Virtually tribal/tribally virtual: Shareholders in indigeneity

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at the University of Otago, Dunedin,

New Zealand.

4.11.2010
Abstract

In this thesis I will explore the use of computer-mediated communication (CMC) amongst members of the Ngāi Tahu tribe, a Māori tribe located on the South Island of New Zealand with tribal members scattered all over the world. The thesis topic originated out of previous research in which I investigated why the tribal corporate, Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu (TRoNT), had developed a web presence. During the prior research employees of TRoNT made arguments for the use of inner-tribal CMC. This thesis was intended to explore whether or not these arguments were accepted by tribal members. During the course of this research the focus shifted towards a more encompassing view on tribal membership and how the use of CMC influences the understanding of tribal membership.

I will argue in this thesis that the use of CMC has not engendered but emphasised existing tensions between many locally active and distant or passive tribal members but at the same time new communication technologies also offer possibilities to overcome these tensions.

To make this argument I will show that a part of the tribal membership and the iwi corporate, TRoNT, favour an inclusive membership discourse, focusing on a single entry criterion, ancestry. For this group within the iwi the use of CMC is a possibility to further inner-tribal democracy with distant and passive tribal members being able to participate in inner-tribal debates without being physically present. Other, mostly locally active members argue that ancestry only generates the potential for membership and that actual membership is reliant on physical participation. For this group the use of CMC as a form of participation is of limited value only and further threatens to undermine the status of locally active members by equalising all members. Lastly I will show that despite the resistance against CMC for inner-tribal communication all of my interview partners used CMC to a greater or lesser extent to stay in contact with family members who were temporarily or permanently geographically distant. Family web sites and emails are used for this purpose. This use, I argue, creates a tribal network of partially autonomous family networks.

The thesis is based on 52 ethnographic interviews held with tribal members, TRoNT employees, and members of the public closely working with the tribe. The interviews were interpreted through a dual focus on literature concerning tribal segmentation,
and the concept of the network society (Castells 2000). The literature on tribal segmentation shows the fluidity of the social structure of Māori society and the influence of colonial ruling with the resulting ossification of the social structure. The literature further shows that forces within Māori society are at play which have aimed for the installation of iwi as the main body of Māori culture and political representation. The concept of the network society in turn offers a widely accepted terminology for processes at work within the Ngāi Tahu tribe, but also within other locales, making it clear that the current processes within the Ngāi Tahu tribe are not unique.
Preface

Dedication

To AMP

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank:

- my partner and our son for their love and understanding,
- my parents and my sister for their support over the years,
- all my interview partners for the knowledge and insights they shared with me,
- my supervisors for their academic support over the long course of this research,
- the three examiners for their insightful, critical comments, which have strengthened this thesis,
- the ladies and gentlemen at the Remote Library Service for all the scanned articles, and
- the staff of Hutt Hospital Medical Library for the generous offer of a quiet working space.
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List of abbreviations

CMC Computer-mediated communication. All forms of communication based on computer networks. This includes, but is not restricted to, ‘the Internet’, the network connecting many smaller networks through the TCP/IP protocol.

NTMTB Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board. The first pan-tribal bureaucratic entity of the Ngāi Tahu tribe.

TRoNT Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu. The legal entity of the Ngāi Tahu tribe as set out in the Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu Act of 1996.

A note regarding macrons

Macrons are used in this thesis according to Ryan’s (2004) ‘The Reed Dictionary of Modern Māori’, 2nd edition, unless:

- macrons were not used in the original name of an institution, e.g. the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board, or

- the institution itself has omitted the macrons intermittently, e.g. Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu.

In both cases the spelling used in the source material has been reproduced in this thesis.
Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This thesis focuses on the Ngāi Tahu tribe, a Māori tribe in the South Island of Aotearoa/New Zealand. It brings together two contexts: Tribal politics, in particular the continued expansion and contraction of the ‘level of political consolidation’ (Sahlins, 1961, 326), and the use of computer-mediated communication (CMC).¹

Māori society, like any other society, carries an abundance of internal friction. To clarify the terminology: Māori society is here only used for the sake of ‘communicative economy’ (Brumann, 1999, 57). A clear separation of Pākehā and Māori society is impossible since there are more political, social, and economic links than there are clear divisions. The same pertains to Ngāi Tahu and the usage of the term in this thesis. Herzfeld’s (2001, 47) argument regarding cultural boundaries between nation-states holds true within nation-states as well:

   Indeed, the concept of discrete cultures is becoming increasingly problematic ... [also], because the increasing permeability of all manner of administrative borders makes the very idea of a bounded entity unpersuasive.

The last decades have seen a proliferation of friction within Māori society. The depiction of Māori society as a clearly delineated three-tiered structure consisting of iwi, hapū and whānau, common during the late 19th and early twentieth century (e.g. Best, 1974; Firth, 1973; Hiroa, 1982) has been criticised since the 1970s (e.g. van Meijl,

¹Single quotation marks indicate a quote from a written source, whereas double quotation marks indicate a quote from a research interview. All personal data had to be made anonymous, therefore only interview numbers are given. See chapter two for further information on ethical issues.
1995; Scheffler, 1964; Schwimmer, 1990; Webster, 1975, 1997). Increasingly new forms of segmentation have become the focus of scholarly inquiry. The fast urbanisation of Māori society in the 1960s has, for example, resulted in tensions between rural and urban Māori populations (Metge, 1964, 1995; Walker, 2003, 167). A tension which some Māori tribal leaders utilise to avoid losing political influence to urban pan-tribal organisations. This despite the fact that most Māori no longer live in remote rural areas, especially not most Māori tribal leaders (Webster, 2002). The introduction of settlement procedures for tribes has had a similar effect with a rising number of hapū attempting to achieve iwi status for settlement purposes (Ballara, 1998), pitting legally recognised iwi against unrecognised iwi, and hapū. In the 1990s, the allocation of fisheries assets, commonly referred to as the Sealord Deal, created further schisms between urban and tribal Māori; the latter being the sole recipients of fisheries assets, and political leaders and their tribal constituencies, which had been consulted only in the final stage of the negotiations (Moon, 1998; Webster, 2002).²

Many schisms have been identified as the outcome of careful calculations rather than the product of historical coincidences. Some authors have identified the Crown as the driving force with its interest in land and the stabilisation of the, at times, tumultuous relationship between Pākehā and Māori (Walker, 2004). Other authors have pointed out that a small group of Māori leaders also stands to gain political influence (e.g. van Meijl, 1997, 2000; Sissons, 2004, 2005a) and economic wealth (Rata, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2003c) from these schisms. This is only possible due to the increasing specificity of Māori protest. A class-based struggle and a pan-ethnic alliance with the Polynesian Panthers (Poata-Smith, 1996) turned into a struggle based first on ethnicity, then indigeneity and later tribalism (Rata, 2001). Iwi are no longer reduced to ‘participation in huge feasts’ (Firth, 1973, 139) as they were at the beginning of the last century. Rather, iwi have become important political and economic forces and are ‘more or less fixed’ as Anderson (2008, 23) remarked. The increasing specificity of Māori protest and the fixedness of tribal boundaries, geographically and in terms of membership, have led to an increase in schism within Māori society, both within tribes and between tribalised and non-tribalised Māori. Whether tribes and in particular tribal bureaucratic structures will be able to retain their current political and economic influence into the future is unforeseeable.

²After five years of negotiations a deal regarding the issue of fishery assets was struck in 1992 between the government and Māori tribes. The centrepiece of the deal was Sealord Products Ltd. The government agreed to pay a sum of $150 million to Māori to acquire a 50% stake in Sealord Products Ltd. Further, Māori were promised 20% of all new fish species introduced into the Quota Management System of New Zealand fisheries after the deal and the government agreed to introduce legislation recognising and safe-guarding customary fishing rights of Māori. In return Māori agreed to cease all legal action regarding commercial fishing rights (van Meijl, 1998, 406; Moon, 1998, 165).
1.2 Ngāi Tahu

Settlement negotiations in New Zealand are to an extent bound to the ability to prove membership. In the case of Ngāi Tahu membership has risen considerably, from approximately 3000 in 1991 (Kelly, 1991, 8) to well beyond 30,000 in 2009. To become officially recognised, tribal members need to prove membership to an ancestor on an ancestral roll, the Blue Book. To become officially recognised as Ngāi Tahu means to become eligible for economic benefits such as the Whai Rawa savings scheme or the Ngāi Tahu Fund, aimed at supporting Ngāi Tahu culture in whichever form tribal members wish to express their culture. Becoming a tribal member also means to come under the bureaucratic umbrella of Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu, TRoNT. Tribal members interviewed during this research had different perceptions of TRoNT and its raison d’être. Some saw it as a legal entity necessary to achieve a multi-million dollar settlement and to administrate the settlement proceeds and to distribute these proceeds out to the hapū. Others saw it as a political entity holding together a constituency consisting of tribal members spread globally. It was also perceived as a political entity creating its own constituency by uniting hapū which, historically, had equally displayed hostility and support. These are, of course, perceptions influenced by current circumstances and certain agendas and interview partners often used more than one of the above descriptions. Kelly (1998, 84, f.) argued that members of TRoNT create a sense of tribal unity by arguing that little has changed between a point in the past, “then”, and the ‘now’. Equally interview partners in this research used the past to claim hapū or even whānau autonomy, pointing towards separate histories and cultural practices. As Anderson (1980, 12) has shown the histories of the different hapū which today constitute Ngāi Tahu are inter-linked but rather than unity autonomy was the aim and the ‘traditional accounts of the settlement of the South Island are little short of a catalogue of violent reciprocity’. As one tribal leader pointed out, TRoNT’s predecessor, the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board was the first ‘pan-Ngai Tahu structure’ (Kelly, 1991, 35), thus placing the beginning of tribal bureaucratic unity in the recent past.

This thesis is not only about tensions between the tribal corporate and the membership and how these tensions are played out in the inner-tribal use of and resistance against CMC, it is also about the resistance of local members against those members described as passive or geographically distant. These members were often described as having lost their Ngāi Tahuness through severing connections to the

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3The replacement of the letters ‘ng’ with ‘k’, such as in ‘Kai Tahu’, is part of the southern dialect of te reo Māori, but is not widely in use in contemporary written sources. For the sake of uniformity ‘ng’ will be used in this thesis unless quoted sources use ‘k’.

4Unless otherwise indicated emphases in quotes, such as italics or inverted commas, are part of the original source.
Ngāi Tahu home-grounds. For many New Zealanders this accusation of the loss of culture would be difficult to understand since Ngāi Tahu are often depicted in the media as the archetypical ‘postcultural’ tribe (Rosaldo, 1988, 78): TRoNT is seen as a successful business venture worth more than half a billion dollars, at the same time rife with internal conflict at the management level, but, all in all, Ngāi Tahu are seen as culturally hardly different from their Pākehā neighbours. Northern Māori tribes have further fuelled this stereotype of Ngāi Tahu as an assimilated tribe (O’Regan, 2001, 21). Against these stereotypes interview partners maintained that there was a distinctive Ngāi Tahu culture and many resisted what they perceived as attempts to digitise parts of their culture.

1.3 Social technologies

Agre (2002a, 185) remarked that ‘culture runs deeper than any technology, and so do its conflicts’. The creation and use of technologies is then intricately linked to existing social conditions. Miller and Slater (2000, 5) formulated this position for their study of CMC in Trinidad:

> The present study obviously starts from the opposite assumption, that we need to treat Internet media as continuous with and embedded in other social spaces, that they happen within mundane social structures and relations that they may transform but that they cannot escape into a self-enclosed cyberian apartness.

The social appropriation of CMC within the Ngāi Tahu tribe and the influence of CMC on the social reality within the tribe are at the core of this thesis. Use of CMC can be strategic and accidental. It is strategic in that CMC is used for specific purposes and resisted for others, accidental in that it has become so ‘mundane’ (Michael, 2003, passim) or ‘familiar and boring’ (Wellman, 2001, 18; see similarly Mosco, 2004, 19) that the choice to use specific technologies is often unconscious. Use of CMC is then — partially — influenced by social structure and at the same time the use of CMC also influences the social structures. Existing cultural norms are for example questioned in light of the possibilities offered by CMC.

It is ‘far too early’ (Galston, 1999, 59) to predict where the use of CMC will lead Ngāi Tahu tribal members in particular and the world in general. Despite all the different, and sometimes exiting, possibilities offered by new technologies a certain scepticism seems to be necessary, because as Mosco (2004, 118, f.) pointed out humans are in need of myths:
Put simply we want to believe that our era is unique in transforming the
world as we have known it. ... Looking at the history of technology
literally puts us in our place by suggesting that rather than ending time,
space, and social relations as we have known them, the rise of cyberspace
amounts to just another in a series of interesting, but ultimately banal
exercises in the extension of human tools.

1.4 Argument and thesis structure

In this thesis the pronounced division between locally and globally oriented members
and its effects on the use of CMC for inner-tribal communication will be discussed.
Many locally active tribal members argue that physical participation is an important
criterion for tribal membership, thus peripheralising passive local and distant
members. Other members, often passive or distant but also some locally active
members, argue that with the use of ancestry as sole membership criterion the tribe
has become a democratic constituency with equal rights for all members. The
argument I make is a simple one: The use of CMC for inner-tribal communication
amplifies these tensions but at the same time also helps to overcome them.

To develop this argument the thesis is structured as follows: In the next chapter I
describe the research design, that is the research strategy, the methods used to gather
information, and why some methods failed. Further I discuss the influence of
computers on the analysis of qualitative data, some ethical considerations when
doing research on the use of CMC and why I think my research and the argument I
am making can be considered valid.

In the third chapter I introduce the literature focusing on tribal segmentation. First I
give an overview over the early literature regarding Māori society that remains
influential to this day with their emphasis on a three-tier structure of iwi, hapū, and
whānau, a model presented as the structure of Māori society before European arrival.
Then I discuss works on segmentary politics, mostly based on information gathered
on the African continent, and how these works have been criticised and have
influenced the understanding of tribal societies in other parts of the world. Next I
present material on Māori in the more recent past. Urbanisation and the
individualisation of labour are shown in many works as having had a profound
impact on the three-tier structure. The adherence to a functionalist framework is the
critique of much literature presented in the next section. Here the focus has shifted
from large-scale theories attempting to explain social cohesion to more actor-centred
approaches attempting to explain the motivations and effects of individual actions
(Barnard, 2000, 80). The rise of tribes, and with them tribal leaders, to new political importance is part of many works presented in this section as is the question whether or not this represents a return to a pre-European social structure or the creation of a new structure justified through a mis-representation of the past. The last section in this chapter is focused on material directly related to Ngāi Tahu. Scholars have focused on the rise of the tribal corporate, TRoNT, to become the main political and bureaucratic power, and on the influence of a single membership criterion, ancestry, on the construction of a Ngāi Tahu identity in a largely hostile environment. The theme running through the literature review is the ongoing process of inner-tribal segmentation, the constant waxing and waning of groups and their political influence.

The theme running through the fourth chapter is the social appropriation of technologies and their possible effects on social processes. The purpose of the chapter is three-fold. First I introduce some of the literature regarding the influence of CMC on social structures, political participation and the social sciences. The wide array of interpretations makes it clear that changes effected by CMC are by no means predictable and uniform. Following on from this I introduce the concept of the ‘network society’ (Castells, 2000a, 2004b), the second purpose of the chapter. Barnard (2000, 92, 168) pointed out that theories concerning globalisation are very similar to another theoretical perspective presumed long dead: diffusionism. Although Castells’ network society does indeed bear this mark, and no defence against this claim is offered in this thesis, the concept provides a framework for the analysis of the uptake of CMC in New Zealand, the third purpose of the fourth chapter.

In the fifth chapter I give some historical background information on Ngāi Tahu. The chapter is divided into pre-European and post-contact times and, firstly, the prolonged legal fight for cultural autonomy, Te Kerēme. The chapter focuses on the uptake of technology by tribal members and the impact of land sales on tribal unity via the prolonged legal quarrels.

The sixth chapter focuses on the changes to the tribe through the introduction of a bureaucratic structure. First I show that iwi and tribal bureaucracies have become important politically and are a response to specific economic and political circumstances. Then I describe the creation of the bureaucratic structure within Ngāi Tahu. The importance of the bureaucratic structure is the emphasis members of this structure place on the democratic understanding of individuals as rights holders. I have termed this the inclusive discourse, a discourse which emphasises the rights of

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5The spelling of Te Kerēme has undergone several changes, following the conventions used at different times. Alternative spellings are Te Kereme and Te Kereeme. Unless quoted from sources using alternative spellings Te Kerēme will be used in this thesis.
1.4. ARGUMENT AND THESIS STRUCTURE

the individual tribal members based on whakapapa connections rather than merits and participation. Further I will show that the emphasis on individual members’ rights cements the importance of the bureaucratic structure as distributive agency. In the last section of the sixth chapter I present the online strategies aimed at furthering the inclusive discourse and with it the unification of the Ngāi Tahu tribe.

In the seventh chapter I argue that some, mostly locally active members resist the iwi corporate and influences of distant or passive members. The focus of the chapter is on the resistance against CMC for inner-tribal communication, a process Castells (2004a, 38) called the ‘‘grass-rooting’’ of the space of flows’, an attempt by local communities to maintain a sense of locality, but also, as I argue local boundedness to avoid outside influences. Whakapapa, the use of ancestry for the creation of a web incorporating presently alive and long dead tribal members, animals, and the environment, is the cornerstone of the argument in this chapter. Approximately a third of the interview partners saw whakapapa as information which should only be transmitted face-to-face, thus peripheralising distant and passive tribal members. Rather than relying on a single criterion for tribal membership, ancestry, many of these interview partners argued that participation is of importance, possibly even more so than ancestry. I have called the discourse based on this position the exclusive discourse, the tribe is then not a democratic constituency but a participatory community. From this perspective CMC brings with it a form of tribal membership which is at odds with the ideal of local participation and therefore CMC presents a threat to Ngāi Tahu culture in general and the position of locally active members in particular.

The eighth chapter focuses on my interview partners’ use of CMC. In this chapter I argue that a democratic tribe is a concept with many different meanings. For many new, distant, and passive members democracy presents a way to participate remotely in the tribe but also a way to hold TRoNT to more accountability. For many locally active members democracy is synonymous with a renewed influence of outside forces, both from the distant and passive members and the tribal corporate. Democracy for these members then is the power to peripheralise those members who do not participate. In this chapter I also show that the use of CMC for family communications creates the counter-balance to the efforts of locally active members to peripheralise other tribal members. Through family websites active members keep in contact with family members, often less active or distant. The segmentary tendencies inherent in the exclusive discourse are then softened by the use of CMC. Simultaneously the unifying forces of the inclusive discourse are also softened, since inner-familial communication is regarded as distinct from tribal interaction. The eighth chapter then shows that the Ngāi Tahu tribe is a network of many smaller, largely autonomous networks.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the ninth chapter is to provide comparative material. I argue that the inclusive and exclusive discourses present within Ngāi Tahu are visible in tribal societies elsewhere. Focusing on tribes within the USA and Canada I show that the settlement processes and the need for clear tribal boundaries cause the tensions which are then exacerbated by the use of CMC. At the end of the chapter I present several generalised findings regarding the influence of indigeneity in the use of CMC and the reverse influence of CMC on indigeneity.

1.5 Groups

There is a need to clarify the boundaries of the groups described within this research. Joan Metge (1995, 78) described the Māori whānau in all its different guises but at the same time maintained that ‘[r]eal life whānau do not and should not be expected to conform too closely to the constructed model’. The same is true for the groups presented in this thesis: locally active, passive, and distant members and TRoNT employees. The boundaries between these groups are blurred, particularly over the life-time of my interview partners. Some tribal members choose to work for the iwi corporate, some employees choose to leave the corporate to become more active in their rūnanga, distant members move closer to the strongholds of their hapū to rekindle the connections to their whānau and other members move overseas and experience the difficulties of being far removed from the local activities. Therefore the terminology locally active, passive, or distant members is not precise in that many interview partners had experienced two or even three of these stages and some had been employed or are still employed by the iwi corporate while also being active in their hapū or rūnanga. While clear separations between groups were wanted by some interview partners it appears that many tribal members often lived their tribal lives in the spaces between the groups.

Further, the groups are not separable from each other in that all groups rely on each other. Without tribal members there would be no need for TRoNT, without the vast numbers of passive and distant tribal members, membership has increased ten-fold within a decade, a settlement would have been far less likely for the locally active members. So, while some interview partners would have been glad to separate themselves completely from "Johnny-come-latelies" [18], and the "marae in the sky" [25], to use some of the nicknames for new members and the iwi corporate, the need for these groups is still there. At the same time families were often divided into active and passive members. Family ties were then mostly stronger than negative perceptions and the locally active members kept passive family members informed.
1.6 Limitations

This thesis focuses on the different understandings of tribal membership and how these understandings influence the use of CMC within the Ngāi Tahu tribe. The idea for this study was conceived during the research for my Postgraduate Diploma, which focused on the website of TRoNT. All interview partners for the first research worked directly for or in close relation with TRONT. The ideas offered during the interviews made it clear that further research was needed to establish if members of the tribe agreed with the views from within TRoNT, more specifically, the idea that all potential members had to be allowed to participate in the tribe and that CMC was a medium to do so. This focus on one tribe allows an in-depth study of the situation and can, possibly, generate insights reaching beyond the focus of the study, but it also limits the research.

First, it is not a study of CMC amongst Māori in general. The target population for such research would be equally diverse as the one of this research regarding the socio-economic contexts, the degree of knowledge about tikanga Māori, and the levels of participation of the interview partners. From a methodological point of view focusing the study on one tribe is then a way of, if artificially, reducing the size of the target population. Theoretically the focus on one tribe is also a response to the political and economic presence of tribes in New Zealand at the current point in time.

Second, it is not a study of pan-tribal CMC. Pan-tribal activities are here understood as activities which are clearly focused on the interests of several tribes. This tribal focus differentiates these activities from activities and groups which are focused on Māori in general. The brokering of the Sealord Deal stands out as an example of pan-tribal activities. This study does not focus on pan-tribal activities. These activities, to the best of the author’s knowledge, are mostly organised in the higher echelons of tribal bureaucracy rather than emerging spontaneously. The Sealord Deal again comes to mind. Hence these pan-tribal activities are clearly outside the intended focus on tribal members’ views.

Third, it is not a comparison of CMC between different tribes. Again focusing on one tribe allows, from a practical perspective, the drawing of artificial boundaries around the target population. Additionally inter-tribal comparison did not appear significant during the research with only a small number of interview partners wanting to know or having knowledge about other tribes and use of CMC within these tribes. As the research was intended to find out what Ngāi Tahu tribal members saw as important in terms of tribal CMC and since members did not appear to be interested in inter-tribal comparison this study does not compare the CMC of Ngāi Tahu tribal
members to that of members of other tribes. This omission on behalf of my interview partners is most likely based on the experience of Ngāi Tahu ‘bashing’ (Walker, 1995, 259) by other ethnic groups and Māori tribes. Ngāi Tahu are frequently described as assimilated (O’Regan, 2001, 21, 160, ff.). Several of my interview partners mentioned these accusations.

Fourth, it is not a comparison of the use of CMC by gender. Again, as for inter-tribal comparison, few of my interview partners talked about gender-specific use of CMC.

Fifth, it is not a comparison of the use of CMC between Ngāi Tahu and other groups, culturally, religiously, or otherwise defined. Again, as for gender-specific use of CMC or inter-tribal comparison, few interview partners talked about other groups. While this is attributable to the framing of the interview questions the absence of these subjects is nonetheless telling since my interview partners related many other subjects back to tribal use of CMC.

And lastly, it is not a study of the actual interaction of tribal members. From a classical anthropological perspective this lack of participant observation constitutes a severe limitation. The counter-argument here is, however, that participant observation is difficult when people choose not to interact, particularly if the necessity to use technology to "keep in touch" [31, fem] is regarded as a sign of being out of touch with the community, the culture, and the daily hardship of being Māori in a society dominated by Pākehā.

After this clarification of the limits of this research the following chapter will introduce the methods used in this research.
Chapter 2

The research design

2.1 Introduction

Vignette

At an early stage of my PhD a lecturer, who I had frequently consulted over issues of confidentiality, made me aware of a presentation being made by the Ngāi Tahu Research Consultation Committee (NTRCC). Seeing an opportunity to reconcile my own experience with the point of view of ‘the other’ I attended the presentation. The presenter saw possibilities for the NTRCC to ensure the cultural appropriateness of research and its benefits to Ngāi Tahu. My experience, on the other hand, was one of inner-tribal politics in action. I had opted against one of my supervisor’s suggestion to do ‘preliminary’ interviewing before receiving full clearance from the Ethics Committee and the NTRCC. Surprisingly I had come up against some resistance from one potential interview partner, who urged me to interview him as soon as possible since he was after all an adult and didn’t need anybody telling him what to do. Especially not, he made it very clear, from one particular person on the NTRCC in Dunedin, who, he believed, was simply trying to gain influence. Armed with this divergent experience I thought myself very witty when I asked the presenter of the NTRCC: “Who watches the watchers?” He looked at me in consternation and then pointed out that there was no need for another layer of checks and balances, since members of the NTRCC were the experts on tribal and cultural knowledge.

In this chapter I will present the design of my research. As the above vignette shows this research is situated in specific circumstances. The research design and the ethical considerations are therefore adaptations to these circumstances. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000, 3):
[q]ualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. ... They turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.

In this quote Denzin and Lincoln have answered amongst others the question whose ‘values’ are being used by using an ‘emic’ (Vidich and Lyman, 2000, 41) approach, an approach favoring the participants’ understandings of events over those of the researcher’s. I will discuss which choices I made amongst the ‘embarrassment of choices’ that is available to qualitative researchers nowadays (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, 18). In this chapter I will explain my research strategy, my methods of data collection, the ethical issues involved in my research and how I interpreted my ‘empirical materials’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, 25) with the help of a computer program. The last topic I will discuss is the validity of my research. Before delving into the explanations of underlying assumptions and procedural choices I would like to add one last quote:

To take as one’s objective the making of a total description of the method of gathering data would shift the frame of ethnomethod reference, in effect substituting the means for the end. Such a substitution occurs when exactitude in reporting research methods takes priority over the solution to substantive sociological problems. (Vidich and Lyman, 2000, 38)

Running the risk of falling into this trap I will describe my methods and the choices I made as exactly as possible, since it seems to me that many anthropologists often fail to show the whole process and tend to place their procedural decisions within a black box which produces an outcome, a finished ethnography (see also Baszanger and Dodier, 2004, 14; Oakley, 1998, 714).

### 2.2 Research strategy

Denzin and Lincoln (2000, 21) described the ‘constructivist paradigm’ as one that ‘assumes a relativist ontology ... a subjective epistemology ... and a naturalistic ... set of methodological procedures’. A researcher moving within the confines of this paradigm therefore believes – or better should believe – in the existence of ‘multiple
realities’, i.e. different accounts given by the different actors of the same event. Furthermore she should assume that understanding is a work of creation between dialogue partners and that this understanding is tied to the ‘natural world’ and has to be studied in this natural world and not under laboratory conditions (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, 21; for the last feature see also Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, 6). Baszanger and Dodier (2004, 8) refer to this condition as ‘in situ’, with the participants of the study behaving in an ‘endogenous manner’, meaning the study does not influence the participants’ ways of dealing with their everyday situations.

Blaikie (2000, 114) refers to this set of ideas as the ‘abductive research strategy’. The work of the social researcher using this strategy consists of gathering descriptions of everyday life situations by the people involved in these situations and subsequently transforming these descriptions into scientific language and models. This transformation involves ‘abduction’ (Blaikie, 2000, 117). An epistemological dilemma underlies the concept of abduction. Essentially the researcher will have to be like those people he or she studies. Vidich and Lyman (2000, 41) ask: ‘[H]ow is it possible to understand the other when the other’s values are not one’s own?’ Or as Blaikie (2000, 120) put it ‘... ultimately all ‘observation’ is interpretation ...’. A question closely related to these two is: How do we know how far we have come in our attempt to be like the ones we study? A problem that is particularly salient in my research. How does one immerse oneself in a culture that has been assimilated for over a hundred years with some interview partners seeing culture as singing songs and learning traditional dances, whereas others see it as a system of interrelated ideas and beliefs? And how does one immerse oneself in a culture that is based on genealogical links, and for some people solely based on these links?

Denzin and Lincoln’s (2000, 21) ‘relativist ontology’ offers the possibility of a multitude of worldviews, but in combination with their ‘subjectivist epistemology’ the multitude becomes more manageable for the social researcher. Not every single person has to be seen as a case study, instead ‘ideal types’ can be derived from the descriptions given, since ‘social actors interpret their activities together’ (Blaikie, 2000, 115). Without these common interpretations social life would not be possible, these understandings negotiated amongst the social actors constitute the ‘social reality’ the place a social researcher tries ‘to inhabit ... as a ‘native’...’ (Blaikie, 2000, 120).

The ontological assumption of ‘social reality’ as ‘the social construction of social actors’ means that every account social researchers give is not only interpreted by them, but has already been interpreted by the ‘social actors’ (Blaikie, 2000, 115, f.). Since the abductive research strategy has as the ‘source of its explanatory account’ the social reality (Blaikie, 2000, 120), the researcher has to deal with the problem, that he
will always be forced to decide whether to produce an account that is a ‘social construction’, meaning the view of the social actors, or a ‘sociological construction’, the view of the researcher and the constraints of the scientific paradigm he subscribed to (Blaikie, 2000, 197).

The issues described above influenced the choices I have made with the methods I have used or tried to use. The methods to acquire ‘primary’ and ‘tertiary’ data were in-depth interviews, archival research and a small amount of participant observation (Blaikie, 2000, 183-185). An online questionnaire and focus groups were planned but never initiated (see below).

