massey seemed particularly worried that approximately £900,000 of revenue would be lost as a result of the carrying of national prohibition. He similarly sympathised with the trade's claim for compensation for the loss of property and livelihood if the prohibitionists were successful. His concern is not surprising. His responsibility for the welfare of New Zealand prevented him allowing a sizeable slice of the country's income to be voted out of existence. Alternatives would first have to be found. Secondly, he was a man of conservative philosophy, a respecter of private property and an opponent of socialism. He was not likely, therefore, to allow private property to be abolished by popular vote without providing some means of compensation.

While this prolonged debate on the majority issue was the major area of interest for the prohibition movement after 1911, other develop-


ments were occurring that were equally as vital for its possible success. The prohibitionists were still desperately trying to attract the full support of the labour movement and to convince it that prohibition of alcohol was in its best interests. They were hindered, however, because the division between labour prohibitionists and labour anti-prohibitionists was widening in line with the division between the moderate New Zealand Labour Party and the more extreme Socialist Party. This reflected the difference in attitude of the older craft unions of the Trades and Labour Councils and the mass of unskilled labourers attracted by articulate leaders into the New Zealand Federation of Labour and the Socialist Party. The aim of the New Zealand Labour Party was

not to overthrow capitalism and its social hierarchy but to improve the status of working men within it... and to achieve a rightful recognition of the dignity of labour and the respectability of the worker. 15

This would be achieved through legislation and arbitration. From this group the prohibition movement was reasonably successful in attracting modified support, as seen in the Trades and Labour Council's programme regarding no-license after 1908.17 The concept of "the respectability of the worker" implied the adoption of middle class mores, of which prohibition was an expression.

The more radical wing of the labour movement, however, believed in the overthrow of capitalism and its replacement by socialism. As reflected in its programme up to this time, it supported the bare majority principle but saw no value in allying itself with the prohibition movement proper.


This division was symbolised by the outlooks of the two organisers for these groups. In 1911 W.T. Mills was used by the New Zealand Labour Party to organise it for the general election. Mills was a strong advocate of prohibition and became involved with the N.Z. Alliance at the same time. H. Scott Bennett was the Federation of Labour's choice as organiser for the Socialist Party at the same election. He was as virulent an opponent of prohibition as Mills was a supporter. 18

Between 1912 and 1916 the labour movement in New Zealand was seeking to establish unity within its ranks. As a result the prohibition issue was to a large extent left to one side, but it could not be ignored completely. At the 1913 congress to work out a means of unification of the various branches of the labour movement the question of prohibition was raised while the general platform of the congress was being decided. Mr W.T. Young, chairman of the Congress Committee, had publicly stated prior to the congress that, in order to meet the views of their prohibitionist supporters, they had decided to adopt the bare majority on all questions submitted to a referendum of the people. As seen, this was not a break with the Labour tradition. The connection, however, of these two issues, no-license and the bare majority, did not meet the approval of the majority of members at the congress, in that no-license was not considered to be part of the party's platform. A proposal that national prohibition should be one of the planks of the general platform was thus overwhelmingly rejected on a voice vote. The issue of the bare majority on any question was also dropped. 19


19. Vanguard, 19 July, 1913, p. 2; Maori Land Worker, 18 July, 1913, p. 5.
The *N.Z. Truth* portrayed the situation much more graphically and sinisterly:

A section, a noisy, almost nasty section of that conference, was wowsery. It was a band of temperance bigots, who fondly hoped to side-track militant Labor into voting for such questions as the Bare Majority on the Prohibition Question... Labour...repudiated the Prohibition Party. It declined, to be used by the wowser for wolfish wowing purposes and it said so cheerfully and emphatically.20

Oversimplified as this description may have been, it was a reasonable interpretation of the situation, at least from a labour point of view. A section of the moderate wing at the congress withdrew from it after the clause providing that strikes should be effective when used and under central direction, was retained. Amongst this group, which became known as the "United Labour Party Remnant", were prominent labour leaders such as J.T. Paul, W.A. Veitch, D. McLaren and George Fowlds. All these men were prohibitionists of the conservative labour mould, who were aspiring to or had already reached, middle class respectability through the adoption of middle class values and

The refusal of the majority at the congress to accept their moderate approach of action through the legal channels of conciliation and arbitration, and the rejection of the prohibition issue from the platform were symbolic of Labour's repudiation of middle class beliefs, ideas, and leadership.

Some realisation of this by the prohibition movement was apparent, and the prohibitionist comment on the congress's rejection

George Fowlds was the epitome of the middle class ideal of the improvement of the working class through self-help, sobriety, and self-discipline. Having only had primary school education, he began his life in New Zealand, at the age of twenty-five, as a labourer, carpenter, and painter. In the 1890s he established a very successful clothing business in Auckland. He entered Parliament in 1899, and remained on the Liberal benches until 1911. He was Minister of Education from 1906 until he resigned in 1911. His main interests were Henry George's Single Tax movement which he saw, along with prohibition, as the means of solving Labour's problems. As a member of the Liberal Left Wing he maintained an interest in helping the labour movement, and had thoughts of leading it in 1912-1913. He found himself rejected, however, by the more radical section of that movement after the 1913 Unity Congress. His defeat at the 1911 and 1914 general elections by a Labour candidate, Payne, ended his attempts at a political career. He had tried, in the Stout fashion, to provide middle class leadership for the labour movement in order to avoid sectional politics. In a letter to Lord Plunket, Fowlds said,

I was alarmed at the rapid growth of the Anti-Social forces in the community, and I felt that unless we could inaugurate a movement which would attract to itself the saner portion of the workers, we should very soon be in serious trouble. I left the Government largely to help in forwarding such a movement.

(Fowlds to Plunket, 7 August, 1912, in Fowlds Papers 1/69, p. 230).
of the no-license and bare majority planks was one of that movement's most abusive of the Labour party. Gone were the subtle attempts to persuade the working class that it was opposed to such a destructive monopoly as that of the liquor trade. Gone was the commiseration with the masses over their harsh lot in life. Now these people were "pot-house habitues" who were too scared to challenge the "bloated monopoly of the liquor traffic". The self-righteousness of the prohibitionist was all too apparent in comments which stated that "by far the greater part of it [alcoholic liquor] was swallowed by the working classes". 22

This split between Labour and Prohibition was further encouraged by the by-election in Grey at this time. In this election the prohibition party supported strongly the Liberal candidate, H.L. Michel, who was only pledged to the three-fifths majority. The Social Democratic Party candidate, P.C. Webb, was in favour of the bare majority. The fact that he was not a prohibitionist explains, in part at least, the refusal of the prohibition party to support him, though previously this would not have been the case. The situation this time was aggravated by the refusal of the Unity Congress a few weeks earlier to have anything to do with the licensing question. Just as the Labour party had refused to truckle to the prohibitionists, so the prohibitionists now decided to throw over the Labour party by not supporting Webb and return to their natural middle class allegiance. The result of this by-election, in the eyes of the Maoriland Worker, had been to open the eyes of many staunch supporters of our movement. In the past Labor has had a tendency to flirt with Madam No-License. It is now about time that the deceitful old jade was exposed for the two-faced

The fact that Webb won the election on a second ballot may well have reduced the amount of venom the labour movement was prepared to spit at the prohibitionists.

By the spring of 1913, therefore, the prohibition movement appeared to be making little headway. Its attempts to achieve a reduction in the majority and to win the support of the labour movement were proving fruitless. It was into this situation that the 1913 watersiders' and miners' strike injected new influences.

To most New Zealanders this strike came as a shock, especially with the outbreaks of violence that occurred. For the prohibitionists it had two effects. It interrupted and overshadowed their 1913 campaign so that their drive towards the bare majority temporarily lost momentum. This was soon offset, however, by the arguments in favour of prohibition that the prohibitionists were able to derive from the strike experience. The second effect, therefore, was to give the prohibition party a new source of propaganda.

Two major arguments were developed, one generalised and one based on specific circumstances. The prohibitionists were quick to argue that the violence in the strike had occurred because of the unleashing of passions through the use of alcohol. The closure of hotels in Wellington and Auckland during the strike was seen as a significant indication of the sources of the worst kind of trouble to be expected in connection with such a social convulsion. If they could only keep them closed there, and close them all around everywhere else, the worst seed-plots of mischief in the whole Dominion would be effectively got rid of.24

23. Maoriland Worker, 8 August, 1913, p. 3.

The closure of the hotels in the main centres and their environs provided a more positive example of the effect of prohibition. Though ordered by the various stipendiary magistrates in these centres as a means of providing for the public safety, these closures had been requested by the Strike Committees in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. The strike leaders were well aware that one of the most effective strike breakers was impecuniosity brought about by money wasted on liquor. The prohibitionists were jubilant that the labour leaders had made such a request; it gave them hope that the labour movement was awakening to the dangers and waste resultant on the drink trade. The effect of this temporary prohibition experiment was regarded as beneficial to the community. The amount of drunkenness decreased, while the job of the police force and the law courts was made much easier.\(^{25}\) It remained to be seen whether any such gains to the prohibition vote would be made after such an experience. A new fund of persuasive propaganda had, nonetheless, been provided. It was regarded as being

a most useful object lesson for many a year to come. For one thing, it affixes in big letters the brand 'DANGEROUS' on the whole liquor selling business. There is only one trade the suppression of which is generally demanded in a time of public excitement, and that is the liquor trade. People will not be slow to learn that what is shut down as a public danger in the time of strike is never otherwise than a source of danger to the public, and as such has never at any time any sane ground for existence.\(^{26}\)

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Apart from having gained ammunition for propaganda from the strike, the prohibitionists' sympathy for it was non-existent. To them it was more important that the liquor trade be revealed as an anti-social force than that the aim of the strike be examined. The various churches opposed the use of the strike weapon, arguing that "the true solution of social and industrial problems will be found only in the application of the golden rule". These middle class reformers were not prepared to examine the very fundamental structure of society which was causing industrial unrest. Instead they talked in vague, idealistic terms about

the hopelessness of founding a Socialistic State apart from the reformation of the individuals who are to compose and control it. Until selfishness and hatred, avarice and ambition, have been eliminated from human nature; until character has been purified and uplifted; until men act under the lofty impulses of religious faith and hope, Socialism is but an idle dream.

Ideally this may have been true, but what programme did the reformers offer to achieve their ideals? To the labour movement it appeared to be a form of Christianity preached from the pulpit and the public platform, and having as its creed belief in prohibition, Sabbath day observance, anti-gambling, and other such moral issues. No thought was given to the capitalistic system or to the complaints of the worker of monopolistic exploitation. The Church, with all its ideals, failed to appreciate the immediate reality of the workers' conditions.

Despite the fact that the Labour party and the prohibition movement were in different ideological as well as social camps, no

27. ibid., 6 December, 1913.
28. Methodist Church of N.Z., Minutes of the Annual Conference, 1914, p. 56.
complete break between them occurred at this stage. In the first few months of 1914 negotiations were underway between the Social Democratic Party and the prohibition movement concerning a possible alliance. The Social Democratic Party was obviously after votes at the next general election to be held at the end of the year. It argued that it was the only party pledged to the bare majority on all questions, and that it ran a recall system of any member who violated an election pledge. A correspondent to the *Maoriland Worker* believed that, because of this pledge of the Social Democratic Party to the bare majority, the prohibition party could not afford to ignore the offer of alliance, especially as the major prohibitionist agitation at this time concerned the achievement of a reduction of the three-fifths majority. To the worker the appeal of such an alliance lay in the presumed results of prohibition:

Wipe the drink out and scabs will be scarcer, savings will be greater, more comfort in the home, more ability and alertness to grapple with the opposing class and checkmate their moves through.

The prohibitionist party ultimately refused to enter such an alliance. It argued that it stood for one issue only, the abolition of alcohol from New Zealand, and that it was not a political party. It preferred to be free to support any political candidate of any hue if he were in favour of granting a reduced majority on the prohibition issue. It also objected to unity with the Social Democratic Party as a large part of that party's support came from people opposed to the inclusion of national prohibition and no-license in its platform.


