Discourse Transformation in Peace Processes
Revisiting Sudan’s 2005 Comprehensive Agreement

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Abstract

An interesting theme in peace studies is how peace processes involving societies transiting from protracted civil wars engender conflict transformation. This thesis contributes to exploration of the theme by investigating discourse transformation in peace processes and how discourse change contributes to conflict transformation after the implementation of peace agreements. To explore discourse transformation, the discursive approach is employed which is one of the theoretical approaches to the study of violent conflict. Using this approach, this thesis develops an analytical framework based on two theoretical constructs, narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion, and then operationalises these analytical constructs using the discourse-historical analysis (DHA) method. The study uses the analytical framework to explore the 2002 to 2005 peace process for Sudan which aimed at resolving the protracted North-South civil war. The Sudan peace process was facilitated by the Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD).

The analysis shows that five narratives of identity competed in the discursive and institutional continuities during the second civil war from 1983 to 2002. These narratives stood on almost equal footing in 1993. However, devastating violence from 1994 to 2002 altered the hierarchy of narratives. As a result, only three narratives of identity were articulated in the 2002 to 2005 peace process. The analysis also demonstrates how the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was the outcome of the peace process, validated particular narratives of identity into narratives of exclusion. Further, the study shows the materialisation of narratives of exclusion in the form of institutions and policy options during the CPA implementation phase from 2005 to 2011. These findings raise profound questions regarding the writing and interpretation of peace agreements, and the role of peace accords as instruments of conflict transformation. In addition to developing a useful framework for tracing narrative transformation in peace processes, the outcomes of this thesis have advanced our understanding of discourse transformation in peace processes.
Acknowledgements

Writing a PhD thesis is an intensely personal journey. At every turn of that journey, I was fortunate to have people who supported, inspired, encouraged, guided, and cheered me on. I would like to thank, appreciate, and express my heart-felt gratitude to these people.

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<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Abyei Boundary Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>Assessment and Evaluation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALF</td>
<td>Azania Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission for Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUHIP</td>
<td>African Union High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCSS</td>
<td>Coordinating Council for the Southern States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNPC</td>
<td>Chinese National Petroleum Corporation</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHA</td>
<td>Discourse-Historical Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOP</td>
<td>Declaration of Principles</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPC</td>
<td>Democratic Protection Charter</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>Democratic Unionist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>Equatoria Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPRDF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IGADD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>International Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>INC</td>
<td>Interim National Constitution</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>IPF</td>
<td>IGAD Partners Forum</td>
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<td>JDB</td>
<td>Joint Defence Board</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement</td>
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<td>JIU</td>
<td>Joint Integrated Unit</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<td>MHS</td>
<td>Mutually Hurting Stalemate</td>
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<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Congress Party</td>
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<td>NDA</td>
<td>National Democratic Alliance</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NIF</td>
<td>National Islamic Front</td>
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<td>NLC</td>
<td>National Land Commission</td>
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<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Petroleum Commission</td>
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<td>NPCC</td>
<td>National Population Census Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAG</td>
<td>Other Armed Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>OLS</td>
<td>Operation Lifeline Sudan</td>
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<td>PCA</td>
<td>Permanent Court of Arbitration</td>
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<td>PDF</td>
<td>Popular Defence Forces</td>
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<td>PEC</td>
<td>Provisional Executive Committee</td>
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<td>PMHC</td>
<td>Political and Military High Command</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF/A</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front/Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sudanese Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANU</td>
<td>Sudan African National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCP</td>
<td>Sudan Communist Party</td>
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<td>SF</td>
<td>Southern Front</td>
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<td>SHEC</td>
<td>Southern High Executive Council</td>
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<td>SLA-MM</td>
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<td>SPDF</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Democratic Front</td>
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<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement</td>
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SPLM/A-United Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-United
SPLM-N Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North
SRF Sudan Revolutionary Front
SRF South Sudan Defence Force
SSIM South Sudan Independence Movement
SSLA South Sudan Liberation Army
SSLM Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
SSLM/A Southern Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
SSR Security Sector Reform
TMC Transitional Military Council
UDSF United Democratic Salvation Front
UN United Nations
UNAMID UN/AU Mission in Darfur
UNMIS UN Mission in Sudan
UNMISS UN Mission in South Sudan
UN PSO United Nations Peace Support Operation
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UPFLJ United People’s Front for Liberation and Justice
USA United States of America
USAP Union of Sudan African Parties
A Note on Arabic Names

All the sources that I used in this study were in English. Though I have used some sources that were initially written or presented in Arabic and South Sudan languages, I accessed them in English. I have therefore followed a simple system of writing Arabic names and words. I have also avoided all diacritical marks, as well as the classical Arabic way of writing names. For example, I have written Hassan al-Turabi instead of Hassan 'Abd Allah al-Turabi, Jaafar Nimeiry instead of Ja’far al-Numayri, and Sharia instead of Shari’a. In cases of direct quotes, however, I have retained the style in the original source.
INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The second phase of the four decades long North-South civil war in Sudan ended on 9 January 2005. In this date, the main parties, the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Nairobi, Kenya. International actors and analysts hailed the Agreement as an opportunity to end the prolonged civil war by addressing its underlying causes. Comprising of six protocols and a separate set of annexures for implementation, the CPA stipulated an asymmetrical federal system which was named ‘one country, two systems’. This system created a Government of National Unity (GNU) and a Government of South Sudan (GoSS) on top of the existing state governments. Maps 1 and 2 above show the states as of January 2005. This unique version of federalism required the GoSS to serve, in the interim period, as a buffer between the GNU and the southern states. While stipulating Sudan’s unity, the CPA recognised the right of self-determination for the South. Thus, it provided for a referendum at the end of a six-year interim period in which the Southerners would vote to either remain in Sudan or form a separate state. At the centre of the CPA lay a dilemma on how the Southerners would relate with Northerners after decades of bitter war. Despite the Southerners voting for separation at the end of the interim period in January 2011, hostility characterised relations between the two Sudans. This was evidenced by conflicts in the border regions of Abyei, Nuba Mountains, and the Blue Nile, and some small-scale military clashes along the common border. Young (2012) has attributed the continued conflicts to the peace process.

This linkage between the 2002 to 2005 peace process and the post-CPA conflicts in Sudan represents a central issue that faces all countries emerging from protracted civil wars: how former enemies will relate with each other after the war. Scholars and practitioners of conflict resolution have argued that, because of the profundity of protracted civil wars, transitions to peace require transformation of conflicts. This raises an interesting puzzle of how peace processes engender conflict transformation.¹ The

¹ There is no universally agreed definition of the term peace process. However, the peace and conflict studies literature broadly refers to a peace process as the series of peacemaking interventions from pre-
puzzle has engaged scholars of conflict transformation and post-conflict peacebuilding for more than two decades (see, for example, Mac Ginty 2010, 2008; Darby and Mac Ginty 2003, 2000; Lederach and Lederach 2010; Lederach 2003b, 1997). This research adds a new dimension to the explorations of the puzzle by investigating discourse transformation during peace processes and how this transformation engenders post-agreement conflict transformation. Noting that this theme has received scant academic attention, I postulate that because discourses are vital ingredients in the eruption and escalation of violent conflicts (Hayward and O’Donnell 2011), they are central in the peace processes, and in post-agreement conflict transformation. As Kaufman (2007) notes, a durable end to violent conflict requires elites and the population to adjust current discourses or embrace alternative discourses. To study discourse transformation, I will employ the discursive approach, which is one of the theoretical approaches to violent conflict.² I will elucidate in the next chapter my understanding of the concept of discourse and the core postulates of the discursive approach.

The first section of this chapter will explain the overall research objective, the specific objectives, and the broader theoretical area to which this study will contribute. The second section will be a brief account of how I became interested in this study area, especially the constructivist approaches to the study of conflicts and violence. The third section will rationalise the choice of Sudan as a case study. The fourth section is a summary of the contributions which this study will make to the field of peace and conflict studies. Finally, the fifth section will highlight the structure of the study.

**Research Questions and Objectives**

The overarching objective of this study is twofold. First, the study aims to explore whether and how peace processes transform discourses which are used by the conflicting parties to drive protracted civil wars. Second, the study aims to explore how change of discourses during peace processes contributes to conflict transformation and, as a result,
whether it engenders peace durability after implementation of peace agreements. Arising
from this overall objective of the research are five specific objectives, namely:

(i) To develop a theoretically informed analytical framework which can be used to
trace the process of narrative transformation in peace processes;
(ii) To map the main conflict narratives that were articulated by the key actors during
the 1983 to 2002 civil war and in the 2002 to 2005 peace process in Sudan;
(iii) To examine how the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for Sudan
took into account the identified narratives;
(iv) To draw appropriate lessons that will hopefully advance knowledge of discourse
and conflict transformation in peace processes;
(v) To recommend some discourse-based policy options that would improve the
peacemaking practice.

In pursuing these objectives, this study will aim at situating a particular peace process
within its historical, temporal, social, economic, cultural, and political context. In this
sense, the study will aim at generating a thick description of the case based on the logic
of understanding. I will elucidate the logic of understanding and the way it differs from
the logic of explanation in chapter three. Moreover, the broader goal of the research
beyond the Sudan case is to speak to theories of conflict transformation, including peace
accords and post-agreement peacebuilding. Therefore, I am using the peace process in
Sudan as a critical case study for evaluating and problematising the agency-structure
dialectic in the transition from civil war to peace, and in the field of conflict
transformation in general.

**Background: Encounters with Discursive Reality**

I became interested in the subject of discourses and transitions from violent conflict to
peace in a rather convoluted way. While working as a Senior Researcher and Analyst at
the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) in Durban,

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3 Chapter three will elucidate in detail the relationship between discourse and narrative and also develop an
analytical framework for analysing discourse transformation in peace processes.
4 ACCORD was founded in 1992 in Durban, South Africa, as a conflict resolution NGO. Focusing on
peace and conflict issues in Africa, it works in partnership with the UN, AU, REC's, and governments. For
details of its programs and activities, see [http://www.accord.org.za/](http://www.accord.org.za/)
South Africa, I was involved in several programmes and a wide range of activities which shaped my thinking. Three specific programmes inspired my interest in the social construction of violent conflicts. First, I managed the peace agreements in Africa initiative, whose main functions were conceptualising and organising engagement forums for continental policy makers and academics with a view to advancing greater understandings of peace agreements in Africa. The core content of these forums was reflection on the various themes and issues in the policy and practice of peace processes.

Second, I was responsible for monitoring the conflict management policies of the African Union (AU).\(^5\) Aspects of this job included participating in training forums for the AU’s staff, and those of the UN peace support operations (PSOs) in Africa, among them the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the UN/AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM), and the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC).

Third, I coordinated monitoring and tracking of contemporary conflict trends in Africa. The main task in this programme was analysing continental and regional conflict patterns and their implications for the continent. My focus area was conflict trends in Eastern and the Horn of Africa regions. Understanding my area necessarily required research on the international peace interventions in the region. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)\(^6\) had facilitated some of these peace processes.\(^7\) The conflict

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\(^5\) The African Union (AU) replaced the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2002. Thirty-two newly independent African states signed the Organization’s founding Charter on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. As they gained their independence in the next forty years, an additional twenty-one countries gradually joined the OAU. Eradication of all forms of colonialism, promotion of unity and solidarity, protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of African states were the Organization’s main goals. However, the end of the cold war, coupled with the emergence of new forms of conflict in the 1990s, including the collapse of the state in Somalia and genocide in Rwanda, presented the OAU with unprecedented challenges. On 11 July 2000, member states transformed the OAU’s Charter into the Constitutive Act of the AU. Then, on 9 July 2002, member states transformed the OAU into the AU. Promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa were some of the main aims of the Union. Key innovations included the establishment of the Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the Pan-African Parliament, and the African Standby Force. For details on the AU, see [www.africa-union.org](http://www.africa-union.org).

\(^6\) The Horn of Africa countries, namely Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, formed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) in 1986. The Organisation’s core goal was to address challenges of drought and famine in the region. Eritrea joined IGADD in 1993. In 1996, the Organisation changed its name to the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and revised its emphasis to conflict resolution.

\(^7\) I was privileged to meet some important negotiators in these peace processes in Nairobi between 2002 and 2005. These include the late Dr Samson Kwaje from South Sudan, who became Information Minister
monitoring initiative also involved conducting field research missions and engaging with diverse actors, ranging from top government officials to grassroots peacebuilders (see photos 1, 2, and 3 below).

Involvement in the three programmes and field experience in different regions of Africa shaped my interest in the subject of the social construction of violence and conflict discourses in two ways. First, I noticed the linkage between the conflicting parties’ conception of their social reality and the eruption of conflict and violence. Particularly intriguing to me were the contrasting processes of collective identity formation, state-making, nation-building, and the rise of violent conflicts in different countries of Africa. Regarding identity formation, for instance, I noted that the way collective identities are understood in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania is very different from the way they are understood in Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, and Sudan. In the former countries, the notion of ‘tribal identity’ is usually understood to mean what the anthropologists call ethnic identity, that is, language-based cultural identity. In Somalia, Rwanda, and Burundi, however, an ethnic identity is divided into several ‘tribes’. Further, in central and western Sudan, racial, ethnic, and ‘tribal’ identities are highly fluid. Because identity was

in South Sudan after the implementation of the peace agreement, and Sheikh Sharif Aden who later became Speaker of the Transitional Federal Assembly (TFA) in Somalia.
one of the issues in violent conflicts in some of these countries, these differences in conceptions of identities had implications for my work as a conflict analyst. As Jabri (2006, 5) notes, ‘the language of [conflict] analysis is not simply a mirror-image of the world “out there”, but actively constructs the world, in its choice of parties to a conflict, its understanding of the issues, the historical trajectory to a conflict, and its conception of desirable interventions and outcomes.’

Another example was the New Sudan vision and the role of the Arabic language in the realisation of that vision. In 1986, Dr John Garang, the SPLM/A leader, argued that New Sudan meant the re-structuring of state power at the centre and not the secession of the South. He also accepted the use of Arabic as one of the official languages of the New Sudan, as it was used widely in towns and trading centres in South Sudan. During the 2002 to 2005 peace negotiations, however, the SPLM/A negotiating team vehemently rejected the use of Arabic as lingua franca in the South. I discussed this point with a

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8 In this study, I will use the South Sudan’s style of using an individual’s first name. Just like in the Northern Arab-Islamic culture, South Sudanese call individuals by their first name because the second name refers to the father and the third name to grandfather. For Salva Kiir Mayardit, for example, Salva is his name, Kiir is his father’s name, and Mayardit is his paternal grandfather’s name. Thus, South Sudanese usually refer to him as Salva. For Dr John Garang, I will simply use Garang.
South Sudan scholar in September 2008 on the sidelines of a peace agreements forum in Durban. He asserted that Garang’s position on the Arabic language had no popular support in the South because South Sudanese viewed Arabic very negatively. In November 2009, I discussed the same point with several South Sudan scholars on the sidelines of The International Sudan Studies Conference at the University of South Africa (UNISA) in Pretoria. They argued that the South Sudanese associated Arabic with exclusive religious, cultural, and political identities, because the Government of Sudan (GoS) had used Arabic to mobilise violence against the Southerners.

Photo: With some county commissioners and civil society officials who attended a peacebuilding training forum in Juba, South Sudan, June 2009. I am seated at the centre in blue shirt.

Therefore, as I participated in debates on violent conflicts and peace processes in Africa, I became interested in the social construction of conflict and violence and the systematic study of the role of discourses in transitions from violent conflict. Interestingly, Jackson (2004, 63) has called for such a study in an article on the social construction of civil wars. Arguing that ‘conflict discourses’ are a ‘key variable in generating internal war’, he posits,

Research into the causes of internal war therefore needs to examine how conflict discourses arise, what distinguishes them from other non-violent discourses, the
ways in which they “defeat” alternative (non-violent) discourses, and how they can be de-constructed and replaced with democratic and inclusive discourses.

As the review of literature on peace processes in chapter one will show, conflict research has paid very little attention to the role of discourses in the transition from violence to peace.

Second, in our engagements with international peace interveners and post-agreement peacebuilding organisations in different parts of Africa, I noticed their emphasis on what the literature on peacebuilding refers to as technical peacebuilding (Cockell 2003; David 1999; Lederach 1997). Because technical peacebuilding primarily aims to prevent the resumption of violence, it emphasises the transformation of material resources, institutions and political power, and leadership in the post-agreement phase. In contrast, conflict transformation theorists argue that post-agreement peacebuilding has to be transformative in order for it to realise durable peace (Lederach 2005, 2003b, 2000, 1997). That is, post-conflict peacebuilding has to address the structural causes of conflict, repair damaged relationships between the parties, and deal with psychological trauma at the individual level (Botes 2003; Kriesberg 2007; Lederach 1997). Therefore, the realisation of durable peace, or building what Lederach (2005) calls peace infrastructure, necessarily requires not just the resolution of structural issues, but also the transformation of discourses and their inbuilt components such as narratives, symbols, and memory.

This study hopes to contribute empirical insights into this thinking through exploring whether and how conflict discourses change during peace processes and how this transformation engenders peace durability after the implementation of peace agreements. Though the research will derive empirical data from Sudan, especially South Sudan, I am very hopeful that the insights and lessons will be applicable to other cases and, with all due caution, may be a step towards generalised knowledge.

**Case Selection: Revisiting Sudan**

Sudan was the largest country in Africa in geographical size until June 2011, when the southern region seceded to form the Republic of South Sudan. By January 2005, when
GoS and SPLM/A signed the CPA, the second North-South civil war had been on-going for at least twenty two years. Though widely referred to as the North-South war, or the ‘Southern Problem’ in the earlier academic writings (Beshir 1974b, 1968), the protracted civil war had embedded conflicts in three frontier areas of Abyei, Nuba Mountains, and Blue Nile. The longevity of the war, the complex web of sub-regional conflicts, and the embedded ‘mythico-history i.e. a mixture of fact and fiction’ (Lemarchand 1994a, 18) which the combatants designed in order to legitimise their interpretation of the conflict, justify utilising the discourse approach. Subsequent chapters will demonstrate that the main parties to the conflict produced the ‘Southern Problem’ as the dominant discourse in their interpretations of the political, economic, and social conditions that existed in Sudan before independence in 1956. In turn, the post-1956 Sudan responded to the ‘Southern Problem’ through political, economic, and development strategies that reproduced cycles of violence. Therefore, exploring the transformation of the ‘Southern Problem’ discourse in the 2002 to 2005 peace process provides a useful empirical case of how peace processes transform discourses.

Further, advancing conflict research in general and developing an analytical framework is one of the main aims of this research. This makes Sudan a good empirical case because reasonable amounts of scholarly writing exist. Yet, none of these studies explores the civil war from a discourse approach, although most of them implicitly touch on the main narratives at the centre of the conflict. For example, Salih (1999, 6) has emphasised that ‘discursive narratives’ were ‘instrumental in subverting or maintaining power relations’ in Sudan. Other authors such as Deng (1995), Sharkey (2008), and de Waal (2005b) have linked identity narratives with the civil wars in Sudan. The amount of academic interest devoted to the subject of discursive issues, including identity and exclusion, links very well with the objectives of this study.

Moreover, peacemakers have been surprised by the prospect of war between the two Sudans after the South separated, the crisis of nation-building in South Sudan, and the widening of regional conflicts in North Sudan (ICG 18 June 2013a, 14 February 2013, 29 November 2012). Indeed, Young (2012) has claimed that the peace process failed.

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9 In some of his speeches, the SPLM/A leader, Dr John Garang, addressed this point of mythico-histories. See for example, Garang’s Speech to the Sudanese Diaspora in the United States, August 2004 and Garang’s speech On the History of Sudan, 1988. See also the May 2008 SPLM Manifesto. http://www.splmtoday.com
This raises profound questions about the intricate connections between conflict discourses and peacemaking processes. As Salih (1999, 6) comments, discourses conveyed meanings that translated into action ‘to maintain the status-quo or to break- away from the prevailing relations of dominance’. Therefore, I hope that a focus on discourse deconstruction and reconstruction will provide crucial insights on post-agreement violence mobilisation. I also hope that insights on discursive transformation during Sudan’s peace process will lead to a richer understanding of the processes that engender durable peace after the implementation of peace agreements more generally.

Additionally, Sudan’s self-perpetuating cycles of violence and trauma weigh heavily on the present and the future. The title by Alier (1990), *Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*, clearly reflects the trauma arising out of the failure of the country to implement peace agreements in the past. According to Young (2012), neither the SPLM/A nor the government expected the CPA protocols to be honoured when they signed them in 2002 and 2003. Thus, exploring the narratives that underpin enmity, the cycles of violence and how the peace process dealt with them interweaves very well with the aim of advancing theoretical understanding. Indeed, experience from the Horn of Africa shows that secession does ‘not yield peace and stability, much less democracy’ (Young 2012, 352). Instead, it produces ‘a new set of conditions that [lead] to inter-state wars and a proliferation of internal conflicts.’ Confronted by this experience, peace and conflict researchers need to explore alternative analytical approaches that will help the field grasp the complexities of violent conflicts in countries such as Sudan. I postulate that Sudan provides rich empirical data which could contribute towards this goal.

Lastly, the conflicts in Sudan attracted a great deal of international attention, and the international actors were well represented in the peace process. Initiated by IGAD, the peace process was financed by the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), a group of 26 countries and organisations which supported IGAD’s initiatives. Leading the IPF’s involvement in the peace process was the ‘troika’ of the United States, Britain and Norway, with the

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10 In December 2013, for example, South Sudan exploded into a deadly civil war. For details see, *South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name*, an International Crisis Group (ICG) Report, 10 April 2014.

11 For example, the conflict in the Darfur region is highly publicised internationally. International lobbies led by Save Darfur Coalition have been campaigning for accountability and justice in Darfur. The UN Security Council (UNSC) appointed a Commission of Inquiry on Darfur in 2004, while the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted President Omar al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity in 2009.
latter acting as the guarantor of the process (Johnson 2011b). In this sense, Sudan provides an empirical illustration of how international interveners interpret discourses in a protracted conflict. Therefore, it presents a good case for empirical investigation on how such interpretations influence discourse transformations during peace processes, and the effect of those interpretations on post-agreement peacebuilding.

**Contributions of the Study**

This thesis will contribute to the field of peace and conflict studies in three main areas: research, theory, and practice.

*Research on Peacebuilding*

There exists a large literature on the essential components of peace processes and the conditions under which they succeed or fail. Further, literature on peace agreements and post-agreement peacebuilding has covered various aspects, such as inclusion/exclusion in peace negotiations, power-sharing, wealth-sharing, SSR and DDR, amnesty provisions and how all these issues affect post-agreement peacebuilding. Therefore, through a comprehensive review of the current literature in the first two chapters, this study will contribute to knowledge by clarifying the existing gap. The study will also seek to address this gap by providing insights on the discursive approach to peace processes. Very little academic research has been done in this area.

Moreover, a common assumption in the post-conflict peacebuilding literature is that the implementation of a peace agreement would be followed by peace. Underneath this assumption is a conceptualisation of peace in the minimalist sense, that is, negative peace (Galtung 1969). In this view, peace is seen as a static product, which should persist once a peace agreement has been implemented. However, conflict transformation literature conceptualises peace in the maximalist sense, that is, positive peace (Galtung 1969). According to Lederach (2005, 2003, 2000, 1997), conflict transformation understands peace as a continuous change or improvement of relationships between the various actors. This continuous improvement of relationships between the conflicting parties after the implementation of a peace agreement is the cornerstone of peace durability. By advancing an understanding of discourse transformation in peace processes, this study
will provide insights into how these continuous improvements in relationships can be attained with a view to achieving durable peace. Therefore, it will contribute to the literature on post-agreement peace durability. Moreover, the conflicts in Sudan and the Horn of Africa in general have presented particular challenges to peace and security in Africa and beyond. This study will not just add to the existing scholarship, but it is also significant because it will produce insights into a hitherto unexplored dimension of discourse transformation.

*Conflict Transformation Theory*

This study holds that discourse is important in the eruption and escalation of violent conflicts. Yet, a review of the peace processes literature reveals that current theories pay scant attention to discursive change during conflict resolution interventions. Therefore, this study will seek to contribute to theoretical propositions by developing the link between discourse theory and conflict transformation perspectives. Through synthesising these two theoretical approaches, the discursive approach and conflict transformation theory, the study will aim to advance insights by developing an analytical model which traces discourse change in peace processes. In addition, the discursive approach postulates that aspects of discourse, such as identity, narratives, symbols, and memory, play a significant role in framing the terms of violent conflict. By expounding on discourse transformation during peace processes, therefore, this study will build on the current understanding of the discursive approach, and contribute to broader theoretical knowledge in the agency/structure problématique, conflict transformation, and post-agreement peace durability.

*The Practice of Peacemaking*

Hayward and O’Donnell (2011) have affirmed that conflict resolution aims to restore debate and dialogue as methods of expressing dissent and difference, instead of violence. Thus, an important aim of a peace process is to establish institutional mechanisms which shift the conflict from violence to the political arena. I postulate in this study that central to the shift is the transformation of discourses. However, the practice of peacemaking to date has been to leave the reconstruction of discourses to post-conflict reconciliation commissions or institutions. Therefore, this study is practically significant because it
seeks to explore the deconstruction and reconstruction of discourses at the peacemaking phase. By providing insights into the discursive gap between the start of a peace process and the peace agreement implementation phases, this study aims to encourage peacemakers to reflect on their practice and review their intervention strategies. I also hope that the insights of this study will encourage training institutions to include the discursive approach in the training of diplomats, mediators, and negotiators who participate in peace processes.

**Thesis Organisation**

I have organised this thesis into eight chapters, which I divide into three parts, in addition to the introduction and conclusion. The introduction has already presented the research problem, the objectives, the rationale underpinning selection of the case, and the anticipated contributions to the research, theory, and practical components of the peace and conflict studies field. Part one constitutes the literature review, which I have divided into two chapters. Chapter one will review the literature on peace processes and theories of violent conflict, focusing on the structure-centred and agency-centric approaches which have dominated analyses of peace processes and post-agreement conflict transformation. The chapter will then review the discursive approach and locate the current research gap. Chapter two will review the Sudan studies literature. I chose to review Sudan studies literature because the civil war and the peacemaking interventions in the country attracted broad academic interest from diverse fields of study, including political science and human rights. Understanding these perspectives is important for positioning this study.

Part two will cover theory and research design chapters. Chapter three is the theory chapter and will explain the ontological and epistemological stances which underpins this study. It will then expound the foundational postulates of the conflict transformation approach and review the approach’s current understanding of peace processes. The chapter will introduce the notion of narrative transformation and further theoretical insights on the concept of narrative by turning to discourse analysis. After elucidating the main propositions of discourse theory, the chapter will develop the analytical framework of this thesis by synthesising conflict transformation and discourse analysis. The centrepiece of the analytical framework will be two concepts: narratives of identity and
narratives of exclusion. It will be followed by chapter four, which will explain the design of the study, and operationalise the two theoretical constructs using the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA). Chapter four will also explain the sources of empirical data.

Part three will move the study from theory to data analysis. Therefore, it will have four chapters. Chapter five will examine state formation and the construction of the narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion in Sudan. Chapter six will explore how the conflicting parties articulated these narratives during the 1983 to 2002 civil war. Chapter seven will interrogate how the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) represented these narratives. Chapter eight will investigate how the implementation practices materialised the narratives represented in the CPA in the form of governance institutions and social policies. I will then conclude the study. The conclusion will synthesise the theoretical issues in chapter three with the empirical findings. I will in this final section also highlight some of the limitations of this study, mention areas of further research, and recommend some policy options. Among the limitations is my lack of proficiency in Arabic language. This limitation affected the selection of sources of the empirical data. As a result, the study will focus more on the South Sudan narratives and will not analyse the complexities of the Northern narratives.
PART ONE: PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Chapter One

Discourse Transformation in the Peace Processes Literature

In our war-ridden contemporary societies, we must continuously remind ourselves that all conflict starts and ends with constructing or deconstructing an enemy, ‘an other who is so foreign and distant that who becomes it. It can be tortured, maimed, slaughtered; who cannot’. (Mona Baker 2006, 14).

1.1. Introduction

The labyrinthine literature that explores peace processes and conflict transformation spans several fields of study. Therefore, this literature is diverse in the way it approaches the subject and the manner in which it engages with key thematic areas. Broadly, the literature presents conflict transformation as the resolution of the underlying causes of conflicts. ‘A consensus has emerged that, in order to be successful,’ Maney et al. (2006, 182) observes, ‘a peace process must transform the underlying causes of ethnic conflict.’ Mac Ginty (2010, 146) observes that unless the ‘structural factors underlying the causation and maintenance of violent conflict’ are addressed, most peace processes produce a situation of ‘no war, no peace’, despite the existence of a peace agreement. However, scholars in peace and conflict studies have argued that there is no one underlying cause because each conflict case is unique. In the literature on conflict transformation, the causes of violent conflicts stretch along a continuum from the structural issues to the concerns of the actors. Natural resources, geographical territories, demographics and social structures, including states and economic relations, are some of the structural issues, while components of the actor dimension include identities, fear, mistrust, irrational myths and false consciousness (Kaldor 1999; Kalyvas 2003, 2001; Kaufman 2006a, 2006b; Fearon and Latin 2003; Reynal-Querol 2002; Wilmer 1998, 2002).

Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, it will review the main lines of research within the broad literature on peace processes with a view to positioning this study. Second, it will present the discursive approach. Third, it will review how the peace and conflict studies literature engages with the question of discourse transformation in peace processes. The first part of the chapter will focus on the main arguments in the peace processes literature, while the second section will review the
structure-agency problématique. The third section will introduce the discursive approach and the fourth section will review its representation in the peace processes literature. The fifth and final section will restate the research gap which this study hopes to cover.

1.2. Peace Processes and Peace Agreements

A peace process which brings together the main actors involved in a civil war constitutes the most critical phase of conflict resolution. Indeed, the policy interventions that are stipulated in peace agreements, which are the key outcomes of peace processes, seek to respond to the conflict issues as the warring parties present them. This is why participation in peace processes, and the signing and implementation of peace agreements, are regarded as major indicators of the conflicting parties’ commitment to the transformation of the conflict (Darby and Mac Ginty 2008, 2003; Guelke 2003; Arnson 1999). Therefore, the implementation of a peace agreement marks a critical turning point in the transition from civil war to peace. However, not all societies experiencing civil wars move away from violence to durable peace after implementing peace agreements. Some societies attain durable peace, while others revert to conflict and violence (Fearon and Latin 2003; Nathan 2011; Toft 2010). Many other societies move from direct violence to situations of no war, no peace.

For example, direct violence has persisted in Southern Somalia, despite the hosting of more than fifteen (15) peace processes, the implementation of various peace agreements, and the deployment of an African Union peace enforcement mission. In the previous decade, Angola experienced its worst violence in 1992 after the implementation of the Bicese Accords; the war ended with the military defeat of one party ten years later. Rwanda sank into genocide in 1994 after the failure of the 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement; the conflict ended with a military win by the Rwandan Patriotic Front/Army (RPF/A). In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a deadly war followed the

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1 The literature on peace agreements shows variations in the use of the terminology. The term ceasefire agreement is broadly accepted as referring to agreements in which parties commit to stop firing guns and to enter into negotiations. But there is no universal definition of the other terminologies, such as global and comprehensive peace agreements. I understand the terms global and comprehensive to mean the same thing. Further, I agree with Roger Mac Ginty’s (2010, 2008) view of comprehensive peace agreements as all-encompassing agreements, that is, agreements which comprise of ceasefire, substantive, and implementation requirements.

2 For the mandate and activities of the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM), see http://amisom-au.org/
Lusaka Accord of 1999; the main parties had to sign supplementary peace accords in 2002 and 2003. In Côte d’Ivoire, the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement of January 2003 collapsed as soon as it was signed and the war continued until 2006. Mac Ginty (2010, 2008) argues that Côte d’Ivoire moved from direct violence to a situation of no war, no peace after 2006.

Sudan, which is the case study for this thesis, implemented the 2005 CPA which allowed the South to vote for secession in June 2011. But relations between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan have been characterised by hostility and occasional amassing of troops along the border. Moreover, new conflicts arose in the frontier areas, while South Sudan experienced deadly violence in some states. These cases and many others in different parts of the world, including Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland, raises a question: what determines whether a society which is transiting from prolonged civil war will attain durable peace, stall in a ‘no peace, no war’ situation, or revert to conflict after the implementation of a peace agreement? Scholarship seeking to answer this question has focused on several overlapping lines of research.

1.2.1. Dynamics of Negotiations

The first line of research has focused on the dynamics of negotiations. Scholars focusing on this line have advanced several arguments. Some scholars have underlined the approaches of the warring parties to peace processes and their commitments to a peaceful resolution of the conflicts (Guelke 2003; Arnson 1999; Mitchell 2003; Zartman 1995). The main point in this literature is the importance of good faith and trust between the negotiating parties, and their ability to break down the psychological dimension of the
conflict (Lederach 1997). According to Guelke (2003, 53), for example, ‘tangible evidence of a commitment to peace on the part of the major combatants is needed to create the right climate for negotiations to end violent political conflict.’ Among the indicators of non-commitment to peace is the ‘pursuit of irreconcilable aims by the major antagonists’ and ‘obdurate political leadership’ (2003, 53).

There is also an argument which has emphasised the timing of peace negotiations (Zartman 2003, 1995, 2008; Mitchell 1995; Kriesberg 1991). William Zartman (2003, 19), a key thinker in this area, has emphasised that the ‘timing of efforts for resolution’ of a conflict is crucial because parties ‘resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so.’ Another argument centres on the inclusion-exclusion of actors in the peace process (Call 2012; Nilsson 2012; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008; McClintock and Nahimana 2008; Lanz 2011; Paffenholz 2014). Proponents of this argument claim that excluding some armed parties in peace processes undermines peace agreement implementation because these parties become ‘spoilers’, while excluding unarmed groups risks pushing these groups into armed rebellion (Stedman 1997; Zahar 2003). Other researchers have added that excluding civil society and women impedes local ownership of the peace accords and the attainment of durable peace (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008; Paffenholz 2014; Nilsson 2012).

Underpinning these arguments are three assumptions. First, if the warring parties are committed to the resolution of a conflict, if they negotiate in good faith, and if they trust each other during negotiations, then they will keep their part of the bargain inherent in a peace agreement. Second, the timing of a peacemaking intervention must coincide with the parties’ commitment, otherwise they will neither negotiate faithfully nor implement the peace agreement. Third, allowing a wide array of actors in peace processes minimises exclusion and promotes ownership of the peace agreements. Therefore, the central pillar of these arguments is the emphasis on the agency of the warring parties. There is no doubt whatsoever that this line of research has offered valuable insights into the academic understanding of peace negotiations as principal aspects of peace processes. The research has indeed contributed to theoretical understanding of the peace processes and it raises issues which are relevant to this study. However, it is limited by its sole focus on the agency of the warring parties at the negotiation phase.
1.2.2. Contents of Peace Agreements

Emphasising the content of peace agreements, the second line of research has focused on a broad array of issues. There are scholars who have analysed the design of peace agreements, that is, inclusion of key provisions, the issues agreements emphasise, and the writing (clear or vague), details, and definition of mechanisms for implementation, (Mattes and Savun 2009; Guelke 2003; Stedman and Downs 2002). For example, Stedman and Downs (2002) have pointed at vague and expedient agreements which leave important matters undecided and unclear, as one of the main reasons why peace agreements fail.

Other scholars have focused on particular themes. A theme that has attracted the interest of some scholars is ceasefire accords and the conditions under which they succeed or fail (Fortna 2004, 2003). Another theme which has been studied is power sharing mechanisms, with one of the main arguments being that power sharing is an elite pact and, thus, it does not necessarily lead to durable peace (Martin 2013; Jung 2012; Jarstad 2009; Wolff 2007; Sisk 2003; Spears 2000). A third theme is sharing of resources (Wennmann 2009; Humphreys 2005; Binningsbø and Rustad 2012). Also analysed are amnesty provisions, transitional justice, and human rights mechanisms in peace agreements (Babbitt and Lutz 2009; Wallesteen, Melander, and Högbladh 2013; Aggestam and Björkdahl 2013; Bell 2008, 2003). Lastly, there is a collection of academic works which has focused on implementation issues, including DDR, SSR, state-building and economic recovery (Gamba 2003; Kingma 2002, 2001; Stedman and Downs 2002; Rothchild 2002; Hartzell 2002).

Two points link all the issues emphasised under this line of research. First, issues such as power sharing, amnesties, and DDR target the various layers of actors. Second, issues such as state-building, resources sharing, SSR, and economic recovery aim at reforming the structures. Other issues are essentially operational, that is, they address the interaction between agents and structures. Therefore, this literature implies that attainment of a durable peace after implementation of a peace agreement requires the interaction between agency-centred and structure-centric approaches. However, it does not theorise the interaction between agents and structures.
1.2.3. The ‘Spoiler’ Problem

The third line of research has studied the role of ‘spoilers’. In a seminal article, Stedman (1997: 5) defined spoilers as ‘leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.’ According to Nilsson and Kovacs (2011, 606), Stedman was not the first scholar to identify the spoiler problem or to address it, but he pioneered a systematic analysis of the problem, developed ‘a typology for categorizing different actor types based on the motives and means of spoiling,’ and discussed the policy implications for peace processes. Since then, academic studies on spoilers in peace processes have focused on three broad issues (Nilsson and Kovacs 2011; Zahar 2006b, 2006a, 2003; Newman and Richmond 2006; Stedman 2003).

The first issue concerns the definition of spoilers, that is, who should be counted as a spoiler, the means they use to spoil, and their spoiling activities. In Stedman’s original definition, spoilers were limited to the key warring actors in an armed conflict, but Nilsson and Kovacs (2011) show that subsequent scholarly works have expanded the definition to include non-armed and international actors. The second issue concerns why spoilers emerge in peace processes and their effects on the outcomes of the peace processes. While Stedman (1997, 2003) placed emphasis on factors which are endogenous to the parties, other researchers, including Zahar (2006a), Darby (2001), and Blaydes and Maio (2010), have stressed contextual factors. The third issue is spoiler management, with the main lines of debate being whether facilitators of peace processes ought to prevent the emergence of spoilers or manage them when they emerge (Nilsson and Kovacs 2011; Greenhill and Major 2006; Zahar 2006b).

Therefore, academic research on spoilers is very robust and has provided crucial insights for empirical peace research, and contributed significantly to the general research on violence and peace processes. Nonetheless, this line of research remains focused on the actors in general. It does not analyse the interaction between agents and structures.
1.2.4. Challenges of Peace Agreement Implementation

The fourth line of research has sought to understand the challenges which confront the implementation of peace agreements. Pioneering research work in this area, Hampson (1996) cited four main reasons why peace accords succeed or fail, namely, the extent to which international guarantors nurture a peace process, the timing of a peacemaking intervention, systematic and regional power balances in favour of peace, and the quality of a peace agreement. As subsequent academic research explored these arguments, scholars focused on other areas and offered alternative explanations. While some explored security guarantees inbuilt in peace agreements which allow the armed groups to overcome their commitment problems (Walter 1999, 1997), others focused on strategic deception, violence and the role of spoilers (Stedman 2003, 1997; Darby 2001; Greenhill and Major 2006; Zahar 2006a, 2006b). Other issues which attracted academic interest were vague and expedient peace agreements, lack of coordination between mediators and implementers, incomplete fulfilment of the mandated tasks, and limited commitment by implementers (Mehler 2009; Stedman 2002; Hartzell 2002, 1999; Rothchild 2002; Stedman and Rothchild 1996). In recent years, some of these issues, such as coordination between implementers and fulfilment of all the mandated tasks, have received attention in post-accord peacebuilding policies.5

Also explored under this line of research, especially in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, is social transformation as a strategy of implementing peace agreements (Pecency and Stanley 2001; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Doyle 1996). The core argument here is that both the international guarantors and the domestic implementers ought to pursue a transformative strategy which transcends the elite and targets the masses and the social institutions. Premising this view is the assumption that such a strategy contributes towards overcoming the resistance or deception of the main warring parties. However, Stedman (2002) has critiqued this view, arguing that it does not explain how peace researchers could measure whether implementers are pursuing such a strategy, whether it applies to all civil wars, and which institutions and practices should be prioritised. Thereafter, post-accord conflict transformation received wide academic attention, though not in the form in which these scholars conceptualised it (see, for example, Lederach and

5 One of the main tasks of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, for example, is to facilitate coherence, cohesion, and coordination among peacebuilding organisations.
Moreover, in the last decade, studies on post-accord transformation have been submerged under post-agreement peacebuilding debates which I will consider in the next section. Therefore, this line of research is very relevant to this study because it raises the question of post-accord conflict transformation.

1.2.5. Post-Agreement Peacebuilding

Post-agreement peacebuilding has received very wide academic attention in the last decade. Literature under this line of research falls into two broad categories. The first category has focused on technical peacebuilding which involves interventions at the transition phase, that is, immediately after the implementation of a peace agreement. A critical transition intervention which is fairly covered in the literature is disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants (Ong 2012; Giustozzi 2012; Berdal and Ucko 2009; Gamba 2003; Kingma 2001). The reform of security institutions has also attracted a good amount of academic analysis (Nilsson and Kovacs 2013; Jackson 2011; Vetschera and Damian 2006; Muggah 2009; Ryan 2011). Both DDR and security reform interventions target lower level agents, that is, soldiers and armed combatants. Other technical peacebuilding interventions which have received academic interest are resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees, rebuilding of the state, and rebuilding of the economic institutions (Daley 2013).

The second category has analysed issues of long-term transformation or transformative peacebuilding. This literature advances two main positions. Some academic studies have emphasised the structural underpinnings of a conflict as the underlying causes (Mac Ginty 2010, 2008; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). Therefore, they have argued that durable peace cannot be attained unless peacemakers ‘deal with the structural factors underlying the causation and maintenance of violent conflict’ (Mac Ginty 2010, 146). Comparatively, other scholars have maintained that, while it is desirable that structural violence is addressed, it is agents who engage in direct violence not structures. Therefore, peacebuilders must not stop at addressing structural issues, but must aim at transforming relations between the warring parties (Lederach and Appleby 2010; Lederach and Lederach 2010; Lederach 2005, 2003b, 2003a, 2000). The two positions diverge because one emphasises structures, while the other one stresses agency. In broad
terms, however, both the technical and the transformative peacebuilding literature recognise different layers of agency, and they implicitly refer to the interaction between structures and agency.

In the last decade, critical peace researchers have added a new dimension to the arguments in the transformative peacebuilding literature. Informed by the critical theory and the post-structuralist critique of international peacebuilding interventions, this literature has argued that efforts to attain transformative peacebuilding in societies which are transiting from protracted civil wars have failed because they are based on a notion of the liberal peace (Mac Ginty 2010, 2008; Richmond and Franks 2009; Richmond 2011, 2010; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; Fanthorpe 2006). The literature conceptualises the liberal peace as part of western liberalism with its inherent notions of individualism and practices of democracy, which emphasise electoral politics, civil society, and free market economics. Underpinning the liberal peace critique are four arguments.

First, post-agreement practices which impose the liberal peace ignore alternative local systems. Second, local agency comprises several layers, yet the liberal peace emphasises the elite level at the expense of the lower levels which are equally important in peace sustainability. Third, because of the power-knowledge divides between the global and the local structures, post-accord peacebuilding practices universalise western norms and values, which are not necessarily suited to non-western societies. Fourth, the power-knowledge asymmetry between the international actors who conceive, finance, and guarantee peace processes, and the local actors who implement peace agreements and peacebuilding practices, undermines peace durability. ‘Rather than a lasting and inclusive peace, many post-peace accord societies experience a grudging hiatus in violent conflict that is internationally celebrated but finds little approval at home after initial enthusiasm has worn off,’ writes Mac Ginty (2010, 151). The literature from the critical peace research school has advanced our knowledge of post-accord peacebuilding practices, and raises pertinent issues which are relevant to this study. However, because it emphasises international agency, it has not systematically investigated the linkage between agency and structures.

In summary, the overarching theme that has emerged from the review of these five lines of research on peace processes is the lack of systematic analysis of the structure-agency
interaction. While these lines of research have contributed significantly to theoretical understandings of peace processes and their policy practices, they have only implied the interaction between structures and agency. I will briefly problematize the structure-agency approaches in peace processes before proceeding to the discursive approach which addresses the structure-agency interaction.

1.3. Structure-Agency Approaches Reconsidered

The preceding sections have shown that much of the literature on peace processes has emphasised structure-centred and/or agency-based issues. The structuralist understanding of violent conflict emphasises structures which include natural resources and the social, economic, and political organisation of societies as the principal causes and drivers of violent conflict (Mueller 2000; Gopin 1997; Galtung 1971; Smith 2003; Arnsen 1999). Hence, the structuralist approaches emphasise the reform of structures during peace processes. Some scholars have, however, argued that the determinism of the structuralist approaches glosses over the complexity of human society, as it assumes that all interactions occur endogenously within structures (Demmers 2012; Jabri 1996). As Wilmer (1998, 93) puts it, ‘structural factors may contribute to precipitating a conflict or to constructing a framework for stable peace, [but] structural factors alone neither cause nor resolve protracted and violent conflict.’ In contrast, the actor-centric understanding of conflict views individual and group goals as the core determinants of conflicts (Bar-Tal 2007; Fearon and Latin 2003, 1996; Burton 1990a, 1990b). For example, Kaufman (2007) has insisted that myths, fear and hate greatly explain why disputes over material or nonmaterial goods turn violent. Therefore, the actor-oriented approaches focus on individual and group interests during peace processes. However, actor-based approaches have been criticised for downplaying the role of structures.

Broadly speaking, both structures and actors are critical and must exist at the same time and location in order for violent conflict to occur, but they need a bridging factor which creates the enabling environment. As Jackson and Dexter (2014, 19) state, violent conflict ‘is a multi-level social construction involving structures, processes and agents. It cannot be explained solely by reference to conflict-generating structures or to the actions of conflict entrepreneurs.’ Structure-based and agency-centred approaches have made important contributions to increasing our knowledge of transitions from civil war to
peace, but emphasising either of them while analysing peace processes has affected the research findings because the theory that one utilises greatly influences the research findings. Moreover, theory has important ramifications for policy-making, as different theoretical approaches carry with them different implications for the management of peace processes, the writing and implementation of peace agreements, and the institutionalisation of post-accord conflict transformation policies. In view of this, this study turns to the discursive approach, which has theorised the structure-agency interaction, and whose core postulates I will now elucidate.

1.4. The Discursive Approach

The discursive approach is one of the approaches to understanding violent conflict. The approach is inspired by critical theory, and the feminist and post-structural critiques of mainstream conflict resolution (Jabri 2006, 1996; Demmers 2012). It problematizes agency and structure-centred theoretical approaches and its foundation is the constructivist understanding of conflict. According to Lederach (1995, 8), ‘the point of departure for the social constructionist understanding of conflict is the fundamental idea that social conflict emerges and develops on the basis of the meaning and interpretation people involved attach to action and events.’ Thus, constructivism is premised on the view that our understanding of the world is not objectively derived, but it is socially constructed. Constructivists hold that human agents construct and continuously negotiate their social realities.

The literature on constructivism analyses the interaction between agents and structures, but it rejects a simple linear notion of causality and offers an alternative or implicit notion. Constructivists do not search for cause-effect relations; instead, they hold that the relationship between agents and structures is dialectical (Jabri 1996; Linders 2008; Wilmer 1998, 2002; Fearon and Latin 2000). To the constructivists, agents and structures act on one another in a reciprocal manner. As Demmers (2012, 120) puts it, ‘we are born into social structures that are both enabling and constraining to us. These social structures do not exist independently of us: we make them, and [we] are made by them.’ According to Wilmer (2002, 177), the emphasis that agency and structures exist in a dialectical relationship turns ‘attention to what connects structure and agency – the social rules in relation to which agents act.’ The constructivist literature asserts that these rules
are articulated in social interactions, where they are manifested in the form of discourses (Demmers 2012; Wilmer 2002, 1998; Jabri 1996; Dijk 1997, 1993; Fairclough 1995a). It is these discourses which create meanings, interpretations and legitimation. It is also through these discourses that power is exercised. Figure 1.1 below represents the relationship between structures, agency, discourses, and social practices.

![Figure 1.1: Relationship between structure, agency and discourses. Source: Demmers (2012, 122)](image)

From the perspective of the discursive approach, both structure-centric and actor-centred approaches are necessary, but they are insufficient because they do not show violent conflict as a recursive human activity (Jabri 2006, 1996). That is, they do not show violent conflict as a social institution which is produced and reproduced through discourses that justify and legitimise it. According to Demmers (2012, 117), the discursive approach ‘aims to understand specific cases of violent conflict by looking at the social process of discourse formation.’ To Jabri (1996, 1), any attempt to uncover the genesis of violent conflict ‘must incorporate the discursive and institutional continuities’ which makes violent conflict acceptable and legitimate. I will expound the terms discursive and institutional continuities in chapter three. Thus, the discursive approach offers a different understanding of violent conflict to both structural and agency-centred
approaches. Because it emphasises the construction of meaning and interpretation, the discursive approach understands violent conflict as a constructed discourse (Demmers 2012; Jabri 1996; Wilmer 2002; Fearon and Latin 2000; Lemarchand 1994a).

The concept of discourse has been used in different ways in the literature on discourse analysis. As Wodak and Meyer (2009, 3) note,

Discourse means anything…. We find notions such as racist discourse, gendered discourse, discourses on un/employment, media discourse, populist discourse, discourses of the past, and many more – thus stretching the meaning of discourse from a genre to a register or style, from a building to a political programme. This causes and must cause confusion.

In broad terms, the discursive approach understands discourse as both systems of thoughts comprising ideas, attitudes and beliefs, and social practices (Wodak et al. 2009; Jabri 1996; Demmers 2012). In this understanding, a discourse has two dimensions: the discursive forms and the social practices. The discursive forms comprise spoken and written texts as well as forms of knowledge, while the social practices dimension comprises the institutional and organisational practices, including cultural, political, educational and other public policies, and their manifestations in social and material structures (Demmers 2012; Wodak et al. 2009; Wilmer 2002; Lemarchand 1994a). The discursive approach asserts that the relationship between the two dimensions is dialectical (or inter-subjective). For example, a collective identity discourse involves how groups view themselves and present others; how groups establish memberships; how groups negotiate boundaries; the myths and histories from which groups draw; narratives and stories that group members share; language, cultural practices and organizational structures that groups construct; actions that groups undertake; and representation of these in symbols, institutions, and material structures.

Therefore, understanding a violent conflict as a constructed discourse means understanding it as constructed and articulated in discursive forms and realised in social practices. In this view, violent conflict is discursively constructed, but it has a real and profound impact on societies in terms of human killings and material destruction. That is, the discursive approach understands violent conflict as constructed discourses in the
sense that they involve defining and constructing enemies, framing and legitimising hostility, and perpetrating direct violence against the defined enemies. This is why the approach aims to understand violent conflicts and conflict resolution by analysing the social processes of discourse formation. I will elucidate in chapter three how the process of defining, constructing, framing, and legitimising violent conflict unfolds.

In summary, the foundation of the discursive approach is the understanding that violent conflict is produced, reproduced, and legitimised through discourses. According to Demmers (2012), research on violent conflict which employs this approach highlights the discursive construction of the ‘Other’, and the discursive practices that justify violence against the ‘enemy-Other’. An important aspect of the discursive practices is language use in contexts. Language use in this sense is not simply ‘a mode of transmitting information in the process of communication’; rather, language use involves ‘interpretative schemes and shared worlds of meaning’ which legitimise and reproduce violence against the ‘enemy-Other’ (Jabri 1996, 94). Other fundamental aspects of the discursive practices are social policies, institutions, narratives, performances, images, and metaphors. ‘Narratives keep violence alive in stories, either by glorifying one’s own group or derogating the enemy. Performances are public rituals in which the antagonistic relationships are staged and enacted,’ writes Demmers (2012, 127). The approach underlines that the discursive forms and social practices construct enemies and legitimise violent actions against the constructed enemies.

This leads to the next question. The preceding sections showed that the literature on peace processes does not systematically analyse the interaction between agents and structures, but does this literature refer to the discursive approach or to the discourse transformation in peace processes?

1.5. Discourse Transformation in Peace Processes

According to Demmers (2012), the view that discourses matter is widely held in conflict studies. For instance, Jackson and Dexter (2014) have highlighted the role of discourse in the social construction of organised political violence. Baker (2006, 2) has asserted that ‘declaring and sustaining a war have to be discursively justified and legitimised; politicians have to pave the way for war to be accepted, for human sacrifice to be
justified.’ Kaufman (2006a, 202) has referred to the importance of discourse in the generation and legitimisation of violent conflict, arguing that conflicting parties use ‘emotion-laden symbolic politics of defining, pursuing and discussing’ to pursue their interests. Though he was not writing from a peace and conflict studies perspective, Lemarchand (1994a) analysed the ‘ethnocide’ in Burundi ‘as discourse and practice’.

Focusing on the interaction between the elite level negotiations and the public peace process, Ron (2009) has examined how a peace process changes the vertical and horizontal discourse of power and control. He defines discourse as ‘a shared set of assumptions and capabilities embedded in language that enables its adherents to assemble bits of sensory information that come their way into coherent wholes’ (2009, 2). He then argues that discourse changes at two levels in a peace process. The first level is between the warring groups, while the second level is at the interaction between the public and the elite in each group. Ron then outlines the purpose of his study as to develop a theoretical framework which examines the interactive effects of war and peace on discourse at these two levels. The starting point for his framework is to understand a peace process as a discourse. Underpinning his idea of a peace process as a discourse are two notions: a peace process is an epistemological crisis and dialogue in a peace process is a fusion of horizons. These two notions help in understanding vertical and horizontal discourses in a peace process. Ron’s arguments are fundamental to this study and I will refer to them in chapter three where I will develop the analytical framework.

Hayward and O’Donnell (2011) have edited a collection of fourteen chapters by scholars from different academic disciplines on the 1998 Northern Ireland peace process and the Good Friday Agreement. Aiming to examine the role that political discourses played in the sustenance and resolution of the conflict, the contributors analysed the ‘discourses from a wide range of actors in Northern Ireland’s peace process – from heads of government to community workers, from former paramilitary prisoners to journalists’ (2011, 1). They define ‘political discourse broadly – not by its context or speaker but it terms of its use, i.e. language that performs the social function of defining collective identities, legitimate hegemony and motivating values which find expression in political associations and goals’ (2011, 3). Thus, the contributions in the book focus on language use by various actors and its effects on the Irish peace process.
Despite the limitations of only focusing on the use of political language, this study makes three vital contributions. First, Hayward and O’Donnell (2011) acknowledge the importance of understanding the relationship between discourse, conflict, and peace during transitions from civil war. Second, the study understands the discursive construction of ideologies and identities whose transformation is essential in peace processes. Third, the contributors recognise that discourse transformation is central to conflict transformation during peace processes. While a small number of other scholars have commented on the discourses in the Northern Irish peace process, their works are not as detailed or diverse as the above edited volume. For instance, White (2013) has confined his analysis to the lessons learned from the process, Wilson and Stapleton (2012) have focused on the discursive construction of the Northern Ireland Assembly after the implementation of the peace agreement, while Shirlow (1998) has dealt with the language of Sinn Fein during the peace process.

Some academic studies have also commented on the discourses in the 1993 to 2000 Oslo peace process for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to McMahon (2010), the dominant international interpretation initially regarded the Oslo process as a peacemaking breakthrough between Palestinians and Israelis. Stunned by the failure of the process, he argues, different interpretations attributed the failure to Yasser Arafat, Ariel Sharon, or Ehud Barak. Other interpretations blamed Israeli’s settlement policies in the occupied territories, while another group argued that the parties did not make sufficient concessions during the negotiations. Criticising these positions, he advances the argument that ‘the Oslo Process was an articulation of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations’ (2010, xiv). He then employs Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical methods to challenge the mainstream international interpretation of the Oslo process. His main claim is that the Oslo process institutionalised the discursive and non-discursive ‘analytics of truth’ through which the Palestinian-Israeli relations had been historically interpreted. Therefore, he concludes that the Oslo process failed because it did not transform the discourse which informed the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This study fits in the critical peace research tradition, although the author is not writing from a peace and conflict studies per se.

Seliktar (2009) has also analysed ‘the Israeli discursive community’ with a view to understanding ‘the Oslo peace process as it was heavily shaped by the academic-
intellectual paradigms of the day.’ She defines the discursive community as ‘all those who share an active interest in a certain policy domain – academics, public intellectuals, political actors, lay experts, advocates, journalists, and others’ (2009, 4). Her study analyses the paradigms that evolved in the Israeli-Palestinian relation’s discourse since 1967, and the emergence of the ‘conflict resolution “ripeness”’ moment which produced the ‘New Middle East’ paradigm (2009, 4). This is the paradigm which drove the Oslo process and envisioned the outcome. She then blames Yasser Arafat for the failure of the Oslo process and concludes that the failure of the process undermined the core assumptions which underpinned the New Middle East. According to this text, therefore, Arafat was responsible for the failure of the Oslo process to transform the discourse which informed Israeli-Palestinian relations and the retention of the old Middle East. While I do not necessarily agree with her conclusion, her study recognises the importance of changing discourses during peace processes.

Other academic works, including Rothstein, Ma’oz, and Shikaki (2002) and Peleg (1998), have not directly addressed discourse transformation in their analysis of the Oslo process, but they have alluded to the argument that discourse change would have produced a different outcome. Ghazi-Bouillon (1999) has explored the impact of the Oslo process on the New History, post-Zionism, and the discourses of identity in Israeli society, while Mullin (2010) has investigated the Islamist challenge to the liberal peace discourse in the Middle East. There are many other academic works which have used the terms discourses (meaning viewpoints), narratives, or perspectives and their effects on the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but they have not explicitly analysed discourse change during the Oslo process or other Middle East peace processes (see, for example, Matthews 2011; Daoudi and Barakat 2013).

In summary, other than the 1998 Northern Ireland peace process and the 1993 to 2000 Oslo peace process, this research did not find academic works in peace and conflict studies which are dedicated to discourse transformation in peace processes. Further, the research did not find any academic study that has utilised the discursive approach to the analyses of peace processes. Therefore, it finds a paucity of academic studies which have utilised the discursive approach to analyse peace processes or discourse transformation in peace processes.
1.6. Restating the Research Gap

It is helpful that I restate the research gap as identified in the above literature review before I conclude this chapter. The literature on peace processes and conflict transformation is very diverse in the way it approaches these subjects and the themes that it emphasises because it crosses several fields of study, including peace and conflict studies, international relations, and political science. Nonetheless, a core assumption in this literature is that the end goal of a peace process is conflict transformation. Within the literature on peace processes, there are five overlapping lines of research, namely dynamics of negotiations, contents of peace agreements, the spoiler problem, peace agreements implementation, and post-agreement peacebuilding. A literature review shows that these five lines of research have analysed agency-centric and structure-centred approaches. Though they have alluded to the structure/agency interaction, the five lines have left a major analytical gap because they have not systematically investigated the structure/agency interaction. In turn, this has affected the research findings since the theory that one utilises influences the research findings and the policy proposals. To cover this gap, I propose to utilise the discursive approach which theorises the structure/agency interaction and focuses on the social process of discourse formation.

A subsequent review of the literature on peace processes and peace agreements has revealed a major gap. Specifically, peace research has given scant attention to the discursive approach and discourse transformation during peace processes. Also not investigated in peace research is how discourse change engenders conflict transformation after the implementation of peace agreements. Moreover, the literature review has found that, despite the incidences of civil wars, peace processes, and peace agreements in Africa in the last two decades, scholars in peace and conflict studies have not used the discursive approach to analyse peace processes in the continent. Further, the literature review did not find any studies which have investigated discourse transformation in an African peace process. This thesis aims to contribute towards filling this lacuna.

1.7. Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was threefold: to review the literature on peace processes with a view to identifying the main lines of research; to present the discursive approach;
and to review how peace and conflict studies literature engages with the question of discourse transformation in peace processes. The review found five lines of research which pay more attention to the agency or structures. It then introduced the discursive approach as a way of bridging the agency/structure divide. Arising from constructivist thinking, the discursive approach ‘aims to overcome simplistic dichotomies of elite/mass, greed/grievance, identity/economy or agency/structure,’ which forms the backbone of many theories of violent conflict (Demmers 2012, 117). Further, the approach focuses on the process of discourse formation. The chapter then reviewed the peace processes literature and found a paucity of academic studies which have utilised the discursive approach to analyse peace processes or explored discourse transformation in peace processes. Having identified the research gap, we can develop an analytical framework for analysing discourse transformation in peace processes. Before turning to the framework, however, it is necessary that I review the representation of conflict discourses in the Sudan studies literature, since other fields of study have analysed the country’s protracted civil war and the 2002 to 2005 peace process.
Chapter Two
Discourse Transformation in the Sudan Studies Literature

2.1 Introduction

The civil war and the peacemaking interventions in Sudan have attracted academic interest from diverse fields of study. These have included political science, anthropology, and human rights. Although the Sudan studies literature does not approach the civil war from a peace research perspective, it provides valuable analytical perspectives, insightful interpretations, and useful empirical data. In broad terms, previous research in Sudan studies which touches on the peace process and the role of discourses in the transition from civil war comes from different strands of literature. The main aim of this chapter is to review these different strands with a view to assessing the accumulated scholarship on the subject. The chapter will also review how scholars of Sudan have framed their arguments and conceptualised the country's transition from war to peace. For ease of analysis, I will divide the literature review into five themes: peace processes, Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), causes of the civil war, conflict intractability, and humanitarian interventions. I will then link these findings with the previous chapter, reaffirm the gap, and conclude the chapter.

2.2 Civil War Discourses in Sudan Studies

2.2.1 Peace Processes

The first genre of literature is concerned with the peace process which led to the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Facilitated by the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the process started in 1994, but the crucial phase took place from 2002 to 2005 when the CPA was negotiated. The main negotiating parties were the GoS and the SPLM/A. The literature on the peace process contains three main arguments.

The first argument emphasises the components of a peacemaking process such as representation, legitimacy, inclusion, and exclusion. For example, Young (2005b, 100)
has argued that the process excluded the majority of Sudanese in both the North and the South as it was ‘dominated by a handful of Western states led by the US which … injected their own interests into the process.’ Therefore, the process threatened the long-term viability of peace in Southern Sudan because the international community encouraged the GoS and SPLM to reach an agreement, thereby reducing ‘the Sudanese people and their democratic organisations’ to endorsing a deal that had already been made (2005b, 101). In contrast, Woodward (2004) has argued that the peace process injected hope into Sudan. This was because there were only two parties negotiating, IGAD already had an institutionalised process with a clear negotiation methodology, the IGAD Partners’ Forum was interested in Sudan and the negotiating parties had already settled on Kenya for decisive talks (2004, 475).

The second argument stresses the presence of the necessary conditions for conflict resolution. These include parties’ willingness to negotiate, ripe moments, mutually enticing opportunities, mutually hurting stalemates, appropriate turning points and the external context. According to Woodward (2004, 473), the conflict in Sudan was ‘ripe for resolution’ for various reasons. The parties had reached a military deadlock, and none of them could force a political breakthrough. The ruling National Islamic Front (NIF) had split into two factions, while the opposition National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and the SPLM/A were riven by policy differences. The April 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement had collapsed, yet the discovery of new oil fields required the cessation of war. Moreover, there was general war weariness in the country and, lastly, the international climate favoured negotiations. Rolandsen (2011b) also emphasises this ‘ripeness’ moment. While recognising that Sudan had attained the ripeness moment, Johnson (2011b) pays more attention to the role of external factors, principally the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, in creating this turning point.

The third argument relates to the role of external actors. Authors such as El-Affendi (2001), Adar (2000), Young (2005b) and Rolandsen (2011b) have analysed the historical evolution of the IGAD and the factors which led it to shift from environmental concerns to conflict resolution in Sudan and Somalia. Among these factors were the regional impact of the conflict in the Sudan and support by the IGAD Partners Forum. Adding to these analyses, Johnson (2011b) has provided a first-hand account of how the international actors helped in shaping negotiations and the substantive content of the key
CPA protocols. She also draws attention to the impact of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York on the behaviour of the negotiating parties. In the early 1990s, Sudan hosted Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. Though bin Laden left Sudan in 1996, the country remained on the US list of international terrorism supporting states. In her view, Sudan feared that the US would attack it in the global war on terror. The international actors exploited this fear to exert pressure on Sudan to negotiate peace.

These three arguments do not address the main research question of this study, but they are important because the issues they raise touch on the transformation of discourses and the way context structures discursive possibilities. They also link us to the second set of arguments which focus on the content of the CPA which was the main outcome of the peace process.

2.2.2 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)


Some authors have directed their writings to the CPA as a whole. For instance, in the introduction to her edited volume on the CPA, Grawert (2010c) has argued that the CPA generated hope in Sudan because its key protocols on wealth and power sharing addressed some of the substantive issues at the heart of the protracted civil war. In her view, the substantive issues were ‘economic marginalisation of the South and a near-exclusion of southerners from positions in government’ (2010a, 1). Woodward (2010) has also analysed the CPA as a whole, arguing that the agreement was driven more by external actors than Sudanese parties, the GoS and the SPLM/A. This zeal by the external actors raised questions over the ownership of the peace process and the broader acceptance of the CPA. Rolandsen (2011b, 559) argues that ‘dependence on the personal
relations between [Vice-President] Ali Osman Taha and [the SPLM/A leader] John Garang’ was a major weakness, because their leadership was crucial for successful implementation of the agreement and the pursuance of post-agreement reforms in Khartoum. Thus, Garang’s death and the weakening of Taha’s position in Khartoum hampered speedy implementation of the CPA. Other authors who have commented on the CPA as a whole include Elia (2009), Deng (2005b) and Lobban (2010).

Other authors have dealt with specific protocols of the CPA. For example, Johnson (2010a, 2008) and Deng (2010d) have analysed the Protocol on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict and contestations of the border areas. Abyei measures about 10500 square kilometres astride the North-South border as shown in map 2.1 below.