Another reason to choose the methods just mentioned was that they fit the sources of data, although some of the methods did not go beyond the planning stage. Blaikie (2000, 187-191) gave three possible ‘phenomena’, groups, within ‘natural social settings’. First of all he identified ‘micro-social phenomena’ with the characteristics of face-to-face interaction of the members, a common history, a ‘relatively permanent membership’ and a tendency to organise themselves, or as Blaikie (2000, 188) put it ‘they develop and reproduce patterns, structures and institutions’. His second level of phenomena is the ‘meso-social’, including ‘organizations, communities, crowds, and social movements’ (Blaikie, 2000, 189). For this project only the first two are of interest. Organisations are in this case not only business related groups, but also private ones. The sole purpose of organisations is to ‘achieve goals’ (Blaikie, 2000, 189). Changes within these organisations are possible, sometimes occurring at a high pace, but the leadership structure seems to be ‘relatively enduring’ (Blaikie, 2000, 189). Communities are different to organisations, their social structure is looser and the ‘defining characteristics’ are either ‘space or common interests’ (Blaikie, 2000, 189). The third sort of phenomena ‘macro-social phenomena’ comprise ‘much larger social entities’ than the ones used as examples for the first two phenomena or are of a ‘very abstract’ nature, with a combination of both features being obviously possible as well (Blaikie, 2000, 190). The research discussed in this thesis shows features of all three phenomena. In later chapters it will become obvious that the activities described in interviews range from face-to-face interaction among local members to dealings with a nationally operating multi-million dollar corporation and to endeavours to offer tribal members all over the world a communication bridge to the local tribal community.

2.3 Interviews

My main source of information were the 51 interviews I have held with members of the tribe, people regarded as cultural experts and with workers of the tribal
2.3. INTERVIEWS

organisation. Using the same time line as during the interview process I will first explain my sampling strategies, then the reasoning for the choice of interview strategy and last I will give an overview of the statistics of my interview partners.

**Sampling strategies**

Different research strategies favour different sampling strategies. Using an abductive research strategy I was less interested in producing a statistically representative sample as close to a ‘*simple random sampling*’ as possible (Blaikie, 2000, 199). The aim was rather to get an understanding of the situation by having a manageable amount of data with an empirical depth as high as possible. The means to this end was a combination of ‘*theoretical sampling*’ (Flick, 2002, 64) and ‘*snowball sampling*’ (Blaikie, 2000, 204). On top of those two techniques ‘*accidental*’ sampling was used for some of the interviews in the North Island and for some of the international interviews (Blaikie, 2000, 204). In the following I will explain the reasons for employing the three different sampling methods.

Flick (2002, 64) explained that when using theoretical sampling the ‘(expected) level of new insights for the developing theory’ is what leads a researcher to her or his next group or individual. Citing Glaser and Strauss Flick (2002, 64) stated: ‘[t]he main question for selecting data is: ‘*What* groups or subgroups does one turn to *next* in data collection? And for *what* theoretical purpose?’

I determined for my research that there were three broad groups I wanted to look into: Tribal members, who were not working for TRoNT, TRoNT workers and finally tribal members again, but this time with an international focus. The first group was subdivided further into a) members who were working for a marae administration and therefore were dealing with the administrative side of the tribe and b) regular members, with some of them being active and others being hardly interested in the tribe. These regular members were further divided into those being physically close to their marae and those living further away. The reasoning for the three broad groups was twofold. One reason was that I assumed TRoNT workers and tribal members would have different expectations towards CMC within the tribe. My second assumption was that international members would have to rely more on distance communication media than local members and therefore CMC would provide a good opportunity for them to participate in the tribe.

After having established these three groups I decided that using a ‘*snowball sampling*, also known as network, chain referral or reputational sampling’ was the best way to achieve my goals (Blaikie, 2000, 204). Being an outsider made finding single first
contacts relatively hard, but having a referral for follow up interview partners always seemed to enhance the chances for an actual interview. Blaikie (2000, 204) gave two reasons for using this type of ‘non-probability method’: In case the population is ‘difficult to identify’ or if the researcher wishes to find out what types of ‘natural social networks’ occur within his or her research population. For my research both reasons were valid, although I could have dealt with the identification problem in a relatively easy way by using membership sampling lists as a sampling basis. Several reasons lead to the decision to use snowball sampling and not take the easier option. I never intended to use member lists to do a random sample and during the process of my research I was also made aware that the lists, if available to me at all, might not necessarily be up-to-date. In addition to that TRoNT and the 18 rūnanga hold different lists, one of the circumstances for a general overhaul of the administrative database system within TRoNT described in the chapters to come. I had two reasons for not wanting to use these membership lists. First, I did not want to have only active members in my study, as during my research I learned that being part of the list and receiving information does not necessarily mean that members are active. Secondly, I thought having a close connection with TRoNT – which would inevitably be the case if I told people where I got their details from – might not be very helpful for my research. The fact that I came in as a complete outsider without connections to any of the organisations within the tribe often seemed to induce people to talk relatively freely about inner-tribal affairs.

For some of the interviews in the North Island and for some of the interviews with members overseas I had to revert to a list from the language program Kotahi Mano Kaika. This was the case because few interviewees on the South Island could give me contacts for the North Island or overseas and if they did a lot of the contacts never worked out. I used the list to call up as many people as I could for one location without any further knowledge what these people might know apart from the fact that they were tribal members, enrolled in a te reo program and not in close proximity to their marae. Interestingly these interviews proved to be very valuable.

Data collection was finished once I felt that interviews were only producing marginally different answers to what I had heard in other interviews before. In the often cited words of Glaser and Strauss (1968, 61) I had reached ‘theoretical saturation’. It is necessary to add at this point that the researcher plays a major role in determining whether this point has been reached or not, since there is no numerical goal to aim for. In more eloquent words:

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1Even after repeatedly mentioning that my research was not funded or requested by or in any other way related to TRoNT and that the interviews would not be available to anybody working within Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu some tribal members still asked me before or after the interviews if I was sent by TRoNT, a situation also encountered by other researchers (see for example Fontana and Frey, 2000, 655).
2.3. INTERVIEWS

The criteria for determining saturation, then, are a combination of the empirical limits of the data, the integration and density of the theory, and the analyst’s theoretical sensitivity. (Glaser and Strauss, 1968, 62, emphasis mine)

The interview process

During the course of my research I learned that making contact with prospective future interview partners and setting a specific date, time and location does not mean that anything in terms of an actual interview will happen. Generally everything worked out to mutual satisfaction, but sometimes interviews were rescheduled numerous times or cancelled at my arrival. After several attempts I started sending out reminders, although I felt that this implied that my interview partners were not organised. To make my interview partners feel more at ease with the situation I adopted an ‘available at all times’ approach and asked my interview partners which location would suit them best. I personally see this as common courtesy and would not go as far as Limerick et al. (1996, 453), who state that the interview partner is ‘empower[ed]’ by being given the choice of time and location for the interview. The time factor in terms of how much time interview partners were granting me mentioned later in the article was only a factor with a few interviews and I personally did not perceive it as a struggle for power, but rather as a contextualisation of my interviews into my interview partners’ lives (Limerick et al., 1996, 455).

With few exceptions where time or space were an issue the interviews normally followed the same structure. Once both my interview partner and I had settled down I explained what the research was all about and why he or she was of value as an interview partner. My interview partners had to sign a consent form and received an information sheet, in case they felt the need to contact my supervisors after the interview. All interviews were held in English with some interviewees occasionally choosing to use words or phrases in te reo Māori. I believe that using English as interview language was within the parameters given by Fontana and Frey (2000, 654), stating that the interviewer had to understand the interview partners’ language and culture, since English is the language in everyday use in New Zealand. After the interview normally a brief chat followed with people inquiring about my PhD and whether the results would be made available to them or not.

The interviews had all the ‘key features of the in-depth interview’ defined by Legard et al. (2003, 141). First of all they were ‘intended to combine structure with flexibility’ (Legard et al., 2003, 141) and were situated somewhere between May’s (2001, 123) ‘semi-structured interviews’ with pre-defined questions – my ‘introducing questions’
(Kvale, 1996, 133) – and the ‘unstructured or focused interviews’ which allow the interview partners to use their own language and thereby create a ‘greater understanding of the subject’s point of view’ (May, 2001, 124). Miller and Glassner (2004, 100) went even further and stated that using qualitative interviews will grant the interview partners’ ideas and explanations ‘the culturally honoured status of reality’.

The second feature defined by Legard et al. (2003, 141) is the ‘interactive ... nature’ of the interview. Knowledge is not retrieved from the interview partners, but rather created in a collaborative effort between the one who knows and the one who seeks knowledge (Holstein and Gubrium, 2004, 114; Holland and Ramazanoglu, 1994, 131). For Limerick et al. (1996, 458) this knowledge is part of the ‘gift’ the researcher receives from the interview partners.

The use of ‘follow-up questions’ for the purpose of a ‘fuller’ understanding is the third feature Legard et al. (2003, 141) described. Here I used ‘content mining questions’ (Legard et al., 2003, 148), questions which Kvale (1996, 133, f.) termed ‘Follow up’, ‘Probing’ or ‘Specifying Questions’. Since my interview partners were not forced to answer in a specific way but could explain their thoughts in their own terms, what Sarantakos (1993, 178) defined as ‘unstandardised’, follow-up questions were often necessary simply to understand parts of the initial answer where my interview partners were assuming that I was familiar with their ideas and their background knowledge.

The fourth feature Legard et al. (2003, 142) described for in-depth interviews is their ‘generative’ nature. Knowledge previously unknown to both interview partners is created during the interview. This happened regularly during the interviews, with my interview partners trying to make sense of their own ways of dealing with CMC and their communicative actions within the tribe.

Most in-depth interviews are conducted ‘face-to-face’ as Legard et al. (2003, 142) stated in their fifth feature. All of the interviews for this research were conducted face-to-face and were recorded as sound files onto a laptop. This setup proved to be very helpful. My interview partners seemed to relax after being able to put a face to the voice on the phone or to the text of an email. The laptop had the advantage of being an unobtrusive recording tool, interviewees normally looked at it at the beginning of the interview, but due to the lack of visual stimulation tended to forget about it fairly quickly. The presence of the laptop also frequently led to conversations about the technical equipment of my interview partners before the interviews, which helped interview partners to relax into the situation.
2.3. INTERVIEWS

All interviews were transcribed verbatim and the transcripts were sent to my interview partners. All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity. Some chose to remove parts of the interview to avoid being recognised by their speech characteristics or their specific views.

Several problems occurred during the interviews. I want to mention the most salient ones. Fontana and Frey (2000, 660) suggested as one technique for interviewing that the interviewer should keep the conversation in ‘a tone of ‘friendly’ chat while trying to remain close to the guidelines of the topic of inquiry’. Looking at the amount of laughter in the interviews I would state that most interview partners were at ease with me and the procedure. I think the bigger problem was that at some stages that I did not use enough ‘Structuring Questions’ to get people back to the topic of the inquiry (Kvale, 1996, 134).\(^2\) One favourite topic to discuss was the relationship between TRoNT and the tribal members, a topic very important for my research, but at times I felt like a researcher described in Fontana and Frey (2000, 655) with TRoNT replacing nuclear dumps:

Survey researcher asking respondents whether they would or would not favor the establishment of a nuclear dump in their state (Frey, 1993) do not have too much work to do in the way of gaining trust; respondents have opinions about nuclear dumps and are very willing to express them, sometimes forcefully.

Sticking religiously to the guideline of my predefined introduction questions is the last problem I want to mention here. Flick (2002) used Hopf (1978) as a guideline to describe three reasons for this behaviour, I think all of them are valid for certain interviews at some stage of my research. First, the interview guide has a certain ‘protective function’, one is always reminded what questions still need to be asked and then followed up (Flick, 2002, 92). I think this is also related to the decision of the researcher on ‘how to represent oneself’ (Fontana and Frey, 2000, 655). This is valid not only for the researcher, but also for the interviewees. The interview guide definitely helped to conjure up a picture of a scientist with which some of my interview partners seemed more at ease with. The ‘fear of being disloyal’ to the goals of my project, Hopf’s second reason, certainly urged me on in some interviews to cut some answers short that might have been interesting in favour of asking other questions (Flick, 2002, 92). Gubrium and Holstein (1998, 175) granted the whole project itself a certain amount of ‘formal narrative control’ over the whole setup. I would not go to the same extreme, but certain interviews definitely suffered under

\(^2\)See also Scott (1990, 7) for problems of ‘credibility’ if interviewees see the ‘interview as a humorous diversion’.
my feeling of needing to ask every question. Flick (2002, 92) also mentioned the time pressure that certainly played a role in some of my interviews, but I never felt like it was deliberately used to put me under pressure but it rather arose out of the occasion.

Interview statistics

Overall I held 51 interviews, with one person being interviewed twice and one interview being a group interview with two interviewees. The interviews ranged from 20 minutes to three hours with the average interview ranging between 40 and 90 minutes. I held interviews with 30 female interviewees and 21 male interview partners. My youngest interview partner was 19 years old, the oldest was over 70. Of all interview partners 44 were registered tribal members, one person was Ngāi Tahu but not registered with the tribal authorities and the remaining six interview partners were not Ngāi Tahu, but stood in close connection to the tribe. I interviewed 18 people working for tribal organisations, five of my interview partners worked in different administrative positions within rūnaka administrations, the other 13 interview partners worked for TRoNT.

The last ratio is about the geographical location of my interview partners. Two groups are distinguishable. The first group are members who live far away from their papatipu rūnaka, the second group live close to it. For the second group several things are important: Some of my interview partners affiliated to more than one of the 18 papatipu rūnaka, with some having affiliations to more than 10 of them. Being affiliated to and living in close proximity to a papatipu rūnaka was not necessarily an indication that people were active at this marae. Some interview partners choose to be active at the marae they felt most connected to, even if this marae was not in close proximity. Another factor for proximity was that some of my interview partners were unsure about the entirety of their whakapapa connections and therefore felt they only affiliated to one specific marae. These three specific situations are not reflected in the following numbers, which are solely based on geographical distance. Overall 28 of my interview partners lived close to a papatipu rūnaka they affiliated to, three lived further away but were still located on the South Island. Eight of my interview partners lived on the North Island and six lived overseas.

2.4 Archival research

My other source of information, next to interviews, was archival research. Scott’s (1990, 12, f.) definition of documents is: ‘...documents may be regarded as physically embodied texts, where the containment of the text is primary purpose of the physical
2.4. ARCHIVAL RESEARCH

medium’. The documents I used were all what Scott (1990, 14) defined as documents with an ‘official’ authorship as opposed to a ‘personal’ one. Official documents are further separated into ‘private’ and ‘state’ documents. The documents from both groups that were used for the thesis fell under the ‘access’ cluster of ‘open-archival’ or ‘open-published’ apart from speeches, which were not always openly available (Scott, 1990, 14).

The tribal publications I used were *Te Pānui Rūnaka*, a tribal magazine with information on the different papatipu rūnaka, *Te Karaka*, a magazine for a wider public about Ngāi Tahu and Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu, the annual reports published by TRoNT and the website hosted by TRoNT. These sources constitute what Hammersley and Atkinson (1995, 165) termed ‘documents in context’. Several speeches held by Ngāi Tahu members on public occasions were used as background information. Also within this group were discussions about inner-tribal affairs on a private homepage. These were used with caution, since I did not introduce myself as a researcher but was only a lurker, someone who follows online discussion groups without participating.\(^3\) As further sources newspaper clippings and official statistics were used for the research, as was, obviously, academic literature.

As shown above many of the documents used in this thesis are published by TRoNT. The use of these sources follows in the footsteps of Atkinson and Coffey, who wrote that the description of those studied by anthropologists as non-literate is a figment of anthropological imagination and that there is a need for close scrutiny of the ‘processes and products of self-description’ (Atkinson and Coffey, 1997, 45). TRoNT certainly produces something resembling the notion of an ‘audit’, which Atkinson and Coffey (1997, 48) described as the ‘characteristic of ... reflexive modernity, or modernization’. Necessarily these documents were read critically, since they harboured a ‘distinctively documentary vision of social reality’ (Atkinson and Coffey, 1997, 47). Nonetheless the documents were not used by themselves, as Atkinson and Coffey argued for, but alongside and as support for other methods and as sources to compare my views and interpretations with those of others (May, 2001, 175).

All documentary sources were seen as ‘social facts’, since they were ‘produced, shared, and used in socially organized ways’ (Atkinson and Coffey, 1997, 47). Other authors have termed documents ‘the sedimentations of social practices’ (May, 2001, 176) or ‘the traces of social activities left behind’ by the participants (Blaikie, 2000, 196). Having subscribed to an abductive research strategy and since the social aspect is the defining feature in all these descriptions I used a mixture of approaches, namely an ‘interpretive’ approach and ‘discourse analysis’ (Jupp and Norris, 1993, 42, 46).

\(^3\)See Schrum (1995, 320) on how to do ethically informed research in chatrooms.
Both approaches look at the production of the text and what it reveals about its author and the discourses at the time of the production. To achieve this deep understanding texts have to be read in ‘an engaged ... fashion’ (May, 2001, 183; see also Atkinson and Coffey, 1997, 58; and Prior, 1997). Other documents become important as landmarks to identify the position of the document at hand, termed ‘intertextuality’ (Atkinson and Coffey, 1997, 55; see also May, 2001, 194). This eclectic approach – using an interpretive approach and discourse analysis – was due to the fact that I did not always see larger societal forces at play, but also identified inner-tribal politics and personal likes and dislikes, which were evoked in some documents. All, societal forces, politics within the tribe and personal feelings, were couched within a rhetoric of persuasion, trying to allude to the readers’ sense of understanding and intelligence (Atkinson and Coffey, 1997, 61; see also May, 2001, 183). Alongside these rhetorical tricks the authorship and the lack of some voices was an important factor in the analysis of the text, with some authors being ‘agents’ within social discourses forming and using these discourses to their own benefit (Prior, 1997, 71).

The census data used was treated in the same way as other documents. Special recognition needs to be given to this type of data, since a specific problem arises when census data is collected. The problem is that people filling out the census have to identify themselves within the confines of the given categories. Ahmad and Sheldon (1993, 125) reported that in Great Britain in 1979 and 1989 the number of people reporting their ethnicity ‘correctly’ was between 89 and 90%, depending on the ethnic group people belonged to. This is partially because some people did not want to be classified in that way or saw the classifications given as not fitting their own mix of cultural backgrounds. As Ahmad and Sheldon (1993, 127) stated:

The use of ‘ethnicity’ as an analytical category implies the acceptance of some notions of homogeneity of condition, culture, attitudes, expectations, and in some cases language and religion within the groups defined on an ‘ethnic’ basis.4

In this thesis two perspectives were used, both closely related and hardly separable when in use. An ‘institutionalist’ and a ‘radical perspective’ were used when dealing with the census data (May, 1993, 59), meaning that the census was an indicator of what the data told about the agencies and what it told about the societal forces behind the collection of the data.5

4Reflexivity demands to give more credit to Statistics New Zealand than Ahmad and Sheldon would do. Silverman (1997, 241) raised the point that maybe it is sometimes the ‘critics of demography who are naïve rather than demographers themselves’, with the latter being aware of the ‘problematic nature of the realities portrayed by official statistics’.

5For an interesting, albeit at times rather cynical insider account of the British census see the article by the Government Statisticians’ Collective (1993).
2.5 Participant observation, nethnography, and abandoned research methods

The use of participant observation as data collection method has certainly influenced anthropological research and writing (Pratt, 1986, 32; Van Maanen, 1988, 22). The idea of fieldwork as ‘rite de passage’ is very popular among anthropologists, highlighting the importance which they attach to it (Van Maanen, 1988, 14). The focus of this research on the use of CMC within one specific tribe brought with it two issues regarding the possibility to do field work. First, how and where to undertake participant observation, and, second, the study of open online communities through ‘nethnography’ (Ignacio, 2006, passim).

Multi-sited ethnography

Local members have been the focus of several studies such as Russell’s (2000) doctoral dissertation on the importance of locality for Ngāi Tahu culture, Tau’s (2003; 2008b; 2008a) and Anderson’s (1980; 1998; 2008) historical analyses in their numerous books and articles, Dacker’s (1990; 1994) descriptions of the tribal life in the distant and recent past, and Evison’s (1986; 1986; 1988; 1993; 2006) books on the legal situation of the tribe. Most of these works mention at some point the continued migration of tribal members from rural areas into towns and cities or to overseas locations. But most works then focus on Ngāi Tahu culture as it was or is lived in close relation to the South Island (O’Regan’s (2001) use of different levels of members’ involvement in tribal affairs is a notable exception here). As my interviews showed this understanding of Ngāi Tahu culture as grounded in the South Island is important but only lived by a minority of tribal members. Few interview partners expressed the importance of the direct, physical connection to the land, more often than not the connection was expressed as an abstract idea, a vague connectedness.

Participant observation was only a very small, but nonetheless important, part of the research, as is often the case with ‘multi-sited ethnography’ (Marcus, 2006, passim). This was due to my failure to create a new method of engagement with the largest proportion of tribal members, those who are inactive. This ethnography of the lurker, so to speak, is an enterprise doomed to fail since ‘lurkers by definition lurk’

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6This is not to say that the aforementioned authors are not aware of this. See for example Tau (2008b, 9), who stated that ‘[f]ood-gathering expeditions now tend to be family picnics rather than week-long camps, and communal living is regarded as an uncomfortable activity, to be undertaken reluctantly.’

7Marcus (1986, 171) first used the term ‘multi-locale ethnography’ and later changed it to ‘multi-sited’ (Marcus, 1995). I wish to thank Dr. Goldsmith for pointing out to me that while Marcus himself has presumably never done any substantive multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork he has the ability to create fitting neologisms.
(Hine, 2003, 25). While this issue is well known amongst scholars of CMC, who mostly carefully avoid lurkers due to their ‘unobservability’ and their perceived lack of influence (Hine, 2003, 25), it takes on different dimensions when encountered off the screen.

First, it means that due to this unobservability no given field sites exist within which lurker behavior can be observed. This even if we take Clifford’s (1992, 98) argument into consideration that anthropologists have always created their fields as small, ‘manageable units’. Those possible field sites which do exist are sites where active members partake in some form of tribal live somewhere on the South Island. Additionally for this thesis Hannerz’ (2003, 211) argument that ‘settings of modernity’ are the standard field sites for multi-sited ethnographies also holds true. As Hannerz pointed out these field sites make participation or observation difficult, if not impossible, thus making interviews a more important part of the research. In Hannerz’ case the international correspondents spent hours in front of the screen producing texts and fieldwork was only possible in distinct settings such as the newsroom. In my case even the hours in front of the computer screen were often reported to be spent on other things than tribal affairs and fieldwork was only possible for a small part of the actual tribal population.

Second, for this research the usual provisional character of authority also has to be checked against a spill over effect of authority. By spill over effect I mean the granting of authority to a text as a whole because one form of data generation is deemed authoritative. This spill over effect is a reflection of the standards of ethnographic authority rather than the actual data. Marcus (2009) pointed out that fieldwork experience lends credence for a certain locale. He acknowledged something similar to the spill over effect when he argued in an earlier publication that fieldwork in many locales brought with it a disparity in in-depth knowledge of the different locales (Marcus, 1995). Two decades earlier Rabinow (1977, 3) had made the observation that fieldwork in general is considered transformative and lends authority to the returned ethnographer. In the particular case of this research this means that the two distinct sources of data are based on two different kinds of authority. On the one hand there are hours and hours of interview tapes, transcribed into just under one thousand pages of interview transcripts. These transcripts have the authority of ‘hard’ data, available for re-interpretation. On the other hand there are the few encounters, which hold the ethnographic authority of having been there and having made all the usual mistakes an ethnographer makes at some stage. The few short fieldwork experiences gave insights into the ‘situation on the ground’ and, in retrospect, have possibly informed my reading of the interview data more than I first understood. The interview transcripts gave insights into a situation, which could not be encountered, the situation of the non-active tribal members. Both forms of data have become entwined into the argument I present in this thesis (on the creation of textual authority see for example Clifford (1983) and Marcus and
Cushman (1982)). I deem it necessary to repeat that both forms of data come with their own specific and equally valid claim to authority.

**Nethnography**

In the following, I will show that on-line fieldwork can be just as difficult in certain circumstances. During the course of this lengthy study an online community developed, both steered from TRoNT – CommunityNet – and from families. These virtual locations, however, were barred to outsiders. In the cases where family websites were openly accessible research participants’ mentioned this lack of audience control. Exchanges between family members were then considered restrained.

Hall (1999, 46) called attention to ‘cyberpunk’s gated communities’, the narrowing down of online interaction to people of similar tastes. Familial ties or tribal affiliation, rather than taste, were the distinguishing characteristics of the different websites in this research. The online communities created around these characteristics would have offered rich ethnographic fields. Two points are of importance here: The distinction between open and gated online communities in regard to access and the consequences of this distinction for ethical considerations.

To avoid ethical pitfalls, ‘nethnography’ (Ignacio, 2006) has to be based on openly accessible material. In her book *Virtual Ethnography* Hine (2003), for example carefully chose a case, which allowed the mode of ethnographic encounter she advocated. The websites and newsgroups surrounding the Woodward murder trial, Hine’s case study, were open to the public. The same is true for Corell’s (1995) ethnography of a lesbian online café, Baym’s (1998) ethnography of usenet newsgroups, Miller and Slater’s (2000) investigation into the use of the Internet on Trinidad, Bernal’s (2005) study of Eritreans online on www.dehai.org, Dochartaigh’s (2009) study of the Ulster loyalists use of CMC to gain support amongst the Irish-American diaspora, Ignacio’s (2000; 2006) observations on soc.culture.fillipino, Poster’s (1998) discussion of virtual ethnicities based on a Jewish listserv group, and Whitacker’s (2004) reflections on Tamilnet.com.

The point here is that all examples are based around openly accessible virtual communities. This sort of choice is reminiscent of Strathern’s (1988, 89, f.) exemplary localities: To study online behavior means to go to newsgroups and open websites. My study is then somewhat different in that I didn’t have the chance to do fieldwork where it would have been most fruitful: online in the fora of private family websites or in the emerging tribal CommunityNet.

An additional point is that all the studies imply a more or less cohesive online community by mentioning lurkers, yet not theoretically incorporating the potentially large number of inactive forum readers. Hine (2003) made this point, but subsequently did not incorporate lurkers in any significant form within her theoretical discussion. Re-
CHAPTER 2. THE RESEARCH DESIGN

garding the current tribal membership numbers – ~ 30,000 – and the estimated number of active members – ~3000 – inactive members are in the majority, by far. It would have been interesting to see whether this disparity is maintained online or not and who the active online members are.

Ethical use of openly accessible information on websites, newsgroups, listservs, etc. has been the focus of many publications (e.g. Hakken, 2000; King, 1996; Polanic Boehlefeld, 1996; Schrum, 1995; Reid, 1996; Thomas, 1996; Waskul and Douglass, 1996; Allen, 1996; Herring, 1996; Hudson and Bruckman, 2004; Jacobson, 1999. The study of ‘gated’ online communities, however, brings with it different issues.

First, the ethnographer is granted omniscience due to forum archives and search engines. Fieldwork then has the potential to become retrospective as Hine (2003) pointed out, data retention as a blessing for the researcher and a boon for the studied (see also Blanchette and Johnson, 2002). The question is then whether or not a researcher has to obtain informed consent from all members of the online communities, present and past.

Second, the demands of ‘internal confidentiality’ (Tolich, 2004, 101), especially in ‘small town’ New Zealand (Tolich and Davidson, 1999, 77), make any quotations from archived online interactions impossible. Several decades ago participants were happy to be named, in fact even annoyed if they were not. Today’s ethical guidelines make naming a hazardous business, even if only online monikers are used.\textsuperscript{8}

A third point is related to the first point of scholarly omniscience in CMC settings. Does the presence of a participant observer impact upon the participation of others? Unlike in a natural setting a virtual setting, at least if text-based, does not allow members of the community to go unnoticed. This raises the question at which point research interests need to give way to respect for a community. Faubion (2009, 147) argued that the mark of a good fieldworker was a certain ‘thickness of skin’, the ‘incapacity to recognize social disapproval [or] at least a generous gift of indifference to it’. This incapacity or indifference does, however, not alleviate the need for ethical behavior and, I believe, neither did Faubion try to imply this.

Abandoned research methods

Other methods of data collection were intended, partially to obtain more data, but also to use several different methods – or ‘mixed research’ (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004)\textsuperscript{9} – and to match up my research methods with the research topic. The idea was to use an online questionnaire and a focus group to have access to a

\textsuperscript{8}I wish to thank Dr. Leckie and Dr. Goldsmith for making me aware of this shift in attitude, from both the participants and the ethics committees.

\textsuperscript{9}Blakie (2000, 259-276) argued that there are ontological and epistemological problems when combining qualitative and quantitative methods. Oakley (2000) argued the opposite.
2.6. COMPUTER AIDED ANALYSIS

wider population of the tribe, especially the international members. The questionnaire was designed and sent to several interview partners to see if they identified any problems. Minor revisions were made, but after my cultural advisor and my supervisors predicted a lack of participation in the online questionnaire and the focus group I decided to not spend the money and the time on these methods and instead focused entirely on the interviews.10

2.6 Computer aided analysis

The analysis strategy used for this project was ‘open’ and then ‘axial coding’ (Blaikie, 2000, 239) by some called ‘categorical indexing’ (Mason, 2002, 150), followed by the search for ‘connections’ between the concepts and categories found and applied during the coding stages (Blaikie, 2000, 240). I assumed a middle ground between a ‘low stance’ and a ‘high stance’ in terms of concept and category generation (Blaikie, 2000, 239; see also Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, 211; and Ryan and Bernard, 2003, 88). In some cases the categories were formed from the interview data, while in other cases I applied categories from pre-existing ideas. On the following pages I will describe the analysis process in further detail and will show how computer software was used to support the analysis.

Blaikie distinguishes between form and function of social theories. The form or definition of ‘researchers’ theory’ - based on research findings and developed over the course of the research - is:

a related set of statements about relationships between concepts with a certain level of generality which are empirically testable; and which, when tested, have a certain level of validity (Blaikie, 2000, 142, f.; see also Snow et al., 2003, 185).