It is probable that behind this prohibitionist refusal were other, more fundamental reasons. It was not apparent to any political observer that the Social Democratic Party was as yet a viable political party. It only had two members in Parliament and certainly did not seem to be about to come to any greater prominence. It appeared that the Social Democrats would gain more by prohibitionist support than would the latter by the support of the Social Democrats. Secondly, the prohibitionist party was well aware that its supporters were not all inclined towards separate Labour representation in Parliament. Many of them were successful members of the middle class, comfortable, if not wealthy, as a result of their success in a capitalist economy. They had no interest in a party that aimed to overthrow this system. Hence they were not interested in an alliance with a socialist party which might result in economic suicide.

The connection between Prohibition and Labour thus drifted into a state of limbo. Individuals put forward their views but nothing was done at an official level to improve or wreck the uneasy relationship that existed. By the time of the 1914 election the Maoriland Worker was arguing that, "wherever in the North a Social Democrat alone would have a chance of victory these Would-be-moral-reformers of the Workers have trust in a candidate to split up his vote". The most obvious incidence of this was in Eden, where the prohibitionist, W.R. Tuck, stood as an independent Labour candidate against the Social Democrat W. Richards. Overall, however, such an accusation was difficult to prove one way or the other. Yet the Maoriland Worker went on to say,

The issue has got beyond the question of License or No-License. Social Democracy

has to decide at the next ensuing Election whether the life of New Zealand is to be dominated by the Wowser who is the bitterest enemy of Social Democracy, who is the strongest supporter of the Massey Party, and who, tomorrow, if you vote him to power will hand you over to the Baton and the Exploiter. 33

In the light of this increasing distrust between Labour and Prohibition it is surprising that no complete break occurred until 1920, when all reference to the liquor question was dropped from the New Zealand Labour Party's platform. 34 The move towards this break had been facilitated in 1917 by the inclusion of a remit "that the question of State Control be placed on the ballot paper when the refer-endum is taken on the liquor question." 35 To the prohibition party this was tantamount to supporting the liquor trade, and resulted in the temporary withdrawal from the Labour Party of its president, James McCombs, a staunch prohibitionist. He rejoined the party in 1918, but he did not modify his outlook on the liquor problem. 36 Just as the other major political parties had refused to involve themselves with the prohibition movement but had allowed their members a free vote on the issue, so the Labour Party's decision of 1920 brought it to a similar position and ended thirty years of diffidence within the labour ranks as to its connection with the prohibition movement.

After the 1913 strike was over and the government of the country had returned to normal, the prohibitionist agitation again focussed on the majority issue. 37 While they hoped for success with the Licensing

33. ibid.
34. Brown, op. cit., p. 32.
35. ibid., p. 30.
36. ibid., pp. 30-31.
Bill promised by Massey for 1914, they did not allow their hopes to deter their campaigning for more prohibition votes as they prepared for the 1914 liquor poll. They still had to achieve a sixty per cent majority until the Bill was passed, and there was no certainty that it would be. As it eventuated the 1914 Licensing Bill was passed with the clause reducing the necessary majority to fifty-five per cent having been deleted, despite the prohibitionists' lobbying of Parliament and their threats of political repercussions at the next general election if the majority were not reduced. The whole issue had been, in its final stages, overshadowed by the outbreak of World War 1, which may well have been responsible for the rushed nature of the measure and the rejection of the fifty-five per cent clause.

As a result of their failure to achieve any reduction in the majority, the prohibitionists had plans to exert massive influence at the elections to elect only those candidates who guaranteed to support such a reduction. As the magnitude of the struggle in Europe became clearer, however, so the demands that the 1914 election and liquor poll be postponed became louder. It was argued that party strife would be undesirable during a war emergency, and that the war would prevent the people from giving adequate attention to domestic politics. Petitions urging the postponement were organised by the New Zealand Moderate League and presented to Parliament.

38. ODT, 5 Dec, 1913, p. 5.
40. NZPD, 168-170, (1914), passim, debates on Licensing Bill; ODT, 29 July, 1914, p. 4.
43. JHR, 1914, Schedule of Petitions, pp. xxi-xlil
This League was the outcome of the moderate opposition to the 1914 Licensing Bill and was led by A.A.S. Monteath. It had been set up to oppose the prohibition campaign of the N.Z.A. Its motive for wanting to postpone the election is therefore suspect, in that it may really have been trying to postpone the licensing poll. It is possible that it feared that wartime conditions would give the prohibitionists an opportunity to press for further restriction of the liquor traffic on the grounds that this would be a desirable wartime economy and would also be beneficial to the troops in maintaining their prime fighting condition. Such arguments were put forward by the prohibition party. The appeal for a postponement created little excitement, however, and does not appear to have been taken very seriously by other sections of the community.

Massey quietly considered the issue during August and September, during which time a "truce" had been called between the two major political parties on political activity. Once it was apparent, however, that the war would not be over by Christmas, the country began to prepare in earnest for the election and liquor poll to be held in early December.

As well as agitating for a postponement of the election, the Moderate League also demanded a Bill to enable the armed forces to vote before they went overseas. The prohibition party saw this move as an

44. ODT, 7 July, 1914, pp. 4-6.
attempt by the League to influence the voters, especially as in its manifesto it urged people to resist national prohibition as an extreme and irrational measure, impossible in practice, and carrying with it Social Tyranny, Financial Disorganisation, and Unemployment, which at this critical time, more than ever, would be absolutely against the best interests of the country.48

The prohibitionists did not oppose giving the forces the right to vote before they went overseas, and nor did Parliament. The Expeditionary Forces Voting Act was quickly passed.49

During the election campaign the prohibitionists did not hesitate to attack the propaganda put out by the Moderate League, though their attacks were somewhat naive in their brutal simplicity.

The humbug of the 'Moderate' party in suggesting a truce in the interests of patriotism was really too transparent to impose upon anybody...Let the delusion be at once got rid of that the distraction caused by the war in Europe will rob of its keenness the public interest in the fight on the liquor question. Let nobody suppose that the liquor trade will leave one possible vote uncaptured on the plea that the thoughts of the people are turned in another direction. 50

While they were wise in not relaxing their efforts to achieve support for prohibition, they were slow to perceive that the country was perhaps not as interested in the issue as it had previously been, solely because its attention was directed towards family and friends on the European battleground. Even calls to people to do their patriotic duty by dealing a "death-blow to the greatest iniquity that defiles the Dominion" did not seem to fall upon totally receptive ears.51

51. N.Z. Baptist, Dec, 1914, p. 221.
Yet the prohibition party remained confident that there would be an increase in the number of no-license areas and also a three-fifths majority vote for national prohibition.

The results of the poll proved otherwise. The objective observer it seemed for the first time that the support for prohibition might be on the wane, and that after twenty years of agitation the prohibition movement might at last be defeated. There was a substantial drop on the 1911 results of 4.21 per cent in the support for local no-license (to 45.54 per cent) and 6.84 per cent in the support for national prohibition (to 48.99 per cent). No area of New Zealand went dry. As the voter turnout was greater than in 1911 (85.31 per cent compared with 83.54 per cent), and as there was a greater percentage of valid votes than in 1911 (81.79 per cent compared with 79.94 per cent on no-license, and 81.92 per cent compared with 78.91 per cent on national prohibition), there would appear to have been either a revulsion of feeling towards prohibition or the extra voters were solidly against prohibition and had voted to offset the possibility of a repeat of the 1911 results, in which the country had run reasonably close to becoming absolutely dry.

The prohibitionists explained their setback largely by the effect of the war. Its outbreak had led to indecision as to whether there would be a liquor poll and general election. The result of such indecision was the arrest of plans of a country-wide campaign. Work that should have been spread over several months was crowded into the last few weeks. As a result the anti-liquor propaganda had been lacking both in extent and impressiveness. Such an argument was true in part, but

52. See Tables 20, 21, Appendix G.
53. Vanguard, 9 Dec., 1914, p. 2.
would appear to be grossly overstated. The prohibition campaign had been underway prior to the outbreak of the war in early August, and had only been interrupted for a month and a half at the most while the Government was deciding whether an election and poll would be held. A full two months campaigning had still been possible immediately prior to the liquor poll.

The claim of the liquor trade to have secured the right of voting for the Expeditionary Force before it went overseas by the Expeditionary Forces Voting Act was given as a second reason for the decline in support for prohibition.\textsuperscript{54} It did not follow, although it was argued, that because of this claim thousands of troopers felt obliged to vote in return for the liquor trade.

The prohibitionists were on stronger ground when they mentioned the effect of the trade's propaganda about the financial effect of prohibition. The trade, represented by the National Trade Defence Council, had issued prior to the election a manifesto arguing that it was dangerous for a country to consider abolishing such a large industry, involving £15 million to £20 million in capital, £1 million in revenue, and the employment of thousands of people, in a time of national emergency.\textsuperscript{55} Many people had probably been convinced that in a wartime situation it would be dangerous to upset the finances of the country by enacting prohibition, the effects of which would have to be offset by a sizeable increase in taxation. One writer felt that this had more to do with the decline in the prohibition vote than any other argument put forward.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{54} ibid.

\textsuperscript{55} ODT, 26 Sept, 1914, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{56} J. Cocker, in Vanguard, 16 Jan, 1915, p. 4.
Apart from reasons associated with the war, other possible factors were recognised as having affected the prohibition vote. In the parliamentary elections the prohibitionists had, through their pledge campaign, given considerably more attention than at previous elections to supporting or opposing candidates according to their attitude on the three-fifths majority question. The effect of this was thought to have alienated many people who had previously voted for no-license or national prohibition, in that the prohibitionists had opposed the candidate whom individuals had been supporting. Party feeling was said to be strong, and people had not thought twice about retaliating against the prohibition movement's interference in the general election.57

The Bible-in-Schools question was also regarded as having helped bring about the polling result. Early in 1914 it had been noticed that the energy poured into the prohibition campaigning did not reach the same level as in previous years. The moral energies of the country, and especially the churches, were directed towards the gaining of Bible reading in State Schools. Organised in a Bible-in-State-Schools League, their agitation was for a referendum on this issue. Some prohibitionists noticed this and commented on the difference in the amount of energy of the two movements.58 The Presbyterian Church's Outlook gives the impression that such a situation was indeed the case. If the content of its columns is analysed then it would appear that

57. Ibid.

58. Mrs A. Don, president of the W.C.T.U., said that, "if the No-license party showed one third of the energy of the Bible-in-Schools League, national prohibition would be carried at the next general election", cited in ODT, 13 March, 1914, p. 3.
from 1912 to 1914 the Bible-in-State-Schools campaign dominated the efforts to achieve social and moral reform in New Zealand, and that as a result the prohibition issue faded into the background, at least until the liquor poll campaign. Even then, however, the agitation for a referendum occupied as much space as the prohibition issue. Two hundred and twenty-nine petitions were sent to Parliament both for and against the 1914 Religious Instruction in Schools Referendum Bill. 59

The press as well as the prohibition party noted the effect that the Bible-in-Schools agitation was having on the prohibition campaign. A report in the Otago Daily Times stated that one strong supporter of no-license said,

We have in our ranks of no-license supporters men belonging to all religious sects, Protestant and Catholic among them. There are differences of opinion regarding the Bible-in-Schools question, and with such differences of opinion there would not, I fear, be that cohesion and spirit of zeal required to carry the no-license flag to victory next December. 60

The problem was that the Bible-in-State-Schools League was supported by Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists; the smaller denominations and sects and the Roman Catholics were opposed to the scheme. 61 On the liquor issue, however, the Protestant sects and non-episcopalian churches were united, with individual Anglicans and Roman Catholics, in favour of prohibition. It did not augur well for the prohibition movement, therefore, if the Protestant churches fell out with each other over a separate issue. It was possible, and indeed probable, that any such split would reduce the prohibitionist vote at the liquor