Map: The contested Abyei region. Source: Enough Project

The Ngok Dinka, a subgroup of the Dinka, and Humr Misseriya, a subgroup of the Misseriya Arabs, inhabited the northern and southern parts of the region respectively. Both groups settled in the area from different directions in the 17th and 18th centuries. Before 1905, the Ngok Dinka areas were in the Bahr al Ghazal region, while the Misseriya areas were in Kordofan. The two groups co-existed in a symbiotic relationship which allowed them to share the wet season grazing lands north of the Misseriya territory, and dry season pastures and the water of the Bahr al Arab River (Kiir in Dinka) in the Dinka territory (Deng 1995; Johnson 2008). According to Johnson (2008), who served as a resource person in the peace process in 2003/2004 and later as an expert on
the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC), the seasonal right of way granted in these symbiotic arrangements did not translate into a right to claim ownership of the territory. Additionally, this symbiotic system had inbuilt conflict resolution mechanisms.

The contention arose from changes in administration structures after 1905, when the British colonial officers implemented the indirect rule policy which involved administering the country through ‘tribal’ systems of authority. Considering the Ngok Dinka as a ‘tribe’, the British officers transferred their territory to Kordofan for administrative reasons (Johnson 2008; Deng 2010d). The subsequent adoption of the dar (‘tribal’ homeland) system altered the symbiotic relations in Abyei. Mahmood Mamdani (2012, 2009) argues that a dar in Sudan represented a territory where a group had settled at the time of colonisation, but it did not include all their grazing areas.¹ The homeland entitled the ‘tribe’, through its leaders, ‘to manage the resources of that territory for their own benefit, to exclude others from either its seasonal use or permanent settlement, or to grant others temporary access’ (Johnson 2008, 5). Thus, the dar system privileged sedentary communities and disadvantaged semi-nomadic and nomadic groups who had no settled villages. Though the colonial government made efforts to manage the resultant disputes, the dar system ‘often led to an increase, rather than a decline, in conflict’ (Johnson 2008, 5).

Hitherto manageable conflicts between the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya over the grazing areas acquired a dangerous dimension during the first civil war when the two groups supported different sides. Authors claim that Dinka civilians were massacred in the Misseriya towns of Muglad and Babanusa in the 1950s and 1960s (Deng 1995, 1973; Wai 1981; Johnson 2003). Recognising Abyei as a hot spot, the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement gave the region special administrative status under the presidency, pending a vote by the Ngok Dinka in a referendum on whether they wanted to join the newly formed Southern Region. The government did not implement the referendum.

¹ Mahmood Mamdani argues that ‘tribe’ as an administrative entity - which defines access to land and participation in local governance and rules for settling disputes according to tribal identity – did not exist before colonialism. As understood by the colonialists, ‘tribe’ was a political, totalizing identity. For details, see Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity (2012) and Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror (2009) by Mahmood Mamdani.
Other issues worsened the relations between the Misseriya and the Dinka. First, changing rainfall patterns and the government’s policy of expanding mechanised agriculture in Kordofan put pressure on Misseriya’s grazing lands (Deng 2010d; Komey 2010b). Second, the Southern regional government’s replacement of northern civil administrators, police, and the army in the neighbouring Bahr al Ghazal with southerners, mainly ex-Anya Nya soldiers, altered the dynamics of dispute resolution in the region (Johnson 2008). Third, because Abyei enjoyed special status under the presidency, the increased representation of Ngok Dinka in the administration and the police triggered alarm bells among the Misseriya, especially because the Dinka wanted Abyei transferred to Bahr al Ghazal. The discovery of oil in the region inflamed already poisoned relations, as the government employed the Misseriya militia – murahalin – and the regular army to remove the Dinka population from the oil fields (Johnson 2008; Deng 2010d). During the second civil war, the Ngok Dinka supported the SPLM/A, while the Misseriya supported the government.

Therefore, the Abyei region was contested because the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) aimed to secure the loyalty of the Misseriya, while the government wanted to retain the control of the oil deposits, and also did not want to concede areas which were not included in the Southern provinces at independence on 01 January 1956 (Deng 2010d, 2005b; Johnson 2010a, 2008). For its part, the SPLM/A regarded the Dinka Ngok community as one of its constituencies. The Abyei Protocol addressed the conflict by providing ‘a set of procedures for delimiting and demarcating its boundaries’ (Deng 2010d, 300). The Protocol also stipulated the right of the people of Abyei to hold a popular vote to determine whether the region would remain in the North or would join the South if the latter voted for separation in the 2011 referendum, and the establishment of the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC). In the interim period, the Protocol granted the area a special administrative status under the presidency of the republic. The ABC issued its first report in July 2005 which was accepted by the SPLM as final and binding but rejected by GoS (Deng 2010d). The parties subsequently took the case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague for final and binding decision. Meanwhile, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA fought intermittent battles in the Abyei area.
The point of interest in these arguments on the Abyei Protocol is the linkage between events in the distant past and the present. This linkage is relevant to this study as it reveals the persistence of certain narratives of the distant past, the inability of the post-colonial Sudan to transform them, as well as how they were being summoned during the peace process and thereafter to justify present socio-political practices.

Other authors have focused on the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the two States of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. The South Kordofan State covers a geographic area of about 88 000 km² and is centred on the Nuba Mountains, which occupies about 50 000 km² of the area (see map 2.2 below). The Area’s population is predominantly Nuba (70%), who live in the Nuba Mountains, and the Baggara Arabs (Hawazma, Humr Misseriya, Zuruq Misseriya, and the Awlad Humeid or Kenana), who occupy the plains. Other groups in the State are the Fellata, Borgo, Borno, Dajo and the Jellaba (traders from the North).

Map : The South Kordofan State. Source: UN OCHA maps

Nuba is a cluster of many ethnic groups. According to Salih (1995, 72), the name Nuba was first used by the British colonial officers ‘to refer to the mountain peoples of Kordofan who had no collective name.’ For administrative reasons, the British then federated small Nuba groups into larger units based on linguistic and cultural affinity or geographical proximity. Wassara (2010, 85) argues that the Nuba comprises ‘more than 50 languages and dialect clusters, re-grouped into ten major groups.’ Before the second civil war, he notes, ‘the Nuba regarded themselves as forming part of an alliance with the
Baggara groups and the central government, and the notion of a “Nuba” identity was vague’ (Wassara 2010, 86). Alex de Waal (2012, 422) points out that ‘under different definitions of “ethnic groups”, the Nuba consists of anywhere up to 40 distinct groups with different languages.’ Similarly, Komey (2010b, 113) notes that the term Nuba refers to the ‘indigenous inhabitants of more than 80 hill communities of the Nuba Mountains’ who share a common cultural make-up, despite their ethnic and linguistic divergence. Though cultural affinity ‘does not pervade the whole cultural life of the groups,’ Komey (2008b, 997) avers, the Nuba identity ‘could be explained, in the common environment, as an adjustment of essentially dissimilar groups to identical conditions of life’. Therefore, Nuba is a ‘territorially based ethno-political identity [which] has progressively been constructed’ (2008b, 997).

The second North-South war entered the Nuba Mountains in 1985. According to de Waal (2012), it then unfolded in three phases. The SPLA gained ground in the 1985 to 1988 phase. The 1989 to 1992 phase was devastating to the Nuba population because the government used horrifying counterinsurgency tactics, including using ‘tribal’ militias and the PDFs to attack their subsistence base, massive relocation of the population to ‘peace villages’, the use of death squads, and the starving of SPLM/A controlled areas. Equally disastrous was the 1993 to 2002 phase because it was an intra-Nuba war. Academic studies attribute Nuba involvement in the war to local grievances centred on three broad issues.

First, due to historical reasons, ‘the Baggara and the Jellaba ethnic groups operated the institutions of power and coercion (such as the police and the army) and oppressed the indigenous groups’ (Salih 1995, 72). Accordingly, the state institutions excluded the Nuba. Second, because the plains of Southern Kordofan are among the most fertile land in Sudan, the government alienated Nuba farmland to create large scale mechanised agriculture (Wassara 2010; Komey 2010b, 2008b, 2010a, 2009). As Komey (2008b, 1002) puts it, the ‘single most important issue behind the extension of the civil war into the Nuba Mountains was the encroachment of mechanized rain-fed farming into the customary Nuba farming land bringing socioeconomic devastation.’ Third, the combination of administrative domination, political exclusion and repression, as well as expropriation of their land and other natural resources threatened the Nuba’s cultural identity (de Waal 2012; Salih 1995; Komey 2009, 2008b; Suliman 1999).
While these local grievances propelled the Nuba to join the rebellion, the SPLM/A tied them with marginalisation protests from the South and the other peripheral regions of Sudan, and blamed the structure of the state at the centre in Khartoum. Therefore, Komey (2010a) has analysed the responses of the CPA to the linkage between the Nuba people, their identity, geographical territory and the north-south war. During negotiations, he notes, the SPLM and GoS initially disagreed, as the latter rejected the inclusion of the Nuba Mountains, Abyei and the Blue Nile State in the negotiation agenda, as it did not see them as part of the ‘Southern Sudan problem’. Eventually, the parties agreed to negotiate a separate protocol for the resolution of conflict in the two states which established the modalities and principles for resolution of the conflict. During the transition period Komey (2010a, 55) points out, the Nuba realised that ‘the fundamental questions of their identity, territory and political destiny had not been satisfactorily dealt with in the agreement.’ He then concludes that the CPA did not address the root causes of the war in the Nuba Mountains: ‘it failed to provide real opportunities for demarginalisation and development processes. Most importantly, it left the Nuba people in political uncertainty’ (Komey 2010a, 57).

In contrast, Wassara (2010) has addressed the implications of the CPA for peaceful co-existence in the Nuba Mountains. Despite contextualising his analysis on the CPA, Wassara deals with the prospects and challenges of peaceful co-existence after the implementation of the agreement. The protocol stipulated a structure of government, executive and the judiciary in the Southern Kordofan state, Wassara (2010, 91) notes, but the two parties had an uneasy relationship that impeded the establishment of effective rule. The consequences of this were an inability to establish a functioning unity government, ethnic polarisation, land contestations, and shifting alliances of the Other Armed Groups (OAGs). As a result, the area experienced political instability and intermittent violence during the transition period and thereafter. Also writing on CPA implementation issues in the Nuba Mountains is Damin (2010), but he narrows his analysis to the re-integration of returnees and immigrants.

Similar to the Nuba Mountains case is the conflict in the Blue Nile State. Deriving its name from the Blue Nile River that drains the region as it flows from the Ethiopian highlands, the State measures about 45 000 km² and borders Sennar to the north, Upper...
Nile (South Sudan) to the west and south and Ethiopia to the east. The ‘indigenous’ Funj people comprise 50% of the population and are evenly spread among the Islamic, Christian, and traditional beliefs and religious practices. The Funj are not an ethnic group in the anthropological sense. Rather, the Funj identity was historically constructed as a regionally inclusive socio-political category which incorporates more than fifteen linguistically and culturally distinct groups, including the Ingessana (with four distinctive sub-groups), Berta, Burun, Gumuz, Hamaj, Jumjum, Koma, Ragarig, and Uduk (Gramizzi 2013; ICG 18 June 2013b; James 2007). But unlike the Nuba, the historical construction of the Funj identity predates British colonialism. Other groups in the Blue Nile State include Fellata (Fulani and Hausa), Western Sudanese (Darfurians), Watawit (people of mixed ancestry), sedentary Arabs (Jaaliyin, Shaygiya, and Shukriya), and nomadic Arabs (Rufaa al Hoi and Kenana) (Gramizzi 2013; ICG 18 June 2013b; Ahmed 2009). The Fellata and Western Sudanese comprise 30% of the population, while Arabs and the others make 20%. In a sense, the Blue Nile is a microcosm of Sudan in terms of diversity.

Just like the Nuba, the Funj became involved in the second civil war in the late 1980s because of local grievances. First, increased migration due to the completion of the Roseries Dam in 1966 and its expansion in the 1970s, adoption of the unregistered land laws in 1970, and abolition of the Native Administration in 1971, led to appropriation of land for agricultural schemes by the central government and displacement of the indigenous people (Gramizzi 2013; James 2007). Moreover, successive waves of immigration triggered competition over land and other resources, which created feelings of discrimination, exclusion, and exploitation among the indigenous communities (James 2007; ICG 18 June 2013b). Second, the central government promoted extraction of minerals, especially gold and chrome, in the region, which encroached on farming and grazing land, displaced thousands of people, and degraded the environment (Ahmed 2009; Gramizzi 2013; James 2007). Third, as part of Sudan’s periphery, the Funj population felt marginalised from the state of Sudan. The SPLM/A tied these grievances with those of the other peripheries, including the South and the Nuba Mountains, and linked them with the configuration of state power at the centre in Khartoum. As a result, the Funj accepted the SPLM/A’s New Sudan vision, making the Blue Nile State the northern front of the second civil war and a strategic stronghold for the SPLM/A (Gramizzi 2013; Young 2012).
Particular themes around the CPA have also attracted the interest of various authors. Whereas Nyaba (2009), Ahmed (2010) and Biel (2010) have written on power sharing mechanisms stipulated by the CPA, authors such as Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson (2008) and D’Agoût (2009) have paid attention to the wealth sharing mechanisms in the CPA. There are also authors, such as Gibia (2008), Biel (2010), Grawert (2010c), Woodward (2010), Sheeran (2011) and Elia (2009), who have commented on self-determination provisions and their implementation. Other themes that have attracted analysis are post-agreement democratisation (Eltahir 2010; Sidahmed 2010; Fluehr-Lobban 2009), cultural and religious diversity (Musa 2010; Medani 2011; Komey 2010a; El-Battahani 2007; Deng 2005a; Ell-Hassan 2009), citizenship and reintegration (Damin 2010; John 2010; Komey 2010b; Wassara 2010; Abdulbari 2011), language policies (Abu-Manga 2009; Abdelhay 2007; Abdelhay, Makoni, and Makoni 2011; Abdelhay 2010), regional implications of the CPA (Grawert 2010b; Katete 2010), as well as possible post-referendum trajectories (Abulbari 2011; Sheeran 2011; Woodward 2011; Verhoeven 2011; Medani 2011; Johnson 2010a; Deng 2010d).

Despite being very rich in data on the various CPA provisions and themes around the agreement implementation, this literature does not address directly the research questions of this study. Yet, it implicitly affirms its central premise about the role of discourses in conflict construction and resolution.

2.2.3 Causes of the Sudanese Civil War

The third set of literature deals with the causes of the civil war and contain five main arguments. The first argument emphasises that the north-south civil war was rooted in the country’s colonial history which engendered unequal political, economic, and social relations between the two regions. According to Rolandsen (2011a, 213), a lot of Sudan’s historiography on the conflict focused on ‘the bifurcated Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899-1956) policy of actively favouring a centre in Khartoum while neglecting and isolating the peripheries, and this policy’s consequences for the independent Sudan.’ For Nyaba (2000, 14-15), ‘the colonial concentration of economic, political, and administrative development in the North at the expense of the South’ created ‘socio-economic and political disparities between the two parts’ which continued
to affect ‘the relationship of the two people’ after independence. Other authors, such as Nasong’o and Murunga (2005), Beshir (1968), Bleuchot, Delmet, and Hopwood (1991), Holt and Daly (1980), Oduho and Deng (1963) and Wai (1970), have also highlighted in detail the role of colonial history in generating the civil war. In contrast, Kok (1996) has faulted this viewpoint for downplaying the responsibility of the post-independence leadership. Daly and Sikainga (1993), Johnson (2003) and Woodward (1980) have similarly attributed the conflict to the colonial history, as well as to the post-colonial state.

The second argument, which centres on national identity, state identity, and nationhood, is the most researched. In his elaborate academic work, Deng (1995, 4) has stated that the ‘state of affairs now prevailing in the Sudan is the culmination of a long historical process in which Northerners and Southerners were the principal antagonists in the war of racial, cultural and religious identities.’ In this view, the war involved the Northern Sudanese who identified themselves as Arabs and Muslims against the Southerners who saw themselves as Africans. The separation between the Arab Muslim North and the African South, Deng (1995, 9) adds, ‘has its roots in the Arabisation and Islamisation of the North and in the resistance to those forces in the South.’ In other words, the North-South war raged for years because the successive Arab-Muslim dominated post-colonial governments pursued policies which aimed to ‘dominate, Islamize, and Arabize the South’, but the Southerners continuously resisted the ‘Arab-Muslim domination and assimilation’ (1995, 11).

Sharkey (2008) highlights the role of Arabisation in the generation and persistence of the North-South war. However, she separates Arabisation as a cultural process in which ‘Arabic continues to spread at the grassroots as a lingua franca and literary language,’ and Arabisation ‘as a post-colonial policy of national integration’ (2008, 22). In her view, Arabisation as a cultural process has been successful, while Arabisation as a political policy has been a failure largely because it connoted Arab racial supremacist ideology. O’Fahey (1996b, 258) focuses on Islamisation which he defines as ‘the organised expression of a specific religious and political ideology, “Islamism” (Islamiyya).’ He further distinguishes between Muslims and Islamists, pointing out that both are labels but they have different implications in practice. Islamism, as expressed by the Islamists, is a ‘deliberate adherence to a specific Islamist political ideology’ (1996b,
He then attributes intensification of the conflicts in Sudan to Islamism in the Islamists’ sense, because it is ‘an expression of a Northern Sudanese ethnicity's determination to preserve its control over as much as possible of the Sudan, not least the Nile Valley’ (1996b, 259). In short, he faults Islamism as a political ideology of domination and exclusion.

Unlike Sharkey and O’Fahey, however, a wide range of literature has broadly linked enforcement of Arabic racial (or ethnic) and Muslim religious identities without drawing a line between cultural and political Arabism, or Islam and Islamism. Deng (2005a, 261) has, for instance, averred that the ‘civil war has been perceived as a cleavage between the dominant Islamic and Arabised north… and the subordinated but potentially richer African south that is predominately traditional in its religious beliefs.’ Similarly, Adar (2001, 81) has attributed ‘the core of the civil war’ to the ‘exclusive ethno-religious-centred policies’ namely Islamisation and Arabisation which have been pursued since 1950s.’ He blames the ‘persistent derogation of the linguistic and ethno-cultural practices of the southerners and non-Muslims in general by the Arabic-speaking Muslims’ for undermining the formation of a Sudanese national identity (2001, 81). Komey (2010a) has observed that the Sudanese state was founded on the narrow basis of Islamism and Arabism, despite being a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious country. It is this view of civic identity, that is, Sudanisation as Arabisation and concomitantly Islamisation, which led to the protracted conflict because it generated resistance which was based on ethnic and regional identities.

The identity viewpoint links with the third argument in the literature, which portrays the conflict as a resistance to internal colonialism. Nasong'o and Murunga (2005) have stated that the colonial interpretation emanated ‘from the differentiation between the ruling race (Northern Arabs) and the subject race (Southern Africans).’ The two authors infer that the Northern Arabs treated South Sudanese as a subject race rather than as citizens. Further, this argument claims that the Northern Arab elite who took state power from the British attempted to correct what it saw as the divisive policies of the British colonial administration by aiming to construct a united Sudan with Arab-Islamism as the sole determinant for national unity and citizenship (Deng 1995; Abd-al-Rahim 1970; Deng 2005a; Howell 1973; Rolandsen 2011a; Woodward 1980). As Deng (2005a, 264) puts it, the northern elite saw ‘the religious and cultural diversity of the country as a threat to
unity and strove to eliminate it.’ Thus, the elite sought to use the post-colonial state power to frighten the Southerners into submission (Albino 1970). The Arab elite’s subsequent monopolisation of social, educational, administrative and military affairs and harsh implementation of the Arabisation and Islamisation policies turned the South into a colony (Beshir 1968; Johnson 2003; Khalid 2003; Nyaba 2000; Abd-al-Rahim 1970; Howell 1973). As a result, the protracted Southern resistance was a war of liberation (Nyaba 2000).

The fourth argument views the causes of the civil war in terms of exclusion of the peripheries by the centre. According to Deng (2005a), the pre-colonial and post-colonial ruling elite adopted exclusionary and discrimination policies. For Komey (2010a), it is the exclusion of the peripheries by the centre which solidified ethno-political identities, and led to their conversion into armed resistance movements. Musa (2010) has buttressed this argument with statistical data showing variations in the representation in key positions at the central government. According to the data on the ministerial distribution on a regional basis, Khartoum state (the capital) and the Northern region took the majority of ministerial posts in all governments since independence. At some time, ‘Khartoum took nearly half of the Cabinet and the Northern region took one-quarter, leaving the rest to be shared by other regions’ (Musa 2010, 558). Other authors who have commented on the conflicts in the peripheries such as de Waal (2005a, 2005b), de Waal and Flint (2005), Kasfir (1977), Young (2003) and Salih (1999) have touched on exclusion as a key factor. However, some authors like de Waal (2005a, 2005b) have cautioned that exclusion as a causal factor needs to be qualified, for it assumes cohesiveness of the peripheries. Also commenting on exclusion as the most important causal factor is Niblock (1987), but unlike other authors who have emphasised religious, ethnic or regional identities, he has premised his analysis on economic identities.

Closely linked to exclusion is the question of access to natural resources, particularly oil, grazing lands, and water. For example, D’Agoût (2009) has attributed the intensification of the war in the 1970s and 1980s to oil resources. ‘Occupation of the oilfields and the exploitation of oil were critical to the government’s quest for a new source of revenue,’ he says. ‘For the South, oil exploitation was considered an act of plunder that needed to be obstructed by all means necessary, including military attacks’ (2009, 119). Adar (2001) has similarly remarked that oil provided revenue which the government used to
finance war efforts against the rebel movements. Furthering this argument, Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson (2008) have noted that because the control and extraction of oil resources was a major factor in the decades-long conflict, the issue would be very contentious in the post-CPA transition from war to peace. ‘Attempts to incorporate the oil rich provinces into Northern territories,’ they write (2008, 387), ‘contributed to the rise of the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) and increasing demands for autonomy.’ They also note that the agreement addressed this issue by allocating equal sharing of the oil resources between the North and the South, after removing 2% for the Oil Development Fund.

The last argument revolves around leadership and has three angles to it. Rational instrumentalism on the part of ethnic elites comprises the first angle (Nasong'o and Murunga 2005). Accordingly, ethnic elites, who used their ethnic communities instrumentally as they sought to maximise their material interests in a multi-ethnic society, led the civil war. The second angle attributes the civil war to a ‘lack of an all-encompassing consensus on the constitutive fundamentals of the Sudanese State’ (Nasong'o and Murunga 2005, 55). These fundamentals are agreement on attaining, exercising, and checking state power; agreement on production, distribution and exchange of wealth; and agreement on the administration of justice and maintenance of the rule of law. Other fundamentals are agreement on the nurturing and projecting of national identity; agreement on meeting the legitimate claims and aspirations of the different ethno-regional groups; and agreement on maintaining the territorial unity of the country. The third angle perceives ‘the civil war as a southern problem that was caused by sinister international interference’ (Deng 2005a, 262). Commonly associated with the northern Sudanese elites, this view found scholarly support in the work of writers who sought to provide empirical evidence that external intervention in favour of the southern armed movements was critical to the onset and in the sustainability of the civil war (Deng 2005a).

The five arguments on the causes of the civil war do not directly address the research question of this study. None of these studies adopts a discursive approach, nor do they attempt to analyse the role that discourses played in the construction of conflict. Nonetheless, they highlight racial, ethnic, religious, and political identities, as well as political, economic, and cultural exclusion, as realities that were socially constructed
through people’s actions. They implicitly show the power of discourses in shaping the understanding and actions of the conflicting parties. The arguments underscore the point that the various identities were being debated not just in cultural expressions but, more importantly, in legal and policy circles. Hence, the arguments touch the heart of this thesis, for they illustrate how discourses produce and reproduce conflicting realities.

2.2.4 Conflict intractability

Some authors have implicitly addressed the question of the intractability of the conflict in South Sudan. A conflict becomes intractable when political, social, and economic exclusion and marginalisation converges with group identities. Indicators of intractability include the long duration of conflict, a deep sense of grievance, bitter feelings of enmity, cycles of destructive violence, and many failed peacemaking interventions (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2004; Lederach 1997). The literature on conflict intractability in Sudan advances three arguments.

First, political, economic and social domination by the Nile valley Arabs led the dominated peripheries to mobilise violently around ethnic and cultural identities (Salih 1999; Musa 2010; Roden 1974; Daly and Sikainga 1993; Deng 1995; Gibia 2008; Khalid 2003; Komey 2010a). In the words of Komey (2010a, 49), ‘the excluded sub-national identities occupying particular regions began to make their political and economic demands to the state on the basis of their ethnic identities.’ The linkage between ‘primordial’ ethnic identities, distribution of resources, and exercise of economic and political power turned the conflict into an intractable one. According to Deng (2005b, 245), the civil war became ‘one of the longest and most intractable conflicts in Africa’ and spread to ‘other parts of Sudan and across international borders.’

Second, the Arabisation and Islamisation policies in a culturally and religiously diverse country, as well as identifying Sudan as an Islamic state, generated resentment and secessionist tendencies among non-Muslims (Gibia 2008; Deng 1995; Khalid 2003; Lesch 1998; Deng 2005a; El-Battahani 2007). Highlighting the effect of Arabisation and Islamisation policies, Deng (2005a) has argued that the dominant elite saw ethnic, cultural and religious diversity as a curse and a threat to national unity. Thus, the elite sought to eliminate the diversity by assimilating everybody into the Arabic and Islamic
culture. The Khartoum elite even attempted to enforce assimilation through violence, which left communal trauma and bred deep and painful resentment among the non-Muslim population. Instead of achieving national unity, the Arab-Islamic framework caused divisions, marginalisation, and exclusion that led the non-Muslims to wage a long-drawn-out war against the centre. The conflict then became intractable as the northern elite refused to acknowledge the failure of the Arabisation and Islamisation policies (Deng 1995). Salih (1999, 6) adds that the proponents of the Arab-Islamic paradigm purveyed discourses which aimed at maintaining the status quo, while their opponents pursued discourses that exhorted non-Muslims to ‘break away from the prevailing relations of dominance.’

Third, the government dishonoured too many peace agreements (Alier 1990). The failure of these agreements, writes Nyaba (2009, 140), led the SPLM/A to redefine and rearticulate ‘the problem hitherto misnamed “the problem of southern Sudan” to the problem of the whole of Sudan.’ In this view, the conflict only became ripe for resolution after the SPLM/A inflicted heavy military losses on the SAF and controlled large swathes of Southern Sudan. Lobban (2010) has argued that these agreements failed for three reasons: there was no mutual trust between the conflicting parties; military thinking was dominant in the Sudan polity; and there were too many actors who were strong enough to block agreement implementation, but none who were strong enough to implement the agreements. As a result, dysfunctional division prevailed and prolonged the war.

The intractability dimension is vital to this study because one pillar of post-agreement conflict transformation is changing the discourses that reproduce violent conflict. According to Verhoeven (2011, 674), the Sudanese ruling ‘elites – whether socialist, militarist or Islamist – have continually deployed specific narratives of cultural and racial supremacy that have been designed to legitimate the exploitation and repression of the peripheries.’ As a result, adds Salih (1999, 11), the construction of the conflict meaning ‘is informed by Sudan’s diverse cultures, ethnic groups, and languages as well as the economic and political circumstances that have produced one of the longest civil wars in Africa.’ One of the strengths of the conflict intractability literature is its recognition of the importance of discourses in the construction of identities and in mobilisations for the civil war. However, it has focused on discourses before and during the course of the civil
war. Therefore, it has not analysed discourse change during the peace processes and the implications of such change to peace in Sudan.

2.2.5 Humanitarian interventions

The literature on the humanitarian interventions in Southern Sudan falls into two categories. The first category analyses pre-2005 interventions, while the second category focuses on the post-CPA interventions and the operations of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). There are two related arguments in the pre-2005 category. One argument emphasises the linkage between relief efforts and the war economy. Analysing the interplay between the politics of relief and the war economy, Johnson (2011a, 143) has noted that relief interventions in Sudan in the late 1980s and 1990s were ‘entangled with the related issues of war aims and the peace process.’ That is, the international relief interventions became trapped in the war economy as each of the main conflict actors sought to use the relief efforts to further its war aims and strategies. ‘The war economy of both the government and the guerrillas,’ writes Johnson (2011a, 143-144), involved the ‘capture of labour, as much as the capture of territory.’ As a result, relief efforts became part of the government’s ‘development strategy’ and ‘slavery and the exploitation of oil’ became ‘inexplicably linked in the war effort’ (2011a, 144).

Affirming this point, Riehl (2001) argues that international relief aided the authoritarian tendencies of GoS and supplied the SPLM/A with material resources, which supported the movement’s military activities and diplomatic and propaganda purposes. Though this view is not directly answering the research question of this thesis, it implies that the pre-2005 humanitarian interventions became trapped in the conflict discourse.

Another argument underlines the role and functions of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) which undertook humanitarian interventions, especially Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). The OLS was an umbrella organisation of international NGOs which had been working in South Sudan since 1983 (Riehl 2001; Johnson 2011a; Khalid 2003). Founded to avert an anticipated famine in the South, the OLS’s strategies were ‘distribution of grain and the establishment of feeding centres for specific vulnerable populations’ (Johnson 2011a, 148). The operation comprised two branches: the northern sector which was based in Khartoum and served government held towns,
and the southern sector that was based in East Africa and accessed the SPLM/A held territory.

The government controlled relief operations in the northern sector, but accessibility, rather than reported needs, determined relief work in the southern sector (Johnson 2011a; Khalid 2003; Riehl 2001). Further, famine in the north, especially in the Kordofan region, affected relief distribution in the northern sector. Meanwhile, the fall of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, and the SPLM/A split and factional fighting, disrupted relief efforts in the southern sector (Johnson 2011a; African Rights 1997). Therefore, the two sectors, though officially committed to the same cause, adopted divergent approaches to relief work. Johnson (2011a, 151) has observed that the northern sector emphasised development and ignored ‘the war in its advocacy of a move away from relief to development’, while the southern sector ‘was confronted with the stark realities of a war almost on a daily basis’. In practical terms, the northern sector emphasised development as a means of transforming the economy with a view to reducing dependency on relief. However, this emphasis ended up converting the war-displaced population into a labour reserve for the government or private agricultural schemes. In contrast, the southern sector preferred complementing relief work with projects that aimed at resuscitating the rural subsistence economy. The ‘two approaches,’ writes Johnson (2011a, 151), ‘were, in effect, opposed, especially in areas… where the tactics of the war on the government side were squeezing labour from non-governmental to government-controlled areas.’

In summary, the observation that the OLS was split into two sectors which adopted opposed approaches to their work, does not explicitly address the research question of this study. However, it implicitly highlights how different interpretations of a discourse contribute to different policy actions. Indeed, I argue that the two contrasting approaches to relief in South Sudan arose from different interpretations of the war discourse. These interpretations were imposed by the geographical locations where these sectors were headquartered and, consequently, by the dominant conflict agents in those locations.

The category of literature on post-2005 international interventions is mostly about the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) which was established through Security Council Resolution 1590 of 24 March 2005. UNMIS was a chapter VII mission and its
mandate was fourfold. First, to support the implementation of the CPA through, among others, monitoring the ceasefire arrangements and verifying violations, liaising with international funders on the formation of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), and observing and monitoring the movement of armed groups. Second, the mission would facilitate the return of refugees and IDPs. Third, the mission would provide humanitarian and de-mining assistance and technical advice. Lastly, the mission would coordinate civilian protection and provide political support to the government and the SPLM. The mandate of the mission ended on 9 July 2011. On the same date, the UN Security Council closed UNMIS and established the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS).

Lijn (2010, 44) has argued that UNMIS’s assistance to the parties enhanced the ‘process of political transformation and democratisation in both northern and southern Sudan.’ The mission also helped the parties address some of the conflict causes and fostered inter-group relations through reconciliation initiatives (Mingst and Karns 2007; Lijn 2008, 2010). For example, UNMIS facilitated agreements between nomads and settled communities which eased seasonal migrations and reduced communal tensions in Abyei (Lijn 2010). In other words, UNMIS’s mandate of supporting the implementation of the CPA allowed it to engage in some post-agreement peacebuilding activities. The literature on the UNMIS does not directly address the research question of this study though it raises interesting issues regarding post-agreement peacebuilding.

2.3 Reaffirming the Research Gap

The Sudan studies literature on the civil war and the 2002 to 2005 peace process comes from diverse fields of study. However, to date, it has not approached the study of the civil war, the 2002 to 2005 peace process, CPA implementation, or post-CPA peacebuilding, from a specifically peace and conflict studies perspective. Nonetheless, this review has found that it links with the peace processes literature which I reviewed in chapter one as it covers all the main themes which the peace and conflict studies literature deals with, including dynamics of peace negotiations, contents of a peace agreement, peace agreement implementation issues, and post-agreement peacebuilding. This review further found that the Sudan studies literature powerfully highlighted issues around the role of agents and structures in the rise, escalation, and resolution of a
protracted civil war, and alluded to the structure/agency interaction. However, this review also identified a major gap in the scholarly literature: no previous study has analysed discourse transformation in the 2002 to 2005 peace process, or employed the discursive approach to analyse the peace process. I aim to contribute to filling this lacuna.

2.4 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to review the existing Sudan studies literature with a view to assessing the accumulated scholarship on conflict discourses and to survey how scholars of Sudan studies have framed their arguments and conceptualised peace interventions. The review focused on five broad themes, namely, peace process, peace agreement, causes of the civil war, conflict intractability, and international humanitarian interventions. Though a broad literature exists on the Sudan civil wars and the peace process, and some scholarly works implicitly allude to the importance of discourses, the review has found a major gap because there are virtually no texts which are explicitly dedicated to the subject. Based on this research gap, I will develop in the next chapter an analytical framework for discourse transformation in peace processes that I will subsequently use to analyse the Sudan peace process.
PART TWO: THEORY AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Chapter Three
From Hurting Stalemate to Agreement Implementation:
A Discourse Transformation Framework

If we consider violence as a postmodern problematique, what is required to understand it is the interpretation of violence as a discourse and a semiotics, and a phenomenology in which violence is itself a mode of interpretation, with interpretation leading to violent events: protest, insurrection, terrorism. (David Apter 1987).

3.1. Introduction

This chapter will develop an analytical framework that will guide the collection and analysis of data. As Yin (2009, 40) has affirmed, the use of theory in case studies ‘is an immense aid in defining the appropriate research design and data collection. The same theoretical orientation also becomes the main vehicle for generalizing the results of the case study.’ The first section will elucidate the ontological and epistemological positions which underpin this study. As chapter one has explained, this study is based on the discursive approach which provides an alternative approach to positivism in conflict research. Therefore, it is necessary to explain its ontological and epistemological foundations. The second section will cover the conflict transformation approach to which this study hopes to make a significant contribution, and the way it is conceptualised in the transition from civil war to peace.

The third section will develop the theoretical linkages between conflict transformation and discourse theory. Utilising the idea of civil war as a constructed discourse, the section will argue that discourses are critical processes which the political elite, who participate in peace processes, employ to change the collective understanding of the conflict. Thus, change in narratives, which are the centrepiece of discourses, comprises a fundamental pillar of conflict transformation. The section will then argue that this is an insight that has been lacking in the literature on conflict analysis, and elucidate the connection between narratives, identity, and exclusion as conceptualised by the discursive approach. Blending the discursive approach with conflict transformation perspectives will contribute new insights to the analysis of peace processes.
The last section of the chapter will develop a framework for tracing the process of narrative transformation in a peace process. This study will use the framework to trace shifts in narratives from the start of a peace process to the implementation of a peace agreement. The analytical framework and its application in tracing narrative transformation in peace processes will be another significant contribution of this study to the literature on transitions from civil war to peace.

3.2. Ontology and Epistemology

Ontological and epistemological positions specify the philosophical foundation of a research study. Whereas ontology is concerned with claims about the existence of realities such as peace, conflict and violence, epistemology seeks to demonstrate knowledge about the existence of those realities. According to Jackson (2014) the question of ontology and epistemology has not been debated widely in peace and conflict studies, as it has been in international relations and political science. Aggestam (1999) and Jabri (1996) made the same observation more than a decade ago. However, all the theories and analysis of violent conflict are underpinned by ontological and epistemological claims. The literature on conflict analysis confirms that ontological and epistemological positions are implicit rather than explicit in most academic writings. But whether these positions are acknowledged or not, ‘they shape the approach to theory and methods which the social scientist utilises’ (Marsh and Furlong 2002, 17). According to Demmers (2012, 15), ‘the many different theoretical traditions of violent conflict are all simply variations on two sets of ontological and epistemological themes: structures and agents as ontological stances, and explanation or understanding as epistemological stances.’

The fundamental divide on ontological positions between various theories of violent conflicts is centred on whether the seeds of violent conflict are located in the structures, or whether they are products of agency. Chapter one and two have reviewed this structure/agency divide. As Demmers (2012, 15) puts it, ‘does structure primarily determine action or does action determine structure?’ Where a conflict researcher locates the seeds of violent conflict determines his/her ontological viewpoint, and, subsequently, his/her analytical starting point. If a researcher emphasises the primacy of structures, then his/her analytical position is that agents involved in violent conflicts act primarily in
response to structural pressures. For example, some structural theories postulate that competition over resources causes conflict between groups. In contrast, proponents of agency-centric approaches view agents as the initiators of violent conflict. Consequently, they lean towards the belief that structural change results directly from agents’ actions. Social identity theory and other social-psychological approaches, for instance, regards individuals’ emotional needs as the motivation for construction of in-groups and out-groups (Demmers 2012; Jacoby 2012; Kaldor 1999; Gallagher 1997; Fearon and Latin 2003). Similarly, the rational choice theory of conflict posits that individuals initiate and sustain violent conflict as long as it is profitable (Demmers 2012; Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Reno 1995).

As an alternative to structure and agency-centred theories, the discursive approach emphasises the social process of discourse formation, and the notion of violent conflict as a constructed discourse is its fundamental premise (Demmers 2012; Jabri 1996; Wilmer 2002; Lemarchand 1994a). In essence, the discursive approach views agents and structures as mutually constitutive. That is, the approach ‘emphasises how structures and agents stand in a dialectical relationship to each other: they are seen as mutually constitutive entities’ (Demmers 2012, 137). The notion of mutual constitution means that violent conflict is viewed as ‘situated and reproduced in discursive, intersubjective and institutional continuities. Thus, shared understandings and social institutions provide power and legitimacy, which enable and reproduce conflict and violence’ (Aggestam 1999, 31).

Ontologically, therefore, the discursive approach synthesises agency and structures. Agency-structure synthesis means that agents produce structures which then reproduce agency. Hence, the two are ‘understood as ontologically intertwined and interdependent… neither agency nor structure has an existence in isolation from the other, as their relationship is genuinely relational’ (Strömbom 2010, 9). The notion of structure-agency synthesis has attracted criticism for blurring the conceptual distinction between agency and structures, yet it is this distinction that allows researchers to create clarity and order in peace and conflict research (Demmers 2012; Jabri 1996). Nonetheless, the discursive approach offers crucial insights into the social construction of violent conflict. As Demmers (2012, 137) has argued, ‘through a focus on discursive and institutional continuities and social practices the dialectics between the abstract
“structure” and “agency” becomes researchable’. In other words, the discursive approach’s systematic analysis of discourses provides a method through which we can understand violent conflict as a constructed discourse.

The foregoing ontological position raises the question of epistemology. The epistemological divide is between those researchers who seek to provide causal explanations of violent conflicts, and researchers who aim to understand the meanings and rules of social action (Marsh and Furlong 2002; Aggestam 1999; Druckman 2005; Demmers 2012). Those who seek causal explanations argue that ‘the social world can best be examined from without’, while those who aim at understanding ‘claim that the social world must be studied from within’ (Demmers 2012, 15). As Suganami (1999, 366) explains,

To explain an occurrence is to treat it as though we were a natural scientist dealing with unselfconscious entities, with a view to identifying the causes that led to the outcome. To understand an occurrence is to make sense of the situation in the light of the rules and institutional practices of the society concerned and the participants’ own reasons for their actions pertaining to the situation.

Premising the explanation (or positivist) position is the notion that human action is built on regular relationships and causal laws (Demmers 2012; Marsh and Furlong 2002). In this view, generating and testing hypotheses can establish these causal relationships and thus ascertain a general explanation of a social phenomenon. As Marsh and Furlong (2002, 23) notes, positivism holds that social science is possible ‘if we followed the scientific method; deriving hypothesis from theory and then testing them in an attempt to falsify them.’ The explanation epistemology regards human behaviour as ‘essentially determined and predictable’ and theory as ‘a set of propositions that link cause and consequence’ (Demmers 2012, 16). The explanatory epistemology has attracted several criticisms. The main one is that the concepts that researchers use mediate the knowledge that they acquire, and the chosen theory affects the chosen facts and their interpretation. For example, Marsh and Furlong (2002) have noted that in those survey questionnaires where participants are asked to reply to queries with scales, their replies are forced into researchers’ categories, the meaning of which is given an interpretation by the researcher. Thus, the researcher’s interpretations do not just reflect the reality of the
questionnaire respondents, but they construct a certain social reality. Another criticism is that social structures do not exist independently of the activities they shape; rather, the activities affect the agents’ understanding of the structures and this helps to change them. (Marsh and Furlong 2002, 24). Thus, social structures change as a result of the actions of agents over time and across space.

In contrast, the understanding (or interpretive) epistemology posits that ‘the world is socially or discursively constructed’ (Marsh and Furlong 2002, 26). As a result, researchers who adopt the interpretivist position aim at understanding the meaning or interpretation of action (Marsh and Furlong 2002; Demmers 2012; Druckman 2005; George and Bennett 2005). Demmers (2012, 16) has observed that while actions ‘derive their meaning from shared ideas and rules of social life, the construction of meaning is historically and culturally specific.’ In other words, scholars have to study the meanings and interpretations in context. According to Marsh and Furlong (2002, 26), the fundamental dictum in interpretivism is that contextual meanings ‘can only be established and understood within discourses or traditions.’ The interpretivist epistemology also rejects the notion of structural determinism and emphasises ‘the creative and unpredictable way in which people construct meaning’ (Demmers 2012, 16). Positivists have criticised interpretivism as mere opinions and subjective judgements about the world. They have also argued that interpretivists lack a basis on which to judge the validity of their knowledge claims. But according to Marsh and Furlong (2002, 27), these criticisms are ‘based on a totally different ontological view and reflect a different epistemology and, thus, a different view of what social science is about.’ Demmers (2012) has connected these contrasting epistemological positions and ontological claims using the Hollis (1994) matrix, as shown in table 3.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ontology/Epistemology</th>
<th>Explaining (positivist)</th>
<th>Understanding (interpretive)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structuralism</td>
<td>Social structures are systems external and prior to actions and determining them fully</td>
<td>Social structures of sets of rules telling people how ‘to do’ social life (language, religion, economy). Agents are role/rule followers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Agents are self-contained units and the source of action.</td>
<td>Agents are embedded in society but have agency, they can act, initiate change, they have room for reflective self-direction.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Ontological and Epistemological positions in Hollis Matrix. Source: Demmers (2012, 16)
I have so far argued that the discursive approach upon which this research is premised synthesises structure and agency. I have also argued that the discursive approach views violent conflict as a constructed discourse and as such focuses on interpretations and meanings. This means the discursive approach is concerned with systematic analyses of discourses within their specific cultural, historical and power contexts. Epistemologically, therefore, ‘discourse theory is firmly rooted in the “understanding” side of the Hollis (1994) matrix and takes an interpretive stance’, as represented in table 3.2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ontology/epistemology</th>
<th>Explaining (positivist)</th>
<th>Understanding (interpretive)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structuralism</td>
<td></td>
<td>The discursive approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2: The Discursive Approach in Hollis Matrix. Source: Demmers (2012, 137)

I will now link these ontological and epistemological stances with conflict transformation thinking and then develop a framework of analysis which this study will employ to understand discourse transformation in peace processes.

3.3. Conflict Transformation in Peace Processes

The previous chapters noted that a peace process is a critical juncture in the transition from civil war to peace because its chief aim is to transform conflicts. But the introduction chapter posed a question: how does a peace process engender conflict transformation? I will review the theorisation of conflict transformation before I attempt to answer this question. In broad terms, the literature on conflict resolution covers three main approaches: conflict management (CM), conflict resolution (CR) and conflict transformation (CT) (Jeong 2009; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2005; Kriesberg 2008; Aggestam 1999; Mitchell 2002; Botes 2003). The literature indicates that each of these approaches refers to the conceptual view of conflicts. While the term conflict transformation has dominated the literature in recent years, the other two terms are commonly used, especially in practice.

Initially, the conflict transformation approach elicited heated debates because its proponents presented it as an alternative to conflict resolution (see Botes 2003; Lederach
1997; see Mitchell 2002; Aggestam 1999; Rhodes 2008; Clements 2002). Some scholars like Mitchell (2002, 2) initially questioned its utility, arguing that the original meaning of the term conflict resolution adequately covered all the ‘additional implications generally involved in the idea of a transformative process or solution.’ Botes (2003) delineated the progression from resolution to transformation in an effort to clear up its usage in academic literature. However, Lederach (2005, 2003b, 2000, 1997) insisted that a conflict has long-term relational, structural, contextual and cultural dimensions. Therefore, a conflict moves through certain predictable phases transforming relationships and social organisations. ‘The idea of transformation does not suggest we simply eliminate or control conflict, but rather points descriptively towards its inherent dialectical nature. Social conflict is a phenomenon of human creation, lodged naturally in relationships,’ he argued (1995, 17).

Two intertwined ideas, which are requisite in the transition from civil war to peace, can be deduced from the conception of conflict transformation. First, conflicts are part of the social construction of societies. Second, conflicts are nonlinear, cyclical, and dialectical processes. Thus, conflict resolution interventions should aim for transformation and not just resolution. The conflict transformation literature conceptualises ‘transformation’ as changes in individuals, shifts in the relationships between the warring parties, and the restructuring of social institutions and material structures (Botes 2003; Mitchell 2002; Kriesberg 1997, 2007; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2005; Lederach 1997, 2006; Rhodes 2008). As Mitchell (2002, 9) explains it, transformation transforms ‘three broad categories: those dealing with personal changes, those dealing with structural changes, and those dealing with relational changes.’ Echoing the same view, Botes (2003, 10) interprets conflict transformation as ‘transformation of the individuals, transformation of the relationships, and transformation of the social systems, large and small.’ The emphasis on actor, relationship, and structural change is fundamental for two reasons. First, it centres on the agency/structure dialectic which the previous chapters raised. Second, it links the discursive approach and its view of conflict as a constructed discourse with how peace processes engender conflict transformation. Thus, furthering theoretical understanding of these three attributes of conflict transformation is imperative.
**Actor transformation**

Actor transformation is built on the idea that parties in a conflict have certain perceptions towards their adversaries, and particular views towards the conflict and the structures in which they interact (Rhodes 2008; Kriesberg 2008; Lederach 2006, 1997; Botes 2003; Mitchell 2002; Clements 2002). A ‘conflict is born in the world of human meaning and perception,’ Lederach (1997, 63) avers. Thus, transforming a conflict requires changing the perceptions of the actors towards their adversaries and their view of the conflict. Mitchell (2002) has observed that actor transformation includes actors changing the way they frame and understand issues in conflict, actors acknowledging the legitimacy of their adversaries and their claims, concerns and issues, as well as actors’ willingness to heal the damage. Botes (2003) has referred to actor transformation as changes in the emotional, perceptual and spiritual dimensions of a conflict. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall (2005, 163) have similarly stated that actor transformation requires redefinition of directions, modification, or abandonment of cherished goals, and the ‘adoption of radically different perspectives’, that is, ‘new goals, values and beliefs’. However, the notion of actor transformation raises questions about levels of agency because, only Lederach (1997) has clearly theorised levels of agency with his three levels of leadership pyramid.

**Relationship transformation**

Premising relationship change is ‘the structure of relationship within which the parties operate’ (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2005, 163). The central idea in this attribute is that seeds of conflict are located in the relationships between actors, and, thus, achieving long lasting transformation of these conflicts requires shifts in the conflicting relationships (Rhodes 2008; Kriesberg 2008; Lederach 2006, 2003b, 1997; Botes 2003; Mitchell 2002). According to Lederach (1997, 63), a conflict arises and is ‘constantly changed by ongoing human interaction… and the social environment in which it is born.’ In this view, attaining conflict transformation requires changing the relationships between the parties to the conflict. Different analysts have explained relationship transformation as changing of the norms that define the relationship, redefinition of roles in the relationship, changing how the parties communicate, shifting patterns of interaction, and adjusting power imbalances between the parties (Kriesberg...
Explicit in the notion of relationship transformation are changes in horizontal relations between the actors, but it raises questions about vertical relations within an actor.

Structures transformation

The third attribute is the change in social and material structures. The literature on conflict analysis identifies structural issues as the core of the substantive agenda of peace processes (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2004; Jeong 2009; Covey, Dziedzic, and Hawley 2005; Arnson 1999; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2005). Structural transformation according to Botes (2003) involves ‘changes that may transpire in the system or structure within which the conflict occurs, which is more than just the limited changes among actors, issues and roles.’ Structural transformation involves changing political, economic, and socio-cultural institutions. In some civil wars, some of these structural issues are embedded in the regional and international context (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2005).

The conceptualisation of conflict transformation with actor, relationship, and structures transformations as its building blocks can be represented in the form of an analytical triangle, as Figure 3.1 below shows. This visualisation allows us to represent conflict transformation as a dynamic process, in which the three transformations influence and legitimise each other in dialectic relationships.
Introducing Narrative Transformation

Having understood conflict transformation as change in the worldviews of the actors, shifts in their relationships, and adjustments in the structures, let us go back to our original question: how does a peace process engender conflict transformation? That is, how does a peace process transform conflict actors and their relationships? What is it that makes yesterday’s enemies shift their views and start seeing each other as partners in peacebuilding? Conflict transformation theory, as currently formulated, does not provide answers. Its emphasis on relationships, however, suggests that it shares the assumptions of interest-based negotiation theory and transformative mediation. Interest-based negotiation theory presupposes that face-to-face negotiations in a peace parley lead to greater understanding of each conflict actors’ interests because they involve encounters, dialogue and getting to know each other (Fisher and Ury 1983; Ury, Brett, and Goldberg 1988; Ross 2000). As a result, the actors change their perceptions towards each other, shift their views towards the conflict, and search for solutions that seek to satisfy the interests of all conflicting parties. As Kriesberg (2008, 402) states, ‘transformation generally requires that adversaries recognize each other’s claims and humanity to a significant degree. The antagonists also begin to regard their previously conflicting goals as reconcilable.’
Similarly, transformative mediation focuses on change in individual consciousness and character, and presumes that actor transformation results in relational and structural change (Mitchell 2002; Botes 2003; Bush and Folger 1994). As Mitchell (2002, 9) sums up, ‘major change occurs in the individuals directly involved in the conflict as adversaries.’ The idea of individuals shifting their views and perceptions after understanding their adversaries’ perspectives or interests is useful in inter-personal and community conflicts. But it does not explain change in views for those involved in protracted civil wars in which the conflicting parties have deeply held enemy images and denial of the ‘other’. Moreover, it does not explain the process through which individual change produces relational and structural transformation.

Aggestam (1999) has covered this gap in large part by emphasising conflict reframing in her study of actors’ change and continuity in the 1988-1998 Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Reframing as defined by Kriesberg (1991, 15), is ‘redefinition and reconceptualization of the conflict… in a new context, as when a new superordinate shared goal is found.’ Recognising the historical contingency of the actors and social structures, Aggestam (1999) has also embraced conflict transformation and constructivism as important theoretical frameworks. She has also theorised how actors change their perception and the meaning of conflict before negotiations, and how this change influences the negotiation process and outcome. Interestingly, Aggestam (1999) has turned to cognitive and attribution theories of social psychology to explain shifts in enemy images and perceptions of the conflict. ‘An analysis of cognitive and ideological beliefs,’ she (1999, 48) writes, ‘accordingly facilitates an understanding of the images of self and enemy.’ Therefore, she has focused on ‘political elites’, whom she refers to as ‘a few individuals who are part of a single body... a political leadership, which constitutes the inner of a decision-making body’ (Aggestam 1999, 46).

The focus on political elites brings to the fore three critical points. First, it debunks the assumption of unitary actors, wherein lies the explanatory power of the conflict transformation theory as currently formulated. She has thus raised the question of non-unitary actors, and contributed towards covering a critical lacuna in the literature. The notion of non-unitary actors in this sense refers to the vertical cleavages between elites and their support base within the population (Darby and Mac Ginty 2000; Kelman 2007, 1999). The preceding sections referred to this as different levels of agency. The literature
on actors in peace processes has mainly been concerned with the existence of multiple groups or factions, and the theorisation of horizontal relations between these multiple groups (Stedman 1997, 1991, 2003; Kelman 1993; Atlas and Licklider 1999; Zartman 1995; Zahar 2003; Darby 2001). By acknowledging the divide between the elite and their support base within a group, Aggestam (1999) has brought back the question of non-unitary actors to the study of peace processes. However, she has focused her research on change within the political elite and their horizontal relations. In contrast, and just like Ron (2009), this study is concerned with both horizontal relations and the elite-mass relation within a party to a conflict.

Second, Aggestam (1999) has based her analysis on constructivism, and has indeed recognised the elite as ‘situated actors’. While she could be coming from a broader perspective, her study on the Israel-Palestine peace process implicitly takes an instrumental view. The discursive approach has criticised instrumentalism for attributing change solely to the elite. According to Demmers (2012, 35), instrumentalism attributes ‘too much power to the machinations of predatory elite’, and portrays the masses as ‘pawns in a propagandistic conspiracy’. In contrast, the discursive approach affirms mutual constitution between the elite and the masses, and hence views the masses as active rather than passive followers. Third, Aggestam (1999) assumes that once individual elite members have changed their understanding of the conflict, the supporting bases automatically change their perceptions and, subsequently, reconstitution of the social structures follows. Therefore, her study does not address the vertical relations in a non-unitary actor.

From the point of view of the discursive approach, the elite may shift their views and initiate change. However, the supporting bases do not automatically shift their views just because the elite have changed. The elite who are usually the ‘conflict entrepreneurs’ may initiate change once they shift their views, but the success of their efforts is dependent on the collective understanding of the conflict. Elite-mass inter-subjectivity constructs the social meaning of a war at the onset, but the war re-constitutes the meaning, turning it into a very durable and hard to change structure as it progresses (Demmers 2012; Wilmer 2002; Jabri 1996). Therefore, the inter-subjectivity between the elite and their supporters plays a crucial role in the acceptance and successful
implementation of peace agreements, and in legitimisation of the new institutions, which emerge from peace processes.

Recognising this inter-subjectivity, Lederach (2005, 2003b, 1997), one of the central figures in the conflict transformation school, has emphasised relationship transformation. In a three-level peacebuilding model, he has explored the links between the various levels of agency in situations of protracted conflicts. The top level leaders, he writes (1997, 38), ‘are the spokespersons for their constituencies and for the concerns that generate and will resolve the conflict.’ The middle level leadership links the top leadership with the grassroots leadership which acts directly on the population. Each of these levels of agency performs particular peacebuilding functions. While acknowledging ‘the interdependence of multiple levels of society, from grassroots to high-level political processes’ (2005, 9), Lederach has nonetheless averred that they are often independent of each other in many instances of protracted conflicts. Therefore, peacebuilding interventions should aim to utilise the skills and advantages of each of these levels and, more importantly, aim to bridge ‘the vertical gap – the lack of connection between community and political processes of negotiation’ (2005, 9).

Lederach has also developed and espoused a lucid post-peace agreement conflict transformation framework based on relationship transformation. Drawn from his extensive practical experience, this transformative framework aims at creating an infrastructure for peace. The creation of an infrastructure for peace demands a long time commitment by both actors in the conflict and third party interveners. As he puts it,

The notion of infrastructure proposing a longer-term view of change required a high view and reconsideration of context in order to understand, encourage and support resources from within the setting. At its core, infrastructure suggested that change unfolds over time and requires a quality of presence rooted in the setting with a capacity for generative responses to emergent crises and a longer-term, shared vision of desired change (2005, 10) (original emphasis).

Lederach has made significant contributions to the practice and theory of conflict transformation with his systematic analyses. His pyramid of leadership and model of relationship transformation rightly acknowledges the inter-subjectivity between the
leaders and their supporting constituencies. In his insightful elucidation of the role of
cultural context in the social construction of reality and knowledge which generates
violent conflict, he has rightly argued for consideration of these roles in conflict
prevention, peace negotiations, and post-agreement interventions. However, because he
is interested in relations between all actors in general and across all levels of society, his
analyses leans more towards horizontal relations. Therefore, he does not pay sufficient
attention to the vertical relations in a unitary actor such as an armed movement.

Moreover, in his eloquent articulations of relationship transformations, Lederach does
not write on how the top-level leaders, who participate in peace negotiations, transform
the views and enemy images held by their constituencies after they have shifted their
own views and understanding of the conflict. In the 2002 to 2005 Sudan peace
negotiations, for example, ‘the most intense period of the negotiations involved great
personal commitment and tenacity and the transformation of a unique relationship
[between Sudan’s First Vice-President, Ali Osman Taha, and the SPLM/A leader, John
Garang] – from enemies to partners in peace’ (Johnson 2011b, 2). How would each of
these two leaders (and their negotiators) transfer their individual transformation to their
supporting constituencies? In general terms, what is the mechanism for converting a
leader’s or an elite member’s perceptual change into mass or structural transformation?

The discursive approach’s answer to this riddle is discourse. Chapter one explained that
the discursive approach addresses the issue of elite-mass divides by focusing on the
discursive construction of group boundaries. The cornerstones of group boundary
construction are identity and exclusion. Thus, the collective understanding of violent
conflict is achieved through ‘discursive construction of the enemy-other’ (Demmers
2012, 135). In turn, the collective understanding of violent conflict forms the basis on
which the core negotiation or bargaining points in a peace process, including issues,
interests, demands and positions, are discursively constructed. This study, therefore,
posits that the elite who participate in peace processes reconstruct collective
understanding of the conflict by addressing the dominant discourses. As the carriers of
conflict meaning at the popular sites of cultural expression, narratives are the lifeblood of
discourses (Croft 2006; Hayward and O’Donnell 2011; Somers and Gibson 1994;
Somers 1994; Demmers 2012). As Demmers (2012, 118) notes, the discursive approach
transcends the ‘elite-mass controversy’ by ‘focusing on the way social boundaries are constructed by narratives.’

Guided by this thinking, I now introduce the notion of *narrative transformation*. Conceptualising narratives as the essence of discourses in peace processes, I argue that a change in conflict narratives is a necessary turning point in the process of discarding old perceptions and acquiring new perspectives, new beliefs, and new worldviews. As Ross (2000, 1020) puts it, conflicts ‘should be understood as social and cultural constructions whose meanings can be transformed as people change their knowledge, perceptions and models of what is at stake.’ I therefore propose *narrative transformation* as the fourth postulate of the conflict transformation approach, open the conflict transformation triangle (figure 3.1 above) and convert it into a conflict transformation diamond as shown in figure 3.2 below. I will use narrative transformation as a theoretical tool to systematically study discourse transformation in peace processes.

Figure 3.2: The conflict transformation diamond.
3.4. Discourse Transformation in Peace processes

Previous sections have advanced our understanding of the role of discourses in the transition from civil war to peace. This has been done by establishing the linkage between discourse change and conflict transformation, which is the end goal of peace processes. To enhance understanding of discourse transformation in peace processes, I now turn to discourse analysis for additional insights. I will further theorise here the narrative component of discourses with a view to advancing understanding of narrative transformation.

3.4.1. Discourse as an Empirical Concept

Conflict is a situation in which two or more parties, regardless of how they are defined or structured, perceive that they have mutually incompatible goals (Wallensteen 2007; Jacoby 2012; Jeong 2009; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2005; Demmers 2012). Galtung (1996) derived the components of the conflict triangle incompatibility, attitudes and behaviour from this definition. According to Demmers (2012), structural approaches to conflict research emphasise incompatibilities of structures, while actor-centred approaches stress the attitude component in which the origin of conflict is located in the individuals’ make-up. To conceptualise violent conflict as a constructed discourse, the discursive approach regards the notion of perception as the nerve-centre of conflict definition. This is because it is the fulcrum of ‘the ontological relationship between agency and structure,’ and thus affirms violent conflict as ‘a product of human decisions made within the context of structured social relations’ (Jabri 1996, 4). Therefore, perception is the focus of discourse analysis. ‘For a variety of reasons,’ Demmers (2012, 125) writes, the elite ‘convince their audiences that a certain incompatibility of goals is threatening them, and try to turn this into a dominant discourse’. Chapter one defined discourse and explained its two main components, namely, discursive forms and social practices. This section will theorise discourse and its components.

There are various definitions of discourse in the literature, but they all share certain core premises. First, ‘they all share the idea that discourses are stories about social reality’ (Demmers 2012, 125). These stories are expressed relationally and represented by the ‘social truth’. Second, they all argue that we access reality through language. ‘With
language, we create representations of reality that are never mere reflections of a pre-existing reality but contribute to constructing reality’ (Phillips and Jørgensen 2002, 8). Therefore, although discourse analysis recognises the existence of material reality, it asserts that the meaning and representations of that reality are created through language. ‘Physical objects do not possess meaning in themselves; meaning is something we ascribe to them through discourse,’ notes Phillips and Jørgensen (2002, 35). In this sense, discourse, as chapter one defined it, incorporates ways of thinking, beliefs and assumptions, norms, language, written and spoken texts, and social practices, including social organisations and public policies. For example, the Islamist discourse in Sudan was at the centre of the second civil war. It incorporated the Islamists’ ways of thinking, their beliefs and assumptions about state-society relations, their notion of the Sudanese national identity, and their public policies, including the codification of Islamic law and the institutionalisation of moral police force.

Third, discourse analysts agree that socially created meanings and representations not only reconstitute material reality, but also mutual constitution and reconstitution extends to issues such as identities and social relations (Dijk 1993; Fairclough and Fairclough 2012; Fairclough 1995b, 1995a; Dijk 1997; Phillips and Jørgensen 2002). Discourse theory’s conception of identity is premised on the understanding that ‘human beings and social objects do not have a fixed and eternal meaning but acquire their identity in a relational way, i.e. in relations with other entities in the world’ (Anastasiou 2007, 31). From a conflict transformation perspective, this point links with the ideas of relationship transformation. Fourth, discourse analysis proclaims that discourse formation is not a top-down process. That is, elites cannot impose discourse. ‘Coding, interpretation and meaning are the outcome of complex dynamics of interactions between a wide variety of actors,’ observes Demmers (2012, 125).

Underlying these four premises are the ideas of ‘discourse as relational’ and ‘discourse as action’ (Demmers 2012, 125). Discourse is in this view understood to be a particular way of talking about and understanding the world or an aspect of the world. Upholding the linkage between language, relations and actions, Phillips and Jørgensen (2002, 1) have argued that ‘our ways of talking do not neutrally reflect our world, identities and social relations but, rather, play an active role in creating and changing them.’ Thus, discourse analysis involves the systematic breakdown of a discourse with a view to
understanding how it has been produced, and how it reproduces the social world. To Johnstone (2002), discourse analysis entails decoding a discourse into parts such as functions (e.g. narratives), participants (e.g., media and political parties), social settings (e.g., social organisations and schools), or processes (e.g., gendering, ‘enemification’ and ‘othering’ of persons).

In the literature on social constructionism, four broad premises of discourse analysis have been identified (Dijk 1997, 1993; Fairclough and Fairclough 2012; Fairclough 1995a, 1995b; Foucault 1972; Phillips and Jørgensen 2002). The first premise is a critical approach to taken-for-granted knowledge. In essence, this premise affirms that our knowledge and representations of the world are products of discourse. The second premise emphasises the historical and cultural specificity of the way we understand and represent the world. That is, our worldviews, our social relations, and our identities are contingent and therefore can change over time. The third premise is the link between knowledge and social processes. The centrepiece of this premise is the view that discourse reproduces knowledge and maintains social interactions. Finally, the fourth premise links discourse and social action, that is ‘different social understandings of the world lead to different social actions’ (Phillips and Jørgensen 2002, 6).

From the foregoing, the main divide between discourse analysts is the extent to which discourse constitutes the social world. According to Phillips and Jørgensen (2002, 19), ‘the difference can be concretised by locating the approaches on a continuum.’ On the one end of the continuum are approaches that view discourse as constitutive of the social, whereas on the other end are those approaches which view discourse as a reflection of other social mechanisms. Figure 3.3 represents this continuum.

![Figure 3.3: The role of discourse in the constitution of the world (source: Phillips and Jørgensen 2002: 20)](image)

In summary, discourse and discourse analysis as theorised in the literature have provided us with two fundamental insights which will help us understand discourse transformation in peace processes. The first insight is that ways of talking, social identities, social relations, and material structures are mutually constituted. In other words, ‘discourse as
action’ and ‘discourse as relational’ - in terms of power, knowledge, and identities - produce and reproduce each other. The second insight is that though the social world is comprised of socially constructed meaning-systems, it is perceived as objective and permanent because of sedimented discourses (Phillips and Jørgensen 2002; Dijk 1997; Fairclough 1995a; Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). ‘Objectivity is sedimented power where the traces of power have become effaced, where it has been forgotten that the world is politically constructed,’ writes Laclau (1990, 60). Sedimented discourses refer to ‘a long series of social arrangements that we take for granted and therefore do not question or try to change’ (Phillips and Jørgensen 2002, 55). However, such social arrangements or discourses are not fixed; they are temporal, contingent, and open to transformation. ‘Changes in discourse are a means by which the social world is changed,’ affirms Phillips and Jørgensen (2002, 9).

Because these arguments are the key bridge between discourse transformation and conflict transformation theory, I will rephrase them in the form of premises. First, a peace process is the turning point in the transition from a violent conflict to peace. Second, the end goal of a peace process is conflict transformation. Third, if the end goal of peace processes is conflict transformation, and if violent conflicts are constructed discourses, then the end goal of peace processes is the transformation of discourses. In addition, peace processes involving societies that are transiting from protracted civil wars require transformation of the sedimented discourses, and reconstruction of new meanings, new identities, and new relationships. But this raises another question: how does a discourse change after it has become sedimented?