The function of theories in social sciences is according to Blaikie (2000, 143) to ‘give explanations for recurrent patterns or regularities in social life’.

To be able to develop such a theory it is necessary to do the three steps mentioned above. Boulton and Hammersley (1996) described the same procedure in more practical terms. The first task is the ‘close reading of data’, in the case of this research the reading and re-reading of interview transcripts and documents (Boulton and Hammersley, 1996, 290; see also Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, 210). In social science research data analysis is not necessarily set off from the data collection stage,

10As part of the ethical approval the Ōtākou rūnanga made cultural guidance by a cultural advisor a condition.
instead analysis should occur while the researcher is still collecting data. The simultaneity of collection and analysis helps to give the research process a ‘characteristic ‘funnel’ structure’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, 206), with the research becoming more and more focused in one specific direction.

After the first six interviews I started to generate and apply categories, the second step in Boulton’s and Hammersley’s (1996, 291, f.) description of the analysis process. The coding was done with the help of a computer program called TAMS Analyzer.\(^{11}\) Some of the debates of Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis – CAQDA – will be described soon. With the computer program it was possible to create codes, apply these to the transcripts and then retrieve specific codes from the data for further analysis, a classical ‘code-and-retrieve’ action (Weitzman, 2000, 809).

The further analysis of the data segments grouped under one category – intra-category comparison – is the third step mentioned by Boulton and Hammersley (1996, 292). For the sake of contextualisation of the data the important utterance was often left embedded in a larger segment, which led to several codes being assigned to the same part of the interview. The process of comparing data within one category leads in Boulton’s and Hammersley’s (1996, 292) perspective naturally to ‘a network of relationships’ between the different categories. Other authors see this part as a more active process, Blaikie’s (2000, 240) last step for example is the deliberate search for ‘connections’.

By putting the parts of the interviews into certain categories I obviously imposed a subjective reading upon them. I chose to use an ‘interpretive’ and ‘reflexive reading’, which means that I searched for discourses behind the answers of my interview partners and also tried to see what my influence on the answers was (Mason, 2002, 149; Baker, 2004). My position was important in a sense that I was an ‘audience’ for which my interview partners shaped their answers (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, 220). ‘Lack of membership in their primary group’ was certainly a problem between some of my interview partners and me (Miller and Glassner, 2004, 101), the effects being that I was not always able to ask the right questions, but also that some answers seemed to me to be rather misleading to uphold status differences between those who know and the one who asks (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, 229).\(^{12}\)

Nevertheless I was not necessarily the only audience my interview partners had in mind, ‘consciously or subconsciously’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, 255).

\(^{11}\)TAMS Analyzer is available free of charge from <http://tamsys.sourceforge.net/oxtams/> , regular updates are offered. Another advantage is that the author is available for questions.

\(^{12}\)Merton’s (1973) ‘Insiders and Outsiders: A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge’ is still one of the most informative articles on this problem. It is also written in an admirable simplicity and clarity.
Related to this was that sometimes the ‘what’ – the content of an answer – appeared less important to me than the contextual information, like the aforementioned audience or the plot, ‘how a story is being told’ (Gubrium and Holstein, 1998, 165; see also Holstein and Gubrium, 2004, 114). Included in these ‘narrative practice[s]’ (Gubrium and Holstein, 1998, 164) was the omission of knowledge, which, if detected, lead to me asking myself what was not mentioned in the interview and what the possible reasons for this could be (Ryan and Bernard, 2003, 92; see also Holland and Ramazanoglu, 1994, 131).

In the remainder of this section I would like to discuss several issues concerning the use of computer programs to assist the analysis of data. This discussion is by no means exhaustive, I can only offer my limited experience, which leads to a rather critical stance towards the whole debate. Weitzman (2000, 807, f.) listed three ‘real fears’ about Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis – CAQDA: The option to auto-code your data might lead to researchers taking ‘shortcuts’, researchers might not learn how to research due to the use of computer programs and finally the hierarchical display some programs offer might lead to hierarchical thinking in the analysis (for the last point see also Dohan and Sanchez-Jankowski, 1998, 482). All three points are valid, but all of them have to be seen in the context of the current state of computer hard- and software, and in the context of anthropological research.

First of all auto-coding is not necessarily as easy as it might appear. The researcher has to define keywords, all data will then be searched by the computer for these keywords and passages containing the keywords will be tagged with a certain code. To acquire a useful coding these keywords have to be properly thought out, which leads to the researcher reading parts of her data again and again, just like everybody else. At the end of the auto-coding process a recoding is necessary to ensure that all instances of a particular code have been tagged correctly. TAMS Analyzer does not natively offer auto-coding, thus several processes with other programs are necessary to auto-code data. I decided to hand code the interview material once it became clear that the use of auto-coding would involve a lot of time spent on checking the correctness of the individual processes. Another point to mention in relation to auto-coding is that computer programs can not, so far, do qualitative analysis. The idea stemming from quantitative data analysis that once the data is entered the program can do several forms of analysis is not correct for CAQDA (Carvajal, 2002, 4). For the use of CAQDA programs the same is true as for quantitative data analysis programs: The programs can greatly assist the researchers, but ultimately

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13Roberts and Wilson (2002, 2) argued that computers – based on a ‘positivistic’ worldview – can not be used for qualitative data analysis, since the latter deals with ‘fuzzy’ data with ‘slippery boundaries’. I personally would not consider this a problem.
Researchers need to build the theories. Programs only process data, they do not understand it and therefore cannot analyse it (Weitzman, 2000, 806; Dohan and Sanchez-Jankowski, 1998, 488; Carvajal, 2002, 3; Kelle, 1997, 16).

Weitzman’s (2000, 808) second fear of some researchers not learning how to do research properly is certainly valid, but that is not to say that others with sound research strategies can not use programs to their advantage.

The third fear of hierarchical representation of codes leading to hierarchical thinking (Weitzman, 2000, 808) is valid as well, but as Weitzman showed in his article there are solutions to this problem. My solution was to use a second computer program, FreeMind,\textsuperscript{14} to see the connections between the different categories I assigned to the data.

Coffey et al. (1996, 2) saw a different problem at work with the use of CAQDA, which is the ‘homogenization’ of research approaches towards grounded theory, since CAQDA programs, according to these authors favour this theoretical perspective. Nonetheless Coffey et al. (1996, 12, f.) also saw advantages in the use of computers for ethnography, HTML – Hyper Text Mark-up Language – is seen as a possibility to give readers the option to browse data with a commentary by the researcher (see also Mason and Dicks, 2001). Both the fear of homogenisation and the hopes for HTML have their validity, but Lee and Fielding (1996) are certainly correct in stating their disagreement. Grounded theory bears a legitimising power amongst social scientists and has a high ‘recognition value’, but is by no means used by all users of CAQDA software (Lee and Fielding, 1996, 4). Kelle (1997, 8) raised the point that grounded theory is also one of the best described ways of analysing your data and is therefore favoured by novice researchers due to the step by step guide given by Glaser and Strauss. For the use of hypertext it has to be said that this bears the problem of appearing ‘authoritative’ by seemingly representing all sides of the discourse (Lee and Fielding, 1996, 7).

Overall I have found in my research that Weitzman’s (2000, 806) ‘real hopes’ were certainly part of the analysis process: ‘Consistency’ in terms of finding all the segments grouped under the same category; ‘speed’ by allowing me to easily search for codes; ‘representation’ of my ideas in forms of mind-maps and ‘consolidation’ of all my data in one small space (Weitzman, 2000, 807). Bourdon (2002, 3) put my experience into words by stating that

\textsuperscript{14}FreeMind is a program to construct mind maps. It is available free of charge from <http://freemind.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/Main_Page>.
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[one could then argue that computers and qualitative analysis software are not necessarily contributing qualitatively new ways of doing things, but mostly bring about means to process data faster, more precisely and with less floor space.

### 2.7 Ethical considerations

Having explained the process of data analysis I will now explain the grounding of my research in an ethical stance called ‘consequentialism’ (May, 1993, 43). This stance is not interested in using ‘the chimera of individualized categorial imperatives’ (Hakken, 2000, 171) of a Kantian tradition like its counterpart ‘deontology’ (May, 1993). Rather, decisions are made on a case by case basis with the goal to prevent harmful consequences for all of the parties involved (May, 1993, 43). For this research this meant going beyond the expectations of the Human Ethics Committee of the University of Otago.

At the University of Otago any research involving human participants has to be cleared by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. Category A comprises all cases where information is linkable to the individuals and where some form of psychological or physical stress on behalf of the participants is foreseeable. Category B comprises all other research projects involving human participants, which do not fall under Category A.

For this research, since identification of participants was potentially possible, a Category A proposal was necessary. The form for ‘Ethical Approval of a Research or Teaching Proposal involving Human Participants’ showed the features that Christians (2000, 141) described for the ‘ethical standards’ of institutional review boards. Researchers gain ethical approval by adhering to a global set of rules, which are policed by ‘value-neutral academic institutions’ (Christians, 2000, 141). Christians’ (2000, 138) four ‘guidelines’ were all incorporated within the application form. An ‘[i]nformed consent’ (Christians, 2000, 138) form had to be signed prior to the interviews and any form of ‘deception’ was treated with suspicion and had to be justified in a specific section (Christians, 2000, 139). The last two features of ‘[p]rivacy and confidentiality’ for my participants and ‘[a]ccuracy’ of the final document were also requested by the Committee (Christians, 2000, 139, f.). To satisfy all these requirements the proposal to the Human Ethics Committee contained all information

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15 The consequentialist perspective is very similar to the ‘teleological’ one, more precisely the ‘act-utilitarianism’ (Thomas, 1996, 109), although there seem to remain differences in terms of the aspirations for the end results.

16 The form is available from <http://www.otago.ac.nz/acadcomm/categoryA.html>. 


about the data gathering techniques used in this research. I explained the recruitment
techniques for the face-to-face interviews and the fact that the interviews were
intended to be unstructured and that therefore only the general line of the discussion
was foreseeable. Participant observation was also mentioned as a data gathering
technique and clearly stipulated as tentative, since precise times of participant
observation could not be given. I further explained that participants would be treated
anonymously.

The Human Ethics Committee, after receiving the proposal, required proof of
acceptance of my research by the newly established Ngāi Tahu Research Consultation
Committee.\(^{17}\) All research done at the University of Otago has to be accepted by this
committee, which put me in the situation of studying up.\(^{18}\) It also meant, see the
vignette at the start of this chapter, seeing inner-tribal tensions being played out in the
design stage of my research while proposing to study exactly these tensions.

As already mentioned my ethical stance is a consequentialist one, therefore the
recommendations and the requests by both committees and the code of ethics of the
Association of Social Anthropologist of Aotearoa/New Zealand did not suffice in my
view.\(^{19}\) I did not go as far as Horwitz (1996, 137) in using ‘collaborative editing,
favoring end-point versus prior release forms, and using real names’ in my research.
The last two certainly would have been hard to achieve against the will of the two
committees, but also the environment my research was based in would have not been
favorable to this approach. I opted for collaboration on a smaller scale by giving my
interview partners the chance to edit the interview transcript and take parts out or
add further information. Overall I believe this was a good option since some
interview partners were concerned about certain passages by which other members
could identify them.

The problem of anonymity took larger dimensions in my research than I first
expected. Tolich (2004, 101) argued that ‘external confidentiality’ was acknowledged
by most codes of ethics, whereas ‘internal confidentiality was equally important but
far less easy to achieve. Several interview partners wanted to know who else I
interviewed or who else held their opinion within the tribe. I always had to refer
them to the consent form they just signed and their own expectation of being treated
anonymously. Most participants who took parts of their interview transcripts out

\(^{17}\) The online form is accessible on \(<http://policy01.otago.ac.nz/maoriconsultation/index.html>\>

\(^{18}\) May (1993, 37) pointed out that ‘elite’ groups’ often successfully prevent research ‘conducted upon
themselves’ and that therefore most research is conducted upon ‘less powerful groups’. For a similar
argument in the case of CMC see Herring (1996, 165).

\(^{19}\) The code of ethics is available from \(<http://www.asaanz.rsnz.org/codeofethics.html>\>. The ethical
guidelines laid out in this code are of a deontological nature, although the Prologue hints towards a
situational relatedness of ethical behaviour.
2.7. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

seemed to do so due to fears of breaches of internal rather than external confidentiality. Recognition within the tribe was – as far as I could tell – feared less because of a disclosure of personal information and more for shaking on the pillars of existing power structures.

The second important factor in terms of anonymity, which ties in and enhances the problem of internal confidentiality, is described by Tolich and Davidson (1999). Essentially New Zealand has to be seen as ‘a small town’ (Tolich and Davidson, 1999, 77). Two examples will clarify this. In his book on social research methods Blaikie (2000, 191) told a story about a town in New Zealand. For me this was a case of having to research and eliminate all the options, a do-able task since few towns fit the description. Two lecturers I presented this passage to could almost immediately locate the town without further doubt. The size of New Zealand and the small population simply makes it impossible to give hints about the location or the group under study without making it obvious to every other New Zealander which location or which group is being talked about. Another example is the group my interview partners either belonged to or worked with. Ngāi Tahu as a tribe and the Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu as a legal entity are prominent within New Zealand. Without inventing a completely new setting it would have been impossible to say anything about my study without giving away clues to who were the people I studied. This is not to say that individuals are identifiable, but talking about a Māori tribe and computer-mediated inner-tribal communication already narrows the possibilities down, whereas adding South Island and a settlement in 1997 makes it difficult for anybody with general knowledge of the history of New Zealand to make a false guess. But all these markers are important to understand the findings.

As shown, taking the size into consideration, research in New Zealand needs to be done with an ‘Antipodean angle on ethics’ (Tolich and Davidson, 1999, 77). For this research this meant that ethical issues had to be considered at all stages of the research not just during the data collection (May, 1993, 35-37). During the writing up stage this meant anticipating ‘unintended consequences’ (May, 1993, 37). Not necessarily only out of fear to ‘upset the informational economy’ within the tribe or to the outside of it (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, 279), but also because of the ‘consequences for further research’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, 275) which could be embargoed by the Ngāi Tahu Research Consultation Committee. This leads to the fact that the same question about wilful omission of information which I asked myself during interviews could obviously be asked about this thesis and about anthropological research in general (Coffey, 1996, 70; Horwitz, 1996). How much does a researcher

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20For further elaboration on the ‘small town’ problem see Tolich and Davidson (1999) and Tolich (2001).
have to keep out of print to protect the participants, possible future researchers and her- or himself?

2.8 Validity of research

In this section I will show the steps I took to ensure the validity of my findings. Qualitative research findings can not solely be measured with the same criteria as quantitative research. In fact, to do so, would have the opposite effect by ‘tautologically confirming quantitative researchers’ critique’ (Maxwell, 1992, 281).

The ideas about what constitutes validity in qualitative research can be seen as a continuum with one end using translations of validation criteria derived from quantitative methods to the other end, where researchers do ask for ‘trustworthiness’ gained through ‘reciprocity’ with the research participants (Harrison et al., 2001, 324; see also Lincoln, 1995, 283). I would like to position myself on this continuum, combining an ‘instrumentalist’ and a ‘realist conception of validity’ (Maxwell, 1992, 281). By bridging the gap between these two ways of validation I would like to show my appreciation for the need for sound methods and for adequate representations of the research participants and the phenomena under study. But in saying this I would also like to state that I agree with Wolcott’s point of view as explained in Maxwell (1992, 281) that ‘understanding is a more fundamental concept for qualitative research than validity’.

‘Reliability’ and ‘validity’ of data are the two measures used in quantitative research with ‘reliability’ being seen as the measure for ‘replicability of scientific findings’ and ‘validity’ as the arbiter of ‘accuracy’ of these findings (LeCompte and Preissle-Goetz, 1982, 32). It seems as if these measures are hard to separate in situ, the separation seems to be at points rather arbitrary as will become obvious in the reminder of this section. Reliability and validity have been taken into account by some authors under aliases. For example Boulton’s and Hammersley’s (1996, 295) description of ‘reflexivity’ seems to encompass Lincoln’s (1995, 280) ‘standpoint epistemology’, in terms of the researcher’s need for awareness of her subjectivity, and the steps described by LeCompte and Preissle-Goetz (1982, 37-40) to enhance ‘external reliability’. The low level of reliability of anthropological studies might not necessarily only be located in the fact that the conditions in the field under study are continuously changing, therefore making a restudy producing the same results near to impossible (LeCompte and Preissle-Goetz, 1982, 35), but also in the way
ethnographies are written with the aim to present ‘the results of a study artfully and accessibly’ (LeComte and Preissle-Goetz, 1982, 36).²¹

To be reflective and therefore produce reliable data, within the limits of changing circumstances, I have in this chapter shown what the ontological, epistemological and methodological parameters of my study were. Within these parameters I have described the methods used for the production of data. This does not mean that my data is externally reliable, meaning other researchers would come to the same conclusions when doing fieldwork in ‘similar settings’ (LeComte and Preissle-Goetz, 1982, 32), but the disclosure of my background enables a partial reproduction of my research, obviously depending on the possibility to find a similar setting. The possibility to check ‘internal reliability’, i.e. would other researchers come to the same conclusions with the same data (LeComte and Preissle-Goetz, 1982, 32), is one of the demands in the guidelines of the Human Ethics Committee. Tapes of all the interviews have to be stored in the department for five years. Again validity and reliability are intermingled. Maxwell (1992, 286) saw recordings as a proof of ‘descriptive validity’ meaning the ‘factual accuracy of their account’ (see also Bernard et al., 1986, 384; and LeComte and Preissle-Goetz, 1982, 42).

The validity of anthropological work is also relative in a sense that based on the same set of data entirely different but equally valid interpretations and explanations can be given. This means that the application of theories produced by anthropological research to other settings – external validity (LeComte and Preissle-Goetz, 1982, 43) – are not necessarily the only plausible explanations. In Maxwell’s (1992, 288) terms the critical realistic approach to validity ‘refers primarily to accounts, not to data or methods ... validity is relative to purposes and circumstances’. I will show in the chapters to come how I reached my interpretations, Maxwell’s (1992, 288) ‘interpretive validity’, and how the theories used are a possible explanation for the data, Maxwell (1992, 291) called this ‘theoretical validity’. The online questionnaire and the focus group were meant to be the sources for further data to ‘crosscheck conclusions’ (Bernard et al., 1986, 385), but as described above the prepared questionnaire never went online though and the focus group was never set up.

Obviously several factors played a role in the interpretation of the interview data and therefore are important to the validity of my findings. First, the ‘observer effects’ (LeComte and Preissle-Goetz, 1982, 46) had to be taken into account during the analysis. This is Boulton’s and Hammersley’s (1996, 295) first part of reflexivity with

²¹I fail to see the distinction between this problem of reliability and the subsequent use of the term ‘history’ by LeComte and Preissle-Goetz (1982, 44) to describe ‘changes that occur in the overall social scene’ during the research and therefore constitute ‘threats’ to the ‘internal validity’.
the observer ‘thinking about the process of research and especially her or his own role
in it’. My participants had to be taken into account as well, with questions whether
people were ‘putting on a show’ during the interviews (Boulton and Hammersley,
1996, 295) or if ‘cultural norms’ were reported instead of actual behaviour (Bernard
et al., 1984, 508). In other words I took into account that ‘[i]nformants are inaccurate;
memory does decay exponentially with time ... And on top of all this there appears to
be systematic distortion in how informants recall just about everything’ (Bernard
et al., 1984, 509).

Whether the accounts given here can be applied to other settings, ‘external validity’
(LeCompte and Preissle-Goetz, 1982, 51) or ‘external generalizability’ (Maxwell, 1992,
293), is obviously highly dependent on the ‘unique historical experiences’ of the Ngāi
Tahu tribe (LeCompte and Preissle-Goetz, 1982, 52). It is also dependent on the fact
that Ngāi Tahu regularly take part in studies, which maybe cause ‘oversaturation’,
meaning that through regular research the group under study does adapt to being
studied and therefore reacts differently than groups without a history of being
researched (LeCompte and Preissle-Goetz, 1982, 52).

The last point is that my research was certainly not a cornerstone in terms of
reciprocity. The findings will be made available to all participants, but further than
that no reciprocity has taken place or will take place. The research was meant to serve
‘the community of knowledge producers and policymakers’ and not to bring on any
change within the community (Lincoln, 1995, 280).

2.9 Conclusion

In this chapter I have explained my research strategy, the methods of data production
including the sampling strategies and why some of the methods failed. I also showed
how I analysed the data, what ethical problems I tried to avoid during the data
collection and the writing up and why I believe that my research findings are reliable
and are valid. Having stated this I also want to mention that a case of over-analysing
and over-reflexivity is also possible. Silverman (1997, 239) put it more eloquently by
stating that ‘perhaps the reflexive card is now being played too regularly in the social
sciences.’
Chapter 3

Literature review

3.1 Introduction

The aim of this literature review is to situate this thesis in the existing literature on tribal segmentation. Over the last century theorisation of tribal segmentation has turned from a static functionalist and structural-functionalist model into a more nuanced understanding of the forces leading to the creation of new iwi, hapū and the growth of whānau, and an identification of iwi as a response to colonial and economic pressure. Existing literature also shows that membership in hapū has been defined differently by many scholars over the years. Residence in a certain area, common ancestry, participation in group enterprises or a combination of these factors were given as entry criteria. It is clear then that relying on a single entry criteria, ancestry, as today’s iwi bureaucracies do, creates pronounced divisions between tribal and non-tribal Māori, but also, as this thesis shows, between some locally active members and members seeking participation solely on an iwi-wide level or on a local level from afar.

The literature review is divided into three sections. First I will discuss some of the early works of anthropologists studying Māori society in New Zealand. The development and the continued use of the model of a structure of hierarchically organised segments as the basis of Māori society are the main points regarding the early works. The next step will be a look at the use of terminology regarding segmentary opposition, a concept developed by anthropologists mainly focusing on cultures situated on the African continent. Following this I will present some of the criticisms regarding the use of the concept of segmentary opposition and its terminology. In the second section I will take a closer look at later works which mainly focus on the change of Māori social structure since the arrival of European settlers. A theme running through the literature presented in this section is the difference between potential and actualised membership in the different social
groups. In the third section I will focus on the literature regarding the increasing
dominance of iwi in the legal, social, and political context, and the growing
importance of tribal chiefs and tribal bureaucratic structures.

3.2 Segmentary systems in anthropology

Early works

Best (1974, 96) and Hiroa (1982, 82, 333, f.)\(^1\) divided Māori society into a hierarchy of
whānau, hapū, and iwi, each lead by a political leader.\(^2\) Hiroa (1982, 333) described
whānau as the ‘biological family’. Best (1974, 96) referred to it as the ‘family group’.
Firth’s (1973, 111) functionalist analysis relied heavily on Best’s publications and
reiterated that the ‘whanau’, Firth used the German ‘Grossfamilie’ as description, was
the smallest socially and economically autonomous unit within Māori society. Firth
(1973, 111) stated that political and economic interaction between whānau was
limited to those occasions which affected the whole ‘village’ or which concerned
‘tribal policy’. Against Best, Firth (1973, 116-124, 138, f.) argued that within this
autonomous unit the nuclear family did indeed exist, forming a non-autonomous, but
distinct work unit.

The next higher grouping, the hapū, the ‘sub-tribe’ (Hiroa, 1982, 333) or ‘clan’ (Best,
1974, 96), was by all three authors seen as an assemblage of several whānau (Firth,
1973, 111; Best, 1974, 96; Hiroa, 1982, 333). Firth (1973, 113) further added that some
larger hapū were subdivided into several smaller hapū due to large membership
numbers.

The iwi, by all three authors referred to as the ‘tribe’ (Best, 1974, 96; Hiroa, 1982, 333,
Firth, 1973, 114), was regarded as the largest social organisation within Māori society.
Economically this grouping, according to Firth (1973, 139), had only limited functions
other than the ‘participation in huge feasts’ and an ‘all-embracing over-right to the
land within its borders’. Firth (1973, 116; see also Hiroa, 1982, 334) regarded the waka
or canoe, a confederation of several iwi who had arrived in Aotearoa/New Zealand
on the same canoe, as a ‘loose amorphous political unit’, which could under specific
circumstances evoke a sense of unity but was no deterrent to inter-iwi war within the
confederation.

\(^{1}\)Te Rangi Hiroa is commonly known as Sir Peter Buck.
\(^{2}\)Winiata (1956) later reiterated the social structure of Māori society of pre-European times and elab-
orated on the different ranks of political leaders corresponding to the three levels of iwi, hapū, and
whānau.
According to all three authors growing membership numbers would elevate whānau to hapū and hapū to iwi status. While the growth of whānau and hapū was discussed by all three authors only Hiroa (1982) discussed the fission of iwi. Hiroa (1982, 336) argued that the formation of new tribes and the disappearance of older tribes was due to ‘changes in [the] population’.

The reading of Māori society as a hierarchically segmented society was regarded as a description of pre-European Māori society spanning all of New Zealand without tribal, geographical or economic variations. In the descriptions of all three authors the societal structure remained stable with changes being confined to the fate of individual groupings rather than the larger structure. The arrival of European settlers was seen as the reason for large-scale systemic change.

Outside New Zealand, Fortes’ and Evans-Pritchard’s (1950) *African Political Systems* presents one of the most archetypal examples of structural-functionalist endeavour to explain social structures and the functions of these structures for the maintenance of social unity. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard categorised the political systems described in the book into centralised and uncentralised systems of authority. In uncentralised political systems lineage ruled political affiliation, creating the ‘segmentary system of permanent, unilateral descent groups’ (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1950, 6). Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1950, 22), however, also pointed out that the exact locations of ‘the lines of political cleavage’ were difficult to establish with groups being less neatly delineated than the abstract descriptions given by anthropologists.

The segmentary system is defined by three characteristics. First, the breaking up of larger groups into smaller sub-units, creating a hierarchy between larger units and the smaller units encapsulated within these larger units (e.g. Evans-Pritchard 1950, 281, f.; Tait, 1958, 194). The second characteristic is the continued opposition of same-level segments, with clearly defined alliances for every form of dispute (Evans-Pritchard, 1950, 281, f., also Middleton, 1958, 210). The third characteristic is the influence of ancestral links on the spatial separation of the different units.

In *Tribes Without Rulers* Middleton and Tait (1958, 25) also focused on decentralised political systems and emphasised that these ‘lineage systems’, largely because of their decentralised political structure, were in a constant state of ‘change and instability’.3 Concurring with Fortes and Evans-Pritchard Middleton and Tait (1958, 26) described the ongoing change as following certain rules and therefore being ‘repetitive’ rather than chaotic, with new equilibria displaying the structural opposition of the

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3A state of flux Fortes and Evans-Pritchard had described in their respective chapters of *African Political Systems*. 
constituting segments of a society. Middleton and Tait (1958, 7, f.), following Forde’s (1938) terminology, argued that the term ‘segmentation’ was to be reserved for the temporary context-dependent shifts of political alignment, whereas ‘fission’ expressed the cessation of a group’s existence due to a split into smaller autonomous units which were no longer ‘in a state of complementary opposition’. While clear on the term fission neither Forde (1938) nor Middleton and Tait (1958) were restrictive around the terminology used for the processes of fusion. Forde for example used ‘fusion’, ‘accretion’, and ‘recombination’ (all Forde, 1938, 318), and ‘amalgamation’ (Forde, 1938, 321) interchangeably. Evans-Pritchard (1950, e.g. 284), less restrictive in his terminology, used the terms segmentation, and fission and fusion for the same processes.

**Criticism**

Sahlins (1961, 322) argued that the concept of segmentary lineages had not been historically situated but accepted on the tautological explanation that ‘the system is what it is because that is the way it is’ (Sahlins, 1961, 323). Sahlins proposed a wider focus, taking the political interaction of tribes into consideration which lead him to conclude that the segmentary lineage system was a ‘social means of intrusion’ (Sahlins, 1961, 323), a form of ‘predatory expansion’ (Sahlins, 1961, 322) within one particular type of society: the tribal society. Sahlins (1961, 326) argued that a continuous expansion and contraction of the ‘level of political consolidation’ occurred. Unity at any level was then a response to external threats.

In *Tribesmen*, Sahlins (1968) offered several further important qualifications of the structural-functionalist understanding of hierarchically segmented societies. On the one hand Sahlins (1968, 8) posited that ‘primitive society is at war with Warre’, ‘Warre’ here not meaning the actual state of war, but the status of violence as a legitimate means of social control. ‘Peacemaking’ (Sahlins, 1968, 8) in the form of ‘reciprocity’ (Sahlins, 1968, 9) becomes a means to avoid or contain violence. On the other hand Sahlins pointed out that tribes could not be regarded as clearly bounded. Instead he argued that there was an ‘ambiguous zone of transition’ (Sahlins, 1968, 16) between tribes. As later research, cited below, has shown Sahlins’ ‘ambiguous zone of transition’ was not confined to the iwi level, but was also present in hapū affiliations in Māori society, particularly since peace-making, peace-keeping, and the expansion of spheres of political influence were often achieved through inter-marriages.

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4Sahlins’ works on tribes mentioned here hold evolutionist undertones which I do not share. Change is in this thesis not understood as a development towards a more complex form of society but as an adaptation to new circumstances.
Barnes (1962) critiqued the influence of structural-functionalist thinking on anthropological endeavours in the New Guinea Highlands. This influence obscured the fact that African unilineal descent systems emphasised ‘group solidarity’ whereas systems of ‘unbounded affiliation’ furthered ‘network cohesion’ (Barnes, 1962, 8). Webster (1997, 311, f.) went further and argued that the influence of structural-functionalist thought was not limited to the anthropology of the New Guinea Highlands but was equally visible in New Zealand.

Fortes (1959a; 1959b, passim; see also Leach, 1962) objected to the use of ‘descent group’ for hapū, arguing that an ambilateral descent ideology was incapable of effectively closing group membership. Scheffler (1964; see also Firth, 1963) in turn criticised Fortes’ narrow definition of descent group. He argued that Fortes was in search of a definition of descent which turned descent into the sole purpose of the group, a conflation of the group’s purpose and the way the group was delineated. Hapū, however, were still understood as locally clearly defined entities, an understanding based on the works of Best, Buck, and Firth.