59. JHR, 1914, Schedule of Petitions, pp. xxi-xlili.
60. ODT, 25 July, 1914, p. 9.
After the results of the poll were known it was generally conceded that the predominance of the Bible-in-Schools issue had hindered the people from concentrating their attention upon the prohibition question, and had thus weakened their enthusiasm. In electorates where the prohibitionists did not support the Bible-in-Schools candidate the prohibition vote suffered. Two moral questions with similar methods were before the people at the same time, and where the advocates differed in their support of a candidate, one of the reforms suffered.62

More objective observers of the results were not totally convinced by these reasons put forward by the prohibitionist party. It seemed to them that prohibition sentiment had declined naturally rather than as a result of the war and a few other issues. The editor of the Otago Daily Times was astute enough to note that the leaders of the prohibition movement may secretly have felt the same way. He noticed that an urgent call had been made for an immediate Special Convention to consider the situation of the prohibition party. Quoting from the Vanguard he argued:

'There is no occasion whatever for a blue flunk, but we have reached a stage in which it is forced upon us to overhaul our machinery with a view to consider its present effectiveness for the purpose for which it exists.' This reads very like an admission that the abnormal conditions produced by war furnish after all no satisfactory explanation to the prohibitionists themselves of the check received by the movement for which they are working. 63

In 1914 the results of the liquor poll seemed to many to spell the end of an era of attempted social, economic and moral reform by means of prohibition. At best the attempts to achieve this had been


63. ODT, 23 Dec, 1914, p. 4.
only partially successful. After two decades of agitation and campaigning only twelve electorates had adopted local no-license. Any further advance had been hindered primarily because of the retention of the three-fifths majority against continuous and vociferous protestations of the prohibition party. This not only hindered the increase in no-license areas but also caused the prohibitionists to concentrate much of their activity in the legislative field to the detriment of educational activity and local agitation over local circumstances.

Despite such legislative activity the prohibitionists achieved nothing, their political weakness again being revealed. Yet they knew that to form a separate political party based on prohibition would not achieve their goal either. They restricted such political activities to attempts to gain the support of the labour movement. Their aim here, however, was not to achieve a political organisation committed to prohibition but to prevent the growth of a socialist political party threatening the existing capitalist political, economic and social systems. Their abhorrence of separate working class agitation and politics and their concern for the moral, economic and social conditions of society, and especially the working class, were combined in their belief in the total efficacy of prohibition to solve society's problems without having to alter its economic, social and political structure. As a result they alienated what labour support they had by showing no appreciation of Labour's feelings and aspirations. In this the prohibition movement revealed its middle class outlook, an outlook which by the time of the 1914 liquor poll appeared to be losing touch with popular opinion on the question of social, economic and moral reform. There was more than an element of truth in the N.Z. Truth's brusque
dismissal of the prohibition movement after the 1914 poll:

The real cause [for the result of the poll] is the feeling of repulsion towards Wowserism, and all that Wowserism means. This the Wowser's know is the true position. They sought to bull-doze the community; they sought to make everybody miserable. In short the Wowser-Prohibs. made one of the biggest blunders of their miserable existence. They failed to judge the temper of the people. North, South, East, and West, in "dry" districts and "wet", the people were solid against Wowserism. 64

CHAPTER IX

PROHIBITION AND POLITICS

Much of the activity of the prohibition movement between 1894 and 1914 was directed at achieving legislation favourable to its desires, with particular concentration on achieving a national option poll and a reduction of the necessary majority required to carry no-license. As a result it was believed that the political effect of the prohibition issue was considerable. The exact nature of this effect was, however, never defined. Certainly, at no stage was a separate Prohibition Party established to represent the prohibition movement in Parliament. There had been attempts to do so, for example by Stout in the 1890s and W. Richardson after 1900, but not one was successful. Similarly threats by the N.Z.A. itself and by various parliamentarians that they would form a separate party (notably in 1903-1904 and 1912) were never sustained. The prohibition movement as a whole did not support such moves after 1896 when it became apparent that the prohibition question was not a partisan political issue and could not form the basis of a viable political party.

While no separate Prohibition Party was established in New Zealand, it was still believed that the prohibition issue had considerable effect on the political scene between 1894 and 1914. This belief was encouraged by two factors: the holding of the liquor poll on the same day as the general election, as stipulated by the Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act Amendment Act of 1895; and the prohibition movement's attempts to support only those political candidates who publicly favoured changes in the licensing law that were favourable to prohibition. The question is,

1. See pp. 170-174; 196, footnote 68.

2. See pp. 212, 222, 308-310.
what was the nature of this presumed effect on political parties, political candidates and political policies, and what did it mean for the prohibition movement?

A major problem in analysing the effect of prohibition on the political issues and parties of the period is to be found in deciding who was a prohibitionist. Throughout the period 1894-1914 party allegiance was often indefinite, and especially so during the 1890s. The Parliamentary Liberal Party under Ballance had emerged in 1890 as a reasonably cohesive unit, but around it were several individuals who often supported its measures but who refused to commit themselves to party ties. Such people included the new Labour members, loosely linked in a Liberal-Labour alliance, and some Independents.3

On the other side of the political fence was the Opposition, sometimes labelled the Conservative Party. This party was much less cohesive during the 1890s and early 1900s than the Liberal Party, partly because it lacked a leader of any great political strength who might unite it. It was only under W.F. Massey in the early 1900s that the development of a solid party structure within the Opposition matched the unity of the Liberals.4

Separate Labour representation emerged in New Zealand for the first time in the 1890s. To begin with it was linked to the Liberal Party in the Liberal-Labour alliance encouraged by such men as Stout and Ballance as a means of preventing distinct class divisions in the political sphere. This alliance eventually collapsed, however, and a more radical labour movement emerged after the turn of the century.

whose members were divided between two or three different labour parties. Within Parliament the emerging Labour party's members usually supported the Liberal Party, though they maintained an independent stance and organisation.5

In this fluid political situation the issue of prohibition provided a further divisive force, and one whose effect it is difficult to measure. Part of the difficulty lies in defining exactly who was a prohibitionist. For example, Sir Robert Stout claimed after the 1893 election that forty-four of the seventy members of the House of Representatives were pledged to the bare majority principle on the licensing question as well as on other matters, and that, as a result, the repeal of the 1893 Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act was demanded by the people.6 The New Zealand Alliance was much more cautious, however, and claimed on the basis of pre-election pledges that nineteen favoured full repeal, fifteen were for partial repeal, twenty-three were against any repeal, and thirteen were unknown.7 This gave only thirty-four members in favour of some change in the Act. When it came to an actual vote on the alteration of the three-fifths majority to a bare majority only twenty-two members supported the change, with thirty-one against, thirteen absences and two sets of pairs.8 Hence only twenty-four members could be said to be solidly in favour of the bare majority.

This does not deny that other members were prohibitionists. There were a number who supported this reform movement but who were moderate in their opinions as to how it should be achieved. They could

see value in the three-fifths majority requirement as a means of ensuring stability through adequate popular support. Others were in favour of local no-license but were opposed to any idea of a national prohibition option. To them this would be too radical a change with unknown possible effects on the whole community.

While there were these different types of prohibitionists to be found within Parliament, there were also those who professed at the polls to be in favour of some modification to the licensing law, normally to the changing of the three-fifths majority to the bare majority, but who were not prohibitionists. Some of these people were simply insincere and were hoping to catch the prohibitionist vote at the elections. Others were sincere, especially on the majority question, in that they thought democracy should be allowed to rule by the bare majority on all questions, but they were themselves opposed to prohibition as a means of reform. Their democratic principles placed them alongside the prohibitionists, but they were in reality walking a very different path of social reform towards the millenium. For example, in 1896 Mr Pinkerton, one of the three members for Dunedin City, came out strongly against colonial prohibition as a satisfactory means of reform, but he nonetheless believed that the people should have the right and the power to prohibit the sale of liquor if they wanted to do so.9

A further confusing issue in this attempt to define who was a prohibitionist is that over a period of time people were inclined to change their stance on various issues. This occurred within the prohibition movement as well as outside it. Many prohibitionists, even men such as the Rev. Rutherford Waddell, moved from opposing the

9. ODT, 8 July, 1896.
bare majority to opposing the three-fifths majority. On the other hand Robert McNab, member of Parliament for Mataura during most of the period under study, changed his position on the majority question from being a supporter of the bare majority to supporting the three-fifths vote. Both D. Pinkerton (Dunedin City) and J.A. Millar (Chalmers) had prohibitionist support at the 1893 election, but had alienated that support by 1896 by their outspoken opposition to prohibition. Millar even attempted to extend the hours of liquor trading in towns and cities from ten o'clock to eleven o'clock with a Licensing Amendment Bill in 1898. Though not strictly prohibitionists, James Allen (Bruce) and W.F. Massey (Franklin) were not opposed to temperance reform. By the time they took over the government of New Zealand in 1912, however, they were much less favourable to any changes in the law, particularly concerning the majority issue, and were considered by the prohibition movement to be opposed to prohibition. Their positions demanded moderation, but it is interesting to note that the nearer to power they came, the less was their enthusiasm for a divisive, sectarian movement.

The fluid political allegiance of politicians and parliamentary candidates and the variety of stances possible on the prohibition issue make it difficult to ascertain the exact effect of the issue on

11. see p. 259, fn. 17.
politics and Parliament. By considering statements made by political candidates and members both within and outside the House, by looking at their voting on various matters relating to the licensing laws, and by taking cognisance of the attitude of the prohibition party to them, an attempt has been made, however, to define the structure and allegiance of the prohibition party within Parliament, and hence to measure its political impact.

At each election from 1893 until 1914 between one-fifth and one-third of all candidates were professed prohibitionists. The peak year was in 1896, when it was expected that the prohibition issue would be a major factor in deciding who was elected to Parliament. This expectation was the result of several things. First, the connection of the liquor poll with the general election by holding them on the same day created an artificial link between the two events. Second, the 1894 liquor poll had not expressed the views of a large number of voters because of the low voter turnout at that time. The public debate on the licensing issue between 1894 and 1896 had given such attention to the question that it was expected to be a major issue in the 1896 campaign, and it was generally believed that the prohibition vote would be very influential. Third, Sir Robert Stout had revealed in the 1894-1896 period the possibility of forming around him a prohibitionist party as an alternative to the Seddon administration. It was these three factors which gave the impression that the vote of prohibitionists would be of some importance in the political contest of

15. See Table 17.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1893</th>
<th>1896</th>
<th>1899</th>
<th>1902</th>
<th>1905</th>
<th>1908(^2)</th>
<th>1911(^2)</th>
<th>1914</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Candidates for Parliament.(^1)</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Candidates = Prohibitionists as % of total number of Candidates</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>27.37</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>33.69</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>27.22</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>23.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of successful prohibitionist Candidates as % of all prohibitionist Candidates</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>76.92</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>52.38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>61.22</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>70.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of members of Parliament = Prohibitionists</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>57.14</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>47.14</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>42.85</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>40.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. All Maori electorate candidates and members excluded from all calculations.

2. First ballot figures.
1896. As a result a large number of candidates (33.69 per cent) sought to gain prohibitionist support by adopting a favourable prohibitionist stance on the issue. They were aided by the policy of the N.Z. Alliance to ensure that in each constituency there would be at least one candidate favourable to the prohibitionist cause, and especially to the reduction of the three-fifths majority stipulation.¹⁸

Such a policy brought forth a host of indignant editorials from newspapers throughout the country. It was argued that the subordination of general politics to one "fad" was not only unjust but also irresponsible. The Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act was thought to give the public a complete say in matters relating to licensing and to have removed the issue from the political arena. The policy of the prohibition party was considered an unwarranted intrusion upon the general elections and dangerous to the good government of the country.¹⁹

The refusal of Parliament throughout this period 1894-1914 to reduce the majority required to carry no-license and national prohibition resulted in the continued influence of the liquor issue at each election. The N.Z. Alliance did not alter its policy of supporting candidates who favoured the bare majority. This in itself ensured that the liquor question would play some part in the election campaigning.