The literature on discourse analysis highlights two ways in which sedimented discourses change. The first way is the emergence of a crisis, which interrupts continuity and puts a stress on the system (Croft 2006; Adler 1991). Sedimented knowledge represents the general knowledge that a society understands as true. Therefore, crises are very effective in changing sedimented discourses because they undermine this ‘social truth’ and expose to the agents the limitations of the existing institutions or approaches. According to Adler (1991, 55), crises induce a ‘cognitive punch’ and, thus, they accelerate ‘reevaluation and change from one set of collective understandings or paradigms to another.’ Rephrasing this view, Anastasiou (2007, 43) has averred that ‘crises shake the intransigence of institutions and relations.’ In cases of protracted conflicts, this study
postulates that mutually hurting stalemates are forms of crises because they reveal to the
warring parties that their approaches can no longer help them achieve their goals. It is
this revelation which compels elites, leaders of armed movements and, subsequently,
their supporters to re-evaluate the current discourses and adopt new ones. Indeed, Ron
(2009, 6) has referred to a peace process ‘as an epistemological crisis in the public
sphere.’

In the absence of crises, the literature attributes evolutionally change of the sedimented
discourses to ideational factors. One view on ideational factors, which has emerged from
the constructivist literature, has emphasised the role of norms, norm life cycles and norm
entrepreneurs in engineering change (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Adler 1997; Ruggie
1998; Weldes 1996). In this view, norms, or the rules that guide interactions among
agents, are both constitutive and regulative. This means agents create norms which then
regulate and limit the agents’ choices. Thus, the meanings of norms are collectively held.
Because norms regulate the patterns of behaviour, they are the foundation of sedimented
discourses. In other words, agents use norms to justify some actions and to make others
abominable. Moreover, collectively held norms, or the intersubjective understanding of
reality, are linked to group identity. This means sedimented discourses, or common
knowledge that is collectively shared about a subject, are involved in the making of
group identity. It is through this knowledge that agents differentiate ‘insiders’ from
‘outsiders’.

According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 888), research on norms is interested ‘in the
role norms play in political change – both the ways in which norms, themselves, change
and the ways in which they change other features of the political landscape.’ The
starting point for change is the emergence of new norms which challenge the existing
ones (Adler 1991; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Ruggie 1998). Motivations for the
emergence of new norms vary, but they include ideational commitments, altruism, and
empathy. A three-phase norm life cycle then follows. In the first phase, norm
entrepreneurs, that is, agents who have some power and organisational platforms in the
society, articulate the new norm. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 897) have observed that
an essential component of norm entrepreneurs’ strategies is the construction of ‘cognitive
frames’ through which issues are ‘framed’. Once a norm has become successful, it is
these ‘frames’ which resonate with the ‘broader public understanding and are adopted as
new ways of talking about and understanding issues’ (1998, 897). The cascading phase, when a critical mass embraces the new norm, follows articulations. Imitation and socialisation are critical mechanisms in this second phase. In the last phase, norm internalisation occurs and from then onwards, the norm becomes taken-for-granted knowledge and is no longer the subject of public debate. This taken for granted knowledge comprises the sedimented discourses. In constructivist thought, norm entrepreneurs operating in organisation platforms play a critical role in the emergence and internalisation of discourses.

Another view on ideational factors emphasise the role of the elite in generating change. Adler (1991) has borrowed the idea of cognitive development from social psychology and promoted the notion of ‘cognitive evolution’. The cognitive evolution model offers a three-step process of change. The first step is innovation, that is, the creation of new values, meanings, and interpretations, by agents with some power and within institutions. Among the essential components needed in order for these ideas to succeed are timing and practical applications. The second step is selection, that is, the social process through which some new ideas are accepted and others are rejected. The last step in the process is diffusion which refers to the spread and institutionalisation of the new ideas, expectations and values, is the last step in the process. To Anastasiou (2007, 42), the cognitive evolution model is ‘more helpful in analysing empirical data.’

A third view on ideational factors, which Fairclough (1992) espouses in his arguments on discourses and change, locates the motivation and seeds of change in the contradictions inherent in the existing sedimented discourses. Problematisation of, or questioning these contradictions, creates ‘dilemmas’ which agents try ‘to resolve by being innovative and creative, by adapting existing conventions in new ways, and so contributing to discursive change’ (1992, 96). The contradictions are rooted in the structural and agency levels of the society. As a result, change involves ‘putting together existing conventions in new combinations, or drawing upon conventions in situations which usually preclude them’ (1992, 96). Further, as new discursive conventions are combined in innovative ways, they change the hierarchy of discourses through ‘disarticulating existing orders’ and ‘rearticulating new orders’ of discourse (1992, 97).
The unifying thread between the three viewpoints in ideational factors, and between them and the notion of crises, is the role of agents and institutions in motivating and generating change of the sedimented discourses through innovations, creativity, and the dissemination of change ideas. These connections, in turn, link with the earlier arguments about violent conflict being a constructed discourse, agency and structures being mutually constituted, and discourse transformation in peace processes. We can now visualise peace processes as interventions in which the agents disarticulate the existing discourse and re-articulate a new discourse. The textual foundation of the new discourse is the peace agreement. But from this argument rises another question regarding how discourse transformation in peace processes can be studied empirically. To answer this question, I turn to the building blocks of a discourse.

3.4.2. Narratives: The Building Blocks

The discursive approach examines discourses that generate and legitimise violence against the ‘other’. The literature on the discursive construction of social boundaries highlights the central role of practices such as narratives, performances, and images. As Demmers (2012, 135) writes, ‘the approach looks at stories, both as narratives and images, but also as enacted in practices, materialised in tangible products and inculcated in forms of being… It studies the narrative reconstruction of reality and analyses how these stories have come about.’ This places narratives as a pivotal subject of research in the discursive approach. But what is narrative?

The concept of narrative, when viewed generally as a story, is usually associated with fiction (Baker 2006; Patterson and Monroe 1998; Somers 1994). But as Baker (2006, 28) has noted, ‘the extensive literature on narrative in various disciplines abounds with discussions of typologies, dimensions and axes.’ For instance, in his analysis of psychocultural narratives in the Middle East conflict, Ross (2007, 31) has referred to narratives as ‘explanations for events – large and small – in the form of short, common sense accounts (stories) that often seem simple’. According to this view, narratives could be simple, but they are deeply rooted in cultural worldviews and in-group identities. Thus, they evoke powerful images and contain judgements about the conflicting parties and their motivations.
Narratives are the lenses through which actors in a conflict understand the social and political worlds in which they live and explain the conflicts in which they are involved. Ross (2003, 191) has further identified the functions of narratives as causing, reflecting, and exacerbating conflicts. Funk and Said (2004, 3) have referred to narratives as shared stories by members of social or political groups about their relations with ‘others’ to create or reinforce a sense of collective identity and shared purpose. Focusing on narratives in political science, Patterson and Monroe (1998, 315) have viewed the concept narrative as ‘the ways in which we construct disparate facts in our own worlds and weave them together cognitively in order to make sense of our reality.’ Viewing narratives as the shapers of social actions in response to or in anticipation of political events, Patterson and Monroe draw from the ideas of Somers (1994) and Somers and Gibson (1994). These ideas conceptualise four categories of narratives: ontological, public, conceptual and meta-narratives.

**Ontological narratives** are personal stories, which individuals use to narrate their life histories and locations in society. These ‘are the stories that social actors use to make sense of – indeed, to act in – their lives. Ontological narratives are used to define who we are; this in turn can be a precondition for knowing what to do’ (Somers 1994, 618). Though they are personal stories, ontological narratives are social and interpersonal. Their social nature means they ‘are dependent on and informed by the collective narratives in which they are situated’ (Baker 2006, 29). They are intimately connected to and shaped by **public narratives**, the second category. Somers (1994, 618) conceptualises public narratives as ‘those narratives attached to cultural and institutional formations larger than the single individual to intersubjective networks or institutions however local or grand.’ Social institutions, including the family, religious and educational organisations, the media and political movements, are the purveyors of public narratives.

The third category, **conceptual narratives** refer to those ‘concepts and explanations that we construct as social researchers’ (Somers and Gibson 1994, 620). Social scientists construct conceptual narratives as they seek to understand social phenomena. A good example is the notion of ‘ethnic wars’. Baker (2006) has expanded this conceptualisation to include disciplinary narratives, and cited the example of Huntington’s (1996) *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of the World Order*. Linking conceptual narratives to the larger world are the **meta-narratives**. These are the ‘master narratives in
which we are embedded as contemporary actors in history and as social scientists’ (Somers and Gibson 1994, 619). Examples of meta-narratives include industrialisation, enlightenment, liberalism, communism versus capitalism, nationalism and Islamism. All disciplinary theories and concepts, including peace studies, international relations, and political science, are encoded in meta-narratives. Linking the four categories, Baker (2006, 39) has observed that conceptual narratives ‘penetrate the public space and shape public narratives during a specific period in history.’ Further, she has recognised the importance of academic and cultural institutions, such as mass media, as the purveyors of narratives.

Three insights arise from the above theorisation of narratives as the primary building blocks of discourses. First, narratives construct and reconstruct social reality, including identity. Second, the intimate connection between the first three levels of narrative reflects and reinforces the collective understanding of social reality. Third, historical moments and cultural specificity shapes narratives. In summary, it is narratives that provide the elite who participate in peace processes with interpretative frames – identities, symbols, metaphors and historical memory – on which they build their ‘disarticulations’ and ‘re-articulations’ of discourses in peace processes. These insights make discourse transformation in peace processes empirically researchable because they allow for the identification of public and conceptual narratives which are present in written and spoken texts. In particular, the insights allow me to turn my attention to two aspects which have emerged strongly as the foundation of violent conflict as a constructed discourse: identity and exclusion.

3.5. Narratives of Identity and Narratives of Exclusion

Undertaking armed conflict requires the mobilisation of the general population. Conflict research has confirmed that one of the central links between individuals within a population and mass mobilisation for violent conflict is identity. Literature has also revealed that mass mobilisation for violence entails the construction and articulation of a collective identity which is differentiated from the ‘other’ (Demmers 2012; Wilmer 2002; Jabri 1996; Kaldor 1999; Fearon and Latin 2003; Gopin 1997). Various theories of conflicts have approached the formation of collective identity and its role in the rise and escalation of violent conflict differently. Some research locates the source of identity at
the level of the individual, other studies trace it to the level of the group, while a third category focuses on the interaction between the individual and the group.

Those approaches that emphasise the individual as the primary unit of analysis have understood conflict in terms of individuals seeking to fulfil their basic needs of identity. Because they view identity as fundamental to the survival of individuals and their group, these approaches regard collective (or group) identity as an extrapolation of individual identity (see Demmers 2012; Jabri 1996). But the static, ‘ahistorical and acontextual’ view of identity of these approaches has been criticised for its inability to explain ‘the predominance of one identity… and the relationships between the continuities of social interaction and the construction of identity, the dynamic nature of identity, and the behavioural consequences of identity formations’ (Jabri 1996, 124)

Several strands of thought run through the approaches that have traced the origin of identity at the group level. The first strand of thought, the primordial or essentialist approach, claims that ‘identities are perennial, objective and timeless’ (Demmers 2012, 35). Primordial narratives in the literature on conflict analysis explain ethnic identities as ingrained in human history and experience. Viewing ethnic bonds as overpowering, non-rational, inexplicable, ancient, and enduring, the essentialist perspective is common in explanations of most civil wars. This is because the narratives of origin and blood relations resonate with the popular view that identities are ‘communal bond given by nature, as something that is in your blood, and therefore unchangeable’ (Demmers 2012, 24). In the primordial view, therefore, violent conflicts involving groups arise because people are different. Essentialism has been critiqued for its focus on the nature of ethnic identification, its non-recognition of human dynamism, its inability to explain the emergence of different identities at different historical moments, and for its failure to account for the rise of violent conflict as particular times.

The second strand of thought, constructivism, argues that collective identities are socially and politically constructed over time. According to Demmers (2012), two contrasting views fall under the constructivist approach. The instrumental view emphasises the role of elites who drive the construction process in pursuit of particular goals. In this view, collective identities arise out of social and political activities that are mobilised as a means to attain some goals. Studies advancing the instrumental view have highlighted
violence as one of the main tools that elites utilise to create collective identity (Fearon and Latin 2000; Kalyvas 2003; Lemarchand 1994a; Deng 1995). The instrumentalists’ position on violence as a tool of attaining collective identity contrasts sharply with the primordial view which sees violence as an outcome of pre-determined social identities. Instrumentalism has, however, been criticised for failing to explain the non-rational, emotional depths of some collective identities, and the sacrifices that are made in the name of the groups.

An alternative constructivist view, culturalism or ethno-symbolism, emphasises the social meaning of identity (Kaufman 2006b, 2001; Demmers 2012; Jabri 1996; Grigorian 2007). The approach is primarily concerned with the content that glues holders of collective identity together, rather than the construction of boundaries. The approach conceptualises violence between ethnic groups ‘not as a consequence of security dilemmas, informational asymmetries, commitment problems, or elite manipulation, but instead as a consequence of the content of ethnic groups’ identities… myth-symbol complexes’ (Grigorian 2007, 180). To explain group boundaries, ethno-symbolism stresses myths of origin, collective experiences, and shared memories. Violent conflict between groups is ‘seen as primarily emerging from ethnic group content, such as hostile mass attitudes and ethnic mythologies,’ writes (Demmers 2012, 36). However, culturalism has been criticised for its inability to explain the formation of collective identities, its emphasis on cultural contents, and its turn to essentialism.

There are also social identity approaches that have aimed at linking ‘the individual and group levels of analysis’ (Jabri 1996, 124). Originating from socio-psychological studies, these approaches understand social identity as the actualisation of self-identity through group identification. They thus locate collective identity formation in the individual’s cognitive processes, which stem from the human need to categorise, to belong and to secure self-esteem (Tajfel 1981; Abrams and Hogg 1998). The socio-psychology literature attributes the tendency to classify to ‘the natural need for order and simplification’ (Demmers 2012, 39). This categorisation leads to social differentiation. The emergent social categories are not just cognitive processes that enable individuals to understand their world. They are also emotional and evaluative. Social identity approaches hold that it is this need for categorisation, coupled with the value and emotional significance attached to group membership, which explains the emergence of
in-groups and out-groups. Individuals subsequently employ various strategies to promote their in-group and de-value the out-group. The formation of in-groups and out-groups leads to ‘an escalatory dynamic of group comparison, group competition and ultimately, group hostility’ (Demmers 2012, 40).

Though social identity approaches have provided crucial insights on how and why in-group members support violence against the out-groups, they have attracted several criticisms. First, despite theorising the formation of in-groups and out-groups, they still view the group from the perspective of the individual’s cognitive processes. Second, they fail to explain why people are categorised in certain ways. Third, they are only interested in the consequences of categorisations. According to Demmers (2012, 48), social identity approaches are ‘not interested in the politics of identity group formation and boundary drawing.’

The discursive approach offers an alternative way of conceptualising collective identity formation. Firmly rooted in social constructionism, the discursive approach rejects elite-mass and structure-agency divides associated with instrumentalism, culturalism (ethno-symbolic) and the social identity approaches. Instead, the approach views the elite and masses, and agents and structures, as mutually constituted and, thus, focuses on the way social processes, or discourses, construct identities and violent conflicts. I will elucidate how the discursive approach understands collective identity in more detail because it is the foundation of this thesis.

According to Jabri (1996, 127), the discursive approach starts from the point that the individuals’ daily encounters draw from the existing discursive and institutional continuities and they, in turn, reproduce them through their practices. The discursive and institutional continuities are the rules of social life that guide individuals’ daily encounters. ‘We are born into societies which are organised along certain rules of social life,’ writes (Demmers 2012, 120). Articulated in social interactions, the discursive and institutional continuities guide social life and determine the resources - both social and material - that individuals draw upon to achieve their objectives (Demmers 2012; Jabri 1996; Wilmer 2002; Lemarchand 1994a). These continuities are deeply embedded in time and space such that we see them as natural and self-evident. The discursive and institutional continuities are visible to us through discourses and social institutions such
as families, schools, religious organisations, mass communication, militaries, and so on. In addition, power is exercised through these continuities.

Though attributes such as memories, myths and symbolic orders inherent in these continuities are hardly referred to in the daily encounters, they constitute an important part of individuals’ background, which provides meaning to individuals’ senses of self (Jabri 1996; Wilmer 2002; Demmers 2012). Thus, individuals’ articulated senses of self, or personalities, develop into identities – meanings – within the relationships with others in the social world. As Wilmer (2002, 68) puts it, ‘identity is referential. It exists only in reference to something other than itself, an order, an Other, or multiple orders and Others, orders of others’ [emphasis in original].’ In other words, identity arises out of the affirmation of the self’s existence by others. ‘Social identity is, therefore, implicated and reproduced in the daily encounters,’ writes (Jabri 1996, 130). In this view, individuals are interpretive agents, who constitute their identities, but the existing discursive and institutional continuities constrain their construction of identities.

The discursive and institutional continuities limit the boundaries of social identity construction by providing the social categories, positions, and relations in which the individuals subjectively position themselves. Such social categories and positions are located in deeply held social norms that have been institutionalised over time and reinforced through structures of domination. As Jabri (1996, 130) notes, ‘open expressions of identity are based on a selection of attributes shared with other members of society.’ This means individuals have a choice in constructing their social identities, but the frames they utilise and the social categories in which they situate themselves are provided by pre-existing discursive and institutional continuities. ‘Although identity formation is always a point of active selection and contestation,’ writes Demmers (2012, 135), ‘it is not the same as free selection: it is through deeply engrained institutional and discursive continuities that people situate the self and the other in certain categories of belonging.’

Three arguments lie at the heart of this conceptualisation of identity. First, identity construction is a discursive phenomenon. This means collective identities are constructed from various social repertoires available to people in discursive and institutional continuities. In essence, therefore, collective identities result from continuous processes
of construction and reproduction of shared understandings about a group’s self. Second, the construction of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ occurs simultaneously. Thus, ‘othering’ plays a key role in facilitating development of the group’s common orientation and values. It is, however, not the fact of difference that structures the relations in the social arena between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, but the meanings that are attached to the difference (Jabri 1996; Wilmer 2002; Fearon and Latin 2000; Demmers 2012; Lemarchand 1994a). The differences exist, but ‘it is the significance they have to social action and analysis in the way in which they are constructed within social processes that counts’ (Wilmer 2002, 78).

For example, two groups in the same country could be different in language, cultural affinity, and the way each identifies itself within the historical narrative. But these differences are not as important as how they structure their social relations. The relation between French, German, and Italian groups in Switzerland is a good example. Third, individuals at any point in time have multiple social identities which have been constructed within temporal and relational affiliations. The group identity that emerges as the dominant one at a particular historical moment and cultural interactions is, however, contingent on local and contextual conditions.

The foregoing underscores the ideas that lie at the heart of violent conflict as a constructed discourse: discursive construction of the ‘enemy other’, legitimisation of violence against the ‘enemy other’ and reification. The discursive approach indicates that mass mobilisation is done through discursive construction of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ divides, and the discursive legitimisation of violence against ‘them’, that is, the ‘enemy other’ (Jabri 1996; Demmers 2012; Wilmer 2002). As Jabri (1996, 130) writes, ‘violent conflict is constituted around the construction of a discourse of exclusion. This invokes articulations of separateness, of limitations to access, of strict boundedness [emphasis in original].’

Discourses of exclusion draw from the discursive and institutional continuities, and strive for internal cohesion within the group by rallying the common identity around imminent ‘threats’ or ‘dangers’, either from within or from without. In diverse situations, discourses of exclusion incorporate a great variety of elements, including skin colour, social institutions, cultural patterns (norms, values, rituals), territory, orientations to
one’s self, and the history of one’s collective self compared to the ‘enemy other’ (Wilmer 2002; Jabri 1996; Deng 1995; Lemarchand 1994a; Fearon and Latin 2000). In particular, narratives and myths of origin are powerful discursive elements of mobilising collective identities. As Jabri (1996, 134) avers, violent conflict ‘is the time at which free individuality becomes submerged into a wider group affiliation defined in terms of the nation and a collective memory.’

Two issues arise from these arguments. The first issue is why discourses of exclusion emerge at particular times, while the second issue revolves around the process through which discursively constructed identities become reified, that is, hard and permanent. Demmers (2012, 128) points at moments of social uncertainty as the answer to the first issue. Appearing in different forms such as political crises, economic recessions, cultural challenges or state failure, these moments of uncertainty present conflict entrepreneurs with an opportunity to discursively construct ‘enemy others’. ‘Discourses of exclusion are most powerful when they are both socially meaningful and politically functional,’ affirms Demmers (2012, 129). In certain situations, Jabri (1996, 134) argues, the constructed ‘enemy other’ is not just the offensive leadership, but ‘another constructed entity, an entire population, whose history is reconstructed and itself represented in exclusionist terms, categorised, in turn, according to a specified attributed definition.’

To explain how the emergent discourses of exclusion become sedimented, Demmers (2012, 130) turns to the concepts of enactment and inculcation which Fairclough (2003) developed. Enactment means turning these discourses into actual practices and materialising them in tangible products, while inculcation denotes people owning these discourses and materialising them in communication styles and body postures. Enactment and inculcation of the exclusion discourses turns the spotlight on the eruption and justification of violence against the ‘enemy other’. Some research studies have provided ‘a four-stage model leading from conflict to war’ (Demmers 2012, 132).

The first stage is the structural violence that fuels inter-group competition. Confrontation, that is, conversion of the structural violence into antagonistic relationships is the second stage. It is at this stage that conflict entrepreneurs accelerate the construction of the ‘enemy other’. The third phase entails legitimisation of violence against the ‘enemy other’ as the appropriate course of action. Conflict entrepreneurs
employ narratives, performances, and inscriptions to legitimise violence against the constructed ‘enemy other’. Such legitimisation ‘recreates the past, it appeals to strong feelings of inclusion, based on the experience of either suffering or superiority, and it is a direct route to the assertion of power’ (Demmers 2012, 133). The last phase is conversion of the violence discourse into action. Other studies have highlighted articulation of threat and victimhood narratives, demonization and dehumanisation of the ‘enemy other’, renegotiation of violence norms, and suppression of alternative voices, as the central discursive processes (Jackson and Dexter 2014). However, the central claims in the various studies are in essence the same: generation and legitimation of direct violence is situated in discursive practices, which are built on exclusionist identities.

Regarding the reification of the constructed collective identities, Demmers (2012, 35) notes that the constructed identities, as part of the ‘constructed systems of knowledge and meaning’, become institutionalised and reified over time. The literature on violent conflict identifies social practices and direct violence against the putative identity among the factors critical to the reification process. By treating individual holders of the collective identity as one internally homogeneous, externally bound group, that is, as unitary collective actors with a common goal, social practices facilitate the reification process (Jabri 1996; Lemarchand 1994a; Wilmer 2002; Demmers 2012). As Jabri (1996, 97) notes, ‘forms of signification “naturalise” the existing state of affairs, negating the mutable, historical character of human society. It is here that modes of discourse and particular social orders are taken for granted in lived experience.’ Direct violence against the collected identity is another powerful factor that facilitates the reification process by reinforcing exclusionist identities and reproducing violence discourses (Demmers 2012; Wilmer 2002; Jabri 1996; Lemarchand 1994a; Fearon and Latin 2000). According to Fearon and Latin (2000, 865) direct violence functions in two ways. It can ‘alter the social content associated with being a member of each category – and in turn set in motion a spiral of vengeance’, and it can ‘sharply delineate identity boundaries that everyday interaction… threaten to blur.’

In summary, the importance of narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion in the understanding of violent conflict as a constructed discourse is now explicit. Nonetheless, it is necessary to recap the arguments here. The cornerstones of the discursive construction of violent conflict are discourses of identity and discourses of exclusion.
Discourses of identity involve the discursive construction of the ‘self’, which is contrasted with the ‘other’. The constructions of the ‘self’ always go hand in hand with the constructions of the ‘other’. Discourses of exclusion entail discursive construction of the ‘other’ into the ‘enemy other’. Whereas moments of social uncertainty creates the opportunity for the construction of the ‘other’ into the ‘enemy other’, the actual construction mechanisms are narratives, performances, images, inscriptions, and their materialisation in forms of institutions, policies and other tangible products. Moreover, collective identity formation intertwines identity narratives at the individual level (ontological narratives) with identity narratives at group level (public narratives), while social scientists convert these narratives into societal knowledge structures (conceptual narratives) by utilising these identities as units of analysis. Therefore, narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion are the building blocks of discourses of identity and discourses of exclusion.

By focusing on narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion, this study not only simplifies our understanding of violent conflict as a constructed discourse, but it also makes discourse transformation in peace processes researchable. In other words, by examining the narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion which prevailed in Sudan before the 2002 to 2005 peace process, I hope to understand the second civil war as a constructed discourse. By exploring the representation of these narratives in the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and subsequent practices during the six-year interim period, this study hopes to understand discourse transformation in the 2002 to 2005 peace process. From this detailed exposition of identity and exclusion narratives, I will now develop an analytical framework for tracing narrative transformation in peace processes.

3.6. A Framework for Understanding Narrative Transformation

Researchers in peace and conflict studies have debated the question of the point at which actors in conflict opt for negotiated settlements, or when a peace process is likely to start (Jeong, Lerche, and Susnjic 2008; Kriesberg 2007; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2005; Ohlson 2008; Zartman 1995, 2003). According to Mitchell (1995, 38), ‘four different versions (or models)’ have been forwarded to explain this moment.
The first version refers to this pivotal point as a hurting stalemate. Also referred to as the ‘plateau’ model, the hurting stalemate version suggests that parties to a conflict seek a negotiated solution when they cannot envision successful outcomes through current strategies, or desire an end to continually costly action. ‘When alternative, usually unilateral, means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked, the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament,’ writes Zartman (2003, 19). In this model, the hurting stalemate must be mutual, that is, both parties to the conflict must feel it. As Ohlson (2008, 145) puts it, ‘a conflict resolution process usually begins when both belligerents for one or another reason perceive the war as deadlocked and painfully costly.’ To Mitchell (1995), however, the model does not specify the stronger motivating factor between the rising costs or the failure to achieve success.

The second version emphasises ‘precipice’, or a disaster threatening to overwhelm the stalemated adversaries. In this view, de-escalation of violence and engagement in negotiations is dependent on both parties being threatened by a catastrophe. If a precipice threatens one party only, then the other party has no incentive to engage in a negotiated settlement. The emphasis in both the first and the second versions of stalemates is the cost-benefit analysis associated with rational actors.

In contrast, the third version, which is referred to as entrapment, points at the ‘irrational process by which “costs” become transformed into “investments” in a conflict that cannot be given up for less than complete victory’ (Mitchell 1995, 42). Entrapment means the elite leaders are trapped between achieving goals, justifying costs, minimising losses and exhausting resources. The turning point in this model, therefore, is when a salient event triggers a re-assessment and conflict actors change their goals with a view to salvaging their remaining resources, even if this requires abandoning pursuance of the elusive victory.

The fourth and last version, enticing opportunity, ‘takes a more optimistic view of leaders in conflict, suggesting that a ripe moment can occur when leaders see a much better alternative way of achieving their goals than “slogging” on with the continuing and costly struggle’ (Mitchell 1995, 44). In this model, the emphasis is on the anticipated benefits and rewards, rather than costs and sacrifices. Aggestam (1999) has stated that the difference between this model and the first three is the assumptions on which they are
based. While the first three stress negative experiences such as hurting stalemates and precipice, the enticing model emphasises positive expectations of future gains.

Lederach (2003a, 34) has critiqued the application of the ripeness metaphor, especially in ‘contexts of protracted deadly conflicts’, because it ‘suggests a focus on content and [peace] agreement making rather than being relationship and change-oriented’. He has instead proposed ‘cultivation’ which suggests ‘an organic connection to context, the building of relationships, and a commitment to process over time’ and thus captures the core of the peacebuilding work (2003a, 34). But whether one uses the term ripeness or cultivation, there is no doubt that studies on violent conflict have agreed that protracted conflicts reach a point at which the ‘belligerents decide to abandon unilateral strategies to win the war and instead switch to a bi- or multilateral strategy of finding a negotiated peaceful solution to the conflict’ (Ohlson 2008, 146). Studies on conflict resolution show that a peace process is initiated at this turning point, either by the conflicting parties themselves or by third parties. This is not to say that there are no efforts to end violence before this point. The argument is that such efforts fail because the parties are not yet willing to abandon the clamour for military victory.

This study postulates that from a discursive approach’s point of view, a hurting stalemate, or a turning point, is a crisis or a moment of uncertainty in the life of the civil war. Such a crisis necessitates discursive shifts and the reconstruction of discourse. The study also postulates that the discursive shifts cannot be sudden. On the contrary, this study views a peace process as a decisive intervention, which provides a phased transformation of the narratives. Croft (2006, 84-121) has conceptualized the term decisive intervention as a series of discursive activities that are initiated by the elite in a context of socially constructed crisis to control the crisis and reshape the discursive structures. The shifts in discursive structures are reproduced in the society using pre-existing networks and power structures. In the context of this study, a peace process performs the same functions of shifting discursive structures. Guelke (2003, 56) notes that a peace process has seven phases: the pre-talks, an era of secret talks, the opening of multilateral talks, negotiating to a settlement, gaining endorsement, implementing its provisions and the institutionalisation of the new dispensation. While accepting all these steps, Ohlson (2008) has grouped them into three general phases, namely, the negotiation phase, the agreement implementation phase, and the consolidation phase.
I postulate that the pre-negotiation phase is the first step when the warring parties start discursive change by negotiating representations to the peace process, reconstructing their ‘enemy other’ images and naming and renaming the conflict. The next dialogue phase is the moment when the negotiating parties define their positions, demands, and interests. It is at this phase that the parties explicitly or implicitly espouse the main narratives which have been underpinning their perspectives in the course of the conflict. Further, I postulate that the negotiating parties use the dialogue phase to change the discursive context and generate change within and between them, thus opening themselves to changed perceptions and behaviour. The outcome of the dialogue phase is a peace agreement which I view as the basis of a new strategic trajectory. As Ohlson (2008, 148) states, ‘peace agreements are not only about terminating an old war, but also about putting in place various mechanisms to prevent the occurrence of a new one.’ Thus, this study holds that as transformational documents, peace agreements are supposed to envision the transfer of power, the emergence of new institutions and the attainment of sustainable structural and attitudinal changes. I view peace agreements as the foundational documents of discourse reconstruction. That is, I view peace agreements as the texts that ought to define the new trajectory, including the institutional and policy representations of the new narratives.

To sum up, I propose to trace discourse transformation in peace processes by identifying the discursive gap between narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion at the start of the peace process and representations of these narratives in the peace agreements. Further, this study proposes to explore whether the new institutions, which are established at the peace agreement implementation phase, represent the reconstructed discourses. The implementation phase, Ohlson (2008, 148) wrote, ‘is a fundamental test of the sincerity of the parties and of the quality of the agreement. During this phase it is vital that the former conflicting parties’ commitment to the agreement is underwritten by concrete action.’ In other words, the reconstructed discourse is supposed to maintain the confidence of the parties in the peace process and reduce mutual distrust, fear, and other negatives that may have been carried over from the dialogue phase. Hence, concrete action requires institutionalisation of the new discourse and its embedded narratives. Concrete action, in essence, requires reconfiguration of the discursive and institutional continuities. One can therefore understand the degree of discursive change after the
implementation of the peace agreement by interrogating representations of these narratives in post-agreement policies and institutions. This framework presupposes commitment to transformation by agents who pursue peace settlements and the existence of facilitating social and material structures.

However, challenges may arise at the implementation phase for some reasons. Among them is ‘strategic and tactical deception’ (Stedman 2003, 103) by non-committed parties, and the lack of facilitating social and structural factors. As a result, the peace agreement may be partially implemented leading to some transformation, but not all the envisaged transformation would occur, leading to a ‘no war, no peace’ situation. Alternatively, the peace agreement fails and no transformation would occur. The parties then return to war. Another possibility would be discourse rupture, that is, disconnect between the discursive forms and social practices, or the peace process would create a new discourse of hostility and division. In this case, the parties would still revert to war as happened with the Oslo process for the Israel-Palestine conflict. Figure 3.4 below represents this thinking.
Starting from the view that a hurting stalemate is a crisis of discourse or a moment of uncertainty, this model has three empirical phases. The first phase will be analysing the narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion which prevailed in the course of the civil war in Sudan up to 2002. The second phase will be examining representations of the narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion in the CPA. The third phase will be interrogating the representations of the narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion in implementation practices during the six-year interim period.
3.7. Conclusion

This chapter has elucidated the theoretical foundation of this thesis. Starting from the view that peace processes are pivotal interventions in the transition from civil war to peace, the chapter has postulated conflict transformation as the end goal of peace processes. Therefore, it has explained the main pillars of conflict transformation as currently conceptualised. Moving to the heart of this thesis, which is the idea of civil war as a constructed discourse, the chapter has expounded the theoretical linkage between conflict transformation and discourse transformation in peace processes. The chapter has advanced detailed theoretical arguments and illustrated that discourses construct social reality, which in turn reconstructs discourses. Further, it has elaborated that narratives are the building blocks of discourses and introduced the notion of narrative transformation.

After linking conflict transformation with discourse transformation, the chapter has advanced arguments around violent conflict as a constructed discourse by explaining the discursive construction of exclusive identities and the legitimisation of violence. It has then introduced two concepts, narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion, as the principal analytical constructs. The chapter has then developed an analytical framework after establishing the practicality of the research. In conclusion, therefore, I hope that tracking shifts in narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion between the various phases of a peace process will facilitate understanding of discourse transformation. The first phase of the framework will explore narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion before the start of the peace process. The second phase will examine their representations in the CPA, while the third phase will interrogate the CPA implementation phase. Let me now operationalise the analytical constructs.
Chapter Four
Researching Discourse Transformation in Peace Processes

4.1 Introduction

The literature review chapters demonstrated that peace studies has not paid sufficient attention to explorations of discourse transformation in peace processes. The review also showed that no studies have utilised the discursive approach to analyse peace processes. Moreover, chapter one and chapter three explained that academic studies using the discursive approach examine the formation and institutionalisation of discourses which generate and legitimise violence against the ‘other’. Elucidating an elaborate analytical framework for this study, chapter three developed and explained in detail two conceptual constructs, narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion, which I have used in this research to trace discourse transformation in Sudan’s peace process. Accordingly, this chapter sheds light on all aspects of the research design.

Research design is, in essence, the blueprint that guides empirical data collection and analysis (Marsh and Stoker 2002; Druckman 2005; Yin 2009; George and Bennett 2005; Mouton 2008). According to Yin (2009, 26), research design is ‘the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study’s initial research questions and, ultimately, to its conclusions.’ Thus, the first section of the chapter will explain the research strategy. Besides explaining the case study approach employed in the study, the section will expound on the rationale behind the selection of the approach. The second section will articulate the analytical approach, and it will be followed by the methodological approach section that will operationalise the two analytical constructs. The methodological approach is based on the Discourse-Historical Analysis (DHA) method of discourse analysis. The third section will cover empirical data collection and analysis.

4.2 Research Strategy

Many research projects in peace and conflict studies have emphasised hypothesis testing using relevant empirical data, and confirmation or falsification of knowledge claims. This study differed from that approach because I did not seek to test, refute, or confirm
hypotheses. My theoretical foundation, the discursive approach, arises from constructivist ontology and interpretivist epistemology. In order to achieve analytical depth rather than breadth, therefore, I designed the study as a single-case study where I applied the relevant theoretical insights with a view to obtaining a richer understanding of the stipulated research questions. Yin (2009, 18) has referred to case study as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in-depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.’ Four types of case study designs are found in the methodological literature: holistic single-case studies, embedded single-case studies, holistic multiple-case studies and embedded multiple-case studies (Yin 2009; Druckman 2005; George and Bennett 2005; Marsh and Stoker 2002). The first two are variants of single-case studies; the latter two are variants of multiple case studies. While the whole case serves as the unit of analysis in a holistic single-case study, an embedded single-case study has sub-units or embedded units of analysis (Yin 2009).

The phenomenon from which this study drew its empirical data was the 2002 to 2005 peace process in Sudan. Though the literature broadly refers to this conflict as the North-South civil war, and Sudanese themselves called it the ‘Southern Problem’, it had different components and embedded regional conflicts in the ‘transitional’ areas, which required separate negotiations during the protracted peace process. As a result, the outcome of the process, the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), was a collection of six peace agreements and two annexures which stipulated implementation modalities. The whole case was the subject of this study, but I considered the components, that is, the regional conflicts and the constituent agreements of the CPA, as embedded sub-units within the larger unit. Therefore, this research is an embedded single case study. As Yin (2009, 52) has pointed out, sub-units of analysis may be incorporated within the single case ‘so that a more complex – or embedded – design is developed. The subunits can often add significant opportunities for extensive analysis, enhancing the insights into the single case.’

Single case studies are valuable when the subject of research is examined within the frame of their specific context, and when the boundaries between the subject of study and its context are not clear (Yin 2009; George and Bennett 2005; Druckman 2005). Yin (2009, 18) has explained that case study inquiry is favoured in empirical studies that
involve a ‘technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and relies on multiple sources of evidence.’ Further, case studies are appropriate in research studies which require ‘the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis’ (2009, 18). The choice of single-case study methodology in this study considered several rationales.

First, single-case studies are very useful in empirical studies that contribute to theory development. This quality synchronises very well with one of the main objectives of this research project, which is to develop an analytical framework. As Yin (2009, 47) observes, by advancing or extending a theory, a single case ‘can represent a significant contribution to knowledge and theory building.’ Second, this thesis is a revelatory study. Revelatory case studies are conducted when social research has not been done on a phenomenon, despite its prevalence (Yin 2009, 49). This argument applies to this research because peacemakers hold peace processes and implement peace agreements. Similarly, many studies on both peace processes and peace agreements exist. Yet, the literature review has shown that studies have not used the discursive approach to analyse discourse transformations in peace processes. The lack of scientific studies on discourse transformation in peace processes justifies ‘the use of a single-case study on the grounds of its revelatory nature’ (Yin 2009, 49).

Third, this thesis aims to contribute to the practice of peacemaking. As Aggestam (1999, 11) has noted, single-case studies are appropriate for investigations of contemporary phenomena, whose goal is to ‘provide empirical insights that are of interest not only to academics but also to practitioners.’ Fourth, this study relied on multiple sources of empirical data, that is, primary and secondary texts, as well as interviews with key informants. This made single-case studies methodology very attractive due to ‘its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence – documents, artefacts, interviews and observations…’ (Yin 2009, 11). Fifth, case studies allow for the analysis of social processes, that is, events, interactions, groups and institutions as they emerge and change over time (Anastasiou 2007). Lastly, this study’s theoretical foundation, the discursive approach, is based on social constructionism. Previous chapters argued that the discursive approach synthesises structures and agency and, thus, adopts a ‘holistic’ view of conflicts. According to Yin (2009, 50), a ‘holistic design is advantageous… when the relevant theory underlying the case study is itself of a holistic nature.’ In addition, from a
social constructivist point of view, case studies offer comparative advantage in addressing qualitative variables (George and Bennett 2005, 9).

The single-case study method has attracted several criticisms (Druckman 2005; George and Bennett 2005; Yin 2009; Aggestam 1999; Marsh and Stoker 2002). Critics have argued that case studies lack analytical rigour and sufficiently clear measures of data. They have also pointed at the possibility of shifts in the case during the course of the research. In addition, unlike experiments and surveys, critics have insisted, case studies provide little basis for scientific generalisations beyond the immediate case study. Yin (2009, 43) has, however, argued that criticisms on generalisation are based on assumptions of ‘statistical generalization’, which is associated with survey research and experiments, whereas case studies rely on ‘analytic generalisation’. The case study method, therefore, aims to expand and generalise theories, but not to enumerate frequencies. ‘In analytical generalization,’ he writes (2009, 43), ‘the investigator is striving to generalize a particular set of results to some broader theory.’ Furthering this argument, Aggestam (1999) has added that the generalisation criticism reflects the different ontological and epistemological assumptions that underpin different research methods.

This thesis adopted these arguments and surmised that because the goal is to contribute to the conflict transformation approach, and to advance the discursive approach, its empirical findings could be generalised to other similar cases. The study constructed an analytical model for the empirical analysis of discourse transformation in peace processes which could be very useful for other single cases, as well as for comparative research on peace processes. Nonetheless, I recognise that context matters and some unique elements of the Sudan reality may not be applicable to other cases. Moreover, I appreciate that the North-South civil war in Sudan was protracted, there exists a large collection of failed peace agreements, the peace process was prolonged, and the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) comprises six peace agreements and two implementation annexures. Thus, I designed the case as both an interpretative one requiring ‘thick description’, and an explorative one seeking to understand transformation in peace processes.
4.3 Analytical Framework

To address the research objectives, the methodological approach utilised theoretical insights and the analytical framework elucidated in the previous chapter. Theoretical frameworks, as Druckman (2005, 32) has noted, are used to organise the research process, including: operationalising the core concepts; guiding the collection, analysis and interpretation of data; and understanding the relationships between the various components of the process. Chapter three explained that the discursive approach’s main research method, discourse analysis, understands specific cases of violent conflict by looking at the social process of discourse formation. From this perspective, I postulated that transiting from protracted violent conflict requires transformation of the discourses. I further postulated that a successful peace process requires transformation of conflict discourses. But what are the ‘operational set of measures’ (Yin 2009, 41) that were used to indicate discourse change, and to collect empirical data? Chapter three elucidated in detail two analytical concepts: narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion.

4.4 Operationalising the Analytical Framework

Operationalising the analytical framework requires specifying the method of data collection and analysis, that is, a practical guide to textual analysis. This required developing a set of questions to steer the empirical analysis. The structure of questioning was borrowed from Discourse-Historical Analysis (DHA). The Vienna school of discourse analysis developed the DHA as a variant of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). The approach postulates a dialectical relationship between discursive practices and situational, institutional, and social contexts (Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999; Wodak and Leeuwen 1999; Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Wodak 1996; Wodak and Matouschek 1993). As a research method, DHA ‘combines historical, social-economic-political, and linguistic perspectives to identify the relationship between texts and social practices’ (Sahin 2011, 585). The approach provides four dimensions of textual analysis: context, content, strategies of argumentation, and linguistic realisation.

In DHA, context refers to the relevant background or the historical settings in which a text is situated. The approach emphasises context because a discourse can only be understood and interpreted in its specific context. Context in this sense covers the extra-
linguistic social variables and institutional frames, and the broader socio-political and historical setting in which the discursive practices are embedded (Wodak et al. 2009; Wodak 1996; Wodak and Meyer 2009; Wodak and Leeuwen 1999; Wodak and Matouschek 1993). Because the DHA mainly understands context historically, it combines the historical-political research approaches with the textual analysis of the CDA. ‘The distinctive feature of this approach is its attempt to integrate systematically all available background information in the analysis and interpretation of the many layers of a written or spoken text,’ writes Fairclough and Wodak (1997). DHA asserts that historical contexts are central to analyses of collective identity formation because they provide the frames and social categories of insiders and outsiders, collective memories, common histories and cultures, and common presents and futures which groups identify with (Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999; Wodak and Leeuwen 1999). As Wodak (1996, 19) explains, ‘discursive acts are meaningful only in their situational, cultural, ideological and historical context.’ Chapter three identified these frames and social categories as crucial components of the discursive and institutional continuities.

Content analysis involves examining a text for its contents. Therefore, it employs the CDA’s textual analysis methods. In this study, content was narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion. Argumentation strategies denote what actors want in practice. They are the intentional plan of practices that aim to achieve a particular social, political, psychological, or linguistic goal. DHA identifies five levels of strategies. First, referential or nomination strategies represent or construct social actors as in-groups or out-groups using membership categorisation devices. Second, predication strategies evaluate, label, stereotype, and attribute positive or negative features to the categorised social actors. Third, argumentation strategies justify the ascribed stereotypes and attributes, and legitimise inclusion of some groups and exclusion of other groups. Fourth, framing strategies position the included and excluded groups in the broader discourses through reporting, description, and narration. Fifth, intensifying and mitigating strategies intensify inclusion and exclusion in the society. Linguistic realisation means searching for the linguistic characteristic of texts.

I turned to the DHA for three reasons. First, some of the texts that the study interrogated were historical materials which cover the early phases of the protracted civil war in Sudan. Second, the literature review showed that national identity was a major issue in
Sudan’s prolonged civil war. Therefore, post-agreement peacebuilding required reconstruction of the country’s national identity. The DHA principally focuses on the discursive construction of national identities (Wodak et al. 2009; Wodak 1996; Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999). Third, narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion are the analytical concepts of this study. This made the DHA an appropriate methodological approach.

While utilising the DHA, I adapted it in line with the research question and emphasised the overall problem of research, rather than specific language features. Therefore, I analysed context, content, and argumentation strategies. A set of questions, which were derived from the analytical framework to ensure they were theoretically relevant, guided the collection and analysis of empirical data in a systematic way. I organised these questions into two conceptual groups: narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion.

4.4.1. Questions Posed: Narratives of Identity

The first set of questions interrogated how spoken and written texts produced and reproduced narratives of identity in Sudan. Narratives of identity indicate how people display who they are to each other in different discursive sites, including everyday conversation, institutional settings, commodified contexts, spatial locations, and virtual environments. As elaborated in previous chapters, people use certain cues, signs, frames and markers to place others into social categories such as race, religion, class, cultural groups and ethnicity. This is what the above section referred to as referential strategies. Ascribing a central role to such markers and frames, and thinking with and acting upon such ascriptions (Jenkins 2012), is the foundation of narratives of identity. Inherent in the discursive and institutional continuities, narratives of identity construct and reconstruct identities because they provide the framework through which people perceive and interpret their social reality. It is through these narratives that individuals and groups view themselves and others, present themselves to others, negotiate their roles in relationships, and locate themselves in myths, histories, languages, and cultures. It is also through these social frames that groups establish membership and negotiate boundaries.

There are many markers of group identity in Sudan. This is because the country is very diverse, with race, religion, and geographical area of origin being the most dominant and
important identity groups within society, as noted in the literature review in chapter two. Thus, social categories along racial, religious, and geographical space are not just innocent forms of identification in Sudan; rather, they are the lenses through which people interpret social, economic, and political events, and categorise and define their relationships with others. According to Deng (1995, 16), these three categories are ‘pivotal in defining the identity and status of individuals and groups, determining who gets what from the system. Furthermore, religion and race relations are intertwined, since Islam in the Sudan is closely connected with Arabism as a racial, ethnic, and cultural phenomenon.’ Therefore, narratives of identity built upon these three markers are deeply embedded in daily practices, social structures and interactions, and modes of thought. For these reasons, the main question on narratives of identity was: How do texts represent narratives of identity in Sudan during the two decades civil war, in the 2005 CPA, and during the six-year transition period?

The following supplementary questions facilitated textual analysis.

- Who was involved in the civil war, according to these texts?
- How did the participants frame the civil war?
- How do texts represent relations between diverse groups?
- What qualities and traits do texts attribute to groups?
- What arguments did group leaders use to justify and legitimise violence against other groups?
- How does the text of the CPA represent identity?
- How do texts represent identities during the six-year transition phase?

4.4.2. Questions Posed: Narratives of Exclusion

As forms of social practice, narratives of identity turn into narratives of exclusion when markers of identity, including the ascribed attributes, are mainstreamed and institutionalised as boundaries of exclusion. In the DHA, this turning point falls under predication, argumentation, and framing strategies. Structures of domination, economic contexts, historical moments, myths, and cultures play a decisive role in turning narratives of identity into narratives of exclusion. Indeed, violent conflicts occur when conflict entrepreneurs mobilise narratives of exclusion to justify violence against the
excluded groups. Therefore, this section posed the following question: *Did the inclusion-exclusion dichotomy lead to the rise of and support for the civil war in Sudan, and how did the CPA respond to this dichotomy?*

To facilitate textual analysis, the section posed the following supplementary questions.

- What arguments do texts highlight regarding inclusion and exclusion of groups in Sudan?
- What arguments did the elite use to justify and legitimise inclusion of some groups and exclusion of others?
- Does the text of the CPA mitigate or reinforce narratives of exclusion?
- Do social practices during the six-year transition period mitigate or reinforce narratives of exclusion?

This framework guided the collection and analysis of the empirical data in the next four chapters. As the preceding sections have explained, DHA integrates historical and socio-economic-political approaches with the discourse analysis methods that focus on the intertextuality between text, language, and social practices. While the former methods analyse the historical context, the latter methods deconstruct texts and social practices with a view to reveal contents, argumentation strategies, and linguistic realisation. Employing the theoretical framework developed in chapter three and the DHA method, I divided the empirical analysis part into four chapters. Chapter five covers Sudan’s historical context in which the narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion were constructed. Chapter six analyses the articulations of these narratives during the second war from 1983 to 2002. Chapter seven explores the representations of these narratives in the six agreements which comprise the CPA, while chapter eight examines the manifestations of these narratives in the social institutions and policy practices after the implementation of the CPA from 2005 to 2011.

### 4.5 Data and Analysis

#### 4.5.1. Data Analysis

Because this study is in peace and conflict studies, and as I adopted and adapted the DHA in line with the overall research question, I focused on context, content, and
argumentation strategies. I will demonstrate how I approached and applied the DHA with an example of an extract from a speech by the SPLM/A leader, John Garang. In this speech, Garang was addressing the Sudanese diaspora in the US in August 2004, a few weeks after the signing of the last major protocols. He spoke in English, but he often stressed some points in Arabic.

Garang’s speech to Sudanese Diaspora in the US
Washington DC, 2004


Transcribed from YouTube on 20 August 2014

I greet you in the name of our country, in the name of our movement, the SPLM, in the name of our NDA, and in the name of the New Sudan…. I use this occasion to continue with what we are doing at home, to brief and inform the Sudanese diaspora of the peace process and the peace agreement. Because we want this peace agreement, unlike the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement and other peace agreements that have been signed in the Sudan to be owned by the people…. Because if the agreement is not owned by the people, then anybody can come around and dishonour it, as Abel Alier has written ‘too many agreements dishonoured’.

The Six Protocols that we have signed in Machakos and in Naivasha, if and when implemented, will lead to solving the fundamental problem of the Sudan. It is not peace per se because even a graveyard is peaceful…. When I talk about the peace agreement in the Sudan I cannot disconnect it with the need for fundamental change in the Sudan because peace within the context of the old Sudan is not peace but continuation of war in a different form. Therefore, it is important for me to revisit the problem of the Sudan itself, the problem that we set out to solve, so that we put the peace process in the context of solving what I have called the fundamental problem of the Sudan.

The Southerners in the past have called it the problem of the South. We have disagreed with a lot of people on this because there is no problem of the South. At least Southerners should not be talking about the problem of the South. If you want to give the problem a geographical name then this is the problem of North not the problem of the South. And not all of the North. The Northerners are suffering too. This is the problem of governance in Khartoum. That is the fundamental problem of the Sudan. It is not the problem with Darfur, it is not the problem with Nuba, it is not the problem with Beja, it is not the problem with the Nubians in the far north, and it is not the problem with the poor in Omdurman. It is the problem of governance in Khartoum itself.

We have had nothing but war since independence. From 1955 to 1972, we were in war. Some of us were born in war, grew up in war, went to school in war, and grew grey hair in war. In the year 1983, we changed gears. We changed our direction in terms of the answer that we gave. We said no, it is not the problem with the Sudan. In our view, the problem is the attempt by various Khartoum based regimes to build a monolithic Arab-Islamic state to the exclusion of other parameters of the Sudanese diversity as constituting the fundamental problem of the Sudan. The
vast majorities of the Sudanese people are, therefore, excluded from governance and are marginalised in the political, economic, and social fields. This provoked resistance by the excluded, the neglected, the marginalised, and the oppressed. The Arab-Islamic state ends up being imposed by force. Governance in the Sudan became chauvinistic and eventually fascist. It is clearly shown now by the situation in Darfur, relying on brute force for the ruling NIF elite to maintain its power, rather than by consent of the governed through a consensual social contract.

When I say an Arab-Islamic state, I am not talking in derogatory terms at all because I have made it very clear before that our vision, our ideology of society is that we are all Sudanese, whether we are of Arab origin or of African origin. We are all Sudanese. You know this insistence on our Arabness! Let us become Sudanese, what is wrong with this? That at all does not mean we will drop our Arab cultural heritage because it is a major contribution to Sudanese culture and Sudanese identity. That does not mean we drop Islam because Islam is a Sudanese religion. Let us first and foremost accept ourselves as Sudanese. This is what can unite us. Uruba cannot unite us. Africanism that is opposed to Uruba cannot unite us. Islam cannot unite us. Christianity cannot unite us. But Sudanism can unite us because it is the common factor. Let us also drop these crazy ideas that we must all be Arabs. Even God will not accept this. In his infinite wisdom, it is this same God that made the Arabs, that made the Nuba, that made the Fur, that made the Dinka, that made the Nubians, that made the Beja, that made the Shilluk, that made all the 500 ethnic groups in the Sudan. And who is this to amend God’s creation? The one who makes this amendment I would say is against God! And if this case of mine was taken to God, I will win this case!

We as Sudanese have a concrete anchor in history. We go back a long way and sometimes it is necessary to go back in order to go forward. We need to make this exercise in the Sudan so that we can find our bearings because if you do not have a past, then cannot possibly have a future. There is a series of books on the general history of Africa by UNESCO volumes 1 to 7. Volume 2 covers the Nile valley and the Horn of Africa. I recommend that you read this book. I also recommend that you read a lot about ancient Egypt which is very much interconnected with the Sudan. We have a long history; peoples and kingdoms have lived, thrived, and disappeared in the geographical area that now constitutes the present Sudan. Yet and despite all this wealth of historical evidence, the present and previous rulers in Khartoum presented a false picture of our country, as if the Sudan started with them and as if the history and reality of the Sudan consists only of specific parameters, Arabism and Islamism.

Our contention in the SPLM is that Sudan belongs to all the peoples that now inhabit the country, and its history, its diversity, and its richness is the common heritage of all the Sudanese people. I have called this historical diversity, and it is very rich….

Garang’s main subject was the 2002 to 2004 peace agreements which he had signed. Yet, he tied-up very many issues from the recent and the distant past. He mentioned the 1955 to 1972 civil war, the problem of the South, the Arab-Islamic framework, Uruba, and the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement. He also mentioned Sudan’s racial, ethnic, and historical diversities, assimilation into Uruba and Umma, slavery, and ancient Kingdoms of the Nile Valley. He attributed the civil war to the ‘the problem of governance in
Khartoum’ and proposed a New Sudan which would be anchored on Sudanism. Some of these subjects like the Islamist wars of the 1990s were recent events. Others, such as assimilation into *Uruba* and *Umma*, slavery, and the meaning of Sudanism had been controversial subjects in Sudan’s political, historical, and national identity debates since the turn of the 20th century. Others such as the identity of the historical Kingdoms of the Nile Valley went back into the distant past. My adopted DHA requires understanding the context of this speech context and interrogating it for content and argumentation strategies.

**Context:** The DHA stipulates that a discourse can only be described, understood, and interpreted in its specific context. The approach also specifies that the contents of a text must be juxtaposed with historical events and facts. To understand why Garang linked the 2004 peace agreements with all of the above issues, I turned to Sudan’s historical setting. Therefore, I analysed the historical context in which narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion in Sudan were socially constructed in chapter five. As DHA requires, I employed a historical-political approach in that chapter.

**Content:** The second pillar of my adapted ‘triangulatory’ approach is content. As noted in the preceding sections, narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion are the content in this study. The preceding section has defined narratives of identity. Therefore, to interrogate texts for content, I used the above guiding questions on narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion. When interrogating the above speech, for example, I posed the following questions.

According to Garang, who was involved in the civil war?
As a participant in the war, how did Garang frame it?
How does Garang represent relations between diverse groups in this extract?
What qualities did Garang attribute to groups?
What arguments did Garang use to justify violence against the Northerners?

According to this extract, Garang argued that the war involved a small minority at the centre in Khartoum against the majority of Sudanese in the marginalised peripheries,
including the poor in Omdurman.\(^1\) Therefore, he framed the conflict as a defensive war by marginalised peripheries who were resisting the imposition of an Arab-Islamic state. His answer to the third question was to present Sudan as a very diverse country with historical, ethnic, and geographical diversities. Thus, he viewed all ethnic and religious groups as victims of a small Khartoum based minority, implying that they were fighting together to change their country into a New Sudan. Further, he justified violence as a war of liberation by the marginalised Sudanese. I applied this approach in chapter six, seven and eight, although I varied the questions as per the guide to fit the requirements of each chapter.

**Argumentation strategies:** The last pillar of my approach is argumentation strategies. To deconstruct this extract for argumentation strategies, I examined language use and the intentional plan of practices. For example, Garang referred to the problem of Sudan as ‘the attempt by various Khartoum based regimes to build a monolithic Arab-Islamic state to the exclusion of other parameters of the Sudanese diversity.’ The emphasis here is ‘exclusion’ based on ‘Arabism’ and ‘Islamism’. In practice, he was exhorting the Sudanese to reject exclusivist institutions and policies which were based on these two identity markers. His justification for adopting this posture was that ‘we are all Sudanese, whether we are of Arab origin or of African origin’. He then advocated Sudanism because ‘this is what can unite us.’ The DHA refers to this as a unification and cohesivation argumentation strategy, as it emphasises unifying common features (Wodak et al. 2009, 36). Therefore, Garang employed unification and cohesivation strategy in this extract, which the DHA classifies as one of the constructive strategies. I applied this approach in all the analysis in chapters six, seven, and eight.

In summary, I adopted and adapted the DHA’s ‘triangulatory approach.’ This was done in a way which integrated a politico-historical investigation of the context in which narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion were constructed in Sudan, with deconstruction of contemporary texts and social practices. For logical reasons, the structure of the empirical part will start with a review of the context, followed by interrogation of the contents and argumentation strategies during the second civil war,

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\(^1\) Khartoum metropolis comprises of three cities at the confluence of the White and the Blue Nile: Khartoum, Omdurman and Bahř (Khartoum North). The three cities are interlinked by bridges over the two Niles.
the 2002 to 2005 peace process and the CPA, and the CPA implementation phase. Let us now turn to empirical data sources.

### 4.5.2. Empirical Data Sources

Chapter two showed that extensive academic research has been undertaken on the North-South civil war in Sudan. While some of this research covers the peace process and the CPA, there are no academic works which analyse the peace process from the discursive approach. Because this is an unchartered area, and to ensure a thorough analysis of the case study, I relied on 216 primary and secondary sources (see Appendix II and III for the lists of all sources).

I divided the primary data sources into two sets. The first set comprised 64 speeches of the SPLM/A leadership and nine (9) letters between John Garang and the Northern leaders. Some of these speeches are available on the SPLM website. Other primary sources were 27 documents from the SPLM/A Secretariat, including the earlier and later editions of the SPLM Manifesto, resolutions of the March/April 1994 Chukudum National Convention, and confidential minutes of the December 2004 Rumbek meeting. Further, I reviewed a set of SPLA radio communications between the SPLM/A-Torit and the SPLM/A-Nasir which Lam Akol published in his memoirs. The CPA was also a key primary document. Here, I relied on 12 documents that make the text of the CPA. They are all available on the SPLM website. To buttress the arguments about the CPA, I interrogated 12 additional peace agreements which the Sudan parties signed earlier, including the Koka Dam Declaration of 24 March 1986, the Declaration of Principles (DoP) of 20 July 1994, and the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 21 April 1997.

I also analysed seven published works as primary documents. Two of them, *SPLM/SPLA: Inside an African Revolution* and *SPLM/SPLA: The Nasir Declaration*, are memoirs of Lam Akol, one of the SPLM/A leaders and a chief protagonist to John Garang. Dr Akol became Sudan’s Foreign Affairs Minister after the signing of the CPA

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2 Dr Lam Akol was one of the senior commanders of the SPLA in the late 1980s and the External Affairs Director of the movement. He played a major role in establishing Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the largest relief organisation. Together with Dr Riek Machar, Gordon Kong, and Dr Peter Nyaba, they led a splinter group from the SPLM/A in August 1991 and formed the SPLM/A-United. While Dr Akol retained the SPLM/A-United faction after the SPLM/A-United split in 1996, Dr Machar formed South Sudan
in 2005. The two books expose the conflicting perspectives within the SPLM/A, especially in the 1990s. Also focusing on intra-SPLM wars was The politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider’s View by Peter Nyaba. The fourth book Battle for Peace in Sudan: An Analysis of the Abuja Conferences 1992-1993 by Steven Wondu & Ann Mosley Lesch documents the proceedings of the 1992/93 Abuja peace conferences. The fifth document was a 42-page pamphlet The Sudan: A Second Challenge to Nationhood by Bona Malwal. The sixth document, The Mediator: General Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process, provides the observations of the chief mediator. Written by Hilde F. Johnson, one of the IPF’s representatives to the peace process, the seventh text, Waging Peace in Sudan: The Inside Story of the Negotiations that Ended Africa’s Longest Civil War, documents her involvement and conversations with the key actors during the peace process.

The second set of primary sources was semi-structured interviews, which I did with 11 key informants during a field research trip to South Sudan in January 2013. Seven of these informants were university academics, three were UNMIS officials, and one was an NGO official. I had interacted with some of these informants in my work as an ACCORD staff officer. Two of the University informants had served as SPLM resource persons during the peace negotiations. One of the UNMIS officers had lived in Sudan for more than 30 years; he worked as a senior manager with the Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) in the late 1980s and served as an advisor to John Garang in the early 1990s. At the time of the interview, he was an advisor to the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General in South Sudan. Although those associated with the SPLM cautioned

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3 Dr Peter Nyaba was a political activist and a captain in the SPLA. He was one of the leading SPLM/A separatists and one of the leaders of the group that staged a coup against Dr Garang in August 1991. He returned to the SPLM/A mainstream after a faction of his group led by Dr. Riek Machar, named the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM), signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement with the government in April 1997.

4 Steven Wondu worked in the Southern Sudan government from 1977 to 1987. Then John Garang appointed him the SPLM/A representative to Washington DC, United States. He was the note taker for the SPLM/A-mainstream during the 1992-93 Abuja peace process.

5 Bona Malwal was former national and regional minister. He followed this publication with an English-language daily newspaper, The Sudan Times, which espoused the southern viewpoint. After the 1989 coup, Malwal published Sudan Democratic Gazette from exile in England which produced 139 editions between June 1990 and December 2001 when it ceased publication. He became an advisor to the President of the Republic after the signing of the CPA.
that a lot of information, especially on the SPLM, has not yet been published, they advised that it does not differ much from what has been published in secondary sources.

The secondary data sources that I interrogated were three reports from the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) and 66 copies of the CPA Monitor. The AEC was set up by the CPA and financed by the IPF to assess and evaluate the progress of the CPA implementation, while the CPA Monitor was an organ of the UNMIS which provided progress of the CPA implementation from 2005 to 2011. Both the AEC and the UNMIS closed in July 2011. In addition, I analysed three TV documentaries. Two documentaries, *Sudan: Divided Identity, Divided Land* and *Sudan: History of a Broken Land*, reviewed the conflict from ordinary Sudanese’ perspectives on the eve of the separation. The third documentary, *Sudan Referendum Splits SPLM: Northern Members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement Wary of Post-Referendum Status*, reviewed the reactions of the SPLM-Northern sector members to the results of the self-determination referendum.

Lastly, I supplemented primary and secondary sources with my experience and past engagements with varied layers of officials in the GoS, GoSS, UNMIS, UNMISS and UNAMID. In addition, discussions with academics and civil society officials in Sudan were also used. While working as an ACCORD officer, I interacted with about 200 Sudanese actors in various fora, including field research, peacebuilding training workshops, dialogue forums, and conflict management seminars. The limitations of the research method will be incorporated in the concluding chapter.

### 4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has explained this study’s research design. The chapter started by elucidating the research strategy, embedded case study, and the rationale behind the choice of the strategy. An important point highlighted in the exposition is that case study design contributes to analytical generalisations whose aim is to build theory. The chapter then explained the analytical approach and the two conceptual constructs, *narratives of identity* and *narratives of exclusion*. The chapter operationalised these two constructs using a set of questions developed with the guidance of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA). Also explained were issues of data analysis and data sources.
PART THREE: FROM THEORY TO ANALYSIS
Chapter Five

State Formation and the Construction of Narratives of Identity

‘The dominant feature of our nation is an Islamic one and its overpowering expression is Arab, and this nation will not have its entity identified and its prestige and pride preserved except under an Islamic revival.’ (Sadiq el-Mahdi, Prime Minister, Republic of Sudan, October 1966).

5.1. Introduction

Chapter four has explained the methodological approach of this study and the operationalization of its central concepts through the DHA. By doing this, historical-political research approaches are integrated with the CDA methods. This triangulation arises from the DHA’s position that a discourse can only be described, understood, and interpreted in its specific context. This research approach is consistent with the theoretical arguments in chapter three that social actors construct identities, interpersonal and intergroup relations from interpretive frames, memories, and social repertoires provided by historical contexts and reproduced, and often reconstructed, in discursive and institutional continuities. Following this approach, this chapter will explore the historical and political context in which narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion were constructed in Sudan. The chapter will also review the evolution of the second civil war up to the onset of the final peace process in 2002. The first section will provide an overview of the formative years of Sudan’s state. The second part will review the British-Egyptian Condominium phase when modern Sudan was constructed. The third section will summarise the narratives which competed in the discursive and institutional continuities at independence. The fourth section will then focus on the first civil war. Lastly, the fifth section will review developments and interventions during the second civil war.