The works cited above hold several important points for this thesis. The first point is the understanding of pre-European Māori society as hierarchically segmented. This understanding has come under criticism but it nevertheless continues to influence the understanding of how pre-European Māori society was structured and how it should be structured again in the eyes of ‘iwi fundamentalists’ (Webster, 2002, 355).

The second important point is the concept of segmentary opposition, the continuous shifting of alliances depending on the context and the use of this concept for a diverse range of cultures. The segments referred to in this thesis are not created by lineage systems but instead are far more fluid, in extreme cases cutting across whānau ties. I will use segmentation in a less restrictive way than Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1950) and Middleton and Tait (1958).

The third important point is the distinction made by Middleton and Tait (1958) between segmentation and fission and fusion. For the sake of argumentative clarity I will use the same restriction as Middleton and Tait suggested since processes of — attempted but not necessarily successful — fission and fusion and segmentation are visible within Ngāi Tahu.

Lastly the continuous expansion and contraction of the level of political unity proposed by Sahlins (1961) is implicit in the remainder of the thesis.

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5Sahlins (1961) argued similarly that the concept of segmentary opposition had been applied to a number of unsuitable contexts.
3.3 Studies on European impact

The understanding of pre-European Māori society as Best, Buck and Firth depicted it was criticised from the 1970s onwards, but is nonetheless still widely used as the basis for explanations of cultural change. Webster (1997) pointed out that European and Māori researches alike have reiterated the three-tier structure of a clearly segmented pre-European Māori society. Well-known Māori scholars such as Mead (2003, 209) and Walker (2004) are examples of this continued use.

A clarification of different groupings, conceptual and actualised ones, is necessary since affiliation by descent is ‘ambilateral’ (Firth, 1973, 112) or ‘optative’ (Firth, 1957, 5) in Māori society and group membership is therefore largely a matter of choice for the group offering and the person seeking group membership (Firth, 1963, 28). In Kin groups and social structure Keesing (1975, 9) summarised and clarified the use of ‘categories’ and ‘groups’. Categories are temporary ‘sets we draw mental lines around’ (Keesing, 1975, 10). Groups in contrast are sets of people which are internally organised, giving each person a specific role within the group. Keesing (1975, 10) further distinguished between ‘primary groups’, consisting of members with regular interaction and ‘secondary groups’ consisting of members who are part of the group by virtue of being connected to a higher institution. Keesing (1975, 10) observed that membership in a social category only generates ‘eligibility’ for membership in a group, but not all potential members feel inclined to actualise this group membership.

The distinction between categories and groups proved increasingly important for later works about Māori society. Under Firth’s tutelage several important studies were conducted, two of which will be discussed here. Studying the interaction between urban and rural communities in the far north of New Zealand Metge (1964, 60, 163, f.) found that in both localities hapū had lost importance, but also acknowledged that in other parts of New Zealand hapū might still be in operation. Iwi affiliation, although devoid of ‘material advantages [or] specific obligations’ (Metge, 1964, 58), was still known among both rural and urban Māori (Metge, 1964, 58, 160). Tensions between urban and rural Māori were in Metge’s description ever-present with both groups accusing each other of a loss of culture and a lack of reciprocity (Metge, 1964, 244-247). Countering these tensions was the over-riding common interest of remaining Māori and acquiring individual and communal wealth in a Pākehā dominated economy (Metge, 1964, 247-250).

In a later publication Metge (1995) focused on the whānau within Māori society. She pointed out that the “classic” Māori family as described by Best, Buck, and Firth was far more ambiguous than either of the three authors had acknowledged (Metge, 1995,
3.3. STUDIES ON EUROPEAN IMPACT

35). Within different contexts the term whānau had to encompass different members. Spouses had to be counted to create politically and economically autonomous units, but only blood relatives could be incorporated to create a clearly segmented three-tier system of iwi, hapū and whānau based on descent from an eponymous ancestor (Metge, 1995, 37). This ambiguity lead Metge (1995, 45) to conclude that whānau growth did not necessarily lead to the creation of a new hapū in pre-European times.6 With urbanisation and the individualisation of the labour force further meanings of whānau proliferated (Metge, 1995, 52-56), and whānau of the 1950s and 1960s became ‘more like the 18th-century hapū than the 18th-century whānau’ in that they were far more ad hoc, comprised more than one family, and whānau members did not work as a single unit of economic production (Metge, 1995, 40; see also Metge, 1964, 71). Calling eligibility ‘nominal or potential membership’ Metge (1995, 77) argued that ‘full ... membership’ in hapū and whānau was only possible through active, physical participation, but participation was made difficult by increasing travel distances and the demands of paid work.7

Ian Hugh Kawharu, like Joan Metge one of Firth’s students, described the struggles to incorporate distant members into the existing community in his work on the Auckland suburb of Orakei. Kawharu (1975, 23) distinguished between ‘kinship’ and ‘descent’, regarding them as opposing forces. Descent was ‘divisive’ (Kawharu, 1975, 22), creating factions consisting of locally living close relatives. In contrast to this Kawharu (1975, 23) defined ‘kinship’ as ‘categories of people, not ... local groups’. Kinship, by being ‘general and ambiguous’, then presented the uniting force balancing the divisive force created by descent with its ‘particular and unambiguous’ nature (Kawharu, 1975, 23). This balance of forces, generating a continuous forging and eroding of alliances, halted a ‘final disintegration of the hapu’ (Kawharu, 1975, 71).

Kawharu (1975, 35) also argued that in ‘traditional times’ community stability was achieved by coupling ‘benefits’ with ‘social action’. Rights had to be earned through contribution to a community, effectively stopping the exponential growth of eligibility engendered by ambilateral descent systems. Kawharu, however, also contended that with the arrival of Europeans and, more importantly, the increase in land rights holders less actual participation was taking place, a process he called ‘fragmentation and fractionation’ (Kawharu, 1975, 37; see also Webster, 1975, 135). Further, the relationship between land rights and ‘socio-political rights’ had been reversed, with

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6 Focusing on the economic aspects of hapū, namely the inheritance of land rights, Firth (1957, 7) had earlier hinted that ‘segmentation’ was ‘related to the available resources’ rather than being ‘an automatic process’.

7 Firth (1963, 34) had earlier concluded that in pre-European times the ‘most definite form of social action for validating one’s hapu claims was, of course, residence’.
‘land interests’ having become the basis from which socio-political rights were
derived’ (Kawharu, 1975, 36). In a later publication Kawharu (1977, 39) argued that
in pre-European times eligibility in groups and individual rights could ‘lie dormant’
for long periods of time but ‘could be revived at any moment merely by taking up
residence’, a process seemingly unchanged in the Orakei community of the 1960s
Kawharu (1975) had described earlier. Despite the ease with which rights could be
revived Kawharu (1977, 38) was uncertain how iwi had ‘functioned as a unit’ in
pre-European times, considering that iwi were understood to have been ‘territorial’
units with a certain level of internal cohesion, an assumption clearly falsified by
re-occurring iwi internal fights between hapū.

Schwimmer (1966, 98) also relied on Buck, Best, and Firth for the ‘past that has
vanished’. He argued that by the 1960s hapū had all but disappeared in their social
functions but had remained alive for ceremonies such as weddings and tangi, and
historical friction between hapū was still remembered by members of different hapū.
Residence, Schwimmer argued, had become the overarching principle of social
organisation in rural areas, whereas in urban centres a clear distinction between those
owning the land, tangata whenua, the ‘local people’, and immigrants was maintained
(Schwimmer, 1966, 137). In Schwimmer’s account of Māori society the expansion and
contraction of political unity is clearly visible. He argued that “factionalism” had
always occurred within Māori society, but had been held in check by political leaders
for groups to remain operative (Schwimmer, 1966, 144). In later publications
Schwimmer (1978; 1990) focused on the procedural aspects of hapū affiliation.

Mirroring Sahlins’ argument of predatory expansion he argued against Firth that
political unity rather than economic necessity was the driving force behind hapū
formation, a formation based on common ancestry and local residence at the time of
the hapū formation. The hapū in Schwimmer’s (1978, 218) description was a
‘dynamic and generative unit’ created in times of need for political unity, units which
created around a ‘localised eponymous ancestor’ to whom all hapū members could
prove whakapapa links (Schwimmer, 1990, 297).

The works cited above contain several important points. First, the common
denominator of the works by Metge, Kawharu, Walker, Mead and Schwimmer is the
belief that changes in the structure of Māori society have been largely brought on by
European colonisation. This assumption has been criticised by other authors, cited
below. The second point is the notion put forward by Metge (1995) and Kawharu
(1975) that active participation in a community is necessary to acquire rights. As I will
show later this notion was held by many of those of my interview partners who were
locally active. The third important point is a combination of Kawharu’s
understanding of the iwi in its pre-European form as a unit of which the internal
workings have not been fully understood yet and Schwimmer’s observation that excessive factionalism could lead to a breakdown of efficiency. Kawharu’s pre-European iwi have been revived and adapted to the task at hand, namely to stem factionalisation and to unite all those belonging to a particular descent category to act politically as a corporate group for the purpose of settlements.

The above structures the following parts of the literature review into two linked directions. First I will present criticism regarding the historical correctness of the three-tier structure of pre-European Māori society. And second, following this criticism, many scholars have focused on the rise of tribal leaders based on the propagation of the three-tier structure of pre-European Māori society.

### 3.4 Criticism of earlier analysis

#### The waxing and waning of groups

The notion of a static social structure within pre-European Māori society has been criticised by several authors. Ballara (1998, 21) acknowledged the arrival of Europeans as ‘the most spectacular input of new influences’ on Māori society, but maintained that Māori social organisation had been fluid before and after the arrival of Europeans. Using documents generated in the Native Land Court from 1866 to 1900 Ballara showed that the expectation upheld by the public to find clearly defined ownership of communally held land within Māori society led to misunderstandings when confronted with the ambiguous reality of landownership.\(^8\) Hapū were expected to be clearly defined and to communally hold a ‘specific and limited stretch of land’ (Ballara, 1998, 194). The reality, however, was ‘nebulous’ and the vague courtroom answers given by Māori claimants lead to the impression that hapū were no longer in existence (Ballara, 1998, 194). She further argued that a ‘process of iwi revival’ began during the late eighteenth century, lasting into the nineteenth century (Ballara, 1998, 217). Māori began to emulate the tribes of the official records to retain some control over the remaining lands through the creation of larger corporate groups (Ballara, 1998, 279). The official understanding of tribally based loyalties during the land wars fought in the 1860s and 1870s further ossified the understanding of iwi (Ballara, 1998, 279). Redefinition occurred frequently with hapū apparently disappearing through affiliation to other hapū and iwi. Similarly iwi affiliation was fluid in that groupings became increasingly bigger, subsuming formerly autonomous units under a single tribal name (Ballara, 1998, 279, ff., 290-314). In the 1990s governmental recognition led

\(^8\)Belgrave (2005) pointed out that court documents represent a specific version of the past, one aimed at supporting or contesting claims. This introduces a potential bias.
again to an increase of iwi importance and further redefinition with hapū attempting to attain recognition as a ‘separate and independent’ group by claiming iwi status (Ballara, 1998, 319).

In a series of articles Webster (1975, 1990, 1997, 1998a) argued, like Ballara, that hapū had not disappeared but had fallen victim to erroneous definitions such as ‘contiguous residence’ of its members or ‘territorial discreteness’ (Webster, 1975, 122). Picking up the argument from Scheffler (1964), Webster (1975, 143) further argued for the distinction of ‘descent category’ and ‘descent group’. The former ensures the continued existence of the hapū through the ‘flexibility’ of ‘cognatic descent’ (Webster, 1975, 143). The descent group counters the expansive tendencies of the descent category and establishes, by relying on the criterion of participation rather than residence, a ‘corporate core of tangata whenua’ who are actively involved in the hapū (Webster, 1975, 144). Webster (1975) doubted that residence or territory had ever been important criteria for the definition of hapū membership. He built on Kawharu’s argument of decreasing participation due to the rapid increase of land titleholders by arguing that this increase had led to a stronger emphasis on participation as group membership criterion. Webster further argued that the three-tier structure of hierarchically ordered political power was incorrect since whānau were the only groups capable of ‘centralised political fiat’ (Webster, 1975, 123). As Webster (1998a, 5) clarified in a later article, hapū were structurally different from whānau, the former being ‘descent groups’ whereas the latter were ‘domestic groups’. In several publications Webster (1995, 1997, 1998a) elaborated on structural change and criticised the lack of historical depth in functionalist analyses by pointing out that hapū and iwi had fundamentally changed after the arrival of Europeans and that these changes were of a structural nature rather than following ‘some ahistorical principle of ‘flexibility’” (Webster, 1998a, 5). The hapū of the 1840s were then no exact representations of the pre-European hapū (Webster, 1998a, 32).

Mead (2003) in turn upheld the three-tier structure as representing the social system of pre-European Māori society. He argued, however, that the system had been continuously in flux and had only become ‘frozen’ at the beginning of the nineteenth century (Mead, 2003, 209). Arguing that the situation had changed through population increase he proposed a return to the fluidity of pre-European times with whakapapa still being the ‘fundamental criterion of [hapū] membership’ (Mead, 2003, 218). Mead (2003, 279) argued that against this emphasis on whakapapa the Native Land Court had ‘elevated’ the idea of sustained occupation, ‘ahikāroa’, to ‘the
supreme right to own a block of land’. Mead’s emphasis on the whakapapa faltered, however, when he stated that ‘taura here’ groups, groups of tribal members living outside the officially recognised tribal boundaries, could only gain recognition through their ‘ties to the base group at the homeland’ (Mead, 2003, 226).

Political power and cultural revival

Most anthropologists in New Zealand turned away from the study of kinship structures, with the exception of the aforementioned Metge, Scheffler, and Webster. The ‘politicization of ‘culture” (Wright, 1998) came into focus and with it the expansion and contraction of political loyalties became more obvious. The term segmentary opposition fell into disuse although the content of much anthropological writing on Māori society still fits within this theory. While for the ‘exemplars’ (Strathern 1988, 89; see also Appadurai, 1986, 1988) of segmentation theory, the Nuer and Tiv, lineage offered — largely — the lines along which segmentation occurred, this is currently only the case under specific circumstances in Māori society. Much of the literature on Māori since the 1990s focused on fragmentation and with it the expansion and contraction of political loyalties. Increasingly the evocation of Māori culture came to be seen as politically rather than culturally motivated (e.g. Levine and Henare, 1994; van Meijl, 1997, 2000).

Pearson (1991, see also Babadzan, 2000, Friedman, 2008) argued that struggles for political participation need to be seen within a framework of nation building. The Treaty of Waitangi was then not between Māori and Pākehā, but between ‘representatives of elites’ (Pearson, 1991, 204), which used cultural differences as boundary markers. Writing on the construction of culture Hanson (1989) drew severe criticism from the wider New Zealand public. Hanson (1989, 899) concluded that ‘authentic culture’ was continuously reinvented with ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, most notably anthropologists, being equally active in this process. Webster (1998b, 225) was critical of Hanson’s article and its foundation in an interpretive tradition. He analysed the public debate after the publication and differentiated between culture as an ‘ideology ... in the illusory but reassuring sense of ‘a whole way of life” used for political campaigning in New Zealand and a ‘lived’ experience, ‘a whole way of struggle’ (Webster, 1998b, 225; see also Webster, 1993).

9 Ballara argued the opposite, that the Native Land Court emphasised descent over residence as the ‘primary determinant’ for land rights which was ‘likely’ to have had an effect on the ‘contemporary definition of hapū membership’ (Ballara, 1998, 228).

10 Trask (1991, 163) eloquently argued that ‘politicization’ started with ‘colonization’, and was thus not an invention of the ‘Natives’.
Poata-Smith (1996) and Greenland (1991) focused on the ideological use of culture and the ascent of a new elite in the 1970s, Ngā Tamatoa, a group of young, university-trained urban Māori. Ngā Tamatoa shifted the focus of the political struggles from class to ethnicity. This led Poata-Smith (1996, 111) to conclude that Māori ‘cultural nationalism’ had ‘failed ... dramatically’ because rather than focusing on a change of social and economic relations it encouraged ‘individual lifestyle changes’. In the 1980s indigeneity, through the connection to land prior to the arrival of European settlers, became the focus of Māori struggles (Rata, 2001).

Further fragmentation and a contraction of the ‘level of political consolidation’ (Sahlins, 1961, 326) followed in the 1990s with a shift from indigeneity to ‘tribal fundamentalism’ (Levine and Henare, 1994, 193, see also Rata, 2001). The publicly acknowledged tribes were those recognised as having existed in 1840. Some scholars identified the nation-state as the main instigator of change through settlement processes. Maaka (1994, 314; see also Barcham, 1998), for example, interpreted the rising importance of iwi as an ‘attempt to freeze-frame the tribe, and indeed Māori culture as a whole’, ignoring the volatility of Māori ‘social groupings’, with tribes waxing and waning. Birdling (2004) argued that the government’s preference to deal with large-scale units had seen iwi rise to new political importance and that this rise had brought problems with it, namely fission within hapū and later fusion of hapū for the purpose of a settlement. Bargh (2007, 40) also identified the nation-state as the instigator of change within tribes ‘from communitarian conceptions or interaction towards contractual relations between individuals and agencies’. The settlement process was then a way of introducing neoliberal policies into tribes and Treaty related issues.

Other authors, while accepting the role of the nation-state in the change of Māori society, pointed towards the continued use of reified concepts of Māori culture and past societal structures to justify new forms of political and economic dominance. Levine and Henare (1994, 203), for example, pointed out that claims changed in nature, away from ‘cultural claims’ to materialistic claims based on tribal boundaries and historical grievances. Fishing quotas, negotiated in 1989, were then a ‘property ownership issue’ between the government and tribes rather than Māori as an ‘ethnic group’ (Sir Tipene O’Regan quoted in Levine and Henare, 1994, 204).

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11 Friedman (2004) argued that the shift from class-based to cultural struggles is a global phenomenon.
12 Webster (1998a, 8) pointed out that hapū were regarded as tribes in the Treaty of Waitangi and were only at a later stage relegated to the status of sub-tribes.
13 The aim of Bargh’s article was to show the continued resistance of Māori people against the domination of an imposed government. It is telling that the article instead gives numerous examples of Māori leaders supporting and proposing neoliberal policies.
3.4. CRITICISM OF EARLIER ANALYSIS

In a number of articles van Meijl (1994, 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2006) elaborated upon the use of Māori culture for political reasons and on the influence of Pākehā understandings of Māori culture on the change and re-invention of Māori culture. Van Meijl (1995) drew attention to an early ethnographer, Percy Smith, who had in the late 1890s imposed a timeline upon Māori history. This timeline established the navigator Kupe as the discoverer of New Zealand, followed by Toi, who in turn was followed by the Great Fleet (see also Hanson, 1989, 891; O'Regan, 1992). Van Meijl (1995, 305) also pointed out that ‘Firth’s model of Maori socio-political organisation [was] a post-colonial construct’ based on research material collected over a century after ‘colonial contact’. While for the past the influence of successive colonial governments and European scholars is undeniable, van Meijl’s (2000, 89; see also van Meijl, 1997) view on the present points towards the use of culture by Māori activists and tribal leaders to achieve political ends, namely the justification of ‘Maori claims to political autonomy’. Van Meijl (1997, 85) further argued that ‘paramount chiefs’ had ‘initiated’ a renaissance of the tribal system to widen their constituency to urban Māori thus reclaiming some of the lost authority. Regarding the resulting acute opposition between pan-tribal and tribal Māori and between tribal organisations of higher and lower status van Meijl (1997, 104) asked whether the ‘division ... of Māori interests’ had been the aim of the government all together. In a later article van Meijl (1998, 391) pointed out that democracy has to be understood as a ‘multivalent concept’, which can be used to justify a large range of ‘political and cultural practices’. For some, mainly non-tribalised Māori, ‘proportional representation’ of Māori rather than tribal representation presents the key to countering single-handed chiefly actions such as the Sealord Deal struck in 1992, this although the concept of democracy is linked to Western rule (van Meijl, 1998, 408). With Māori society being such a ‘fragmented field’ (van Meijl, 2000, 101) findings of anthropological research might then be considered ‘subversive’ (van Meijl, 2000, 89) by research participants. Particularly in a political climate where ‘tribal interests’ clash with the search for ‘roots’ by many non-tribalised Māori (van Meijl, 2000, 101).

Sissons (1992, 1993, 1995, 2004, 2005b) has also written about the political use of culture in New Zealand. He argued that ethnicity and culture had been conflated through the reification of culture into ‘key concepts’ (Sissons, 1992, 25). Contributing to the debate concerning the politicisation and invention of tradition, Sissons (1993, 98) separated ‘transformations of tradition’ into ‘politicisation’ and ‘rationalisation’,

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14In his book Patrons of Maori Culture Webster (1998b, 19) came to a similar conclusion, pointing towards specific ‘opportunistic patrons, Maori as well as Pakeha’ as ‘beneficiaries’ of increased cultural awareness rather than the ‘majority of Maori themselves’.

the former using tradition for reasons of identity politics in post-colonial situations, whereas the latter describes the objectification of tradition to enable colonial ruling or the resistance against it. Cutting across and including these processes are the ‘systematisation’ and ‘reactive objectification’ of tradition, again the former being employed by settler nation-states and the latter by ‘ethnic leaders’ (Sissons, 1993, 99). Like van Meijl Sissons (1995, 63) argued that the Māori renaissance in the 1980s was not a ‘“cultural’ phenomenon’ but a ‘political phenomenon’, aimed at gaining access to political and economic power. The contraction of political loyalties in the form of the re-tribalisation has left ‘no secure place for urban indigeneity’ in New Zealand between tribalised Māori and Pākehā (Sissons, 2004, 19, see also Sissons, 2005b). This is due to an ongoing contradiction between the individualisation of land titles in 1865 and the ‘idealised tribalism’ promoted by the Minister of Native Affairs in the 1920s and 1930s, Sir Āpirana Ngata, who saw tribalism as a ‘necessary complement to his economic policies of individualisation’ (Sissons, 2004, 22, 25). The simplified model of Māori society as being separated into iwi, hapū, and whānau was only possible after the idealised tribalism had effected the loss of importance of hapū (Sissons, 2004, 24).

Taking up strands of earlier arguments Sissons (2005b) focused on indigeneity and defined indigenous cultures as ‘... cultures that have been transformed through the struggles of colonized peoples to resist and redirect projects of settler nationhood’ (Sissons, 2005b, 15). A ‘relational approach towards indigeneity’, which puts emphasis on political processes between groups rather than the specific history of a group (van Meijl, 2006, 67). This approach also links indigeneity to the concept of the nation-state and its legal system (Friedman, 2008; Barnard, 2006; see also Kuper’s 2003; 2006 critique of the concept of indigeneity). Sissons (2005b, 31) identified a ‘binary of indigeneism’ at work, with clear boundaries needed in between indigenous cultures and between settler cultures and indigenous cultures. Transgressions of boundaries between any cultures in the form of ‘cultural sharing’ are then threatening the concept of indigeneity and settler nation-states (Sissons, 2005b, 31). Under these conditions urban Māori constitute an ‘excluded middle’, since urban dwelling is outside the understanding of indigenous populations as confined to the margins of society, metaphorically and geographically (Sissons, 2005b, 39). In Sissons’ description several actors gain from this binary of indigeneism. Post-colonial

\footnote{See Babadzan’s (2000, 141) distinction of ‘invented traditions’ and ‘pre-modern forms’. In a later publication he called these ‘state kastom’ and ‘local kastom’ (Babadzan, 2004, 327).
\footnote{Markowitz (2004, 343) argued along similar lines pointing out that in the narratives of indigenous and settler populations ‘hybridity’ creates mixed categories, categories which these narratives portray as ‘better left alone’.}
governments prefer to deal with a single point of contact, found in ‘rural leaders’, thereby circumventing the ‘messier reality of transitory and relocated lives’ represented by urban indigenes (Sissons, 2005b, 124). To retain political power ‘tribal leaders’ in turn have an interest in ‘preserving the appearance of tribalism’ (Sissons, 2005b, 82). Against this Sissons (2005b, 63) proposed to look at urbanisation of indigenous peoples not as the loss of a culture but as a ‘relocation of indigeneity’.

Rata (1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003a,b,c, 2005) focused on the material circumstances of life as the main reasons for changes. Based on a Marxist reading of social conditions, she developed a theory of ‘neotribal capitalism’ (Rata 2000, passim; 2003c, passim; 2005, passim). Changes within Māori society were then increasingly aimed at changing the material circumstances of a small section of Māori society, the ‘comprador bourgeoisie of neotribal capitalism’ (Rata, 2003b, 58). Rata integrated the ethnification of Māori protests in the 1970s, the indigenisation in the 1980s, and the ascent of tribes to their current status of political and economic power in the 1990s into the theoretical framework. In short, the ‘local-global dialectic of capitalism’ (Rata, 2003b, 46) created a strong Māori ethnic identity in the 1970s and 1980s under the project of biculturalism. The 1980s saw the indigenisation of Māori protests, to the effect that Māori became ‘tangata whenua’ (Rata, 2002, 175). A Pākehā relationship to land was then only possible ‘through their relationship to Maori’ (Rata, 2002, 175).

In New Zealand indigeneity then became the concept of historical continuity’ (Rata, 2001, 177), ‘traditional’ society was — and still is — depicted as possessing ‘a stability grounded in time and in space’ (Rata, 2000, 47). A decade later indigeneity and tribal affiliation became congruent through the understanding of the tribe as the ‘legitimate inheritor of a traditional communal society’ (Rata, 2002, 181). Like others before her Rata identified non-tribal Māori and tribes without public recognition as the disadvantaged of this retribalisation process. From Rata’s (2005, 5) perspective the contemporary ‘neotribe’ is not a ‘revival of the tribe’ but a new construct, a ‘historically located response to the harsh material circumstances of global capitalism’ (Rata, 2000, 43, f., also Rata, 2002, 191).

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18From Ballara’s description it is obvious that court hearings were ambiguous situations in regard to chiefly mana. While these hearings presented an opportunity to enhance chiefly mana hearings equally presented a chance for tribal members to publicly subvert chiefly mana by questioning chiefly knowledge ‘in order to protect their own stake in the land’ (Ballara, 1998, 268).

19For Rata (2001, 171) the purpose of this ‘bicultural project’ was the ‘atonement’ of the ‘Pakeha new class’s guilt’ stemming from ‘intellectual idealism’ — establishing a nation by ‘military conquest and colonial oppression’ does not sit well with a liberalist worldview — and from the paradoxical nature of knowledge within this new class: as ‘cultural base’ and as ‘capital commodity’. For Kolig (2000, 246) the bicultural project was a ‘self-cleansing mechanism of hegemony, a palliative of conscience’, whereas for Williams (1996, 12) biculturalism was simply more ‘advantageous’ for global economic relations than ‘colonialism and racism’.

20Pearson (1989, 1991) and Spoonley (1991) both argued that a strong ethnic identity amongst Pākehā, other than in their relationship to Māori, has not emerged due to the lack of political or economic need.
Sissons (2005a) and Ryan (2005) critiqued Rata’s concept of the neotribal elite, seen by Tremewan (2005a,b) as one of the few pieces of scholarly work focusing on the trend of biculturalism. In short both argued that Rata’s concept exaggerated the influence of elites and created a ‘simplistic binarism’ of powerless masses steered by a small elite (Sissons, 2005a, 31), a ‘division of the world and its inhabitants into ‘Goodies-and-Baddies” (Ryan, 2005, 36). Tremewan (2005b) in return pointed out that his concern had mainly been with the lack of influence rather than the lack of existing scholarly material. It remains unclear how and why Rata’s publications have more influence on public discourse in Tremewan’s eyes than the aforementioned publications of Webster, Sissons, and van Meijl.

Works on Ngāi Tahu

Several publications concerning Ngāi Tahu are of particular interest in that they all point towards an increasing importance of the bureaucratic structure of the iwi and the resistance against this structure. While the first three authors are largely critical of the new structure the fourth author defends, implicitly, the existence of this structure. Further the works of three authors cited below, Kelly, Waymouth, and O’Regan, focus on the importance of ancestry as sole criteria for tribal membership and with it the increased political power of the bureaucratic structure.

In an article on the increasing bureaucratisation of the Ngāi Tahu tribe Sissons (1995, 71) pointed out that government recognition has led to ‘a centralization of knowledge and expertise, and an increased politicization of tradition’. These two processes are ‘potentially contradictory’ and have led within the tribe to an emphasis on ‘open and effective communication between the centre and periphery’ (Sissons, 1995, 71).

With her works on the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board (NTMTB) and the successor, Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu (TRoNT), Kelly (1991, 1998) proffered further ethnographic detail to Sissons’ statement of the centralisation of knowledge and the politicisation of tradition and culture within the Ngāi Tahu tribe. To counter the fears of tribal members that the NTMTB might become a ‘centralised structure’ (Kelly, 1991, 83) the rūnanga structure was revived to hand decision-making power back to subsidiary institutions. Fears of bureaucratic centralisation were well-founded as one Board member admitted: ‘We [the Trust Board] built a sort of multinational empire, and we

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21For another critique of Tremewan’s articles see Barber (2006).
22The rūnanga structure was first developed by Governor Grey in the 1860s with the intention to speed up the assimilation of Māori. Although never passed into legislation Ngāi Tahu hapū ‘voluntarily adopted’ the system of territorial organisation and further developed it to suit their needs (Waymouth, 2003, 4). If we accept Fortes’ and Evans-Pritchard’s (1950, 5) dichotomy then this represents a step from a system of uncentralised political power to one with ‘centralized authority’ in which territorial boundaries rather than common ancestry define political allegiance.
left our people behind’ (Solomon cited in Kelly, 1991, 163). Accompanying this was also a shift from private knowledge to official knowledge and power (Kelly, 1991, 109-120). Whakapapa, in this case simply seen as genealogical lists of tribal members, was stored centrally and allowed for ‘documentary proof of tribal boundaries’ which was ‘absolutely crucial to any success anticipated from the land claims’ (Kelly, 1991, 115). Further, the central storage of whakapapa information brought on an unprecedented level of tribal unity, a goal which had remained elusive to all previous institutions attempting to govern the iwi (Kelly, 1991, 120). In a later publication Kelly (1998) focused on the strategic rhetoric use of “Then’ and ‘Now” (Kelly, 1998, 84) by TRoNT members attempting to unite an iwi that had historically never been ‘united’ (Kelly, 1998, 86). Between then and now, so TRoNT members claimed, the tribe had undergone no significant changes, remaining a ‘homogenous iwi who share a united identity arising out of one particular point in history and shared cultural practice since ‘Then” (Kelly, 1998, 84).