In 1908 there were proportionately fewer prohibitionist candidates (17.89 per cent) than normal. This was probably the result of the lack of interest in the 1908 general election, the Liberal administration of Ward having called for a legislative holiday.²⁰ Partly as a result of this the campaign surrounding the liquor poll received


more attention than had been usual and turned out to be the most acrimonious one of the period 1894-1914. Many were the complaints that the licensing issue was dwarfing the general election. W. Downie Stewart wrote to Sir Robert Stout: "Politics here are as dull as they can be. The No-License question obscures the whole political horizon and the candidates can get no one to listen to them". In this situation it is possible that the prohibition party gave less attention to the selection of political candidates while they directed their efforts more intensely at persuading the people to vote for no-license. As a result fewer of the candidates for Parliament were prohibitionist than in the past. A larger proportion of these were, however, successful (66.67 per cent), though this was not an unusually high percentage compared with other years.

The increasing connection between Labour and Prohibition at this time may have had some bearing on the 1908 general election though this is difficult to judge. Nine Labour members were returned to Parliament, but eight of these were really members of the Liberal Left Wing and only supported by labour organisations. All of these Left Wing members had been re-elected and five were prohibitionists, four of whom had been Liberal members in the previous Parliament along with one Independent. Only D. McLaren, the new member for Wellington East and also a prohibitionist, was an Independent Labour representative with the support of the Political Labour League. The labour vote did not yet seem to appreciate the role of its own candidates. The effect of the voting left the labour-orientated group in Parliament very much as it had been, and it would appear that the efforts of individual labour leaders to encourage the working class to support no-license had not

21. Stewart to Stout, 15 Nov, 1908, MS Papers 40, Stout MSS, Alexander Turnbull Library.

22. See Appendix C.
By the time of the election the voters were being encouraged to choose carefully for whom they would vote. One writer pertinently asked about the prohibitionist candidates, "Is it not likely that they are faddists and crude experimentalists on other questions than prohibition?" Such comments, coupled with the prevailing attitude of a large number of moderates that the liquor issue be left alone by the politicians and be given a fair hearing at the liquor polls under the now amended Alcoholic Liquor Sales Control Act, resulted in a decrease in the number of prohibitionists being returned to Parliament.

A similar reduced return of prohibitionist candidates was experienced in 1905, with there being only a 51.02 per cent success rate. Once again the liquor question had been given considerable attention between the previous election and poll in 1902 and 1905. The 1903 and 1904 Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act Amendment Bills had kept the issue in the public mind more than would normally have occurred. In 1905 two factors continued this publicity. The first was the general prohibitionist enthusiasm as the election and poll drew near. Even as early as March 1905 it was being stated that it is more than evident that Prohibition and the land will be the two dominant questions at the next general election... Probably a Prohibition candidate will be run for every electorate, and this will introduce much complexity into the elections. With the Prohibitionists 'No License' is the Alpha and Omega of politics.

The second factor bringing the issue to the forefront of the political scene was the emergence of the New Liberal Party, an anti-Seddon group of backbenchers who believed that the Liberal Government

30. NZO, 5 Dec, 1896, p. 6.

was not very liberal at all. In Whitcher's words, "The New Liberal Party was an expression of the Parliamentary radical discontent and disillusionment with the Seddon ministry". 32 T.E. Taylor, one of the more prominent New Liberals, argued that the Seddon Ministry had lost sight of its 1891 ideals and had become interested only in party politics and power. There was thus a need for a new Liberal Party which "will place the interests of New Zealand first and last, and who will strive to legislate on all questions from the ideal standpoint that all the people in the colony are members of one family". 33 One of the programmes of this new party was direct control of the liquor business by the public vote, that is, local no-license by a bare majority at the liquor poll. Of the original eight members of the New Liberals in 1905, seven were no-license supporters, some prominently so, while the eighth, Hogg, favoured the bare majority on all issues. 34 This in itself was enough to have the party labelled as prohibitionist, though its programme was considerably broader than this. As Whitcher points out, the New Liberals raison d' être was as a radical party rather than a prohibitionist party. 35 That some of the most outspoken prohibitionists in Parliament should have been attached to this party resulted, however, in attention being focussed on it prior to the 1905 general election as a prohibitionist party. The effect was to confuse even more the liquor question with the wider political scene by bringing it to greater prominence as a possible political issue.


35. Whitcher, op. cit., p. 84.
By the time of the general election the New Liberals within Parliament had been reduced to four, largely because of a division over the voucher issue concerning one of Seddon's sons. This charge of corruption recoiled badly on the New Liberal Party. Such was the public reaction to these unproven charges that it resulted in the decimation of the New Liberals at the general election. Only two of its nine candidates were elected. All of these nine men were prohibitionists, and hence the prohibition cause suffered a loss in their defeat. While this explains to some degree the decline in the number of prohibitionist candidates elected to Parliament in 1905, it does not explain all. It gives a clue, however. The fact that the New Liberal Party and the prohibitionist party had been closely linked in the public mind, if not in actual deed, by their attitude on the licensing question and their opposition to Seddon had resulted not only in a public reaction against the New Liberal Party's candidates but also against many other political candidates who happened to be prohibitionists. Furthermore, it was not just prohibitionists generally who suffered, but prohibitionists opposed to Seddon and the Liberal Government. Of the twenty-three unelected prohibitionist candidates only three were Liberals, while seven were New Liberals, six were Opposition supporters, six were Independents and one was representing the Political Labour League. The effect of the voucher case had brought a wave of sentimental support for Seddon and had helped towards the achievement of a massive victory for the Liberals at the polls.

The resulting decisive defeat of the other parties had had its effect on the prohibitionists as well. Not only was the proportion of successful prohibitionists heavily reduced on the 1902 level, but the number of actual prohibitionists in Parliament was also reduced to its

lowest level since the liquor issue had become prominent politically in 1893. 37

The fact that the 1905 election saw a swing against non-Liberal Party prohibitionists but not against Liberal prohibitionists would suggest that the reasons for this vote were much wider than the licensing issue. It is possible that the defeat of so many prohibitionists had nothing to do with the liquor question, but rather they were defeated because the electorate voted strongly in the Liberal interest and against the other parties and factions on political issues that ignored the prohibition agitation. The return of sixteen out of nineteen prohibitionists who happened to be Liberals suggests that the voting had not been decided along prohibitionist lines.

This raises the whole question as to the real role that the prohibition question played in the political life of New Zealand. It has not been disputed, either at the time or by writers since, that the issue clouded the political world and strained, if it did not break, party allegiances. From the 1893 election until the collapse of the prohibition movement in the late 1920s it was commonly believed that the selection of parliamentarians was affected by their stance on the licensing question. 38

Such a claim must be at least modified in that the number of prohibitionist candidates never totalled more than 33.69 per cent of all candidates, and that after the 1893 election they never equalled even half of the members in the House of Representatives. 39 This

37. See Tables 17 and 18.


39. See Tables 17 and 18.
TABLE 18

PARLIAMENTARIANS SUPPORTING LICENSING LAW REFORM FAVOURABLE TO PROHIBITION MOVEMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1893</th>
<th>1896</th>
<th>1899</th>
<th>1902</th>
<th>1905</th>
<th>1908</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1914</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LIBERALS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Total Liberal Members as % of total Members</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>73.68</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. % of Liberal Members = Prohibitionists</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. % of Parliamentarians = Liberal Prohibitionists</td>
<td>24.29</td>
<td>18.57</td>
<td>22.85</td>
<td>17.11</td>
<td>21.05</td>
<td>10.53</td>
<td>11.84</td>
<td>13.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OPPOSITION/REFORM:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21.05</td>
<td>35.13</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30.26</td>
<td>19.11</td>
<td>24.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>15.71</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>12.86</td>
<td>9.21</td>
<td>14.47</td>
<td>11.84</td>
<td>12.37</td>
<td>22.37</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LABOUR:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>66.67</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>66.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.89</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INDEPENDENT:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.57</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.98</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>83.33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. All Maori Members excluded from all calculations.
does not deny, however, that the issue had considerable effect on the selection of candidates in some electorates. It also leaves unanswered the question as to how many Parliamentarians were elected despite their allegiance to prohibition. If one looks at individual prohibitionist candidates who stood for Parliament it is significant that those who stood primarily as prohibitionists were rarely returned. People such as E.H. Taylor, P.B. Fraser, E. Walker, A.C. Begg, F.W. Isitt, W. Richardson, G. Dash, A.S. Adams and D. Whyte stood for Parliament primarily as prohibitionists at various stages between 1893 and 1914. Not one of them was successful, nor did any of them poll particularly well if they faced more than one opponent. It is revealing that when prohibitionist leaders such as F.W. Isitt, A.S. Adams and the Rev. E. Walker stood for Parliament they received fewer votes than was expected by prohibitionists and anti-prohibitionists alike.\(^{40}\)

On the other hand several leading prohibitionists were elected to Parliament - men such as Sir Robert Stout, T.E. Taylor, Rev. L.M. Isitt, A.R. Atkinson, R. McNab and George Fowlds. The reason for the difference between their success and the failure of other prominent prohibitionists seems to lie in the fact that these men did not stand primarily as prohibitionists but were proposing many other reforms in the fields of land, labour, government and finance. These were the areas of most importance for the Government, and were ones which most interested the public. That these men were prohibitionists may well have helped their election, but it does not explain it. The fact that Taylor, Atkinson, McNab, and to a lesser extent Fowlds, had unstable political careers yet remained ardent prohibitionists only confirms the view that prohibition was not a deciding factor in

\(^{40}\) See Table 19.
TABLE 19

Proportion of votes received by candidates standing primarily as prohibitionist.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CANDIDATE</th>
<th>% OF TOTAL VOTE</th>
<th>ELECTORATE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CANDIDATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>E.H. TAYLOR</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>THAMES</td>
<td>2 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P.B. FRASER</td>
<td>38.45</td>
<td>OAMARU</td>
<td>4 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>E.H. TAYLOR</td>
<td>38.16</td>
<td>THAMES</td>
<td>2 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E. WALKER</td>
<td>29.81</td>
<td>WAIKATO</td>
<td>2 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A.C. BEGG</td>
<td>30.23</td>
<td>DUNEDIN CITY</td>
<td>12 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>E.H. TAYLOR</td>
<td>15.32</td>
<td>THAMES</td>
<td>3 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A.C. BEGG</td>
<td>43.22</td>
<td>TAIERI</td>
<td>2 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>W. RICHARDSON</td>
<td>36.28</td>
<td>AUCKLAND</td>
<td>11 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F.W. ISITT</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>THAMES</td>
<td>3 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F.W. ISITT</td>
<td>32.58</td>
<td>WAIPU</td>
<td>2 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F.W. ISITT</td>
<td>27.57</td>
<td>HAWKE'S BAY</td>
<td>2 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F.W. ISITT</td>
<td>19.82</td>
<td>OTAKI</td>
<td>2 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F.W. ISITT</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>MOTUEKA</td>
<td>2 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F.W. ISITT</td>
<td>18.58</td>
<td>BULLER</td>
<td>2 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F.W. ISITT</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>GREY</td>
<td>2 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F.W. ISITT</td>
<td>7.36</td>
<td>WESTLAND</td>
<td>2 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F.W. ISITT</td>
<td>7.27</td>
<td>TIMARU</td>
<td>3 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F.W. ISITT</td>
<td>19.25</td>
<td>WAIKOWAITI</td>
<td>2 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. WHYTE</td>
<td>35.32</td>
<td>INVERCARGILL</td>
<td>2 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. WHYTE</td>
<td>24.62</td>
<td>AWARUA</td>
<td>2 way contest</td>
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### TABLE 19 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>% of Total Vote</th>
<th>Electorate</th>
<th>Number of Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>W. Richardson</td>
<td>20.79</td>
<td>Auckland East</td>
<td>4 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F.W. Isitt</td>
<td>9.33</td>
<td>Motueka</td>
<td>3 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F.W. Isitt</td>
<td>22.16</td>
<td>Buller</td>
<td>2 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G. Dash</td>
<td>20.78</td>
<td>Waitaki</td>
<td>5 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A.S. Adams</td>
<td>35.44</td>
<td>Dunedin Central</td>
<td>2 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>W. Richardson</td>
<td>37.74</td>
<td>Auckland East</td>
<td>3 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F.W. Isitt</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>Thames</td>
<td>4 way contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F.W. Isitt</td>
<td>18.29</td>
<td>Clutha</td>
<td>2 way contest</td>
</tr>
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<td>7.87</td>
<td>Auckland Central</td>
<td>4 way contest</td>
</tr>
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<td>49.4</td>
<td>Thames</td>
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</tr>
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<td>3 way contest</td>
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<td>E.H. Taylor</td>
<td>45.55</td>
<td>Thames</td>
<td>2 way contest</td>
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An analysis of the political allegiance of the prohibitionists who stood for Parliament confirms the picture already developed of the non-partisan nature of the prohibition movement. Prohibitionists were to be found amongst both the successful and the unsuccessful candidates of all the political groups, Liberal, Opposition, Labour and Independent. Proportionately more successful Opposition members were prohibitionists than were Liberal members. For the Labour members and the Independents the issue would appear to have played a more considerable part than it did with the two major parties, though the smallness of their numbers might obscure the trends. It is possible that for these minor groups the prohibition issue was seen as one way to obtain more votes. Some of the Independents were independent largely because of the prohibition issue and their stance on it. Similarly, though less markedly, it is possible that more Opposition members could profess to be no-license supporters merely because they were not the Government and therefore did not have to act upon their statements. This is difficult to prove, however, and certainly does not explain why the Reform Party maintained its proportion of prohibitionists at a reasonably high level even in 1914 when it was the Government.