5.2. Constructing North and South Sudan

At independence in 1956, three dualisms of Arabs/non-Arabs, Muslims/non-Muslims, and Northerners/Southerners were predominant in the discursive and institutional continuities in Sudan (Idris 2005, 2001; Collins 2005; Khalid 2003; Lesch 1998; Malwal 1981; Ruay 1994). These social categories not only shaped contestations over statehood, national identity, citizenship, and access to economic resources, but also premised the
civil war discourse. The civil war occurred in two phases, but views differ on the date the first phase started. Some point to the August 1955 mutiny by the Equatoria Corps as the beginning of the first civil war (Albino 1970; Beshir 1968, 1974b; Daly and Sikainga 1993; Deng 1995; Nyaba 2000; Oduho and Deng 1963; Wai 1970). Others refer to the formation of the Sudan African National Union (SANU) and its armed wing - Anya-Nya - in 1962 (Johnson 2003; Rolandsen 2011a; Aguda 1973). All texts claim the war involved Southerners against Northerners. However, beneath these two broad categories lie many questions regarding conceptions of these identities and their relationship to state formation in Sudan. Broadly, scholars have explored the linkage between state formation and the emergence of political identities in the country (Mamdani 2012, 2009; Idris 2005, 2001; de Waal 2005b; O'Brien 1998; Deng 1995; Ruay 1994). ‘The construction of ethnic, racial, or regional identities in the Sudan is inherently linked to the process of state formation in the region,’ writes Idris (2005, 110). I will review four periods of state formation, namely, 1821 to 1883, 1883 to 1898, 1898 to 1956, and post-1956. I will start with a brief comment on the pre-1821 Sudan.

5.2.1. Pre-1821 Sudan

In the speech quoted in chapter four, John Garang referred to the medieval kingdoms of Sudan. Before 1821, the northern region comprised two independent kingdoms, the Funj in the Nile valley and the Darfur sultanate in the west. Both kingdoms engaged in ‘pre-modern’ slavery, Islam was the religion of the royal court, and Arabic was the official language (Mamdani 2012, 2009; Beshir 1974a; Hasan and Gray 2002; Deng 1995; Searcy 2011). This pre-1821 state formation compares with Kaldor’s (1999) observation about European feudal systems before the emergence of nation-states. While slaves were mainly captured from the non-Muslims in the hinterlands, Sudan scholars disagree on whether these hinterlands included South Sudan.¹ Some authors claim that South Sudan

¹ Some authors from South Sudan claim the issue of slavery has endured in the popular memory in the South. Despite denials by the government of Sudan and questions from critics and scholars from the North, actors from the South broached the issue in the 1972 Addis Ababa peace negotiations and the 2002 to 2005 peace process, claiming that the northern parties were using slavery as a tool of the civil war to humiliate the Southerners. In 1989, for example, Christian Solidarity International (CSI), a Swiss NGO, released a report that accused the Sudan government of engaging in slavery. For details on slavery claims in the 1980s, see War and Slavery in Sudan (2001) by Jok Madut Jok and Children in Sudan: Slave, Street Children and Child Soldiers (1995) by Human Rights Watch/Africa. For details on the linkage between slavery and identity formation in Sudan, see Sudan’s Civil War: Slavery, Race and Formation of Identities (2001) by Amir Hassan Idris. For details on popular attitudes towards slavery, see The Legacy of Slavery
had no contact with the outside world before 1839 (Albino 1970; Oduho and Deng 1963; Gray 1961; Wai 1981). Others claim there was some trade and cultural contacts, but a combination of distance, geographical barriers, and violent resistance by Southerners stopped these states’ penetration into the South (Johnson 2011a; Nyaba 2000; Deng 1995; Collins 1962, 2005; Beswick 1994). As Garang’s alludes, these different interpretations became important after 1956 when different actors appropriated and aligned the past with the first civil war discourse. Chapter three referred to these as historical frames. I argue that the Sudan actors used these frames to reconstruct the past ‘in a way that served the present purposes’ (Idris 2005, 14). This process of drawing different historical frames from the same reality compares with Lemarchand’s (1994b, xii) observation about Burundi, where mythmaking generated ‘a constant interface between past and present, discourse and practice, ideology and violence.’

5.2.2. The Turkiyya

The first period of modern state formation started in 1821 when Turco-Egyptian colonialism (Turkiyya) conquered the northern region. The Turkiyya was an extractive colonial state which relied on brute military force to control the vast territory and to sustain the colony’s mainstay economic activities, especially slavery (Wai 1981, 1970; Collins 1962; Idris 2000; Sharkey 1994; Makris 1996). Sudanese authors agree that the Turkiyya introduced market-driven modern slavery, but they disagree on slavery’s role in the social construction of identities. Southerners claim that slavery determined the emergence of the North-South divide (Deng 1995; Nyaba 2000; Albino 1970; Jok 2001; Ruay 1994). In this view, resistance to slavery in the nineteenth century was a key constituent of the historical narrative which underpinned the discursive construction of the civil war in the 1960s and in the 1980s. In 1965, Southern delegates who attended the Round Table Conference on the Southern Problem raised the question of slavery.² In contrast, Northerners blamed slavery on the Europeans traders (Beshir 1974a; Ali 1972;

² In the 1950s and 1960s, both the Government of Sudan and Southern leaders referred to the 1955 mutiny and the subsequent civil war in the South as the Southern Problem. In 1965, the transitional government, which replaced the military regime in 1964, organised a round table conference in Khartoum involving the Northern and Southern leaders. The conference was the first serious intervention to resolve the conflict. For details on the conference, including presentations by the Southerners and Northerners, see The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict (1968, 165-185) by Mohamed Omer Beshir; see also The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration (1981) by Dunstan M. Wai.
Abd-al-Rahim 1969; Mahgoub 1974). Views from non-Sudanese authors vary. All agree that slavery played a role in shaping Southerners’ perceptions towards the Northerners, but most of them absolve the Northerners, and blame the Turkiyya for commercialising it and the British for reconstructing the meaning of difference by attributing a racial content to it (Niblock 1987, 150; Vezzadini 2011; O’Fahey 1996a). This is consistent with Franke Wilmer’s (2002) argument about the social construction of difference and how the meaning which people assign to difference matters more than the ‘fact’ of difference in the structuring of social relations.

5.2.3. The Mahdiyya

The defeat of the Turkiyya by the Sudanese nationalists was led by Muhammad Ahmed al-Mahdi. The subsequent formation of the Mahdi state (Mahdiyya) in the early 1880s heralded the second period of state formation. While Mahdi is well-represented in Northern Sudan’s popular memory (see photo 5.1 below), most studies regard the Mahdiyya as the precursor to modern Sudanese nationalism (Collins 1962; Beshir 1974b, 1974a; Wai 1981; Searcy 2011; Warburg 2011, 1995). However, Johnson (2011a, 6) argues that interpreting the Mahdiyya ‘as an early form of Sudanese nationalism [due to] the presence of southern Sudanese in the army and therefore in some parts of the administration [is to] misread the Mahdiyya through modern spectacles.’ Some authors claim that the Mahdiyya alienated some groups in the North (Khalid 1990). Others portray it as having attained broad support in the North (Mamdani 2012; Idris 2000; Warburg 1995). A third position insists the Mahdiyya faced violent resistance in the South because the population regarded the defeat of the Egyptians as a return to their pre-Turkiyya lifestyles, rather than submission to the Mahdist rule and Islam (Collins 1962; Wai 1981, 1970). Broadly, this raises questions about historical frames and collective memories.
5.3. Reconstructing ‘Arabs’ and ‘Africans’

The third period of state formation started in 1898 when a British-Egyptian military force defeated the Mahdiyya. Sanderson (1976, 108) claims that by the time the British took over, the penetration into the South by the private armies of slave traders had ‘permanently damaged many southern societies, and inspired in almost all of them a profound and enduring hostility to all lighter-skinned outsiders’. According to O’Fahey (1982, 75), slave traders had defined Sudan in terms of ‘Islamic versus non-Islamic pedigree, brown versus black colour, Arab versus non-Arab descent.’ To change the governance structures at the centre and secure law and order in the South, the British introduced indirect rule. This rule created separate procedures and structures of authority for the North and the South because its basic principle was administering people through indigenous law and custom. In areas where such structures did not exist previously, the British administrators invented them (Mamdani 2012; Idris 2005, 2001; Niblock 1987; Woodward 1980). In the Upper Nile, for example, ‘the task of the government during its first two decades was to invent “a proper tribal” system for the Nilotes’ (Idris 2000, 108).
Therefore, the British classified the central riverian region as Islamic and Arabic. ‘In accordance with the scientific notions of the time,’ writes Vezzadini (2011, 37), ‘the British officers… held firm and outspoken beliefs that there were two races in Sudan, Arabs and Africans, and that the former were superior to the latter.’ Further, they introduced laws and policies, including Christian missionary education in the South, which stopped interaction between the North and the South, ostensibly to give the people of the South a chance to develop as Africans in order to realise their African identity, and nationalism (Idris 2000, 136). Subsequently, the British introduced a Southern Policy which introduced English and prohibited Arabic in the South, replaced Arab administrators with Southerners, removed Arab traders, and authorised African customary laws. The Policy constructed the North and the South into two de facto states, grounding rights in each state on a discourse of nativism (Collins 2005; Idris 2005; Johnson 2011a; Mamdani 2012, 2009). Some authors claim that the Southern Policy hinted at the possibility of linking up the South with British East Africa (Johnson 2011a; Deng 1995; Niblock 1987; Mayo 1994; Holt and Daly 2000; Albino 1970). However, Sanderson (1976, 109) argues that the real aim was ‘to enable the South to stand upon its own feet’ before deciding the ‘kind of political arrangement best suited to its (and Britain’s) needs.’

The Northern viewpoint blames the Southern Policy for producing Arab/African and Northern/Southern dichotomies in the country (Abd-al-Rahim 1969; Beshir 1968, 1974a; Idris 2000; Zain 1996). For example, Abd-al-Rahim (1970, 237) argues that Arab/African, Muslim/non-Muslim, and Northerner/Southerner dualities did not exist before the Condominium because ‘Sudan, as a clearly defined entity and as an object of national loyalty, did not exist before this century.’ Instead, ‘the Sudanese identified themselves as members of different tribes and sub-tribes, adherents to various Tariqas or religious fraternities, belonging to this or that religion of the country’ (1970, 238). This view concurs with arguments on the construction of national identities. As Kaufman (2001, 23) avers, ‘in France, the epitome of a European nation-state, many peasants felt only local rather than national loyalties down to the end of the nineteenth century.’ The Southern viewpoint disagrees. Mayo (1994, 166) justifies the policy as the first serious attempt since 1839 to ‘mitigate the disharmonious relations between the north and the south.’ Wai (1981, 37) claims the Southern Policy ‘did not create hostility between the peoples of the two regions: hatred already had deep roots. The colonial policy attempted
to keep the Northerners and Southerners from clashing.’ Other Southern thinkers defend the Southern Policy for recognising the Southerners’ distinct history and cultural identities (Nyaba 2000; Idris 2000; Malwal 1981).

A third position argues that negative stereotypes towards the people of slave descent, who had assimilated into the culture of the Northern society, were prevalent at the turn of the century. However, the dominant group in the North acquired a distinctly Arab character during British rule (Vezzadini 2011; Makris 1996; Idris 2001, 2005). In this view, the British nurtured an Arab elite by classifying the population into natives (Arabs) and Sudani (people of slave descent). The colonial laws and policies, argues Idris (2005, 2001), transformed flexible and contingent social identities into hard political identities. Further, the British used the label ‘Africans’ to refer to those in the South. Generally, the groups in the South accepted the label ‘African’, but ‘there was little sign of regional let alone national consciousness’ and the native administration did not encourage them to develop it (Woodward 1980, 181). This links with Kaufman’s (2001, 21) argument about ethnic identity construction where groups accepted identity labels, which were first created by outsiders, after governments began utilising them. Paradoxically, the Arab elite adopted the term Sudani in the 1930s to refer to its ‘self-consciously Sudanese Arabic national identity’, despite the word’s previous servile connotations (Sharkey 2008, 21).

The British decided to abandon the Southern Policy in the 1940s, but this did not change the emergent ‘ideology of hierarchy …[which] assigned a subordinate status to the people of the Southern region’ (Idris 2005, 4). Instead, it opened the South to the Northern administrators and traders, legalised proselytization of Islam, and introduced Arabic in southern schools. The subsequent Sudan Administration Conference in Khartoum in April 1946, in which the South was not represented, endorsed union with the North (Wai 1981, 1970; Albino 1970; Oduho and Deng 1963; Woodward 1980). The conference also established a Legislative Assembly in which the Northerners would elect their representatives, but two British Governors would represent the South. Pressed by

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3 For debates on whether the Arab is a cultural, ethnic, or racial identity, see Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror (2009, 75-108) by Mahmood Mamdani; “‘Arab Belt’ versus ‘African Belt’: Ethno-Political Conflict in Dar Fur and the Regional Cultural Factors” in Short Cut to Decay: The Case of the Sudan (1994) by Sharif Harir; and Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African Identities, Violence and External Engagement (2005) by Alex de Waal.
concerns about Southern representation, the colonial office organised another conference in Juba in 1947. Northerners claim the Juba conference affirmed the union (Beshir 1974a, 1974b, 1968; Abd-al-Rahim 1969; Mahgoub 1974). Southerners insist it did not (Wai 1981; Malwal 1981; Albino 1970; Oduho and Deng 1963). Non-Sudanese authors oscillate between these two positions. For example, Johnson (2011a, 25) rejects claims that ‘the Juba conference settled the question of the unity of the Sudan’ and blames the Civil Secretary for making the decision. Sanderson (1974, 518) believes this ‘major decision was taken in Whitehall, and Khartoum complied, probably with some reluctance.’

In the early 1950s, the Northern-based parties dominated political arguments, with the terms of independence being the fault line (Johnson 2003; Woodward 1981; Wai 1981, 1970; Howell 1973; Holt and Daly 2000). Just before independence, the Northern parties fragmented between pro-independence parties and those who preferred some form of union with Egypt, while the Southern parties splintered between federalists and separatists (Wai 1981; Badal 1976; Garang 1971; Albino 1970; Oduho and Deng 1963; Woodward 1980, 1981). Further, the Sudanization policy worsened relations as the Southerners interpreted it as ‘the beginning of Northern colonization of the South’ (Johnson 2011a, 27). To ease the Southern clamour for federation, the Northern parties ‘suggested that the request by the Southern Sudanese members for a federal status for the Southern provinces be given full consideration by the next constituent assembly’ (Kok 1996, 555). However, the Southern soldiers based at Torit barracks mutinied on 18 August 1955, five months before independence.

Before proceeding to the post-independence phase, I will summarise the central ideas from the preceding socio-historical context. First, the social construction of identities can take a short time or a very long time. Some texts trace the construction of the mutually antagonistic identities in Sudan to the recent past, others to the distant past. Second, the process of state formation facilitated the construction of identities. The elite and administrators who held state power played a central role in the discursive construction of identities. However, the process was not wholly instrumental; rather, they built on the

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4 Albino (1970, 33) states that ‘at the end of July [1954], there were 800 posts to be Sudanized. A Public Service Commission – consisting entirely of Northerners – was set up to effect recruitment and appointment to these posts. When the Sudanization was complete, only four junior posts of Assistant District Commissioner and two of Mamur were given to the South.’
pre-existing discursive structures upon which people constructed identity boundaries, including myths and stories of genealogies, metaphors of belonging, and ancient religious beliefs. Using economic relations, law, political practices, cultural and direct violence, the elite and administrators converted fluid occupational and cultural identities into hard political identities. This links with the agency/structure dialectical relations which chapter three elucidated. As agents, the elite and administrators constructed particular identities based on the pre-existing discursive and social structures. However, I argue that their interpretation of those structures was not ‘objective’; rather, the meaning they attached to those structures determined their construction.

5.4. The Competing Five Narratives at Independence

Sudan entered the fourth phase of state formation at independence on 1 January 1956 while in a state of low intensity conflict. Underpinning the conflict were two broadly defined political identities, Northerners and Southerners. Interlocked with these were two racial identities, Arabs and Africans, and two religious identities, Muslims and non-Muslims. The Arab and Muslim identities were discursively interwoven with the Northern political identity, while the African and non-Muslim identities were intertwined with the Southern political identity. However, the existence of Muslim but non-Arab identities in the North, including the Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit, Nuba, Nubians, and Beja, suggested that Islamic identity was socially constructed on the pre-existing cultural identities and Arabisation was not the same as Islamisation. At independence, therefore, identities such as Muslims, Arabs, and Northerners existed in opposition to what they regarded as religious and cultural Others, i.e., non-Muslims, non-Arabs, and Southerners. Chapter three argued that violent conflict arises when ‘Others’ are discursively constructed as ‘enemy-Others’. In the early 1950s, these Others had not yet been constructed into ‘enemy-Others’. Instead, the main contention was how these differences structured relationships in the country.

5 For details on the temporal and contingent nature of these myths and the function of genealogies as political ideologies in Sudan, see Short-Cut-To-Decay: The Case of Sudan (1994) by Sharif Harir and Terje Tvedt and Essays in Sudan ethnographies (1966) by Ian Cunnison and Wendy James.
6 For details on these stereotypes, see Sudan’s Civil War: Slavery, Race and Formation of Identities (2001), and Conflict and Politics of Identity in Sudan (2005) by Amir Hassan Idris.
7 For details on how colonial law functioned to construct ethnic and ‘tribal’ identities, see Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity (2012) and Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (1996) by Mahmood Mamdani.
Thus, I infer five narratives which competed in the discursive and institutional continuities regarding profound issues. These included state formation, nation-building, national identity and Sudan’s post-colonial future. The first narrative, which the Sufi Brotherhoods articulated, promoted an ethnic nationalist approach to nation-building in which the Sudan national identity would be built on one-self defined ethnic group, the riverain Arabs (Idris 2005; O’Brien 1998; Lesch 1998; Salih 1999; Deng 1995). Accordingly, this narrative visualised the assimilation of ‘minorities’ into the Islamic nation (Umma) and Arab culture (Uruba). In practice, the Brotherhoods advocated Islamisation and Arabisation policies. But the ‘Others’ rejected these policies as ‘replacing British colonialism with Arab hegemony’ (Deng 1995, 12).

In reaction to the first narrative, Southern separatists espoused the second narrative which viewed Sudan in racial terms. This narrative argued that the Southerners were Negroid and Africans, while the Northerners were Arabs (Wai 1981; Albino 1970; Oduho and Deng 1963). Because one cannot change Negro into Arab or Arab into Negro, separatists insisted, the solution was separating the two from each other. However, separatism did not acquire mass support in the South in the 1950s because ‘political consciousness was confined to the mission-educated intelligentsia, who were little more than five per cent of the total Southern population’ (Badal 1976, 469).

Northern intellectuals, who were opposed to the Sufi Brotherhoods, espoused a third narrative, which accepted cultural and economic differences between the North and the South, and rejected forced assimilation. Its proponents preferred a secular state with more regional powers for the South, within the context of a unitary Sudan (Khalid 1990; Beshir 1968). The fourth narrative, which the Southern elite espoused, emphasised cultural, political, and economic differences between the North and the South. It advocated a territorial model of nationalism in which the residents of a particular territory have a common allegiance to the state regardless of their cultural or ethnic identities (Lesch 1998). Thus, the narrative preferred a federation, increased representation of Southerners in the federal institutions, and accelerated economic development in the South (Johnson 2011a; Idris 2005; Lesch 1998; Woodward 1981).
The fifth narrative offered the Left’s interpretation of Sudan’s history, cultures, and religions. Propagated by the Sudan Communist Party (SCP), this narrative rejected the cultural and religious homogeneity espoused by the Sufi Brotherhoods and their assimilation policies. It criticised these practices for masking the larger problem of economic exploitation by the remnants of feudalism and the northern bourgeoisie. It also rejected separatism and located the ‘the Southern problem’ within the broader struggle against imperialism (Garang 1971, 181). Insisting that the North and the South were separate entities before 1955, the narrative argued that the Northern merchants who went to the South after 1955 were petty traders whose capital was very small to give rise to ‘such a degree of exploitation as to justify turning the North into the chief enemy of the southern people’ (Garang 1971, 193). Therefore, it promoted an alliance between ‘the Southern people’ and the ‘working-class movement in the North’ to spearhead the struggle against ‘imperialism and the northern bourgeoisie’, with a view to building an equitable, multi-cultural, and more egalitarian Sudan (Garang 1971, 195). I argue that in post-independence Sudan, these five narratives provided the historical frames and social repertoires which the parties used to discursively construct the civil war.

5.5. The First Civil War: Federalism or Separation?

Most authors claim that the first civil war started in 1955 However, some scholars counter that the conflict did not reach the level of a civil war until 1962, when Southern exiles formed the Sudan African National Union (SANU) and its armed wing, the Anya-Nya. As violence escalated in the mid-1960s, several southern groups emerged, including the Southern Front (SF) and the Azania Liberation Front (ALF). The first serious attempt to resolve the conflict was the 1965 Round Table Conference, but it failed because its resolutions were not implemented (Wai 1981). In May 1969, the new military government of General Jaafar Nimeiry expressed willingness to end the conflict,

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8 SANU’s founder members included Joseph Oduho and William Deng Nhial. A former teacher from Torit, Oduho was an MP in the first independence parliament in 1957. He fled to exile in 1958 when the army took power, and became SANU’s founder president. But he broke from the group in 1965 and formed another group, Azania Liberation Front (ALF). After the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, he served the national and the Southern governments as a cabinet minister in several portfolios. William Deng Nhial was one of the four Southerners who were appointed Assistant District Commissioners during the Sudanization programme in 1954. He fled to exile after the army overthrew the government in 1958 and became SANU’s Secretary General at its founding in 1962. After the fall of the military regime in 1964, he returned to Sudan, registered SANU as a political party, and contested the April 1965 elections. Three years later, the army assassinated him at Cueibet County in South Sudan.
while all the Southern groups merged into the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) under the leadership of Joseph Lagu in 1970. The war formally ended in February 1972, when the parties signed the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement.

Throughout the duration of the war, Southerners produced very few texts espousing their viewpoint. O'Fahey (1996b, 264) believes the ‘conflict was scarcely ideologically articulated at all.’ In contrast, the Northern perspective was well articulated (Abd-al-Rahim 1970, 1969, 1965; Beshir 1968; Said 1965). Broadly, however, the dominant Northern narrative propagated the assimilation of all minorities into *Umma* and *Uruba*, while the Southerners rejected this approach and opted for either a territorial model based on federation or outright separation. At the Addis Ababa peace negotiations, the Northern negotiators shifted from their preference for a single centralised system, while the Southern parties dropped their clamour for federation or separation (Wai 1981). Subsequently, the two parties adopted the principles of the Addis Ababa Agreement, which were regional autonomy for the South, representation of Southerners in central institutions, an economic stimulus package for the South, and integration of the Anya-Nya fighters in the Sudan armed forces (Johnson 2011a; Collins 2005; Daly and Sikainga 1993; Mitchell 1989; Kasfir 1977). The Agreement also created a Southern regional assembly and a Southern High Executive Council (HEC) led by a Southern president.

Therefore, the Addis Ababa agreement acknowledged the cultural, linguistic, and ethnic diversity in the country (Johnson 2011a; Lesch 1998; Deng 1995; Kasfir 1977; Wai 1981). According to Lesch (1998), the Agreement adopted an ethnic pluralist approach which recognises and accommodates group differences within the political system, instead of suppressing or denying them. Further, Lesch (1998, 47) observes that,

The Addis Ababa Agreement and constitution articulated the ethnic pluralist model, since they included both equality before the law for all citizens and

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9 Joseph Lagu was an officer in Sudan army in the early 1960s. He abandoned the army and joined Anya-Nya as a regional commander in Eastern Equatoria. He eventually united disparate Anya-Nya groups in 1969 and became major general. In 1970, he emerged as the overall Southern Sudan leader, a position that gave him legitimacy and authority to negotiate the Addis Ababa Agreement.

10 Southerners produced only two key texts *The Problem of the Southern Sudan* by Joseph Oduho and William Deng (1963), and *The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint* by Oliver Albino (1970). The only other publications were Bona Malwal’s newsletter called *The Vigilant*. From 1965 to May 1969, when the military government banned it, the newsletter produced about 200 copies. Another Southerner, a Marxist intellectual, Joseph Garang, wrote a pamphlet *The Dilemma of the Southern Intellectual: Is it Justified?*
special protections for minorities. Territorial decentralization was combined with proportional representation at the centre. The accord recognized that both components were essential.

The Addis Ababa Agreement faced many challenges. First, its centrepiece was the relationship between the central and the regional governments. Second, the central government ministries, especially economic planning and education, made key decisions without consulting the regional government. Compounding this challenge was the inability of the Southern government to raise enough revenues internally to perform operational tasks, including paying civil servants, making it dependent on disbursements from the central government. Third, the Northern political elite did not support the Agreement. Hence, they mounted several coup attempts against General Nimeiry. ‘Right-wing factions of Arabism and Islam saw the agreement as a victory for their adversaries - the southern Christians, the secularists, and the dictatorship,’ writes Deng (1995, 166). As General Nimeiry reconciled with the Northern elite, especially the Muslim brothers and the Sufi brotherhoods, he progressively undermined Southern autonomy. Fourth, internal divisions in the South hampered the operations of the HEC.

Despite these challenges, some analysts argue that the Addis Ababa Agreement was successful because it halted violence and provided space for development in the South (Johnson 2011a; Collins 2005; Deng 1995; Khalid 2003, 1990; Lesch 1998; Kasfir 1977; Badal 1976; Woodward 1990). I argue that the Agreement may have been successful in stopping violence, but it solidified identity differences administratively and through institutions. Therefore, it did not transform the discourse.

5.6. The Second Civil War: A New Sudan or Two Sudans?

By 1983, the Addis Ababa Agreement had collapsed over key issues, among them regional borders, exploitation of the newly discovered oil resources, subdivision of the South into three regions, and financing of regional development (Johnson 2011a; Collins 2005; Khalid 2003, 1990; Lesch 1998; Deng 1995; Alier 1990). In May 1983, former Anya-Nya soldiers based at Bor, Pibor, and Pochalla barracks in the South, who joined the SAF after the Addis Ababa accord, refused transfers to the North. Others deserted the military. As General Nimeiry divided the South into three regions through a presidential
decree the following month, mutinous soldiers and deserters launched the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in July. On 8 September, General Nimeiry completed his return to the assimilationist policies of the 1960s by proclaiming Islamic laws, while the SPLA responded with a military offensive in November 1983.

5.6.1 1983-1989: The Ascendance of the SPLA

In April 1985 the National Alliance for National Salvation, a group of professional and trade unions, led a mass uprising in Khartoum which toppled General Nimeiry. But this did not stop the civil war because the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and the SPLM/A could not agree on how to end it. Analysts claim that the main Northern parties hardly shifted their old perceptions about the South, despite the return of hostilities (Lesch 1998; Collins 2005; Deng 1995; Woodward 1990; Johnson 2003). ‘The dominant triad of Umma, DUP, and NIF viewed the Sudan as predominantly Arab and Muslim, within which the south comprised a discrete entity and southern politicians could be relegated to unimportant portfolios in Khartoum,’ writes Lesch (1998, 92). Due to the SPLA’s advances on the battlefield, many areas in the South did not participate in the 1986 elections, which brought a coalition of the northern parties led by Umma Prime Minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi, to power in Khartoum.

Attempts by the National Alliance to resolve the conflict produced the Democratic Protection Charter (DPC) of December 1985 and the Koka Dam Declaration of March 1986. However, these peacemaking efforts failed because the traditional Northern parties did not support them. Subsequent attempts at peacemaking produced the 1988 November Accord, but it was not implemented because a coup d’état occurred on 30 June 1989. According to Lesch (1998, 108), the Islamists viewed negotiations with the SPLM/A as ‘treasonous’ and loathed the November Accord because it ‘destroyed their dream of an Islamic state.’ Nonetheless, the new military government held two peace meetings with the SPLM/A in 1989. The first meeting took place in August in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, while the former American President, Jimmy Carter, mediated the second meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, in December. None of these interventions succeeded in ending the war.
5.6.2 SPLM/A Fragmentation and South-on-South Violence

1991 was a momentous year for Sudan. In May, the Ethiopian armed opposition alliance, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), defeated the Derg regime which had supported the SPLM/A and hosted thousands of South Sudan refugees. ‘The new provisional government of Ethiopia was not only hostile to the SPLA but had close links with the Sudanese army,’ observes Johnson and Prunier (1993, 139). This setback forced the SPLM/A to evacuate its military camps in Ethiopia and to repatriate more than 300 000 refugees back to the battlefields of Southern Sudan (Johnson 2003; Young 2005a, 2003; Akol 2003; Burr and Collins 1995; Nyaba 2000). As they trekked back to South Sudan, many of these refugees were killed by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) through air bombardment (Burr and Collins 1995; African Rights 1997; Human Rights Watch/Africa 1994). Eviction from Ethiopia affected the SPLM/A’s organisational structures and significantly reduced the movement’s military capabilities.

Then in August 1991, the SPLM/A fragmented into two factions: SPLM/A-Torit and SPLM/A-Nasir.11 Among the reasons for the breakup were disagreements over the overall war strategy, lack of governance structures and accountability mechanisms, lack of clear commitment to self-determination, human rights abuses,12 indiscipline within the SPLA ranks, harsh methods of recruitment,13 and subordination of civil administration in the SPLM/A controlled territories to the military command and goals (Akol 2003, 2001; Nyaba 2000; Young 2005a, 2003; Johnson 2003; Rolandsen 2005; African Rights 1997).

11 Torit and Nasir are towns in South Sudan where the leaders of each faction were based. Torit is a garrison town in Central Equatoria, 200 kilometres South of Juba and close to the Ugandan border. It was the headquarters of Dr John Garang’s faction of the SPLM/A, but the government forces retook it in 1992. From then onwards, Garang’s faction was known as the SPLM/A-mainstream. Nasir is a small garrison town in the Upper Nile state, 450 kilometres North East of Juba at the Ethiopian border. It was the headquarters of the breakaway faction of the SPLM/A.

12 Among these abuses were detention and killing of those harbouring alternative viewpoints. The SPLA executed by firing squads some of those charged with offenses against military discipline, while opponents of John Garang such as Arok Thon Arok, Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, Joseph Oduho, Martin Majier, and Faustino Atem Gualdit were detained in SPLA prisons in harsh conditions. Some of these detainees, among them Kerubino Kwanyin Bol and Arok Thon Arok, managed to escape from Garang’s prison in 1992. For detailed analyses of these issues, see The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider’s View (1997) by Peter Adwok Nyaba; SPLM/SPLA: Inside an African Revolution (2001) and SPLM/SPLA: The Nasir Declaration (2003) by Lam Akol; and Food and Power in Sudan: A Critique of Humanitarianism (1997) by African Rights.

Interestingly, self-determination did not feature in the pre-1991 peace negotiations, but it acquired significant weight after the break-up because the SPLM/A-Nasir emphasised the secessionist narrative. This emphasis arose from the belief that ‘adoption of an unambiguous independence platform would ultimately lead to the defection of the entire SPLM/A to their side, giving them the military clout to... declare independence’ (Johnson 2011b, 112). The separatists believed that the Northerners were one monolithic bloc, the Arabs, while the Southerners comprised another monolithic bloc, the Africans. In their view, ‘there was no reason to believe that the Arab two-thirds of the population of Sudan would ever guarantee the rights and privileges of the non-Arab population’ (Burr and Collins 1995, 300). Therefore, the SPLM/A-Nasir used the break-up as a platform to argue that Garang’s vision of a secular, democratic New Sudan could never be realised.

Though Garang won the armed confrontation with the separatists, the split changed the strategic thinking of his faction. In its Political and Military High Command (PMHC) meeting on 12 September 1991, the faction retained the position that it was fighting for a secular, democratic New Sudan. But it also declared that ‘in any future peace initiatives and talks, the position of the SPLM/SPLA on the system of Government shall be based on resolving the war through a united secular democratic Sudan, confederation, association of sovereign states or self-determination.’ The introduction of self-determination in this resolution was momentous because it placed on an equal footing Garang’s clamour for a New Sudan and self-determination which many Southerners understood to mean separation. Analysts claim that Garang accepted to qualify the clamour for New Sudan because competition for the control of the South from the openly separatist SPLM/A-Nasir emboldened the separatists within his faction (Rolandsen 2005; African Rights 1997; Johnson 1998). As Rolandsen (2005, 39) avers, the ‘SPLM/A

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14 The SPLM/A’s highest decision making organ at its foundation in 1983 was the Provisional Executive Committee (PEC) which had seven members, five soldiers and two civilian politicians. In 1985, Garang imprisoned the two civilian politicians in the Committee, Joseph Oduho and Martin Majier, and he converted the Committee to the PMHC. In 1987 and 1988 respectively, Garang incarcerated two of the five PMHC members, Kerubino Kuanyin Bor and Arok Thon Arok. He then expanded the PMHC to 13 members, all of whom were zonal military commanders. Nine of these 13 PMHC members attended the Torit meeting in September 1991. These were John Garang, William Nyoun Bany, Salva Kiir, James Wani Igga, Daniel Awet, Kuol Manyang, Martin Manyiel, Lual Diing Wol and Galerio Modi. While Yusuf Kuwa could not attend, the other three members, Riek Machar, Lam Akor, and Gordon Kong, had formed the SPLM/A-Nasir. For details of the Torit resolutions, see Guerrilla Government: Political Changes in the Southern Sudan During the 1990s (2005) by Øystein H. Rolandsen.

leadership soon realised that they had to prove themselves worthy to those commanders and ordinary soldiers who had remained loyal to them… Political and military supremacy within the Southern Sudanese rebellion was at stake.

In short, competition for control of the South placed Garang in a dilemma. He had to sustain his New Sudan vision because it had attracted support in marginalised areas beyond the boundaries of the South, including the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, Ingessana Hills, and Western Sudan. The notion of a unified New Sudan had also earned him support from African countries and international actors who were opposed to secession. At the same time, he had to accept inclusion of self-determination to reassure his supporters in the South and to stop defections to the separatists. As Young (2005a, 539) notes, ‘the two notions – self-determination which Southerners equated solely as independence – and “New Sudan”, which was understood to be a call for a united Sudan, went hand in hand. But never comfortably.’ From September 1991 onwards, the SPLM/A juggled the New Sudan vision with the right of self-determination. ‘Which would prove more important to Garang and the movement – the New Sudan or Southern Sudan?’ Johnson (2011b, 77) wondered during peace negotiations in Kenya in 2003.

The fractionalisation of the SPLM/A had other effects on post-1991 peace interventions. First, the SAF regained the initiative on the battlefront and escalated the war on all fronts, specifically concentrating on Garang’s positions. According to Rolandsen (2005, 38), the ‘government forces enjoyed successful dry-season offensives in the period 1992–94, which drove the SPLM/A out of all the major towns in the South, except Yambio in the extreme southwest.’ A new approach in the government’s renewed vigour was the use of both regular SAF troops and the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) militia (Johnson 2003; Rolandsen 2005; Burr and Collins 1995; Nyaba 2000; Hutchinson 2000; Collins 1999).

16 African countries were vehemently opposed to secession. In July 1964, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) passed Resolution 16(1) which declared that ‘all Member States pledge themselves to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence.’ Indeed, the South Sudanese rebel movement of the 1960s failed to attract support in Africa and internationally due to its separatist goal. For the OAU Resolution, see http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBLY_EN_17_21_JULY_1964_ASSEMBLY_HEADS_STATE_GOVERNMENT_FIRST_ORDINARY_SESSION.pdf
The PDF consisted of the National Islamic Front (NIF) militia (volunteer *Jihad* units); ethnic militias, including an Arab militia from Kordofan and South Darfur known as *Murahilin*; and young adult males who were conscripted into six weeks military training (Salih 1989; Jok and Hutchinson 1999; Hutchinson 2000; Collins 1999; Young 2003; de Waal 1993). Hutchinson (2000, 6) argues that the government supported militias ‘were trained in counter-insurgency methods to attack the subsistence base and lives of southern civilians who might offer support to SPLA guerrillas.’ The SAF’s surge drove John Garang out of Torit in May 1992 and his faction moved its political offices to Nairobi and Kampala in Kenya and Uganda respectively. A key consequence of this military success was the strengthening of the NIF’s hold on political power at the centre in Khartoum and the weakening of the northern sectarian and leftist groups (Johnson 2003; Young 2005a, 2003).

Second, the SPLM/A split proved disastrous for the population in the South. Specifically, the subsequent factional fighting degenerated into an ethnic war between the different groups, especially between the Dinka and the Nuer clusters\(^\text{17}\) (Akol 2003; Burr and Collins 1995; Johnson 2003; Nyapa 2000; Young 2005a, 2003; Salman 2013; Hutchinson 2000, 2001). ‘Both Garang and Machar reached for the “ethnic” card,’ notes Hutchinson (2001, 318). The South-on-South violence was so intense and extremely brutal such that it wasted vast swathes of South Sudan countryside.\(^\text{18}\) According to Human Rights Watch/Africa (1994, 90), the South-on-South conflict extracted a higher civilian death toll than even the government offensives, because the warring SPLA factions waged indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population.\(^\text{19}\) In the words of Burr

\(^{17}\) I am using the word cluster because of the fluid nature of the notion ‘tribe’ in Sudan. For example, Johnson (2011a, 51) observes that the ‘Dinka do not form a single “tribe” being divided into more than twenty-five tribal groups, each made up of an aggregate of political units varying in number and size. They have no political centre and are found in at least five of the pre-war provinces (Bahr al-Ghazal, Lakes, Upper Nile, Jonglei and Southern Kordofan.)

\(^{18}\) The South-on-South violence in the literature refers to different categories of violence. These include the post-1991 SPLM/A factional fighting; post-1991 attacks on civilians in the Upper Nile and Bahr al Ghazal; post-1992 SPLA revenge attacks on Nuer civilians in Upper Nile; and post-1993 intra-Nuer violence in the Upper Nile. Others were the Anyanya II attacks on the SPLM/A recruits, who were travelling to the training bases in Ethiopia, in the 1980s; and the SPLA wars against the Mundari, Murle, Taposia, Didinga and other ethnic militias in the Equatoria. According to Lam Akol (2001, 260), the war between the SPLA and the Anyanya II fighters killed more civilians than the war with the SAF between 1984 and 1989.

\(^{19}\) In November 1991, for instance, shocking killings took place in the areas around Bor, Kongor and Jonglei in the greater Upper Nile. All authors agree that Riek Machar’s SPLM/A-Nasir faction committed this horrendous massacre by attacking and killing Dinka civilians, displacing more than 100 000, and looting cattle. But authors disagree on the motive of the killings. Many claim the SPLM/A-Nasir’s motive was to defeat John Garang in his territory as he comes from Wangkuel between Bor and Kongor. Offering a contrary view, Hutchinson argues that the attack was retaliation by Anyanya II, the ‘White Army’ (*Jiech*)
and Collins (1995, 300), ‘the split engendered a shock wave of seismic proportions, particularly because it was followed almost immediately by the eruption of an internecine conflict along tribal lines.’ Similarly, Johnson (2003, 97) affirms that ‘the fighting between the two factions included attacks on civilians on both sides of the border.’

Third, the two factions experienced further splitting which exacerbated the South-on-South violence. In September 1992, Garang’s deputy, William Njuon Bany, defected and formed his faction SPLM/A-Forces of Unity and Democracy. Together with others who had escaped from Garang’s prison (see footnote 4), they joined the SPLM/A-Nasir in March 1993 and renamed it SPLM/A-United. However, some SPLM/A-Forces of Unity and Democracy commanders from Equatoria refused to join the SPLM/A-United and formed Patriotic Resistance Movement of South Sudan (PRMSS). Soon thereafter, the SPLM/A-United imploded due to ‘internal power struggles and recurrent defections to the sides of both Garang and the Sudanese government’ (Hutchinson 2000, 6). In 1994, the faction split into two, SPLM/A-United led by Lam Akol and South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A) led by Riek Machar. Further fragmentation into several factions followed in 1995. The implosion of the Machar group led to ‘the Nuer civil war,’ which continued up to 2002 (Johnson 2003, 111).

Scholars advanced different reasons for the fragmentation. One view blamed the government for fanning the flames of South-on-South violence as part of its long-standing efforts to wage a proxy war against the SPLM/A (Jok and Hutchinson 1999; Young November 2006, 2003; Johnson and Prunier 1993). Another view noted that funding and arming the warring Southern groups advanced the governments’ efforts to portray the war in the South as a tribal conflict (Collins 2005; Nyaba 2000; Salih 1989). A third view argued that the government funded and armed the ‘Nuer warlords’ in

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20 These factions include SPLM/A-Bahr al Ghazal led by Kerubino Kuanyin Bol; SPLM/A-Unity Group led by William Njuon Bany; SPLM/A-Bor group led by Arok Thon Arok; Equatoria Defence Force (EDF) led by Dr Theophilos Ochang; Southern Sudan Freedom Fighters Front (SSFFF) led by Dr Richard Mula; and South Sudan Independence Group (SSIG) led by Kawac Makuel.

21 Hutchinson includes the following faction leaders in her list of ‘Nuer warlords’: Paulino Matiep Nhial in the oil zones north and south of Bentiu, Gabriel Tangeny in Fangak, Simon Gatwich Dual in Akobo, Gordon Kong in Nasir, and Tito Bihl in Bentiu. Each of these faction leaders created an independent military alliance with the government of Sudan. For details, see A Curse from God? Religious and
order to depopulate and control the vast oil fields of Western Upper Nile (Hutchinson 2001, 2000; Jok and Hutchinson 1999; Human Rights Watch/Africa 2003). Thus, three interlocked wars engulfed South Sudan from 1991 to 2002: the government of Sudan and its allied militias against Garang’s SPLM/A, the SPLM/A vis-à-vis its splinter factions and other armed groups, and factional fighting within the splinter factions and other armed groups (including the Nuer civil war). Figure 5.1 below represents these nested wars.

Figure 5.1: Nested wars within the North-South Civil War 1991-2002

Fourth, the fratricidal wars shattered international hopes of initiating peace interventions. According to Burr and Collins (1995, 300), the United States concluded ‘that its efforts would likely be in vain, and the issue of a cease-fire and peace talks was left to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to resolve.’ At the time, the President of Nigeria, General Ibrahim Babangida, was chairing the OAU. Indeed, buoyed by the South-on-South violence and its military successes on the battlefront, the government held peace talks with the SPLM/A-Nasir from 23 to 25 January 1992 in Frankfurt, Germany, which produced a one-page, four-paragraph Declaration. In the Declaration, the government accepted for the first time the right of the Southerners ‘to freely choose the political and constitutional status’ in accordance with ‘their national aspirations, without ruling out any option’. However, the Declaration did not specify how long the transition would be before the Southerners could exercise that right. The SPLM/A-United interpreted the Declaration’s acceptance of any option to mean recognition of the right of self-determination for the people of South Sudan. It claimed that the transitional period issue

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would be resolved in the planned follow-up negotiations in Abuja, Nigeria. In contrast, the SPLM/A-Torit interpreted the Frankfurt Declaration as proof that the government was behind the SPLM/A-Nasir (Nyaba 2000). Nonetheless, the Garang faction sent a delegation to the Abuja peace conference.

5.6.3 The Declaration of Principles (DoP)

The Abuja peace conference was the first international intervention after the 1991 fragmentation of the SPLM/A. Facilitated by the President of Nigeria on behalf of the OAU, the conference occurred in two phases. Abuja I was held from May to June 1992, while Abuja II took place from April to May 1993. Both SPLM/A factions attended and presented their positions in the Abuja I negotiations, but the facilitators of the conference did not invite the SPLM/A-United to the Abuja II conference. The Abuja conferences ended without any resolution (Wondu and Lesch 2000). Subsequently, violence escalated in the three inter-locked conflicts (Burr and Collins 1995; Human Rights Watch/Africa 1994, 1995; African Rights 1997; Hutchinson 2001, 2000; Jok and Hutchinson 1999).

The intensifying violence prompted IGAD countries to form a Standing Committee on Peace in Sudan chaired by Kenya’s President, Daniel arap Moi. The Committee initiated peace negotiations in September 1993 between the government and Garang’s SPLM/A (Waihenya 2006; Adar 2000; Johnson 2011b; Johnson 2003). The IGAD initiative received international recognition in 1994 when a group of international funders – the friends of IGAD, including the US, Netherlands, the UK, Norway, Italy and Canada, formally recognised it (Johnson 2011b; El-Affendi 2001). According to the chief mediator (cf. Waihenya 2006), the Committee summarised the positions of the parties in the form of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) in July 1994. The DoP became the main negotiation Framework because it contained the proposals upon which Sudan could resolve the conflict. Article three of the Framework envisioned a united, peaceful Sudan structured around a secular, democratic state. The DoP anchored the attainment of this state on the acceptance by all parties that Sudan was a multi-racial, multi-ethnic,

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multi-religious, and multi-cultural society. In the absence of this acceptance, the DoP stated in article four that Southerners could exercise their right of self-determination through a referendum.

In other words, the DoP offered a secular, democratic Sudan as the best option for the warring parties. But it also recognised the right of Southerners to determine their future if a secular, democratic Sudan could not be realised. The SPLM/A accepted the DoP, but the GoS rejected the document. Although the 1994 IGAD-facilitated peace negotiations did not succeed in ending the conflict, the DoP kept alive hopes of a negotiated settlement. Indeed, the document became the foundation of the first breakthrough in July 2002 which culminated in the CPA three years later. Meanwhile, some important shifts took place on the battlefront and in the peace efforts between 1994 and 2002.

5.6.4 Peace from within Strategy

John Garang responded to the criticism of his leadership and governance of the movement by convening the first National Convention at Chukudum in Eastern Equatoria in 1994. Attended by 815 delegates from South Sudan, the Convention legitimised his leadership and adopted Resolution 3.2 of the Torit PMHC meeting (Collins 2005; Johnson 2003; Rolandsen 2005; African Rights 1997; Young 2005a, 2003). Garang’s faction then formed an umbrella group, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), with the sectarian Northern opposition parties (Umma and the DUP), the left (Sudan Communist Party (SCP) and the labour movement), and other regional parties (the Beja Congress and the Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP)) (Johnson 2003; Collins 2005; Wondu and Lesch 2000). In June 1995, the NDA members signed the Asmara Declaration which accepted the New Sudan option as a solution to the war after the ‘realization that offering the South the clear option of a democratic, decentralised government was the only likely alternative to secession’ (Johnson 2003, 104).

Interestingly, the Asmara Declaration preferred the modest phrase ‘non-use of religion in politics’, instead of an outright acceptance of secularism. According to Young (2012), the drafters of the self-determination clause in the Asmara Declaration premised it on
IGAD’s DoP. Therefore, the Declaration prioritised ‘the establishment of a democratic government… and agreement on a new constitution, after which the vote on self-determination would take place. All parties, including the SPLM, were committed to supporting unity in the resulting campaign.’ Meanwhile, Garang’s military fortunes improved and his faction recovered many areas that it had lost since 1991, attaining its zenith in 1998 when ‘all of the combatants – government forces and southern insurgents - [became] roughly balanced’ (Jok and Hutchinson 1999, 135).

For its part, the government increased its military, logistical, and financial support to the SPLM/A-Nasir and its splinter factions. Johnson (1998, 64) observes that the SPLM/A-Nasir’s inability to resolve ‘the contradiction between publicly advocating Southern independence and secretly accepting military hardware from Khartoum’ eventually destroyed it. Further, the government engaged these fragments in what it referred to as peace from within, which culminated in the Khartoum Peace Charter of April 1996. The Peace Charter reaffirmed Sudan’s Unity within its boundaries, a federal system (as defined by the NIF), and sharia and custom as the source of the legislation. Interestingly, the Charter granted the Southerners a referendum to ‘determine their political aspirations’ after an unspecified transition period (cf. Article 3, Khartoum Peace Charter 1996).

After the Khartoum Peace Charter failed to stop the resurgence of Garang’s SPLM/A as anticipated, the government brought in more groups from the South into the peace from within strategy. These efforts culminated in the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 21 April 1997 and the Fashoda Peace Agreement of 20 September 1997. Both Agreements retained the general principles of the 1996 Peace Charter, including upholding the unity

24 John Young (2012, 88-100) has argued that the notion of self-determination articulated in the IGAD’s DoP is different from the one that was espoused eight years later in the Machakos Protocol. In this view, the spirit of the DoP, which informed its notion of self-determination, was unity of Sudan while the Machakos Protocol’s notion of self-determination was reductionist and emphasised North-South differences. I will deal with this issue in the subsequent sections.

25 Signatories of the Khartoum Peace Charter were the Vice-President of the Republic for the Government of Sudan, Riek Machar for the SSIM/A, and Kerubino Kuanyin Bor for the SPLM/A-Bahr al Ghazal.

26 The Vice-President of the Republic signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement on behalf of the government. Signatories from the South were Riek Machar on behalf of the SSIM/A and the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF), Kerubino Kuanyin Bor on behalf of the SPLM/A-Bahr al Ghazal, and Kawac Makuei on behalf of South Sudan Independence Group (SSIG). Others were Dr Thiopholus Ochang Loti on behalf of the Equatoria Defence Force (EDF), Samuel Aru Bol on behalf of the Union of Sudanese African Parties (USAP), and Arok Thon Arok on behalf of the SPLM/A-Bor group. Similarly, the Vice-President signed the Fashoda Peace Agreement while Lam Akol signed on behalf of the SPLM/A-United.
of the Sudan and retaining the federal structure as defined by the government. Nonetheless, the Khartoum Peace Agreement went a step further and created a Southern regional government, referred to as the Coordinating Council for the Southern States (CCSS), and stipulated a referendum for the South on unity or secession after an interim period of four years. The Peace Agreement also merged the Southern factions into one political movement, the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF), and one military force, the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF). The security clauses of the Agreement stipulated that the SSDF would remain separate from the SAF and its soldiers would be stationed in their locations under their own command in the South during the interim period. However, the regional government faced many challenges, including factional fighting over the distribution of offices and refusal by militia leaders to place their forces under the SSDF command. As a result, the UDSF/SSDF fragmented into several factions which acquired some autonomy in their fiefdoms in the greater Upper Nile. The Agreement officially collapsed in February 2000 when Riek Machar resigned from the government.

5.6.5 Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS)

While Machar was still in government in July 1997, the government for the first time accepted negotiations with Garang’s SPLM/A based on the IGAD’s DoP. Analysts offer different interpretations for this change of stance. One view holds that African and non-African countries recognised the Khartoum Peace Agreement because it guaranteed religious freedom, a Southern government during the interim period, and self-determination referendum for the South (El-Affendi 2001). This recognition encouraged the government to accept the DoP, despite its misgivings about some aspects of the

27 The SSIM/A leader, Riek Machar, became the President of the CCSS, the country’s second vice-president, the UDSF leader, and the SSDF commander-in-chief, while Lam Akol (the SPLM/A-United leader) joined the cabinet in Khartoum as Transport Minister.

28 An example here was the war that arose over the selection of the Unity State governor in 1998. For the next two years, militia forces aligned to Riek Machar fought pitched battles with those of Paulino Matiep. In addition to killing hundreds of people and displacing thousands in Upper Nile, the war led to ejection of Matiep and Kerubino Kuanyin Bor from the UDSF/SSDF. Kerubino went back to the SPLM/A-mainstream, where he led an assault on the government-held Wau town, while Matiep formed his own militia known as South Sudan United Army (SSUA). Thereafter, Kerubino differed with John Garang in the SPLM/A-mainstream and he re-defected to SSUA where he died in battle during an intra-SSUA war in September 1999. Further, the SAF deployed Matiep’s militia to defend the newly constructed oil infrastructure in the Bentiu area.

29 These are the Nuer Warlords mentioned earlier (see footnote 11).

30 Riek formed another armed group Sudan People’s Democratic Front (SPDF) a few months later, but he eventually re-joined John Garang in January 2002.
Declaration. A contrary viewpoint asserts that the peace from within strategy failed to achieve the desired objective of weakening Garang and accelerating his defeat on the battlefront (Jok and Hutchinson 1999; Johnson 2003; Human Rights Watch/Africa 2003). The partnership with the militia groups in the South helped the government secure the oil-rich areas of the Western Upper Nile and construct a pipeline from Bentiu to Port Sudan on the Red Sea. But the government was unable to defeat Garang on the military front. Moreover, the persistent warfare caused an unprecedented famine, especially in the Bahr al Ghazal region, which aroused international concerns (Johnson 2011b; African Rights 1997; Human Rights Watch/Africa 2003). Compounding these challenges was the clamour for self-determination in the South which had been fuelled by the 1996 and 1997 peace agreements by according it official recognition (Young 2012; Johnson 2003).

A third view argues that the government of Sudan faced international and regional isolation due to its Islamist orientation and support for Islamic groups in the region (Johnson 2011b; ICG 28 January 2002; Human Rights Watch/Africa 2003; Rolandsen 2011b). In this view, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea bolstered Garang’s military capabilities through hardware and logistical support, while the US and other global powers weakened the government through economic sanctions. The consequent ‘military deadlock [was] marked by a seasonal pattern of interethnic violence: months of heavy fighting during the dry season, followed by a low-key war during the rains’ (Jok and Hutchinson 1999, 135).

After the government signed the DoP, the parties engaged in peace negotiations for three weeks in Nairobi, Kenya, in October 1997. But the negotiations were deadlocked because the parties differed on ‘several major points: areas where the referendum should take place, the interim period (two years for the SPLA, four for the government), interim arrangements (confederal for the SPLA, federal for the government) and on religion and the state’ (El-Affendi 2001, 588). Chapter three argued that the narrative that a party to a conflict espouses determines that party’s positions and the issues it present, as well as the demands it makes during peace negotiations. The issues upon which the SPLM/A and the government were deadlocked clearly show the divergence between the narratives they espoused.
The subsequent rounds of negotiations in Nairobi in May 1998 and in Addis Ababa in August 1998 were equally deadlocked over the same issues (El-Affendi 2001). ‘When the talks resumed in July 1999 in Nairobi,’ writes (El-Affendi 2001, 589), ‘the parties again presented their positions with little change.’ The mediators were unable to convene negotiations again until 2000, but the same fate befell the next rounds of negotiations in February, May, and September 2000. As Young (2012, 87) puts it, ‘the July 1999 talks in Nairobi did not make any substantive progress; nor did two further rounds in 2000.’ Subsequent summits by IGAD leaders in 2001 did not break the impasse. According to the ICG (28 January 2002, 156), ‘Khartoum even considered withdrawing from [the IGAD process] during the first half of 2001.’

Two additional factors compounded this mutually hurting stalemate. First, the NIF experienced internal fissures over the control of the state between President Omar al-Bashir and the Islamist ideologue and speaker of the National Assembly, Hassan al-Turabi (Burr and Collins 2003; Collins 2005). The power struggle ended with ejection of Turabi from the centre of power and the decline of the Islamist agenda in Khartoum, although the government continued espousing a modified Islamist narrative. Second, while the SPLM/A benefactors, Ethiopia and Eritrea, fought a deadly war in mid-1998, Uganda became involved in the second war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

5.6.6 Resuscitating the IGAD Peace Process

As the IGAD process floundered in mid-1999, Sudan’s northern neighbours, Egypt and Libya, launched a joint intervention which ostensibly sought to involve the two countries and Sudan’s northern opposition in the search for peace. The northern opposition was Garang’s partner in the NDA, but the IGAD peace process had relegated it to the periphery. The Egypt-Libya Initiative (ELI) proposed nine points, including preserving Sudan’s unity, basing rights on citizenship, recognising Sudan’s diversity, safeguarding democratic pluralism, establishing a decentralised government, and ceasing hostilities (Johnson 2011b; ICG 3 April 2002; Young 2012). However, its conveners omitted the self-determination option. According to Hilde Johnson (2011b, 24), ‘Egypt, with its strategic interest in the Nile waters, feared any exercise of self-determination that might lead to partition of Sudan.’
Reactions to the Initiative varied. The government accepted the Initiative because it viewed it as a way of wriggling out of the DoP’s secularism or self-determination clause. The northern NDA members endorsed the Initiative partly because the conveners included them, partly because they had a long relationship with Egypt and Libya, and partly because the DoP’s self-determination clause worried them (Young 2012; Johnson 2011b; ICG 28 January 2002). The SPLM/A wavered between rejecting and accepting the Initiative, but demanded the inclusion of ‘self-determination, secularism, and coordination of the JLEI with the IGAD peace process’ (Young 2012, 87). For their part, the IGAD partners saw the Initiative as an Arab League effort to be involved in peacemaking and as an attempt to undermine the IGAD process (Young 2012; Johnson 2011b; Waihenya 2006). The Egyptian-Libyan Initiative collapsed in June 2001. Its conveners did not initiate even a single round of peace negotiations between the Sudan parties in its two years of existence. Two other interventions, one by Eritrea in mid-2000 and another one by Nigeria in early 2001, also came to nothing (Young 2012; ICG 28 January 2002).

The failure of the three interventions left the IGAD process as the only one with the prospect of ending the war. From mid-2001, the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) exerted pressure on the regional organisation to show results (Johnson 2011b). The new US President, George W. Bush, added to the pressure by appointing a Special Envoy for Sudan, Senator John C. Danforth, on 6 September 2001 (Young 2012; Johnson 2011b; ICG 28 January 2002).

5.6.7 Mutually Enticing Opportunity (MEO)

The IGAD peace process shifted decisively after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York. The government in Khartoum feared the US because of the NIF leaders’ past relationship with the Al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, and previous cruise missile attacks by the Americans in August 1998, after Al-Qaeda militants bombed the US embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. Thus, Sudan leaders offered to share intelligence on suspected terrorists with the US (ICG 28 January 2002; Johnson 2011b; Young 2012). According to the ICG (3 April 2002, 7), Sudan went a step further and ‘arrested 30 to 40 Al-Qaeda militants, who were then flown to Egypt.’ In turn, the
US Special Envoy visited Sudan in November 2001 and ‘without much international consultation, he presented Khartoum with a set of tests designed to gauge its level of commitment’ to the peace process (Johnson 2011b, 27).

These confidence-building measures were in four areas, namely, humanitarian access to the SPLM/A controlled Nuba Mountains, cessation of aerial bombardment of civilian targets, investigation of slavery claims, and delivery of immunization programmes in SPLM/A controlled areas (cf. Danforth 2002). Danforth also visited the IPF partners in London and Oslo in December and then went back to the field in Sudan in January 2002 to follow up on the confidence building measures. ‘By early January 2002,’ writes Hilde Johnson (2011b, 28), ‘progress had been registered in three areas… humanitarian access in the Nuba Mountains, a temporary ceasefire, and arrangements for cessation of hostilities for immunization.’ Further, Khartoum for the first time hosted the IGAD Heads of State summit in January 2002.

For its part, the SPLM/A welcomed the American and the IPF intervention because the movement already had good relations with these international actors. Moreover, the return of Riek Machar’s SPDF to its fold in January 2002 strengthened its position (ICG 3 April 2002). However, the merger had implications for the competition between the New Sudan vision and the self-determination demands, which the movement had left in abeyance since 1994, because the SPDF comprised outspoken supporters of separation. Further, merging the two forces did not alter the military stalemate on the battlefront. The SPLA could survive for long as a guerrilla force, but the prospects of military success were dim because the development of the oil industry in the late 1990s boosted the government’s financial power and enabled the SAF to acquire sophisticated military hardware (ICG 27 June 2002; Young 2012). Additionally, Sudan’s policy shift from mutual destabilisation to economic and military partnerships with its neighbours Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda decisively improved the country’s relations with the other IGAD members (ICG 3 April 2002, 2).

The developments in the national, regional, and international spheres created a Mutually Enticing Opportunity (MEO). Ohlson (2008, 144) defines MEO as the moment when the warring parties change their attitudes, generate inter- and intra-party trust, and start moving towards each other in a peace process. That is, the post-September 11 moment
made a breakthrough in the peace process possible by prompting both the government and the SPLM/A to show interest in moving forward on the IGAD process and encouraging IGAD to initiate ‘what would prove to be the last phase of the Sudan peace process’ (Young 2012, 92). As noted earlier, the DoP proved very useful at this moment.

In summary, chapter three explained how sedimented discourses change, and how crises undermine the ‘social truth’ inherent in sedimented discourses. In turn, the preceding sections in this chapter have argued that from the 1950s to the 1970s, the elite controlling the Sudan state employed certain interpretative frames, collective memories, and social categories inherent in Sudan’s discursive and institutional continuities, to construct the conflict in the South as the problem of the South. In the extract quoted in chapter four, John Garang acknowledged that even people from the South had accepted this as the social truth. Therefore, he saw the crisis of 1983 and the resumption of the civil war as an opportunity to undermine this social truth and to change the discursive structures, including historical frames, by reformulating the issue from ‘the Southern Problem’ to ‘the Problem of Sudan’.

The 1983 SPLM/A manifesto reflect these efforts. Nonetheless, narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion remained at the centre of the second civil war, as demonstrated by the 1991 SPLM fragmentation and the Islamist wars of the 1990s. Initially, Northerners retained their articulation advantages, including the intellectual infrastructure in Khartoum, media institutions, and international forums. However, the SPLM gradually mobilised international support and had turned the tide by 2002. While much more could be said about the second civil war and why many analysts believe that Southerners better articulated issues in this phase of the protracted war (Johnson 2011a; Warburg 1993; Lesch 1998; Kok 1996), the above provides a sufficient overview for the purposes of this study. In the next chapter, I will interrogate texts for the narratives of identity, narratives of exclusion, and argumentation strategies.

5.7. Conclusion

This chapter aimed at reviewing the historical context in which narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion were constructed in Sudan. As Lemarchand (1994a) observed about Burundi, that is, how contemporary authors appropriated the past and re-positioned
it in line with their version of the post-independence civil war discourse, this chapter has argued that Sudan experienced a prevalence of the interface between past and present, narratives and practice, and ideology and violence. As a result, a prolonged civil war generated discursive practices which spawned further violence. The interface is explicit at the social construction of difference. Wilmer (2002) observes that the meaning which people assign to difference, and the way differences structure their social relations, is more important than how they locate themselves in the historical narrative.

At different times during the protracted civil war in Sudan, the warring parties not only employed contrasting narratives of identity to construct their difference, but they also connected the past through radically divergent cognitive maps. Underpinning these cognitive maps were conflicting perspectives on the agency and the time that created the regions, the institutions that defined Sudan, the formation of the contrasting identities, and the role of these identities in shaping the civil war. Other contested positions were the core components of North and South as distinct identities and the future of the Sudan nation-state. Articulated in the public and conceptual narratives, these contrasting perspectives comprised the building blocks of the North-South civil war discourse.
Chapter Six
Narratives of Identity and Narratives of Exclusion 1983 to 2002

Sometimes we refer to the Sudan as an Arab country. Some say an African country. Others say it is Afro-Arab, that is, Africans becoming Arabs, and I would also add that some call it Arabo-African, that is, Arabs becoming African. In all this, the Sudanese have been left out in the cold; that is, there has been no situation where there is that common Sudanese identity to which we all pay an undivided allegiance irrespective of our tribal background, race, or religion. *(John Garang, speech in London, June 1989)*.

6.1. Introduction

The DHA, as adapted in this study, requires the exploration of three dimensions. These are context, content, and argumentation strategies. The context provides the frames, memories and the social repertoires through which the content (narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion) are interpreted, while the argumentation strategies link narratives of identity with narratives of exclusion. The previous chapter has examined the historical context in which the content was constructed in Sudan. The chapter has also explained that the SPLM/A led by John Garang viewed the 1983 resumption of the civil war as an opportunity to engineer discursive and structural change in the country. Therefore, the July 1983 SPLM/A Manifesto reformulated the central conflict issue from ‘the problem of the South’ to the ‘problem of Sudan’. Chapter three postulated that achieving such a change required transforming the prevailing narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion. This chapter will focus on the content and argumentation strategies from 1983 to 2002. Therefore, I will examine the various texts for the narratives of identity, narratives of exclusion, and the argumentation strategies which the SPLM/A and the GoS employed during this period.

Chapter four explained the relevant texts, including the speeches of John Garang, his protagonists in the SPLM, and post-1983 central government leaders. I will organise the analysis around themes which arise from the set of questions that chapter four generated. Therefore, the first section of the chapter will interrogate texts with a view to identifying narratives of identity, while the second part will examine narratives of exclusion. Exploration of the argumentation strategies follow in the third section.
6.2. Narratives of Identity

Chapter four generated five questions for guiding the interrogation of texts on the narratives of identity. These are: who was involved in the civil war according to these texts? How did the participants frame the civil war? How do texts represent relations between diverse groups? What traits, qualities, and features do texts attribute to groups? What arguments did group leaders use to justify and legitimise violence against other groups? From these questions, I will organise the analysis into four themes.

6.2.1. Framing the Civil War

Chapter five has examined the rise of the Arab/African, Muslims/non-Muslims, and Southerners/Northerners dualities in the discursive continuities in Sudan. Garang knew about the existence of these dualities and was aware that actors from the North and the South had used them in the course of the first civil war and thereafter. He also knew the historical frames, collective memories, and social repertoires upon which these dualities were built. However, he reformulated the conflict issues and attributed the civil war to four factors, namely, dissolution of the regional government, changing of the Southern boundaries, division of the South into three regions, and transfer to Khartoum of the old Anyanya soldiers who joined the national army after the Addis Ababa Agreement (Garang 1992, 7). The July 1983 SPLM manifesto redefined the conflict from the ‘Problem of Southern Sudan’ to the ‘Problem of Sudan’. Therefore, it subsumed the racial, ethnic, and religious identities under the banner of the national question.

In his narrative, Garang rejected the prevailing historical frames which had privileged divisive identity issues as an essential component of the oppressor strategy. He also criticised the ‘secessionist movements’ for ‘chauvinistic tendencies’ which jeopardised ‘the unity of the people and prolonging their suffering and struggle’ (1992, 19). While the prevailing narratives interpreted the war in racial, religious, or ethnic identity terms, Garang reframed it as a liberation struggle by the oppressed from all racial and religious groups in Sudan. To him, the marginalised people were fighting to topple an oppressive and unequal system in order to create a New Sudan. Garang’s New Sudan vision rejected the notions of racial, religious, linguistic, or ethnic majorities and minorities propagated
in ‘the “old Sudan” because nobody is anybody’s minority and nobody is anybody’s majority. We are all Sudanese’ (emphasis in the original) (1992, 92). The SPLM was committed to a radical restructuring of the power of the central government in a manner that will end, once and for all, the monopoly of power by any group of self-seeking individuals whatever their background, whether they come in the uniform of political parties, family dynasties, religious sects or army officers (emphasis in the original) (1992, 26).