Waymouth (2003) focused on the use of whakapapa within the new iwi bureaucracy and showed that TRoNT, despite frequent allusions to being a ‘whakapapa-based society’, had adopted the governance style of a ‘legal-rational bureaucracy’ (Waymouth, 2003, 6). This had opposed TRoNT to the subsidiary entities, the rūnanga, which operated under Māori values. Further, by proposing an iwi-wide unity TRoNT effectively undermined the identity of the constituting hapū and created a ‘single ethnic homogeneous group’, thus ‘TRONT is reinventing itself and creating the appropriate history to satisfy its own reinvention’ (Waymouth, 2003, 9). Turning to the effects on tribal members Waymouth (2003, 10) argued that the ‘principles of whakapapa’, such as reciprocity and sustainability, had been replaced by an individual membership in a tribe as ‘beneficiaries’, with rights but no obligations. Furthering this issue is the geographical dispersion of tribal members (Waymouth, 2003).

O’Regan, of Ngāi Tahu descent herself, creates the counterpoint to the aforementioned authors. Arguing that a ‘denial of Maori identity’ would lead to a ‘denial of substantive Treaty rights’ (O’Regan, 2001, 25), she set out to explain ‘Kai Tahu identity as a constantly shifting relational category’ (O’Regan, 2001, 27). According to O’Regan (2001) the tribe had been the focus of identity before the arrival of European settlers and reliance on whakapapa allowed for a secure identity without the need to comply to preconceived notions of appearance, behaviour, or locality. O’Regan then differentiated Ngāi Tahu membership into eight different categories, displayed as concentric circles, with a decrease in participation from the centre to the periphery. O’Regan’s thesis is a defence of the Ngāi Tahu tribal diversity in times of declining participation against allegations of cultural inauthenticity and assimilation
from other Māori and Pākehā alike. In this sense O’Regan’s thesis is also implicitly a
defence of the tribal bureaucracy to distribute settlement proceeds out to all Ngāi
Tahu tribal members on the basis of ancestry alone.

3.5 Conclusion

As shown above Māori society was represented as a hierarchically segmented static
three-tier structure for a large part of the twentieth century, a structure unchanged by
the growth of internal units. Groups were understood to be associated with more or
less clearly defined areas. Fundamental changes to this structure in the present day
were attributed to the arrival of European seafarers. From the 1970s onwards this
understanding of a static Māori society was criticised by a number of scholars.
Largely focusing on whether or not the three-tier structure was historically correct
these scholars argued that iwi had been far less important than previously advocated
and that changes had taken place regarding the function, composition and the
importance of whānau, hapū and iwi, changes which had influenced the earlier
anthropological depiction of Māori society. From the 1990s onwards, based on the
earlier criticisms of the static model of Māori society, the roles of elites in the
propagation of the three-tier structure became the focus of scholarly inquiry.
Increasingly it became clear that although Pākehā arrival had had a tremendous
influence on the restructuring of Māori society, internal forces within Māori society
played a significant role in this restructuring as well.

With Firth (1957), Kawharu (1975) and Metge (1995) all pointing towards the
importance of active participation to achieve full membership rights within a
community the idea of participation as the basis for the creation of a new segmentary
opposition can hardly be called new. This thesis argues that what is new are a) the
way in which iwi members are nowadays defined singularly through descent by the
bureaucratic structure of the iwi; b) the understanding of participation, shifting from
active participation to democratic participation, and lastly c), the possibilities offered
by CMC to achieve these new forms of participation. The following thesis then fills
this gap in the existing literature about Māori society. The thesis focuses on the
influence of perceptions on the use of CMC, on the construction of an understanding
of what it means to be Ngāi Tahu and how CMC fits into this understanding.

Sissons (1995, 71) predicted that in the future the ‘quantity and quality of information’
passing between the ‘centre’ and the ‘periphery’, TRoNT and the rūnanga, would
become as important as the physical components of communication represented by
computers, faxes, and local meetings. This thesis then tells of the doubts some locally
active members have about the influence of non-active or distant tribal members on decision making processes. It also supports van Meijl’s (1998) assessment of democracy as a fluid concept with many possible meanings. For some tribal members democracy represents a chance to participate remotely, for the iwi bureaucracy it represents a larger area of influence but also a more efficient way of delivering benefits to and staying in contact with tribal members, for others it represents a return to foreign rule by distant or physically non-active tribal members and an iwi bureaucracy regarded as power hungry. The thesis also tells of a continued struggle for valorisation by different groups of tribal members, those who represent what Sissons (2005b, 124) described as the ‘messier reality of transitory and relocated lives’ and those who wish to be seen as quintessential rural tribal members. The use of CMC for inner-tribal communication then becomes more than just the incorporation of a new technology into existing information structures.

To this end the following chapter will show that Ngāi Tahu can be described with one of the currently dominant theoretical directions, the concept of the ‘network society’ (Castells, 2000a, 2004b). The description will give us an understanding to which extent New Zealanders, and with it many members of the Ngāi Tahu tribe, are connected to and reliant on the use of CMC. It will also give us an understanding of the ambiguity concerning the use of CMC by many members. This ambiguity stems from resistance against what is perceived as a loss of cultural values through the digitisation of a culture and the simultaneous increased use of technology to perpetuate and reinvigorate a culture perceived to be under threat. Lastly, using this concept will also clarify that the observed phenomena are by no means unique to Ngāi Tahu or New Zealand.
Chapter 4
Societies and CMC

4.1 Introduction

The last chapter has shown that inner-tribal segmentation within Māori society was at all times more fluid than functionalist and structural-functionalist theories allowed for. The last chapter also showed that change was not always introduced by the Pākehā part of New Zealand’s society. Inner-tribal forces were at play as well, with, for example, tribal chiefs attempting to regain some of their lost political influence and iwi bureaucracies coming into being.

In this environment of shifting allegiances the use of computer-mediated communication (CMC) represents some of the underlying issues within a society, ‘technology’ is then ‘society made durable’ (Latour, 1991, 103). To substantiate this claim the purpose of this chapter is three-fold. First I want to introduce publications concerned with the effects of CMC on social structures, political participation, and social sciences. This literature will show that depending on the specific focus of inquiry largely differing conclusions can be reached. While this is the nature of science it also shows that a technologically deterministic answer regarding the introduction of CMC is not possible. Rather CMC is appropriated and contextualised differently into a wide range of localities with differing social, cultural, and political configurations. This appropriation and contextualisation is at the core of the ‘network society’ concept (Castells 2000, 2004), the introduction of which is the second purpose of this chapter. There are reasons for the creation of a network society and general features of this form of society which pertain to every locale, but local configurations influence the development of a locally specific network society. After a brief introduction of this concept I will use the concept as a framework to analyse the current situation regarding CMC in New Zealand and the Ngāi Tahu tribe, the third purpose of this chapter.
A note regarding the terminology used here. A simplistic analogy for communication protocols are languages. In the following I will use computer-mediated communication (CMC) rather than the Internet because a) this term includes all possible forms of communication and b) some of the literature pertains to networks using protocols which predate the Internet as it is known today, such as the Coloured Book Protocols used throughout JANET, the Joint Academic NETwork in the UK. Today the Internet is understood as the network connecting smaller locally operated networks. To allow information transfer between the different networks the common protocol is the TCP/IP, the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol. The world wide web is only one part of the Internet, consisting of coded documents which are hyper-linked, allowing readers to move between different documents. Other parts are for example file sharing and synchronous and asynchronous communication.

4.2 Interaction between humans and computers

I have divided research concerned with the uptake of CMC into three inter-connected areas: The possible effects on communities, the political process, and social science research.

Communality

Research on the effects of CMC can be divided into several categories. Some researchers see vast changes to societal structures and individuals, others see little apparent effects, others see no change at all, another group argues that the understanding of civil society is flawed, while the last group points towards a lack of analytical objectivity when CMC is analysed.

Baym (1998) argued that social scientists had neglected the impact of CMC on social processes until the late 1990s in favour of studies on its impact on business.¹ Licklider and Taylor, however, posited already in 1968 that ‘commonality of interests’ would be the new driving force behind interaction rather than ‘accidents of proximity’ (Licklider and Taylor, 1968, 31; see also Wellman et al., 1996, 231). CMC then relieves humans of the ‘friction of space’ (Hampton, 2004, 217), all those costs involved in communicating across large distances. Etzioni and Etzioni (1999) went further and argued that CMC was in fact superior to face-to-face communication in many regards and Bailey (1992) even argued that the strength of computers — parallel processing of information — will introduce sequentially thinking humans to entirely different world views.

¹See Berdayes (2000) for a historical contextualisation of computer use in workplaces and Callaghan (2000) for an interesting overview of management philosophies and computer use.
4.2. INTERACTION BETWEEN HUMANS AND COMPUTERS

Wellman (2001, 17) championed the idea that ‘networks’ had replaced ‘groups’ with individuals continuously accessing different networks available to them. Locality, however, does still affect communication through the specific configuration of ‘information, skills, goods, services and networks’ (Wellman, 2001, 36; for a similar argument for businesses see Gurstein, 2001). The new form of communication, Wellman et al. (2001a,b) argued, brings with it an increased level of participation in on-line and off-line community activities, however, it also leads to a decrease in ‘community commitment’ (Wellman et al., 2001a, 448). Hampton (2003, 418) argued that these ‘dense networks of weak social ties’ were an important characteristic of the new form of sociality. New links are made through these networks, weak links which might eventually be transformed into strong relationships, especially within far-flung families (Hampton, 2004).

Mejias (2001, 220) argued that ‘virtuality’ severed the ties between information producers and their environment and was therefore unsustainable. Mejias (2001, 221) further argued that this form of communication cemented elite status and was justified by ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom of expression’. Pardeck and Chung (2000, 204) found the source of problems in CMC technologies themselves and argued that computer use required a ‘tacit acceptance of an ontology’ thus constricting the users’ ‘understanding of social reality’. Blanchette and Johnson (2002, 35) pointed towards the ‘lack of institutional forgetfulness’ as one of the biggest issues of CMC and Robins (1999, 24) argued that rather than improving existing knowledge CMC is creating ‘extraterritorial’, i.e. corporate, and ‘territorial knowledges’, the relation of which needed to be discussed.

For some social researchers CMC had brought little change to social interaction. Kraut et al. (1998, 1019) posited a decline of social interaction through the replacement of ‘strong personal ties [needing] physical proximity’ by CMC. In a more recent study the research team relativised these findings and argued that for ‘extraverts’ the effects of CMC were positive, whereas for ‘introverts’ they were not (Kraut et al., 2002, 64). Gross et al. (2002) came to the same conclusion when studying the effects of CMC on adolescents.

Other scientists argued that CMC is in fact ‘not new at all’ (Silverstone, 1999, 11), and that analysis has to focus on social appropriation — repeated with every new technology — rather than the novelty of the technical aspects of CMC (Livingstone, 1999). Rice (1999), Agre (2002a), and Flichy (1999) similarly pointed towards the socially constructed character of CMCs. Rice (1999) argued that conventions incorporated in new media were more obvious than in old media, whereas Agre (2002a) argued that without a clear view on these conventions responsible use or
theorisation of CMC was impossible. Flichy (1999) argued that past failures of CMC technologies were neglected in the current understanding of CMCs, the understanding is ‘breathlessly present-oriented’ (Wellman et al., 1996, 214). Tyler (2002, 204) came to the conclusion that while there were certain interesting features embedded in CMC ‘basic psychological or social life’ would not be transformed. Mosco (1998) argued that CMC was a way to build community when used in connection with other media, but stated later that CMC represented ‘just another in a series of interesting, but ultimately banal exercises in the extension of human tools’ (Mosco, 2004, 119). The current public and scholarly focus on CMC is based on the human will to live in the era which is ‘transforming the world as we have known it’ (Mosco, 2004, 118). Putnam (2000) argued that civic engagement, mostly in officially recognised organisations, was on the decline in the USA. He was, however, adamant that CMC was not the reason for this decline. Calling Wellman, in private, a ‘wild-eyed optimist’ (Wellman, 2001, 34), Putnam (2000, 411) put a stop to dreams of virtual communality and argued that CMC could only ‘reinforce rather than supplant place-based, face-to-face, enduring social networks’.

Other scholars have argued that the concepts generated before the era of CMC are ill-fitted to the new possibilities. Ester and Vinken (2003, 660), for example, identified a ‘lack of sensitivity’ towards ‘alternative and innovative forms of solidarity’ which were only possibly through CMC. Postill (2008, 414) on the other hand identified ‘an overdependence on two key notions: community and network’ in current research and proposed yet another analytical concept: the ‘social field’ (Postill, 2008, 418), focusing more on the individual users as actors rather than communities or networks.

The last category of scholars argues that CMC cannot yet be fully understood. Galston (1999, 59; see also Baym, 1998, 63), for example, argued that groups based on CMC could fulfil important aspects of social life, however, these groups are by no means a glimpse of social future. Galston (1999, 59) even questioned whether CMC-based communities could develop ‘good citizens and mature human beings’ due to the lack of authority and ‘cost-free entrance and exit’ options. Stolterman (2001) saw the unpredictability of CMC less in the social effects but rather based on the constantly changing nature of the technological details.

**Politics**

Changes in the societal structure effect changes in the political process and vice versa. Researchers into the effects of CMC on the political process can be largely divided into two categories: those who have identified changes and those who see little change at all.
Ronfeldt (1992, 244) predicted that ‘cyberocracy ... [the] ... rule by way of information’ is coming. He did not suggest whether this cyberocracy will create open democracies or all-knowing authoritarian regimes. Both might in fact be the case: ‘part of the populace may be empowered to act more democratically than ever, but other parts may be subjected to new techniques of surveillance and control’ (Ronfeldt, 1992, 283). Mehta and Darier (1998, 155) were equally cautious and pointed towards the ‘potential for increased control’ inherent in CMC and the ‘potential for increased resistance’ equally inherent in CMC. Bimber (1998, passim) predicted an ‘accelerated pluralism’ with fast changing topic-based interest groups. More importantly, he identified two issues with most research regarding the effects of CMC on the political process. The first issue is the assumption that an increase of communication possibilities will result in increased communication. The second issue, running deeper, is the assumption that communication is the basis for community.

Other researchers see a political future for CMC. Lewis (2000, 117) made it clear that the ‘computer is not utopia’, but nonetheless saw in CMC the potential to destabilise ‘dominant discourse’ (Lewis, 2000, 107). Siapera (2006) also saw possibilities for the creation of counter-discourses to dominant discourses through the use of CMC.

Others see the effects of CMC on the political process as less favourable. For Lievrouw (1998, 93) CMC will lead to decreased ‘mobilization’ between ‘social groups’ with a gap opening between resource rich users of private and more narrowly defined information and resource poorer users of ‘mass/public media’ which carries ‘mainstream (noncontroversial)’ information (Lievrouw, 1998, 94). Hall (1999, 51) argued that CMC had brought on a ‘virtual colonization’ and rather than being the ‘gateway to transcendence’ the ‘second media age’ appeared ‘to be a new iteration of long established practices of colonialism’. People using CMC are described as indulging increasingly in solipsistic behaviour, narrowing down the contact with differently interested individuals while increasing contact with like-minded people. Heterogeneity is then more curbed than enhanced by the possibilities of CMC. Hall attested CMC the power to ‘retrenchment’ (Friedman 2004, passim) in all levels of society: ‘cyberpunk’s gated communities, shopping in the virtual mall and engaging only with their own kind, while fighting back the teeming masses beyond the barricades’ (Hall, 1999, 46).

Other researchers have questioned the effects of CMC on the political process. Agre (2002b, 317) argued that CMC does not generate new forces but rather amplifies ‘existing forces’, thus making a generalised answer to the question of influence impossible. CMC, hailed as intrinsically democratic and therefore morally good is subjected to the same constraints as other tools, namely that ‘culture runs deeper than
any technology and so do its conflicts’ (Agre, 2002a, 185). Ranerup (2001, 216)
questioned whether CMC used in Sweden had any ‘democratic effect’, particularly
since participation was far from satisfactory. Bimber’s (1998) argument that more
opportunities did not equal more communication was then correct for this case.
Coleman (1999) was even less optimistic than Ranerup and concluded that political
elite used CMC to further cement their positions and that increased communication
possibilities did not mean that political elites reacted to the input. For Golding (2000,
180) the effects of CMC on the political process faltered with the users: ‘the dream of
Jeffersonian democracy through optic fibres had been transposed into the opportunity
to save a twenty-minute round trip to the video rental store’. Althaus and Tewksbury
(2000) would agree with this conclusion. Their findings were that while CMC
replaced traditional entertainment channels it did not replace traditional news media.

Social sciences

The following publications are grouped into three categories, those concerning
specific problems, those arguing for the need of new theories and those arguing that
existing theories are capable of explaining the social use of CMC.

Inquiries have been made into the use of CMC as a research area (Ruhleder, 2000;
Wilson and Peterson, 2002), the reading of hypertext (Hodge, 2003; Lemke, 2002;
Perez-Hernáiz and Murphy, 2000; Stroud, 2003), ethical problems of CMC research
(Hakken, 2000; King, 1996; Polancic Boehlefeld, 1996; Schrum, 1995; Reid, 1996;
Thomas, 1996; Waskul and Douglass, 1996; Allen, 1996; Herring, 1996; Hudson and
Bruckman, 2004; Jacobson, 1999), the influence of CMC on the actual research process
(Hert, 1997), CMC as a research tool (Bampton and Cowton, 2002; Paccagnella, 1997;
Rezabek, 2000; Jacobson, 1999), and the influence of CMC on the production of
anthropological texts (Barkin and Stone, 2004; Mason and Dicks, 2001; Fabian, 2002).
Many of these publications have been referred to in chapter two and will not be
further discussed here. The publications mentioned above focus on narrowly defined
areas of research and CMC, whereas the publications discussed below focus on the
implications of CMC on social sciences and anthropology in particular.

Some researchers have called for new forms of research, fitting the use of CMC.
Sassen (2002, 365, f) for example called for a new form of sociology which appreciates
the ‘embeddedness’ of new technologies and does not use ‘analytical categorizations
... developed under other spatial and historical conditions, that is, conditions
preceding the current digital era’. An answer can be found in Kling’s (2000, 218; see
also Kling, 1999) ‘social informatics’ aimed at establishing the interaction between
humans, machines, information, and locality. But, this form of social inquiry is hardly
new and has been practised for several decades (Kling, 1980; see also Sawyer and Rosenbaum, 2000). Hakken (2001) wondered whether there was a distinctly anthropological form of inquiry into the use of CMC. He concluded that the ‘centrality of fieldwork’ was at once the answer and the highest hurdle, since research into CMC hardly offered anything akin to classical fieldwork (Hakken, 2001, 538).

Other researchers have argued that existing theories and methods of inquiry are more than capable tools for the analysis of the use of CMC. Iacono (1996, 449) lamented the ‘demise of meaning-making’, arguing that many social scientists focused on ‘information processing’ rather than the ‘struggle over the production of meaning’, which could be addressed with existing theories. Golding (2000, 181) concluded the opposite to Sassen, namely that despite ‘rapid innovations the ‘key analytical elements of modernity’ were still central to social inquiry. Escobar (1994, 211) argued that new fields of anthropological inquiry had to be explored with the creation of ‘cyberia’, but that ultimately CMC was a ‘cultural invention, in the sense that it brings forth a world, it emerges out of particular cultural conditions and in turn helps to create new ones’. Miller and Slater (2000, 5) equally argued that online practices ‘happen within mundane social structures and relations that they may transform but ... they cannot escape into a self-enclosed cyberian apartness’. Anthropological research is then capable to explain the adaptation of CMC to local circumstances. Komito (1998) went further and argued that CMC user communities and foraging societies displayed many similarities and thus theories generated for the latter, the archetypical field of anthropological inquiry, should be used for the new forms of community.

That old departmental boundaries and theories have survived the arrival of CMC is shown by Wynn and Katz (1997). Making a very clear argument the authors ultimately conclude that works concerning the use of CMC written by psychologists, e.g. Turkle and Stone, should be examined critically since the focus on the individual, in particular individuals who ‘exemplify the extremes of behaviour’ (Wynn and Katz, 1997, 300), will only give a distorted view of the reality of CMC.

### 4.3 The network society

**Why this concept?**

The concept of the network society (Castells, 2000a,b, 2003, 2004b,a; Castells et al., 2007) does not answer all the questions regarding the social appropriation of new

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2For Murphy (2000, 125) ‘there is nothing virtual about virtual reality. Virtual reality is merely another cultural world’.
technologies. It does, however, provide a useful framework for the analysis of CMC. The concept has several distinctive features: First, societal change is not attributed to the introduction of computers, rather it is attributed to a number of factors. Second, it does situate the use of computers historically, thus making it clear that the current state of CMC is dependent on past decisions and failures. Third, and last, due to the integration of computers into existing societies the concept of the network society explicitly requires localisation. Abell and Reyniers (2000, 748) pointed out that labelling a society a network society is of little explanatory use. The important insight is then the way in which a society is transformed into a network society.

**Historical contextualisation**

Industrialism, the technological paradigm of the Fordist era, has been replaced by a new paradigm: ‘electronic informational-communicationalism’ or in short ‘informationalism’ (Castells, 2004a, 9). The new paradigm relies on technologies created during the Fordist era and is, like its predecessor, heavily reliant on energy. Under the new paradigm, however, the emphasis is on information processing and distribution. What is new in the informationalist era, since information has always meant power and has always been disseminated in some form? Castells (2004a, 9) identified three ‘major, distinctive features’ of new technologies used in the informationalist era: First, these technologies are able to self-expand their ‘processing and communicating capacity’ (Castells, 2004a, 9) in three dimensions: the speed at which information is processed, the amount of data processed, and the complexity of the data. Knowledge produced with the help of these technologies also allows for the creation of new technologies with new capacities, a ‘continuous feedback effect on technological innovation’ (Castells, 2004a, 10). Second, the new technologies allow for a recombination of information. Unrelated data can be linked together, creating again new technologies and new knowledge. Third, the new technologies are innately flexible, allowing for example the distribution of processing power and the re-routing of digital information around physical obstructions (Castells, 2004a, 11).

In Castells’ concept of the network society, the form of society created through informationalism, technology plays a pivotal role. Yet, the resistance against, the

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3The most concise description of the concept of the network society is the article ‘Informationalism, networks, and the network society: a theoretical blueprint’ in Castells’ (2004b) *The network society: A cross-cultural perspective*. The chapter is used as the main source in the following description.

4See Baca (2004) for a critique of the unquestioned use of the term Fordism since Harvey’s *The Condition of Postmodernity* on which Castells based large parts of his concept. According to Baca, Harvey essentialised Fordism to mean stability in labour relations, which was replaced by post-Fordism, meaning an increased flexibility and individualisation of labour relations taking away all securities such as the negotiation power of large unions, built into the Fordist labour relations.

5Castells (2004a) identified these features also within genetical engineering.
appropriation of, and the demands towards new technologies are locally specific and are an important part of the concept. The concept is then not technologically deterministic.

Castells identified the coincidental co-occurrence of three factors economical, societal and technological in the 1970s as the basis of the new social structure. First, major changes in the prevalent economical ideologies occurred. Several factors contributed to the occurring changes. The levels of ‘productivity growth’ of previous decades could not be maintained through traditional means, i.e. the increase of the production and consumption of energy. Hence a transition to a ‘knowledge-based productivity growth’ had to be made (Castells, 2004a, 15). The reduction of government intervention, welfare spending and redistribution of income, spearheaded by the governments of Thatcher in the UK (1979) and Reagan in the USA (1980), led to the process of globalisation (Castells, 2004a, 16). Lastly, the economy of the Soviet Union reached the ‘point of quasi-stagnation’ and was therefore incapable of challenging the hegemony of globalised capitalism with its many variants in the different nations of the world (Castells, 2004a, 17, f.). Second, the 1960s and 1970s also saw a new type of protest, the ‘cultural social movements’ (Castells, 2004a, 18), which, similar to the new global capitalist regime, built on the historical backgrounds of the individual nation-states both in terms of goals and protest forms thus resulting in social movements specific to particular nation-states. Despite this localisation the common goal of these movements was a fundamental change of values of the respective societies, in Castells’ (2004a, 19) terms ‘these social movements were cultural; that is, oriented toward a transformation of the values of society’. The values proposed around the world were three: the value of individual freedom and autonomy against the oppressive power of the state, society and corporations; the ‘value of cultural diversity’ and minority rights; and, lastly, the value of ‘ecological solidarity’, the turn away from the ‘industrial values’ of consumption and production at all costs to a common goal of humanity: saving the planet (Castells, 2004a, 19). The third and last factor leading to the new social structure was the ‘revolution in information and communication technologies’ (Castells, 2004a, 20) occurring in the 1970s. It is important to note here that despite the historical context of the Cold War and the resulting military funding for the emerging technologies these technologies were not necessarily produced for the military sector, but rather the outcome of experiments by computer scientists to satisfy their ‘own scientific curiosity’ (Castells, 2004a, 20).[^7]

[^6]: Against Castells I would argue that not the process of globalisation but the awareness of globalisation was raised in the early 1980s. Mintz’s (1998) argument against the use of the term transnational instead of international rings true here as well: What is the difference between past and present world-spanning trade expeditions?

[^7]: See Castells (2001, 10-17) for a description of the first years of CMC.
The three processes described above, although originating independently, largely effected upon each other. The new cultural social movements informed the inventors of the new communication technologies, these technologies in turn allowed for the hegemony of a global economy with an emphasis on knowledge based production growth (Castells, 2004a, 22).

**Structure, power, culture**

In his writings Castells stated two important characteristics of the network society. First, while being a ‘global society’ the network society develops in every locale in a highly specialised form, building on and incorporating local past experiences and existing institutions. The integration of existing materials and the ‘coexistence’ of the network society alongside established social structures is ‘a highly significant feature’ of the network society, leading to internal fragmentation (Castells, 2004a, 23). The second characteristic of the network society is the ongoing reliance on simple mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, part of every form of communication. The issue is not solely physical access, referred to as the digital divide, but also a social one. Being part of the physical network is not equivalent to being part of a social network and receiving relevant information (Castells, 2004a, 23).

What all localised forms of network societies have in common are the basic structure and three main features. The basic structure of the network society is a network of autonomous nodes with free flows of information within the network as opposed to the largely one way flow of information from the centre to the peripheries found in hierarchical societies. Nodes are the basic component of the network, processing and storing information. Nodes are not necessarily individuals, but can also represent groups of individuals such as social classes or companies. Yet, nodes do not exist independently of networks, but only as part of them, gaining importance within the network through increased information processing capacities or by absorbing information of relevance to the network (Castells, 2004a, 2-4). The three features distinguishing the network society from previous social structures is its flexibility, scalability and survivability. All three features rely on the new information and communication technologies. ‘Flexibility’ is the network’s capacity to change its components without changing the goals, and also the ability to bypass defective nodes by re-routing the information through other nodes (Castells, 2004a, 5). ‘Scalability’ refers to the network’s ability to expand and shrink without major disruptions (Castells, 2004a, 5). ‘Survivability’ means a network, due to its flexibility...

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8Castells (2000a, 15) defined a node as ‘the point where the curve intersects itself’. Critiquing Castells Abell and Reyniers (2000, 747) asked ‘[w]hat are we to make of all of this?’ Although mathematically possibly correct Castells’ definition does not appear to explain the nature of a node.
and scalability, can only be destroyed through physical elimination of the majority of its nodes (Castells, 2004a, 5). Like all types of past and present networks the network society also has a binary character. Nodes either belong to the network or they don’t, irrespective of the physical distance between them. All nodes within a network share a communication protocol. In conjunction with modern communication technologies the distance between nodes tends towards zero. All of this has to be seen with one clarifying remark: People still live their lives in physical places.

Castells (2004a, 36, ff.) elaborated on two processes at work within the network society: the ‘space of flows’ and ‘timeless time’. The space of flows is, in simple terms, the ‘technological and organizational possibility of practising simultaneity ... without contiguity’ (Castells, 2004a, 36). Three elements constitute the space of flows. First, the ‘space of the network society’ (Castells, 2004a, 36): the locality of activities, i.e. specific places. Second, the ‘material communication networks’ (Castells, 2004a, 36) which link the different places and activities. And, lastly, the ‘flows of information’, both ‘content and geometry of the flows’, performing the activities (Castells, 2004a, 37). The space of flows becomes localised in every form of the network society and is the site of struggle with local communities trying to maintain ’a sense of places’ (Castells, 2004a, 37). Experiential knowledge is valued higher than the instrumental logic of the space of flows. Castells called this process the “grass-rooting’ of the space of flows’ (Castells, 2004a, 38). It is within the process of the space of flows that the issue of the digital divide takes on a new dimension. Many authors have discussed issues pertaining to the digital divide: the social impact of having no access to CMC (Liff and Steward, 2001), the capabilities of communities to close the digital divide (Borgida et al., 2002; Dutta-Bergman, 2005), the impact of race on access (Novak and Hoffman, 1998), the impact of economic circumstances (Baker and Coleman, 2004), and whether or not physical access was the only issue when conceptualising the digital divide (Dijk and Hacker, 2003). Within the process of the space of flows the digital divide also takes on the dimension of resistance. The starting question then is no longer how to close the digital divide but rather whether or not the communities and individuals affected by the divide do indeed feel affected. Analysing the situation for New Zealand the Ministry of Economic Development/Manatū Ōhanga (1999), Doczi (2000), and Te Puni Kokiri (2001) for example raised concerns about the digital divide affecting Māori. Against these concerns Infometrics Ltd (2001) pointed out that national policies were unlikely to succeed unless Māori perceived the digital divide as being to their disadvantage and, if so, were not capable of closing it themselves.