It is too simplistic to argue, however, that the prohibition movement was more inclined to the Opposition party than to the Liberals. Certainly this was never claimed by the prohibitionists themselves.

41. See Appendix D.
42. See Table 18.
In 1894 it was claimed that in the 1893 election on the Liberal side were the small farmers, the working classes and the greater part of the Temperance party. On the side of the Conservatives were the large landowners and their representatives, and the satellites of the brewery companies. 43

The same claim was made in 1908 in a prohibitionist appeal to all political parties for support on the licensing question. The Opposition party was mentioned as "the one with whom we have the least accord, so far as political views go". 44 Once more the accusation was made that the Opposition lent upon the liquor interests and endeavoured to propitiate and win the vote of a party which knows no politics, no principles, which will sell them the day after, and plant a block vote for a Nihilist, if it is to the interest of their pockets and the protection of their business to do so. 45

A more objective viewpoint was provided by Drummond in his official biography of Richard Seddon, when he stated that the prohibition vote was divided on political issues, "but leans more to the Liberals than to the Conservatives". 46

Despite these claims, however, proportionately fewer Liberal members of the House of Representatives than Opposition members were prohibitionists. There were slightly more Liberal prohibitionist candidates than Opposition prohibitionist candidates for most of the period, but not significantly so. They also had a higher success rate than the Opposition candidates, but only because more Liberals were elected to the House than were Oppositionists. In proportion to their numbers the prohibitionist Liberals' success rate was considerably lower,

45. ibid.
and provides no substantiation for the claims that the Temperance party was more Liberal than Opposition orientated. 47

These claims of a Liberal orientation were contradicted by opposing statements that the Opposition was allied with the prohibitionist vote and that the Liberal Party was working in the interests of the liquor trade. The first occasion for such a claim was the result of the manipulation of the prohibition issue by Sir Robert Stout in his attempt to wrest the leadership of the Liberal Party from Seddon. 48 It was generally believed both before and after the 1893 election that Stout was seeking to ally himself and his prohibitionist supporters with the Opposition, in order to create a stronger opposition to the Seddon Government. 49

Such an alliance did not take place, yet the rumours that the prohibitionists and the Opposition had united continued to persist. In 1895 the Otago Workman accused this prohibition group of being

now as ardent oppositionists as they were supporters of the Government at the last election...Nor do we believe that the alliance would convert the Opposition minority into a majority...The Cabal are not strong enough to turn the scale in any election, but they would like it to be thought that they can, and so they run about offering themselves to the highest bidder, and subserving all other questions to their one little fad. 50

A slightly different slant was given to this liaison immediately prior to the 1896 election by the New Zealand Observer, which argued that the Opposition party was trying to encourage prohibition candidates to stand in order to split the Liberal vote. 51 The implication

47. See Tables 17 and 18.
48. See pp. 20-23.
50. Otago Workman, 17 August, 1895, p. 6.
51. NZO, 5 Dec, 1896, p. 6.
was that the prohibition vote was presumed by the Opposition to be predominantly Liberal; if two candidates after the same votes could be encouraged to stand, a third candidate, presumably an Oppositionist, would do well because of the splitting of his opponents' support. There is no evidence that such a situation actually occurred, except possibly in the Christchurch and Dunedin city electorates.

In Christchurch an Opposition member supported by the liquor trade, C. Lewis, headed the 1896 poll, while two Independent Liberal prohibitionists, G.J. Smith and T.E. Taylor, took the other two seats. W.W. Collins, the leading Liberal Party candidate, was fourth. It would appear that the Liberal prohibition vote had bypassed him in favour of Taylor and Smith, and also Ell, another prohibitionist and fifth in the poll. This split had enabled Lewis to head the poll. 52

In Dunedin there was such a plethora of prohibitionist candidates, six out of twelve, that it is impossible to see any trend at all. Only one of these prohibitionists, H.S. Fish, gained a seat and he was a supporter of the Opposition. The Liberal vote was split between one Liberal (W. Hutchison) and three Liberal-Labour candidates (J.A. Millar, D. Pinkerton, and W. Earnshaw), of whom Hutchison and Earnshaw were prohibitionists but neither of whom were successful. Millar took the second Dunedin seat, while the third was taken by the Oppositionist, M.J.S. Mackenzie. The success of the Opposition in gaining two of the three seats would seem to be the result of a split Liberal vote between the four Liberal or Liberal-Labour candidates, rather than a division caused by the prohibition issue. 53

52. See Seddon Papers 3/12, pp. 22-30 for 1896 general election returns; also N.Z. Times, 7 Dec, 1896; Bruce Herald, 8 Dec, 1896.

53. Ibid.
If there were any truth in the Observer's claim as to the use of the prohibition issue by the Opposition, then the Opposition must have been very disappointed with the result, winning only twenty-six seats to the Liberal Party's thirty-seven. The decline in the number of prohibitionist members of the House from forty in 1893 to thirty-three in 1896 must similarly have dismayed the prohibitionist party. One of the reasons offered for this drop was that,

the alliance between the Prohibition party and the Conservatives, which obtained in many constituencies...alienated a great deal of sympathy with the cause among broad, fair-minded people. Prohibition...should not have been made a leading issue at the late election. It is a question which must go hand in hand with progress as a whole. Temperance people should carry on steady missionary work against King Alcohol and reason will win in time. To attempt premature coercion will have the opposite effect. 54

This belief in a Prohibitionist-Opposition party alliance, to be brought about largely by Sir Robert Stout, was given as a reason why the liquor interests were presumed to be behind the Liberal Government. So long as Stout remained in the House there was always the danger that, if the Government were defeated, he would join an Opposition cabinet. The effect of this threat was thought to have encouraged the liquor interests to support the Liberals against the Opposition and Stout. Stout's retirement in 1898 was expected to result in the liquor interest switching its allegiance to the Opposition party, presumably its natural ally in terms of respect for the sanctity of private property. 55

Once again there is no evidence to suggest that such a situation

55. NZO, 12 Feb, 1898, p. 2.
actually developed. Just as it is difficult to see any trends in the political leanings of the prohibition movement, so it is impossible to see the leanings of the liquor trade. The prohibitionists opposed the Liberal Government's Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act because of its three-fifths majority clause and later on because it did not offer a national as well as a local issue. The trade was just as opposed as the prohibitionists to the Liberal's Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act because it left it exposed to the whims of the voter, it threatened its property and very existence, and it gave no offer of compensation in the event of no-license being carried. As Seddon said in a speech at Feilding in 1898, "The Government intended to carry out the wishes of the people, but were blamed on one side for passing the most advanced liquor legislation, while the other side said they were in league with the liquor traffic". It is improbable that both these opposing factions supported the one political party, the Opposition party, against the Government. At no stage during this period did the Opposition claim any connection with the liquor interests. Individual candidates may have had the backing of the trade because as individuals they were opposed to prohibition, but it was never the Opposition party's policy to remove the local option poll if it achieved power.

The Opposition party as well as the prohibitionists believed that the liquor interest worked with the Liberal Party. The prohibitionists based their claim on the connection of Seddon with the liquor traffic through his role as a publican prior to his entering Parliament. This damned him in their eyes and encouraged them in the belief that his actions on this issue were slanted towards the trade. In their opinion the three-fifths majority had been instituted solely

as an attempt to prevent the will of the majority being enacted upon
the liquor issue, and hence to provide a greater safeguard for the
liquor industry. It is possible that this was an element among
Seddon's motives, but it ignores several other factors. Convincing
arguments were offered for the need of a large majority on such an
issue as prohibition before it was enacted, so that every three years
areas did not swing back and forth between no-license and license.
The need for stability was recognised not only by Seddon but by a large
number of politicians throughout the entire period. Attempts to
reduce the necessary majority never received adequate support in Parl-
ament, nor was the vote on such an issue ever decided on party lines.
There were Liberals and Opposition members on both sides of this issue.

The prohibitionists also ignored the fact that Seddon and Ward
did not offer the liquor trade any compensation, even though they and
the Liberal Party were presumed to be working in the trade's interests.
Seddon had parried such claims for years, not, perhaps, because he did
not believe in compensation, but because he was aware that such a
proposal was probably opposed by a majority in the House. He was not
prepared to force this issue but preferred to find a moderate solution
to a vexing non-political problem. Being aware of the liquor problem's
potential to split the Liberal Party into prohibitionists and anti-
prohibitionists, Seddon skilfully avoided such an occurrence by making
the question a non-party, conscience issue within the House and by
putting the emphasis on the liquor poll rather than Parliament as the
means of deciding the issue. On the prohibition question he was

57. White Ribbon, Nov, 1896, pp. 7-8; NZPO, 81, (18 August,
1893), pp. 178-179, Stout.
careful, as were Ward and Massey, to separate his own personal convictions from his public treatment of the issue. He at no stage took the advice of a liquor trade deputation which once told him that he should make their cause a party question, and threaten to resign if his followers did not do his bidding. Mr Louison [of Christchurch] was sure that if the Premier would take his advice he might do what he liked.58

The evidence is thus against any strong connection between the Liberals and the liquor industry. Yet even in 1914 it was believed that such a connection existed. Mr A. Harris, member for Waitemata, asked in a want of confidence debate,

Is it not a fact that the biggest and wicked-est monopoly of all - the liquor-monopoly - has been one that has not only been supported by the Liberal party, but has supported that party through thick and thin, and is supporting it again, and will endeavour all it possibly can to get that party back into power? Is it not a fact that the Liberal party have wilfully betrayed the wishes of the masses of the people by passing licensing legislation that has imposed an absolutely impossible handicap on the people of the country, while at the same time professing to "trust the people"? And for what purpose? For the purpose of preserving for all time the vicious trade under which their supporters flourish; while, in return, this same monopoly contributes liberally towards their party fighting-fund. 59

Such an accusation must be interpreted largely as being political cant of a Reform Party member who was also an ardent prohibitionist. It was a political tactic which had little factual substance behind it. In the vote on the second reading of a Government Bill to reduce the majority at the licensing poll necessary to carry prohibition to fifty-five per cent the two major parties were both reasonably evenly split.