Further, Garang stressed that the SPLM was ‘committed to solving the nationality and religious questions to the satisfaction of all the Sudanese citizens and with a democratic and secular context and in accordance with the objective reality of our country’ (1992, 124). This rejection of the ‘Old Sudan,’ which was built on ‘oppression, racism, sectarianism, religious discrimination, injustice and uneven development’ is emphasised in the report of the 1994 National Convention (1994, 14). Emphasising this rejection in subsequent speeches, Garang articulated a new narrative built upon alternative discursive structures. ‘I have made it very clear before that our vision, our ideology of society is that we are all Sudanese, whether we are of Arab origin or of African origin,’ he insisted (Dr. John Garang Speaks to Sudanese in Washington DC (video) 2004). Thus, Garang disarticulated the old narratives of identity and rearticulated a new narrative. However, he faced a dilemma because the SPLM’s 1994 position, which underpinned negotiations in the IGAD-facilitated peace process, offered unity, confederation, or self-determination as possible solutions to the war.

A second Southern viewpoint implicitly shared this New Sudan perspective, but it did not question the identity dualisms inherent in the discursive continuities. Malwal (1985), who espoused a liberal integrationist perspective, directed his critique at the practices and personality of President Jaafar Nimeiry. While the Muslims comprised ‘60-65 per cent of Sudan’s population,’ he argued, the Africans comprised ‘75 per cent of the population’ (1991, 20). Therefore, he argued that it was the racial majority, not the religious majority, which was entitled to run the country. Emphasising political power

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1 Garang’s rejection of the ‘Old Sudan’ and adoption of the ‘New Sudan’ was borrowed from earlier articulations by the Sudan Communist Party (SCP) in the 1950s and the Free Officers who brought General Jaafar Nimeiry to power in July 1969. As chapter five noted, the SCP supported the 1969 coup d’état. I owe this point to an anonymous examiner.
and the distribution of resources, Malwal insisted that the issues involved in the conflict were not matters of religion. From this perspective, the war involved the marginalised majority vis-à-vis the dominant minority who was using religion and race to sustain its dominance (1990, 79). In essence, this viewpoint called for reorganisation of political power based on the current interpretative frames and social categories.

A third wing of the SPLM/A insisted on the primacy of racial and religious identities and clamoured for separation. Insisting that North and South Sudan were distinct and separate, this narrative held that South Sudan looked to its history and to its African neighbours for identity and solidarity, while North Sudan turned to the Arab world (Akol 2001). Accordingly, ‘many SPLA officers and men identified their enemy as the Arab Muslim North’ (Nyaba 2000, 72). To the separatists, ‘the SPLM manifesto of 1983 was not intended for the people of South Sudan… but rather to gain acceptability in the eyes of outsiders’ (Nyaba 2000, 33). This is because it ‘was at variance with the will and aspirations of many of its members’ who believed that only secession could ‘enable a South Sudanese national identity to evolve and develop’ (Nyaba 2000, 7). Therefore, the SPLM was preaching unity ‘contrary to the expressed opinions of [the] vast majority of the people of South Sudan, including those who joined the rank and file of the armed struggle’ (Nyaba 2000, 186). According to Alier (1990, 272), the ‘SPLA songs, sung in languages of the Southern Sudan, sometimes reveal its aims much more simply, boldly and frankly than the official speeches prepared and delivered to the public in either English or Arabic by the SPLM/SPLA leadership.’ In August 1991, some separatists formed a splinter SPLM/A-United. ‘The strategic difference between SPLA-United and SPLM-Mainstream revolved around the question of secession’ (Lesch 1998, 160). As chapter five showed, this contest between the separatist narrative and Garang’s unitarist narrative persisted up to the peace process.

In contrast, the government and Northern parties in the opposition ‘still held to their pre-Nimeiry platforms of an Islamic state’ premised on the riverain Arab identity (Johnson 2011a, 71). After proclaiming the September laws, General Nimeiry claimed ‘that Islam would unify the country and ensure economic prosperity’ (1984: cited in Lesch 1998). Therefore, he sought to enforce assimilationist policies through military violence. The other Northern parties adopted contrasting positions. The Transitional Military Council (TMC), which overthrew Nimeiry in 1985, viewed the civil war as a problem of the
South (Abdullah 1985; Dafaalla 1985). In a letter to John Garang, the Prime Minister, Dr El-Gizouli Dafaalla stated that,

The government of the popular revolution is giving the solution of the Southern problem top priority…. The political parties and the army stated that the Southern problem should be solved within an autonomous regional framework in a united Sudan…. Though the Southern problem has not started with the so-called Islamic laws, I appreciate their impact on it (1985, 86).

The TMC also framed the war as ‘anti-Arab’ and ‘anti-Muslim’ and appealed to Libya and the Gulf states for financial and military support. This was supposedly because Garang wanted to impose an ‘African identity on the Muslim Arab majority’ (Lesch 1998). This view saw the solution to the war as accommodating Garang in the transition government without altering the dominant Muslim-Arab framework (Wondu and Lesch 2000; Garang and Mansour 1992; Lesch 1998; Deng 1995). Upholding this framework, the military leaders who overthrew the government in June 1989 emphasised Sudan’s centrality in the Pan-Arab vision. Their leader, Omar al-Bashir, who is still the country’s president at the time of writing this thesis, argued that ‘Sudan is an Arab country which supports Arab national unity’ (Radio Omdurman in Arabic, 26 October 1989: cited in Burr & Collins 2003, 38). According to Burr and Collins (2003, 38), the ‘infatuation with pan-Arabism was promoted in Khartoum newspapers.’ Hence, the military government rejected peace initiatives and escalated the conflict by arming Arab militias.

For its part, the National Islamic Front (NIF) ‘wholeheartedly’ supported the re-division of the South, the introduction of Islamic laws, and the ‘vigorous promotion of Arabic and Islamic culture in the South ’ (El-Affendi 1990, 381). In its 1985 election manifesto, the NIF proclaimed Islam as the official religion and Arabic the official language. The Islamists reasoned that minorities could be granted their rights through a federal system built on Arab-Islamic identity (al-Turabi 1992). In practice however, subordinating all facets of life in Sudan to exclusive Islamic principles translated into enforced assimilation of all non-Muslims (Burr and Collins 2003; El-Affendi 1990). In January 1987, the NIF issued the Sudan Charter: National Unity and Diversity, which declared that Muslims neither espoused secularism nor accepted it politically. The Charter further claimed that Muslims regarded secularism as prejudicial to them because it developed
from a peculiar European experience which had no relevance to the historical
development or the legacy of the Islamic civilization. However, it is important to note
that while the Islamists were united against secularism, there were two opposed streams
which competed with each other within the Islamist movement on the question of
Arabisation.² The first stream leaned towards the traditional Arabism and the Arabisation
policies, while the second stream leaned towards a non-racist Islam. It is the second
stream which enabled the Islamists recruits substantial following in Darfur.³ At its
apogee in the early 1990s, the NIF framed the war in the South as a jihad against
secularism fronted by the SPLM/A (Collins 1999; Lesch 1998; Burr and Collins 2003).
But the Islamist project collapsed at the end of the 1990s. In February 2001, the NIF
leader, Hassan al-Turabi, signed a memorandum of understanding with the SPLA
accepting a democratic, federal system.

The other mainstream Northern political parties were not consistent in their positions.
From 1983 to 1985, the Umma Party blamed the war on Nimeiry’s Islamisation policies,
which it termed a perversion of Islam (1984: cited in Lesch 1998). The Umma also
supported the idea of an all-inclusive National Conference and signed the Koka Dam
Declaration which demanded inter alia a New Sudan ‘free from racism, tribalism,
sectarianism and all causes of discrimination and disparity’ (See Appendix C in Wondu
and Lesch 2000, 215-218). Though it rejected ‘the exclusivist version of religious
assimilation’ and positioned itself as a ‘democratic pluralist’ party that would
accommodate a wide range of perspectives, the Umma ‘took for granted Sudan’s
predominantly Arab-Islamic ethos’ (Lesch 1998, 67).

Thus, the Umma-led coalition which came to power after the 1986 elections pursued the
military option instead of implementing the Koka Dam declaration. When the SPLA
advanced into the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, stunned Umma officials ‘exclaimed
fearfully that Africans were poised to overrun the north’ (Lesch 1998, 93). Subsequently,
writes Salih (1989, 170), the Umma government armed the ‘northern Muslim Arabic-
speaking tribes bordering the south, including the Missiriya - both Humr and Zurug -, the

² I would like to thank Alex de Waal for this point and for referring me to Abdullahi el Tom’s articles. For
debates within the Islamist movement, see “Darfur People: Too Black for the Arab Islamic Project” (2006)
International Affairs, Vol 1, No. 2.
³ See footnote 2.
Riziygat and the Ma'aliya, in an effort to check the northward advances of the SPLA/SPLM. Due to battle losses and the deteriorating economy, the Umma shifted its position again in 1988 and accepted the November Accord. However, the June 1989 coup prevented implementation of the Accord. Later, in the 1990s, the Umma joined the SPLM/A in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which opposed the NIF-backed military regime.

Similarly, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) attributed civil war resurgence to Nimeiry’s Islamisation policies. However, it supported revising, rather than repealing, the Islamic laws (1984: cited in Lesch 1998). According to Lesch (1998, 67), the DUP took for granted that Sudan was a Muslim and an Arab country and, thus, its ‘concept of national identity was unself-consciously assimilationist.’ Thus, the party did not accept the Koka Dam Declaration. Shocked by the economic effects of the war, however, the DUP shifted its position in 1988. It acknowledged that Sudan’s ‘national problems are of ethnic origin, [and] they can only be solved through a serious, continuing and clear-cut dialogue among all the Sudanese political forces, on an equal footing within the framework of the forthcoming national constitutional conference’ (October 1988: cited in Lesch 1998, 105). Thereafter, the party signed the November Accord with the SPLM/A, which called for the freezing of Islamic laws and the convening of the constitutional conference (Sudan News Agency (SUNA), 16 November 1988: cited in Lesch 1998, 82). However, the Islamists coup thwarted implementation of the Accord. Later, the DUP teamed up with the SPLM/A in the NDA. In the 1990s, some analysts claim, Northern parties such as DUP and Umma realised that privileging the Arab-Muslim identity in their discourses had aggravated the clamour for Southern secession (Lesch 1998; Johnson 2011a; Deng 1995). Thus, they jettisoned Arabism and shifted their emphasis to national democracy, which was a unitarist perspective. However, the NDA faced the challenge of balancing the unitarist dimensions of national democracy, which bound all its members, with Southern clamour for self-determination strong in the SPLM.

In broad terms, the mainstream Northern parties reproduced the prevailing historical frames, collective memories, and social repertoires which privileged the existent Arab-Islamic framework. However, they differed on whether to pursue assimilationist policies or grant Southerners minority rights within the dominant Arab-Islamic framework. The only Northern party that rejected this framing of the civil war was the leftist Trade Union
Alliance. In its correspondence with John Garang, the Alliance supported scrapping of the Islamic laws, returning of Sudan to the secular 1956 constitution, and constructing a New Sudan free from sectarianism and identity dualisms (Yagi 1985; Congress of Trade Unions (CTU) 1985; Ahmad 1985). Just like Garang, the Alliance disarticulated the predominant narratives and framed the war as the problem of Sudan. After the June 1989 coup, the military government banned the trade unions and the Alliance. The Northern Left later joined forces with Garang in the NDA.

In brief, I infer five narratives which are versions of the narratives identified in chapter five. Like the earlier separatists, the separatists of the second civil war viewed it in terms of Arabs/Muslims versus Africans/non-Muslims. This narrative emphasised the existent identity dualities and preferred separation. The second Southern narrative accepted the identity dualities as they existed in the discursive continuities, but it separated racial identities from religious identities. Similar to the 1950s Southern elite narrative which preferred federation, this narrative stressed that Africans were the majority and the advocated re-organisation of power based on the majority principle. I will call it the centrist narrative. Like the earlier leftists, John Garang espoused what I will call the leftist or New Sudan narrative, which disarticulated the prevailing narratives of identity and articulated a unitarist narrative. He shared this narrative with the Northern Left. The other Northern parties reproduced the existent identity dualities, but their narratives differed slightly, with Islamists preferring the forced assimilation of non-Muslims, while the traditional parties opted for minority guarantees within an Arab-Islamic framework. Both narratives were versions of the earlier Sufi Brotherhoods’ narrative. I will call them Islamists and sectarian parties’ narratives. How did these five narratives represent relationships between groups?

6.2.2. Representing Relationships

Garang’s leftist narrative viewed the Southerners and Northerners as victims of oppression and exploitation. In all his bulletins, Garang avoided identity markers and portrayed the SPLM as a revolutionary movement which aimed at organising and liberating ‘the whole Sudanese people’ (1992, 19). In a speech on 22 March 1985, Garang elaborated this view, maintaining that the oppressor
has always divided the Sudanese people into Northerners and Southerners, into Arabs and Africans, Muslims and Christians, and so forth. In the North itself our people have been categorized into Westerners, Fallatas, Arabs, Easterners and the so-called “Awlad el Balad”; while in the South the enemy has attempted to politicize the people along tribal lines and tribes into sections (1992, 28).

Garang consistently used the metaphor ‘our people’ to refer to all Sudanese. He also claimed the SPLM had destroyed ‘the idea of the South and North being traditional enemies’ through ‘sincere and persistent education of our troops and by the open-mindedness shown by our people from both North and South’ (1992, 29). In a letter to the Prime Minister dated 1 September 1985, he rejected ‘the old North-South perceptions’, stating that Sudan included the ‘West, East and Centre’ (1992, 91). Further, he demanded a public commitment from the Prime Minister ‘to an agenda to discuss the “Problem of the Sudan”, not the ‘so-called problem of “Southern Sudan”’ (1992, 93). He concluded his letter with a call for unified efforts ‘to create a New Sudan that truly belongs to all of us, no matter our (accidental) region, “tribe”, race, or religion’ (1992, 94). He stressed these arguments up to the signing of the CPA in 2005. After he signed the last main agreements in May 2004, he explained that,

The Northerners are suffering too…. It is not the problem with Darfur, it is not the problem with Nuba, it is not the problem with Beja, it is not the problem with the Nubians in the far north, and it is not the problem with the poor in Omdurman. It is the problem of governance in Khartoum itself (Dr. John Garang Speaks to Sudanese in Washington DC (video) 2004).

In the 1990s, Garang acknowledged that the civil war had worsened relations between groups in the country, and he accepted confederation and self-determination as resolution options. Nonetheless, he emphasised at the CPA signing ceremony in January 2005 that a New Sudan was possible because very many people in the North shared the SPLM/A’s dream and believed ‘as we do in the universal ideals of humanity – the ideals of liberty, freedom, justice and equality of opportunity for all Sudanese citizens’ (see Appendix I).

Unlike Garang who eschewed identity markers, Malwal (1985) used cues such as Muslims, Arabs, and Africans But he employed these identity markers to support his
thesis of power imbalances, rather than to condemn whole groups. However, the separatists espoused a different view. Lam Akol argued that hostility had always characterised their relations because the North regarded ‘the Sudanese nationality as a transition to full integration into the Arab nationality for those who are not of the Arab stock, including the Southerners…. The aspirations and attitudes of North Sudan are irreconcilable with those of South Sudan’ (1992: cited in Wondu and Lesch 2000, 35-36). To Nyaba (2000, 19), the post-1956 ‘Sudanese state represented the economic, social and cultural interests of the Muslim and Arab Northern Sudan’. Consequently, Southerners and non-Arab groups shared ‘the psychology of an outsider in the affairs of their country’ because they played ‘an apprentice’ role (2000, 19). Further, he asserted that non-Arabs despised the rule of the ‘Jelaba’ and they ‘like the rest of humanity, love themselves and would want to assert their existence as a people with their language, culture, religions etc’ (2000, 182).

The Northerners’ perspectives varied. The leftists, including the Trade Unions and the Communist Party of Sudan viewed the Northern peasantry, workers, and the population in the peripheries as victims of oppression and exploitation by the military governments, Northern sectarian parties, the Arab fundamentalists, and Islamists. Referring to Garang as a ‘brother’, the Alliance stated that

we sincerely hope to come to a common understanding as to the ways and means of attaining our immediate common goal of National Unity as well as realizing our strategic objectives for a harmonious and equitable development for the different regions of our beloved country. (Ahmad 1985, 101)

The general tone of the letter and use of phrases such as ‘our common goal’ and ‘harmonious and equitable development’ clearly suggests the Alliance empathised with the SPLM’s cause and regarded Southerners as comrades-in-arms. In contrast, the other Northern parties viewed Southerners condescendingly. As noted earlier, the dominant Northern narrative portrayed the Arab-Islamic culture and identity as the national one. Aiming to spread this ‘national’ culture in the South as a basis for unity, this viewpoint presupposed the South was ‘an inert mass, waiting to be shaped anew’ (El-Affendi 1990, 372). But Southerners violently resisted assimilation. Indeed, Southerners accepted the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement because it accepted Sudan’s racial and religious diversity,
adopted secularism, and outlawed ‘any form of discrimination on the basis of religion, race, language, or gender’ (Lesch 1998, 47). While blaming Jaafar Nimeiry for precipitating the second civil war, the Northern parties recognised that hostile relations existed between Northerners and Southerners. However, as chapter five explained, they blamed the British and the Christian missionaries for creating and sustaining these hostilities by thwarting the spread of Islam and the Arabic language into the South. As the civil war escalated in the 1990s, these parties accepted the New Sudan idea as a way of mitigating the hostile relations.

6.2.3. Attributing Negative Qualities and Traits

Another aspect of the narrative of identity is the qualities and traits that texts attribute to the constructed group identities. The SPLM under John Garang avoided attributing negative traits to whole groups and constantly referred to all people as ‘Sudanese’. Garang pointed at the organisation of power in Khartoum as the central problem. Accordingly, he proffered ‘liberation of the whole country from any prejudices based on race, religion, culture, language, or gender’ (Deng 1995, 230). Further, Garang espoused ‘Sudanism’ and expressed his movement’s commitment to ‘national formation’ and ‘national liberation’ (1992, 127). While national liberation required liberating the country from ‘external dependency and internal exploitation’, national formation involved fusing ‘the many nationalities that are sometimes wrongly referred to as tribes… Arab tribes, Nuer tribes, Dinka tribes, Zande tribes, Toposa tribes, the Nuba, Fur, Beja and so on’ into a nation-state (1992, 127). National liberation would install genuine autonomous or federal governments in which the masses and not regional elites would ‘exercise real power for economic and social development and promotion of their cultures’ (1992, 125). Meanwhile, national formation would eliminate ‘all these sectarianisms and look deep inside our country’ for shared experiences (1992, 128). In other words, Garang believed the problem of exploitation and domination was an elite issue, rather than a group problem.

The centrist position espoused by Bona Malwal (1990, 1985) shared Garang’s attitude towards groups. However, the separatists within the SPLM/A upheld the old negative perceptions towards Arabs and Muslims. According to Nyaba (2000, 181), the ‘African people’ suffered from ‘Arab oppression, domination, exploitation and arabo-islamic (sic)
acculturation.’ Noting this point, Deng (1995, 183) observes that while the gulf between the North and the South had widened over time, Islam had ‘become even more blatantly synonymous with northern, Arab hegemony’ and Southerners resisted it ‘as part of the liberation struggle.’ From the separatists’ perspective, peaceful co-existence required dismembering the country into ‘two separate, independent and sovereign entities’, one for the ‘Africans’ and the other one for the ‘Arabs’ (Nyaba 2000, 181).

Equally, Northerners attributed negative qualities to Southerners. In the early months of the civil war, President Nimeiry described the SPLM/A as ‘outlaws’, ‘communists’, ‘anti-Arab’, and ‘anti-Muslim’ (1984: cited in Lesch 1991, 52). In this sense, Nimeiry’s notions of Arabs and Muslims were the traditional Northern elite views, which held riverain Arabs and Muslims as ‘religious’ and ‘civilised’ in comparison to ‘Africans’ and non-Muslims whom Northerners regarded as ‘primitive’, ‘irreligious’, and without culture or history (Deng 1995; Lesch 1998). He also referred to the SPLM as a ‘Dinka’ movement which aimed to dominate the Southern ‘tribes’ (Collins 1999; Lesch 1998; Khalid 1992). As the civil war escalated, however, he offered Garang the country’s first vice-presidency, ‘a position previously impossible for any Southerner to attain’ with ‘carte blanche’ to become the ‘Czar of the South’ (Alier 1990, 259). Nimeiry’s successors were equally contemptuous in their attitude towards the SPLM and Southerners. Besides referring to Garang as a communist, the TMC claimed the SPLM/A intended to impose a ‘African’ identity upon the country’s Muslim majority (Al-Musawwar, 1 November 1985: cited in Lesch 1986). Therefore, the TMC viewed the SPLM/A as anti-Arab and anti-Muslim and, thus, a threat to the presumed national identity.

The other northern parties, with the exception of the Trade Union Alliance, described the SPLM/A as a threat. In 1986, Umma leader and Sudan’s Prime Minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi, branded Garang and his movement ‘terrorists’ (SUNA, 21 August 1986: cited in Bechtold 1991, 14). A few months later, after the SPLM/A advanced into Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile, he claimed the ‘African hordes’ were about to overrun the ‘Arab-Muslim’ North (cited in Lesch 1991, 62). He followed his claims with a policy of arming Arab militias in the frontier regions. Thereafter, al-Mahdi labelled the SPLM/A and Garang a ‘puppet’ of Ethiopia which aimed to impose ‘a Marxist regime in Sudan’ (Cited in Lesch 1998, 93). The NIF went a step further and labelled the SPLM and
secularists enemies of Islam (El-Affendi 1990). Appealing for Islamic solidarity, the NIF referred to its militias as mujahideen (holy warriors), described the SPLM/A and Southerners as ‘kafirin’ (heathens) and ‘infidels’, and branded the Trade Union Alliance as traitors (Burr and Collins 2003; Lesch 1998). Over the course of the next twelve years, however, the Northern parties progressively shifted their perspectives. By 2001, all of them had signed memorandums of understanding with the SPLM/A.

Chapter three presented actor transformation as one of the pillars of the conflict transformation diamond. Using this proposition, I infer that these parties’ change was important for the peace process and for transformation of the conflict. The question is the conditions under which they started changing their ‘social truth’. I argue that these parties changed because the devastating violence of the 1990s and the possibility that the country would split, especially after violence spread to Darfur and to the East, undermined their ‘social truth’ and exposed the limitations of their narratives. I also deduce that Garang’s success in mobilising international opinion, through his New Sudan vision challenged the frames through which the Northern parties understood issues. As chapter three explained, agents re-evaluate their positions and adopt a new way of understanding issues when they reach such a point.

6.2.4. Legitimising Violence

Closely related to attributions are justification and legitimisation of the civil war. Garang justified the conflict as a war of liberation by the oppressed and marginalised people. He elucidated the SPLM/A objective as fighting for a ‘Sudan free from racism; a Sudan in which power is vested in the masses, exercised by them and in their interests; a Sudan in which there is no monopoly of power by any group whether ethnic, religious or regional….’ (Garang and Mansour 1992, 36). He rejected criticisms by Northern-based leaders that the SPLM/A clamoured for separation. The movement not only had ‘a national character’, he insisted, but it had also provided ‘an independent new force capable of galvanizing all revolutionary, progressive, democratic and patriotic forces into a united political alternative capable of tackling and correctly solving the fundamental problems such as the national question’ (emphasis in the original) (1992, 58). Therefore, the SPLM was ‘committed to the liberation of the whole Sudan and to the unity of its people and its territorial integrity’ (1992, 124). ‘Since 1956,’ he added,
we have been talking of an African Sudan or an Arab Sudan or an Afro-Arab Sudan or an Arabo-African Sudan or simply as a bridge, a connection between the African world and the Arab world. I have been fighting since 1983 to get rid of this sectarianism and to have in its place a new socio-political formation (1992, 204).

The theme of SPLM/A’s national character pervades all his speeches and writings up to 2005. Articulating a similar perspective to Garang, Bona Malwal (1985, 1990) justifies the civil war as resistance to family oligarchs and military strongmen who had refused to accept Sudan’s diverse and multi-cultural nature. ‘Since independence,’ he writes, ‘power in Khartoum has passed back and forth between the sectarian families and elements of the armed forces’ (1990, 82). By using Islam and Arabism to maintain their domination, the civilian oligarchs and military strongmen created discontent among the politically marginalised Sudanese who resorted to armed rebellion. However, the separatists rationalised the civil war as a legitimate resistance to imposition of ‘the Arab nation, the Arab culture, and the Islamic religion’ (Akol, 1992: cited in Wondu and Lesch 2000, 44). Describing Sudan as a ‘marriage of convenience [that] had failed, due to war, deception, and betrayal’, Akol (1992: cited in Wondu and Lesch 2000, 54) argued that splitting Sudan was the only solution because the country was ‘comprised of two nations that had tried but failed to live together.’ The SPLM/A ‘leadership was talking of a united socialist Sudan,’ Nyaba (2000, 41) wrote, but ‘the people were talking of secession of South Sudan’ because they knew ‘the enemy was the Arab North’.

In contrast, the Northern controlled governments justified the war as defence of Sudan’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national identity. Initially, General Nimeiry described the SPLM/A as ‘Garang’s movement’ which would collapse if he was offered a high position in Khartoum (Lesch 1998, 93). Similarly, the TMC initially viewed the SPLM/A as a reincarnation of the Anya-Nya and attempted to revive the Addis Ababa Agreement. In the words of Prime Minister Dafaalla (1985, 86), ‘the political parties and the army stated that the Southern problem should be solved within an autonomous regional framework in a united Sudan.’ After the SPLM rejected the TMC offer, the military ruler, Suwar al-Dhahab, appealed for aid from the West, claiming that Garang wanted to rule ‘all Sudan under a Communist system’ (Al-Hawadith, 25 November
1985: cited in Lesch 1986, 421). Meanwhile, the TMC turned to the Gulf States for military support arguing that Garang intended to impose an African identity upon the country’s Muslim-Arab majority (Al-Musawwar, 1 November 1985: cited in Lesch 1986). Thus, the TMC justified the war as a defence of Sudan from Communism and protection of Muslim-Arab identity.

Subsequently, Umma Prime Minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi, justified the war as defence of the North, Islam, and Arabism against forces of the South, Christianity, and Africanism fronted by Garang and the SPLM/A (Lesch 1998; Johnson 2011a; Garang and Mansour 1992). Building on these fears, the NIF painted secularists as enemies of Islam (El-Affendi 1990, 382) and blamed the Christian missionaries for ‘instigating southerners to demand secular laws’ and for halting ‘the natural spread of Islam southwards into the heart of Africa’ (Makki 1989,137: cited in Lesch 1998, 92). Additionally, the NIF saw the war as a legitimate force necessary to create ‘a modern state out of the recalcitrant tribal structures in the South’ (El-Affendi 1990, 382).

In summary, this section shows that five narratives of identity competed in the discursive and institutional continuities during the second civil war. Two narratives were from the South, two were from the North, and one was crosscutting. But how did these narratives understand exclusion?

### 6.3. Narratives of Exclusion

Chapter three explained that narratives of exclusion reflect the materialisation of the narratives of identity into social practices using discursively constructed identity boundaries. To interrogate texts for narratives of exclusion, chapter four generated two questions: what arguments do texts highlight regarding inclusion and exclusion of groups in Sudan? What arguments did the elite use to justify and legitimise inclusion of some groups and exclusion of others? The five narratives of identity analysed above approached these issues from diametrically opposed perspectives. I will merge the two questions into one theme.
6.3.1. Mitigating or Legitimising Exclusion

John Garang understood the war as the ‘Problem of Sudan’. His narrative portrayed exclusion of the South as part of the broader exclusion of peripheries in the country. In his words,

we did not organize the SPLA to fight for restoration of the Addis Ababa Agreement or for the reunification of Southern Sudan, or for more and better concessions for South Sudan. No, we organized the SPLA for much higher and national objectives, including of course regional interests for the South and for all other neglected and backward regions (1992, 53).

Garang also portrayed the SPLM as the vanguard of ‘people from different nationalities and from different regions – North, South, East, West and Centre’ (1992, 58). Further, he upbraided ‘the political forces in Khartoum’ for arrogating ‘to themselves a national role and responsibility to decide on the fate of the nation as a whole’ while denying the same role to others, especially the SPLM which they relegated ‘to a “Southern Movement” that must negotiate with them for what they can “give” to the South’ (1992, 91). He emphasised that ‘the problem is in Khartoum, meaning that the government has been taken by the people of Khartoum alone’ (1992, 125).

In the 1992 Abuja peace process, his party’s negotiation paper argued that the Khartoum elite had employed various strategies, including racism, to exclude some groups from political, administrative, military, and economic systems (cited in Wondu and Lesch 2000). The paper further censured the Khartoum elite for utilising ‘Arabic language’ and ‘racist and sectarian religious institutions’ to exclude indigenous languages, religions, and cultures (Wondu and Lesch 2000, 34). Lastly, it rejected Islamic laws for curtailing equality of citizenship before the law and equality of opportunities. ‘They say you are a Nuba, you are a Westerner, you are a Southerner, you are an Arab and you are so and so. These things must not be there because we must all be Sudanese…. SPLM is dedicated to the eradication of tribalism, sectionalism and provincialism,’ Garang insisted (1992, 125-126). Therefore, Garang’s narrative unequivocally rejected conversion of the prevailing narratives of identity into narratives of exclusion.
For its part, the centralist narrative broadly concurred that the conflict issue was the power configuration at the centre in Khartoum (Malwal 1990, 1985). The narrative blamed family oligarchs who benefited from economic, social, and educational advantages offered by the British condominium, and the military strongmen who used military means to usurp power. As ‘vehicles for narrow regional, sectarian, and familial – as opposed to national – interests,’ these oligarchs excluded large sections of the country from political power and economic opportunities by ‘appealing to the religious sentiments’ in the country (1990, 80). The narrative also blamed the ‘Islamic fundamentalist faction, the National Islamic Front (NIF)’ for combining Muslim sectarianism with Islamic jihad (1990, 81). Therefore, just like Garang’s leftist narrative, the centralist narrative rejected conversion of the prevailing narratives of identity into narratives of exclusion. The divergence between the two lay in the leftist foundation of Garang’s narrative and the liberal underpinnings of the centralist narrative.

The separatists offered a third southern position on exclusion. Lam Akol (1992: cited in Wondu and Lesch 2000, 35) argued that the ‘North had thwarted the South’s right to develop its own culture and institutions of authority.’ He added that the use of Arabic as a medium of communication and Islam as the state religion had privileged Northerners and ‘made Southern Sudanese unequal to Northerners by law’ (1992: cited in Wondu and Lesch 2000, 44). He insisted that the South wanted to control its resources and economy. Similarly, Nyaba (2000) claimed that the Arab-Islamic notion of the Sudanese nation-state excluded those in the peripheries who were racially, linguistically, and religiously different. In this view, ‘many youths from the west, significantly the Nuba and people from central Sudan, like Ingessina, who also suffered oppression in the hands of the Arab North, joined the rank and file of SPLM/A’ (2000, 27). The separatists concluded that the Islamic-Arab exclusivist vision encountered violent resistance in the peripheries because state violence buttressed it. Thus, the separatists’ narrative preferred conversion of the prevailing identity boundaries into permanent exclusion through secession.

Similarly, there were three competing narratives in the North. The leftist view admitted that Southerners had been excluded, but it located exclusion within the broader national relations of production. Therefore, it rejected the conversion of the prevailing identity narratives into narratives of exclusion. Instead, the Koka Dam Declaration (see Appendix C in Wondu and Lesch 2000, 215-218) which the Alliance led called for the creation of a
New Sudan ‘free from racism, tribalism, sectarianism, and all causes of discrimination and disparity’. Further, the declaration acknowledged the need to solve *inter alia* ‘the nationalities question, the religious question, development and uneven development, and the cultural question’.

This narrative contrasted with that of the traditional sectarian parties, especially Umma and the DUP. At times, these parties viewed the ‘SPLM’s challenge to the structure of power in Khartoum as proof that the movement was anti-Arab and anti-Muslim’ (Lesch 1998, 93). Their stance implicitly denied exclusion and privileged the identity dimension. At other times, the sectarian parties acknowledged exclusion of the South and socio-economic disparities between the centre and the peripheries, thus preferring a return to the 1972 Addis Ababa framework of devolution in the regions within a centralised Sudan (Lesch 1998; Wondu and Lesch 2000; Deng 1995). But as chapter five noted, the Addis Ababa agreement solidified the narratives of identity.

In the 1990s, they shifted their positions and formed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) with the SPLM. In a statement in 1994, the Umma Party publicly acknowledged Southern exclusion, supported a democratic government based on territorial decentralisation, and accepted conditional unity and the right of Southerners to decide their future (Umma statement, cited in Lesch 1998, 193). ‘We accept the future which the peoples of the South freely decide for themselves,’ Umma declared. According to Lesch (1998, 193),

the Umma recognized that a vote for secession would be the outcome not only of current policies, which overwhelmingly alienated African Sudanese, but also its own prior view that ‘Sudanese self-consciousness… was Islamic-Arabic’ and its failure to recognize the grievances of the ‘African Sudanese ethnic groups’.

The DUP similarly accepted in its June 1994 convention that the South had been excluded. Specifically, it ‘emphasized that the future political system must be grounded in the reality of the multiracial, multi-ethnic, and multicultural Sudanese society’ (Sudan News & Views (SN&V), 23 June 1994: cited in Wondu and Lesch 2000, 194). On 27 December 1994, the party signed the Asmara Declaration, which demanded the ‘non-use of religion in politics’ and endorsed Southerners’ right to secede if the central
government failed to abide by the principles of equality (see Asmara Declaration in Wondu and Lesch 2000, 231 - 241).

6.4. Argumentation Strategies

Chapter four explained that argumentation strategies denote what actors want in practice. They reflect the intentions and plans which would materialise the conflict actors’ goals in the institutional, policy, and social spheres. Following the theoretical exposition in chapter three, argumentation strategies are critical for two related reasons. First, actors in conflict use them to convert narratives of identity into narratives of exclusion. Second, actors in conflict employ argumentation strategies to construct or deconstruct the collective understanding of conflict. Because they link public narratives with ontological narratives, argumentation strategies are crucial ingredients of narrative construction and transformation. This section will explore the argumentation strategies which both Southerners and Northerners employed to construct and sustain narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion, which the preceding sections have discussed, and to produce and reproduce the civil war in the discursive and institutional continuities.

6.4.1. ‘Othering’ and Emphasising Difference

The first strategy was ‘Othering’ and emphasising difference. The DHA classifies this as a strategy of justification which constructs difference by emphasising ‘us’ against ‘them’ (Wodak et al. 2009, 36). This strategy furthers the theoretical arguments in chapter three about the discursive construction of the ‘Other’ and the ‘enemy-Other’, and the legitimisation of violence against the ‘enemy-Other’. From 1983 to 2002, cornerstones of this ‘Othering’ strategy were ‘us-Africans’ against ‘them-Arabs’, ‘us-Southerners’ versus ‘them-Northerners’, ‘us-non-Muslims vis-à-vis ‘them-Muslims’, and ‘us-marginalised’ against ‘them power wielders’. The strategic goal of the parties determined their choice of the ‘Othering’ categories.

Garang’s leftist narrative avoided racial and religious categories. Instead, it emphasised ‘us-marginalised’, ‘us-exploited’, and ‘us-peripheries’ against ‘them-power-holders’, ‘them-exploiters’, and ‘them-centre’. The narrative criticised the ‘old Sudan’ for uneven development and for marginalising the peripheries. Garang argued that he was fighting
for a New Sudan in which the national question would be resolved and ‘all the regions of the country’ would ‘receive a fair socio-economic development’ (1992, 36). The new Sudan would be free from racism and no group would monopolise political power. Garang aimed at rallying the marginalised and the peripheries, and his end goal was transformation of the structure of power at the centre. In 1991, Garang recognised that Arabisation and Islamisation policies had provoked a strong Southern Sudan nationalism which clamoured for separation (Lesch 1998; Wondu and Lesch 2000). However, he maintained the belief that a New Sudan was achievable all the way up to his death in July 2005.

Similarly, the centrist position represented by Bona Malwal also emphasised ‘marginalised’ and ‘peripheries’ vis-à-vis ‘power holders’ and ‘centre.’ But it later accepted the rise of Southern Sudan nationalism and confederation. In contrast, the separatists portrayed ‘them-Arabs’, ‘them-Muslims’, and ‘them-Northerners’ as the enemy-Other. Accordingly, they declared that ‘the aspirations and attitudes of North Sudan [were] irreconcilable with those of South Sudan’ (Akol 1992: cited in Wondu and Lesch 2000, 36). To Nyaba (2000, 41), the people knew ‘the enemy was the Arab North.’ The separatists visualised only one outcome: ‘split the North and the South into two states’ (SPLM-United Abuja peace conference paper 1992: cited in Wondu and Lesch 2000, 54).

The Northern parties equally employed the ‘Othering’ strategy, although they differed in emphasis. Just like the SPLM/A, the Trade Unionists and the leftists avoided racial and religious identity markers and emphasised ‘us-exploited’ and ‘us-marginalised’ vis-à-vis ‘them-exploiters’ and ‘them-dominators’. In his letter to John Garang, Secretary-General, Awad-Al-Karim Ahmad (1985, 100-101), used phrases such as ‘revolutionary ideas which the Trade Unions Alliance shares fully with you’, ‘our call to you as a comrade-in-arms’, and ‘the struggle to establish a truly democratic and free society.’ Thereafter, the Alliance issued a joint statement with the SPLM/A in which they stated ‘the root causes of Sudan’s chronic social and political instability are essentially national’ and called for repealing of the September laws (Garang and Mansour 1992, 109-110). In the 1990s, the Islamic regime depicted the leftists and other Northern secularists as ‘apostates’ and ‘traitors’ (Lesch 1998; Collins 1999; Burr and Collins 2003).
Contrastingly, the sectarian parties initially labelled the SPLM/A as ‘anti-Arab’ and ‘anti-Islam’, and Southerners as ‘non-Muslims’, ‘uncultured’, and ‘tribal’. ‘Before Nimairi’s fall in 1985,’ writes Johnson (2011a, 79), ‘Sadiq advocated the inevitable Islamisation and Arabization of the southern Sudan through the manipulation of differences between Southern leaders, and through the activities of Islamic scholars and merchants.’ Accordingly, this strategy envisioned the solution to be military defeat of the SPLA and assimilation of the Southerners into Islam and Uruba. The Umma shifted this strategy to the protection of minority rights within the Arab-Muslim framework in the late 1980s, and then to acceptance of multi-religious, multi-racial, and multi-cultural reality of Sudan in the late 1990s. The DUP also followed Umma’s trajectory. Located on the far right, the NIF’s ‘Othering’ strategy constructed the SPLM/A as anti-Islam and anti-Arab, the Southern secularists as infidels and heathens, the Northern secularists as apostates, and all of them as enemies of its Islamic vision (Burr and Collins 2003; Lesch 1998). Accordingly, this strategy escalated the civil war in the 1990s to enforce its idea of Islamic revolution.

6.4.2. Historical Continuity

The second strategy is historical continuity. The DHA classifies ‘continuity’ under ‘strategies of perpetuation’ (Wodak et al. 2009, 39). I have called it historical continuity because it involved utilising historical frames which indicated continuity between the past and the present. Southerners employed this strategy not just to refer to the historical past, but also to portray the civil war as a continuation of that past. Garang avoided racial and religious identity markers, but he employed historical continuity to portray the civil war as a continuation of the past struggles between the ‘oppressed’ and the ‘oppressors’. The ‘history of the Sudanese people from time immemorial has been the struggle of the masses of the people against internal and external oppression’, he declared (Radio SPLM, 3 March 1984: in Garang 1992, 19). ‘The oppressor has time and again employed various policies and methods of destroying or weakening the just struggle of our people….’ Garang’s focus was oppression as a phenomenon, rather than the racial, ethnic, or religious identity of the oppressor. Therefore, his strategy exhorted all the oppressed groups to reject oppression and ‘combine forces to create a New Sudan that truly belong to all of us, no matter our (accidental) region, “tribe”, race, or religion’ (letter to Prime Minister, 1 September 1985: in Garang and Mansour 1992, 87-94).
However, the SPLM/A separatists explained the war as a continuation of the historical enmity between the ‘Africans’ and the ‘Arabs’. According to Nyaba (2000, 19), the ‘Sudanese state is a Northern institution handed over to them by the British colonial authority on independence in 1956…. The role Southerners and any other none-Arabs (sic) played in this Sudanese state was and still remains that of an apprentice.’ To the separatists, nothing short of separation would resolve the conflict between non-Muslim Africans and Muslim Arabs.

For their part, the Northern parties also emphasised the common history of colonialism. The Northern leftists stressed the phenomenon of oppression across various historical phases, instead of the oppressor identity. The Trade Union Alliance called for the repealing of the Islamic laws, adoption of a secular constitution, and resolution of the nationalities, religious, cultural and governance questions (see Appendix C in Wondu and Lesch 2000, 215-218). In contrast, the sectarian parties blamed the British for halting the spread of Islam and Arab culture in the South. It was the British ‘who divided the North and South and left the South backward economically and socially,’ argued the government delegation during the 1992 Abuja peace process (cited in Wondu and Lesch 2000, 31). According to Northern Historian, Abdel Rahim Muddathir (1964: cited in Lesch 1998, 33), the ‘the harm done by the [British] in the Southern Sudan far outweighs that of memories of the slave trade.’

In this view, both the Northerners and Southerners shared a common history of British colonial oppression. The parties also viewed Islam as closer to Africa than Christianity, which they regarded as a Western religious institution that the British introduced to counter the spread of Islam (Lesch 1998; Deng 1995; El-Affendi 1990). This strategy, therefore, implored the people to reject the SPLM/A as a foreign supported movement that furthered the historical mission of external forces. However, in the 1990s, the sectarian parties shifted from this position and accepted Sudan’s multi-racial and multi-cultural reality.

The fundamentalist NIF also employed the common history strategy, but it went a step further. Specifically, it framed the conflict as a continuation of the historical polarisation between the forces of Islam, who ‘have been trying in vain to fight against the “foreign”
influence of past “evil colonialist policies” and “hypocritical European missionaries”, and those of Christianity and secularism (El-Affendi 1990, 386).

6.4.3. Separate versus Common Future

Closely related to the above was the third strategy of separate versus common future. Separate vis-à-vis common future falls under two classifications in the DHA: discontinuation and continuation. The DHA classifies discontinuation as a strategy of demontage (or dismantling) (Wodak et al. 2009, 42), and continuation as a strategy of perpetuation (2009, 39). I have combined them into one strategy in this study because they provide support to the theoretical arguments in chapter three that the future which groups construct for themselves structures their relationships with other groups.

Garang focused on the phenomenon of oppression instead of the oppressor identity. He presented a vision of a common future in which cultural, racial, religious, and ethnic groups would co-exist in a New Sudan. The ‘SPLA/SPLM is committed to the liberation of the whole of Sudan and to the unity of its people…. [we are] committed to the establishment of a democratic new Sudan,’ he declared (speech at Koka Dam conference, 20 March 1986, in Garang and Khalid 1992, 124). The centrists’ position in the South represented by Bona Malwal also envisioned a common future for all Sudanese if power configuration was restructured at the centre (Malwal 1985, 1990). However, the separatists preferred a separate future. Because ‘equality proved elusive,’ argued SPLM-United during the Abuja peace negotiations, the ‘North and the South should become two separate states based on two separate nations’ (cited in Wondu and Lesch 2000, 35-36).

In contrast, the Northern parties agreed on a common future for all Sudanese, though they differed on the method of its achievement. As argued in the preceding sections, the leftists’ parties preferred a secular state. The sectarian parties initially viewed the Southerners as primitive, pagan, and without history, and pursued assimilation and Islamisation policies. In the 1990s, they accepted multi-racial, multi-cultural, and multi-religious principles in a federal Sudan. The NIF was the last party to accept the multicultural reality of Sudan, and it finally did in 2001 when its leader, Hassan al-Turabi, signed a peace agreement with the SPLM/A.
6.4.4. Casting Doubt

The fourth strategy was *casting doubt*. The DHA places casting doubt as one of the strategies of justification (Wodak et al. 2009, 36). This strategy involves imputing negative motives or doubting the seriousness of the other party with a view to justifying one’s own actions. All parties in the Sudan civil war occasionally employed this strategy.

Garang rejected General Nimeiry’s offer of peace because its aim was to ‘tantalize the Sudanese people with the prospect of peace, because he knows that he has terrorized and bankrupted the nation…’ (speech over radio SPLA, 22 March 1985: in Garang and Khalid 1992, 33). In this respect, he cast doubts on General Nimeiry as a leader who could not be trusted as a peacemaker. Thereafter, Garang refused to recognise the TMC, arguing that ‘the army officers’ who stole people’s victory against General Jaafar Nimeiry had ‘contributed to… oppression and exploitation during Nimeiri’s rule which they staunchly defended…’ (speech over SPLA radio, 9 April 1985, in Garang and Khalid 1992, 39). Here, he was imploring the people to reject the army generals because they could not institute the desired change. Garang frequently uses this argumentation strategy in all subsequent speeches up to 2004. The separatists also deployed this strategy in their texts. For example, Nyaba (2000, 33) insists that even after implementing the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, ‘the northern elite… remained suspicious of the intentions of the South, as they will always be.’ To the separatists, Southerners would never win ‘the confidence and trust of the northern elite’ (2000, 34). Therefore, separation was the only option.

The Northern parties similarly employed casting doubt as a strategy. When Prime Minister of the TMC, Dr El-Gizouli Dafaalla, wrote to Garang arguing that ‘the South is now suffering from serious famine and people are dying of starvation everyday’ (letter in Garang and Khalid 1992, 85-86), he was casting doubt on Garang’s commitment to his people. He was implying that, if Garang really cared about the South, he would stop fighting, join the TMC, and together they would organise humanitarian relief for the dying Southerners. Another example is the presentation by the government delegation at the Abuja peace conference in 1992. The delegation argued that the ‘North-South tensions had arisen in 1955 when Shari’a was not the country’s legal code’ (cited in
Wondu and Lesch 2000, 41). Simply, the government side was casting doubt on the claims by Southerners that the second civil war arose because of the Islamic laws. The sectarian parties also employed this strategy until they shifted in the late 1990s.

### 6.4.5. Victim-Perpetrator Inversion

*Victim-perpetrator inversion* was the fifth argumentation strategy employed by the parties. Under the DHA classifications, the victim-perpetrator inversion (or strategy of scapegoating) is a justification strategy. That is, actors employ this strategy in order to justify their positions or actions. In essence, the strategy involves perpetrators blaming their victims for their actions, claiming that they are the victims. The Northern side mostly employed this strategy to counter the rising international empathy for the Southerners who were dependent on humanitarian relief. For example, the government side blamed the failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement on infighting among the Southern groups because Equatorians rejected domination by the Dinka (Wondu and Lesch 2000, 31). In the 1990s, the Islamists appealed to international Islamic solidarity by claiming they were victims of a Christian international conspiracy to prevent them from spreading Islam and Arab culture in the South (Burr and Collins 2003; Collins 1999).

### 6.5. Conclusion

Employing textual analysis techniques of DHA, this chapter set out to investigate the narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion which were articulated during Sudan’s second civil war from 1983 to 2002. The chapter used a set of guiding questions, which chapter four developed from the theoretical framework, to interrogate texts. The first part of the chapter explored the narratives of identity, the next section narratives of exclusion, and the third part argumentation strategies. The main findings were that five narratives of identity competed in the discursive and institutional continuities and underpinned the second civil war discourse in the 1980s and 1990s. These findings are summarised in table 6.1 below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Northern viewpoint</th>
<th>Southern viewpoint</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who was involved in the civil war?</td>
<td><em>Islamists’ narrative</em> Muslims, Arabs, Northerners, and Southerners</td>
<td><em>Separatists’ narrative</em> Africans, Arabs, Southerners, Northerners, non-Muslims, Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sectarian parties’ narrative</em> Muslims, Arabs, Africans, Northerners, Southerners</td>
<td><em>Centrists’ narrative</em> Oppressors, oppressed, centre, peripheries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Leftists’ narrative</em> Oppressors, oppressed, centre, peripheries</td>
<td><em>Leftists’ narrative</em> Oppressors, oppressed, centre, peripheries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How did the involved groups frame the war?</td>
<td><em>Islamists’ narrative</em> Defence of Islam and Arabism</td>
<td><em>Separatists’ Narrative</em> War of liberation from Arab-Muslim domination and colonialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sectarian parties’ narrative</em> Defence of Sudan’s territorial integrity; defence of Islam and Arabism</td>
<td><em>Centrists’ narrative</em> War of liberation from a small group of family oligarchs and military men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Leftists’ narrative</em> Struggle against oppression and exploitation</td>
<td><em>Leftists’ narrative</em> War of liberation from oppression; war to build a New Sudan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How did they represent relationships?</td>
<td><em>Islamists’ narrative</em> The ‘Others’ were heathens and infidels who needed to be converted to Islam</td>
<td><em>Separatists’ narrative</em> Irreconcilable relationships due to historical enmity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sectarian parties’ narrative</em> The ‘Others’ were inferior and needed to be assimilated into Islam (umma) and Arab culture (uruba)</td>
<td><em>Centrists’ narrative</em> Africans, Arabs, Muslims and non-Muslims were victims of power imbalances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Leftists’ narrative</em> Peasants, workers and peripheries were victims of oppression</td>
<td><em>Leftists’ narrative</em> All groups were victims of oppression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What qualities did they attribute to groups</td>
<td><em>Islamists narrative</em> The ‘Others’ were anti-Arab, anti-Muslims, infidels and heathens</td>
<td><em>Separatists’ narrative</em> Arabs and Muslims were oppressors, exploiters, colonisers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sectarian parties’ narrative</em> SPLM/A and Africans were anti-Arab and anti-Muslim; Africans were pagans, primitive and without history</td>
<td><em>Centrists’ narrative</em> All people were Sudanese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Leftists’ narrative</em> All people were Sudanese</td>
<td><em>Leftists’ narrative</em> All people were Sudanese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How did they justify or...</td>
<td><em>Islamists’ narrative</em></td>
<td><em>Separatists narrative</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.1: Narratives which competed in the discursive and institutional continuities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narratives</th>
<th>Centrists’ narrative</th>
<th>Centrists’ narrative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sectarian parties’ narrative</td>
<td>Defence of Sudan’s territorial integrity and national unity/defence of Islam and Arabs</td>
<td>War of liberation/equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftists’ narrative</td>
<td>Struggle against oppression in the peripheries</td>
<td>Leftists’ narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War of liberation/self-determination/form a separate state</td>
<td>Centrists’ narrative</td>
<td>Leftists’ narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>War of liberation/equality</td>
<td>Leftists’ narrative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other findings were five argumentation strategies that the various parties employed in the course of the civil war. These were Othering, historical continuity, and separate vis-à-vis common future, casting doubt, and victim-perpetrator inversion. Besides these main empirical findings, three theoretical issues arose from the explorations, which are relevant to a peace process as a mechanism of transition from civil war to peace. The first issue was horizontal relations between the elite. This issue is important because the elite negotiate in the peace processes on behalf of their constituencies. The relation between John Garang and the Northern elite, including the TMC, the sectarian parties’ leaders, and later the military government, reflect this issue. The second issue is the vertical relations between the elite and their supporters, and the role of argumentation strategies in these relations. Chapter three postulated the centrality of discourse in constructing vertical relationships and the collective understanding of conflict. Garang used the SPLA radio to sustain these relations.

The third issue, which chapter three expounded in detail, is the point at which agents change sedimanted ‘social truth,’ re-evaluate their positions and adopt new positions. This chapter and the previous one have shown that extreme Islamist violence in the 1990s not only fuelled the separatist sentiments in the South, but it also shook the ‘social truth’ of the Northern sectarian parties. As a result, they accepted Garang’s New Sudan vision and its secularist underpinnings. Chapter three developed a three-phase analytical framework. The first phase traced narratives of identity during a civil war up to the mutually hurting stalemate point, while the other two phases covered peace negotiations and peace agreement implementation respectively. This chapter has covered the first phase. Representing these findings in the framework produces figure 6.1 below. I have
placed the leftist narrative at the centre of the figure because it was the same for both Northerners and Southerners.

Figure 6.1: Representing the identified narratives in the analytical framework

The next chapter will explore articulations of these narratives during the 2002 to 2005 peace process and their representations in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).
Chapter Seven
Narratives of Identity and Narratives of Exclusion in the CPA

The government had acquiesced in self-determination, including the option of secession, in order to preserve the religious foundation of Sudan. The SPLM/A had given up a secular, confederate state, an essential part of the ‘New Sudan’ agenda, in order to get a referendum on unity or secession for the South. (Hilde F. Johnson 2011, 54).

7.1. Introduction

Chapter five analysed the historical context in which the 1983-2005 civil war was constructed in Sudan. Subsequently, chapter six interrogated texts on the war with a view to identifying narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion which competed in the discursive and institutional continuities during this civil war. This chapter will turn to texts on the 2002 to 2005 IGAD-facilitated peace negotiations and the six agreements which comprise the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to examine articulations of these narratives. The President of the Republic of Sudan, General Omar al-Bashir, and the SPLM/A leader, Dr John Garang, signed the CPA on 9 January 2009 in Nairobi, Kenya. While the CPA was the outcome of the 2002 to 2005 peace process, IGAD’s involvement in peacemaking had started in 1993. The 2002 to 2005 phase was, therefore, a turning point in the decade-long search for peace because it marked the signing of the CPA.

Just like chapter six, this chapter will cover narratives of identity, narratives of exclusion, and argumentation strategies. Chapter four generated one question regarding narratives of identity in the CPA: how does the text of the CPA represent identity? Chapter four also generated one question regarding narratives of exclusion: does the text of the CPA mitigate or reinforce narratives of exclusion? To ensure thorough analysis, the logic of presentation in this chapter will follow the CPA protocols. Thus, the first section will provide a brief overview of the 2002 to 2005 phase of the peace process. The next section will interrogate texts with a view to understanding how the narratives of identity identified in chapter six were represented in the CPA Protocols. The third section will focus on the narratives of exclusion, while the fourth section will analyse texts for argumentation strategies.
7.2. The Final Peace Negotiations 2002 to 2005

The first session of this phase took place in Karen, Nairobi, in May 2002 and focused on the agenda and modalities for the negotiations. According to Hilde Johnson (2011b, 42), the talks were contentious and only reached an agreement ‘when the unity of Sudan was moved to the top of the agenda, self-determination put further down, and ceasefire removed altogether.’ The next session started on 17 June 2002 at the town of Machakos, 60 kilometres South East of Nairobi. After a month of intense and acrimonious negotiations, the parties signed the watershed Machakos Protocol on 20 July 2002. The Protocol addressed the competing narratives by reaching ‘credible compromises on a number of key issues, particularly self-determination for southern Sudanese, elements of religion and state, and the length of the interim period before the South’s self-determination referendum’ (ICG 17 September 2002, 3). The chief mediator (cf. Waihenya 2006) notes that the Machakos Protocol was the biggest breakthrough in the eight year IGAD peace process. Two pillars underpinned the Protocol. First, the Protocol stipulated self-determination for the South by means of a referendum, which centred on unity or separation, after an interim period of six years. Second, it specified application of the Sharia law in the North and a secular system in the South during the interim period. The Machakos Protocol became the foundation upon which subsequent progress was built (Johnson 2011b, 54).

The parties resumed negotiations in mid-August 2002 to continue with the other major issues. These were power and wealth sharing, restructuring of the state, security arrangements, and resolution of the conflicts in Abyei, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile. But the negotiations deadlocked after only two weeks for three reasons. First, the SPLA escalated violence and captured Torit Town on 1 September 2002 where it killed a ‘large number of senior military officials’ (Young 2012, 101). Therefore, the parties disagreed over the timing of the ceasefire (Young 2012; Johnson 2011b; Waihenya 2006; ICG 17 September 2002). Second, the government accused the SPLM/A of ‘taking positions contrary to the Machakos Protocol by calling for a confederal arrangement and re-opening the issue of state and religion by asking for a Sharia-free capital’ (ICG 17 September 2002, 1). Third, the government blamed the SPLM/A for introducing new items onto the negotiation agenda by questioning the status of Abyei, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile. The chief mediator (cf. Waihenya 2006, 93) observes that the
‘SPLM/A insisted that they could not continue with the negotiations without first tackling the three conflict areas, namely the Abyei area, the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile (also known as the Funj). These three areas had not been mentioned in the Machakos Protocol.’

Thereafter, the parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the cessation of hostilities and unimpeded access to humanitarian aid on 15 October 2002. They then signed another MoU on power sharing on 18 November 2002, when the Machakos talks concluded because Kenya was holding elections the following month after which President Daniel arap Moi would leave office (Johnson 2011b; Waihenya 2006). The next round of negotiations in the New Year began on 23 January in Karen, Nairobi. Though the ‘agenda called for discussion of power sharing, wealth sharing, and the Three Areas,’ the parties solely focused on the violation of the ceasefire MoU (Johnson 2011b, 66). On 4 February 2003, the parties signed an Addendum to the MoU on cessation of hostilities. The Karen negotiations ended without any further agreement. Subsequent rounds of talks took place from May to August 2003 in Nakuru and Nanyuki - 140 kilometres West and 150 kilometres North East of Nairobi respectively (Waihenya 2006; Johnson 2011b; ICG 10 February 2003, 7 July 2003). Neither of these parleys made any breakthrough, even though the mediators changed the negotiation strategy from issue-by-issue to ‘an approach in which all the outstanding issues could be discussed together, and traded off against one another’ (ICG 11 December 2003, 3).

Frustrated by the persistent deadlock, the IGAD Secretariat brought in the principals to the negotiations. They were Vice-President Ali Osman Taha for the government and John Garang for the SPLM/A in September 2003. The two met for the first time on 4 September 2003 at the town of Naivasha, 100 kilometres West of Nairobi. After three weeks of intensive negotiations, they signed the Agreement on Security Arrangements on 25 September. Direct negotiations between Taha and Garang then picked up momentum. On 7 January 2004, they signed the Agreement on Wealth Sharing. Three more agreements, Protocol on Power Sharing, Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, and Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area, followed on 26 May 2004. Finally, on 31 December 2004, the two principals signed the Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices. The six agreements and the
Permanent Ceasefire and Implementation Modalities were then combined to make the CPA which the parties signed publicly in Nairobi on 9 January 2005.

Before turning to the narratives of identity in the CPA, let us recap the central issues that emerge from this overview and the arguments in chapter five and chapter six. First, the IGAD facilitated peace process continued for ten years, but the 2002 to 2005 phase was the turning point. Second, chapter six identified three Northern and three Southern narratives that provided the interpretive frames through which the warring parties understood the civil war discourse. These six narratives stood on an almost equal footing at the start of the IGAD process in 1993. However, intensive violence from 1994 to 2002 hardened positions and altered the hierarchy of narratives. In the North, the alignment of the Islamist narrative with the state power relegated the leftist and sectarian parties’ narratives in the hierarchy of narratives. In the South, unending war, deepened cleavages, and South-on-South violence emboldened the separatists. As a result, only one northern and two southern narratives were articulated in the 2002 to 2005 phase of the peace process.

Third, the position of the SPLM/A oscillated between the unitarist narrative of the New Sudan vision and the separatist narrative. In contrast, Southern opponents of John Garang espoused the separatist narrative unequivocally. Therefore, by 2002, the main fault line in the South was between the unitarist and the separatist narratives. Fourth, the issues, positions, and demands which were articulated by the three narratives that dominated in the 2002 to 2005 phase of the peace process, namely, the Islamist, the separatist, and the New Sudan’s unitarist narrative, revolved around state and religion (or secularism versus Islamism), structure of government, wealth sharing, and self-determination for the South. Guided by the questions developed in chapter four, I will now turn to representations of these narratives in the CPA Protocols.

7.3. Narratives of Identity in the CPA Protocols

7.3.1 The Machakos Protocol

The Machakos Protocol was the backbone of the CPA. The first section of the Protocol explained the principles upon which it was based, while the other four sections covered
the transition process, state and religion, structures of government, and the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan. The transition period covered a pre-interim period of six months in which the government and the SPLM/A would establish transitional institutions, followed by an interim period of six years in which the transitional institutions would be operationalised. The Protocol stipulated an internationally monitored referendum at the end of the interim period for the people of the South to either confirm the unity of the Sudan or vote for secession. The next section on state and religion recognised Sudan as a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual country. It also allowed ‘freedom of belief, worship and conscience for followers of all religions or beliefs or customs’ (Article 6.2). But this recognition was diluted by the next section on structures of government which stipulated Sharia as the source of the legislation in the North. That is, the Protocol specified that Sharia would be ‘the law of the North, as defined by the 1956 borders. Khartoum was part of that deal and was going to be the capital’ (Johnson 2011b, 82).

The last section of the Protocol focused on the self-determination for the people of South Sudan to determine their future through a referendum.

While the text of the Machakos Protocol employed terms such as ‘the National government’, ‘the people of South Sudan’, and ‘states outside Southern Sudan’, nowhere did it mention Arab/African or Muslim/non-Muslim identity dualities. However, it is evident that narratives of identity inspired the Protocol. The chief mediator (cf. Waihenya 2006) argued that the Protocol covered the most contentious issues, including separation of religion and state, and self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan. However, the ICG (17 September 2002) insisted that the Protocol only partially defined the relationship between state and religion. It further claimed that the ‘SPLM’s compromise on the religion and state’ implicitly endorsed ‘Sharia in the North [as] the will of the majority of northern Sudanese’ (17 September 2002, 6). I argue that these contrasting viewpoints reflected the contest between the Islamist narrative, which rejected secularism and emphasised the inseparability of religion and state in Islam, and the other northern narratives, especially the leftists, who espoused secularism. Because these other Northern parties were in partnership with the SPLM/A in the NDA, the mediation team assumed that the SPLM/A represented their positions (Young 2012; Waihenya 2006; Johnson 2011b; ICG 18 December 2002). Yet, they articulated different narratives. Further, I argue that the contrasting viewpoints reflected the differences
between the extreme positions represented by the Islamists, who saw the Muslim/non-Muslim identity duality as the main dividing line, and the separatists who touted the ‘Arab-North’ and the ‘Africa-South’ as monolithic blocs.

Closely linked to the foregoing is the way the various parties linked the language of the DoP and the Machakos Protocol. The chief mediator (cf. Waihenya 2006) and the IGAD felt that the DoP formed the basis of the Machakos Protocol. Sharing the mediator’s viewpoint, Hilde Johnson (2011b, 53) noted that the ‘Protocol contained detailed provisions for the referendum, including the language of the Declaration of Principles.’ Others disagree. The ICG reports (18 December 2002, 17 September 2002) showed an awareness that the two documents may have contained unity and self-determination but the underlying narratives of identity had implications for Sudan beyond the peace process. Indeed, some critics of the CPA emphasised the post-CPA implications for Sudan.¹ For example, Young (2012, 95) argued that the

IGAD Ministerial Sub-Committee on Sudan of 19-23 July 1999 and the Joint Communiqué of the First Session of the Political Committee Task Force of 20 July 2002 emphasised their commitment to the DoP, [but] the Machakos Protocol – which provided the framework – bears only superficial resemblance to it.

From this perspective, the Protocol deviated from the letter and the spirit of the DoP. This was because the Declaration prioritised unity and limited the choices for the self-determination referendum to unity, confederation, or federation (Article 3), unless the parties failed to attain a secular, democratic, and united Sudan (Article 4). In contrast, the Machakos Protocol offered self-determination regardless of whether the parties pursued a secular, democratic Sudan or not. That is, the DoP required the parties to pursue a secular, democratic Sudan and only go for a separation referendum if they failed to achieve that goal, but the Machakos Protocol did not bind the parties to the goal of a united Sudan. While affirming the SPLM/A’s commitment to the New Sudan vision, an academic at the University of Juba, who served as one of the SPLM/A’s advisers during

¹ Several academics and civil society activists expressed these criticisms in our discussions in different dates i.e. in Pretoria, South Africa, in October 2009 and in Khartoum, Sudan, in February and September 2010.
the Naivasha negotiations, explained this contradictory stance as tactical. This means the SPLM/A negotiators wanted to secure a fallback position because they feared that the GoS would not honour the commitment.

However, the deviation jeopardised the next phases of the peace process. According to Young (2012, 94), the separatist stance of the Machakos Protocol shocked John Garang and largely accounted for ‘the tensions between Garang and Salva [Kiir] that would come close to bringing about the collapse of the SPLM/A a few years later.’ These tensions and rumours that Garang’s long-standing deputy, Salva Kiir Mayardit, would be arrested are documented in the minutes of the SPLM/A Rumbek meeting of 29 November to 1 December 2004. A professor at the University of Juba informed me that the disagreement persisted even after the Rumbek rapprochement and forces aligned to the two leaders almost fought just before Garang died in July 2005. Similarly, the Protocol’s separatism shocked the Americans, who supported Garang, because ‘their understanding of the negotiating position of the SPLM derived from their meetings with Garang, who opposed such a forthright commitment’ (Young 2012, 94). The group that was most aggrieved by the Machakos Protocol was the SPLM/A leaders from Abyei, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile. The chief mediator (cf. Waihenya 2006, 93) states that these leaders ‘brought considerable pressure to bear [on John Garang] and made it clear that it was an act of betrayal to sign a protocol that did not include the three conflict areas.’