Within this thesis the grass-rooting of the space of flows shows this dimension of resistance even more clearly with some tribal members artificially creating a digital divide to peripheralise other members.
CHAPTER 4. SOCIETIES AND CMC

The second process, ‘timeless time’ (Castells, 2004a, 37) refers to the compression of time and the blurring of time sequences through the possibilities offered by the new communication technologies. While during industrialism ‘becoming structured being’ informationialism is based on the premises that ‘being cancels becoming’ (Castells, 2004a, 37). Considering the groundedness of life in biological cycles I understand this process to be confined to information dissemination and the technologies related to it. Abell and Reyniers (2000, 748) accused social scientists in general of having taken to ‘the coining of striking (although vacuous) phrases which, while not helping our understanding of the world one iota, will be picked up by colleagues’. Timeless time seems to be an example of these kinds of ‘pseudo-poetic expressions’ (Abell and Reyniers, 2000, 749). Hine (2003) also critiqued Castells’ concept of timeless time and argued that ethnographic material offered one of the most powerful critiques of this concept. Closer inspection of participants’ actions reveals that ‘interpretive work’ is needed to ‘make sense of conflicting temporal orders’ (Hine, 2003, 103). She concluded that, although convincing ‘in an abstract theoretical sense’, the capability of the Internet to compress ‘time and space’ was far from easily observable in participants’ Internet use (Hine, 2003, 150).

Power and cultural diversity are incorporated in the new technological paradigm and the resulting new social structure. Using a Weberian approach Castells (2004a, 31) defined power as ‘the structural capacity to impose one’s will over another’s will’. Where power in the network society differs from power in the industrial society is the emphasis on networks of power rather than power focused within one person or node. Due to the multilayered dependencies between the different networks of power no one network can achieve power over all other networks. Governments worldwide are linked in supra-national organisations and have simultaneously devolved large parts of their power to more specialised representative bodies within the nation to attain ‘legitimacy through decentralization’ (Carnoy and Castells, 2001, 16). Military power alone cannot contain a crisis of capitalism, although war has established itself as a stable source of income for some countries. The global market appears to be out of control of any one government, while it is at the same time highly dependent on information which it receives through media networks. The list of dependencies is obviously much longer and much more in depth.

Castells (2004a, 32) argued that the connections between the different traditional power sources of society - military, economical, and political power - constitute networks themselves and are the ‘power-holders’. Nodes within these power-wielding networks are either ‘programmers’ or ‘switchers’ (Castells, 2004a, 32). Programmers are nodes which are able to change the goals of a network, capable of defining and redefining the purposes and the goals of networks. Switchers are
those nodes which link different networks, capable of using ‘protocols of
communication’ to translate the information one network carries into the protocol of
another network (Castells, 2004a, 3). Combined these two types of nodes create a
network of power, re-defining goals and communicating between different networks.

Castells (2000a, 7) defined cultures as ‘systems of values and beliefs informing codes
of behaviour’, which are products of the crystallisation of ‘symbolic communication
between humans, and the relationship between humans and nature’ specific to
particular areas (Castells, 2000a, 8). In the network society cultures are caught
between two opposing forces. One force is a global culture, which is ‘not made of
content but of process’ (Castells, 2004a, 39). The basic value of this pervasive culture
distributed through the networks is the ‘value of communication’ (Castells, 2004a, 39),
the importance of sharing information. The global culture is one of ‘communication
for the sake of communication’, which revels in the ‘joy of diversity’, of
communicating with others who are fundamentally different but are willing to
communicate their difference (Castells, 2004a, 40). The second force is constituted by
the localised cultures resisting a global culture and the influence of the local on the
global and vice versa. The network society is not imposed upon an existing culture,
but rather ‘develops in a multiplicity of cultural settings, produced by the differential
history of each context’ (Castells, 2004a, 38). This leads to many networks of differing
cultures interacting and conversing, not to one homogenous world culture;
‘fragmentation rather than convergence’ is the prevalent picture (Castells, 2004a, 39).
Localised cultures are the ‘trenches of autonomy’ (Castells, 2004a, 38) for those who
want to reassert their particularity in contrast to what is perceived as a homogenous
global culture.

4.4 The New Zealand network society

The New Zealand nation-state displays many of the features described by Castells as
typical for a network society. In the following I will point out some of these features,
give a brief history of CMC in New Zealand and, lastly, refocus on Ngāi Tahu and
give some figures regarding the use of CMC within the tribe.

International and national networks

The ‘contemporary doctrine of state sovereignty’ (Patman, 2005, 5) was established
already in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia. New Zealand, like many other
nation-states has undergone significant changes over the last half of the twentieth
century. Four areas of change will be highlighted here: military pacts, international
trading, national labour relations, and the devolution of powers. Only the last area
directly pertains to the argument made in this thesis. The other three areas are,
however, important for the creation of a network society.

In terms of its defence situation New Zealand has from an early stage onwards relied
on strategic partnerships. New Zealand entered into a military agreement with
Australia in 1944, the ANZAC Treaty, and together both nations entered into an
agreement with the USA in 1951, the ANZUS Treaty (Patman, 2005). The nation joined
SEATO, the South-East Asia Treaty Organization, in 1955 (McGibbon, 2005, 17) and
increased development assistance, such as the ‘Colombo Plan’, aimed at helping states
to develop and bringing economic stability to the region and thereby strengthening
these states against the perceived threat of communism (Rolfe, 2005, 34). The 1970s
saw a turn away from this military concept in New Zealand and a turn to stronger
economic bonds with the Southeast Asian region rather than military reliance on
Great Britain and the USA (Smith, 2005). New Zealand no longer perceived the region
through the ‘lens of imperial security’, but rather as a ‘barrier’ to southward
movements of forces potentially hostile to New Zealand itself (McGibbon, 2005, 7).

New Zealand lost its major export destination with the entry of Great Britain into the
EEC in 1973. To make up for this loss New Zealand negotiated an agreement with the
EEC for its farm products, signed direct agreements with a number of states including
Australia (CER 1983), Hong Kong, Singapore, and Chile. New Zealand has entered
into multi-lateral trade relations such as the APEC, and economic forums such as the
Pacific Islands Forum and ASEAN (Patman, 2005). New Zealand’s relationships with
the organisation and the individual member states and the perceived economic
benefits of an interaction with the organisation grew to such an extent that in the 1990s
government officials pointed out that New Zealand was of less interest to ASEAN
than vice versa (Rolfe, 2005; see also Hawke, 2005, 66-72, 74-82). Another feature of
the network society is visible in New Zealand’s relationship with the Southeast Asian
region: the interaction of different networks through the work of ‘switchers’ (Castells,
2004a, 33), connecting nodes between different networks. By the mid 1980s the New
Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued for a style of business relationships which
was modelled on an ‘Asian-style approach’, an approach essentialised to stand for an
‘emphasis on contacts and networking’ (Hawke, 2005, 64; O’Brien and Holmes, 1995,
1-3). At the same time, the Ministry pushed for an ‘economic co-operation’ approach
originating from Asia, with meetings between representatives of the business and
government sector to clarify goals and interests and foresee possible differences
(Hawke, 2005, 64). The relationship between New Zealand and the wider Southeast
Asian region ‘thickened’ from one of aid and defence to one ‘involving trade, investment and a policy dialogue built on economic co-operation’ (Hawke, 2005, 86).9

National labour relations in New Zealand have changed towards what Castells (2004a, 27) called a ‘feminization of the paid labour force’, characterised not only by the increased number of females but also by a higher level of flexibility. Within 30 years, between 1961 and 1991, female participation in the labour force rose by 182.5%. The male participation, in comparison, only rose by 39.1% between 1961 and 1986 and fell by 5.6% between 1986 and 1991 (Clark and Williams, 1995, 61). Regarding the general situation Patman (2005, 9) argued that New Zealand became more unequal in the decade from 1986 to 1996, due to ‘labour market deregulation’ and ‘cutbacks in social provisions’.10 Flexibility of the labour market was as predominant in New Zealand as in other OECD countries. In 1993, just two years after the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act of 1991 already 75% of employees were covered by a new employment contract (Clark and Williams, 1995, 60). Individual productivity and performance was rated higher than the bargaining power of unions.

New Zealand also saw an increase in part time work, although moderate, between 1979 and 1991. Again women were more flexible in their work hours, forced or voluntarily, with 35.7% of female labour being in part time work in 1991, whereas in the same year only 9.7% of male labour was in part-time work (Clark and Williams, 1995, 70). By the end of March 2007 these figures had changed to 34.7% of female labour being in part time work and 10.7% of male labour, with overall 21.7% of all labour in New Zealand being part time labour (Statistics New Zealand, 2008, 151). The steps described above the demise of the welfare state, deregulation of the labour market and national and international trading, feminisation and flexibility of labour are commonplace for the network state worldwide (see for example Castells, 2004b). Within the parameters of globalisation the ‘main project’ of the capitalist state is no longer to separate workers from their ‘class-based identity’, but to bring the ‘isolated, individualized worker into a global, market identity’ (Carnoy and Castells, 2001, 8).

As mentioned earlier the network society is characterised, amongst other things, by its fragmented nature. Nation-states have given much of their former power to international organisations and devolved large parts of the responsibilities within the state to nation-wide operating agencies. The focus here is on the rise of Māori protest and the resulting devolution of state powers to newly founded agencies and political

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9See O’Brien (2004; 2005) on increased regionalism effected by globalisation, e.g. ASEAN, the Pacific Islands Forum, and bi- and multilateral agreements. See Jones (1996) for the influence of international trading on New Zealand’s law and the necessary adaptations made.

entities. The revival of Māori identity in the 1980s has been documented and commented upon by authors such as Sissons (1992, 1993, 2004), van Meijl (1997, 1998), and Rata (1996, 2003c,a). Rata (2000, 2001, 2002, 2005) argued convincingly that the focus of these struggles changed over time from an ethnicity based Māori identity to one of Māori as the indigenous population of New Zealand and then, at the wake of potential redress payments, to a further fragmentation into different iwi. Iwi, with the negotiation of settlements involving large sums and vast land areas, have taken on the role of distributors of benefits, relieving the state of the burden of defining the status of beneficiaries, i.e. iwi membership, and responsibilities for the successful distribution of funds to the beneficiaries.

At the same time this devolution of power has also meant that iwi have taken on more features of a ‘western business ethic’ [39] as one of my interview partners called it. Transparency and outcome orientation, i.e. monetary returns, have become important, not only for the iwi administrations, but also for those who are supposed to benefit from the settlements, the tribal members. The devolution of power to newly created iwi authorities will be described further in chapter six.

**Short history of CMC in NZ**

Has the ‘revolution in information and communication technologies’ (Castells, 2004a, 20) occurred in New Zealand? The following short history of CMC in New Zealand suggests that this is indeed the case. The uptake of CMC within New Zealand follows largely the same path as the uptake in other countries with large mainframes being replaced by smaller systems and universities slowly being replaced as ISPs by private companies.

In October 1960 the first computer in New Zealand, an IBM 650, was installed in the Treasury Department in Wellington and officially introduced to the public on 23 March 1961 (Applerley, 1997; Beardon, 1985; Isaac, 1982, 64). Within five years 70 computers were installed and by 1982 over 4000 computers were estimated to be in use throughout the country (Beardon, 1985, 8, 22). In 1982 New Zealand had become ‘one of the world’s most highly computerised nations ... in terms of computing power per head of population’ (Isaac, 1982, 11), the large majority of which was focused within the government.

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11I want to thank Neil Jameson and Damien Mathers for sharing their first hand experience of the first years of CMC in New Zealand. The interview with Neil Jameson took place on the 17 November 2006, the interview with Damien Mathers took place on the 23 November 2006. Quotes from these interviews will be referenced with [NJ], for Neil Jameson and [DM] for Damien Mathers.
The introduction of micro-computers made computing power accessible to non-specialists. Through connecting several micro-computers to a network and task sharing micro-computers began to rival mainframe computers.\(^{12}\) Networking several micro-computers was also comparatively cheap, since a data line to a mainframe computer incurred costs between NZ$12,000-$14,000 a year, the ‘price of an entire micro system’ (Isaac, 1982, 149, f.). Nonetheless mainframe computers were still in use and users, mainly government agencies and universities, leased lines. Arguing that a ‘single compatible network’ (Isaac, 1982, 28, f.) had to be created New Zealand Post created a monopoly on information ‘transmission networks’ through the Post Office Act. Despite the high prices for leased lines New Zealand Post supported in 1981 ‘800 leased telephone lines’, constant lines between two terminals, and ‘1,800 modems connected to the standard telephone system’ (Beardon, 1985, 24). This was a considerable increase from the less than 200 lines leased in 1973 (Isaac, 1982, 28).

The first step towards the CMC in New Zealand was taken, as in most countries around the world, by the universities because of a ‘collective interests in networking’ ([NJ]; see also Phelps and Lipscombe, 1995, 5). Companies were hesitating to use the new technology due to the lack of a governing body and a clear structure. With the introduction of the first visual browser surfing was born and companies saw the potential value of the world wide web [NJ].

The six universities within New Zealand created several networks over the years. In 1975 the first network, KiwiNet, consisted of Massey University in Palmerston North and Victoria University in Wellington (Hine, 1987, 19). UniNet followed, incorporating all six universities [NJ]. In 1985 the universities collaborated with DSIR\(^{13}\) and MAF\(^{14}\) to create a New Zealand wide network with a link to international sites. The international connection made the need for a protocol shift obvious. The Coloured Book Protocols used throughout JANET – the Joint Academic NETwork of the UK – had to be replaced with the TCP/IP protocol to be able to access information being held on servers in the USA (Hine, 1987, 27). The actual protocol change occurred several years later in 1990 with the implementation of the Kawaihiko network, the name deriving from the Māori words kawai, an outwards branching structure, and hiko, electricity.

The first permanent overseas analogue cable link had already been installed in 1989, the PACCOM gateway, between the University of Waikato and a server in Hawai’i as

\(^{12}\)The idea of networking mainframe computers had led to ‘Databank’, a national cheque clearing system founded in 1969 by the trading banks ANZ, BNZ, Nationalbank, and Westpac founded in 1969 (Databank Systems Limited, Applications Development Dept., 1985).

\(^{13}\)The Department of Science and Industrial Research, later split into the CRIs, the Crown Research Institutes.

\(^{14}\)The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.
part of the Pacific Communications programme. Costs were carried by NASA and the six universities. The New Zealand government refused to provide support for the gateway (Brownlee, 1994). In 1994 the name of the link was changed to the more suitable ‘NZGate’ (Waikato Linux Users Group, 2005).

In 1992 TuiaNet, tuia meaning to bind together, was implemented, creating a single TCP/IP network between the universities, the National Library and the Crown Research Institutes. NZGate remained the only path for international traffic and the network structure of TuiaNet was very much in the nature of the beginning of the Internet in the USA: ‘[N]o formal management structure’ existed, instead the participating institutions held ‘occasional co-ordinating meetings’ (Brownlee, 1994, see also Brownlee and Fulton, 1999; Waikato Linux Users Group, 2005; Newbery, 1993; Jackson, 1995).

Private businesses remained passive until the early nineties, partly because international traffic had to be ‘research or education oriented’ (Newbery, 1993). The situation changed from the second half of 1994 onwards. Commercially used domains increased from less than 200 in December 1993 to 1302 in November 1995, whereas non-commercial domains grew only from around 200 to 420 in the same time period (Jackson, 1995). In 1994 members of TuiaNet founded ISOCNZ, the Internet Society of New Zealand, now called InternetNZ, imbued with the task to overview the development of the Internet within New Zealand including the authority to issue domain names formerly held by Waikato University ([NJ]; Waikato Linux Users Group, 2005).

In the same year, 1995, an estimated 12,000 New Zealanders used 12 different ISPs. As ISPs the universities were slowly replaced by commercial ISPs, e.g. ICONZ, Voyager, and CompuServe. Following the same trend away from the universities as ISPs New Zealand’s link to servers overseas, NZGate at Waikato University, was closed in 1996 and replaced by a ‘neutral interconnection point’, the New Zealand Internet Exchange – NZIX – which offered ISPs the opportunity to connect to the national and international network (Brownlee and Fulton, 1999, 1). After the introduction of NZIX the structure of the Kawaihiko network changed, access to the Internet was purchased from Telecom NZ, Clear Communications and Telstra NZ. The billing of the universities for the traffic through NZIX was balanced through an elaborate system of meters, which proved to be too expensive to run. In December 1998 the Kawaihiko network was closed down and the universities acquired connectivity through local ISPs (Brownlee and Fulton, 1999, 2, 8).

In the following years the universities played less important roles in the maintenance of the Internet. Commercial interest in CMC began to rise with the arrival of the first
visual browser and Telecom finally in May 1996 entered the ISP market with its company named Xtra. In 1999 New Zealand became the third nation within the OECD, after the USA and Canada, to have broadband, Telecom’s ADSL, and the speed exceeded by far the usual starting speed of 256 Kbps (Howell, 2006, 4, 16). With an estimated number of 862,000 users in 1999 CMC technology had become a part of many New Zealand household (Newman, 2004).

After the first Māori domain had been awarded to a mail server running under the domain suffix <.iwi.nz> in 1995 general Māori domains without iwi affiliations were introduced in September 2002 with the domain suffix <.maori.nz> (Jackson, 1995; Waikato Linux Users Group, 2005). The use of te reo Māori on the Internet has also increased. In 1999 hardly any websites supported te reo Māori language (Keegan, 1999). In a later publication Keegan (2000) stated that the number of websites in te reo Māori was on the increase. In 2003 Keegan and Cunningham (2003) reported the findings of a repeat survey, which showed that the number of websites using te reo Māori had increased from 41 to 100 over the four and half year period. The number of web pages within these sites had increased dramatically from 304 to 30,346, however, three websites accounted ‘for almost 75% of the total Web pages’ (Keegan and Cunningham, 2003). Lack of personnel, translation costs, and orthography - issues regarding the macronization of content - were given as reasons for the small number of websites and webpages using te reo Māori. In a later publication Keegan et al. (2004) split websites and webpages into sources making it apparent that the New Zealand government was the producer of by far the largest number of websites and webpages, a trend increasing from the 1998 to the 2002 survey. While in 1998 one in six websites in te reo Māori were produced by the government the number was increased to one in three in 2002. The Ministry of Health produced 78% of the webpages in te reo Māori. Only three ‘tribal groups’ and four ‘Māori organisations/interest groups’ offered their webcontent fully or partially in te reo Māori (Keegan et al., 2004, 35).

The government’s initial reluctance to contribute funding to the overseas link between Waikato University and a server in Hawai’i has been replaced by a push towards increased network use. Then Prime Minister Helen Clark declared broadband distribution a top priority in her statement to parliament in 2006 and the subsequent National led government announced that, if matched equally by private investors, it would spend NZ$ 1.5 billion on an upgrade to broadband technology (NA, 2009a, The Press).
Ngāi Tahu

New Zealand as a nation-state displays significant features of Castells’ concept of the network society, as shown above. Ngāi Tahu tribal members as part of New Zealand society are therefore operating under the same technological paradigm. The same is assumed for the 8.5% of the members living outside New Zealand in 2004 (Ngai Tahu Development Corp, 2004, 26). As Sissons (2005b, 122) has shown indigenous populations strive for increased decision making power within the state rather than complete autonomy. Where states strive for ‘territorial integrity’ indigenous populations look for ‘cultural autonomy’, thus allowing the ‘two notions of self-determination to coexist’ (Sissons, 2005b, 127). In the case of Ngāi Tahu this point is further strengthened by the geographical spread of the iwi. In 2006 46% of the Ngāi Tahu tribal members who lived in New Zealand resided in the North Island (Statistics New Zealand, 2007a, 1). While Sissons’ territorial integrity would require iwi members to live in a specific area within the nation cultural autonomy does not.

Ngāi Tahu participate successfully in the New Zealand economy. The median income has risen from $16,807, established in the general census in 1996, to ‘approximately $22,500’ in 2004, leading the authors of Mō Tātou to the conclusion that the respondent groups for the two censuses ‘differed significantly’ (Ngai Tahu Development Corp, 2004, 61, f.). In 2006, however, the median income for Ngāi Tahu rose to $23,400, compared to $21,900 for Māori in general and $24,400 for the total New Zealand population (Statistics New Zealand, 2007a, 8). This makes the figures established in Mō Tātou more plausible than they appeared at the time.

Ngāi Tahu also displays a feminisation of the labour force, with women showing more adaptability to the new work conditions. Firstly, 34% of Ngāi Tahu women were working part-time in 2006 compared to 13% of the men (Statistics New Zealand, 2007a, 5). Secondly, while over 50% of Ngāi Tahu men in 2006 held jobs historically associated with Māori, i.e. technicians, tradesmen, labourers, machinery operators and drivers, around 40% of Ngāi Tahu women held jobs as professionals and clerical and administrative workers (Statistics New Zealand, 2007a, 6).

The uptake of communication technology amongst Ngāi Tahu also warrants the hypothesis that Ngāi Tahu is part of the network society. In 2006 66% of Ngāi Tahu had in-home Internet access and 85% had access to cellphones within their household (Statistics New Zealand, 2007a, 10). In comparison 60.5% of the total population of New Zealand had access to the Internet in their household, and 74.2% had access to a

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15Ngāi Tahu also showed a significantly higher percentage of members with a formal qualification compared to other Māori, 71% and 63% respectively. Higher levels of formal qualifications generally correlate with higher uptakes of information technology.
cellphone (Statistics New Zealand, 2007b, 11). This high level of uptake of technology is coupled with a young median age, 25 years as compared to 36 years for the total New Zealand population (Statistics New Zealand, 2007a, 2). With the high number of Internet and cellphone users among the younger population this would suggest that Ngāi Tahu members are indeed part of the network society, using electronic communication tools to their advantage.

In my research connectivity was 100% and all but one participant had in-home Internet access.16 Access speed was rarely mentioned as a problem.17 The only complaints came from those participants who were interested in large-scale projects such as the live streaming of hui. The absence of individuals without access to CMC in this research is possibly due to the fact that all participants were located in the proximity of larger cities: Dunedin, Christchurch, Wellington, Sydney and London. Whether or not a more rural based sample of participants would have had resulted in less access to the Internet is not predictable, although Howell (2001) and her analysis of the uptake of CMC by rural businesses gave an indication that this might not necessarily have been the case. At the same time only 16% of Ngāi Tahu lived in rural areas in 2006, with 64% living in areas with a population higher than 30,000 (Statistics New Zealand, 2007a, 1).

### 4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have shown that a technologically deterministic answer regarding the effects of CMC use on societies and their political structure is not possible. To substantiate this I have surveyed some of the available literature and have shown that answers differ widely and that therefore no one effect exists but many.

While some scholars argue that CMC leads to a decline of sociality, others argue that it has lead to new forms of connections between individuals and has freed individuals from the trappings of localised communities and enabled the generation of communities of interest. Again other scholars argue that the effects are far from fully understood at this point in time and possibly never will be. The fourth group of scholars argues that the effects of CMC on societies are in fact negligible.

Every form of society has its form of political representation. As with the effects on society the effects of CMC on political structures is far from clear. Again some scholars

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16There are, however, also tribal members without any access to CMC or landlines. Some of my interview partners mentioned this factor, but none gave further details.

17Issues with the speed of dial-up connections were, however, mentioned by some tribal members who did not participate in this study.
argue that CMC will offer new avenues of participation, thus making the world a
more democratic place. Others counter that more participatory possibilities do not
necessarily lead to increased participation and that these possibilities are no guarantee
for actual influence. A further group of scholars argues that the effects of CMC on
politics is dependent on a number of factors, but could be positive and negative,
possibly even at the same time for different strata within a society. Which effects will
be achieved is then reliant on the existing social, cultural and political configurations.

Following on from this I have introduced the network society and explained the
general structure and the causes leading to the creation of this form of society. A large
part of this concept is the reliance on local conditions such as existing physical
networks, and political and social conditions.

Using the concept as a framework for the analysis of New Zealand and Ngāi Tahu I
have then shown that the network society does indeed exist within New Zealand.

It is now clear that physically CMC is possible for a large majority of tribal members.
The following chapters will focus on the social reasons behind support and resistance
of CMC for inner-tribal communication. The following chapters are then about the
process of ‘‘grass-rooting’’ ... the space of flows’ (Castells, 2004a, 38), about the ways in
which some tribal members attempt to peripheralise distant members by insisting on
the importance of the local, whereas other tribal members attempt to change the
understanding of tribal participation to be able to participate from afar. The following
chapters will also show that the inner-tribal use of CMC possesses a moral component
in that democratic participation is possible and democracy presented as the morally
superior form of inner-tribal organisation. It is therefore difficult for locally active
members to resist the use of CMC within the tribe without appearing anti-democratic.
But the following chapters will also show that democracy does not always mean the
same thing to all parties involved as van Meijl (1998) has shown. For many distant
members democracy and with it CMC represents a possibility to partake in the tribe,
for some locally active members democracy represents foreign rule this time not by
foreign people but by distant tribal members.
Chapter 5

Historical background

5.1 Introduction

Vignette 1

During the second year of my PhD I decided to take a te reo Māori course and a course on Māori society. I ended up studying the learning material and my study colleagues. Most students seemed to be from overseas. It became quickly apparent that the Māori society class was in fact a Māori society of the North Island class. The well-known 3-tiered social structure was taught and very few differences were highlighted regarding the social structure, tribal cohesion, and colonisation experiences between North and South Island Māori. I diligently wrote my observations in the margins of my course book, including how all the overseas students were going to take this skewed understanding of Ngāi Tahu culture back to their countries of origin. Later, after reading the PhD thesis of a Ngāi Tahu scholar, I came to understand that what were mere observations to me were gross transgressions of boundaries to others. To the Ngāi Tahu scholar these generalisations presented the starkest form of disrespect: The retelling of a tribe’s story in a way which was not sanctioned by tribal members. Ngāi Tahu bashing in real life, within their own rohe.

Vignette 2

In one of the interviews for my Post-Graduate Diploma my most important source of information about the genesis of the TRoNT’s website explained the use of a morphing face on a very early version of the website. Thinking of Terminator 2 she wanted a face, her brother-in-law, morphing from tribal warrior to corporate warrior, from a moko-wearing, stern-looking defender of personal and tribal mana to a smiling, besuited office worker or
businessman. Years later, after handing in my PhD, the conversation over morning tea in the NGO I was volunteering for turned to the ways Ngāi Tahu defended the northern borders against the small tribes living in the triangle between Cape Kahurangi on the West Coast, Pari-nui-o-Whiti (the White Bluffs) in the east, and the Nelson Lakes as the most southern point. The manager smiled and explained that 150 years ago a war force would have been sent up there to deal with the issue, nowadays you ”just send the lawyers”.

What was to me grit for the anthropological mill turned out even higher-grade than anticipated when another co-worker, a published scholar with several years’ experience in research with Māori communities, pointed out the irony of the situation: The legal system Māori often blamed for the subjugation of their culture and people was today heavily relied upon for the restoration, maintenance, and accumulation of personal and tribal mana. The manager’s response was a shrug and an abrupt change in topic.

The two vignettes above present the two main themes running through this chapter. The first is the unique situation of the South Island and the influence this had on the social structure of the many smaller units, which later united to become today’s Ngāi Tahu. The necessary adaptations to environmental conditions and the distinct colonisation experiences have formed a tribe, which is in some respects different to its North Island counterparts. The second theme is the ongoing centralisation and coporationisation of the iwi, from a loose agglomeration of dispersed groups to a politically and economically influential multi-million dollar iwi corporate.

Participants mentioned these themes, in somewhat changed form, often in relation to tribal members as individuals as well. Two skill sets were thought to be characteristic for Ngāi Tahu tribal members, past and present: Ngāi Tahu tribal members were described as economically savvy and highly adaptive to new ideas and technologies. Interestingly being economically savvy was not always identified as such but was often also interpreted as being disloyal to one’s cultural heritage. Those members who left the tribal area or chose not to be identified as Ngāi Tahu to have economic success were not seen as savvy, but rather as disloyal to the tribe. Equally, use of new technologies was condoned by all of my interview partners, but not all thought new technologies were appropriate in all contexts. Walking in ”both worlds” [40], the Pākehā and the ”Māori world” [5, 41], is then a balancing act. An act which in the eyes of many of my interview partners can only succeed if the grounding in the ”Ngāi Tahu world” [42] is secure.

This chapter is a short history of the meeting of the ”Ngāi Tahu world” [42] and the Pākehā world. A full description of the tribal history of Ngāi Tahu would go beyond
the scope of this chapter. The history of the tribe is described in three stages: pre-European contact, post-European contact and the fight for a settlement with the government for past grievances, Te Kerēne. The settlement with the Crown is described in detail since it had a profound impact on the tribe and the intra-tribal communication.

Much of the literature written on the subject of Ngāi Tahu is based on material gathered for ‘petitions and submissions to commissions of inquiry’ meaning the material was accumulated to prove a point rather than collected for the sake of creating a historical account (Belgrave, 2005, 173). Belgrave (2005), a historian of the Waitangi Tribunal, has presented an alternative reading of Ngāi Tahu land sales. He also pointed out that the tribal claim before the Waitangi Tribunal underwent major changes during the claims proceedings. Historical material and readings of these materials became the cornerstone of the claim. As mentioned above the sources used were mostly material gathered for earlier cases, thus potentially generating a distorting effect. In this chapter Belgrave’s description of the claims process is used to provide a differing view on some of the interpretations of historical events presented before the Waitangi Tribunal.