54.29 per cent of the Reform Party members supported the second reading, along


59. NZPD, 168, (1 July, 1914), pp. 159-160.
with 43.75 per cent of the Liberals. Considering that of the Reform Party members 45.71 per cent were professed supporters of licensing reform, compared with only 28.13 per cent of the Liberal members, the vote on this issue hardly indicated that the Liberal Party was in league with the liquor trade.

The evidence available leads emphatically to the conclusion that the licensing question was very much a non-political, non-partisan issue. Throughout the period it was argued by prohibitionists, anti-prohibitionists, and more moderate and objective observers that the prohibition party was in alliance with the Liberal Party, the Opposition, and neither. Similarly the liquor trade was accused of being in league with both the political parties. The particular allegiance suggested depended on the point of view of the speaker or writer.

It has also been seen that the connection of the labour movement with the prohibition movement did not result in any increase in the number of labour candidates being returned to Parliament by prohibitionist votes, except perhaps in 1893. That the labour movement should have considered incorporating at various stages between 1894 and 1914 a resolution in favour of no-license in its platform and yet have attacked prohibition as a reform movement was a natural reflection of its desire to reform society economically and socially and its distrust of any proposals emanating from middle class sources and which appeared to offer pious platitudes rather than genuine help to the poor and needy. The labourites were similarly well aware that there was no consensus of opinion on the liquor issue among its ranks. The consumption of alcohol was just as much a habit of the working class as it was of any other socio-economic group. As a result there was no point in trying

to formulate a policy on the question, other than to leave it to the individual to decide. That this neutral position was not fully adopted before 1920 was largely the effect of the confusion of the support for the bare majority principle with support for prohibition per se. It is significant that the introduction of the bare majority at the 1919 liquor polls was soon followed by the removal of the licensing question from the Labour Party's platform.

The prohibition party similarly had its own reasons for not entering fully into an alliance with the labour movement. It could argue that it was primarily concerned with the amelioration of the lot of the working class; it could exploit to its own advantage Labour's support of the bare majority principle; but it could not afford to forget that it was not predominantly a working class movement. Its leadership was largely from the professional and business groups of society, while its support was predominantly from the non-episcopal churches which had, to a considerable degree, lost sight of the interests and problems of the working man. Its aim reflected the type of people it most represented: a proposed solution for economic and social problems which would not require any change in the basic economic structure of society. The acceptance of this economic system by the large moderate section of the labour movement enabled the prohibition party to attract support from its ranks throughout the period. Yet the prohibitionists knew that they could not afford to ally with any political party. To do so would ensure reduced support, if not disaster. They had to remain outside any political allegiance and at least give the appearance of being above sectional interests. Their realisation of this essential if they were to be at all successful explains the failure of any attempt during this period to establish a separate political Prohibition Party or even to ally itself with one
particular party. It was in its connection with the political labour movement and in its attempts to have that movement adopt prohibition as part of its platform that the prohibition movement came closest to becoming a political party. As seen, however, no such development ultimately occurred. At no stage after 1896 did the prohibition movement look to one particular political quarter for its support; rather it attempted to appeal to all sections of the community and the political spectrum, realising that prohibition was not a party question.

This negative conclusion as to the connection and effect of the prohibition issue on New Zealand's political life at this time is substantiated by statistical analysis of four elections and liquor polls - those for 1896, 1902, 1908 and 1911. All electorates were examined in a national survey and in a survey by electorate type in which electorates were grouped in seven categories according to their urban composition. 61 Correlations between the percentage vote for Liberal, Opposition/Reform, Labour and Independent candidates and the percentage support for no-license in the corresponding electorates proved to be insignificant in nearly every instance. Where a correlation had a high significance level the correlation coefficient was too low to suggest any real connection between the vote for a political party and the vote for no-license. 62 A similar analysis of the correlation between the percentage vote for prohibitionist candidates, no matter what their political allegiance, and the percentage support for no-license again revealed no definite trends as to a direct or adverse relationship. 63

61. See Appendix F.

62. See Table 23

63. See Table 24
TABLE 23

Correlation between percentage vote for political party candidates and percentage support for no-license.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>INDEPENDENT</th>
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KEY: r = Simple Correlation Coefficient
      P = Significance Level of Simple Correlation Coefficient
      r is highly significant at a 95% confidence level if P<0.01.

1. Correlations only possible where three or more observations (electorates) are involved.
Correlation between percentage vote for prohibitionist candidates and percentage support for no-license.

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**KEY:**
- \( r \) = Simple Correlation Coefficient
- \( P \) = Significance Level of Simple Correlation Coefficient.
- \( r \) is highly significant at a 95% confidence level if \( P < 0.01 \).
- Correlations only possible where three or more observations (electorates) are involved.
All these results confirm the argument above as to the lack of any positive relationship between the prohibition issue and politics. The issue does not appear to have favoured any particular political party, nor did it favour a candidate of any political hue who called himself a prohibitionist. If any connection between prohibition and politics did exist it was not revealed in the results of the general elections, but was considerably less tangible and less drastic than was believed at the time.

The effect of the licensing issue on politics lay not in its influence on the nature of the composition of the House of Representatives but in its impact on the activities of Parliament. The refusal of the various Governments of the period to reduce the three-fifths majority regulation resulted in continual agitation from the prohibitionists to do so. This became an annual request, and almost every licensing Bill saw some debate on this question. Considerable time and energy were spent by Parliament on the whole question of licensing reform. This was a major factor in keeping the question in the forefront of the country's affairs. The other important reason for the prominence and political influence of the prohibition issue was the taking of the licensing poll at the same time as the general parliamentary election.

The effect of the issue on the selection of parliamentary representatives does not appear to have been in reality very great. Candidates could not ignore it in their campaigning, but the overriding picture is that, despite the attention given to the issue, the majority of voters did not let it sway their political preferences. The failure of the prohibition party to return enough prohibitionist candidates to compose even fifty per cent of Parliament between 1894 and 1914, in
contrast with their increasing support at the licensing polls, suggests that the voting public, if not the prohibition organisations and the politicians, had clearly defined ideas as to the position the licensing question should have at the general election. They would vote on the issue at the liquor poll; they did not need to vote on it at the general election as well. This situation is well summarised by the words of a prohibitionist from Oamaru immediately after no-license was carried in that electorate in 1905:

It is years since the party here resolved to have nothing whatever to do with party politics...It was felt that any confusion of the issue with colonial politics, or even local representation, would bring about failure. We had a moral cause to fight, and we fought for that with single-heartedness. It would have given many of our workers the greatest satisfaction to have seen such men as Messrs T.E. Taylor, A.S. Adams, H.D. Bedford, or G. Dash elected, and it is with a distinct sense of the loss the whole movement has suffered by their defeat that I venture the opinion that the Local Option vote in Christchurch, Dunedin, and Waimate would have been more gratifying had the minds of the electors not been directed to two contests, and the issue, perhaps in a measure unintentionally confused, by the candidature of these gentlemen. 64

Oamaru carried no-license and returned an anti-prohibitionist, Thomas Duncan, to Parliament. At least some people were aware that prohibition and politics should not be mixed.

64. Prohibitionist, 30 Dec, 1905, p. 6.
CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

The years from 1894 to 1914 had seen the prohibition agitation develop from a localised and loosely organised phenomenon into a powerful and closely co-ordinated grass roots movement led by the N.Z.A. In undertaking their attack on the citadels of liquordom the prohibitionists had a two-pronged programme, involving political action in order to achieve more favourable legislation for their cause, and temperance education, propaganda and agitation to encourage greater support at the triennial licensing polls.

The major legislative aims of the prohibitionists were the national prohibition poll, achieved in 1910, and the simple majority, not granted until 1918. It was in this long and unsuccessful battle for the bare majority that many aspects of the overall licensing debate could be seen.

The most obvious were the immutable arguments presented by both sides. In twenty years of debate there had been no advance in the reasons postulated for reducing the majority or for retaining it at sixty per cent. On the one hand was democratic principle, on the other stability and property rights. At no time did the leaders of either party admit that the other side had some reasonable claim to their position. This immutability reflects the forces that were involved. The prohibitionists were convinced of their divine mission and that the abolition of the drink trade was the fundamental reform required to heal society's social, economic and spiritual ills. By simplifying the complexity of the situation, by seeing the problems only in terms of black and white, by believing completely in Divine blessing and the
inevitable achievement of Christ's kingdom on earth, they tended to bypass other means of reform of the liquor problem on their march along the narrow path of no-license to prohibition. Such immutability could only breed intolerance, especially as defeat followed defeat. In time intolerance could lead to social disorder and even anarchy; in New Zealand this was avoided, largely by a heavy reliance upon the process of democratic government rather than direct action. The failure of the prohibition party to achieve the bare majority in contrast to their massive majority support at the polls reflects this conservativism of political action by New Zealand citizens.

For the liquor trade supporters the question was much more one of self-interest and self-preservation. For some the principle of individual liberty was important; for most it was purely a question of liking liquor and being opposed to the dominance of fanatics and religious enthusiasts. Not convinced by the prohibitionists' arguments of social reform by means of abolition of the liquor trade, the supporters of continuance were more inclined to see the benefits of the trade. To them it was a question of property, of employment, of revenue, of economics, of pleasure. The retention of the three-fifths majority was as much a matter of self-preservation as it was of social stability and individual liberty.

The debate on the majority issue reveals, therefore, a clash of two sub-cultures. On the one hand was the highly moralistic Victorian middle class mentality with its traditional puritan values of sobriety, self-help and respectability. On the other was a more realistic if less philosophic mentality, reflecting the tough nature of colonial life and uninhibited by the influence of puritan thought. Between these two outlooks was a large gulf in which the moderates walked,
those who saw the need for reform of the liquor trade but who did not see prohibition as the answer. They could offer no solution to a real problem, however, except perhaps the untried experiment of State or corporate control, but to them is the legacy that the prohibition movement eventually failed in New Zealand because the licensing law was framed to allow expression of moderate opinion. Their influence far outweighed their numbers in that the belief in their existence rather than the knowledge of their existence influenced the shaping of the law, as seen in the debates on the reduction issue, the no-license and national prohibition issues, and the bare majority issue.

This emphasis on legislation meant that the prohibition movement appeared to have a considerable effect on the political life of New Zealand. The N.Z.A.'s policy of encouraging its adherents to vote only for those political candidates who supported changes in the licensing law that favoured the prohibition cause resulted in the widespread belief that the movement was of vital political importance. The voting patterns of the average voter revealed, however, that his political preference was not decided on prohibitionist grounds.

Seddon had also helped to reduce the political effect of the issue by means of the licensing poll, which he had originally intended should remove the liquor issue from the political arena. In this he was partially successful. He further reduced its influence by treating it as a conscience rather than party issue in Parliament. He knew, as did the prohibition movement, that the licensing issue was not one that could form the basis of a viable and alternative political party. His actions were imitated by his successors, Ward and Massey. It was primarily on the issues of national prohibition and the three-fifths majority that the prohibition question had such political
prominence throughout the period. The movement's failure to reduce the latter reflected its political weakness.