I argue that the deviations between the Machakos Protocol and the DoP arose from the tensions within the SPLM/A between the separatist narrative and the New Sudan unitarist narrative. Because the leaders from the other non-South regions of Sudan, including Abyei, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile, were attracted to the SPLM/A by the unitarist narrative, they felt betrayed by the Machakos Protocol since it privileged the separatist narrative. Further, I argue that the SPLM/A’s subsequent demands for a sharia-free capital and pursuance of the Protocols on Abyei, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan was an effort to mitigate these tensions. Indeed, it is these tensions which caused disagreements and restructuring of the next rounds of peace negotiations. As the chief mediator (cf. Waihenya 2006, 93) put it, the SPLM/A leaders from these regions insisted

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2 Face-to-face interview at the University of Juba, 22 January 2013.
3 Face-to-face interview at the University of Juba, 19 January 2013.
that ‘they could not continue with the negotiations without first tackling the three conflict areas.’

This insistence contributed to a new round of deadlock as the SPLM maintained that ‘resolving the status of the three areas require(d) special consideration due to their history and the ongoing fighting,’ while the government argued that the Machakos Protocol limited the South ‘as defined at independence in 1956’ (ICG 17 September 2002, 19). To resolve the deadlock, the IGAD mediation team scheduled the next round of negotiations for January 2003 ‘with the status of three contested areas – Abyei, the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile – first on the agenda’(ICG 10 February 2003, 2). Map 7.1 below shows the three areas and the 1956 boundary.

In summary, the Machakos Protocol deviated from the letter and the spirit of the DoP. The DoP aimed at transforming the conflict by articulating an all-inclusive vision of Sudan and subordinating the right of self-determination to the failure of the national government to realise that vision. In contrast, the Machakos Protocol solidified the
existing narratives of identity as discursively constructed by the separatists and the Islamists. In essence, it was ‘a road map for the secession of southern Sudan’ (Young 2012, 96). However, because the SPLM/A oscillated between the unitarist and the separatist narratives, the unitarist wing of the movement challenged the separatist stance of the Protocol. The SPLM/A leader, John Garang, responded to these tensions by pursuing additional agreements which focused on the contested non-South areas of Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and the Blue Nile. But could these protocols be the basis of discourse transformation? Did these additional protocols resolve tensions between the unitarist and the separatist narratives within the SPLM/A?

7.3.2 Protocol on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict

Chapter two explained the conflict in Abyei and mentioned the core provisions of the Abyei Protocol. A key issue that emerged from the literature review was the linkage between the localised narratives of identity in the region with the identity narratives at the national level. This is why the SPLM/A leaders from Abyei pressurised Garang after the signing of the Machakos Protocol, as most Ngok Dinka areas in Abyei lay north of the 1956 border, which the Protocol stressed. The tone of the Protocol on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict suggests that Garang recognised the dilemma the Machakos Protocol had imposed. Article 1.1 of the Protocol referred to Abyei as ‘a bridge between the north and the south’, and defined the territory as ‘the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905.’ The Article also stipulated that the ‘Misseriya and the other nomadic peoples retained their traditional rights to graze cattle and move across the territory of Abyei.’ In Article 5.1, the Protocol created the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) to delimit and demarcate this area. Unlike the Machakos Protocol, which avoided mentioning identity markers, the Protocol on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict mentioned these markers explicitly and allocated rights based on these identity markers. In Article 3.1, it allocated 2% of resources generated from oil drilled from the region to the Ngok Dinka and 2% to the Misseriya people. Further, in Article 6.1, it defined the residents of Abyei area as ‘the Members of Ngok Dinka community and other Sudanese residing in the area.’

However, allocating rights on the basis of identity markers in Abyei did not resolve the tensions between the unitarist and the separatist narratives within the SPLM/A. Nor did it
invalidate the separatist stance of the Machakos Protocol. On the contrary, it escalated these tensions. Because the New Sudan vision aimed at discourse transformation, the unitarist narrative emphasised the primacy of citizenship as a fundamental pillar of the vision and sought to allocate all rights, including land rights, on this basis. The Abyei Protocol contradicted this principle of citizenship by privileging claims based on ethnic identity markers as expressed in the localised narratives of identity. Further, while Article 2.1 accorded Abyei ‘special administrative status under the institution of the Presidency’ during the interim period, Article 8.1 stipulated a referendum at the end of the interim period for the residents to choose whether Abyei would ‘retain its special administrative status in the north’ or it would opt to ‘be part of Bahr el Ghazal.’ Article 8.2 specified that the ‘residents of Abyei’ would vote in the referendum.

When read together with Article 1’s definition of Abyei as the ‘area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms’, Articles 8.1 and 8.2 raised profound questions regarding the Protocol’s interpretation. The SPLM and GoS sought the interpretation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). However, I argue that this speaks to a broad issue which is necessary for discourse transformation: consistency in the writing of peace agreements and interpretation of peace agreements. I postulate that inconsistency in the writing of a peace agreement exposes it to diverse interpretations by the implementing agents. In turn, the narrative that implementers emphasise mediates the interpretation and implementation practices.

In this instance, the SPLM’s interpretation leaned on the Protocol’s definition of Abyei as a Ngok Dinka area and granted them the right to choose either to remain in the North or join the South if the latter opted for separation in its referendum. While this interpretation did not deny the Misseriya secondary (grazing) rights, it had two disastrous consequences. First, it opened the possibility of permanent curtailment of these rights if the South opted for secession, thus creating an international border. Second, it implicitly disparaged universal rights and obligations conferred by Sudanese citizenship as articulated in the unitarist narrative. In summary, therefore, the Abyei Protocol was tailored to respond to the demands of the Ngok Dinka SPLM/A supporters who questioned the limitations of the Machakos Protocol, but it did not resolve the tensions between the unitarist and the separatist narratives in the SPLM/A.
Chapter two explained the rise and spread of the second civil war in the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. The chapter also explained the construction of the Nuba and the Funj identities, which provides empirical evidence to the theoretical arguments in chapter three on the discursive construction of identities and the contingency of historical moments and contextual conditions. Motivated by local grievances to join the rebellion, the Nuba and the Funj embraced Garang’s New Sudan project because it promised to transform the entire country. As Alex de Waal (2012, 434) puts it, the ‘Nuba SPLA leadership had always feared the secessionist tendencies of the Southern majority in the SPLA which would leave them isolated as a small “African” minority within a truncated northern Sudan more strongly identified with Arabism.’ This is why the Machakos Protocol horrified the SPLM /A leaders from these regions. The chief mediator (cf. Waihenya 2006) claims that these leaders confronted him during a consultative meeting in August 2002. As he puts it,

As the meeting went on, a delegate, Commander Malik Agar Eyrie, rose to speak. He was a tall hefty man who weighed not less than 250 pounds. He could scare anyone with his massive weight and his aggressive language…. ‘General,’ the man said in a metallic, impersonal voice…. ‘General, if you do not include the Funj people of Southern Blue Nile, we shall finish you…. Let me remind you something… [I am the one] who said in Addis Ababa that if the South border does remain as it was in 1956, we will continue fighting’ (cf. Waihenya 2006, 93).

Malik Agar Eyrie was vehemently opposed to secession and was willing to go back to war if the peace negotiations did not review the secessionist stance of the Machakos Protocol (Young 2012). But did the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States resolve these issues? Signed on 26 May 2004, the Protocol has eleven articles which focused on general principles, definition of the two areas, popular consultation, state structure, power and wealth sharing, and security arrangements. The Protocol negated the stance of the Abyei accord because it did not mention identity markers. Instead, it unequivocally reaffirmed citizenship as ‘the basis for equal rights and duties for all Sudanese citizens regardless of their ethnicity or
religion’ (Preamble). The Protocol also recognised the population diversity of these two states in Article 1.2, where it committed to protect and develop the ‘diverse cultural heritage and local languages of the population.’ This unambiguous recognition of the primacy of citizenship as the basis of rights indicated that the Protocol embraced the unitarist narrative.

Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Protocol focused on structures of power in the two states. These structures included offices of governors, state executives, state legislatures, and state courts. Comparatively, Article 8 regulated wealth sharing between the various levels of government. Article 8.1 stipulated equitable sharing of wealth ‘between different levels of Government so as to allow enough resources for level of Government to exercise its constitutional competences.’ Further, Article 8.3 specified that each oil producing state was ‘entitled to two percent (2%) of the oil produced in that state, as specified in the Wealth Sharing Agreement.’ Regarding political power and representation during the interim period, Article 11.1 allocated 55% of the seats in both states to the NCP and 45% to the SPLM, while Article 11.1.2 stipulated rotational governorship. The people of the two states would elect their leaders at the end of the interim period. By emphasising ‘state governments’, ‘state legislatures’, and ‘state courts’ instead of allocating power on the basis of identity quotas, these articles buttressed the notion of citizen equality in all spheres of life. Therefore, they affirmed the unitarist narrative because it was advocating this equality.

Then there is Article 3 which addressed the issue of popular consultation regarding the implementation of ‘a just, fair and Comprehensive Peace Agreement to end the war in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States.’ Article 3.2 specified that the agreement that the negotiators would sign at the end of the peace negotiations would be ‘subjected to the will of the people of the two states through their respective democratically elected legislatures.’ The highlight here is ‘the will of the people of the two states’, which is also underlined in Article 3.5. The notion of ‘the will of the people’ is all-encompassing, that is, it means citizens of Sudan residing in these two states regardless of their racial, religious, ethnic, cultural, or other identities.
The other two articles, 9 and 10, dealt with land issues and security arrangements. While Article 10 left the decision to determine the deployment of the security forces during the interim period to the Presidency, Article 9 has attracted more academic analysis because it focused on the land question, which was the heart of the ‘indigenous’ people’s rebellion in the two States. The article created ‘a State Land Commission in the State of Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile respectively’ (Article 9.3). According to Article 9.6, the Commission would review ‘existing land leases and contracts and examine the criteria for the present land allocations and recommend to the State authority the introduction of such necessary changes, including restitution of land rights or compensation.’ The other two sub-articles, 9.7 and 9.8 dealt with operationalization of the Commissions and the relationship between the State Land Commission and the National Land Commission. Analysts (see Komey 2010b, 2008a, 2010a, 2009, 2008b; Wassara 2010) have argued that Article 9 did not solve the land issues in the two States.

The point of interest for this study is that Article 9 embraced the discourse transformation foundations of the New Sudan narrative and avoided all identity markers. Instead, it implied that citizenship rights as affirmed in the preceding Articles, rather than claims based on the autochthonous identity (see Komey 2008a, 2008b), would be the main criteria for allocating land rights. In broad terms, therefore, the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States was the most transformative. It explicitly affirmed the unitarist narrative as embodied in the New Sudan vision and negated the separatist position of the Machakos Protocol. However, because the two Protocols had to be implemented together as part of the CPA, this raised the issue of the way the implementing agents would interpret it.

7.3.4 Power Sharing Protocol

The Power Sharing Protocol accepted the Machakos Protocol as the foundation of comprehensive peace in Sudan. Article 1.1 notes that the Protocol was a follow up to the Machakos Protocol, while Article 1.2 affirmed the ‘Agreed Principles of Governance as

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4 Article 5.1 of the List of Corrections in the Protocols and Agreements of 31 December 2004 revised ‘Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains’ wording to read ‘Southern Kordofan’ as the name of the state.
stipulated in the Machakos Protocol of 20th July 2002.’ The aim of the Protocol was to lay down modalities for the implementation of the Machakos Protocol and power sharing during the interim period. Even though the Protocol did not address the competing separatist and unitarist narratives, the undertones of these narratives and the tensions between them are discernible in the various Articles of the Protocol.

The Protocol was divided into five parts which established the structures of government during the interim period. Part I created four tiers: the national Government, the government of Southern Sudan, the state governments, and the local governments. Interestingly, the Protocol established the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) as a buffer between the States in the South and the national government, but it subjected all the state governments in the North to the supervision of the national government. This was in line with the separatist view of the country. Besides recognising ‘the sovereignty of the nation’ and ‘the autonomy of the Government of Southern Sudan and States throughout the Sudan’ (Article 1.4.1), the Protocol also created a ‘Government of National Unity’ (Article 1.5), which would govern the country during the interim period. Further, the Protocol affirmed a universal bill of rights, which guaranteed fundamental human rights, including the right to vote and the right to be voted for based on universal suffrage, and outlawed all forms of discrimination, extrajudicial killings, torture, and slavery (Article 1.6). The bill of rights was consistent with the unitarist narrative and negated the Islamist narrative, which was inherently discriminatory to the non-Muslims.

Part II of the Protocol focused on the institutions at the national level. These were ‘National Legislature’, ‘National Executive’, ‘National Judiciary’, and ‘National Security Service’. Regarding representation, it set the legislative elections mid-way during the interim period. In the meantime, it stipulated the following distribution of the National Assembly seats: NCP 52%, the SPLM 28%, other northern political parties 14%, and other southern political forces 6% (Article 2.2.5). The share in the GNU followed the same percentages. However, it created a collegial presidency led by the national president, first vice-president, and second vice-president. The incumbent national president retained the position and the SPLM took the first vice-president’s position. I make three inferences here. First, the power sharing percentages reflected an acceptance of a revised Islamist narrative as articulated by the NCP in the North. Second, the re-structuring of power indicated acknowledgment of Garang’s critique of the existing
power structure and, thus, were aimed at reconfiguring power at the centre by accommodating the SPLM in line with the unitarist narrative. Third, despite highlighting some core attributes of the unitarist narrative, including the status of the national capital, tolerance, and bill of rights, the re-structuring did not change the separatist underpinnings of the Machakos Protocol.

Part III of the Protocol focused on South Sudan, while Part IV dealt with government institutions at the states’ level. Echoing the Machakos Protocol, Part III defined Southern Sudan ‘as per the borders of 1/1/56’ (Article 3.1). It also created a Government of Southern Sudan and its institutions, including Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary and conferred to it the power over the State governments in the region. During the interim period, it stated in Article 3.5, the SPLM would control 70% of the Southern Sudan Assembly, the NCP 15% seats, and the ‘other Southern political forces’ 15%. Sharing of power in the executive followed the same percentages (Article 3.6.4). Therefore, the Protocol endorsed the dominance of the SPLM/A over all the other forces in the South.

But this did not change the tensions between the separatist and the unitarist narratives within the movement. According to de Waal (2012, 434), those from north of the 1956 border placed ‘their faith in Garang, whose commitment to a whole-Sudan strategy they never questioned.’ Part IV of the Protocol, which deals with the institutions in the States, also established the same pattern of dominance by the NCP in the north and the SPLM in the South. Article 4.4.2.1 granted 70% of legislative seats and executive power in the Northern States to the NCP and 70% in the Southern States to the SPLM. Then Article 4.4.2.2 allocated 10% of Northern states to the SPLM and 20% to the other Northern political forces, and 10% of the Southern states to the NCP and 20% to the other Southern political forces. The restructuring of power in the States did not change tensions between the narratives. Part V of the Protocol covered schedules A, B, C, D, E and F which defined the functions and areas of control of the various tiers of government.

In summary, the Protocol on Power Sharing does not explicitly mention identity dualities. Instead, it mentions the ‘National Government’, the ‘Government of Southern Sudan’, and ‘State Governments’. However, tensions between the separatist and the unitarist narratives are implicitly evident in the various Articles of the Protocol.
Moreover, these tensions and the arguments in this section take us back to the agency/structure problématique and the elite-mass vertical relations which chapter three theorised. The Power Sharing Protocol was inherently contradictory for three reasons. First, it accepted the Machakos Protocol as the foundation of transformation in Sudan, yet the Machakos Protocol was a separatist document. Second, it accepted a revised Islamist narrative which discriminated against non-Muslims. Third, it acknowledged Garang’s critique of the existing power and economic structures. Resolving these contradictions would depend on the power of the agency, especially Garang. Although Garang did not explicitly state his intentions, he possibly hoped that he would use his new role to realise his New Sudan agenda by changing the existing structures, including political and economic institutions. Perhaps, the new structures would enable him undermine the separatist clamour in the South and the Islamist sentiments in the North by showing all of them that a new, secular, and democratic Sudan could be achieved.

7.3.5 Wealth Sharing Protocol

The Protocol on Wealth Sharing is a relatively brief document that was primarily concerned with the economic structures. It has fifteen articles. Article 1 sets the principles on which it is based, Articles 2 to 7 articulated distribution of ‘land and natural resources’, ‘oil resources’, and ‘taxes’. Articles 8 to 14 dealt with fiscal management, government liabilities, financing and monetary policies during the transition period, while Article 15 established ‘Reconstruction and Development Funds’. Therefore, the Protocol was based on the same premises as the Power Sharing Protocol. Article 1.4 specified that ‘wealth emanating from the resources of the Sudan’ would be shared by all citizens ‘without discrimination on grounds of gender, race, religion, political affiliation, ethnicity, language, or religion.’ This principle shows that the Protocol accepted Garang’s critique of the old Sudan. Therefore, it articulated redistribution of the wealth as espoused by the unitarist narrative. Articles 1.5 and 1.6 accepted that Southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, and Abyei needed special attention because of the war and past marginalisation, while Article 2 focused on the land issue. The separatist narrative viewed land rights through the lens of ‘autochthonous identities’ (Komey 2008a, 2008b), but the Protocol specified that ‘the regulation of land tenure, usage and exercise of rights in land’ was to be ‘exercised at the appropriate levels of government.’
Article 3.2 created a ‘National Petroleum Commission’ chaired by the President of the Republic and the President of GoSS whose responsibilities included formulating policies on oil production. The more interesting part on the oil production was Article 5 which allocated 2% of oil revenue ‘to the oil producing states/regions’, 50% of the net oil revenue derived from Southern Sudan to the GoSS (after removing 2%), and the other 50% to the ‘National Government and States in Northern Sudan.’ Because the separatist and the unitarist narratives differed in their understanding of the Southern Sudan and Northern Sudan, I argue that the unitarist narrative informed the distribution of oil resources. Article 14 on the monetary policy, banking, and currency is also interesting because it not only specifies that the Protocol on Wealth Sharing had to be consistent with the Machakos Protocol, but it also created ‘a dual banking system in Sudan during the interim period.’ A dual banking system meant ‘an Islamic banking system’ for Northern Sudan and a ‘conventional banking system’ for Southern Sudan (Article 14.1). Thus, Article 14 responded to the Islamist narrative’s demand for an Islamic banking system by creating it in the North, and to the Southerners demand for a secular banking system by creating it in the South. In essence, Article 14 negated the unitarist stance of the previous articles by emphasising the Islamist and the separatist narratives. In sum, the inherent contradictions in the Protocol undermined discourse transformation.

7.3.6 Protocol on Security Arrangements

The Protocol on Security Arrangements stipulated that if the Southerners opted for unity in the referendum on self-determination, then the SAF and the SPLA would merge to form a new armed forces. In the interim period, Article 1b proclaimed, the SAF and the SPLA would remain separate armies with separate command structures. The SAF would be stationed in the North and those already in the South would be ‘redeployed North of the South/North border of 1/1/56 under international monitoring and assistance’ (Article 3b). Similarly, the SPLA units ‘deployed in Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile’ would be ‘redeployed South of the South/North border of 1/1/56’ (Article 3c). I argue that the separation of the armed forces reinforced the separatist position of the Machakos Protocol. Young (2012, 105) has remarked that the agreement to separate the forces caused consternation in Khartoum because it ‘appeared to acknowledge’ the separatists’ claim that the SAF ‘was an army of occupation, the removal of which would pave the way for the South’s independence.’
To mitigate the impact of separate armies, the Protocol created Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) which would draw equal numbers of soldiers from both the SAF and the SPLA (Article 4). The JIUs would form the foundation of a new army of Sudan if Southerners opted for unity. Meanwhile, they would serve as a symbol of national unity and sovereignty and would be deployed in the sensitive areas during the interim period. Article 4.1c identified these sensitive areas as Southern Sudan (24,000 soldiers), Nuba Mountains (6,000 soldiers), Southern Blue Nile (6,000 soldiers), and Khartoum (3,000 soldiers). The oil fields of western Upper Nile hitherto controlled by the SAF and its allied militia groups were among the areas in the South where the JIUs would be deployed. For command and control, Article 5 established a Joint Defence Board (JDB) that would command the JIUs and coordinate relations between the SAF and the SPLA. Subsequently, Article 6 required the SAF forces in the North and the SPLA forces in the South formulate a common military doctrine, which would also be the doctrine of the JIUs. Lastly, the Protocol outlawed all military forces other than the SPLA and SAF and required that all Other Armed Groups (OAGs) disband or integrate into the SPLA or SAF (Article 7).

I argue that Garang’s insistence on two armies was a push for security guarantees. The issue of security guarantees in the transition from civil war has been debated in peace and conflict studies (see Walter 2002, 1999, 1997). Analysts view security guarantees as critical to conflict transformation because they enable parties to overcome their commitment problems and reduce temptations to return to war. Further, security guarantees assist parties in containing strategic deception during peace negotiations and peace agreement implementation (see Stedman 2003; Zahar 2006b, 2006a). Therefore, the idea of establishing the JIUs, linking them with national unity and sovereignty, portraying them as the foundation of a future national defence force, and establishing a common military doctrine for the separate armies and the JIUs, was a confidence-building measure. However, creating two armies undermined the unitarist narrative and solidified the separatist narrative. Therefore, creating two armies undermined discourse transformation.
7.4. Narratives of Exclusion in the CPA Protocols

Chapter three theorised how a peace process ought to change the discursive structures. The chapter further argued that a peace agreement is supposed to provide a road map for discourse transformation. From this perspective, the CPA was meant to provide a new institutional and policy trajectory for Sudan. Therefore, how it represented the narratives of identity determined whether it reconstructed the discursive structures, or it converted the narratives of identity into narratives of exclusion. That is, how the CPA represented the narratives of identity determined their materialisation in institutional forms and policy options in the post-CPA Sudan.

7.4.1 The Machakos Protocol

The Machakos Protocol, as the backbone of the CPA, should have laid the foundation for transformation of the structural and cultural violence in Sudan. Instead, it undermined discourse transformation by formalising the separatists’ and Islamists’ narratives into narratives of exclusion. First, the Protocol accepted the demands of the Islamists’ narrative that Sharia be the source of legislation in the North. Chapter six argued that Sharia as articulated by the Islamists excluded non-Muslims. Therefore, the Machakos Protocol validated the exclusion of non-Muslims, who were mostly people from the Southern region and the areas along the North-South frontier.

Second, the Machakos Protocol traded the Islamists’ exclusion with the separatists’ demands for self-determination. Underlying the separatists’ demand for self-determination were Arab/African, Muslim/non-Muslim, and Northerners/Southerners identity dualities. The separatists believed that these identity dualities could not co-exist peacefully in one Sudan and the only way out was separation. Therefore, the Machakos Protocol ratified the separatists’ narrative, thereby entrenching exclusion. Third, the Machakos Protocol, unlike the DoP, did not commit the parties to pursue Sudan’s unity. While the DoP promoted an all-inclusive vision and required the Sudan parties to pursue a unified nation-state, the Machakos Protocol privileged exclusionary narratives. Fourth, the Machakos Protocol accepted the 1956 border which excluded Abyei, Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains, and Blue Nile States. Yet, these regions had been attracted to
the SPLM/A by John Garang’s representation of Sudan’s peripheral regions and his transformative New Sudan vision.

7.4.2 Protocol on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict

The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei aimed at mitigating the impact of the separatist stance of the Machakos Protocol. However, the Protocol formalised the localised narratives of identity into narratives of exclusion instead of reversing the separatist position. Article 1.1 of the Protocol was inherently contradictory because it described the region as a bridge between the North and the South and then defined Abyei as the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms that was transferred to Kordofan in 1905. While a bridge is a connector or a unifier, limiting the region to the Ngok Dinka chiefdoms drew upon localised narratives of autochthony which privileged the Ngok Dinka and imposed a subordinate status on the other residents of Abyei. The other Articles in the Protocol followed suit and allocated rights and resources based on this definition. Though the Protocol granted Misseriya the grazing rights, the territorialised identity narratives which it recognised reinforced the belief that the economic resources in the defined area belonged to the Ngok Dinka only. This reduced Misseriya to ‘guests’ with grazing rights, but these rights would be tempered by the condition that they abide by the hosts’ rules of hospitality.

The foregoing affirms the argument in chapter three about two groups in a country that could be different in language, cultural affinity, and the way each group identifies itself in the historical narrative. However, the more important point is how these differences structure their social relations. Even though Ngok Dinka and Misseriya were different in language, cultural affinity, and located themselves differently in the historical narrative, the two groups had evolved a symbiotic relationship which had regulated their interactions for a very long time (see Francis Deng 1995, 241 - 286). While the protracted civil war in post-independence Sudan altered this relationship, the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei reformulated the relationship in a way that turned the old Ngok Dinka-Misseriya symbiosis on its head. In other words, the Protocol validated territorialised identity narratives which were constructed during the civil war and the inherent cultural violence that was attached to them.
Thus, besides reducing the civic rights of Misseriya and the other residents, which the Sudanese citizenship granted, the Protocol validated the exclusion of the non-Dinka Ngok residents. Moreover, the Articles on the Abyei Boundary Commission and the Abyei referendum, in which the residents would choose to either remain in the North or join the South, complicated the case. Because the Protocol defined the area as belonging to the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms, it implied that only the Ngok Dinka would participate in the referendum. This completed formalisation of the narratives of identity into narratives of exclusion as separation would lead to two regions, a Ngok Dinka region in Southern Sudan and a Misseriya region in Northern Sudan.

7.4.3 The Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile

The need to mitigate the separatist position of the Machakos Protocol also inspired the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. This protocol was the most unitarist among the six agreements that comprise the CPA, perhaps because of diversity, the local issues that inspired the ‘indigenous population’ to join the rebellion, and the geographical location of the two states. The Protocol avoided all identity markers in its articles and sanctioned the primacy of citizenship. Therefore, it rejected all forms of exclusion and accorded primary and secondary rights, including economic and social rights, on the basis of citizenship. While land claims based on localised autochthonous identities had informed segments of the indigenous people’s rebellion, the Protocol did not validate those claims and, instead, created State Land Commissions in the two areas to address those concerns at the state level.

Critics such as Guma Kunda Komey (2010a, 2010b, 2009, 2008a, 2008b), who comes from the Nuba Mountains, have argued that by not officially recognising these autochthonous narratives, the Protocol and the CPA in general did not resolve the issues in the two regions. In this view, the peace process did not address the underlying conflict causes, despite the signing of the Protocol. However, I argue that the Protocol affirmed the New Sudan unitarist narrative, broadly recognised the rights of all citizens, and left resolution of the localised land grievances to the State and the National Land Commissions. In short, the answer to the guiding question of this research is that the Protocol did not reinforce narratives of exclusion.
7.4.4 Power Sharing Protocol

The Power Sharing Protocol was inherently contradictory. It accepted the Machakos Protocol as the basis of sustainable peace in Sudan. It also created two broad tiers of government, the National Government and the Government of South Sudan, which would govern the Northern and the Southern regions respectively. This structure was in line with the separatists and the Islamists’ view of the country and, logically, it would lead to secession of the South. Therefore, it formalised narratives of identity as articulated by the Islamists and the separatists into narratives of exclusion. At the same time, the Protocol affirmed a bill of rights which recognised Sudanese citizenship and emphasised the rights of all citizens. Building on this recognition, it specified a ‘comprehensive process of national reconciliation and healing throughout the country as part of the peace building process’ (Article 1.7). The Protocol viewed national healing as an important constituent of post-agreement transformation which involved, among others, rebuilding of group and individual relationships. Post-agreement reconciliation is well covered in peace and conflict studies literature. But this aim undermined the narratives of exclusion privileged in the other articles.

The subsequent articles on power sharing within the various tiers of the government pursued this theme by focusing on inclusion at the centre, decentralisation of power to the regions, and mainstreaming multiculturalism. However, by emphasising the 1956 border and granting the NCP 70% of power in the North and the SPLM 70% of the power in the South in the subsequent articles, the Protocol negated the unitarist stance and affirmed the exclusionist position of the Machakos Protocol. In broad terms, therefore, the Protocol may have recognised inclusion and the unitarist narratives that were driving it, but it validated the narratives of exclusion as articulated by the Islamists and the separatists and represented in the Machakos Protocol.

7.4.5 Wealth Sharing Protocol

The Protocol on Wealth sharing was underpinned by the same principles as the Power Sharing Agreement. Article 1.4 emphasised citizenship as the primary criteria for distributing resources, while Articles 1.5 and 1.6 accepted the special needs of the South, the Nuba Mountians, and the Blue Nile. Further, while the Protocol left resolution of the
land issues to the National and States Land Commissions, it specified distribution of revenue generated from the oil resources. In these two issues, the Protocol privileged the unitarist narrative and emphasised inclusion. However, it negated inclusion in the subsequent articles on monetary policy in which it created two banking systems. The first was an Islamic banking system which responded to the demands of the Islamists, while the second was a conventional (secular) banking system which addressed the demands of the secularists and the separatists. By creating two banking systems, the Protocol reinforced narratives of identity as articulated by the Islamists and the separatists and validated them into narratives of exclusion. In other words, the answer to the guiding question is that the Protocol on Wealth Sharing was inherently contradictory, but read together with the other Protocols, especially the Machakos Protocol and the Power Sharing Protocol, it stipulated materialisation of the narratives of exclusion.

7.4.6 Protocol on Security Arrangements

Just like the other Protocols, the Protocol on Security Arrangements had some articles whose stipulations were based on the separatist narrative and others that were inspired by the unitarist narrative. Article 1 of the Protocol created two separate armies, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) to defend the North, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) to defend the South. The Protocol required the SPLA to move out of the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile states and deploy south of the 1956 border. Nonetheless, the creation of separate armies institutionalised exclusionist narratives of identity. At the same time, the Agreement acknowledged the unitarist narratives by creating JIUs which would draw equal number of soldiers from both SAF and the SPLM. The JIUs would also have a common command. Additionally, the Protocol stipulated deployment of the JIUs in the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, Abyei, and in the South. I have already explained the role of this Protocol as a security guarantee. However, this did not change the dominant separatist position of the Protocol because the success of the JIUs was dependent on commitment from the SPLA and the SAF commands. In summary, therefore, the Protocol on Security Arrangements reinforced narratives of exclusion and paved the way for the secession of South Sudan.
7.5. **Argumentation Strategies in the CPA Protocols**

The previous chapter explained the role of argumentation strategies as the bridge between narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion. It also explained the strategies which the various parties employed during the civil war in order to reproduce it in the discursive continuities and as a social practice. In turn, chapter five showed that only a revised Islamist narrative from the North was represented at the peace process, while the separatists and the unitarists narratives competed within the SPLM/A. Therefore, the argumentation strategies during the 2002 to 2005 peace process were those of the SPLM and the GoS. These strategies were reflected in the CPA.

7.5.1 **Balancing one narrative against another**

The first strategy that the parties employed was balancing one narrative against the other. The DHA classifies this as one of the strategies of ‘justification and relativisation’ which actors use to justify certain positions or actions (Wodak et al. 2009, 36). As a strategy of argumentation, it is realised in practice by ‘one-sided weighing’ of claims which are expressed as an unbiased and detailed presentation. Both the SPLM and the GoS negotiators made detailed presentations during negotiations, but these were just one-sided positions which aimed at enhancing their narratives and reflected their interests. In practice, therefore, they wanted the mediators and their opponents to accept those positions as justified, incorporate them in a peace agreement, and then restructure the post-agreement institutions and policy practices accordingly. Recordings of the negotiations show that, in many instances, each of the negotiating party would accuse the other of pursuing exclusivist or narrow aims while presenting its own position as the national one (Johnson 2011b; Waihenya 2006; ICG 10 February 2003, 17 September 2002). An example here was the presentation of Islamism, secularism, and separatism at the Machakos talks. According to the chief mediator (cf. Waihenya 2006, 85),

the SPLM/A believed that the division of the country was imminent unless separation of state and religion was effected. ‘We are not Arabs,’ a member of the delegation stated, ‘We are separate people. Names of those in the South are not Islamic. They are Christian.’ But the government demanded of SPLM/A to have a national outlook.
The GoS position was that the SPLM/A’s secularist position did not denote a ‘national outlook’ because the Northerners were mostly Muslims. It therefore sought to balance the SPLM/A’s demands for secularism with an assertion of Islamism. However, its own Islamist position excluded non-Muslims in the country. It was this exclusion which had driven the unitarists to demand secularism and separatists in the SPLM/A to argue for secession. The chief mediator (cf. Waihenya 2006) and Johnson (2011b) depict many other instances of this balance of one narrative against another strategy in their recordings of the negotiation proceedings.

On the question of religion, for example, the government delegation asserted that ‘nothing stopped the Christians from building churches in the North’ (cf. Waihenya 2006, 86). Through this assertion, the government aimed to invalidate the separatists and secularists’ claims that it excluded and discriminated non-Muslims. Both the secularists and the separatists balanced these assertions by offering a counter-narrative that the Christians ‘needed a permit to do so which were never granted’ (Waihenya 2006, 86). Accordingly, the Islamists’ state enforced religious exclusion through the law. But the secularists and the separatists disagreed on the finer details of their counter-narratives. To the secularists, the problem could be addressed by having a secular state in which all religions were equal before the law and where no one needed a permit to construct a religious shrine or to proselytise their faith. To the separatists, the solution was secession of the South. Other areas where this strategy was manifest included negotiations over governance arrangements, especially ‘confederation providing the basis for a New Sudan and unify Southerners and the Three Areas’ or ‘self-determination, exercised by referendum, and with an option of independence’ (Johnson 2011b, 48).

As argued in the preceding sections, the Machakos Protocol counter-balanced Islamism with self-determination. While the Protocol accepted Sudan as ‘a multi-cultural, multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual country’ (Article 6), it offered South Sudan ‘a referendum to determine their future status.’ In other words, the mediators and the negotiators involved in the Machakos parley responded to this strategy by granting Islamism to the North and a self-determination referendum, with the option of secession, to the South. The Machakos Protocol then placed on the shoulders of the
government of national unity the burden of making ‘the unity of the Sudan an attractive option especially to the people of South Sudan’ (Article 1.5.1).

However, this perpetuated the strategy in the subsequent phases of negotiations when the SPLM/A supporters from Abyei, Nuba Mountains, and the Blue Nile State challenged the separatists’ orientation of the Machakos Protocol. Shortly after the signing of the Machakos Protocol, the SPLM/A revised the narrative and demanded that the three areas be addressed first, but the GoS balanced the SPLM/A narrative by declaring that the Machakos Protocol had closed the issue of the three areas when it specified the 1956 border (Johnson 2011b; Waihenya 2006; ICG 17 September 2002, 17 November 2002, 18 December 2002, 3 April 2002). This balancing of narratives is reflected in all the other Protocols. For example, in both the Abyei and the Nuba Mountains/Blue NileProtocols the notion of popular consultation was a response to this balancing of narratives. Similarly, the notion of JIUs and a common military doctrine was a response to balancing of narratives.

7.5.2 Separate versus Common Future

Chapter three argued that the future which groups residing in a territory discursively construct, regardless of their historical frames and cultural differences, determines their relations. This argument is pervasive in the conflict transformation literature, especially writings on reconciliation. Reconciliation theorists believe that groups in a society emerging from a protracted conflict can promote reconciliation and construct a common future by constructing new relationships, attitudes, and gestures which underpin a commitment to that shared future (see Lederach and Lederach 2010; Lederach 2005; Kelman 1999). Chapter three postulated that a peace process provides the foundation for such a construction. In turn, chapter six has explained how the Sudan actors utilised the separate versus common future strategy to mobilise their constituencies in the course of the civil war. The DHA refers to this as one of the ‘constructive strategies’ which emphasises ‘unifying common features/shared sorrow or worries’ (Wodak et al. 2009, 38). This argumentation strategy de-emphasises past differences and employs common bonds to articulate a shared future. It is usually packaged in unifying metaphors and idioms because it appeals for cooperation and solidarity and, therefore, it is a powerful

The unitarists from North and South Sudan employed this strategy to articulate a common future for all Sudanese. Comparatively, the separatists stressed differences and envisioned different futures. The unitarists’ narrative rejected the African/Arab, Christian/Muslim and other identity dualities and espoused transformation of the structural and cultural violence through building of a new society based on secularism, equality, justice, and democracy. In contrast, the separatists’ narrative presented South Sudan nationalism as the answer to the structural and cultural violence in the country. It therefore essentialised and reified African/Arab and Christian/Muslim identity dualities. Underpinning the separatist narrative was the belief that the Northerners comprised one monolithic bloc, the Arabs, and the Southerners comprised another monolithic bloc, the Africans. The secessionists’ narrative rejected a common future for these blocs because ‘there was no reason to believe that the Arab two-thirds of the population of Sudan would ever guarantee the rights and privileges of the non-Arab population’ (Burr and Collins 1995, 300).

In essence, the peace negotiations at the various venues - Machakos, Nairobi, Nakuru, Nanyuki, and Naivasha - centred on the futures articulated by these narratives. As chapter five explained, the SPLM/A faced a dilemma in these negotiations because it oscillated between the unitarist and the separatist narratives. Garang espoused secularism, reform of power structures at the centre, and a common future for all Sudanese. He rejected the prevailing identity dualities and articulated a shared future built upon Sudanism. However, he insisted on security guarantees in the form of separate armies and a government of Southern Sudan which was not under the control of the federal government, yet these guarantees emboldened the separatists. This illustrated Garang’s ‘constant dilemma: tension between his vision of a New Sudan, which implied reform at the centre and a process of transformation; and the need to secure the fundamental interests of Southern Sudan, including the referendum’ (Johnson 2011b, 77).

The Northerners’ narratives on the future also varied. The sectarian parties initially pursued assimilation of the Southerners into Islam. As the civil war intensified, the
sectarian parties changed their assimilation narrative and accepted the New Sudan vision and its inherent multiculturalism. However, they were not represented at the negotiation table because they were in partnership with the SPLM/A in the NDA. Similarly, the NCP Islamists, who controlled the state and dominated in the North, accepted a multicultural Sudan during the peace process, but they built their notion of multiculturalism on the supremacy of Islamism in the North. The NCP negotiators initially stuck to the provisions of Article 3.2.1 and Article 3.2.2 of the Machakos Protocol which specified that sharia was the source of legislation in the Northern States, while ‘popular consensus, the values and the customs of the people of Sudan including their traditions and religious beliefs’ would be the source of legislation in the Southern States (ICG 17 September 2002, 17 November 2002). In essence, these articles offered separate futures and, thus, contradicted other provisions of the same Protocol, including Article 1.1 and Article 6.3, which accepted multiculturalism in a unified Sudan. As the negotiations progressed, however, the NCP position emphasised citizenship and accepted a capital city that symbolised ‘national unity’ and reflected ‘the diversity of Sudan’ (Article 2.4.1 of the Power Sharing Protocol). In sum, the tensions in the CPA between the unitarists and separatists’ narratives reflected contentions within the SPLM/A and the NCP Islamists not just over Sudan’s future, but also over the components of that future.

7.5.3 Discontinuation (or dissimilation)

Discontinuation or dissimilation was a third main argumentation strategy which the SPLM/A and the government of Sudan employed during the 2002 to 2005 peace process. This is represented in the CPA protocols. The DHA classifies discontinuation as a constructive strategy which negates the historical continuity strategy (Wodak et al. 2009, 38). That is, where historical continuity insists on the old discursive frames, discontinuity calls for construction of new relationships and new frames. This is in line with the post-agreement transformation arguments which the above section has discussed. As a transformation strategy, Wodak et al. (2009) explains, discontinuation emphasises the difference between the past and the present. The strategy’s main means of realisation in the social practices is underlining ‘a necessary difference between now and the future’ and presenting a crisis as an opportunity to correct the past and reshape the future (Wodak et al. 2009, 40).
Both Garang and Taha frequently employed this strategy in their public speeches in which they presented the peace process as an opportunity for the people of Sudan to start afresh and build a New Sudan. In his speech to the Sudanese diaspora in Washington DC in late 2004, for example, John Garang explained that his aim was to explain the contents of the agreements and the way Sudanese could use it to effect democratic transformation. Even though he was addressing the Sudanese diaspora, his message was a call for Sudanese in general to recognise the peace process and the Protocols as an opportunity to change the governance structures and effect democratic transformation in their country. This was in line with his critique, which chapter six expounded, that Sudan’s core problem was governance structures at the centre, rather than in the peripheries. He then emphasised the difference between this peace process and previous ones. By emphasising discontinuation with the past in which too many agreements had been dishonoured, Garang was responding to fears of South Sudanese and arguments by the separatists who based their secession case on historical continuity and the untrustworthiness of the ‘Arabs’.

Similarly, Vice-President Taha underscored the role of the peace process as an opportunity to discontinue with the past and build a New Sudan. As Johnson (2011b, 89) notes,

Influenced by the deteriorating situation in Darfur, Taha and the President were fearful of Sudan in the worst case breaking up like Somalia; they needed to act quickly to get a solution…. A deal between the ruling party and the South would shift the political landscape in any case, and elections during the interim period might offer new opportunities.

This discontinuation with the past and imagination of a new future strategy was evident in some articles of the six Protocols which comprise the CPA. Sudan is a ‘multi-cultural, multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual country’ and ‘religion shall not be used as a divisive factor,’ proclaimed Article 6 of the Machakos Protocol. ‘The people of the Sudan share a common heritage and aspirations and accordingly agree to work together,’ specified Article 1.5 of the Machakos Protocol. ‘Eligibility for public office, including the presidency, public service and the enjoyment of all rights and duties shall be based on citizenship and not on religion, beliefs or customs,’ Article 6.3 of the
Machakos Protocol stated. Other Protocols had similar provisions. For example, the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State specified that ‘citizenship shall be the basis for equal rights and duties for all Sudanese citizens regardless of their ethnicity or religion.’ These articles reflect a discontinuation of the past assimilationist, Islamisation, and Arabisation policies. They sought to reimagine and project a future Sudan as a tolerant, multicultural society. In essence, they aimed at transforming the old Arab/African and Islam/non-Muslim identity boundaries which underpinned the protracted civil war.

7.5.4 Uniqueness

Another argumentation strategy that the unitarists and the revised Islamist’ narratives employed was to emphasise Sudan’s uniqueness as a country due to its racial, cultural, religious, ethnic, and geographical diversity. The aim of this strategy was to build on the discontinuation and the common future strategies. The DHA argues that uniqueness is a constructive strategy which emphasises national and subnational uniqueness, as well as a national model character (Wodak et al. 2009; Wodak and Leeuwen 1999; Wodak 1996; Wodak and Matouschek 1993; Sahin 2011). This strategy upholds that the unique features of a country define its people and holds them together. According to Wodak et al. (2009, 38), the strategy transposes ‘subnational uniqueness onto the national level’ and reduces ‘supranational uniqueness to the national level.’

This uniqueness argumentation strategy is evident in many of Garang’s speeches. In the 2004 Washington speech, for example, he insists that the Arab cultural heritage is a major contribution to Sudanese national identity. Similarly, Africanism, Islam, Christianity, and other cultural heritages from ‘the 500 ethnic groups in Sudan’ contributed to produce the unique Sudanese national identity. He then presented this unique identity, which he referred to as Sudanism, as the foundation of the New Sudan vision (see Dr. John Garang Speaks to Sudanese in Washington DC (video) 2004). Francis Deng (1995, 2010c, 2010b), a prominent Sudanese scholar, has argued that this uniqueness is what made Sudan the bridge between Africa and the Middle East.

Many Sudanese who supported the unitarist narrative and opposed separation cited this uniqueness as one of the best qualities that Sudan contributed to humankind. In a TV
documentary, *Sudan: Divided Identity, Divided Land*, Fikria Abyreed, a director at the Sudan News Agency (SUNA), refers to Sudan as ‘a very diverse country consisting of different ethnicities, nationalities, and religions’ (see Sudan: Divided Identity, Divided Land (video) July 2011). Echoing the same theme, a Sudanese citizen in the streets of Khartoum states: ‘we are Africans and Arabs. We speak the Arabic language, and we are originally African.’ Another citizen avers: ‘there is an Arab breathing and there is an African breathing. All together they mix and they became what? They became Sudanese.’ While visiting Sudan for research and training purposes as an ACCORD officer, I often heard this framing of Sudan’s uniqueness.

The six CPA Protocols have articles which reflect this uniqueness strategy. ‘The people of the Sudan share a common heritage and aspirations,’ states Article 1.5 of the Machakos Protocol. Similarly, Article 6 of the Protocol recognised Sudan as a ‘multi-cultural, multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual country.’ Read together, these two articles imply that, regardless of their racial, ethnic, religious, cultural, or regional backgrounds, all Sudanese had a common heritage which all of them had contributed to produce. Garang termed this heritage ‘Sudanism’. Article 1.1.1 of the Abyei Protocol described Abyei as ‘a bridge between the north and the south, linking the people of Sudan.’ The ‘link’ in this article was the cultural heritage that the Ngok Dinka-Misseriya relationship contributed to Sudan.5 Further, when Article 2.4.1 of the Power Sharing Protocol specified that the national capital would be ‘a symbol of national unity’ and reflect ‘the diversity of Sudan’, it was affirming that the capital would be the embodiment of Sudan’s uniqueness.

7.5.5 Compensation

Compensation is the last argumentation strategy which this section will consider. Wodak et al. (2009, 36) classifies compensation as one of the strategies of ‘justification and relativisation’ and cites the example of ‘postwar reconstruction work with Nazi crimes.’ In practice, this strategy requires various forms of material and non-material compensation as part of post-conflict transformation. It is common in peace processes and as part of post-agreement interventions. All the Protocols of the CPA have articles

5 For details on the cultural links between the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya, see *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan* (1995) by Francis M. Deng.
which reflect this strategy. In its Preamble and Principles, for example, the Machakos Protocol recognises the ‘historical injustices and inequalities in development between the different regions of the Sudan that need to be redressed.’ Article 1.5.4 of the Protocol says the negotiating parties agreed to ‘formulate a repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development plan to address the needs of those areas affected by the war and redress the historical imbalances of development and resources allocation.’

Similarly, Article 1.2.4 of the Abyei Protocol states that the ‘National Government will provide Abyei with assistance to improve the lives of the people of Abyei, including urbanization and development projects.’ The Protocol also granted the people of Abyei 4% of revenue from oil resources from the area. For the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, the Protocol provided for the creation of a National Reconstruction and Development Fund (NRDF) to ‘develop the war affected areas and least developed areas in the Sudan with the aim of bringing these areas to the national average standards and level of development’ (Article 8.5). Specifically, the Protocol allocated 75% of the NRDF resources to the ‘war-affected areas, particularly to Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States’ (Article 8.6). Clearly, the end goal of these provisions was material and non-material compensation to the South and the peripheries which had been affected by the protracted civil war. Indeed, the parties negotiated the Wealth Sharing Protocol to address these needs.

7.6. Conclusion

This chapter has interrogated the representation of narratives of identity identified in chapter six in the 2002 to 2005 phase of the IGAD facilitated peace process and in the CPA. It was found that though six narratives competed in the discursive and institutional continuities during the civil war, only one Northern and two Southern narratives were articulated during the peace process and represented in the CPA. The Northern narrative was a revised Islamist version which the NCP articulated, while those from the South were the unitarist narrative associated with John Garang’s New Sudan and the separatist narrative. Having identified the narratives of identity in the CPA, I now locate them in the peace negotiations/peace agreements phase of the three-phased framework in figure 7.1 below.
The chapter also found that the six protocols which comprise the CPA contained some articles that were informed by the unitarist narratives and others that were underpinned by the separatist narrative. As a result, the CPA was riddled with tensions between the two narratives. The chapter has also identified five main argumentation strategies which are reflected in the CPA: balancing one narrative against another, separate versus common future, discontinuation (or dissimilation), uniqueness, and compensation. I turn to an analysis of the implementation practices in the next chapter.
Chapter Eight
Narratives of Identity and Narratives of Exclusion 2005 to 2011

It would seem obvious that what the country needs is to find itself, to discover its true racial, ethnic, religious, and cultural composition, to develop a framework with which all its diverse groups can identify on equal footing, and to go beyond diversity to postulate a framework of inclusive mutual integration of all the groups as Sudanese. Race, ethnicity, religion, and culture, though important subjective factors, should not affect the status of citizenship and full equality in the enjoyment of all the rights accruing from that status. (Francis M. Deng 2010a, 13).

8.1 Introduction

Chapter three argued that a peace agreement is the principal document which provides a roadmap for discourse transformation. It also presented the implementation practices as the main activities which materialise this roadmap in the form of governing institutions and social policies. The mediators and facilitators of the Sudan peace process viewed the CPA as a resolution of the protracted conflict and a roadmap through which Sudan could attain sustainable peace (Johnson 2011b; Waihenya 2006). Yet, as chapter seven has shown, the Protocols of the Agreement were characterised by a logical contradiction between the separatists’ and the unitarists’ narratives. These contradictions exposed the CPA to contrasting interpretations, contradictory framing of the post-CPA realities, and inconsistent policy positions.

This chapter will explore how the CPA implementers addressed divergent interpretations, with a view to identifying how they resolved the contradictions between the separatist and unitarist narratives. Chapter four generated one question regarding narratives of identity during the CPA implementation phase: how do texts represent identities during the six-year transition period? Chapter four also generated one question regarding narratives of exclusion: do social practices during the six-year transition period mitigate or reinforce narratives of exclusion? For detailed exploration of these two questions, the logic of presentation in the initial parts will follow chronological developments from 2005 to 2011. However, I will adopt the thematic approach in the argumentation strategies part. Thus, the first section will provide an overview of the interim period, while the second section will explore the materialisation of the narratives of identity in the institutions and policy practices. The third section will cover narratives
of exclusion and the fourth section will analyse argumentation strategies. I will then conclude the chapter.

8.2 Challenges of CPA Implementation 2005 to 2011

The CPA stipulated a six month pre-interim period in which the parties would establish transitional institutions, institute mechanisms to monitor ceasefire, create a constitutional framework for the Agreement, and seek international assistance. The CPA also required various activities to be implemented during the six-year interim period, including establishing an independent Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) to monitor CPA implementation. The agreement mediators and guarantors anticipated that the Sudan parties would implement the Agreement in a way that would make unity attractive to the Southerners. In practice, this would require resolving the contradictions between the unitarist and the separatist narratives of identity inherent in the CPA. However, myriad challenges encumbered the CPA implementation.

First, the parties disagreed on the formation and integration of the JIUs. This delayed the implementation of the other CPA provisions and led to violations of the permanent ceasefire in Malakal in November 2006 and February 2009; Abyei in May 2008, January and February 2011; and Upper Nile in February 2011 (AEC 2007, 2008, 2010; ICG 31 March 2006, 12 October 2007, 13 March 2008, 17 December 2009; UNMIS March 2011). Second, the SPLA and the SAF fought over the implementation of the Abyei Protocol (AEC 2008; UNMIS June 2008; Sudan Tribune 22 July 2008). Chapters two and seven explained the issue and why the parties turned to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). The PCA issued its ruling on 22 July 2009 which reduced the territory granted to the Ngok Dinka by the ABC, and interpreted the Protocol as intended to empower the Ngok Dinka as a group to choose their status in a referendum (PCA Final Award 2009). However, the parties disagreed over the issue of residency. The discord went on as various mediators, including the US and the AU’s Thabo Mbeki, attempted to broker an agreement. Therefore, the Abyei referendum was not held at the end of the interim period as stipulated in the Protocol.

Third, the parties disagreed on wealth sharing, especially oil revenue. In particular, the SPLM accused the NCP of lacking transparency about the amount of oil which was

Fourth, discords arose over border demarcation in other non-oil producing areas. The border disputes had four elements.¹ First, the boundary was not demarcated on the ground. In some places where the delineation of the boundary was not disputed, local understandings of the boundary were not consistent with that delineation. Second, there were disputed areas. These were the Kafia Kingi enclave (also known as Hofrat al-Nahas or Dar Fertit), which was transferred from Bahr al-Ghazal to South Darfur in 1960;

¹ I would like thank Alex de Waal for these facts on the disputed border areas. He passed them to me through a personal communication.
Kaka, a town in Upper Nile; Jebel Megeinis; and Jodha in Upper Nile. Another area, the ‘14-mile’ strip of land immediately south of the Bahr al Arab/Kiir river between South Darfur and Northern Bahr el Ghazal was later added. Third, the border in Abyei was disputed. Fourth, the SPLM claimed additional areas, mostly based on a 1953 ethno-linguistic map. According to Alex de Waal, the SPLM’s claim on these additional areas was not consistent.

The CPA’s implementation mechanisms mandated a Border Technical Committee (BTC) to demarcate the border. It was important for the demarcation to be complete before the elections at the mid-way in the interim period and, therefore, before the 2011 referendum. However, the BTC had not completed its work by the time of the 2008 census or the 2010 elections (AEC 2010; UNMIS March 2010). The border demarcation issue had not been resolved by the end of the interim period in July 2011 (see Final Report, AEC July 2011). The last issue was the disputes between the SPLM and the NCP over the national census, elections, and the question of the OAGs (ICG 25 July 2005, 9 August 2005, 31 March 2006, 26 July 2007, 13 March 2008, 17 December 2009; Young 2012, 2005a). These issues were complicated by the armed conflicts in the other peripheries, particularly Darfur in the West and the Red Sea region in the East. The SPLM confronted other challenges, including lack of capacity and resources, the resettlement of millions of returnees, and reconciliation in the South. Using the guiding questions in chapter four, I will now explore how policy practices materialised the narratives of identity inherent in the CPA from 2005 to 2011.

8.3 Narratives of Identity

In a TV documentary Sudan: History of a Broken Land (Al Jazeera English January 2011), a musician from South Sudan laments: ‘the Arabs don’t respect us, the Arabs don’t give us our rights, the Arabs don’t give us our dignity; they don’t see us as people.’ Another Southerner says that ‘people are working for separation; that they have to separate from the North. Enough is enough.’ A third interviewee, a Khartoum based businessperson, expresses regret that his country was breaking. ‘I feel very sad,’ he says, ‘I think we have arrived to a very dangerous point where we have to divide our country.’ Between June 2009 and October 2010, I heard these diverse viewpoints when, as an ACCORD staff member, I did field research in Sudan and participated in a series of
conferences and peacebuilding forums on the transition. These contrasting viewpoints reflected the persistence of the narratives of identity in the discursive and institutional continuities, despite the swell of optimism which engulfed Sudan following the signing of the CPA in January 2005.

8.3.1. Six Months of Optimism

At the CPA signing ceremony in Nairobi on 9 January 2005, John Garang was optimistic that ‘Sudan for the first time will be a country voluntarily united in justice, honour and dignity for all its citizens regardless of their race, religion, or gender’ (see appendix I). He then defined ‘the fundamental problem of Sudan’ as ‘the attempt by various Khartoum-based regimes to build a monolithic Arab-Islamic state to the exclusion of other parameters of the Sudanese diversity.’ Repudiating the identity dualities which the post-1956 regimes had bequeathed to the country, he cited various aspects of Sudanese diversity upon which a New Sudan could be built. Further, Garang argued that the CPA implementation practices had to seize this ‘opportunity to make a real paradigm shift from the old Sudan of exclusivity to the New Sudan of inclusivity.’ Otherwise, the aggrieved citizens would dissolve the union ‘amicably and through the right of self-determination at the end of the six years of the interim period.’ In this speech, Garang interpreted the CPA as obliging the parties to pursue unity and only turn to self-determination as a last resort. Others would argue that the CPA offered a self-determination referendum regardless of whether the parties pursued unity or not. Yet, January to July 2005 was seen as Garang’s finest hour, for he inspired so much optimism in Sudan which was ‘demonstrated by the huge crowds that gathered to greet his inauguration as first vice-president in Khartoum on 9 July’ (Johnson 2011a, 169). As the ICG (9 August 2005, 5) reported,

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2 I was involved in many forums which discussed the CPA and the transition in Sudan. These included: a conflict resolution training for government officers in Juba, South Sudan, in June 2009; a training forum for UNMIS and UNAMID civil affairs officers in Kampala, Uganda, in June 2009; and a forum for Sudan civil society actors in Pretoria, South Africa, in October 2009. Other forums were an International Sudan Studies Conference at UNISA in Pretoria, South Africa, in November 2009; a field research work in Khartoum, Sudan, in February 2010; a workshop for Sudan civil society actors in Pretoria, South Africa, in July 2010; and a field research mission in Khartoum and Darfur in August/September 2010.

3 According to media reports, more than a million Sudanese came to Khartoum to welcome Garang. See ‘Rebel leader returns to Khartoum after 22 years’ in the Sudan Tribune, 9 July 2005. http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?ifram&pag=imprimable&id_article=10545
Garang transcended the South, and because he was such a good politician, he had helped sell the SPLM nationally. The signing of the CPA, the transformation of the SPLM into a political party and Garang’s triumphal return to Khartoum triggered a swell of support in the North, with thousands applying to join the movement in the capital and the northern and eastern states, forcing it to cope with rapid expansion.

Thus, the first six months of the CPA saw Garang’s New Sudan vision, which espoused secular, democratic, and egalitarian values, gained credence in most parts of the country. Beneath the veil of optimism, however, there was a simmering debate between the unitarists and the separatists regarding the end goal of the six-year interim period. According to the ICG (25 July 2005), the unitarists were committed to a fundamental change in Khartoum, while the separatists viewed secession as the goal. Garang was sworn in as Sudan’s First Vice-President in Khartoum on 9 July 2005. This was to be followed by the formation of the GNU on 9 August and the GoSS on 9 September. But Garang died in a helicopter crash on 31 July.4 His demise shattered the optimism which had swept Sudan (ICG 31 March 2006, 9 August 2005; Young 2005a; Yoh 27 September 2005). An academic at the University of Juba informed me that, although the SPLM/A’s deputy leader, Salva Kiir Mayardit, immediately replaced Garang as the country’s First Vice-President and President of South Sudan, Garang’s death irreversibly changed the course of the CPA’s implementation.5 As the SPLM’s ‘chief ideologue and visionary,’ the ICG (9 August 2005, 5) wrote, ‘one of Garang’s greatest national asset was his perceived support for a united “New Sudan”, based on equality, secularism and democracy – in sharp contrast to the widespread demand for independence among most southerners, including within the SPLM.’

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4 Garang’s death sparked unprecedented violence and destruction in many parts of Sudan. In Khartoum, the violence involved Southerners against Northerners, while it evolved into interethnic fighting in some parts of the country. He was buried at the John Garang Mausoleum in Juba on 6 August. For detailed analysis of the violence see ‘Garang’s death: Implications for Peace in Sudan’ by the International Crisis Group (ICG), 9 August 2005; ‘John Garang's legacy to the peace process, the SPLM/A and the South’ by John Young (2005) in Review of African Political Economy no. 32 (106): 535-548.

5 Face-to-face interview at the University of Juba, 22 January 2013.
8.3.2. From Optimism to Separatism

Chapter three argued that the agents’ commitment to transformation and the existence of facilitating social and material structures are critical to discursive change at the peace agreement implementation phase. Indicators of non-commitment include strategic and tactical deception, and discourse rupture. Therefore, Salva Kiir’s rise was crucial to the CPA implementation because the Agreement granted most implementation responsibilities to the reformed institution of the presidency. Chapter six noted that Garang was aware that the massive structural violence in the South, and the cultural violence which Southerners had been subjected to by the Northern elite, did not create the facilitating social and material structures. He hoped to use his position in the reconstituted presidency to effect structural changes, which he would then use to transform the discursive structures in the country. Therefore, Salva’s commitment and approach were important for the success of this institution as the engine of discourse transformation. During negotiations, Garang and Vice-President Ali Osman Taha, developed close personal relationships which they were hoping to employ during the CPA implementation phase (Waihenya 2006; Johnson 2011b). Indeed, speculations abound that Garang and Taha had struck a secret deal regarding the future of Sudan. Aspects of this deal included appointment of a Southerner to the Ministry of Petroleum and transformation of the SPLM into a national political party, which would then form a coalition with the NCP. Moreover, Garang’s consistent articulation of the New Sudan had won him support in all peripheries, and reassured the northern constituency that voluntary unity was possible if structural violence was addressed (Young 2012, 2005a; Deng 2010b; Johnson 2011a; ICG 9 August 2005). In contrast, Salva’s views on the New Sudan and the unitarist-secessionist tug-of-war were not clear-cut.

Salva joined the national army from the Anya-Nya soldiers of the first civil war. He was among the top military defectors who founded the SPLM/A in 1983 and served as Garang’s deputy for more than a decade. Although he lacked Garang’s charisma, academic achievements, national stature, and international connections, his SPLM/A

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6 I am using the South Sudan’s style of using an individual’s first name. Just like in the Northern Arab-Islamic culture, South Sudanese call individuals by their first name because the second name refers to the father and the third name to grandfather. For Salva Kiir Mayardit, for example, Salva is his name, Kiir is his father’s name, and Mayardit is his paternal grandfather’s name. Thus, South Sudanese usually refer to him as Salva.

7 Alex de Waal, personal communication, January 2015.
colleagues regarded him as a good military strategist and a respectable field commander (Young 2012, 2005a; Johnson 2011a; Johnson 2011b; ICG 9 August 2005, 31 March 2006). ‘As the head of the SPLM’s negotiating team at Machakos,’ Johnson (2011a, 169) wrote, ‘he got credit for having secured self-determination for the South.’ Chapter seven elucidated how this issue caused friction between him and Garang.⁸ Salva pledged that he would uphold the New Sudan vision, but the ICG (9 August 2005, 5) claimed that he was ‘perceived as a secessionist’. Thus, the SPLM under Salva confronted two multi-pronged challenges. First, it had to sustain the transformative tempo of the New Sudan vision at the national level. This involved reconciling the unity and self-determination requirements of the CPA. Second, it had to build state institutions in the South and reconcile a population which had been traumatised by the war.⁹ In particular, Salva had to deal with the issue of the other armed groups, especially the SSDF which was bigger and better armed than the SPLM (Young 2012, 2006, 2003). Therefore, the contradictions between the unitarist and the separatist narratives played out in several areas.

**Participation in the Government of National Unity**

A key area was the SPLM’s participation in the GNU and the Movement’s role at the national level, with the key question being whether the SPLM was a national movement or a regional movement. The SPLM’s unitarist wing viewed it as a national front whose main goal was Sudan’s transformation, while the separatist wing proclaimed it as a Southern movement whose objective was to liberate the South from Arab-Muslim rule. Garang had consistently stated that the SPLM was a national movement which aimed at Sudan’s transformation. ‘On this crucial issue,’ wrote the ICG (9 August 2005, 5), ‘Garang [was] irreplaceable.’ Nonetheless, chapter five and six showed that the separatist sentiments in the SPLM were strong enough to force the inclusion of both the New Sudan vision and self-determination in the CPA Protocols. Therefore, Salva’s role was crucial, as it would tilt the balance to either New Sudan or separation.

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⁸ The SPLM held a special session to discuss this crisis from 29 November to 1 December 2004. For Minutes of this meeting, see ‘TEXT: Minutes of Historical SPLM Meeting in Rumbek 2004’, in the Sudan Tribune 10 March 2008.

⁹ See statement by General Salva Kiir Mayardit, the SPLM Chairman at The SPLM 2nd National Convention, Juba, 15th-20th May 2008. [http://www.splmtoday.com](http://www.splmtoday.com)
Before the GNU’s inauguration on 20 September 2005, the SPLM and the NCP engaged in acrimonious negotiations over the sharing of the cabinet portfolios (ICG 31 March 2006; Yoh 27 September 2005; UNMIS January 2006). Article 2.5.3 of the Power Sharing Protocol stipulated clustering of the GNU ministries, while clause 25 of the Implementation Modalities categorised them into sovereignty, economic sector, and services sector clusters. Further, clause 26 of the Implementation Modalities allocated portfolios in each cluster according to the sharing formula provided in Article 2.5.5 of the Power Sharing Protocol, that is, 52% NCP, 28% SPLM, 14% other Northern political forces, and 6% other Southern political groups. Appendix D of the Implementation Modalities specified the ministries under each cluster. For ease of distribution, the ‘parties agreed to pair ministries in each cluster’ with the understanding that each party would take one ministry among the paired ones (ICG 31 March 2006, 3). For example, they paired the Ministry of Finance with the Ministry of Energy in the economic cluster. Accordingly, if the NCP took the Ministry of Finance, then the SPLM would take the Ministry of Energy. However, the negotiators did not write the pairing into the Implementation Modalities.

The SPLM claimed the Ministry of Energy and Mining, which was responsible for oil, because the CPA had created two banking systems and a Ministry of Finance for the government of South Sudan. The NCP claimed both the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Energy and Mining. This dispute started during the pre-interim phase, but Garang died before it could be resolved. After taking over, Salva argued that leaving the Ministry of Energy to the SPLM was a good way to make unity attractive to the Southerners. However, the NCP refused to relinquish the Ministry. The refusal did not violate ‘the text of the CPA, [but it] went against the spirit of Naivasha and failed to show either good faith or goodwill on the part of the NCP’ (ICG 31 March 2006, 3). Views on this controversy vary.

An UNMIS official blamed the NCP for indulging in strategic deception and aiming to reduce the SPLM to a southern movement in order to preserve its dominance in the north.10 The New Sudan unitarists upheld the SPLM ‘as the guardian of Sudan’s transformation’ (Yoh 27 September 2005). To them, the SPLM’s primary responsibility

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10 Face-to-face interview in Juba, South Sudan, 22 January 2013.
in the GNU was to materialise the New Sudan by institutionalising new power and wealth distribution systems. Yoh (27 September 2005)\(^\text{11}\) articulated this thinking, arguing that the fundamental issue in this dispute was not the Ministry of Energy per se, but the transformation of the ‘Old Sudan’ into ‘New Sudan’. As the ICG (31 March 2006, 22) reported, ‘entire populations in marginalised regions in the North look to the SPLM to push for fair allocations of the national wealth and political power to all the marginalised regions of the country.’ Therefore, the unitarists blamed Salva ‘for failing where Garang would have succeeded’ (ICG 31 March 2006, 21). An academic at the University of Juba informed me that the separatists viewed the NCP’s decision as an affirmation of their belief that the ‘Arabs’ could not be trusted to implement any agreement.\(^\text{12}\) Therefore, they wanted the SPLM to focus on preparing the South for separation and let the NCP keep control of the North. This preparation included integrating the SSDF into the SPLA and the government of South Sudan.\(^\text{13}\) To them, the CPA was ‘ultimately about the southern self-determination referendum’ and ‘the agreement clearly divided the country between North and South’ (ICG 31 March 2006, 6).