I argue two points in this chapter. First, that members of the Ngāi Tahu tribe adapted successfully and quickly to the new technologies available and participated successfully in the new form of economy after the arrival of the first sealers and whalers. This is not to say that all Ngāi Tahu were affluent. The opposite was the case with most Ngāi Tahu entering the new economy at the lowest level of labouring jobs. Second, I argue that the land sales had a profound impact on the members of the tribe enforcing a fast adaptation to the new circumstances, but also unifying the tribe in the process of all the petitions and hearings of commissions which followed shortly after completion of the sales.

The following ‘historical background’ (Handler, 1985, 179) is not meant to create the idea of a unified tribe. Rather the historical narrative given here, but more so in

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2I am aware of the pitfalls of imposing a chronological order upon oral historical accounts. Anderson (1998, 17), a scholar of Ngāi Tahu descent, pointed out that this mistake is made by most Western scholars. Tau (2003, 9, f.) suggested the creation of a poly vocal description of events:

If a history is to be written, it would be better to establish the central pillars in which a theatre of our past could be told, rather than impose a chronological and geographical order upon them.

As Belgrave (2005) has shown it is rather difficult to establish in which way the ancestors saw the world, especially if this world-view is used as the basis for substantial grievance claims.
CHAPTER 5. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Chapter six, shows that tribal unity is very much a matter of political calculation rather than organic growth. Although many key points such as the loss of land, the decrease in numbers and the introduction of a new economic system were experiences shared by all people across the South Island the use of Ngāi Tahu here as a common name for this large group of people is not meant to create a false sense of singularity of experience of tribal life. It is simply to avoid confusion and for the sake of ‘communicative economy’ (Brumann, 1999, S7) that I use Ngāi Tahu rather than the people who together are today known under the name Ngāi Tahu.

5.2 Pre-European contact.

The preceding tribes

When and by whom New Zealand and the South Island were discovered is a matter of debate. Some scholars argued that the navigator Kupe from Hawaiki sailed in his canoe Matahora to New Zealand in the year 925 AD (Pybus and Meares, 2002, 14). Others, such as van Meijl (1995) and Walker (2004), raised doubts about the correctness of this statement. Van Meijl (1995, 304) named Percy Smith, ‘Surveyor General and Commissioner of Crown Land, (co-)editor of The Journal of the Polynesian Society’, as the one who eternalised Kupe as the discoverer, and who introduced the idea of the migration to New Zealand in waves. Walker (2004, 34, ff.) further questioned Smith’s idea of two different men named Kupe and added that rather than discovering New Zealand in 950 AD Kupe circumnavigated the North Island some time between 1325 AD and 1350 AD. Hiroa (1929, 23) attributed to Kupe the circumnavigation, rather than the discovery, of the North Island and the exploration of the West Coast of the South Island. Buck, unlike Walker, stuck to Percy’s suggestion of AD 950.

Current consensus is that the South Island has been settled by several tribes over the centuries. Most western scholars have simplified the history of migration to Te Wai Pounamu in two ways. First, the number of tribes is often reduced by subsuming a variety of tribes under one encompassing name, as the Ngāi Tahu scholar Anderson (1998, 18) pointed out. The other simplification is the reduction of migration reasons with warfare and lack of resources being mentioned although the reasons were more complex than that according to O’Regan (1994, 235). The following description will not do justice to the migration history due to the limited space and the lack of sources.

It is unclear who the very first people were to settle the South Island. Two possible candidates are Te Rauwai or Hawea. Both tribes are believed to have emigrated out
5.2. PRE-EUROPEAN CONTACT.

of the North Island. Te Rapuwait are also referred to as ‘Te Mano o Rapuwait’, ‘the
great number of Rapuwait’ (Anderson, 1998, 20), which indicates the formidable
adaptation of this tribe to the conditions in the South Island (Anderson, 1998, 18, ff.).

The next tribe to settle Te Wai Pounamu were Waitaha.³ Like their predecessors the
Waitaha people came from the North Island. Some authors claim that this tribe was
the first to settle the South Island (O’Regan, 1994, 237; Taylor, 1952, 10). This might be
due to the distinct way the name Waitaha is used. The first use of the name is to refer
to all the small groups – including Te Rapuwait and Hawea – living in the South Island
after the navigator Rakaihautu settled Te Wai Pounamu and before the arrival of the
next tribe – Ngāti Māmoe. The second use of the name ‘refers specifically to the
descendants of Waitaha Nui and Waitaha Ariki’, which appear in the whakapapa of
southern Māori ‘twenty-five to thirty generations from the present day’ (Anderson,
1998, 21). Stack (1994, 11) gave ‘1477 to 1577’ as the century in which Waitaha were
the predominant tribe in the South Island.

According to O’Regan (1994, 235) Waitaha were the ones who gave the South Island
the name Te Wai Pounamu after the greenstone found in some rivers. Waitaha only
appear in the tribal mythology of Ngāi Tahu. No other Māori tribe claims whakapapa
links to this people (O’Regan, 1994, 235).

The reasons to migrate from the North to the South Island were certainly varied and
case-specific as O’Regan (1994, 235) reminded us. Nonetheless today two related
factors appear as the main reasons for the continuous migration over the centuries.
The first main reason to migrate was the rise in numbers of Māori living in the North
Island leading to an increased pressure on all resources, especially food. The second
main reason were the intra- and inter-tribal tensions caused by the lack of resources.
The tensions lead to continuous warfare and a growing number of refugees.
Anderson (2008, 26), however, pointed out that the ‘hapū migration can be seen, at
least in part, as aggregated movements resulting from the pursuit of numerous
individual causes or vendettas which could flare up across generations’. Large-scale
tribal migration is then the outcome of family migrations rather than a concerted
action. Expansion on the lower part of the North Island was only possible towards the
South. The tribes which migrated to the South Island found in Te Wai Pounamu a
wide variety of food in the form of plants, fish, birds, and mammals. The abundance
of these food sources was a strong incentive to resist the colder weather of the South
Island and also attracted further migration (Anderson, 1998, 22, f.). One version of the
migration story of Ngāti Māmoe states that the tribe decided to settle in the South

³Beattie (1954, 80-82) named several tribes before the arrival of Waitaha, with the first occupation
dating to the years before 400 AD.
Island after they ate preserved food sent to them by Waitaha. It is said that the ‘downfall’ of the Waitaha tribe ‘was ... its generosity with food’ (Anderson, 1998, 22).

Ngāti Māmoe quickly became the dominant tribe in the South Island. At times domination was achieved through warfare and subsequent occupation of Waitaha land (Pybus and Meares, 2002, 36). At other times political marriages between members of the two tribes were the means to domination. According to O’Regan (1994, 237) these strategic manoeuvres were more common than war. Ngāti Māmoe’s reign over the South Island lasted from the late sixteenth to the late seventeenth century (Stack, 1994, 11; see also Anderson, 1998, 23).

Ngāi Tahu settle the South Island

Ngāi Tahu, now one of the few remaining and by far the largest tribe of the South Island, were the last Māori group of extended families to land on the shores of Te Wai Pounamu. Like Waitaha and Ngāti Māmoe before them, Ngāi Tahu did not consist of a clearly defined group. After the migration several groups were subsumed under the name Ngāi Tahu because of their common ancestry to Tahu Potiki from the eastern part of the North Island. The unification of all these groups into a tribe with more or less stable boundaries took until ‘nearly a century’ after the migration to the South Island (O’Regan, 1994, 237, f.; see also Anderson, 1998, 23-27). The unification process was probably slowed down by the fact that several Māori tribes share common ancestry out of the Hawkes Bay region. Today these tribes are known as Ngāti Porou, Ngāti Kahungunu, Rangitane, Ngāti Māmoe and Ngāi Tahu. Since groups put different emphasis on specific ancestors a shared ancestor was not a guarantee for peaceful cohabitation in a new area (Anderson, 1998, 23, f.).

Stack (1994, 11) dated the occupation of the South Island by Ngāi Tahu around 1677. According to the same author the ‘reliable history of the Maori occupation’ of the South Island starts around the year 1650, when Ngāi Tahu were living in Hataitai, a suburb of today’s Wellington (Stack, 1994, 19).

Several reasons are reported why Ngāi Tahu left the North Island. Ongoing fights with Ngāti Kahungunu, who were located in the Wairarapa, could have been the

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4For an interesting examination of three Ngāi Tahu texts concerning Ngāi Tahu history from the migration to the South Island onwards see Tau (2003, 185-257). Tau (2003, 111) also gave a reason why there are no texts describing how the tribes which later constituted Ngāi Tahu lived in the North Island:

‘In oral traditions ‘[i]nformation about mana to previously held lands would be dropped over successive generations. The rule is that the loss of ahi kā equates to the loss of one’s spiritual attachment to the land.’

This means that ‘[e]ven the origins of Ngāi Tahu cannot be established beyond doubt. Oral traditions, the bed-rock of Māori history, cannot be taken uncritically’ (Tau, 2003, 147).
5.2. **PRE-EUROPEAN CONTACT.**

reason (Taylor, 1952, 12, 18). Another author sees the migration of Ngāi Tahu as part of a general movement southwards by tribes living in the eastern part of the North Island. This general movement was caused by warfare and other, unexplained reasons (O’Regan, 1994, 237). Pybus and Meares (2002, 36) saw a combination of warfare and diminishing resources as the reason for the migration. As for all the preceding tribes the reasons why Ngāi Tahu migrated were certainly more varied than known today.

The migration southwards did not take place in an orchestrated fashion. Tribes split up into different groups, searching for new dwellings in different parts of New Zealand and wrought alliances with their new neighbours. Subsequently the different groups became known under different names, which ‘often complicates the narrative’ (Stack, 1994, 19; see also Anderson, 1998, 57). Two big migration waves are reported. The first migration, ‘Heke a Purahо nui’, was under the leadership of chief Purahо around 1670 (Taylor, 1952, 18). The second wave was around 1727 when Ngāi Tahu had already occupied most parts of the South Island (Stack, 1994, 38). It is debatable, however, whether or not the two migration waves did indeed exist. It seems likely that smaller movements were clustered together in historical narratives at a later stage as has occurred with the migratory movements to New Zealand (van Meijl, 1995, 304).

Ngāi Tahu treated Ngāti Māmoe in a similar fashion as the latter had treated Waitaha a century before. Warfare between the two tribes was a regular occurrence (Stack, 1994, 19-45; see also Pybus and Meares, 2002, 36-40; Taylor, 1952, 19, f.; and Anderson, 1998, 34, f.). Again intermarriage occurs to have been a far more common and accepted way to achieve ascendance, as was the case during the period of Ngāti Māmoe domination over Waitaha. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the dominance of Ngāi Tahu was accepted, although Ngāti Māmoe retained influence on a local level in the area of Murihiku (Anderson, 1998, 57-59, 92). Despite accepting Ngāi Tahu as the dominant tribe Ngāti Māmoe and Waitaha whakapapa was still known when the Treaty of Waitangi was signed (Tau, 2003, 242).

Fights among groups of Ngāi Tahu were common as well (Pybus and Meares, 2002, 40-43). A reason for these intra-tribal fights could be the slow process of ‘bonding into a reasonably unitary tribe’ described by O’Regan (1994, 237, f.). The groups did not see themselves as one tribe yet, but rather as small autonomous political entities in close proximity. As we will see in later chapters the tribal unity is still not guaranteed and intra-tribal disputes are still a regular occurrence.

The hapū and whānau today subsumed under the name Ngāi Tahu dominated over most of the South Island, with only the top of the island being claimed by other tribes. The northern boundary of the land claimed by Ngāi Tahu was established at the
beginning of the nineteenth century. Ngāti Tumatakokiri were defeated in a battle in the Wanganui Inlet, since then Ngāi Tahu claimed the West Coast up to Cape Kahurangi. The eastern boundary was at Pari-nui-o-Whiti, today know as the White Bluffs. Inland the boundary dropped down to the Nelson Lakes, forming a V between the most Northern points on the East and West Coast (Anderson, 1998, 39, 91; see also map in O’Regan, 1994, 236; and Evison, 2006, 16).

**Differences in the South Island**

The situation Ngāi Tahu encountered in the South Island was different from the North Island. Ngāi Tahu brought with them what O’Regan (1994, 238) called the ‘‘classic’ Māori culture’. How this culture was different from the existing one is not further explained but two related factors indicate why the South Island enforced new ways of living. First, the weather, as mentioned, was considerably colder than in the North Island. The second factor was the economy, which had been adapted to the colder climate (O’Regan, 1994, 238). A third difference, increased mobility, is related to the first and second factors.

The colder climate on the South Island rendered horticulture difficult and for some plants impossible. A prominent example is the kūmara, sweet potato (*Ipomoea batatas*), which according to a myth was brought to New Zealand by a bird called Mānukura (Tau, 2003, 86, f.). This staple of the North Island Māori diet did not grow south of Lake Ellesmere (Anderson, 1998, 72). Nonetheless food was abundant, but the resources occurred naturally and had to be hunted or gathered. Mahinga kai (also mahika kai), were places where food and other resources like pounamu and flint were gathered. The animals hunted were, amongst others, eels, waterfowl, weka, native rats, muttonbirds and fish. Some of the edible plant parts were the roots and the young shoots of fern and the roots and the pith of the cabbage tree (Anderson, 1998, 111, 131; see also Evison, 2006, 17, 19). By extrapolating from two lists produced by Ngāi Tahu elders in 1880 Anderson estimated that approximately 2000-3000 mahinga kai might have existed in the eastern regions of the South Island which were below 1000 metres in altitude. At the same time mahinga kai only included those places where specific resources were gathered. Other animals like sea fish, seals, shellfish and coastal birds were hunted as well, providing an even greater diversity of food for all South Island Māori (Anderson, 1998, 132, f. 136, 138).

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5For an overview map of resource areas see Dacker and New Zealand 1990 Commission (1990, 15). For a calendar of the food sources see Dacker and New Zealand 1990 Commission (1990, 10, f.).

6For an interesting and informative summary of Ngāi Tahu’s fishing and hunting methods and the use of natural resources see Anderson (1998, 131-148).
5.2. PRE-EUROPEAN CONTACT.

In later years mahinga kai were to become one of the ‘nine tall trees’, the nine main grievances brought before the Waitangi Tribunal to settle the Ngāi Tahu claim. Belgrave (2005, 177-180) pointed out that the understanding of mahinga kai as specified food gathering places was probably not shared by Kemp, who has been given the task to acquire land from Ngāi Tahu for the New Zealand Company. Kemp, according to Belgrave (2005, 177), more likely saw ‘mahinga kai’ as ‘additional reserves ... beyond those of cultivations and village sites’.

Trade among groups living in Te Wai Pounamu was regular. A pattern of trails connecting the different settlements on the South Island was well established. Kūmara were exchanged southwards, tītī (muttonbirds) were exchanged northwards, sea fish were transported inland to be exchanged against eel and valuable stones like greenstone were transported from the West Coast to the Canterbury Plains. Even tribes in the North Island were trading in food and greenstone from the South Island (Anderson, 1998, 12, 39, 126-129; see also Beattie, 1954, 31; Dacker and New Zealand 1990 Commission, 1990, 14; and Dacker, 1994, 6-8). According to O’Regan (1994, 236) this sort of trade had already occurred in Waitaha times. Not all trade was beneficial for both sides, as tribute payments between hapū are known as well (Anderson, 1998, 126).

South Island Māori appear to have been more mobile than the tribes living in the North Island. There were two different types of movements. The first were seasonal movements to gather food in remote areas. The second type of movement were permanent shifts from one settlement to another.

The lack of horticulture in most parts of Te Wai Pounamu enforced a cycle of long journeys to mahinga kai. The journeys were adapted to the availability of the different food sources. Several mahinga kai were visited on these journeys. Ngāi Tahu travelled 300 kilometres and more to their food sources. Larger distances were not uncommon, for example Ngāi Tahu living in Kaikōura had to do a return travel of 1800 kilometres for muttonbirds, caught on Stewart Island. Seasonal shelters were erected near the mahinga kai called kainga mahinga kai or kainga nohoanga. Often whole extended families went on month long trips to their private food gathering places, travelling by foot and on downstream journeys using mohiki (also mogi), boats made of reed and fern. With the aid of these temporary boats long distances could be travelled at relative high speed. At the same time large quantities of food – weights of 800 kilograms are recorded – could be carried with these boats (Anderson, 1998, 117-120, 122-126, 131, 142; for travel and mohiki see also Dacker and New Zealand 1990 Commission, 1990, 6, 19; for travel and kainga nohoanga see also Evison, 2006, 19).
The rights to resource access were inherited. Two different models can be distinguished: the ‘wakawaka model’ and the ‘mahinga kai model’ (Anderson, 1998, 112; see also Dacker and New Zealand 1990 Commission, 1990, 16). The former consisted of large pieces of land which sometimes contained several resources. These pieces of land were allocated to specific families. The wakawaka model was prevalent in the north of the South Island and it was the system of North Island Māori land right allocation. The mahinga kai model was the predominant form of resource allocation in the South. Each resource, e.g. muttonbirds or fern roots, constituted a mahinga kai, which was then further divided into wakawaka. These wakawaka were much smaller than the ones found on the North Island and usually comprised only small sections within a certain mahinga kai (Anderson, 1998, 111-115).

Seven major settlements existed in Te Wai Pounamu: The areas around Kaikōura, Banks Peninsula, Temuka, Waikouaiti down to Otakou, Molyneux Bay and central Foveaux Strait and Poutini Coast. Between these centres groups ranging from small families to entire hapū relocated and settled in other settlements (Anderson, 1998, 116). Through this pattern of constant movement hapū affiliations were spread out across the whole of the South Island (Dacker and New Zealand 1990 Commission, 1990, 6). As Mantell remarked (cited in Anderson, 1998, 104) about his difficulties of taking census data in Arowhenua in 1848, ‘each man, as usual, [is] taking five minutes to decide a hapu for himself’.

The second type of movements, the non-seasonal movements resulted in the long term in what Anderson (1998, 115) called the ‘distance (or time) decay model’. The orthodox Māori method of allocating land-rights – the wakawaka model – was not used in the Southern region of the South Island, because clans and families moved down the coast, spreading out their hapū affiliations over large areas. Here the mahinga kai model was used. In the Northern regions hapū were more centralised and maintained the land right allocation in a North Island Māori fashion (Anderson, 1998, 115).

### 5.3 Post-European contact

In 1770 Captain Cook sailed past Kaikōura, presumably seen by only a small number of Māori. Even during a three month visit to the Dusky Sound in 1773 few Māori were seen (Anderson, 1998, 63). The first regular European visitors were sealers in the 1790s (Evison, 2006, 20). Sealing stopped in 1827 due to a drop in seal skin prices (Evison, 1993, 27). Sealing sparked the flax trade which lasted from 1813 until the 1840s. From 1829 onwards whaling replaced sealing (Anderson, 1998, 75). The living
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conditions of the Ngāi Tahu tribe changed profoundly and rapidly with European contact. The changes outlined in this chapter are the adaptation of members of the Ngāi Tahu tribe to new technologies, a new economy and new food, the impact of Christianity, intermarriage, the decline in numbers and land sales.

**Adaptation to European technology, economy and food**

Ngāi Tahu adopted readily to the technology the ‘tangata pora’ – the boat people – had to offer (Evison, 1993, 28, 178). One example are canoes: In the 1820s the classical triangular sail shape was replaced by the rectangular sail shape of European vessels and paddles were replaced by oars (Anderson, 1998, 210). Within 20 years canoes were nearly completely replaced by fishing vessels, which proved safer and required less crew (Dacker, 1994, 12; Evison, 1993, 63, f., 113). Subsequently the vast network of walking tracks covering Te Wai Pounamu was abandoned with sailing becoming the main way of travelling between the distant Māori coastal settlements (Evison, 1993, 86). Shortland, an Assistant Protector of Aborigines in the Protectorate Department, for example found that his idea of walking the distance from Waikouaiti to Akaroa was not easy to understand for his Māori guides especially since Shortland had already been offered passage on a ship (Shortland cited in Evison, 1993, 178).

Another European import, the musket, had an impact similar in size to the one made by boats. According to Dacker (1994, 10; see also Anderson, 1998, 77) muskets were first used on the South Island in the last intra-tribal fight of Ngāi Tahu history, the Kai Huaka – ‘eat relations’ – feud in the fighting season of 1827. Evison (1993, 36) stated that warriors from Murihiku, the most Southern district of Te Wai Pounamu, already used muskets in 1825. The date of the first use of muskets might be debatable, but the ensuing arms race is clearly visible. Te Rauparaha, a Ngāti Toa chief from the North Island invaded the South Island in the fighting season of 1827 and in the three consecutive years from 1829 to 1831. After experiencing Te Rauparaha’s attacks Ngāi Tahu were seeking muskets to defend themselves. The weapons were traded for flax and potatoes (Evison, 1993, 38), at some occasions land was sold to acquire muskets (Anderson, 1998, 86; see also Dacker, 1994, 17), and there are known incidents of Māori men selling their daughters for muskets (Evison, 1993, 38). The weapons were not only bought from Europeans landing at the shores of Te Wai Pounamu, but crossings to Sydney were also made to purchase muskets, powder and balls (Evison, 1993, 38). At the time of Te Rauparaha’s last attack on the South Island muskets were used on both sides (Dacker and New Zealand 1990 Commission, 1990, 22). In addition pā structures had been changed to allow for better defence against large-scale warfare with guns (Groube, 1969, 9).
Steel, iron or brass tools were sought after as well. Everyday items like fish-hooks, nails, pots and iron adzes were bought for high prices.\(^7\) According to (Anderson, 1998, 75) ‘[a] single spike nail cost about 55 kg of potatoes in 1813 at Bluff, and an iron adze as much as 1600 kg of potatoes at Otago as late as 1827.’ Although not everybody was able to purchase these items the impact was felt by all. The materials used for tools until the arrival of the Europeans were gradually losing their value (Anderson, 1998, 76). To which extent the overall value of some materials, especially greenstone – pounamu – declined is unsure, since the latter brought good prices with the Europeans when fashioned into pendants. Groube (1969, 8) for example assumed that a lot of pounamu adzes were rendered useless as tools in comparison to the superior iron adzes, but were reborn as tiki, to be sold to settlers and traders.

Another technology South Island Māori adopted quickly was reading and writing. From very early on Ngāi Tahu understood that survival in a world with the tangata pora was based on understanding the English language and being able to communicate through the written word. Having command over the new language ensured that interpreters were not needed and could not impose their mark upon trade deals and important negotiations, as had happened from early days onwards to the disadvantage of Ngāi Tahu. At the same time being able to read and write was seen as an entry card into European trade with contracts between the trading partners (Dacker, 1994, 17). Missionaries saw the desire to read and write and offered classes, often amazed and delighted by the eagerness Ngāi Tahu displayed to learn and to deepen their knowledge in the new found skill (Evison, 1993, 153-156).

Ngāi Tahu adopted to a new style of economy and started trading with the Europeans from an early stage. Crops were sold to the sealing and whaling ship crews and later to the immigrants. Large potato fields were tended to be able to afford the overpriced goods the Europeans had to offer, like the iron and steel nails and adzes mentioned above. Two strategies to compromise between the seasonal travels to the mahinga kai and the need for constant care of the potato fields were developed. Either the potatoes were cultivated near the mahinga kai or several people of one settlement stayed in the settlement to tend the fields. Both methods were used during the 1840s (Anderson, 1998, 72-74). Anderson (1998, 75) assumed that potatoes were not grown for subsistence but mainly as trading objects with the Europeans. Others, like Evison (1993, 27), emphasised the importance of the potato as a subsistence crop because it grew, in comparison to the kūmara, throughout the South Island. Several reasons support Anderson’s assumption. First, Europeans demanded high prices for metal tools and utensils. If Ngāi Tahu would have used potatoes only to replace kūmara

\(^7\)An interesting example is the use of nails and later No 8 wire to construct trolling lures in a quick fashion (Smith, 2007).
then much smaller quantities of potatoes would have been sufficient. A second factor is the occurrence of large potato fields around harbour settlements, like today’s Dunedin or on Ruapuke Island, and the subsequent abandonment of these cultivations after the decline of the potato industry (Anderson, 1998, 173; Dacker, 1994, 22). These large fields might be explained by a rising need for food for all Ngāi Tahu moving closer to the whaling stations, but not only potatoes were farmed but also wheat and pigs (Anderson, 1998, 77; Dacker and New Zealand 1990 Commission, 1990, 22), all items the whalers and sealers stocked. A third reason which supports Anderson’s assumption is that a ‘vigorous indigenous subsistence round was clearly still maintained’ although pigs and potatoes were readily available on Ruapuke Island by 1828. The same is true for other settlements with European contact (Anderson, 1998, 70, 174).

Intra-tribal disputes, or rather disputes between the different constituting hapū are visible in the trading relations. Ngāi Tahu in Murihiku for example proved to be cunning business people and tried to keep a trading monopoly by telling Ngāi Tahu in Otakou that no ship would be coming and therefore no surplus flax production was needed (Evison, 1993, 34).

Ngāi Tahu quickly saw that trade generated more trade and that the Europeans were concerned about their safety. From an early stage onwards Ngāi Tahu chiefs were eager to make it clear to Europeans and other Ngāi Tahu that the trading relationships were of good value and therefore the safety of the Europeans was of importance (Evison, 1993, 33, 38). The dependency on the trading relationship was mutual. According to Dacker (1994, 22) ‘Ruapuke was built on trade with visiting Pakeha ships …’ The first settlers arrived in Dunedin in 1848 and were dependent on the local produce to survive. A cash economy developed, replacing the former barter economy (Dacker, 1994, 31).

Trading with Europeans was not the only way Ngāi Tahu participated in the new economy. More Māori took up jobs as whalers, builders and loggers, others who were fortunate enough to possess larger boats were in the transportation business, carrying passengers and cargo between the harbours around the South Island and to the North Island (Dacker, 1994, 13, 31-33; Evison, 1993, 88, 90). Ngāi Tahu were highly mobile, since they were used to the typical South Island food gathering lifestyle with its long journeys to the mahinga kai. This mobility and the attraction of being able to buy European commodities like clothes and tobacco lead to large numbers of Ngāi Tahu moving to European settlements (Anderson, 1998, 173, f.). A further reason for an increased participation in the new economy was the civilising mission the Europeans embarked upon. Māori were to be civilised by sustained contact with Europeans. By
reducing the land available to Ngāi Tahu to a minimum the Europeans forced Ngāi Tahu to enter the market economy, since the access to natural food resources became more and more restricted. Making a living through earning money became the norm for a large number of Ngāi Tahu by 1890 (Dacker and New Zealand 1990 Commission, 1990, 26, 28; see also Evison, 1993, 157). The exchange of foods common before the arrival of the Europeans ceased once a high number of Ngāi Tahu had lost their mahinga kai through land-sales or could not afford to leave their work places. Instead modern goods were bartered for food and by the 1930s the barter for mahinga kai within Ngāi Tahu was replaced by a cash economy (Dacker and New Zealand 1990 Commission, 1990, 31, f.; Dacker, 1994, 86, f., 106).

According to Anderson (1998, 210, 184) many Ngāi Tahu started drinking alcohol, i.e. brandy and rum, by the 1840s. The situation deteriorated so much over the next decade, with Ngāi Tahu being forced into small parcels of land, that some families tried to find new homes outside the city to avoid the drunken disputes. This movement was mirrored in the 1980s by the ‘return migration’ of urban Maori to rural areas with young urban Maori attempting to avoid unemployment or retirees wanting to spend the years of retirement in the areas of their childhood (Pool, 1991, 206).

Christianity

The introduction of Christianity is a further example of fast adaptation. All the main congregations sent their missionaries to New Zealand in the 1840s (Evison, 1993, 151-156) and within a decade most Ngāi Tahu had converted to Christianity (Anderson, 1998, 215). The process was sped up by a decision of ‘several important younger chiefs and learned men’ to become baptised in 1843 (Dacker, 1994, 17; see also Evison, 1993, 163, f.) and the introduction of Ngāi Tahu lay preachers (Dacker, 1994, 16).

The influence of Christianity went beyond the prohibition of work (Evison, 1993, 153, 120) and cooking (Beattie et al., 1994, 466) on Sundays. The Wesleyan church made a connection between the mana – the authority and the power – of the English Crown and the mana held by God (Dacker, 1994, 17). If it was for the fear of prosecution by the Crown or the prospect of eternal hell, the fighting between the North Island Māori tribes and Ngāi Tahu stopped, as did the practice of utu, the act of retributive killing (Dacker, 1994, 12, 40). The chiefly mana sustained a considerable loss, since the source of tapu was no longer in the chiefs’ hands, but was now the prerogative of the Christian god. The power of the chiefs was still great, but the status differences within Ngāi Tahu faded with the introduction of the notion that all men are equal (Dacker, 1994, 40; Evison, 1993, 202).
Decline in numbers

The size of the Ngāi Tahu population declined after the contact with the first Europeans. Warfare, introduced European diseases and intermarriage with subsequent abandonment of Ngāi Tahu tribal ancestry are seen as the main reasons for the steady decline. The figures given by the different authors greatly vary. O’Regan (1994, 238), for example, gave the figure of 20,000 by the year 1800, while Anderson (1998, 196) estimated a number of 5,000 Ngāi Tahu by the 1820s, which would indicate a loss of three quarters of the population within two decades.

Political reasons are partly to blame for the great variation in estimates. For the early Europeans a rapid decline in Māori numbers was a useful argument in the struggle for political dominance. Māori dying of introduced diseases was construed as evidence of a weak constitution, since Europeans often only suffered short periods of illness from these diseases. At the same time it was not always the Ngāi Tahu population that was talked about by Māori, but the decline of earlier tribes like Ngāti Māmoe (Anderson, 1998, 191, f.).