Only with the labour movement did the prohibitionists have any close political connection; even so, this was of a very tenuous nature and did not seem to benefit either group, largely because they were working at cross purposes. The labour movement was attempting to develop its own alternative political party based on socialist ideals to bring about economic and social reform. This was regarded by the prohibitionists with scepticism and hostility. They were aware that advocates of socialism did not usually support prohibition for its own sake but because they regarded it as a step along the road towards State control of the liquor trade. This was not the prohibitionists' aim. The concept of State control of the means of production, distribution and exchange was opposed by those who subscribed to a capitalist, private enterprise system. The prohibitionists hoped to stem Labour's drift away from the prevailing economic, social and political structure into something more threatening by offering prohibition as the cure for all of society's problems. This would not, in their view, involve the need to change the structure of society, and in this they revealed the basic conservatism of their position. A separate working class political party would, on the other hand, pose a threat to middle class predominance and leadership in society. It was in the prohibitionists' interest to prevent such a development, or, if that proved impossible, at least to influence its policies and leadership. Such attempts at influence and leadership in the political sphere were best seen in the role played by Sir Robert Stout in the 1890s, the Left Wing Liberals and the New Liberals in the early 1900s, and the attempts
of prohibitionists such as George Fowlds, W.T. Mills and J.T. Paul to influence the platform of the emerging Labour Party in 1912, 1913 and 1914.¹

The development of a separate working class political party suggests that there were in New Zealand society at the beginning of the twentieth century separate socio-economic groups with differing political philosophies and aspirations. These socio-economic groups were not in themselves class groups, but tended to become so because of the attitudes of each group to the other. As seen the wealthier group considered itself more successful, more industrious, more thrifty, more sober and more respectable than the poorer group, which it talked about in terms of "the masses", "the working men", and the "working class". The emphasis that the wealthier group placed on success, industry, thrift and sobriety, and its various attempts to have these values adopted by the working class through such reforms as anti-gambling and prohibition, further reveal a form of class structure in that the so-called middle class saw itself as a distinct group in society with a definite and leading role to play. The very fact that the middle class believed in its superiority would show that some form of class consciousness, however, crude, existed in New Zealand at this time, if Baker's thesis relating to language, rhetoric and perception is accepted.²

While political action was a major activity of the prohibition movement, it was not the only one. The existence of the licensing polls guaranteed that there would be considerable agitation to


² See Introduction, p. 4-5.
convince more than just the politicians of the need for the removal of alcohol from society in order to encourage social, economic and moral reform. It was in the propaganda and agitation surrounding these polls that many of the ideas of the movement found their fullest expression, and in which it became apparent that the prohibitionists were primarily concerned with the economic, social, physical and moral conditions of the working class and how these could be improved.

Behind this drive for prohibition was the overwhelming concern that the structure of New Zealand society should be familial, with the values associated with such a structure being the social mores of the whole community. The role of women in shaping this environment was given special emphasis in the prohibitionists' arguments. Seen in this light the prohibition movement must be regarded as one which was not merely trying to eradicate alcohol because it was considered harmful in itself, but which was also a movement to define the complete social environment. New Zealand was at a stage in its history when it was moving from being a frontier colonial society to becoming a more established, more complex, and more settled community. The 1890s and early 1900s were a crossroads at which it was thought necessary to define more explicitly the nature of society and people's responsibilities within it. The prohibition movement was one such attempt at definition in which a puritan section of the middle class tried to impose its concepts and aspirations, its values and beliefs, on the whole community. Their success may be seen in that, although they did not achieve their immediate goal of prohibition, they did, to a very large extent, successfully impose the beliefs that women could find their greatest fulfilment within the home and that society
should be structured around the nuclear family and its values. They were also successful in imposing the feeling that the use of alcohol was not altogether right and that the licensed bar was certainly not respectable. It still remains to be seen whether New Zealand can completely overcome such attitudes and adopt a more sensible approach to what is still a serious social problem.

What did the prohibitionists achieve during this period in their attempts to lessen the effects of the licensed trade on society? Between 1894 and 1908 twelve licensing districts adopted no-license. The first of these to restore licences would be Ohinemuri in 1925. The rest would not follow until the 1940s and 1950s. Between 1894 and 1915 publicans' licences were reduced from 1,337 to 1,027, accommodation licences from 242 to 180, while head of population per licensed house increased from 437 to 948 (excluding Maoris). Despite these statistical advances the drink bill for New Zealand continued to increase along with consumption of alcohol. The prohibitionist agitation and education programmes were not able to stem the growth of the liquor trade; nor was the movement able to introduce reforms that civilized to any large degree the drinking habits of New Zealand society. Partly this was the result of the financial power of the liquor industry, but it was also partly the result of the prohibitionists' concentration on legislation and liquor polls, which took them along a narrow road that bypassed many opportunities for what might have resulted in more lasting and beneficial reform. Their idea that "prevention is better than cure" was a worthy sentiment, but in trying to bring this about they forgot that cure was necessary until prevention


4. See Tables 1 and 2, pp. 37-38.
was achieved. The prohibitionists had a policy of removing alcohol from society, but they did not have a more humane and Christianlike policy of trying to help individuals who had suffered the ravages of alcoholism. The Government had attempted to fill this gap by establishing inebriates' institutions at the turn of the century, but these had not succeeded. 5 The very people who should have been involved in such work as a result of their supposed Christian concern and interest in the drink problem, the prohibitionists and the churches, were not farseeing enough or not genuinely interested in the plight of the individual to undertake such work. The Salvation Army must be excepted from this, in that such work was very much part of its social mission among the poor. 6 The remainder of the pietistic denominations, steeped in middle class ideas about self-help through self-discipline and control, were too busy attempting to reform society in one blow to devote serious attention beyond charity to individual cases of need.

This concentration on prohibition by these middle class reformers as the chief means of social and economic reform for the poorer section of the community eventually alienated the working class and encouraged it to organise and fight for itself on both the political and industrial stages. This division between the middle class reformer and the Labour advocate was reflected in the seemingly declining interest in prohibition as a means of reform by 1914. Prohibition was a middle class ideology, supported and led by the non-episcopal middle class, but with considerable support from skilled workers, and aimed at helping the unregenerate working class. It had

5. 'Inebriates' Institutions Act', N.Z. Statutes, 1898, no 8, pp. 16-22; 1903, no 7, pp. 22; ODT, 24 Dec, 1904, p. 7; NZO, 7 Jan, 1905, p. 3.

not, however, succeeded. It was, therefore, not surprising that the uneasy relationship between the Labour movement and the prohibitionists should have been severely weakened by 1914, while more positive means of reform were demanded.

In such a situation of flux many people thought that the prohibition movement had had its day. The complex economic, social and moral problems that had emerged in the 1880s and 1890s had not been eradicated, and did not seem likely to be solved by an idealistic and simplistic measure such as prohibition. The outbreak of war on a grand scale, while a reality, was also symbolic of this seeming collapse of the confidence of the previous two decades. Old forces and influences were passing away; new conditions were constructing a different society.

The prohibitionists, however, were not so easily swayed from their aim. To them the war was only another argument for the beneficial effects of prohibition. It was to prove more than this in the end. By 1919, as a result of wartime measures and hysteria, they could show that their support was still large, though it never again reached the level of 1911. By 1928, however, this support had collapsed and the prohibition movement faded from the New Zealand social and political scene as a viable means of reform. The harsh realities of the 1920s and 1930s were no place for the idealistic panaceas of the 1890s and 1900s. This was in the future, however. In 1914, while the liquor trade and its supporters preached doom to the prohibition movement, the prohibitionists revealed their enthusiastic and optimistic realism in words that summed up the movement:

We know our cause is a real live cause today, and that it is bound to conquer. The forces of righteousness never suffer ultimate defeat; the fight for freedom,
though baffled oft, is ever won...
The fight may be long, but victory is certain. 7

APPENDIX A

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CLASSIFICATION OF OCCUPATIONS

In establishing a model for the classification of occupations reference has been made to A.A. Congalton's 'Social Grading of Occupation in New Zealand', C.P. Aimer's 'The Politics of a City - Auckland, 1899-1935', and R.S. Neale's Class and Ideology in the Nineteenth Century. Congalton gives a seven point classification which was found, however, to be inoperative in several areas when put into practice: for example, separating group one (higher professional and administrative work) from group two (lower professional technical and executive work); separating highly skilled workers in group three from skilled workers in group four, and skilled workers from semi-skilled workers in group five. Aimer tried to overcome these problems by combining Congalton's groups one and two, by introducing a new category (three) of small self-employed people, and by combining semi-skilled and repetitive work with unskilled repetitive work, to give group five. This also led to problems, however, particularly when it came to separating groups three and four, when many of those in skilled work were also small self-employed people. Wise's Post Office Directory Trades Section for 1908 and 1916 could not help in separating the groups. A similar though smaller problem existed in separating highly skilled work in group two from group three. Neale's five class model for England in the 1830s and 1840s was found to be inoperative in the New Zealand context as New Zealand did not possess in any real sense an upper class of aristocratic, landholding, authoritarian and exclusive characteristics. The majority of people in New Zealand would have fallen by Neale's definition into the middling class, working class A and working class B, with a few middle
class. Nor was there the same authority conflict in early twentieth century New Zealand as there was in 1830s Britain, so that the concept of social class being "conflict groups arising out of the authority structure of imperatively co-ordinated associations" cannot be rigidly applied to New Zealand with its full adult suffrage. This is not to deny that there was social conflict, between capital and labour, and landed and landless in particular. For the purposes of social stratification in New Zealand, however, Neale's concept does not help.

Thus it was necessary to establish a new means of classification, modifying Aimer's six point schema. Groups one, two and six were retained, while group four as artisan, or skilled, was to a large extent retained, though modified slightly to conform to a definition of artisan labour given in a table on wages in the Statistics of New Zealand, 1908, p. 228. Added to this definition were other occupations which arose in the random surveys and were known to be skilled. Group three was formed from those who could not be called artisans but were possibly self-employed and definitely not semi-skilled or unskilled and doing repetitive work, all of whom were put into group five.

Socio-economic classification of occupations:

1. Higher professional and administrative work, lower professional and technical and executive work.
2. Clerical and highly skilled work.
3. Self-employed, skilled and servicing.
4. Artisans.
5. Semi-skilled and unskilled repetitive work.
6. Farmer and farm manager.
References:


Congalton, A.A., 'Social Grading of Occupations in New Zealand',

Neale, R.S., Class and Ideology in the Nineteenth Century, (London,
1972).

Statistics of New Zealand, 1908, p. 228.
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<td>Non-party government</td>
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<td>Place of labour movement</td>
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<td>Divorce, and emancipation of woman within marriage</td>
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<td>Prison reform</td>
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<td>National Council of Women, and other female organizations</td>
<td>Land tenure</td>
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<td>Suffrage movement in Great Britain</td>
<td>War and peace, and military training</td>
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APPENDIX C

Political allegiance of Members of Parliament,
1893-1914.

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</table>
APPENDIX C Continued

LIBERAL

COLLINS

JOYCE (P)

RUSSELL, G.W. (P)

MONTGOMERY (P)

SAUNDERS (P)

McLACHLAN

MASLIN (P)

HALL-JONES (P)

STEWARD

DUNCAN

MCKENZIE

HUTCHISON, W. (P)

LARNACH

CARNROSS

McNAB (P)

MACKINTOSH

KELLY, J.W. (P)

WARD

1. (P) = person who expressed some interest in prohibition, be it no-license or national prohibition, by three-fifths or bare majority.
<table>
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APPENDIX D

POLITICAL CAREERS OF SOME LEADING PROHIBITIONISTS ELECTED TO PARLIAMENT

ROBERT McNAB:  
1893-1896 - represented Mataura  
1896 - defeated in Mataura  
1899-1908 - represented Mataura  
1905-1908 - Minister of Lands  
1908 - defeated in Mataura  
1911 - defeated in Palmerston North  
1914 - represented Hawke's Bay

T.E. TAYLOR:  
1896 - defeated in Christchurch City by-election, February  
1896-1899 - represented Christchurch City  
1899 - defeated in Christchurch City  
1902-1905 - represented Christchurch City  
1905 - defeated in Christchurch North  
1908-1911 - represented Christchurch North until his death in July, 1911

A.R. ATKINSON:  
1896 - defeated in Wellington City  
1899-1902 - represented Wellington City  
1902 - defeated in Wellington City  
1908 - defeated in Wellington East
G. FOWLDS: 1896 - defeated in Auckland City
1899-1902 - represented Auckland City
1902-1911 - represented Grey Lynn
1906-1911 - Minister of Education until resignation in August, 1911
1911 - defeated in Grey Lynn
1914 - defeated in Grey Lynn
APPENDIX E

CLASSIFICATION OF CITY POLLING BOOTHS,
FOR DUNEDIN AND AUCKLAND, 1905 - 1914.