According to Nyaba (2010) the GNU could not materialise the New Sudan project for three reasons.\(^\text{14}\) First, the Power Sharing Protocol instituted power asymmetry in the relationship between the NCP and the SPLM which favoured the former. While the Protocol sought to balance this asymmetry with a collegial presidency, Garang’s demise dealt a blow to the SPLM because effective functioning of the collegial presidency depended on the personal relationship between the President, First Vice-President, and

\(^{11}\) At the time of writing, John Yoh was the SPLM’s representative in the Republic of South Africa and a lecturer at the University of South Africa (UNISA) in Pretoria. He attended most of our forums on Sudan and was an important resource for ACCORD’s activities in South Sudan. He also facilitated my travels to South Sudan in 2009. After South Sudan separated in 2011, he was appointed the country’s ambassador to South Africa.

\(^{12}\) Face-to-face interview at the University of Juba, South Sudan, 19 January 2013.

\(^{13}\) Salva Kiir’s finest hour was January 2006 when he signed the Juba Declaration with the SSDF. The Declaration specified ways in which the SSDF would be integrated into the SPLA. For details see, *The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration* (November 2006) and *The Fate of Sudan: The Origins and Consequences of a Flawed Peace* (2012, 120-121) by John Young.

\(^{14}\) Peter Nyaba was the Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research in the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) from September 2005 to August 2013. He first presented these views in a paper titled *SPLM-NCP Asymmetrical Power Relations Jeopardise Implementation of the CPA and the Future of Sudan at the Conference at the International Sudan Studies Conference* which took place from 25 to 28 November 2009 at the University of South Africa (UNISA) in Pretoria, South Africa. I was at that conference and I attended his presentation. The African Renaissance Centre at UNISA later published his paper as an article in the *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies*. 
Second Vice-President. Second, internal contradictions and lack of effective governance structures hampered the SPLM. Third, Salva surrounded himself with separatists, who ostracised ‘some of Garang’s former confidantes’ and campaigned against ‘the SPLM’s raison d’être - the concept of the “New Sudan”’ (2010, 142). An academic at the University of Juba informed me that the clamour for separation served Salva because he wanted to be the President of South Sudan, unlike Garang who preferred to be the President of a united Sudan. In other words, issues of strategic deception and agents’ commitment affected the agreement implementation.

For his part, Salva insisted that by taking the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Finance, and Energy, the NCP had trashed the CPA’s provisions of wealth sharing and power sharing. Thus, it weakened the provision for making unity attractive to the Southerners (UNMIS January 2006; ICG 31 March 2006). This raised the issue of interpreting Article 1.5.5 of the Machakos Protocol, which committed the parties to make unity attractive to the Southerners. What did ‘making unity attractive’ mean? Who was responsible for making unity attractive? How was ‘making unity attractive’ to be realised in practice?

To some, including Salva, this article placed the burden of making unity attractive on the NCP and the Northerners. Speaking to Southern Sudanese on 1 October 2010, for example, Salva declared that the North had failed ‘to make unity a realistic proposition.’ The SPLM Secretary General, Pagan Amum, asserted the same in a different forum on 8 May 2010. In contrast, the unitarists asserted that Article 1.5.5 placed the burden of making unity attractive on both the NCP and the SPLM. For example, an SPLM Political Bureau member, Dr Elwathig Kameir (24 December 2009) observed that the CPA had changed the questions from ‘what will the north do?’ and ‘what will Khartoum give to the south?’ to ‘what can we all do?’ He further argued that the ‘creation of the New Sudan in the context of the post-CPA situation’ depended on all

15 In this critique, Peter Nyaba was being inconsistent. In his previous work, The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider’s View (1997), which chapter five quoted, Nyaba articulated a separatist position. In the book, he explains that he was one of the leaders of the SPLM/A-Nasir which openly advocated separation. He also says he disagreed with Dr Riek Machar and Dr Lam Akol when they started receiving funding from Khartoum.
16 Face-to-face interview at the University of Juba, South Sudan, 19 January 2013.
17 See full speech, Public Address on the Occasion of his return from the Official Visit to the United States of America, Juba, Southern Sudan, Friday 1 October 2010. http://www.splmtoday.com
18 See full speech, SPLM Presentation as Delivered by Pagan Amum, SPLM Secretary General at the Consultative Meeting on the Sudan by the AU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, AU Conference Centre. 8 May 2010. http://www.splmtoday.com
the CPA partners. He then urged the SPLM to remain true to its character ‘as a revolutionary movement struggling for change’ and to ‘promote its concept of unity on new bases.’

I argue that the acrimony centred on the institutional and policy form in which the narratives of identity in the CPA would take. Because the CPA contained both unitarist and separatist narratives, it attracted contrasting interpretations. Unfortunately, the discords over the agreement’s interpretation and narrative dominance took their heaviest toll on the SPLM’s northern sector which had been attracted to the movement by the New Sudan vision. According to Young (2012, 230), many northerners ‘became disillusioned, particularly when they realised that the SPLM under Salva Kiir had turned away from the New Sudan vision and was dedicated to achieving southern independence.’ Kameir (24 December 2009) claimed that ‘to the membership and supporters of the SPLM, especially in the north,’ the Movement had replaced ‘the New Sudan vision and the Manifesto with the CPA.’ He complained that the SPLM had ‘withdrawn into a cocoon, waiting for secession of the South, instead of using the Agreement as a launching pad’ for a New Sudan.

Management of the Boundaries

The Machakos Protocol mentioned ‘the people of South Sudan’, but none of its articles defined the North-South border. However, Article 3.1 of the Power Sharing Protocol and Article 3(b) of the Security Arrangements Protocol stipulated that the North-South border would be as it was on 1 January 1956. Moreover, clause 46 of the Implementation Modalities created ‘a Technical Ad hoc border committee to demarcate precisely the 1/1/1956 North/South borderline’ during the pre-interim period after the adoption of the Interim National Constitution (page 162). Although the CPA did not provide additional guidance on the demarcation of the border, two academics at the University of Juba informed me that the unitarists anticipated that the exercise would approach these provincial boundaries in a way that reconciled the unity and self-determination articles of the Agreement.19 In contrast, the separatists wanted the border demarcated and then the two countries would negotiate any arising post-secession issues. Young (2012, 138)

19 Face-to-face interview at the University of Juba, South Sudan, 19 January and 22 January 2013.
quotes a ‘commissioner of a border area’ saying that the SPLM ‘did not want border demarcation to interfere with the referendum and that the problem would be better resolved when the south was independent and could get support from outside countries.’

The delineation process started in September 2005 when President Bashir created a Technical Ad hoc border committee\(^{20}\) through a presidential decree, but the progress was very slow due to a variety of reasons, including lack of funds and wrangles between the Northerners and the Southerners in the Committee (UNMIS January 2006; ICG 2 September 2010; AEC 2008). The SPLM’s publicly stated policy on border demarcation was that ‘it would accept no alternative to the 1956 provincial boundaries’ (Johnson 2011a, 170) regardless of the human movements or development projects that had taken place in the frontier areas since 1956. From the perspective of this study, the difference between the unitarists and the separatists was the meaning of the boundaries.

One of the contested areas was Abyei. As chapter seven argued, the Abyei Protocol defined the area in exclusive identity terms thereby creating a political border where none existed previously. This exclusive definition intensified conflicts as the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya groups started identifying themselves with different futures. The Ngok Dinka identified with a future that the SPLM determined in the South, while the Misseriya identified with the Northern political administration. This observation is consistent with the arguments in chapter three on discursive construction of common identities, and how the futures that different identity groups construct for themselves structure their relationships with their neighbours.

Further, the proclamation of the 1956 border affected the livelihoods of the transhumant communities in other frontier areas. In the distant past, these ‘borderlands were highly permeable, as different pastoralist groups moved into and out of the area following the seasonal pattern of rainfall and pastures’ (Johnson 2010a, 37). The transhumant communities in these areas had, therefore, evolved systems of resolving conflicts between dominant rights, shared secondary rights, and secondary rights (Johnson 2010a,

\(^{20}\) The Committee had 18 members. Seven were from the South and eleven were from all the Northern areas, including the border states. Dr Abdullah Alsadig Ali (a Northerner) chaired the Committee, while Riek Degoal (a Southerner) deputized him.
While the British administrators replaced the traditional systems with the native administration, this issue acquired grave dimensions in the 1960s and 1970s when the government established mechanised agricultural schemes and dissolved the native administration. Chapter seven explained how the clash between customary land regimes and development policies represented by mechanised agricultural schemes drove the Nuba people of Southern Kordofan and the Funj people of the Blue Nile to the SPLA. In addition, changing rainfall patterns in the 1970s and 1980s altered the transhuman cycles of the northern pastoralist communities by reducing the dry-season grazing areas in the northern parts (Johnson 2010a, 2009, 2010b). Thus, development policies and decline in rainfall pushed the transhumant communities further into the South.

The biggest impact, however, came from the 1983-2002 civil war because both the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A exploited local grievances to mobilise and recruit ethnic groups to their sides (Johnson 2009, 2010a, 2008; ICG 31 March 2006). ‘During the recently ended civil war,’ writes Johnson (2010a, 37), ‘parts of the borderlands became the site of conflict as groups allied either with the government in Khartoum or the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) sought to annex or defend territory they had previously used only seasonally.’ Thus, after 2005, border demarcation became an explosive issue because the national politicians in the NCP and the SPLM articulated land rights in these areas as collective rights of ‘ethnic’ groups. In turn, this privileged the localised narratives of identity and generated conflicts for three reasons. First, it meant overturning the established socio-cultural systems by converting some groups’ secondary rights to exclusive dominant rights. Second, creating an international border meant locking out some ethnic groups permanently from grazing areas where they had previously enjoyed shared and secondary rights. Third, it raised fundamental questions about rights, obligations, and responsibilities conferred by the Sudanese citizenship.

Douglas Johnson explains that exclusive dominant rights conferred permanent settlement and exclusive use of land to a group, and denied secondary rights to non-members of the group, while non-exclusive dominant rights bestowed dominant occupation and use of land to a group, but granted non-group members limited use of land on a seasonal basis (secondary rights). Shared secondary rights involved land use by members of two or more groups within a territory marking the boundaries between them. He further argues that, in practice, Dar rights were non-exclusive dominant rights. For details see Decolonising the Borders in Sudan: Ethnic Territories and National Development (2009) and When Boundaries Become Borders: The Impact of Boundary-Making in Southern Sudan’s Frontier Zones (2010) by Douglas H. Johnson.
National Capital & the Citizenship Dilemma

In January 2005, John Garang was so elated at the prospect of a transformed Khartoum (cf. Johnson 2011b, 143) that he joked: ‘we will open clubs, people will dance, women will dress the way they want, and young girls will have bare stomachs…. You will be surprised with the people who will come to us for a glass or two.’ However, efforts to convert this dream into a reality turned into bitter disputes from August 2005 to January 2011. A case of one southern girl in a street in Khartoum illustrates the challenges.

At one time there were street riots in Khartoum. I was wandering the street wearing a short sleeved blouse; a policeman came across to me and asked why I was dressed in that way [sic]. ‘Is this your home town that you should dress like that [as if you were] in Juba?’ Someone explained I might be Christian [sic]. The policeman said ‘Christian or not this is not her home town. She should respect the view of the rest as they are all Muslims’ [sic]. So I could give no answer. Policeman continued ‘This may as well be her own way of dressing but she should not wear this way here, let her do that in Juba’ [sic].

This case illustrates the CPA’s dilemma in terms of transforming the narratives of identity at the ontological and public levels through institutionalisation of a secular state. The Machakos Protocol traded self-determination for the South with the application of Sharia laws in the Northern states. At the same time, it recognised Sudan’s religious and cultural diversity, and clearly specified that eligibility for public office and enjoyment of human rights would be based on citizenship. Moreover, the Power Sharing Protocol stipulated Khartoum as the national capital and visualised it as the ‘symbol of national unity that reflects the diversity of Sudan.’ In particular, Articles 2.4.3, 2.4.4, and 2.4.5 required state agents, including the police and the judicial officers, to respect, uphold, and protect the fundamental rights and freedoms for all Sudanese in the national capital. Additionally, Article 2.4.6 required the presidency to appoint a ‘special commission… to ensure that the rights of non-Muslims’ were protected in the capital city.

22 Salma Mohamed Abdalla quoted this case in a paper The State of Sharia (Islamic Law) and the Rights of Non-Muslims in Post-CPA Khartoum, which she presented at the International Sudan Studies Conference which took place from 25 to 28 November 2009 at the University of South Africa (UNISA) in Pretoria, South Africa. I was in that conference and I attended her presentation. Salma and I met for the first time at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research (DPCR), Uppsala University, Sweden, in May 2008. Thereafter, she became a good resource person for my work on Sudan.
Many in the SPLM, including Salva, claimed that the NCP obstructed reform of the Islamic laws and restructuring of the law enforcement agencies to reflect the status of the national capital. Among the anticipated reforms were reorganisation of the national civil service, establishment of human rights monitoring mechanisms, and appointment of a special commission to monitor protection of non-Muslims’ rights. Others were restructuring of the national security service, especially the police and the intelligence agencies. Additionally, the SPLM complained that the security services were violating the rights of non-Muslims, instead of protecting them as required by the CPA. For example, on 15 May 2008, Salva claimed that ‘the law enforcement agencies in our national capital still maintain the same pre-CPA attitude and practices of working with impunity.’

He also criticised the judiciary for ‘the seeming reluctance … to upset laws that are repugnant to the constitution, which is the supreme law of the land.’

Similarly, the Minister of Peace and CPA Implementation, Pagan Amum, insisted that the structure of the national security was ‘not in conformity with the CPA’ because the Southern Sudanese component was ‘very small compared to magnitude of the organ.’ He then claimed that ‘the National Security Service [was] still highly dominated and monopolized by the NCP.’ Thus, it served ‘an Islamic agenda of the NCP’ instead of the interests ‘of the whole country and its citizens’. In contrast, the unitarists accepted that the necessary legal reforms had not been implemented, but they viewed Salva’s complaints as disingenuous because he was the First Vice-President in a collegial presidency which was responsible for implementing most of these reforms. According to Kameir (24 December 2009), the SPLM had abandoned ‘the responsibility of separating religion from the state’ at the national level. Questioning why the SPLM did not include the issue in its election manifesto, he wondered whether the SPLM’s call ‘for the abrogation of these laws, as one of the necessary and imperative conditions for ending the war’ was ‘a pretext to advance the right of self determination’ with a view to using it ‘as a raison d’être for separation.’

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24 See Current Political Situation in the Sudan by Pagan Amum, the SPLM Secretary General, speech at the All Political Parties Conference (APPC), Sudan, on 26th-30th September 2009. [http://www.splmtoday.com](http://www.splmtoday.com)
I argue that these contrasting interpretations and practices illustrate the role of committed agency in institutionalising discursive change after the implementation of a peace agreement.

*National Census & the Question of Belonging*

The Power Sharing Protocol provided for a national census by the end of the second year of the interim period. President Bashir established a National Population Census Council (NPCC) by a decree on 7 January 2006 (UNMIS January 2009; AEC 2007). Though a Monitoring and Observers Committee to monitor the census implementation was appointed thereafter, the census was delayed due to various factors, including funding, security and logistical problems, and the return of IDPs and refugees (AEC 2007). ‘One of the SPLM’s major complaints was that the NCP was dragging its feet on releasing the funds necessary for the census, feeding suspicions that it was seeking to delay the elections’ (ICG 13 March 2008). Thereafter, the census date was revised to February 2008, and a pilot project conducted from 15 to 30 April 2007. But the SPLM rejected the final form which was used during the pilot project because it excluded questions on ethnicity and religion. Subsequently, a presidential decree dated 11 February 2008 revised the census date to 15-30 April 2008. However, Salva cancelled the census in the South on 12 April 2008, citing ‘the Darfur crisis; non-completion of return movements of IDPs from the north to the south; non-inclusion of questions on ethnicity and religion in the questionnaire; and delays in the demarcation of the north-south border’ (UNMIS January 2009, 7).

The GNU then shifted the census in the entire country to 22 April to 6 May. Explaining his decision, Salva stated that the NCP, ‘contrary to the provisions of the CPA and our constitution,’ refused to include the questions related to ethnicity and religion in the census questionnaire.25 Previous chapters argued that religious, racial, and ethnic identity markers were not just ubiquitous in the discursive and institutional continuities in Sudan, but they were also the foundation of the separatist and the Islamist narratives. According to the SPLM Secretary General, Pagan Amum, the SPLM was insisting on ‘inclusion of important questions in the census questionnaire that would ascertain the demography of

Sudan’s multi-ethnic and religious diversity.26 Thereafter, Salva rejected ‘the dubious national census results,’ arguing that the SPLM ‘noted serious irregularities in the conduct of the 5th Population and Household Census.’27 He then blamed the NCP for ‘lack of good faith in the exclusion from census forms references to religion and ethnic origin.’ He then proposed that ‘the CPA formula, or any other acceptable formula, be used for the purpose of the mid-term General Elections.’ This dispute persisted until 21 February 2010 when the parties agreed to allocate 40 additional National Assembly seats to the South (UNMIS June 2010).

From the perspective of this study, this dispute illustrates the contradictions between unitarist and separatist narratives in the CPA and the inability of the implementers to transform the narratives of identity. This failure explains why the dispute over the census was most intense in the other peripheries, especially Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Darfur (ICG 21 October 2008, 13 March 2008).

2010 Elections & SPLM’s Desertion of the Centre

The Power Sharing Protocol stipulated national elections by the end of the third year of the interim period. But the Implementation Modalities shifted the date to July 2009. According to the AEC (2008, 16), successful elections would make unity attractive and ensure wider ownership of the peace process. The National Assembly approved the Political Parties Act in January 2007, but the passing of the relevant electoral laws was delayed. On 7 July 2008, the National Assembly passed the National Elections Act, and then followed it with the constitution of the National Elections Commission (NEC) on 17 November. The NEC finished the demarcation of constituencies in August 2009. In the meantime, wrangles over the preparation of the elections between the SPLM and the NCP continued, with the former blaming the latter for deliberately delaying the process. For example, on 26 September 2009, Salva declared that they had managed to resolve some CPA issues through dialogue with the NCP, but the latter had resisted those related

to democratic transformation. Further, Salva insisted that the SPLM would not allow any delay in the national elections to affect the January 2011 referendum.

In contrast, the unitarists questioned the Movement leader’s approach to the elections and his commitment to the goal of transforming the entire Sudan as espoused by the New Sudan vision. ‘What are the main features of the SPLM elections manifesto or program? What is the nature of the Movement’s political alliances that would lead to making unity attractive? In other words, what is the objective of the SPLM in contesting the elections?’ Kameir (24 December 2009) queried. He then wondered whether the SPLM was adhering to the CPA provisions while ‘waiting for the self-determination referendum and ultimately the secession of the south,’ or it was interested in ‘genuine participation in the process of democratic transformation towards building the Sudanese citizenship-state.’ According to Young (2012, 141), the SPLM’s northern supporters hoped that the elections ‘would start the long-promised democratic transformation’, but the ‘southern Sudanese saw the election as a critical step on the way to achieving self-determination.’ Indeed, in October 2009, Salva told a congregation in a cathedral in Juba:

> When you reach your ballot boxes the choice is yours: if you want to vote for unity so that you become a second class in your own country, that is your choice. If you want to vote for independence so that you are a free person in your independent state, that will be your own choice and we will respect the choice of the people. (Reuters 31 October 2009).

Thereafter, the NEC completed voter registration and finalised candidates’ nomination in January 2010 and set the national elections for 11 to 13 April 2010 (UNMIS March 2010, June 2010). President Omar al-Bashir ran for the national president, but Salva ‘chose not to run, thereby sending a powerful message that he was not personally committed to the unity of the country’ (Young 2012, 190). Instead, Salva ran for the president of South Sudan and fielded a Northerner, Yasser Arman, for the national president (Sudan Tribune 15 January 2010; UNMIS March 2010). According to Young (2012, 156), Arman was a staunch unitarist and his campaign was so effective in mobilising people in the North and in the peripheries that he became a ‘living proof that

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the ideal of New Sudan had a concrete political basis with the potential of winning mass national support.’ A few days before the elections, however, the SPLM delivered a coup de grâce to the unitarists by withdrawing Arman and all its gubernatorial, parliamentary, and municipal candidates from all the northern states, except Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile (BBC 7 April 2010; Sudan Tribune 6 April 2010; Reuters 6 April 2010). The Movement cited irregularities, voter fraud, and conflict in Darfur to justify its decision. However, Arman described the withdrawal as ‘a tragic moment’. 29 Talal Afifi, another Northern sector member and a writer and leftist political activist, stated: ‘no words can really describe how I feel. I am disappointed, betrayed, let down, and exposed.’ 30 ‘It was precisely at that point that New Sudan was sacrificed for the achievement of southern separation,’ Young (2012, 157) concluded. From then onwards, focus shifted to the January 2011 referendum and post-secession arrangements.

The Triumph of Separatism

Before I move to the narratives of exclusion, it is helpful that I summarise and synthesise the issues examined in this section. The central thesis in the analytical framework is that peace agreement implementation practices ought to materialise the envisaged transformation in the form of institutions and policy options. From this perspective, the CPA partners should have materialised the narratives of identity represented in the CPA in institutional forms and policy options. However, the CPA contained both unitarist and separatist narratives, and therefore, faced many implementation challenges. For example, the NCP Islamists interpreted the CPA provisions narrowly in order to justify retention of Sharia in the capital city, while the separatists emphasised the self-determination provisions. This underlines the role of agents in institutionalising narratives in social practices, which then reconstitutes the agency.

In August 2005, Salva claimed his allegiance to the New Sudan project, but the separatist narrative progressively dominated the SPLM’s practices. This created disillusionment among the SPLM northern sector ‘supporters whose minds and hearts [had been] captivated by the New Sudan Vision’ (Kameir 24 December 2009). When Salva

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30 Ibid
suspended the SPLM’s participation in the GNU on 11 October 2007, he cited various disputes over the CPA implementation (UNMIS January 2008; AEC 2008). An UNMIS official and some academics at the University of Juba informed me that, although the SPLM returned to the GNU on 27 December 2007, the suspension and the SPLM’s subsequent practices dealt the unitarists a fatal blow.31 From then onwards, the ‘SPLM leadership, now content with its power in Southern Sudan, retreated to Juba and would occasionally complain or react to the slow pace of the CPA implementation, heaping all the blame on the NCP’ (Nyaba 2010, 142).

Interestingly, the SPLM’s Second National Convention in May 2008 approved a Manifesto which reiterated the New Sudan vision.32 Defining Sudan as a diverse country, the Manifesto categorised this diversity into historical and contemporary diversity. The historical diversity covered ancient civilisations along the Nile Valley which contributed to the formation of the present Sudan, its culture, and identity. The contemporary diversity comprised modern ethnic, cultural, religious, linguistic, social, political, economic, and geographic diversity, whose evidence included the ‘over 500 different ethnic groups, speaking 130 distinct languages,’ 69% of population ‘whose mother tongue is not Arabic,’ 31% of population ‘who spoke Arabic as mother tongue,’ 65% Muslims, and 35% non-Muslims (page 5). Blaming the post-colonial governments for disregarding these diversities and emphasising only two parameters, Arabism and Islamism, the Manifesto espoused a New Sudan devoid of racism and religious bigotry.

Yet, the post-2005 SPLM prodded ‘many Southern Sudanese intellectuals and opinion makers into secessionist mode’ (Nyaba 2010, 144). Ultimately, the SPLM’s withdrawal from elections in the Northern states in April 2010 was akin to a de facto declaration of independence. All claims thereafter were mere justifications for legalising separation through the forthcoming January 2011 referendum. For example, on 17 September 2010, Salva declared that,

Over the last five years, it has become clear that unity has not been made an option for our people. Our partners in the North showed very little interest or

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31 Face-to-face interviews in Juba, South Sudan, 16-22 January 2013.
activity to make unity a realistic proposition. At the moment, all signs point to the fact that on January 9th, 2011 Southern Sudanese will vote overwhelmingly for independence.33

Salva repeated the same claims in an address to the United Nations High-Level Meeting on Sudan on 24 September.34 He then emphasised the same in an address to South Sudan on 1 October 2010.35 He then declared: ‘if I were to vote as a person and choose between the two options of unity and separation, I would vote for separation’ (Sudan Tribune 2 October 2010). Similarly, the SPLM’s Minister of Peace & CPA Implementation, Pagan Amum, told the UN Security Council on 16 November 2010 that ‘all signs point to the fact that the people of Southern Sudan are likely to vote for independence in January.’36

On 9 January 2001, South Sudanese cast their ballots in the self-determination referendum and, as fate would have it, the curtain fell on the New Sudan project on 7 February 2011, when the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission announced the results. ‘1.17% of valid votes were cast in favor of unity, 98.83% of valid votes were cast in favor of secession with a 97.58% voter turnout (3,851,994 registered voters)’ (UNMIS February 2011, 1). In short, Garang’s death considerably weakened committed agents within the SPLM. To understand the dominance of the separatists’ narrative, I will turn to the narratives of exclusion.

8.4 Narratives of Exclusion

In the quote that opens this chapter, Francis Deng (2010a, 13) observes that the CPA provided Sudan with an opportunity to discover its true racial, ethnic, religious, and cultural composition and to ‘develop a framework of inclusive mutual integration of all the groups as Sudanese’. However, the analysis shows that the CPA Protocols contained both unitarist and separatist narratives of identity. Further, the preceding sections have

35 See full speech, Public Address on the Occasion of his return from the Official Visit to the United States of America, Juba, Southern Sudan, Friday 1 October 2010. http://www.splmtoday.com
shown that practices to materialise the CPA provisions into governance institutions and policy options generated acrimony not only between the main partners, the SPLM and the NCP, but also between the unitarists and the separatists in the SPLM. Underpinning the acrimony was the institutional form in which the inclusion vis-à-vis exclusion that the CPA provisions had validated would take.

8.4.1. National vis-à-vis Southern Movement

The CPA inspired a swell of optimism and Garang’s New Sudan project acquired new supporters in Northern Sudan from January to July 2005. But Garang’s death raised questions about his successors’ commitment to the New Sudan project. According to Young (2012, 141), ‘northern Sudanese viewed Salva with considerable suspicion; as the NCP’s Sana Ahmed said: “people looked upon Garang as a Sudanese, not a southerner, like Salva”.’ Thus, after August 2005, the NCP interpreted the CPA provisions and implemented policy practices which aimed at sustaining its political hold on the Northern region and reducing the SPLM to a Southern Sudan regional movement. Aspects of this approach included controlling the key ministries, including Finance, Defence, Internal Security and Energy, while at the same time weakening those ministries which were held by the Southerners by hiving off crucial departments (ICG 31 March 2006). Because equitable sharing of the cabinet portfolios was a key indicator of the parties’ commitment to the CPA’s power sharing and wealth distribution protocols, the NCP’s practices solidified the narratives of exclusion into institutional, policy and material exclusion. Inadvertently, it strengthened the separatist wing of the SPLM. According to Young (2012), the public appeal of the New Sudan project, which was evidenced by the millions of Sudanese who went to Khartoum to welcome Garang in July 2005, shocked the NCP. Therefore, the proponents of the Islamist narrative in the party preferred southern secession to ‘the SPLM’s New Sudan ideology, with its dual threat of secularism and diversity’ (2012, 195). That is, the NCP accepted the secession of the South because it viewed the New Sudan project as the biggest threat to its exclusivist version of Islamism.

For its part, the SPLM was divided between those who emphasised the separatist provisions of the CPA and those who underlined the unitarist components. The separatists believed that the CPA’s central logic was to deliver the self-determination referendum. In their view, a political partnership with the NCP was preferable, regardless
of the setbacks in the interim period, because ‘the best way to protect the referendum [was] to allow the NCP to keep control of the North, while their party focused on the South’ (ICG 26 July 2007, 4). Therefore, the ‘strategic arena of this group [was] in Juba, at the level of the GoSS’ (ICG 31 March 2006). Young (2012) observes that Salva exposed his affiliation to this group by rarely going to Khartoum to perform his duties as the First Vice-President. Moreover, the SPLM under Salva ‘made little effort to ensure that the CPA quotas for southerners in the GNU were met, presumably because it wanted them to return to the south or out of concern that if they were given good jobs in Khartoum they might be reluctant to support secession’ (Young 2012, 190). Thus, the separatists emphasised the self-determination aspects of the CPA, and engaged in institutional and policy practices whose end goal was the solidification of narratives of exclusion inherent in the CPA into permanent exclusion through separation.

In contrast, the unitarists viewed the CPA as a transformative agreement and emphasised those components of the CPA which aimed at realising the New Sudan project. Viewing the SPLM as a national front, whose primary responsibility was to institutionalise change from the ‘Old Sudan’ to the New Sudan, the unitarists wanted the SPLM to manage ministries, including energy and mining, not just for power sharing but also for establishing new governance systems and wealth distribution policies. ‘For this group,’ the ICG (31 March 2006, 22) wrote, ‘the strategic arena [was] the GNU in Khartoum and the state governments throughout the North.’ Moreover, the unitarists wanted the SPLM, as a national front, to operationalise the New Sudan programs and policies in the areas that it controlled. This would demonstrate how it would govern the country by restructuring power, introducing democratic governance, observing human rights, managing diversity, and instituting equal and sustainable development (Kameir 24 December 2009).

Therefore, the unitarists emphasised the SPLM’s role at the centre. Aiming to break the barriers of exclusion which symbolised the ‘Old Sudan’, the unitarists wanted the SPLM to pledge ‘adherence to the New Sudan vision at the program and policy levels’ (Kameir 24 December 2009). This meant pursuing establishment of the JIUs, reforming government systems in Khartoum, championing the country’s democratisation agenda, re-orienting Sudan’s foreign policy, advocating for the interests of all the peripheries, espousing a clear national unity position, and initiating peace negotiations for conflicts in
Darfur and Eastern Sudan. This unitarists’ position had its biggest appeal in the peripheries. In less than three years, however, the SPLM’s initial lustre had faded and the Movement’s decision to withdraw all its electoral candidates from the Northern states in April 2010 shattered the New Sudan project. Evidently, the Movement chose permanent exclusion through separation.

8.4.2. From ‘Soft’ Boundaries to ‘Hard’ Borders

The CPA had anticipated that the implementing partners would demarcate the North-South border during the pre-interim period. However, the SPLM and the NCP disagreed on the delineation and the demarcation process. The interim period ended and the self-determination referendum took place before the parties could resolve the disputes. The divergence over the border demarcation was not just between the SPLM and the NCP, but also between the unitarist and the separatist wings of the SPLM. Separatists wanted the border demarcated and then South Sudan and North Sudan would negotiate arising issues, including grazing rights for the transhumant communities, cross-border movements, trade and investments, and state security concerns. For the unitarists, the New Sudan vision had guided the SPLM’s struggle and informed its alliances with the other political forces in Sudan, including the NDA and the Communist Party. The New Sudan project aimed at building a secular, democratic, New Sudan founded on a new social contract, new power and wealth distribution systems, and new social arrangements. Accordingly, Sudanese citizenship would be the criteria upon which the New Sudan would uphold, respect, and protect all rights, including various land rights in these frontier areas. Therefore, the unitarists’ position preferred that the provincial boundaries be demarcated in a way that allowed all citizens of Sudan residing in these areas to exercise their rights, obligations, and responsibilities as citizens of Sudan.

From the perspective of this study, the divergence between the unitarists’ and the separatists’ positions on the border hinged on the meaning of the new border, with the main fear being whether the new border would include or exclude some ethnic groups. That is, the heart of the conflict was the prospect that the creation of an international border between Sudan and South Sudan would transform previously ‘soft’ boundaries into ‘hard’ borders (Johnson 2010a, 2009, 2008; ICG 2 September 2010). While the unitarists preferred the adoption of ‘soft’ boundaries, the separatists hoped that post-
secession negotiations would mitigate the impact of ‘hard’ borders. According to Johnson (2010a), the CPA was not the first peace agreement in Sudan to change ‘soft’ boundaries into ‘hard’ borders, as the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement had done this when it created a Southern Region with its own government.

The literature on borders argues that ‘soft’ borders are open, inclusive, communicative, and porous, while ‘hard’ borders are closed, exclusive, and controlled (ICG 2 September 2010; Johnson 2010b, 2008). Where ‘soft’ borders allow socio-cultural interactions and facilitate the easy movement of people, goods, and services without security concerns, ‘hard’ borders limit socio-cultural interactions and restrict the movement of people, goods, and services. After the SPLM opted for separation, the AU High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan (AUHIP) mediated negotiations between the two Sudans with a view to mitigating the effects of ‘hard’ borders.37

8.4.3. Institutionalising a Secular State

Previous sections have quoted Salva Kiir attributing his refusal to support unity to the NCP’s obstruction of the necessary legal reforms. Reforming Sharia laws was crucial to state-religion separation. The Machakos Protocol traded Sharia in the North with the self-determination referendum for the South, while the Power Sharing Protocol clearly stipulated the status of the national capital. Young (2012, 189) observes that ‘it was disingenuous’ for Salva and his SPLM wing to attribute ‘the failure to make unity attractive to the NCP’s adhering to sharia’ because they had accepted the compromise of the Machakos Protocol. He concedes that while both the Machakos and the Power Sharing Protocol qualified sharia with respect for the rights of non-Muslims, the NCP failed to honour this qualification by obstructing the construction of churches and the opening of Christian restaurants during the Muslim holy month of Ramadhan. Nonetheless, Young (2012, 190) maintains that ‘the SPLM leadership never demonstrated much concern about the rights of Southern Christians in Khartoum, so it was hard to take seriously claims that sharia was a major obstacle to unity when in any

37 The African Union appointed a high-level panel on Darfur led by three former African Presidents, namely Thabo Mbeki (South Africa), Abdulsalam Abubaker (Nigeria) and Pierre Buyoya (Burundi) in March 2009. After it presenting its report on Darfur in October 2009, the AU Peace and Security Council re-mandated it as the AU High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan (AUHLP) to oversee the implementation of its recommendations on Darfur, promote democratisation in Sudan, assist in the implementation of the CPA, and mediate post-referendum negotiations.
case it had no impact in autonomous southern Sudan.’ This was the unitarists position. Unitarists blamed the Movement for abandoning the state-religion separation issue throughout the interim period (Kameir 24 December 2009). Further, they asserted that while the SPLM under Garang had in the past initiated dialogue with many Northern forces and made significant breakthroughs on the issue, the Salva-led SPLM failed even to make the issue an aspect of its election manifesto (Kameir 24 December 2009).

I argue that the logic of the Islamist and the separatists’ narratives fed into each other. Chapter five explained that the Islamist narrative initially argued for religious homogeneity by converting everyone to Islam, but resistance and the protracted civil war had forced them to move from assimilation. Chapter seven showed that the CPA recognised and validated the NCP’s version of Islamism. Thus, the NCP accepted the cost of secession of Southern Sudan as not ‘too high a price, particularly if they could gain desired concessions from the SPLM and the international community’ (Young 2012, 196). The logic of the separatists’ narrative was that partition of Sudan was the only way out, because the ‘Africans’ in the South and the ‘Arab-Muslims’ in the North could not co-exist. Thus, during the interim period, the exclusivist positions of the SPLM separatists and the NCP Islamists reinforced each other.

8.5 Argumentation Strategies

I have explained in the previous chapters how argumentation strategies link narratives of identity with narratives of exclusion. From 2005 to 2011, the CPA implementers employed various argumentation strategies to justify their practices and policy positions. I will review the five main strategies.

8.5.1 Shifting Blame & Responsibility

The main strategy which both the SPLM and the NCP employed was shifting blame and responsibility. The DHA regards this as one of strategies of ‘justification and relativisation’ which actors use to justify and legitimise their policies and practices (Wodak et al. 2009, 36). In practice, this strategy is realised by parties refusing to acknowledge their responsibility and attributing their failures to the other parties. In Austria, for example, which Wodak uses as her case study, the government sought to
justify its anti-immigration laws by blaming the immigrants (Wodak and Leeuwen 1999). Both the SPLM and the NCP employed this strategy, though Salva and his SPLM wing used it more than the other partners did. By using this strategy, Salva not only wanted to justify his belief in separation, but also to convince the CPA monitors and the international guarantors to blame the NCP for the partition of Sudan. In an address to the SPLM’s 2nd National Convention on 15 May 2008, for example, Salva said,

the SPLM gained momentum and its call for the creation of a New Sudan based on liberty, justice and equality for all, resounded all over Sudan and beyond. The marginalised people of Sudan were inspired by the vision of the New Sudan, making tens of thousands of their sons and daughters join the SPLA gallants forces and moved stubbornly, with one common aim, to liberate the whole Sudan.38

Here, Salva was restating the rationale of the New Sudan project and claiming that he believed in it, just as tens of thousands of Sudanese did. He then asserted that

though a lot has been achieved, there are still cardinal issues to be addressed. Without addressing those issues, we can hardly claim that we are out of the woods. The non-implementation of those issues made me, with the support of the SPLM (INC), to instruct all advisors, ministers and state ministers to withdraw from the Government of National Unity (GoNU) in October 2007.39

Clearly, Salva was blaming the other CPA partner for failing to implement the Agreement, and attributing his decision to pull out of the GNU to this failure. Salva was the First Vice-President in a collegial presidency, which was responsible for implementing most of the issues. He was therefore shifting the responsibility to the other CPA partners and blaming them for non-implementation. Yet, Salva himself had abandoned ‘the national stage, despite being the first vice-president of the country, and his neglect of the SPLM northern sector effectively put an end to the SPLM’s New Sudan project…’ (Johnson 2011a, 176). In subsequent speeches, Salva consistently

39 Ibid
blamed the NCP. On 1 October 2010, for example, he said: ‘over the last five years, it has become clear that unity has not been made an option for our people. Our partners in the North showed very little interest or activity to make unity a realistic proposition.’ Following Salva, other SPLM leaders shifted blame and responsibility to the NCP. On 30 July 2009, for example, the Head of the Government of Southern Sudan Mission to the United States, Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth, reported to the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission (TLHRC),

Four years into the interim period, the deliberate non-compliant and obstructionist posture of the NCP with regards to some of the CPA’s most transformative and significant provisions represent a great obstacle to the achievement of peace and is a dangerous abandonment of the partnership with the SPLM that requires a shared commitment to the spirit and letter of the CPA.

For its part, the NCP was split between those who blamed the SPLM, Salva and the international community, and those who preferred the secession of the South. An academic at the University of Juba informed me that senior NCP leaders did not regard Salva highly. Young (2012, 198) affirms the same observation, noting that ‘the NCP viewed Salva as inexperienced, intellectually limited, inconsistent, and beholden to “rabble rousers” like Pagan Amum and to an “Abyei Mafia” (Deng Alor, Luca Biong, Edward Lino, etc.).’ Many NCP officials blamed the SPLM for creating an impression that it was supporting the New Sudan while in reality the Movement was clamouring for secession. To the NCP, the SPLM’s lack of commitment to the unity of Sudan and Salva’s leadership were responsible for the conflicts over the CPA implementation. In my work on Sudan as an ACCORD officer, some government officials and university of Khartoum academics told me that some international actors were driving the SPLM to clamour for secession.

40 See full speech, Public Address on the Occasion of his return from the Official Visit to the United States of America, Juba, Southern Sudan, Friday 1 October 2010. http://www.splmtoday.com
42 Face-to-face interview, University of Juba, 22 January 2013.
43 Discussions during ACCORD field visits to Khartoum, February and September 2010.
8.5.2. Casting Doubt Strategy

Another strategy that the CPA partners employed was casting doubt. The DHA classifies casting doubt as one of ‘justification and relativisation’ (Wodak et al. 2009, 36). In practice, this strategy is realised through imputing negative motives or doubting the other party. Both the SPLM and the NCP used this strategy many times with a view to justifying their practices and unifying their core constituencies. While addressing the UN High Level Meeting on Sudan on 24 September 2010, for example, Salva insisted that,

As you all know, a vital moment is approaching for the holding of the referenda in Southern Sudan and Abyei, to take place on January 9, 2011 as agreed in the CPA. The referenda must take place on time, for the people of Southern Sudan and Abyei to exercise their right to self-determination. This is the bottom line and a hard won right whose ultimate price is more than 4 million lives lost during the two civil wars since independence in 1956. 44

By insisting that the self-determination referendum was the bottom line, Salva was casting doubt on the commitment of the NCP to holding the referendum. He was therefore inviting the support of the international actors to pressure the NCP to honour the agreement. Further, by citing the 4 million people killed in the past, Salva was alerting ‘the international community to make very clear that any delay or disruption’ would lead to ‘instability and violence of a massive scale’. 45 Rather than trust the NCP, an important CPA implementing agency and his partner in the GNU, Salva trusted the international community. Similarly, the SPLM representative in the US claimed that the government had not only failed to release funds for the JIUs, but it had also sent ‘militias used by the NCP during the civil war, now usurped into SAF’ as the ‘SAF component of the JIUs’. 46

In other instances, the SPLM suspected the NCP and the SAF of supporting OAGs in the South and regional armed groups, especially the Lord’s Resistance of Army (LRA) of

Uganda, in order to destabilise the South (ICG 31 March 2006, 23 December 2009). In this suspicion, the SPLM doubted the NCP’s commitment to the CPA and to a stable and peaceful South Sudan if the latter opted for secession. In turn, the NCP cast doubts on the SPLM, but its version of doubt was not directed at the Movement’s commitment to the CPA implementation. Rather, it cast doubts on the SPLM’s commitment to the unity of Sudan. For example, regarding negotiations on the sharing of cabinet portfolios in August 2005, the ICG (31 March 2006, 3) reported that,

When Salva made a final plea to Bashir for the Energy Ministry, arguing that it would be an important step towards making unity attractive, Bashir reportedly replied that southerners were going to vote for separation irrespective of whether they had the Energy Ministry.

Thereafter, a fair amount of doubts on the SPLM’s commitments was expressed in the Arabic press in Khartoum. Citing the case of Ali Osman Taha, who ‘stayed true to the agreement he signed and mistakenly believed that Salva was a unionist, and was deeply embarrassed by his espousal of secession,’ Young (2012, 196-197) quotes an NCP official saying: ‘Ali was duped into believing the SPLM was unionist and therefore favoured a strategic partnership with it. But such an arrangement could never have existed given their polar opposite positions.’ To these officials, the SPLM was not unionist. Further, the NCP suspected the SPLM of supporting armed groups in Darfur and in eastern Sudan in order to undermine it, and to destabilise the North (ICG 5 January 2006; Young 2012; Johnson 2011b). Meanwhile, the unitarists doubted the commitment of both the SPLM and the NCP to the New Sudan vision (Kameir 24 December 2009). As Young (2012, 142) wrote, ‘the CPA had already led northern opposition politicians to increasingly doubt the SPLM/A commitment to New Sudan in favour of southern secession.’ In sum, the casting doubt strategy worsened relations between the SPLM and the NCP, the two principal CPA implementing partners.

8.5.3. Discrediting Opponents

Also utilised by the SPLM and the NCP during the implementation phase was the discrediting of opponents’ strategy. According to the DHA, discrediting opponents is one of the strategies of dismantling and destruction (Wodak et al. 2009, 42). In practice, this strategy is realised through portraying others in black and white terms, derogatory denotations, derogatory metaphors, and insinuations. For example, Salva often insinuated that the NCP leadership encouraged negative, and at times malicious, criticism of the SPLM in sections of the Arabic media in Khartoum, because the state law office and the media regulation institutions failed to take legal action when the SPLM complained. In his words,

In no single case did the agencies entrusted with the regulation of the press or applying the law, bother to look into false news or seditious features addressed against the SPLM, SPLA and GoSS, and in a sustained manner. I leave it to you, Dear Comrades, to draw up your own conclusions.48

By insinuating that the NCP supported the media’s malicious campaign against the SPLM and GoSS, Salva was discrediting the Party’s leadership as unreliable. In other speeches, he declared that ‘unity has not been made an option for our people,’ because ‘our partners in the North showed very little interest or activity to make unity a realistic proposition.’49 Salva used these expressions to discredit the NCP and Northerners as untrustworthy because the SPLM, and Southerners by implication, showed their trust through signing the CPA, but the Northerners had failed to implement key provisions of the Agreement.

Using a similar approach, the NCP discredited the SPLM. According to the ICG (31 March 2006, 18), senior NCP officials ‘described the SPLM after Garang’s death [as] in “a stage of free-fall” and incapable of maintaining a partnership with the NCP.’ Another example occurred in 2007, when the SPLM suspended its participation in the GNU. The

48 Ibid
NCP claimed that the withdrawal was ‘a clever way for the SPLM to hide growing internal divisions and that it was being pushed by a small faction led by Secretary-General Pagan Amum, with the aim of overthrowing Salva Kiir’ (ICG 13 March 2008). Both the NCP and the SPLM used this strategy throughout the interim period.

8.5.4. Positive Self-Presentation

The CPA partners also employed positive self-presentation as a strategy of argumentation. The DHA classifies positive self-presentation as one of the strategies of transformation (Wodak et al. 2009, 40). This strategy is realised in practice through emphasis on the positive side of the ‘self’. On the question of whether the SPLM was a national or regional movement, for example, Salva said,

There are elements in Southern Sudan, including few SPLM cadres, who want us to withdraw southwards and forget about what happens in Khartoum, contrary to the provisions of the CPA…. The people of Southern Sudan know better that it was the SPLM which asserted, as never before, the right of Southern Sudan to liberty, dignity and rightful place under the sun.\(^{50}\)

In this instance, Salva was asserting the contribution of the SPLM to Sudan’s transformation and the Movement’s role at the centre. In subsequent speeches, however, Salva defended secession and the viability of South Sudan as a state. For example, he said,

I would like us to stay clear of our detractors who have in the past floated propaganda about the viability of Southern Sudan as a state if its people chose independence…. We have got potentials that, in a free and peaceful environment, can be exploited not just for the development and sustenance of the new state but also for the benefit of the neighbouring countries.\(^{51}\)

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\(^{50}\) See full speech, Opening Statement by The Chairman of SPLM, General Salva Kiir Mayardit, at The SPLM 2nd National Convention, Juba, on 15th-20th May 2008. [http://www.splmtoday.com](http://www.splmtoday.com)

\(^{51}\) See Public Address on the Occasion of his return from the Official Visit to the United States of America, Juba, Southern Sudan, Friday 1 October 2010. [http://www.splmtoday.com](http://www.splmtoday.com)
In this view, South Sudan was not just viable as an independent state, but it could also benefit the neighbouring countries and the Horn of Africa region. Meanwhile, the unitarists presented a secular, democratic New Sudan as the best option for the country (Kameir 24 December 2009). In contrast, the NCP presented itself as a victim of an ungrateful SPLM and an international conspiracy. For example, Young (2012, 188) quotes some NCP officials complaining that Hilary Clinton and US State Department officials ‘treated the NCP like “schoolboys” and did not appreciate that the party had a genuine constituency and could not do everything being demanded of it.’

8.5.5. Unification and Cohesivation Strategy

The last argumentation strategy that I will consider is unification and cohesivation, which the DHA categorises under constructive strategies. According to Wodak et al. (2009, 38), a unification and cohesivation strategy emphasises ‘unifying common features or shared sorrows, for example, at a subnational or national levels.’ In practice, it appeals for cooperation and often emphasises components of solidarity or unity. For example, in their appeal for the SPLM to play its role as the guardian of Sudan’s transformation at the centre, the unitarists emphasised that all peripheries shared marginalisation and common experiences. Writing on cabinet portfolios, Yoh (27 September 2005) urged the SPLM to not only negotiate ‘on the behalf of the South, but of all the progressive political forces in the country’, including ‘the Darfurians, the Easterners and the NDA as its natural allies.’ As the SPLM drifted towards separation four years later, Kameir (24 December 2009) wrote,

The New Sudan vision remains the source of the growing popular support that the Movement has been able to garner all over the Sudan, particularly in the North. Thus, the membership of the SPLM has a national character and is not restricted to southerners only, but embraced large numbers from the north, the west, the east, and the centre.

For their part, the separatists emphasised the unifying features of the Southern Sudanese. In an address to the South-South dialogue forum on 8 November 2008, for instance, Salva said,
Seeing you all together today in this hall is a clear indication that we are more united now than at any time in the past. From our history, we know that our greatest threat to our unity is ourselves. Although we are members of different parties, we have many things in common. Most of us in this hall are Southerners and we share similar history of struggle for our own survival as a people. This has been in many ways a bitter history and we have all suffered many losses.\(^{52}\)

Lastly, as previous chapters have argued, the NCP often invoked Islam as the unifying factor to rally the Northern population. For example, Assim Sati Mohamed, a leftist political activist explains how the NCP leaders described Northerners who supported the SPLM as infidels and threatened them (see Al Jazeera TV English 25 December 2010).

### 8.6 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to examine how the CPA partners, the NCP and the SPLM, materialised, in the form of institutions and social policies, the narratives of identity and the narratives of exclusion inherent in the Agreement. In the quote that opened this chapter, Francis Deng hoped that the Sudanese would use the CPA as a foundation for a new society in which diverse cultures, religions, races, ethnic groups, and social classes would co-exist peacefully. This is in line with the arguments in chapter three about a peace agreement being a roadmap for discourse transformation. Unfortunately, the findings in this chapter show that the CPA implementation practices and policies led to permanent exclusion through separation.

In the first six months, the CPA inspired optimism in the country, but Garang’s death in a helicopter clash in July 2005 shattered this optimism. Thereafter, the NCP and the SPLM wrangled and even clashed militarily over many issues, among them the operationalization of the JIUs, Abyei border demarcation, the sharing of oil revenue, border demarcation in other areas, and democratic transformation. Therefore, the main findings of the chapter are as follows. First, the contradictions between the unitarist and the separatist narratives inherent in the CPA played themselves out in several areas,

\(^{52}\) See full speech, Comrade Salva Kiir Mayardit, Chairman of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, *Opening Remarks in the Dialogue between the SPLM and Southern-Based Political Parties*, Juba, 8th November 2008. [http://www.splmtoday.com](http://www.splmtoday.com)
including the SPLM’s participation in the GNU, border demarcation, and the institutionalisation of a secular state. Second, Garang’s demise weakened committed agents and strengthened the separatist narrative. This led to a discourse rupture, that is, a disconnect between the discursive forms and the social practices, and ultimately, the separation of the South. I now locate these findings in the peace agreements’ implementation phase of the three-phased framework in figure 8.1 below.

Third, the CPA implementation practices and policies of the NCP and the SPLM solidified the narratives of exclusion in the CPA into institutional, policy, and material exclusion, which undermined the institutionalisation of a secular state and Sudan’s democratic transformation. Fourth, the parties’ implementation practices and policies converted previously ‘soft’ borders into ‘hard’ borders, thereby threatening the lifestyles of transhumant communities. Lastly, the parties employed various argumentation strategies to justify and legitimise their practices. The five main arguments which I have identified in this chapter are shifting blame and responsibility, casting doubt, discrediting opponents, positive self-presentation, and unification and cohesivation. With these findings and those of the previous chapters, I will now conclude the overall study.
CONCLUSION
Conclusion

Discourse Transformation in Peace Processes

Introduction

The motivation for this study was a basic puzzle about how peace processes contribute to conflict transformation in a society which is transiting from a protracted civil war. While this puzzle has engaged scholars of peace and conflict studies for more than two decades, I focused on discourse transformation and how it engenders conflict transformation. The choice of discourse transformation was informed by my field experience in different parts of Africa. Therefore, the overarching aim of this study was to understand how discourse change in peace processes contributes to conflict transformation. Five specific objectives were integral to this broad aim. The idea of discourse change is fundamental in the discursive approach which is one of the theoretical approaches to the study of violent conflict. The discursive approach problematizes the agency/structure theories and offers an alternative understanding of violent conflicts. Arguing that agents and structures exist in dialectical relationships, the approach emphasises the construction of meanings and interpretations which are articulated in discourses. Therefore, research using this approach focuses on discourses.

To study discourse transformation in peace processes, I developed an analytical framework based on two theoretical constructs, narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion. I then employed the framework to analyse the 2002 to 2005 peace process for Sudan. I will now summarise the findings in the three-phase analytical framework from the critical turning point to the end of the peace process. Then I will elucidate how my model has advanced our understanding of discourse transformation in peace processes and how it provides a useful framework for analysis in empirical peace research. The first section will synthesise the empirical findings and the analytical framework, relating them back to the broader theoretical arguments in peace and conflict studies. The next section will highlight the limitations of this study, while the third section will point to directions for future research. I will then reflect on the implications of the findings to conflict resolution policy and practice.
Tracing Narrative Transformation

Chapter three developed an analytical model for tracing narrative change from the mutually hurting phase to the implementation of a peace agreement. In turn, the empirical chapters have located the narratives which were represented before 2002, in the CPA and during the CPA implementation phase. Integrating all the phases into one model produces figure 9.1 below.

![Figure 9.1: Tracing narrative change in the 2002 to 2005 Sudan peace process](image)

In the following, I will synthesise these findings with the theory and the broader debates in the peace and conflict studies literature as I evaluate the contributions of this study.
Theory-Empirical Synthesis: Evaluating Contributions

Research Gap Revisited

This study started with a review of the peace processes and the Sudan studies literature. The review of the peace processes literature showed that a large amount of scholarly writings covers broad themes, including peace negotiations, peace agreements, and post-agreements’ peacebuilding. The review also found analyses of many sub-themes within each of these broad themes. However, peace research has paid scant attention to the issue of discourse transformation in peace processes. The review showed that a few studies have analysed discourse change primarily in the 1990s Northern Ireland peace process and the 1993 to 2000 Oslo peace processes for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, these studies have not approached the subject from a peace and conflict studies’ perspective. More importantly, most of them have not conceptualised the concept of discourse the way this study has done. Further, no scholarly texts have analysed peace processes using the discursive approach. Regarding Sudan, the review confirmed that a large amount of scholarly writings has analysed the protracted civil war, while a few authors have alluded to the importance of discourses. Nonetheless, no scholarly studies have systematically examined the transformation of discourses in Sudan’s peace processes.

Focusing on this gap, this study has contributed to an area that is not only of academic interest to peace research, but also of great practical relevance, as the question of peace sustainability after the implementation of peace agreements is an issue that policymakers struggle with. Moreover, the study has contributed to the scholarship on conflict research in Sudan and Africa in general.

Theoretical Elements

*Narratives of Identity & Narratives of Exclusion*

In order to analyse how discourse transformation contributes to conflict transformation in peace processes, I developed an analytical framework which synthesised the conflict transformation approach with discourse theory. The synthesis started with an
examination of the core postulates of the conflict transformation approach, and then showed that the approach does not sufficiently cover the vertical relations in a non-unitary actor. Asserting that the elite who lead a non-unitary actor and their supporting constituencies are mutually constituted, I argued that they construct a collective understanding of a conflict through discourses. I then introduced the notion of narrative transformation because narrative is the foundation of a discourse.

From this notion, I developed two analytical constructs, narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion, with a view to making discourse transformation in a peace process empirically researchable. I operationalised the two theoretical constructs using the discourse-historical analysis (DHA) method. Herein lay three contributions. The first is synthesising the conflict transformation approach with the discursive approach in order to analyse conflict transformation in a peace process. The second is making discourse transformation in a peace process empirically researchable through tracing narrative change from the start to the end of a peace process. The third is utilising DHA as a research method to analyse discourse transformation in a peace process.

*Transformation in a Peace Process*

Conflict researchers argue that a protracted civil war reaches a turning point in which the warring parties enter into peace negotiations. I postulated in the analytical framework that this turning point is a form of crisis or moment of uncertainty in the life of a civil war. Further, I postulated that this moment of uncertainty compels the parties to a conflict to re-evaluate the discursive structures, knowledge networks, and power systems which produce and reproduce the civil war as a discourse. Following arguments in the conflict transformation literature about relationship change and long-term commitments, I emphasised that transforming discursive structures cannot be sudden; it requires a phased approach. Although most peace processes are short-lived activities, my framework postulated that a peace process serves as a phased approach in which the warring parties initiate a long series of activities to change the discursive structures and social practices.

Therefore, the starting point in the framework is the change among the elite who recognise the turning points and negotiate in peace conferences. Moreover, the discursive
approach presupposes vertical relations between the elite and their supporting constituencies. Thus, I affirmed that the elite convert their change into mass change using narratives, as they are the building blocks of discourses at the grassroots level. Two implications lie at the centre of this framework. First, the agency/structure dialectical relationship suggests that a successful change during the implementation of a peace agreement is contingent on the existence of agents who are committed to the transformation, and facilitating social and material structures. Second, a key indicator of discursive change is the adoption of the new narratives by a critical mass in the broader public. These theoretical postulates were crucial in the assessment of the empirical findings.

The Empirical Findings

**Discursive Construction of Identity Dualities**

The DHA requires exploration of the historical contexts because they reveal the construction of the interpretive frames, collective memories, and social categories inherent in the discursive and institutional continuities. Hence, I explored the historical context in which the narratives of identity and narratives of exclusion that predominated during the 1983 to 2005 civil war were constructed. The cue was Garang’s speech at the CPA signing ceremony on 9 January 2005 in which he talked about Sudan’s historical and contemporary diversities (see appendix I). Therefore, I reviewed four phases of state formation because the Sudan studies literature linked the three dominant dualisms of Arabs/non-Arabs, Muslims/non-Muslims, and Northerners/Southerners to the process of state formation. These were: the Turkiyya from 1821 to 1883; the Mahdiyya from 1883 to 1898; British colonialism from 1898 to 1956; and 1956 to 2002 when the final peace process started. This section produced several findings which feed back into the discursive approach and the conflict transformation theories.

The first finding regards the construction of the identity dualisms of Arabs/non-Arabs, Muslims/non-Muslims, and Northerners/Southerners. Some writers trace the construction to the recent past, especially to British colonialism, while others refer to the distant past. However, I argue that the process of state formation facilitated these constructions, with the elite and the administrators who controlled the state at each phase playing a major
role. The theory chapter elucidated how the role of the elite in the discursive approach differs from that conceptualised by instrumentalism. Instrumentalism emphasises the use of violence by the elite to achieve their goal of identity construction; the construction process is top-bottom. The discursive approach views the construction as a dialectical process which links agents, social and material structures.

Therefore, I argue that the elite constructed these dualisms on the pre-existing discursive structures upon which people constructed identity boundaries. These included myths and stories of genealogies, metaphors of belonging, and ancient religious beliefs that derogated the ‘Others’. Using economic relations, law, political practices, cultural and direct violence, the colonial administrators and the elite converted the prevailing fluid occupational and cultural identities into hard political identities. I also insist that their interpretation of those discursive structures was not ‘objective’; rather, the meaning they attached to them determined their construction. Although Mahmood Mamdani (2012, 2009, 1996) does not write from a peace and conflict studies perspective or from a discursive approach’s point of view, he has alluded to this form of construction process in his writings on the role of European colonialism in the construction of political identities in Africa. Similarly, Kaufman (2001) writes from an ethno-symbolic perspective, but he has alluded to the same process in his arguments about ethnic identity construction where groups accepted identity labels that were first created by outsiders.

The second finding regards the historical frames and collective memories through which the warring parties interpreted the civil war. The divergence was whether the North and the South interacted before the Turkiyya and when the ‘Southern’ and ‘Northern’ regions emerged as geographical and political identities. I found that these different interpretations acquired significance after 1956 when different actors appropriated and aligned the past with the first civil war discourse. Using divergent historical frames, the conflict actors recast the narratives of identity and reconstructed the past in a way which served their present objectives. This process of using divergent historical frames to reorganise the present narratives of identity compares with René Lemarchand’s (1994a) observation about Burundi where the warring parties generated myths with a view to linking the past and present, discourse and practice, ideology and violence. It also compares with Franke Wilmer’s (2002) observations about Yugoslavia where conflict
entrepreneurs propped up certain historical frames in order to justify their war practices in the 1990s.

The third finding is that the Arabs/non-Arabs, Muslims/non-Muslims, and Northerners/Southerners identity dualisms were prevalent in the early 1950s. However, none of them had been constructed into the ‘enemy-Other’. The theory chapter elucidated how the discursive approach understands the ‘Othering’ process. The central argument was that a conflict arises when ‘Others’ are discursively constructed into ‘enemy-Others’. Because these ‘Others’ had not yet been constructed into ‘enemy-Others’ in the early 1950s, the main debate in the country was the way these differences would structure relationships in post-independence Sudan. This builds on two constructivist arguments. One argument is that the meaning that people assign to difference is more important in social relationships than the ‘fact’ of difference. The other argument is that the future that a discursively constructed group envisions determines its relations with its neighbours. I then inferred five narratives which proposed contrasting approaches to this issue.

The Sufi Brotherhoods (*Turuq*) articulated the first narrative which promoted an ethnic nationalist approach. This approach preferred building the Sudan national identity on one self-defined ethnic group, the riverain Arabs, and then visualised assimilation of the minorities into this Islamic nation (*Umma*) and Arab culture (*Uruba*). Therefore, it advocated Islamisation and Arabisation policies. Southern separatists who viewed Sudan in racial terms advocated the second narrative. Arguing that Southerners were Africans and Northerners were Arabs, this narrative advocated separation. Northern intellectuals espoused the third narrative which rejected Islamisation and Arabisation policies and accepted cultural and economic differences between the North and the South. This narrative preferred a secular state with more regional powers for the South, within the context of a unitary Sudan. The Southern elite espoused the fourth narrative which emphasised cultural, political, and economic differences between the North and the South, and espoused federation, increased representation of Southerners in the federal institutions, and accelerated economic development in the South. The Leftists espoused the fifth narrative which visualised an equitable, multi-cultural, and egalitarian Sudan based on socialist principles.
These five narratives competed in the course of the first civil war up-to the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. During negotiations, the Southern parties dropped their clamour for federation or separation, while the Northerners dropped their preference for a centralised system and accepted a Southern regional government. Analysts hailed the Addis Ababa agreement as successful because it halted violence and paved the way for resolution of the structural violence in the South. However, I argued that it solidified Northern-Southern differences administratively; thus, it did not transform the discourse. Critical peace research has recently raised this question, arguing that most peace agreements ‘reinforce rather than challenge inter-group division’ (Mac Ginty 2008, 5). This failure, in part, generated the second civil war.

The fourth finding regards crises, mutually hurting stalemates, and change in sedimented discourses. Chapter three explained the way crises undermine sedimented discourses and create opportunities for reformist agents to review the prevailing ‘social truths’. John Garang used the crisis of the second civil war to question the prevailing ‘social truth’ which viewed the war as ‘the problem of the South’. Striving to change the dominant discursive structures, including the historical frames, collective memories and social categories, he reframed the conflict as the ‘problem of Sudan’ and endeavoured to unite all the peripheries and the marginalised in the North against the power-wielders in Khartoum. He then espoused a New Sudan project. His narrative resonated powerfully with the grassroots in the peripheries between the North and South. However, the massive structural violence in the South, displacement and devastation by the war, and the cultural violence which the Northern elite had subjected the Southerners to hampered the entrenchment of Garang’s New Sudan narrative in the South. Therefore, despite Garang’s powerful argumentation strategies, the old narratives of identity remained at the centre of the second civil war.

Therefore, I inferred five narratives of identity that competed in the discursive and institutional continuities during the second civil war. These five were versions of the previous narratives. Garang shared his New Sudan narrative with the Northern Left and it was similar to the Leftist narrative of the 1950s. But they revised it slightly after 1991 by dropping the Socialist elements. The separatists’ narrative retained its Arabs/Muslims vis-à-vis Africans/non-Muslims viewpoint. By the early 1990s, this narrative had gained broad support in the South, including in Garang’s SPLM. The Southern centrist narrative
accepted the identity dualities, but it separated racial identities from religious identities. The other two were the Northern sectarian parties’ (the Sufi brotherhoods) narrative and the Islamists’ narrative. The former oscillated between granting minority guarantees and accepting Garang’s New Sudan vision which it preferred instead of separation, while the latter narrative wavered between assimilation, granting minority guarantees, and accepting separation.

The fifth finding centred on the hierarchies of narratives and the conditions under which some narratives dominate and others wither. The theory chapter alluded to the interaction between reformist agents and enabling structures as necessary conditions. Underpinning this interaction are issues such as power relations, knowledge structures, and external contingences. Thus, I found that at the start of the IGAD-facilitated peace process in 1993, these five narratives stood on an almost equal footing. However, devastating wars from 1994 to 2002, coupled with changing power relations, hardened positions and altered the hierarchy of narratives. In the North, the Islamists who aligned with the SAF and controlled the state used military violence to suppress the Left and the sectarian parties. The ascendance of Islamists and change in power relations in the early 1990s subjugated the leftist and sectarian parties’ narratives. In the South, unending war, ravaging famine, deepened cleavages, and intensive South-on-South violence emboldened the separatists.

Additionally, I found that changing external factors played a role in altering the hierarchy of narratives. These include changes in Ethiopia in the early 1990s, wars between neighbouring states which had been supporting the Sudan parties, and changing international relations after 11 September 2001. Specifically, the terrorist attack on 11 September had a big impact on the Islamist narrative as the ruling elite sought to mend relations with the United States. As a result, only one northern and two southern narratives were articulated in the final phase of the peace process from 2002 to 2005. The two Southern narratives were from the SPLM which had been oscillating between the New Sudan unitarist narrative and the separatist narrative since 1991.
From Narratives of Identity into Narratives of Exclusion

The theory chapter elucidated how the discursive construction of the ‘enemy-Other’ occurs through conversion of narratives of identity into narratives of exclusion. Narratives of identity involve placing others into specific social categories, while narratives of exclusion involve constructing boundaries using these categories and excluding others based on these boundaries. The theory chapter also explained that conflict entrepreneurs employ various strategies of argumentation to convert narratives of identity into narratives of exclusion and to legitimise violence against the constructed ‘enemy-Other’. The framework then postulated that warring parties employ various strategies to deconstruct or reconstruct narratives of exclusion during peace processes. Analysing narratives of exclusion and argumentation strategies in this research produced several findings that feed into the discursive approach and conflict transformation theories.