1905:

POOR CITY
ALBANY ST
LEITH VALLEY
DOWLING ST
LOWER HANOVER ST
NORMAL SCHOOL
HIGH ST, ROSLYN
ROSLYN INSTITUTE
WAKARI HALL
ST ALBANS
MANSE ST
WALKER ST
RUSSELL ST
OLD COUNCIL CHAMBERS, MORNINGTON
CAVERSHAM TOWN HALL
KENSINGTON
CAVERSHAM HALL
PARKSIDE
ST KILDA
ST PETER'S HALL
KEW
SALVATION ARMY BARRACKS
DUNCAN ST WESLEYAN HALL
ENDEAN BUILDINGS, QUEEN ST

WEALTHY CITY
UNION ST
GEORGE ST
WOODHAUGH
MAORI HILL
ARTHUR ST SCHOOL
HIGH ST, DUNEDIN
TOWN HALL, MORNINGTON
BELLEKNOYES
ST CLAIR
PONSONBY HALL
PRIMITIVE METHODIST SCHOOLROOM, PONSONBY
RICHMOND RD SCHOOLHOUSE
BAYFIELD SCHOOLHOUSE
DRILL SHED
ST GEORGE'S HALL

URBAN FRINGE
WAKARI
BROCKVILLE
HALFWAY BUSH

POOR CITY con.
ST BENEDICT'S HALL
EPHPHANY SCHOOLROOM
KING EDWARD'S HALL
FEDERAL HALL
ST JAMES HALL
SEAMEN'S MISSION HALL
1908:

POOR CITY | WEALTHY CITY | URBAN FRINGE

ALBANY ST | UNION ST | DIXON'S FACTORY
LEITH VALLEY | GEORGE ST | PINE HILL
MacLAREN'S HALL, GARDENS | WOODHAUGH | BROCKVILLE
OPOHO | MAORI HILL | BUNTINGS
NORTH EAST VALLEY | HIGH ST | |
GARRISON HALL | MORNINGTON TOWN HALL | |
WALKER ST | BELLEKNOWES | |
RUSSELL ST | ARTHUR ST | |
CAVERSHAM | ST CLAIR | |
MORNINGTON COUNCIL CHAMBERS | PONSONBY HALL | |
ST ALBANS | ST JOHN'S | |
WAKARI | BAYFIELD SCHOOL | |
ROSLYN COUNCIL CHAMBERS | QUEEN'S HALL | |
ROSLYN INSTITUTE | ST STEPHEN'S | |
ISAAC'S STORE | RICHMOND RD SCHOOL | |
OLD KNOX CHURCH | DRILL HALL | |
NORMAL SCHOOL | CRAFTON FOOTBALL CLUB | |
(CAVERSHAM) ARCADE | ST GEORGE'S | |
WESLEYAN SCHOOL | | |
KING EDWARD ST | | |
KENSINGTON | | |
ST KILDA | | |
MUSSELBURGH | | |
BAYVIEW RD | | |
CAVERSHAM HALL | | |
ST PETER'S HALL | | |

POOR CITY con.

KEW HALL
FRANKTON RD
ST BENEDICT'S
KING EDWARD'S
OLD AGE PENSION OFFICE
EPHAPHANY SCHOOL
FEDERAL HALL
ST JAMES' HALL
SAILOR'S MISSION
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GARRISON HALL
MORAY PLACE
HANOVER ST
ALBANY ST
COUNCIL CHAMBERS, ROSLYN
INSTITUTE, ROSLYN
WAKARI HALL, ROSLYN
WEDDERSPOON'S, KAIKORAI VALLEY

GREAT KING STREET
TOWN HALL, SOUTH DUNEDIN
TOWN HALL, ST KILDA
PUBLIC SCHOOL, MUSSELBURGH
PRESBYTERIAN HALL, ST KILDA
WESLEY ST
CARGILL RD
ODDFELLOWS HALL, CAVERSHAM
MARION ST
FRANKLIN RD
MASONIC HALL, NEW NORTH ROAD
EPHPHANY SCHOOL, GRUNDY ST
NEWTOWN EAST

WEALTHY CITY

BAYFIELD SCHOOL
RICHMOND RD SCHOOL
MUNRO HALL, PONSONBY ROAD
MASONIC HALL, JERVOIS RD
DRILL HALL
ST ANDREW'S HALL
SKATING RINK, KHYBER PASS
GRAFTON FOOTBALL CLUB
DRUIDS HALL, NORTH ST

POOR CITY con.

HARBOUR BOARD SHED, NO 2 JETTY
GRAFTON SCHOOL, NUGENT ST
TOWN HALL
ST JAMES' HALL, WELLINGTON ST
SAILORS MISSION
WHOSOEVER HALL, VICTORIA & CUSTOMS ST
APPENDIX F

CLASSIFICATION OF ELECTORATES

In classifying electorates for the four years 1896, 1902, 1908 and 1911 a similar method to that used by R.K. Newman in his study of the 1908 and 1911 licensing polls has been adopted. Some major modifications have, however, been made. It was felt that a village or settlement of 500 people was too small to be labelled as urban; a figure of 1000 was preferred as being more likely to provide a distinct voting bloc in a predominantly rural environment. A centre of 2000 people or more has been used to separate rural interests from urban interests.

An electorate with an urban population of 0-24.99 per cent, with no settlement over 2000 people, has been labelled Farmer. Those electorates with 25-54.99 per cent urban population have been labelled as Rural, and include electorates with one centre or more of over 2000 people, but not enough to be one quarter of the population. It was assumed that such a settlement would have enough people involved in transport and servicing to provide a detectable non-farmer political outlook.

A new category, Rural/Urban (55-74.99%) has been introduced to contain a small group of electorates that consisted of one major settlement, comprising of over half the population, and its hinterland. It was possible for these settlements to dominate the electorate politically, and therefore they have been separated from those electorates that were predominantly rural. This category also includes some electorates which were the outer suburbs of major cities. These were mixed

electorates containing a well-to-do, urban-orientated, commuting population, a retired population and small farmers and market gardeners producing for the urban market. These electorates were growing at the fastest rate and were in a state of rapid change in the period 1896-1914 as they were gradually absorbed into the cities. The proportion of rural population in them was, however, of enough significance to prevent them being classed as mainly urban.

Mainly Urban (75-89.99% urban): these electorates consisted of city suburbs or large provincial towns with a small rural fringe or small built-up areas that were not yet boroughs in their own right.

Within the major cities (90-100% urban) classification has been determined by social composition. No city in this period contained wealthy residential areas large enough to fill a single electorate, but some electorates had significantly more well-to-do areas than others. These have been labelled Mixed City and the remainder, mostly working class areas, have been called Poor City.

Special Country: These were country electorates with a significant proportion of the population involved not in farming but in goldmining, coal mining and saw milling. Politically they were alien to farming and rural interests, and so have been separately classified on political rather than urban/rural criteria.

1896:

**Farmer** (0-24.99% urban):

- MARSDEN
- ASHLEY
- FRANKLIN
- GERALDINE

**Motueka**

- BAY OF ISLANDS
- WAITEMATA
- SELWYN
- WAIKATO

**Bay of Islands**

- ELLESMER
- OHINEMURI
- WAITAKI
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1908:

**FARMER:**

| BAY OF ISLANDS | EGMONT | WAITAKI | KAIPARA |
| Otaki          | TAIERI  | FRANKLIN | MOTUEKA |
| Clutha         | BAY OF PLENTY | HURUNUI | TUAPeka |
| Taumarunui     | ELLESMERE | WAKATIPU | PAHIATUA |
| Selwyn         | AWARUA  | WAIRARAPA | GERALDINE |
| Wallace        |         |         |         |

**RURAL:**

| Marsden        | WAIPAWA | MANAWATU | BRUCE |
| Manukau        | MASTERTON | WAIRAU  | MATURA |
| Waikato        | TARANAKI | KIAPOI   | TAURANGA |
| Stratford      | ASHBURTON | GISBORNE | PATEA |
| Oamaru         | HAWKE'S BAY | OROUA  | CHALMERS |

**RURAL/URBAN:**

| Palmerston North | PARNELL |
| Lyttleton        | WELLINGTON (NORTH, SOUTH, EAST) |
|                 | CHRISTCHURCH (NORTH, SOUTH, EAST) |
|                 | DUNEDIN (NORTH, WEST, CENTRAL) |
|                 | WELLINGTON SUBURBS |
|                 | INVERCARGILL |

**POOR CITY:**

| Auckland (East, West, Central) | Thames |
| Grey Lynn                      | OHINEMURI |
| Dunedin South                 | RANGITIKEI |

**SPECIAL COUNTRY:**

| Thames |
| OHINEMURI |
| RANGITIKEI |

(The four city licensing districts each combined three electorates after the old city electorates were divided into three in 1905).
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<td>WAKATIPU</td>
<td>22.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WALLACE</td>
<td>58.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INVERCARGILL</td>
<td>53.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWARUA</td>
<td>65.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Vote re. publicans' licences only  2. <sup>a</sup> = no-license poll  3. Void  <sup>b</sup> = national prohibition poll
TABLE 21

National support for local no-license, local continuance, local reduction, national prohibition and national continuance, 1894-1914, as a percentage of total valid votes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CONTINUANCE</th>
<th>REDUCTION</th>
<th>NO-LICENSE</th>
<th>NATIONAL CONTINUANCE</th>
<th>NATIONAL PROHIBITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>39.46</td>
<td>14.97</td>
<td>45.57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>53.71</td>
<td>36.38</td>
<td>37.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>50.54</td>
<td>38.23</td>
<td>42.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>47.89</td>
<td>43.16</td>
<td>48.89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>47.18</td>
<td>40.45</td>
<td>51.28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>45.41</td>
<td>42.35</td>
<td>53.45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>50.25</td>
<td></td>
<td>49.75</td>
<td>44.17</td>
<td>55.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>54.46</td>
<td></td>
<td>45.54</td>
<td>51.01</td>
<td>48.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Vote re. publican's licences only.
TABLE 22

Percentage of electorates with a vote of more than 50% in favour of no-license and national prohibition which had a reduced vote for prohibition at the following poll, compared with percentage of all electorates that had a reduced vote for prohibition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>OVER 50%</th>
<th>ALL ELECTORATES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>22.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>12.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>33.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>53.85</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911 a</td>
<td>87.23</td>
<td>81.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911 b</td>
<td>38.29</td>
<td>27.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914 a</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>97.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914 b</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. 1911 a = No-license poll
   1911 b = national prohibition poll compared with 1908 no-license poll. This is more significant than 1911 a.

   1914 a = No-license poll compared with 1911 a.
   1914 b = National prohibition poll, compared with 1911 b.

2. Only valid polls considered. Invalid polls were:
   1899 - 3
   1902 - 3
   1908 - 5
   1911 a - 2
   1911 b - 2
   1914 a - 2

Some of these invalid polls were the results of boundary changes, with new electorates being non-comparable with any previous electorate.
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       H-44  Sly-Grog Selling in each Electoral District, 1895-1899.

1903  H-26  General Election, 1902

1904  H-35  Alcoholic Liquor Railed into the Ashburton Electorate, 30 June, 1903-30 June, 1904

1906  H-25  General Election, 1905

1907  H-25  Votes Cast at Local Option Poll, at the General Election, 1905
1908  H-28 Alcoholic Liquor Sent into No-License Districts
1909  H-30 General Election, 1908
      H-30A General Election, 1908
      H-30B Local Option Poll, 1908
      H-30C General Election, 1908
1912  H-12 General Election, 1911
      H-12A General Election, 1911
      H-12B Local Option Poll and National Prohibition Polls, 1911
1915  H-24 The General Election, 1914
      H-24A The General Election, 1914
      H-24B Local Option Poll and National Prohibition Polls, 1914

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