The first finding regards boundaries of exclusion. Proponents of the five narratives of identity differed on the identity markers they emphasised and the way they constructed boundaries. The Sufi brotherhoods, the separatists and the Islamists emphasised racial and religious identity boundaries and constructed boundaries of exclusion based on these markers. I found that the most common argumentation strategies which these parties employed to draw boundaries along these markers were emphasising difference and historical continuity. In contrast, John Garang and the Northern Left stressed regional and economic identities. Thus, they emphasised unifying factors and discontinuity with the past. In the broader peace and conflict studies literature, this form of boundary construction and its accompanying strategies of argumentation is documented in many conflict countries, including Yugoslavia (see Wilmer 2002, 1998).

The second finding centres on the imagined futures. The discursive approach and the broader constructivist literature affirm that the future which two discursively constructed groups envision determines their relations, regardless of their location in the historical narrative. I found that proponents of each of the five narratives used various argumentation strategies to justify their envisioned futures. Those who envisioned a common future for all Sudanese, especially John Garang and the Northern Left, stressed unifying factors. They also advocated change of the prevailing assumptions, dominant
historical frames, and collective memories through respect for historical and contemporary diversities. Further, they espoused re-imagination and reconstruction of the prevailing social categories and power-knowledge frameworks. In contrast, those who envisioned separate futures emphasised different historical frames, divergent collective memories, conflicting racial and religious identities, and permanent boundaries of exclusion.

The third finding concerns the solidification of group differences through peace agreements. Critical peace research has questioned the ‘problem-solving’ approach employed in the research on peace processes and peace agreements (see Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; Mac Ginty 2010, 2008). A basic premise in its critique is that ‘problem-solving’ approaches attribute peace agreements’ failure to poor or lack of implementation. The critique then asserts that many peace agreements reinforce group differences, instead of mitigating or transforming them. This study has confirmed this critique because some CPA Protocols, especially the Machakos Protocol and the Abyei Protocol, validated the existing group differences. Chapter seven has actually argued that the Abyei Protocol turned the old Dinka-Misseriya symbiotic relations in the region on their head and provided the two groups with different futures. In turn, these different futures became the new basis for conflicts. This feeds back into the critical peace researchers’ argument about examining the nature and quality of peace accords. It also links with the next findings about the meaning and interpretation of peace agreements.

*Meaning and Interpretation of Peace Agreements*

The mainstream literature on peace processes regards peace agreements as the blueprints for peace in societies emerging from protracted civil wars. In turn, I postulated in the theory chapter that peace agreements are the foundational documents for discourse transformation. Thus, I argued that peace accords are supposed to define a new trajectory for a society that is emerging from a protracted civil war. Based on the core theoretical constructs of this study, I then postulated that implementation practices should materialise the narratives represented in peace agreements in the form of institutions and policy options. I have two findings regarding the CPA and its implementation practices which link with the discursive approach and the broader conflict transformation literature.
The first finding regards two intertwined issues: the writing and interpretation of peace agreements. The CPA was inherently contradictory because it contained both unitarist and separatist narratives. The Machakos Protocol provided Sharia for the North and self-determination for the South, regardless of whether the Sudan parties pursued unity or not. Because the Protocol was the backbone of the CPA, the other Protocols failed to mitigate this contradiction, although they included unitarist provisions. This contradiction affirms the argument from the critical peace research school about the pitfalls of recommending full implementation of a peace agreement without evaluating its nature and quality. Indeed, the main finding here is that the contradiction between the unitarist and separatist narratives generated implementation challenges, which hampered discourse transformation, because it provided the implementing agents with the space to select and emphasise some parts of the agreement and disregard others. For example, the Islamists were reluctant to reform Sharia in the capital city as stipulated by the Power Sharing Protocol; rather, they emphasised those articles of the Machakos Protocol which accepted Sharia for the Northern states. In contrast, the separatist wing of the SPLM abandoned the institutionalisation of a secular state as stipulated by the Power Sharing Protocol and focused on the self-determination articles of the Machakos Protocol.

Compounding this problem of interpretation and implementation was the fact that Northerners read the CPA in Arabic, while Southerners read it in English. According to Alex de Waal, the two versions raised questions of translation. The Arabic version was *Ittifaq aq salam al Shamil*. Those who read the Agreement in English understood the term ‘comprehensive’ to mean that the CPA had addressed all conflict issues. However, those who read the Arabic version understood the term *Shamil* to mean the Agreement was sealed, closed and definitive. Thus, the CPA caused fears of authoritarianism in the North.

Closely related is the second finding. In the general Sudan studies literature, some authors have attributed the NCP and the SPLM’s implementation practices to the peace process’s dependence on Garang-Taha personal relations. As noted in chapter eight, this view implies that Garang and Taha struck a secret deal regarding the future of Sudan.

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1 Alex de Waal, personal communication in January 2015.
Other authors have blamed the NCP and the SPLM for lack of commitment to the CPA. I infer that the implementation practices raise a concern regarding the meaning that implementing agents attach to peace agreements and the way it influences their practices. Underpinning this inference are three premises which both the peace processes literature review and the analytical framework covered. One premise is agents’ commitment to transformation. The other premise is vertical relations within a non-unitary party. A third premise is that some issues, which are negotiated in secret, are not reflected in the official documents. The literature on peace agreements cites non-committed implementers as one of the main reasons why peace agreements fail. In the framework, I presupposed that if agents participate in a peace process because they have reached a critical turning point, then their signing of a peace agreement would indicate commitment to discourse transformation. In turn, the commitment would be reflected in their interpretations of the agreement and in the vertical relations. In addition to commitment problems, challenges of implementation arise from the third premise if those who negotiate an agreement are not the implementers.

For this study, therefore, the NCP and the SPLM implementation practices demonstrate that the meaning which agents attach to a peace agreement influences the way they understand its transformative potential. Further, their practices show that the meaning influences the way agents pursue transformation of vertical relations and collective understanding of the conflict. John Garang visualised changing Khartoum, because he viewed the CPA as a transformative document. He also knew that the embedded cultural violence in Sudan and the massive structural violence in the South, undermined the appeal of his unitarist narrative in the region. Therefore, he hoped to use his role at the centre to institute new structures, which he would then use to change the narratives in the South. However, his successors in the SPLM attached different meaning to the CPA because the Agreement was an elite exercise and the vertical relations in the SPLM were weak. To conclude, committed agents determine discourse transformation during peace processes. As this case shows, however, the agency/structure dialectical relations suggest that they need enabling social and materials structures in order to be successful.
Limitations

This study aimed at understanding discourse transformation in the 2002 to 2005 peace process in Sudan. I developed a new analytical framework, employed a ‘triangulatory’ methodology, and analysed over 200 primary and secondary documents. Yet, no academic work in peace research is ever comprehensive. Therefore, there are several limitations to this study.

First, I am not proficient in the Arabic language. Most of the literature on the CPA and the civil war in Sudan is in English. I know that the majority of academics and elite in Khartoum are proficient in both English and Arabic, and Khartoum-based NGOs usually write their reports in Arabic and English. However, some good background academic literature from the North is in Arabic. Therefore, where I have used materials in Arabic, I turned to fluent Arabic speaking friends for interpretation. To balance the possibility of translation weaknesses, I depended on my previous discussions with government officials, academics, and NGO activists in Khartoum when I visited for research or held conferences as an ACCORD staff officer. In some cases, I used documents which secondary sources had translated. Moreover, the media in Khartoum is overwhelmingly Arabic. Therefore, I accessed views from the Northern elite which appeared in both the Arabic and English media, but I missed the views that appeared in the Arabic media only. Some friends in Khartoum had offered to translate the necessary media materials for me, but a combination of distance and the difficulties of selection hampered the arrangement. As a result, I have analysed more primary materials from the SPLM and the Southerners than from the Northern actors. This is an important limitation which skewed the study towards Southern narratives. Therefore, an additional study covering more Northern narratives is needed.

Second, I did not do fieldwork in Khartoum due to financial and other constraints. Indeed, the University of Otago does not allow students to do fieldwork in areas that the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has classified as dangerous zones. The Ministry has classified both North and South Sudan as dangerous zones. Therefore, the University allowed me to go to Juba only because I am Kenyan and I have been to South Sudan previously. I believe that further discussions with key informants in Khartoum would not have changed the findings, but they would have enriched them.
Third, this study has produced interesting findings on discourse transformation in peace processes and the utility of the discursive approach. However, case studies as a method of research and the specific nature of thick descriptive analyses have their limitations. Although the analytical framework may be useful in other cases, it is hard to replicate the specific context of pre-2011 Sudan to other situations. Therefore, subsequent studies on discourse transformation in peace processes will have to adopt and adapt this framework in line with the cases under review.

**Future Research**

The methodology and findings of this study clearly point to certain directions for future research. The first direction comes from the findings on the discursive construction of conflict and the literature review. Both the peace processes and the Sudan studies literature reviews illustrated that peace research has paid scant attention to discourse transformation in peace processes. The review also showed that peace researchers have not employed the discursive approach to analyse conflict transformations in peace processes. This study has covered the 2002 to 2005 peace process in Sudan, but this is only one case and it does not even cover the whole of the pre-2011 Sudan because I did not broach the Darfur peace process. Discourse transformation in peace processes is clearly under-researched and focus on other cases is one area that merits further attention.

Moreover, the paucity of research using the discursive approach clearly points to the need for further studies on transitions from civil war to peace using the approach. While cases such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Northern Ireland conflicts have attracted some studies using interpretivist approaches, studies on peace processes, especially conflicts in Africa, are dominated by positivist approaches. This area needs further research using the discursive approach and other constructivist methods.

The second direction emanates from the findings on the writing and implementation of peace agreements. The contradictory protocols in the CPA, the conflicting meanings and interpretations which the implementing agents derived from the CPA, and the divergent futures which the implementing agents drew from the Agreement, raises some profound
questions regarding the role of peace accords as instruments of conflict transformation. This is another area for further research. In particular, the role of peace accords in constructing futures, as well as in mitigating or solidifying group differences, deserves academic attention.

**Implications for Policy and Practice**

This study has implications for conflict resolution policy and practice. First, the contradictory narratives of identity inherent in the CPA protocols provided the implementing agents with the space to focus on divergent interpretations. A basic implication here is understanding that peace agreements in themselves do not transform conflicts. It is the implementing agents and their interpretations of the agreements’ narratives that determine discourse transformation. Therefore, a policy proposal from this finding is that facilitators and mediators of peace processes should write peace agreements with consistent narratives. This requires a clear understanding of the narratives of each of the conflicting parties, where these narratives intersect, where they clash, and the way they construct post-peace agreements’ future.

Second, the study suggests the need to introduce the discursive approach as one of the ways of analysing conflicts during peace negotiations and the writing of peace agreements. Further, introducing the discursive approach suggests the need to train negotiators, facilitators, and mediators of peace processes on the approach and ways of identifying conflict discourses. Hence, the study recommends introduction of the discursive approach into the curriculum for training negotiators, mediators, and facilitators of peace processes.

Closely connected to this is the third proposal concerning the interpretation of peace agreements. Most of the mediators of peace agreements are not the implementers. An important policy proposal that has emerged from this study is the need to harmonise the way those who mediate and write peace agreements and those who implement them understand the core contents of these agreements.

Fourth, the dynamics of negotiations and the writing of the CPA suggest that mediators and facilitators of the peace process approached the conflict issues in Sudan from a
problem-solving perspective. However, this study points towards the importance of broadening peacemaking practices by including critical peace research approaches in peacemaking interventions and in the training of mediators and diplomats who facilitate peace negotiations.
POSTSCRIPT

Introduction

The triumph of separatism in the South generated disillusionment and feelings of betrayal in the SPLM’s northern sector. John Garang’s New Sudan vision had resonated with the Northern peripheries because it promised to address their localised grievances, especially land rights and politico-economic marginalisation, within the context of a united Sudan. In particular, the vote for secession had a huge impact on the SPLA’s 9th division in Southern Kordofan and the 10th division in the Blue Nile, because soldiers from these regions constituted the two divisions. Therefore, tensions began to build in the three regions of Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile as soon as the results of the self-determination referendum were announced. In May 2011, the SAF entered Abyei, while civil war resumed in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile in June and September 2011.

Moreover, the triumph of separatism neither ended tensions between the South and the North, nor led South Sudan towards sustainable peace. Instead, escalating tensions led to military clashes along the Southern Kordofan/Unity State border and almost drove the two Sudans to an all-out war in 2012.¹ Then, in December 2013, South Sudan imploded into a civil war. Ascertaining the actual number of people killed by the two civil wars is difficult. However, the UN-OCHA reported that the war in Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile had displaced more than 1 200 000 people as of 5 October 2014.² Further, the civil war in South Sudan had displaced more than 1 910 000 people by 14 November 2014.³ I will summarise the issues in the two civil wars and the way they link with my findings.

Conflict in Abyei

In the study, I explained that the Abyei referendum did not take place simultaneously with the South’s self-determination referendum. This happened because the NCP and the SPLM disagreed on who was to participate. The CPA specified that the residents of Abyei would vote in the referendum. However, the NCP and the SPLM disagreed on what constituted residency. The NCP argued that the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in July 2009 did not resolve the residency issue. Claiming that the Misseriya were residents of Abyei, the NCP wanted them to vote. In contrast, the SPLM insisted the ruling of the PCA clarified that the Abyei Protocol aimed at empowering the Ngok Dinka as a group. Therefore, only they were supposed to vote in the referendum. Various interventions by the African Union High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan (AUHIP) did not resolve the dispute.

Following the results of the Southern referendum, intermittent clashes between the SPLA and the SAF occurred in Abyei from February to April 2011. In May 2011, the SAF formally re-occupied Abyei. Although it pulled out in June 2012, no official referendum has been held in the area todate. Nonetheless, the Abyei Referendum High Committee organised an unofficial referendum in October 2013 in which only the Ngok Dinka participated. 99.9% of those who voted opted to join the South. This affirms my findings that conflicts arose after 2005 largely because the CPA validated the boundaries of exclusion which were constructed during the civil war. It also provided the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya with divergent futures.

War in South Kordofan & Blue Nile

Prospects of war resuming were evident in Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile by April 2011 (ICG 14 February 2013, 18 June 2013b; Gramizzi and Tubiana 2013; Gramizzi 2013; Young 2012). Three key issues underpinned these prospects. First, the interim period was ending, yet the CPA’s Articles on land reforms in the two states had not been implemented (ICG 14 February 2013).

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Second, the Southerners’ vote for secession caused worries about the popular consultation which the CPA stipulated. In Southern Kordofan, popular consultation had not been implemented because a new state assembly had not been elected. The problem was that Southern Kordofan did not hold elections in April 2010 with the rest of the country, because the population figures provided by the 2008 census were disputed. The census reported that Southern Kordofan had a population of 1 406 404 people, but the SPLM and the Nuba leaders disputed this figure, arguing that it did not account for the displaced population (ICG 14 February 2013; Gramizzi and Tubiana 2013; Young 2012). A repeat census in June 2010 produced a figure of 2 508 268 people, but the SPLM argued that even this figure was too low (ICG 14 February 2013). According to Young (2012, 244), ‘it was strongly suspected that this new number was a “political figure” cooked up by the presidency.’ Because of this dispute, gubernatorial and state elections were pushed to May 2011. Consequently, popular consultation could not be held within the interim period as the CPA required. The civil war re-ignited in June 2011.

In the Blue Nile, the SPLM’s leader, Malik Agar, won the gubernatorial elections in April 2010, while the SPLM won 19 seats compared to NCP’s 29 seats in the state assembly (ICG 18 June 2013b; Young 2012). Under his leadership, the state initiated popular consultation, which took place from January to July 2011, and collected views from 73 000 people (ICG 18 June 2013b; Young 2012). The popular consultation process, including submission of its report, was supposed to end before 9 July 2011. However, in September 2011, civil war resumed while the popular consultation commission was still drafting the report.

Third, the vote for secession raised profound issues about the fate of thousands of soldiers in the SPLA’s 9th division in Southern Kordofan and the 10th division in the Blue Nile. Estimates for the 9th division varied from 17 000 to 30 000 soldiers (ICG 14 February 2013), while estimates for the 10th division varied from 20 000 soldiers in 2005 to 10 000 in 2008 (ICG 18 June 2013b). Hailing from the two states, these soldiers joined the SPLA because they were attracted to Garang’s New Sudan vision, and they played a decisive role in his military confrontation with the Southern separatists in the early 1990s (Gramizzi and Tubiana 2013; McCutchen October 2014).
The CPA required the SAF to withdraw to the north of the 1956 border and the SPLA to the south of the border during the interim period. It also specified the formation of JIUs, which would be the Sudan defence force if Southerners opted for unity. The Agreement required the JIUs to reintegrate into their former armies if the Southerners opted for secession. This was tricky for the 9th and 10th divisions because their soldiers hailed from Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile respectively. After Southerners voted for secession, the SAF demanded immediate disarmament of these divisions. The SPLA proposed conclusion of the popular consultations after which the parties would initiate phased integration of these soldiers into the SAF, or implement a mutually agreed and non-threatening DDR process (ICG 14 February 2013, 18 June 2013b). Despite mediation efforts by the AUHIP, civil war formally resumed in Southern Kordofan in June 2011 after the SAF attempted to disarm the 9th division soldiers forcefully.

Aiming to stop escalation of the civil war, Ethiopia mediated a framework agreement. Signed on 28 June 2011 in Addis Ababa by the SPLM-N’s leader in Blue Nile, Malik Agar, and the co-deputy chairman and presidential assistant, Nafie Ali Nafie, the framework was not a ceasefire agreement per se (ICG 14 February 2013, 18 June 2013b). However, it committed the parties to pursue negotiated resolution of the conflict in Southern Kordofan. Substantively, the framework recognised the right of the SPLM-N as a legal political entity in Sudan, and accepted that the SPLA members from Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile were citizens of the Republic of Sudan (ICG 18 June 2013b, 14 February 2013; Gramizzi 2013; Gramizzi and Tubiana 2013). However, President Omar al-Bashir publicly rejected the framework on 30 June 2011 and vowed to pursue military victory. Follow-up mediation efforts by Ethiopia and the AUHIP flopped.

The civil war spread to the Blue Nile on 1 September 2011. On 8 September, the SPLM-N formally broke its links with the SPLM in the South. The 9th division was renamed the SPLM-N 1st division, and the 10th division became the SPLM-N 2nd division. On 12 November 2011, the SPLM-N joined forces with three armed movements from Darfur, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Minni Minawi (SLM/A-MM), and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Abdel Wahid (SLM/A-AW). They named their umbrella organisation the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF).
Among the goals of the SRF were ending marginalisation of the peripheries, decentralising power and wealth to the regions based on the population, democratising Sudan, and promulgating a secular constitutional order (ICG 14 February 2013, 18 June 2013b; McCutchen October 2014). Interestingly, these were the goals of John Garang’s New Sudan vision. On 2 May 2012, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2046 which called for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. However, several rounds of negotiations mediated by the AUHIP failed to end the conflict. Instead, the civil war spread to the Eastern Sudan in October 2013, when the United People’s Front for Liberation and Justice (UPFLJ), an opposition group from the region, joined the SRF (McCutchen October 2014).

From the perspective of my study, the resumption of the civil war has to do with the discursive construction of the SPLM/A as a Southern movement by the separatists and the NCP Islamists. It also has to do with the materialisation of the CPA narratives into social practices, and the jettisoning of the unitarist vision during the interim period. Broadly, this links with the study’s findings on the discursive construction of the boundaries of exclusion, solidification of group differences, and the meaning and interpretation of peace agreements. On 17 November 2014, the eighth round of peace negotiations stalled without any resolution. At the time of writing, therefore, the peripheral belt in the Republic of Sudan comprising Darfur in the West, the new South, and the Eastern Sudan, is in a state of civil war.

**South Sudan-North Sudan Skirmishes**

The renewed civil war in the ‘new South’ in Sudan escalated unresolved tensions between the GoS and the GoSS. This included tensions over Abyei, border demarcation, oil transit charges, and citizenship rights for Southerners in the North and Northerners in the South. In January 2012, South Sudan shut down oil production in an effort to stop the GoS from taking oil to make up for what it called unpaid fees for transit and use of the oil pipeline. Then each side accused the other of supporting armed rebels in its territory. While the SAF accused the SPLM-N of being a proxy of South Sudan, the SPLA blamed

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the SAF for arming and supporting the South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SSLM/A) and South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A) militias which were based in the Unity and Jonglei states (ICG 14 February 2013; SAS 22 November 2013).

In February and March 2012, the SAF carried out aerial bombardment of the areas along Southern Kordofan/Unity State border (ICG 14 February 2013; Sudan Tribune 26 March 2012). In turn, the SPLA launched a ground offensive on 10 April 2012 that pushed all the way up to Heglig oil fields which produced half of Sudan’s oil (Al Jazeera English 15 April 2012; Laessing and Dziadosz 20 April 2012; BBC Africa 20 April 2012). The SPLA withdrew from the area under international pressure a week later. Thereafter, the AUHIP mediated the conflict, the military clashes stopped, and the parties agreed to demilitarise the borderlands. While tensions over permanent settlement of Abyei, border demarcation, and suspicions that each was supporting armed groups in the other’s territory remained throughout 2012, their relations improved in 2013. In broad terms, the skirmishes indicated continuation of the old war despite separation.

The Implosion of South Sudan

The separation of South Sudan did not lead to sustainable peace, as the separatists had projected. From January to July 2011, the country experienced an intense debate and bitter disputes within the SPLM and GoSS regarding the structure of the state, centre-periphery relations, and the role of Arabic as one of the national languages (ICG 10 April 2014; Young 2012). Some SPLM leaders, including President Salva Kiir, preferred a centralised state anchored on a strong presidency and rejected the use of Arabic in South Sudan. Other SPLM leaders, especially those from Equatoria and the greater Upper Nile, clamoured for a federal state, stronger role of the state governments, and the adoption of Arabic as one of the official languages (see Young 2012, 289-304).

Underpinning the disputes on the structure of the state and centre-periphery relations were localised grievances in the states, especially land rights and economic relations. This feeds back into my findings because those clamouring for a decentralised state articulated localised grievances as collective rights of ethnic groups. By privileging localised narratives of identity, they negated the pre-2011 separatists’ narrative that
portrayed South Sudan as a monolithic bloc. Moreover, although the debate ended with the adoption of a new constitution in July 2011, the disputes provided the social repertoires which the parties used to construct the 2013 political crisis and subsequent civil war.

After proclamation of independence in July 2011, South Sudan experienced militia violence, especially in Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states. Among the militia groups were the SSLM/A, SSDM/A, and remnants of the pre-2005 SSDF. These militias arose from three areas. First, some of the armed groups were combatants in the 1990s South-on-South violence. The CPA recognised only the SPLA and the SAF and required integration of all the other armed groups (OAGs) into these two militaries. Many pre-2005 OAGs integrated into the SPLA after the Juba Declaration of January 2006. According to Young (2012), the integration process was problematic because the integrated soldiers did not develop a national ethos or fidelity to the SPLA as a national defence force. Rather, they remained loyal to their militia leaders who took senior positions in the SPLA. Additionally, some SSDF-aligned militia leaders declined to be integrated and remained active in the Upper Nile state (SAS 22 November 2013; ICG 10 April 2014; Young 2012).

Second, challenges of reintegration arose in the SPLA as some former SSDF groups claimed that the integration process was flawed. Therefore, they defected and started rebellion in the Unity state under the banner of the SSLM/A. They were joined by those who felt alienated by the SPLM’s conduct of the 2010 elections in the state. Meanwhile, another group launched an armed rebellion in the Jonglei state under the SSDM/A. This group was aggrieved by the April 2010 elections and localised grievances, especially the SPLA’s disarmament campaign in the state (SAS 22 November 2013).

Third, frustrated politicians and demobilised SPLA soldiers exploited localised grievances in the states, especially land rights, lawlessness, cattle rustling, and security for the civilian population, to launch militia armies. In general, therefore, July 2011 to December 2013 saw fortunes change as some militia leaders died in battle, others

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7 For details of the SSLM/A and other post-2011 South Sudan militia groups, see “Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan”, Small Arms Survey HSBA Issue Brief, no. 22 (2013).
8 For details of these groups, see The South Sudan Defence Forces in the wake of the Juba Declaration, by John Young. Small Arms Survey, 2006.
accepted President Kiir’s blanket amnesty in April 2013 and re-joined the SPLA, while others remained in armed opposition.

Then, in December 2013, South Sudan descended into a civil war. On one side was President Salva Kiir and his wing of the SPLM/A. On the other side was former Vice-President, Dr Riek Machar Teny, and his wing of the SPLM/A. The civil war was the culmination of a political crisis in the GoSS and the SPLM which arose from political competition (ICG 10 April 2014). The crisis started in 2008 when Riek opposed Salva for the SPLM leadership at the 2008 national convention. Salva won the leadership by consensus, and he continued as South Sudan’s President. He also reappointed Machar as the Vice-President. Nonetheless, the challenge triggered deadly competition for the control of the SPLM. Other factors complicated the political competition.

First, the SPLM’s dominance and its conflation with the state meant that whoever controlled it ruled the state. Thus, the crisis manifested itself in the form of bitter disputes over the transformation of the SPLM from a liberation movement into a political party. A contentious issue here was the method of electing the SPLM’s leaders, especially the president (ICG 10 April 2014). Second, the majority of the SPLM leaders derived their legitimacy from their participation in the military campaign against the Northerners. Consequently, they viewed leadership as dominance through military power and resolved internal disputes with military violence. Third, political power, economic prosperity, and military positions were entangled in post-2011 South Sudan. Fourth, challenges of re-integrating the OAGs affected the SPLA structures. According to Young (2012, 323), the SPLA ‘operated as a collection of militias and warring factions whose members were more loyal to their tribe or individual leaders than to the SPLA hierarchy.’ Fifth, the GoSS failed to institute a successful reconciliation process which would heal the trauma and bitterness of the 1990s South-on-South violence.

The political crisis worsened in July 2013 when President Kiir sacked Vice-President Machar and a group of cabinet ministers.⁹ He also effected changes within the SPLM at state level. On 6 December 2013, the sacked team, including John Garang’s widow,

Rebecca Garang, denounced Salva for dictatorship and claimed the SPLM had lost its vision. Salva responded by convening the SPLM’s National Liberation Council (NLC) meeting on 14 and 15 December 2013. The meeting was acrimonious on 14 December and the Machar team did not attend the 15 December session (ICG 10 April 2014). Fighting started on the evening of 15 December within the units of the SPLA’s presidential guard. It then acquired ethnic dimensions as the SPLA fragmented and quickly spread to the neighbourhoods of Juba city. Thereafter, civil war moved to the states, especially Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile. On 23 January 2014, the warring parties signed an internationally mediated ceasefire agreement, but they violated it immediately. Then they signed another ceasefire deal on 9 May 2014, but they also violated it. At the time of writing, IGAD mediated peace negotiations in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, have stalled.

From the perspective of this study, the separatists discursively constructed the Northerners as Arabs/Muslims and the Southerners as Africans/non-Muslims. Beyond separation from the North, however, the separatists did not articulate a vision for transforming the localised narratives of identity in the South. In my view, emphasising and materialising the separatist narrative greatly contributed to the post-CPA wars and the implosion of South Sudan. May be emphasising the unitarist narrative and the new Sudan as espoused by John Garang would have created an opportunity for discourse transformation.

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APPENDIX I

Dr JOHN GARANG’s ADDRESS TO SIGNING CEREMONY
OF THE SUDAN COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT
(NAIROBI, KENYA: JANUARY 9TH 2005)

PART ONE:

A. Greetings and Opening Words:

Your Excellency, President Mwai Kibaki, President of the Republic of the Republic of Kenya;
Your Excellency Former President Daniel Arap Moi; former President of the Republic of Kenya,
and who launched the IGAD peace initiative on Sudan; Your Excellency President Yoweri
Museveni of the Republic of Uganda and the Current Chairman of IGAD; Your Excellencies,
Heads of State and Government; Your Excellencies, Ambassadors and Representatives of
Government and Non-Governmental International organizations; Distinguished Invited Guests;
Ladies and Gentlemen; Compatriots, fellow Countrymen and Women;

Allow me at the outset to convey to you my best wishes for the New Year. The Year 2005 will
mark a year of peace not only for the whole of Sudan, but equally throughout our sub-Region and
Africa as a whole.

• On this joyous day and occasion I greet and salute all the people of Sudan, from Nimule
in the far South to Halfa in the far North, and from Geneinna in the West to Hamshkoreib and
Port Sudan in the East;

• I greet and salute all the marginalized rural people all over Sudan who have suffered in
dignified silence for so long; I greet and salute all the farmers, workers and professionals, who
are the creators of wealth, but who have no wealth and have seen their living conditions
deteriorate over the years;

• I greet and salute all the Sudanese women everywhere; women in Sudan as elsewhere in
the world are the “marginalized of the marginalized” whose suffering goes beyond description.
The Sudanese rural woman, for example, gets up at five O’clock in the morning, to walk five
kilometers, just to bring five gallons of water after five hours walk, spends another five hours
working on the family farm, and five more hours making the family meal;

• I greet and salute all our students and youth, who have borne the brunt of the 21 years of
this war, and to whom the future belongs and urge them to invest in their future and that of the
nation in the post conflict period, leaving her with less than five hours of sleep in a day.

B. Congratulations for the Dawn of Peace:

• Compatriots, fellow country men and women, Congratulations! Maburuk wa Maburukat!
Your Movement, the SPLM/SPLA, and the National Congress Party (NCP) Government of
Sudan, have delivered to you a comprehensive peace agreement, a just and honourable peace
with dignity, which we have signed today. This is the best Christmas and New Year’s gift to the
Sudanese people, to our Region and to Africa for 2005.

• With this peace agreement we have ended the longest war in Africa, 39 years of two wars
since August 1955 out of 49 years of independence, and if we add the 11 years of Anyanya-2
war, then Sudan had been at war within itself for 50 years, which covers the whole of its
independence period. With this peace agreement we have brought half a century of war to a
dignified end.

- With this peace agreement there will be no more bombs dropping from the sky on innocent children and women. Instead of the cries of children and the wailing of women and the pain of the last 21 years of war, peace will bless us by once more hearing the happy giggling of children and the enchanting ululations of women who are excited in happiness for one reason or other.

- At the political level, this peace agreement affirms the right of self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan and the right of popular consultation for the people of Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, so that the unity of Sudan becomes based on the free will of its peoples instead of the wars and the forced and false unity of the last 49 years of independence.

- This peace agreement will change Sudan forever! Sudan cannot and will never be the same again as this peace agreement will engulf the country in democratic and fundamental transformation instead of being engulfed in wars as it has always been for the last 184 years since 1821 when our country was first invaded by outside powers and exposed to the ravages of the slave trade, wars and predatory commerce of all sorts.

- This peace agreement coincides with Sudan’s 49th independence celebrations, and I agreed with what President Beshir said on 31st December in Naivasha when we signed the last two documents of the CPA that Sudan’s independence on 1st January 1956 was not complete because there was war in the South. The war we are ending today first broke out in Torit on August 18th 1955, four months before independence, and so the South like other marginalized parts of the Sudan were really not part of that independence.

- With this peace agreement we begin the process of achieving real independence by all the Sudanese people and for all the Sudanese people. The signing of this Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) thus marks the end of what I would correctly call the 1st Republic of the Old Sudan, that has lasted 49 years from 1st January 1956 to 31st December 2004, when we signed the last two agreements on Comprehensive Ceasefire and Implementation Modalities; and at a personal note exactly 42 years to the date when I first left Sudan for the bush on December 31st 1962 to join the first war.

- This peace agreement therefore signals the beginning of Sudan’s 2nd Republic of the New Sudan. From here on, Sudan for the first time will be a country voluntarily united in justice, honour and dignity for all its citizens regardless of their race, religion, or gender; or else if the country fails to rise to this challenge of moving away from the Old Sudan to the New Sudan of free and equally citizens, then the union shall be dissolved amicably and peacefully through the right of self-determination at the end of the six years of the Interim Period.

- I call on the Sudanese people to own this peace agreement, because it belongs to them; it does not belong to John Garang or the SPLM Leadership; it does not belong to Ali Osman Taha, Omer al-Bashir, or the National Congress Party. This agreement belongs to all of Sudan, to its neighbours, to Africa and the Arab World, and indeed to the rest of the world; that is why you see this august attendance. Although the CPA was negotiated by the two parties as a matter of necessity and practicality to end the war in the first place, and now that the war is ended, I call on all Sudanese people and their political forces to build consensus around the CPA and use it to end war in other parts of Sudan and to re-launch the Sudan to the Promised Land of the New Sudan of progress and equality of opportunity for all citizens of Sudan without distinction.

- Finally and not least, I salute all our martyrs and wounded heroes on both sides. I salute and congratulate all officers, NCOs and soldiers on both sides of the conflict for their heroic
sacrifices. I pay tribute and thank our civil population, who provided the logistics for the war, especially those in SPLM/A administered areas, for without their contribution this comprehensive peace agreement would not have been possible. It is because of the role played by our civil population in the long war, that we have invited some 50 chiefs and traditional leaders representing our civil population at the grassroots. We have also invited the SPLA military band to represent the SPLA rank-and-file.

• On this joyous occasion of the signing of the CPA, and as you will recall that the SPLA has released more than 3,000 POWs at various times over the last 21 years, I here as of today order the immediate release of all POWs that are still under the custody and care of the SPLA.

• It is fitting as we celebrate this momentous historical landmark; we pause to remember the thousands of fellow human beings who recently perished in both Asia and Africa in one of the Planet’s worst natural disasters of the modern era. Our hearts pour out in grief and solidarity to the peoples of South East Asia in this their hour of tragedy in the hands of a merciless earthquake and Tsunamis.

• As we share the pain and suffering of our fellow human beings in all the countries that have been devastated by the earthquake and the accompanying Tsunamis, we also urge the international community after it has pledged so generously to help alleviate the suffering and rebuild shattered lives in the afflicted region, to spare some resources to help post-conflict Sudan recover and develop. We therefore look forward to a massive turn out of donors, with their pledges at the prospective Oslo Donor’s Conference for Sudan.

PART II: The Fundamental Problem of Sudan and the Road to the CPA

Excellencies, compatriots, fellow Citizens: In order to understand and appreciate the present historical moment of the signing of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement I beg your indulgence to allow me to talk briefly about the problem we are solving. As I said before Sudan has been at war within itself for the whole of the 49 years of its independence; and as we end this war today another serious one is intensifying in the Western Darfur Region while another threatens in Eastern Sudan. Why? What is the problem? Why should a community subject itself to generations of war and suffering in so many parts of the country?

In our view the attempt by various Khartoum-based regimes to build a monolithic Arab-Islamic state to the exclusion of other parameters of the Sudanese diversity constitutes the Fundamental Problem of the Sudan and defines the Sudanese conflict. The Sudanese state has excluded the vast majority of the Sudanese people from governance, and therefore their marginalization in the political, economic and social fields. This provoked resistance by the excluded. There have been wars and there continues to be wars in the Sudan simply because the majority of Sudanese are not stakeholders in governance. The Arab-Islamic State in the Sudan ended up being imposed by force, rather than by consent of the governed through a consensual social contract; and force has been responded with force.

The solution to the fundamental problem of Sudan is to evolve an “all-inclusive Sudanese state” which we have called the New Sudan, a “new Sudanese political dispensation” in which all Sudanese are equal stakeholders irrespective of their religion, race, tribe or gender, and if this does not work, then look for other solutions, such as splitting the country. But we believe that a New Sudan is possible, for there are many in Northern Sudan who share with us in the SPLM/A, and believe as we do in the universal ideals of humanity – the ideals of liberty, freedom, justice and equality of opportunity for all Sudanese citizens. As is the case in the South, the events in Darfur, Eastern Sudan and elsewhere have made it clear that we must have an “all-inclusive Sudanese state” at the national level and full devolution of power to the various regions of the Sudan, for otherwise it is unlikely that the country would stand any chance of remaining united.
But this “all-inclusive Sudanese State” which we have called the New Sudan must have some basis, for example, in history that makes us into one country or nation. The question is whether there is a basis for the New Sudan? My answer is yes there is, and it is this answer in the affirmative that has guided and sustained the vision of the SPLM for the last 21 years and enabled us to reach this CPA.

For this purpose, I want to go down the corridors of history very briefly to show that we, the Sudanese, are indeed a historical people, and that the New Sudan has an anchor in history. If we cannot find an anchor in history, then we either create one or dissolve the union peacefully. Sometimes it is necessary to go back in order to gain momentum to go forward. That is why you see sheep (rams) moving first backwards when they fight; they aim to gain momentum before they lock horns. It was also noticed that the cruel sea in South East Asia during the recent tragedy of the earthquake and Tsunamis first receded back and then came forward with devastating force and fury that shocked the world. We very much need to do this exercise in the Sudan, to go back thousands of years, so as to rediscover ourselves, gain momentum and then move forward with the momentum of five thousand years to propel ourselves and smash our way into history once again.

And we have a long history indeed; peoples and kingdoms have lived, thrived and disappeared in the geographical area that constitutes the present modern Sudan. Many people will be surprised that in the Bible, in the Old Testament, the Sudan was part of the Garden of Eden (See Genesis 2:8-14, "The Good News Bible", Today's English Version, United Bible Societies; Old Testament; American Bible Society, 1976). The relevant quote states: "A stream flowed in Eden and watered the garden; beyond Eden it divided into four rivers. The first river is the Pishon; it flows around the country of Havilah. (Pure gold is found there and also rare perfume and precious stones). The second river is the Gihon; it flows around the country of Cush. The third river is the Tigris, which flows east of Assyria, and the fourth river is the Euphrates." As you can see the White Nile (Pishon) and Blue Nile (Gihon) are two of the four rivers that watered the Garden of Eden, the other two rivers being the Tigris and Euphrates. So, clearly the Garden of Eden was not some small backyard vegetable garden, but vast land that extended from the Tigris and Euphrates in the East to the White Nile and Blue Nile in the West). This puts my village of Wangkulei in Bor County just inside the Garden of Eden as it lies 30 miles east of the White Nile.

We also read in the Bible that during the rule of King Asa of Judah, a Sudanese General by name of Zerah invaded Judah with an army of one million men [2 Chronicles 14 V 8-10]. Also the Sudanese King Tirhakah is reported to have led a mighty Egyptian army in [2 Kings 19 V 8-11]. Sudan and its peoples are unambiguously defined in the Book of [Isaiah Chapter 18 V 1-7] in the following words:

“Disaster! Land of whirring locust beyond the rivers of Cush, who send ambassadors by the Sea, in little reed-boats across the waters! Go, swift messengers to a nation tall and bronzed, to a people feared far and near, a mighty and masterful nation whose country is crisscrossed with rivers”. This is a clear description of present day Sudan. And it will surprise many of you that the wife of the Prophet Moses was probably a Sudanese woman named Zipporah [Numbers 12 V 1-2 and Exodus 2 V 21-22]. Additionally, it can be inferred from the Book of [Numbers 2 V 1-2] read together with [Exodus 2 V 21-22] and [Exodus 18 V 13-27] that the Medianites from which Jethro, the father of Zipporah hailed, were Cushites and therefore Sudanese (Black). Since the wife of Moses according to [Numbers 2 V 1-2] is reported to have been a Cushite, and since her father, Jethro, who was identified as a Medianite according to [Exodus 2 V 21-22], then the Medianites must definitely also have been Cushites.

In the New Testament, Biblical research has now confirmed that the Ethiopian eunuch referred to in the Acts of the Apostles [Acts 8 V 27 -- ], as “a man of great authority under the Candace, the Queen of the Ethiopians, who had charge of all her treasury,” This man was baptized by Philip in
approximately the Year 38 A.D. He was actually a Sudanese Nubian, as the Candace was the Queen-ruler of the Kingdom of Merowe, which is north of the Sudanese Capital of Khartoum. Christianity thus first came to the Sudan 1,967 years ago, say, 2,000 years ago.

In the Southern part of our country, it is reported that the ancient and powerful Kingdom of Wawat probably extended from just south of Khartoum to as far south as south of Malakal and westwards to Kordofan and Darfur and as far south as south of Waw. The present Waw, Capital of Greater Bahr el Ghazal, Waw-Shilluk and the Waw of Nuer near Ayod possibly derive their names from the Kingdom of Wawat, and Wawat had social and economic ties with Ancient Egypt, which was visited on many occasions by the rulers and princesses of Wawat, taking with them and bringing back gifts. The Kingdom of Irtet is believed to be the ancient name of the present Shilluk people of Southern Sudan and to this day the Nuer call the Shilluk “Tet”. The Kingdoms of Wawat, Madja and Irtet are believed to be connected with the present Dinka, Shilluk, Nuer and the peoples of Central and Western Sudan, while the Kingdom of Annu is believed to be associated with the present Annuak people. The Annuak (or Annu) are believed to be connected with the ancient Egyptian God of Annu, the God of the Nile, whom the ancient Egyptians believed regulated the flow of the waters of the Nile at its source and to whom the ancient Egyptians made sacrifices to appease God Annu so that He releases more water.

Up the corridors of history, after the Biblical days and the ancient Sudanese Kingdoms, we move to the Kingdom of Merowe that bequeathed and spread Iron Civilization to the rest of Africa. Merowe got transformed into the Christian Kingdoms of Nubia, where Christianity flourished for more than 1,000 years. There then followed the spread of Islam and Arab migrations into the Sudan and the subsequent collapse of the last Nubian Christian Kingdoms of Makuria, Alwa and Soba in 1504, and the rise on their aches of the Islamic Kingdom of Sennar, which was founded by the Fung and Shilluk people.

The rest of Sudanese history is familiar from the Islamic Kingdoms of Sennar to the Turko-Egyptian occupation; to the first Islamic Mahdist State; to the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, to independence in 1956 and the Anyanya Movement of 1955 – 1972; to the rise of the SPLM/A in 1983; to the second Islamic State of the Ingaz from 1989, and to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which we signed today. This is the history of Sudan, and this is how we got here. It has been a long journey of more than 5,000 years to reach Naivasha and Nyayo Stadium today. It is important to know and appreciate where we came from in order to be better able to chart the way forward with the momentum of historical force.

That was Sudan in history. As for contemporary Sudan, it has over 500 different ethnic groups, speaking more than 130 distinct languages. These ethnic groups fall into two broad categories, indigenous African Sudanese, those whose mother tongue is other than Arabic were 69% of the population according to the 1955 colonial census, while Arab Sudanese were 31% of the population. Another fact that many people do not know or do not want to know is that indigenous Africans are more in the North than in the South (39% of total population as compared to the South’s 30%). Ethnicity is thus one major form of contemporary diversity. The other form of contemporary diversity is religion. The Muslims are mostly in the North and constitute about 65% of the total population, while Christians and followers of Traditional African Religions constitute the remaining 35%.

Yet, and despite all this wealth of historical evidence about Sudan’s rich historical and contemporary diversity, as we have shown, from the Garden of Eden to the present Movement for the New Sudan, the present and previous rulers of Khartoum present a false picture of our country and as if the Sudan started with them and as if the history and reality of Sudan consists only of two parameters – Arabism and Islamism. This is why there have been wars in the Sudan.

Our contention in the SPLM/A is that Sudan belongs equally to all the peoples that now inhabit the country, and its history, its diversity and richness is the common heritage of all Sudanese
people. The comprehensive peace agreement that we have signed today is based on these historical and contemporary objective realities of Sudan, and by implementing the provisions of the CPA that we have signed today, we shall evolve an all-inclusive form of governance that ensures that all Sudanese are equal stakeholders irrespective of ethnicity, race, tribe, religion or gender.

Furthermore, by adapting and applying the form of governance and wealth sharing arrangements stipulated in the CPA to other parts of the country with similar afflictions as the South, such as Darfur, Eastern Sudan and the far North, we can once again become a great nation that is voluntarily united in diversity rather than divided by diversity and forcibly kept under a coerced and fake unity. This is the context and value of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement we signed today. It provides the Sudan with a rare and perhaps the last opportunity to make a real paradigm shift from the Old Sudan of exclusivity to the New Sudan of inclusivity, achieved not through force but through the exercise of the right of self-determination. Viewed this way, the right of self-determination, which is among the main cornerstones of the CPA, is a blessing rather than a curse as many in the Northern Sudanese appear to fear.

**PART III: SPLM COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY**

Excellencies, Distinguished Guests,

Compatriots, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The transformation which shall be engendered by this Agreement, to which I have alluded, shall be reflected, first and foremost, in a veritable democratic mutation and to which the SPLM is fully committed. Surely, by democratic, we do not mean return to the sham procedural democracy of the past which was but a camouflage for the perpetuation of vested interests. In that sham democracy, civil rights were subject to the whims of rulers; the majority of Sudanese in the regions remained peripheral to the centre of power and was treated as an expendable quantum only to be manipulated through political trickery and double dealing. The so-called national governments in their civilian guise or military aberrations seemed to have been treating the Sudanese people with contempt.

The transformation envisaged in the CPA puts an end to all that and to the Old Sudan of the last 49 years, since it represents a political and socio-economic paradigm shift which entails the recognition of political diversity by guaranteeing full freedom for political pluralism, the entrenchment of human and peoples rights in the constitution, the upholding of the independence of the judiciary including the creation of an inviolable constitutional court and commitment to the rule of law by both government and the governed, and the establishment of a truly independent and competent civil service at all levels of government. It also conceptualizes and seeks to realize a recreation of the legislature in a manner that shall ensure rigorous checks and balances and guarantees powers to the GOSS and the States, powers which can neither be withdrawn nor impaired by other centres of power. Eventually, the CPA ordains that within a maximum of three to four years governance at all levels shall be mandated by the supreme will of the people through internationally monitored free and fair elections.

**PART IV: SPLM STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT**

Excellencies, Distinguished Guests,

Compatriots, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The long war to which we have put an end today pauperized our citizens and reduced a country with tremendous resources to destitution. Without claiming that the new economic paradigm shift to which I have alluded is the ultimate panacea for curing the nation’s ills, it provides at least a
vision and modalities to address the problems besetting the nation in the here and now, while I leave the world hereafter to those who claim some divine qualifications.

The next period will be payback time by the SPLM to the Sudanese people who fought and sacrificed for the last 21 years. The major problems and programs that will require extensive attention by the SPLM-based GOSS and the State Governments of the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and Abyei during the Interim Period and beyond fall in the areas of physical infrastructure, good governance, financial infrastructure and viable markets, development and provision of social services and basic necessities: health, education, water, food security, employment opportunities, building the SPLA as an army that will safeguard the agreement, building the SPLM in both North and South to lead the political transformation of Sudan, and above all, dignity rather than elitism.

In Southern Sudan and other war affected areas (Southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, Eastern Sudan, Darfur), as well as in the slums of our major cities, the baseline from which we shall start development is shocking and I will not bore you here with statistic of the status of such parameters as prevalence of child malnutrition, primary education, mortality rates among children, rate of maternal mortality, rate of births attended by skilled health staff, access to improved water sources; these statistics are among the worst if not the worst in the world.

To combat this pervasive and humiliating poverty and political disenfranchisement a general policy framework has been charted, and published in a booklet entitled “SPLM Strategic Framework for war to peace Transition”. In summary, the SPLM shall articulate and implement a social, political and economic development strategy and programmes that include the following highlights:-

1. Firstly, as an overview, the SPLM will have ten main responsibilities during the Interim Period. These are: (1) forming the GOSS; (2) effective participation in the GONU; (3) Effective participation in the State Governments of the Two areas (Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile); (4) Abyei Executive Council; (5) Participation in State Governments of the remaining 13 Northern States of the North; (6) Command and development of SPLA, (7) JIUs; (8) Socio-economic development of the South, the Two Areas and Abyei; (9) Democratization and transformation of the Sudan, and finally (10) Ensuring the holding of referendum on the Right of Self Determination for the South and Abyei and the Right of Popular Consultation for the Two Areas. These are both tremendous opportunities as well as very serious challenges. The SPLM shall need to build capacity and establish good governance in Southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and Abyei and participate with others in ensuring the democratic transformation of the country at the Center.

2. Secondly, the SPLM shall adopt an economic development paradigm that emphasizes economic growth through rural development and transformation of traditional agriculture that is integrated with agro-industries. We must transform the present subsistence traditional agriculture in Southern Sudan and other areas through technological innovations, making agriculture the engine of growth. The building of dykes for flood control and canals and underground water development for irrigation will be priorities to guarantee crop production. The SPLM vision and slogan shall be to “use the oil revenues to fuel agriculture”.

3. Thirdly, the SPLM will change the urban bias and centre-focus development paradigm in favour of rural and decentralized development. The SPLM vision, policy and slogan shall be to “take towns to people in the countryside rather than people to towns”, where they end up in slums as has happened in many countries with a consequent deterioration in their quality of life. Rural small town planning and rural electrification will therefore be priorities, so that these small rural towns become focal points for rural development and therefore a modal for rapid lifting of the living conditions of rural people who constitute more than 95% of the population of Southern Sudan.
4. Fourthly, the SPLM shall emphasize and develop new ways of delivery of services. As we move to the new era of peace, the people of the Sudan, particularly the war-affected communities, face formidable social and economic problems and also tremendous opportunities. The major problems that require immediate attention fall in the areas of health, education and water. We must find new ways to rapidly and efficiently deliver these services, for example, constructing windmills all over rural Sudan to provide clean drinking water and building micro-dams for generating small scale hydro-electric power for rural towns as well as the use of solar, wind and biomass energy sources.

5. Fifthly, the SPLM shall exert all efforts to build Physical Infrastructure: roads, rail and river transport and telecommunication. There has never been any tarmac road in New Sudan since creation, an area the size of Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi put together. The SPLM Vision for transport infrastructure is at three levels: To develop Regional transport linkages between Southern Sudan with neighbouring countries and with Northern Sudan, implemented by the GONU and GOSS. At a second level state road network implemented by each State, and at a third level feeder roads implemented by Local Government.

6. Sixthly, and finally in terms of social and cultural parameters, the SPLM shall adopt strategies and programmes that shall restore and achieve dignity of the people of Sudan through social and cultural empowerment. Programmes will include information and media – radio, TV and print, promotion of New Sudan arts, songs, dances, theatre, sports and development of indigenous languages and cultures, Archives of the struggle, modern history of Sudan, archeology, antiquities and ancient history of Sudan, Africa, Middle East and the World.

7. Finally, when we signed the Security Arrangements Agreement in September 2003, I said that we had solved the most difficult problem by agreeing to have two armies (SAF and SPLA) in one country, and that I thought we had reached the top of the highest mountain. Bu then I discovered that there was another mountain series, which too we had to climb. Today, with signature of the CPA, I can confidently say that we have climbed the last mountain. But alas there are now different types of mountains; these are the mountains of socio-economic development and provision of services to our people, which I have just outlined. I want to assure all the people of Southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Abyei and all Sudanese that your Movement, the SPLM, will also scale and reach top of these new Mountains; the SPLM will take you to the Promised Land of the New Sudan.

PART IV: SPLM VISION OF PARTNERSHIP WITH THE NCP

Excellencies, Distinguished Guests,

Compatriots, Ladies and Gentlemen,

In order to conclude the CPA and safeguard full compliance with the requirements of the Agreement the SPLM obviously had to enter into partnership with the National Congress Party (NCP). The objective of this partnership is to ensure a sincere implementation of the CPA in both letter and spirit and to provide within the parameters of this Agreement permanent solutions to the problems inherent in Sudan's cultural, social and political diversity. Failure to appreciate the wealth in diversity is a major cause of our national woes. However, diversity viewed positively is a mutually enriching phenomenon and ultimately a source of national cohesion and strength. Viewed otherwise, that is as a source of dissimilarity or distinction; it shall lead inevitably to the ultimate disintegration of the country as unquestionably threatens
today.

Furthermore, the partnership does not mean abandonment of political allies by any of the two parties. Such partnership, while safeguarding the new political dispensation, shall in effect nurture the democratic transformation and political multiplicity, which by their very nature, may lead to diverse alliances. But so long as those alliances are based on commitment to the letter and spirit of the peace agreements that have put an end to the longest war in Africa, alliances become assets, not liabilities. It is our submission in the SPLM that political struggle in the Sudan shall henceforward translate into competing visions of identity, peace, progress and social and economic development, which is a healthy phenomenon, and never into the use or threat of force.

The SPLM, ladies and gentlemen, will ensure that the new political dispensation is wide enough to accommodate all legitimate political and social forces in the country. It is, therefore, our hope to achieve popular consensus on those agreements. As a Movement that has been fighting against the marginalization of others, we shall not tolerate the exclusion of anybody from this process. The parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) share this conviction and will do all that is necessary to actualize and ensure that all the Sudanese people and other political forces own and rally behind this Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

In this regard the SPLM will play its role at the national level to work with the NCP and other political forces to ensure full inclusiveness. While the SPLM and the NCP shall be the major partners in the initial interim GONU, our understanding of partnership is well rooted in inclusiveness, which means bringing on board all political forces in the Sudan, chief among them the political parties under the umbrella of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which we call upon to complete negotiations with the GOS based on the Jeddah Agreement, and so that they take their share in the Government of National Unity (GONU) and participate fully in all the national commissions stipulated in the CPA, especially the National Constitution Review Commission.

Southern Sudanese Concerns

South-South Dialogue: On building national consensus, the SPLM/A is also spearheading a South-South dialogue. Before signature of the CPA, South-South dialogue might have acted as a distraction and might have had a derailing effect of successful negotiations of the CPA. However, now that we have signed the CPA, South-South dialogue is an urgent necessity. This dialogue is, above all, to heal wounds and restore fraternity and mutual respect so as to create a healthy political environment that is accommodative of all Southern Sudanese political forces both at the level of South Sudan and at the national level. But South-South dialogue is not only about power, it is above all an inevitable democratic exercise based on mature and selfless political discourse amongst South Sudanese with a view to galvanizing all our human material resources for the service of our people. South-South dialogue will also enable other Southern political forces to discuss with the SPLM how to share up their share among themselves in the GOSS and GONU as stipulated in the power sharing percentages in the CPA, as well as how they participate in the various commissions in the CPA, such as the National Constitutional Review Commission and the Commission to draft the Constitution of Southern Sudan, and so on.

Democracy whether in the North or South, should no longer be viewed as solely a struggle for power but rather as a competition on providing good governance, development and delivery of services for our people and restoring the dignity and worth of every man and woman. Yet, in terms of power sharing in the South, I want to assure all Southern Sudanese that there will be enough room for everyone including those who have not been associated with SPLM, even those who for one reason or other were opposed or against the SPLM, there will be room for them.

I want in this regard to assure all Southerners that there shall be room for everybody who wishes to participate, and by way of this assurance I quote the Gospel of John 14 V 1-2: “Do not be
worried and upset” Jesus told them. “Believe in God and believe also in me. There are many rooms in my Father’s house, and I am going to prepare a place for you. I would not tell you this if it were not true.” So, I say to all Southerners that there will be many rooms in an SPLM-based Government of Southern Sudan, and all are welcome.

I also want to assure all Southerners and Sudanese in general that this CPA will not be dishonored like other agreements that Abel Alier has described as “too many agreements dishonored”. The biggest challenge will be implementation of the peace agreement. We have sufficient organic and external guarantees that will ensure implementation of the CPA.

The SPLA: I want also want to assure the SPLA officers, NCOs and men that the experience of Anyanya-1 where some fighters were absorbed in the Sudanese army while others were so-called leftovers, will never repeat itself with respect to the SPLA. We have solved the issue of funding adequately in the CPA. The JIUs component of the SPLA shall be funded by the GONU, not as a separate army from the Mother SPLA, but as part and parcel of it with the same wage and living conditions. The Mother SPLA on the other hand will be funded by the GOSS, and the GOSS has been empowered by the CPA to raise financial resources from both local and foreign sources and seek international assistance for the purpose. There is therefore absolutely no reason why the GOSS will not be able to fund the SPLA adequately, considering that countries in the Region, such as Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda, countries with far less resources than Southern Sudan manage to fund their armed forces.

The Diaspora (Refugees and IDPS): Finally, I would like to address the Diaspora and assure them that the GOSS as well as the GONU will need their skills, and I take the opportunity of this forum to appeal to them to return home. As I said before the House has many rooms, and the Diaspora are welcome to return home and fully participate in the development of Southern Sudan, the two areas and Abyei as well as Sudan.

Excellencies, Distinguished Guests,

Companions, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Those Ladies and Gentlemen are the objectives for whose achievement I and the SPLM shall exert all our faculties and energize the efforts of all our people. What we are launching by signing the CPA today is a multi-dimensional revolution; political, administrative, economic, social and moral, and revolutions of this nature never go backward and from them there is no turning back. They should also not be allowed to wither away through inactions and apathy. The SPLM/A shall be rigorously engaged and fully proactive in the coming period and we pledge that we shall measure up to the challenges of peace and development in the post-war era. I pledge that the SPLM/A shall do everything to fulfill the aspirations and expectations of the Sudanese people anywhere, in the South, North, East, West, Center and the far North. In short the Comprehensive Peace Agreement will usher in a complete metamorphosis of the old Sudan to a New Sudan of freedom, justice, and equality of opportunity for all irrespective of race, religion or gender and the release of our productive forces for rapid economic development and the uplifting of life for all Sudanese. And in implementation of the CPA the SPLM/A shall in coordination and cooperation with the GOS set out immediately to send delegations to Khartoum, Juba, Wau, Malakal, Kadugli, Damazine and Abyei, and I myself will be visiting all these places and other places.

Finally, let me pay tribute and salute the courage of the other Party to reach this agreement and in particular President Omer Hassen al-Beshir and Ustaz Ali Osman Taha, with whom I sat for 16 months to reach this agreement. I congratulate the two delegations of the SPLM and GOS, and of course General Sumbeiywo, and before him Ambassador Daniel Mboya, and the late Minister Zackary Onyonka, and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kolonzo Misyoko, and now Minister Koech, and the IGAD envoys, facilitators and secretariat for guiding the peace process
to this successful conclusion. In our tortuous journey toward peace for the last ten years there were ups and downs. Like the weather the atmosphere of negotiations sometimes changed suddenly and drastically, sometimes becoming very cloudy and dark, and sometimes clearing up and becoming very bright; there were moments of despair and spells of hope and there were occasions of complete lapse of faith in any peace prospect, but we persevered and eventually made.

But let us also give due where due is deserved. At this juncture, I would like to point to and commend and thank that the IGAD countries and their Heads of State, Ministers, Peace Envoys, and indeed their populace, who have been with us through thick and thin, guiding, advising, cajoling and sometimes threatening to abandon the process. They deserve praise! Our thanks also go to those brotherly countries in Africa, the Arab world and the wider international community who, in numerous occasions either volunteered to bring peace to Sudan or did encourage in manifold manners the on-going peace process. In this connection, I wish to single out the Nigerian efforts (Abuja I & II), the Joint Egyptian-Libyan Initiative (JELI), the African Union and the Arab League efforts for post-conflict reconstruction.

I must also mention a few of the very many names to thank for their contribution to the Sudan peace process; among them are eminent people like Obasanjo and Babangida of Nigeria, Kaunda, Mugabe, Masire, Njoma, Chisano and Mandela of Southern Africa; Mubarak, Gadafi and Boutaflika of Northern Africa; Jimmy Carter, the late James Grant and OLS that has save millions of lives since 1989,

President Bush, his Secretary of State Collin Powel and his Special envoy Senator Danforth and Andrew Natsios of USAID; both Houses of the United States Congress; Prime Minister Tony Blair and his Special Envoys Ambassadors Alan Goulti and Macphail; The United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Anan and his Special Envoys Ambassador Sahnoun and Dr. Pronk; and a special friend of the Sudan peace process, the Norwegian Minister Hilde Johnson, and finally, last but not least, the leaders of this Region led then by Daniel Arap Moi and now by President Mwai Kibaki, Museveni, Zenawi and Aferwoki and the President of Djibouti and Somalia, and finally I pay tribute and thanks to my wife, Rebecca, and the wives of all my colleagues and comrades in the struggle for their patience and contributions for without which life in the bush would not have been bearable. My sincere thanks to all these peace makers, who contributed to the Sudanese peace process at various times.

Finally, I once more pay tribute to the all martyrs and wounded heroes who sacrificed their all in order for us to be able to celebrate today, and I once more congratulate and salute all the Sudanese people to whom this Comprehensive Peace Agreement belongs. Thank you very much. God bless the Sudan and Africa!
APPENDIX II

KEY DOCUMENTS ANALYSED (205)

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<tr>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>DOCUMENT</th>
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<td>7 January 2004</td>
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<td>20 July 1994</td>
<td>Waithaka Waihenya, 2006</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
<td>The Washington Declaration</td>
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<td>Lam Akol, 2003</td>
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<td>2.5</td>
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<td>19 June 1992</td>
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<td>The Koka Dam Declaration</td>
<td>24 March 1986</td>
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3. **Speeches by President Salva Kiir Mayardit**

<p>| 3.1 | Closing Remarks at the 8th Governors’ Forum, Juba | 30 October 2010 | <a href="http://www.splmtoday.com">http://www.splmtoday.com</a> |
| 3.2 | Public Address on the Occasion of his return from the Official Visit to the United States of America Juba, Southern | 1 October 2010 | <a href="http://www.splmtoday.com">http://www.splmtoday.com</a> |
| 3.5 | Opening Speech All Sudan Political Parties Conference Juba | 26 September 2009 | <a href="http://www.splmtoday.com">http://www.splmtoday.com</a> |
| 3.6 | Speech at the Governors Forum Meeting and Launching of the Payroll Cleansing Campaign | 10 August 2009 | <a href="http://www.splmtoday.com">http://www.splmtoday.com</a> |
| 3.7 | Speech on DDR | 2009 | <a href="http://www.splmtoday.com">http://www.splmtoday.com</a> |
| 3.8 | Keynote Speech on the Occasion of the Celebrations of the 4th Anniversary of the Signing of the | 9 January | <a href="http://www.splmtoday.com">http://www.splmtoday.com</a> |</p>
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<th>3.9</th>
<th>Opening Remarks in the Dialogue between the SPLM and Southern-based Political Parties</th>
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<td>Opening Statement to the the SPLM 2nd National Convention Juba</td>
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<td>9 January 2005</td>
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<td>Sudan Tribune, 19 May 2004</td>
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<td>Speech to the Conference of the Equatorian Sudanese Community Association in Minnesota</td>
<td>2002</td>
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5. **Statements by other SPLM Leaders**

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<td>Statement by Pagan Amum, GoSS Minister of Peace and CPA Implementation and SPLM Secretary-General at the Consultative Meeting on the Sudan by the AU</td>
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<td>Report by Pagan Amum, GoSS Minister of Peace and CPA Implementation and SPLM Secretary-</td>
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**6. Documents from the SPLM/SPLA Secretariat**

<p>| <strong>6.1</strong> | SPLM Secretariat Message on the Martyrs’ Day | 31 July 2011 |
| <strong>6.2</strong> | SPLM Deputy Secretary General, Dr Anne Itto, Message on 16 May celebrations | 14 May 2011 |
| <strong>6.3</strong> | Bol Makueng, Secretary for Information, Culture and Communication, SPLM Statement on April 2010 elections | April 2010 |
| <strong>6.4</strong> | SPLM Political Bureau Meeting No 1/2011 | 12-16 February 2011 |
| <strong>6.5</strong> | SPLM Statement on the International Day of Reconciliation, The International Forgiveness Day Message | 23 October 2010 |
| <strong>6.6</strong> | Resolution of all Southern Sudanese Parties | 16-17 October 2010 |
| <strong>6.7</strong> | Code of Conduct for Referenda and Popular Consultation | October 2010 |
| <strong>6.8</strong> | SPLM Policy Framework | 2010 |
| <strong>6.9</strong> | Juba Declaration on Dialogue and National Consensus (Arabic) | 26-30 September 2009 |
| <strong>6.10</strong> | Joint Declaration between SPLM and Umma Party | 5 September 2009 |
| <strong>6.11</strong> | South-South Dialogue Final Communique | 8-13 November 2008 |
| <strong>6.12</strong> | Resolutions &amp; Recommendations - SPLM and Southern Political Parties Dialogue | 8-13 |</p>
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<td>SPLM historical background</td>
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9. **Other Texts**

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10. **Radio Communications & TV Documentaries**

| 10.1 | Sudan: Divided Identity, Divided Land (Video Documentary) by Northwestern University in Qatar | July 2011 | https://www.youtube.com/watch |
| 10.2 | Sudan: History of a Broken Land (TV Documentary) | January 2011 | Al Jazeera TV, 2011 |
| 10.4 | Sudan Referendum Splits SPLM: Northern Members of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement Wary of Post-Referendum Status | 25 December 2010 | Al Jazeera TV English |
| 10.5 | Islamic Conversations: Islamic State by Hassan al-Turabi (video) | 2012 | Mahmood Jamal |

11. **Memoirs & Published Books**

| 11.2 | Waging Peace in Sudan: The Inside Story of the Negotiations that Ended Africa’s Longest Civil War by Hilde F. Johnson | 211 | |
| 11.3 | SPLM/SPLA: Inside an African revolution by Lam Akol | 2001 | |
| 11.4 | SPLM/SPLA: The Nasir Declaration by Lam Akol | 2003 | |
| 11.5 | The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider’s View by Peter Nyaba | 2000 | |
| 11.7 | The Sudan: A Second Challenge to Nationhood by Bona Malwal | 1985 | |
## APPENDIX III

### INTERVIEWS

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APPENDIX IV
Ethics Approval Letter

2 November 2012

Dr K Brouneus
Academic Services
Manager, Academic Committees

Dear Dr Brouneus,


Thank you for your email of 2/11/2012 outlining the arrangements and consideration of the risks pertaining to Mr Mbugua’s travel to Kenya and South Sudan in order to conduct his research.

In addition you have provided the amended Information Sheet and Consent Form, and a document providing an outline of the questions that will form the basis of the interviews to be undertaken. We confirm that the documentation provided is approved.

On the basis of this response, I am pleased to confirm that the proposal now has full ethical approval to proceed.

Approval is for up to three years from the date of this letter. If this project has not been completed within three years from the date of this letter, re-approval must be requested. If the nature, consent, location, procedures or personnel of your approved application change, please advise me in writing.

Yours sincerely,

Mr Gary Witte
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