The constant movement of the Ngāi Tahu population is another reason for the differences in estimates. Before the arrival of the Europeans Ngāi Tahu regularly travelled to their familial mahinga kai. After the arrival of the Europeans many Ngāi Tahu moved closer to the harbour dwellings to obtain work or to do business. Later the trend was away from towns and into smaller settlements close by but many Ngāi Tahu still maintained, to a somewhat lesser extent, their mahinga kai travels. Shortland (Anderson, 1998, 191, f.; see also Evison, 1993, 179) did not question the decline in numbers, but argued that the constant movement could have been one of the reasons why the numbers seemed to dwindle so dramatically. While this could be true for the first decades after European contact in later years, with onset of a sedentary lifestyle, the numbers generated by subsequent censuses should have been more accurate.

The first attempted census in 1857 reported 1363 Ngāi Tahu, excluding those in Kaikōura and on the West Coast. Catastrophes of huge proportions were needed to explain the decline from the earlier estimates of 10,000 to 15,000 Ngāi Tahu between 1820 and 1840, although these numbers were based on hearsay and quite often did not stem from Ngāi Tahu themselves, but from people living close to their settlements (Anderson, 1998, 187, 190, f.).

Despite the earlier over-estimated numbers the decline must have appeared dramatic to those witnessing it as Anderson (1998, 196) showed with his conservative estimates of 5,000 Ngāi Tahu in the 1820s and only 2,500 by the year 1844. The reasons for the decline, as mentioned earlier, were warfare, European diseases and intermarriage.
CHAPTER 5. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The death tolls of wars were another reason for the diminishing Ngāi Tahu population. The last battle within the tribe was the Kai Huaka feud in the fighting season of 1827 (Dacker, 1994, 10; see also Anderson, 1998, 77). Following this intra-tribal feud Te Rauparaha’s attacks made an impact on the Ngāi Tahu population. How big the impact of the newly introduced muskets was is debatable. Some scholars argue that the introduction of muskets saw the death tolls of battles rise to unprecedented heights (Evison, 1993, 47-70; see also Pybus and Meares, 2002, 44-57; Taylor, 1952, 35-37, 72, f., 75; and Ballara, 1998, 234, f., 241). Pool (1991, 237), however, argued that the impact of muskets has been greatly over-estimated.

Diseases introduced by the sealers and whalers were a second factor leading to the decline of Ngāi Tahu numbers within a short period. Evison (1993, 85, f.) estimated that about 50 percent of the Ngāi Tahu population died from diseases introduced by Europeans in the 1830s, claiming a higher toll than the Te Rauparaha attacks. Again Anderson (1998, 194) showed that the numbers of deaths varied between accounts, due to the same reasons as above.

The Europeans introduced venereal diseases like syphilis, pulmonary diseases like tuberculosis and viral diseases like influenza and measles. The effects of all diseases were devastating at the beginning with large numbers of Ngāi Tahu dying of diseases which affected Europeans only mildly (Anderson, 1998, 193, f.; Evison, 1993, 85, f.) or from inadequate treatments (Beattie et al., 1994, 463; see also Evison, 1993, 85). This situation changed after several years of exposure to introduced disease such as the influenza virus (Anderson, 1998, 193).

According to Anderson (1998, 194-196; see also Evison, 1993, 179, 208) by far the largest contribution to the rapid decline came from the intermarriage of Ngāi Tahu women with European men, since the children of these marriages often chose to uphold their European ancestry. Women usually outnumbered men in the Ngāi Tahu tribe before the arrival of the Europeans, due to accidents at sea and the death tolls of wars. Forging alliances with other hapū and iwi through marriages had been the most common way, as described above. The arrival of the first European sealers saw the continuation of this tradition, albeit in smaller numbers. The owner of the whaling station in Otago, Edward Weller, for example, married chief Taiaroa’s daughter Nikuru and thereby won Taiaroa’s support, consent and protection for his whaling station (Dacker, 1994, 15, 82). The Codfish Islands, north west of Stewart Island, are another example. The islands were occupied by sealers and their Māori wives (Anderson, 1998, 76). Marriages were also economic transactions with women

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8Russell (2000, 248) argued that Pākehā were given to women as husbands, thus ‘agency remained fairly with Kai Tahu’.
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being sold or exchanged for muskets (Evison, 1993, 38, 88; Dacker, 1994, 13). Over time the lack of men within the Ngāi Tahu tribe turned into a lack of women. With the arrival of the first female settlers Ngāi Tahu men began marrying white women (Beattie et al., 1994, 465). This was especially the case after the end of both World Wars (Dacker, 1994, 110).

Marriages between Europeans and Ngāi Tahu tribal members were also seen as a solution to the decline in numbers after the attacks lead by Te Rauparaha (Dacker, 1994, 15, 82). The off-spring of these unions were seen as half-cast. Ngāi Tahu themselves, as well as the Europeans, clearly distinguished between full-blooded and half-blooded members of the tribe. Instead of the rise in numbers hoped for the part Ngāi Tahu part European children often chose to uphold their European side for economic reasons (Dacker, 1994, 83, 85).

Land sales

The sale of land had a great impact on Ngāi Tahu as a tribe. With the land Ngāi Tahu lost the natural resources, which forced members of the tribe to make a living by working in the European economy. The following section is about the land sales and their impact.

The early sealers and whalers had special arrangements with Ngāi Tahu chiefs. The owners of the whaling stations accepted the mana of the local chiefs and received protection and the right to fish within a 24 kilometre stretch of coast around the whaling station, 12 kilometres being the agreed distance a usual whale hunt would take in the early 1800s (Evison, 1993, 88). Leasing land to the whalers in return for muskets, powder and balls instead of trading them for flax and food was seen as a welcome change for Ngāi Tahu. Port Bunn at Preservation Inlet for example was one of the more successful enterprises for Ngāi Tahu. The chief Te Whakataupuka achieved weapons supremacy within the South by granting the station land and the rights to hunt to Peter Williams. The overall value of goods exchanged was £225, which equalled sixty new muskets and 450 kilograms of powder and balls respectively (Evison, 1993, 51, 63).

This granting of access to resources was a common practice within Ngāi Tahu, ‘making an acceptable payment’ was enough to open up these resources to others who had not inherited rights to the resources (Evison, 1993, 96). Therefore the whalers’ requests to build stations and to hunt in a specific location was easily accommodated within the land management systems of mahinga kai and wakawaka. In those early days agreements about land still worked very much in the way Ngāi
Tahu wanted them to be understood, as leases that had to be renewed whenever the granting chief died (Evison, 1993, 88; see also Dacker, 1994, 17). In 1838 the situation changed with the rumour that the British Crown was planning the annexation of New Zealand. The resources offered by the land became a secondary concern, the primary focus was upon the European sense of land ownership. The news about the annexation lead to a ‘land sales boom’ (Evison, 1993, 96).

After the British annexation the newly installed colonial government started buying land from the 1840s onwards. The prices offered and paid by the government did not differ much from the prices paid by the speculators. Kemp’s Deed for example was a 20,000,000 acres block, which the government ‘claimed to have purchased’ for a sum of £2000 in 1848 (Dacker and New Zealand 1990 Commission, 1990, 23; see also Evison, 1993, 273). The request of Ngāi Tahu to be paid £5 million for this vast land area was dismissed by Commissioner Kemp, who stated he could only pay the offered sum of £2000 (Evison, 2006, 83).

Interestingly the offers made by the government varied widely between the North and South Island. On the North Island Ngāti Toa received about six cents per acre and the Wanganui tribes received two cents per acre. Ngāi Tahu however were given approximately the 50th part of a cent per acre for the eight million hectares of Kemp Purchase (Evison, 1993, 255, 273).

The land sales raise the questions over why Ngāi Tahu agreed to sell the land and why they sold it at such low prices. Certainly there were several reasons, but two interrelated reasons had particular influence at the time. The first reason was the confusion over landownership; the second was the loss of mana caused by this confusion.

The attacks of Te Rauparaha and the ensuing stream of refugees, as mentioned in Anderson (1998, 90), disturbed the land tenure system in the South Island. By the time the land speculators and the government started buying land the tribal system of resource access rights was in turmoil. In the north of the South Island many tribal members had either died in the wars or fled south, leaving vast areas sparsely populated. In Akaroa the French used this to their advantage, touching ‘upon the raw nerve of Maori land tenure – the conflict of interest between absentee hereditary owners and resident hereditary owners’ (Evison, 1993, 140). Further south the influx of refugees caused a different kind of problem. Refugees had to be accommodated

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9 As a comparison: Kemp’s Deed was just short of 81,000 square kilometres, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland combined have a land area of 86,576 square kilometres.

10 In 1851 £1 was the wage for 40 hours of unskilled labour in the Canterbury district (Evison, 1988, 19; see also O’Regan, 1994, 243).
and needed access to resources to survive. The hereditary owners of resource rights had to share these rights with the newly arrived refugees. This led to a disruption of the ‘traditional succession’ (Anderson, 1998, 90). Again European land buyers used this confusion over the rightful ownership to play off the different tribal members who claimed rights to specific areas against each other.

The confusion over hereditary rights resulted in a downward spiral of strategic sales to prevent a loss of mana. Selling land implied having mana over this land, which meant that other tribes could not have mana over it. After having raided the South Island several times, with Te Rauparaha as military mastermind, Ngāti Toa sold land in the South Island. From a Ngāi Tahu perspective this meant that their claims to take tupuna, inherited land rights, were dishonoured. The only way to regain lost honour, other than warfare against the Europeans, was the sale of the same piece of land. Kemp’s Deed was one of the most prominent examples of this dilemma. Kemp claimed to have bought vast areas on the South Island from Ngāti Toa. Some Ngāi Tahu feared that if the sale of Kemp’s Deed was not completed Kemp would proceed and buy the land from Ngāti Toa, leaving Ngāi Tahu land-less, honour-less and without money (Dacker, 1994, 25, 29, f.; see also Evison, 1993, 241, f., 258-260). The concern of loosing mana is also visible in the protests against the Kemp Purchase following almost immediately after the sale. Rather than assailing the purchase Ngāi Tahu were concerned with the establishment of a secure northern boundary (Belgrave, 2005, 181, f.). The same dilemma as described for the inter-tribal level above existed on a private level. People hearing about sales of land they had inherited rights to were willing to resell the land to re-establish their mana, sometimes to other buyers (Evison, 1993, 97, f., 138). The European land buyers used this fact – knowingly or unknowingly – to their advantage. No Ngāi Tahu had the right to sell land without consulting with those who had inherited rights to this land as well (Evison, 1993, 96). By approaching the chiefs for land and getting their consent – intended as lease, not as sale – the Europeans spread dissatisfaction among tribal members who saw their rights violated by their chiefs.

Most European land speculators and later the settlers did not see themselves as people disrupting a land tenure system that had worked for centuries but rather as bearers of civilisation. Two attitudes were prevalent: the idea of the tenths and the understanding that Ngāi Tahu stood in the way of progress.

The tenths were introduced by the New Zealand Company, a company which systematically bought land in Te Wai Pounamu. The idea was that the land value would rise due to the presence of Europeans bringing civilisation to Ngāi Tahu. The value of European civilisation was set at a high level: After successful civilisation the
land was estimated to be worth 10 times more than before the arrival of Europeans. For the New Zealand Company the consequence was to attempt to strike deals which left Ngāi Tahu with one tenth of the land they just sold (Evison, 1993, 109, f.). Over time the idea of the civilising mission changed in England. Civilisation was no longer dependent on possession of land among Europeans but on the access to schooling and religion. Simultaneously the land sales showed that the tenths were really elevenths. Instead of granting Ngāi Tahu a tenth of the total land area sold in one sale the usual practice was to divide the land into 10 parts for future resale and then grant Ngāi Tahu a tenth of these 10 parts (Evison, 1993, 160, f.).

The idea of tenths might have been prevalent at the time and it would have been fair to introduce the tenths into the sales documents. Belgrave (2005, 187), however, showed in his account of the Ngāi Tahu claim to the Waitangi Tribunal that in the case of Otakou, ‘no such promise had been made, nor could it have been’. In the case of the Kemp Purchase the promised reserves had been set aside, leaving the historians to conclude that ‘there were no unfulfilled promises in the Kemp Purchase, only vague ambiguities’ (Belgrave, 2005, 173). These findings came as somewhat of a surprise at the Waitangi Tribunal hearings to the Tribunal members and Ngāi Tahu claimants alike. All participating parties had held the ‘fervent belief ... that the history was a done deal’ (Belgrave, 2005, 197).

The other prevailing idea was that Ngāi Tahu were standing in the way of European progress. Particularly once Lord Stanley, the newly appointed Colonial Officer in charge declared that the New Zealand Company was not allowed to buy or resell further land until ‘the Company’s original 1839 land purchases’ were reviewed (Evison, 1993, 165). As a consequence the New Zealand Company was no longer able to provide the arriving settlers with land, land which the settlers had already paid for. Evison (1993, 165) concluded:

This from the settlers’ point of view, could only be because the Government was being over-indulgent towards Maoris who were standing in the way of progress and civilisation. Thus was reinforced a lasting belief in New Zealand society, that Maori interests were incompatible with progress and natural justice.

The sale of land resulted in a rapid decline in living conditions among Ngāi Tahu. Lacking their food sources from the mahinga kai more and more Ngāi Tahu were forced into labouring in the new European economy (Dacker and New Zealand 1990 Commission, 1990, 26, 28; see also Evison, 1993, 157). The loss of land occurred at such a rapid speed that in two decades, from 1844 to 1864, ‘Ngai Tahu were left with
barely one acre out of every one thousand acres they had once owned’ (Anderson, 1998, 206). This led the Arowhenua chief Horomona Pohio in 1876 to describe the situation of tribal members as ‘living as manene’, beggars, who could not live off the land any more (Dacker and New Zealand 1990 Commission, 1990, 23). Webster (1998b, 142) argued that changes can be seen either as ‘adaptation’ or as ‘resulting from such specific historical situations and especially changes in control over land and labour’. For Ngāi Tahu both views hold true with adaptation preceding changes enforced by the political and economical situation.

Urbanisation

Before the two World Wars the Māori population of New Zealand was mostly rural, a situation which changed slowly in the years 1945-56 with a drop of the rural Māori population from 75% of the overall Māori population in 1945 to approximately 60% in 1956 (Pool, 1991, 153; Metge, 1995, 22, 75). In the following decade urbanisation gained momentum and the urban-rural population pattern was reversed with 62% of the overall Māori population living in urban centres in 1966. The age cohorts of 5-14 and 14-24 were over-represented in urban areas (Pool, 1991, 153, 158, f.). In the 1990s the Māori population in the urban centres of New Zealand reached 82% of the overall Māori population, with 15% of New Zealand’s population having Māori descent but only 12.7% identifying as Māori (Metge, 1995, 19, 75).

The 1970s saw an increase in international migration and in the 1980s the annual ‘net loss’ to the Māori population reached between 1500 to 2000 (Pool, 1991, 179; Metge, 1995, 22). There were also few Māori ‘at kaumatua ages’ in the late 1980s, and most of the living kaumatua had been born in rural communities (Pool, 1991, 236). Pool (1991, 235) argued that this situation was prone to create tensions ‘in an ethnic group which emphasises intergenerational transfers of cultural values often moulded by the life experiences of the elderly’. This tension was further enhanced by the fact that cultural revival was often driven by Māori people living in urban centres who were conscious of the loss (Metge, 1995, 22).  

In the 1986 census self-ascribed ethnic categorisation was introduced. Pool (1991, 163) argued that people had used self-ascribed ethnic categorisation in earlier censuses and that the rise of ‘solely Maori’ reporting between the census years ‘81 and ‘86 was due to an ‘upsurge in ethnic awareness’ rather than the new categorisation offered in the census. In the South Island Māori the number of people reporting as Māori overall

11Metge’s (1964) A New Maori Migration: Rural and Urban Relations in Northern New Zealand offers insights into the intricacies of urban-rural relations and the similarities displayed by Māori living in both areas.
increased by 13.6% between 1981 and 1986 (Pool, 1991, 163). The 1980s also saw an increase in ‘return migration’ from urban centres to the rural areas with young Māori ‘fleeing unemployment’ and ‘Maori retirees’ spending their retirement near the places of their youth (Pool, 1991, 206; see also Metge, 1995, 75). The continued growth of the urban Māori population is then attributable to natural growth rather than ‘in-migration’ (Pool, 1991, 204).

5.4 Te Kerēme and the settlement

The legal fight for justice, Te Kerēme, and its culmination in the settlement with the Crown in 1997 are two of the most important, if not the most important points of reference for Ngāi Tahu in the last two centuries. To a large extent Te Kerēme unified Ngāi Tahu as an iwi. The following is a short account of Te Kerēme and the settlement with the Crown.

Te Kerēme

The Treaty of Waitangi was signed in 1840. Few of the South Island chiefs ever saw the document with only three and half weeks being set aside to gather sufficient signatures within this area (Evison, 1993, 132-134). The Treaty was a response of the British Crown to several issues. First, it extinguished the threat of the French government annexing New Zealand (Evison, 1993, 136-143). Second, it dwarfed any attempts by the settlers to set up an independent government (Evison, 1993, 130). Third, it allowed for an even faster appropriation of land by the British Crown. The English and Māori version of the Treaty document are incongruent in important parts. Walker (1994, 266) concluded that ‘no chief would have signed’ the Treaty had the translation been more specific in its explanation of powers bestowed in the Crown (see also Walker, 2005, 64; Durie, 1991, 157). Some chiefs, however, were well aware of the magnitude of the document and signed hoping to strengthen their waning chiefly powers — lost to the Christian doctrine of equality — and to avoid the state of lawlessness the missionaries predicted (Walker, 1994, 265, 269). The missionaries in turn, had a ‘vested interest ... in land’ (Walker, 1994, 266). While Walker’s conclusion might be correct for the chiefs residing on the North Island it cannot be correct for the South Island, since missionaries only arrived weeks before the Treaty (O’Regan, 1994, 239). After the signing a state apparatus was introduced, which slowly expanded until

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12Evison’s (1993) Te Wai Pounamu, the Greensstone Island and Dacker’s (1994) Te Māmāe me te Aroha, the Pain and the Love offer excellent and in-depth accounts of Te Kerēme from a perspective based on court documents. Belgrave’s (2005, 134-217) account of the Waitangi Tribunal hearings offers a differing view on the claim history of Ngāi Tahu.
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the newly founded state had all elements of a Western state, including a constitution, a bureaucratic structure, a system of political representation, a government, and an education system. Māori were excluded from this new system until they received four seats in parliament under the Maori Representation Act 1867 (Walker, 2005, 64).

Te Kerēme, the Ngāi Tahu claim, started not long after the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, although not in a unified form. The name ‘Te Kereame o Ngai-Tahu raua ko Ngati-Mamoe’, later to be shortened to Te Kereme, was used from 1907 onwards. On 16 July 1907 a committee was founded with the goal ‘to collate documents, appoint legal advice, call meetings, and levy the various runanga for a fighting fund’. The Ngāi Tahu claim became unified with the Otago Purchase and Kemp’s Deed as the basis of the iwi wide claim (Evison, 1993, 480, f.).

The incorporation of earlier tribes into the name of the claim is explainable. According to Tau (2003, 242)

> [a]ll the signatories to the Treaty of Waitangi in the South Island claimed descent from all three tribes [Waitaha, Ngāti Mamoe, and Ngāi Tahu] – however all signatories claimed Ngāi Tahu as having manawhenua. The mana of Ngāi Tahu to the land was agreed to by the Ngāti Māmoe during a tribal meeting in Murihiku, where the Ngāti Māmoe chief Horomona Pukehetei and his followers were satisfied that their claim to land was secondary and that they could claim land through their Ngāi Tahu ancestry.\(^{13}\)

Dissatisfaction of tribal members with the old leadership and a struggle of the new leadership to incorporate all factions is another reason why Ngāti Mamoe are named as well (Evison, 1993, 499).

Ngāi Tahu demanded the reserves and the mahinga kai they thought had been agreed upon in the eight land sales comprising nearly the entire South Island. The claim was mostly fought in institutional arenas established by the British and followed the procedures the British had introduced.\(^{14}\) Already in 1843 Commissioner Godfrey held court, dealing with land claims predating 1840. The results were largely dependent on the circumstances and the claimants. In Akaroa Ngāi Tahu won all three land claims, whereas in Otakou the situation presented itself differently. Hone Tuhawaiki, a Ngāi

\(^{13}\)As described in more detail later the Waitangi Tribunal accepted Ngāi Tahu’s reading of the tribal whakapapa, which went against the reading of most other New Zealand tribes, on the grounds that every tribe had its own history.

\(^{14}\)There was at least one occasion were Te Kerēme was fought outside courts and the House of Representatives. In the winter of 1877 Te Maiharoa and his followers occupied an area near Lake Benmore and remained there until they were evicted in the winter season of 1879 (Dacker, 1994, 60-66).
Tahu chief who was an admirer of British army and regalia, supported many of the claims made by Europeans and on the basis of his testimony many of the claims were granted (Evison, 1993, 166-171).

Ngāi Tahu used several different avenues to fight for their land and rights and to gain public awareness of their situation. The Ngāi Tahu chief Matiaha Tiramorehu used the public as a way of protesting in 1849. He wrote an open letter to Lieutenant Governor Eyre in Wellington, which was printed in the Wellington based newspaper, The New Zealand Spectator and Cook Strait Guardian. In his letter Tiramorehu explained that the reserves set aside for Māori were insufficient and that Ngāi Tahu and not Ngāti Toa were the rightful owners of Kaiapoi (for reserves see Dacker, 1994, 34; for ownership of Kaiapoi see Evison, 1993, 298). Political representation in the House of Representatives and the Upper House was a further way of making the Pākehā public aware of Ngāi Tahu’s grievances. In the 1870s Hori Kerei Taiaroa for example, who had been elected to the House of Representatives and called to the Upper House several times, used his position to strengthen the case in every possible way. He petitioned motions, requested selected committees for further inquests into the land claims, and acted as a constant reminder of the situation most Ngāi Tahu were in (Dacker, 1994, 58, f., 61,f.).

Governor Grey had in the 1860s set up a ‘system of district runanga’ (Walker, 2004, 118). Grey’s rūnanga were directly reporting to the Pākehā commissioner responsible for the district. Having lost several claims in the land courts Ngāi Tahu followed this idea and established local bodies, rūnanga, in 1874. The rūnanga, were responsible for the running of the legal affairs of the hapū and kāinga. The establishment of rūnanga allowed Ngāi Tahu to fight Te Kerēme through Parliament (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 60).

Three years later, in 1877, Chief Judge Prendergast effectively closed the courts to Māori land claims. In the case Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington Chief Judge Prendergast ruled that the Treaty was a ‘simple nullity’ on the grounds that the Māori signatories in 1840 had no sovereignty to cede to the British Crown due to a lack of ‘body politic’.15 As a result of this he concluded that land claims could only be brought before the courts by the Crown and not by Māori. This ruling heralded the turn to a less favourable position towards native land titles. In earlier years judges had ruled that native land titles were legally binding and ownership of land could only be acquired with the expressed consent of the native land owner. Chief Judge Prendergast’s ruling rejected the legal status of native land titles and undermined the

15Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 72, 78.
importance of the Treaty of Waitangi (Evison, 1993, 441; see also Hayward, 1997, 476).16

By far the most successful way to keep Ngāi Tahu grievances in the historical records, and one which Ngāi Tahu used from an early stage onwards, were commissions of inquiry. After investigation into Kemp’s Deed and the Otago and Akaroa Purchase the Smith-Nairn Commission found in 1879 that the claims made by Ngāi Tahu about insufficient reserves and mahinga kai were justified. The results of the Smith-Nairn Commission were never made public. When Taiaroa, a Member of the House of Representatives, in 1882 inquired about the findings the Native Minister John Bryce replied that no further action would be taken, since the ‘opinions’ expressed by the commissioners were ‘utterly impractical’ (Bryce cited in Dacker, 1994, 67; see also Evison, 1993, 442-450, 455-458). In 1886 the Alexander MacKay commission found that ‘the grievances were supported by historical evidence, and that the lack of land had detrimentally affected Kai Tahu Whānui’ (Dacker, 1994, 71). Again no actions were taken upon the findings of the commission. Five years later, in 1891, MacKay authored a social impact report for a further commission. Again MacKay found that the situation was far from what the government had agreed to, with only 9.1% of Ngāi Tahu having the minimum land of 50 acres or more, 43.15% had less and 47.74% had no land (Dacker, 1994, 73, f.). In 1921 a further commission was established to investigate the Kemp Purchase, which found, as other commissions had before, that the Ngāi Tahu claims were justified and recommended a compensation sum of £354,000 (Evison, 1993, 483, 499). The allocation of this money17 was debated. Some members wanted to split the money between those who had a direct connection to the block of land Kemp had purchased, i.e. those who were direct descendants from occupants in 1848. Others wanted to distribute the money to all tribal members, arguing that during Te Rauparaha’s attacks – mentioned earlier – the southern hapū had come to the aid of the northern hapū (Dacker, 1994, 96). The findings presented in this thesis show that similar debates are occurring to this day, however, attempts are made to shift the focus away from whakapapa as sole access key to tribal redress —

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16 See Hayward (1997) for an excellent overview of the principles arising from the Treaty and the changing attitudes of Pākehā institutions towards the Treaty of Waitangi from the 1840s until the 1990s. See McHugh’s (1991) description of the Whig theory of sovereignty and Williams’ (1991) differing view for a contextualisation of Chief Judge Prendergast’s decision. The ‘Whig theory of government by consent’ (Williams, 1991, 190) stated ‘...(1) the paramuncty and (2) the indivisible character of the Crown’s sovereignty’ (McHugh, 1991, 181), which would have not allowed for Māori to retain any kind of self-rule after signing the Treaty of Waitangi. Furthermore the Whiggish conceptualisation of democracy sees the Westminster model of representation as a ‘constitutional predestination’ (McHugh, 1991, 184), which explains – but does not excuse – Chief Judge Prendergast’s decision to declare the Treaty a legal nullity due to a lack of body politic and therefore no progress towards a political representation in a Western sense.

17 The recommended compensation was not paid, but the recommendation was taken into consideration years later in the Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act of 1944 (Evison, 1993, 486).
the inclusive discourse — to a combination of whakapapa and active participation — the exclusive discourse.

The reserves set aside for Ngāi Tahu were in most cases the least desirable pieces of land, most were difficult to access and in bad soil condition (Dacker, 1994, 86). Even the Crown negotiator James Mackay Jr came to this conclusion during the purchase of land around Kaikōura in 1859, stating that the reserves were of the ‘most useless and worthless description’ (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 65).

The legal battle for more resources was expensive. Funds were raised within the different hapū to cover the costs. The first fighting fund was established in Otakou in 1875 with the aim to raise £5000 to send a Ngāi Tahu representative, accompanied by a lawyer, to England to meet the Queen and speak before parliament (Dacker, 1994, 57). These expenses came at times when most tribal members had hardly enough to survive (Dacker, 1994, 75, f.). Despite the poverty of the tribal members large sums were raised. In 1877 for example Taiaroa banked £3000 on behalf of the various rūnanga. The rūnanga raised the funds by further impairing their situation; stock was sold and parts of reserve land were leased to acquire the much needed money (Evison, 1993, 440). But not only fiscal amends had to be made in order to be able to pursue the claim. One of my participants remembered that her mother and her grandfather had both "worked tirelessly for the tribe" and in the end both died at a relatively young age [32].

The lack of resources at the early stages of Te Kerēme and Chief Judge Prendergast’s ruling that the Treaty was a ‘simple nullity’ had an influence on the jurisdictional level the claim was dealt with. In 1872 the Otakou hapū, for example, was not able to appeal to the Privy Council in London and instead had to accept £5000 from the New Zealand government as a payment for not taking the claim any further. What may have seemed like a loss at the time proved to be advantageous at later stages. Dacker (1994, 49) argued that the

failures to obtain remedies for their grievances in the Native Land Court
and the Supreme Court focused Te Kerēme on Parliament, the highest
‘court’ in New Zealand.

During the 150 years of negotiations, submissions, petitions and legal battles the tactics used by Ngāi Tahu changed several times. In the years following the land sales the only form of claims which stood any chance of winning were claims for further compensation, while in later decades titles to land which had not been sold could be acquired (Belgrave, 2005, 189). With increasing length of the different claims the sophistication in legal procedures and the cohesiveness of Ngāi Tahu claimants’
statements increased, although in some cases statements directly contradicted statements made in earlier claims.\textsuperscript{18} In a number of tribal hui a consensus was sought as to what had actually happened during the Kemp Purchase. Overall the decades after the eight land sales show a growing awareness of Ngāi Tahu individuals that with the land sales the rights to the resources on the land had been sold as well (Belgrave, 2005, 190, f.). To European witnesses this must have also come as a surprise in later years, ‘the extent to which Maori rights were being denied in the 1840s’ was clearly not understood (Belgrave, 2005, 193). The difference was that during the 1840s Ngāi Tahu was not seen as owning the land, and that giving each tribal member 10 acres would go ‘beyond their original legitimate claims of ownership’ (Belgrave, 2005, 194). In the 1880s, after all the effects of the land sales had transpired, members of the Native Land Court concluded that transaction such as Kemp Purchase were not easily comprehensible. It is obvious that the understanding of what had been done was different between the sellers and the buyers at the time (Belgrave, 2005, 194). It is also important to note, however, that differing understandings were not necessarily only a result of misunderstandings at the time of the purchases. The promises of both the Otakou and Kemp’s land purchases, deemed unfulfilled by tribal members, were repeatedly cited for nearly 150 years during recurring claims. In 1991 however, against the understanding of everybody, including Crown representatives, the Waitangi Tribunal found that these promises were in fact never made, but rather had become a fixture in claims through repetition rather than being based on historical evidence (Belgrave, 2005, 194, f.).\textsuperscript{19} Today’s understanding of the situation 150 years ago has been influenced by court proceedings and during these proceedings both sides have changed their understandings of what was at stake several times.

With the unification of the various land claims into Te Kerēme the Native Land Court saw the need for a membership list in the 1920s. After reviewing Mantell’s 1848 census in 1925 and finding it to be unreliable the Ngaitahu Census Committee was established. In 1929 a further hearing of the Native Land Court used the committee’s iwi-wide survey and Mantell’s two censuses from 1848 and 1853 to create a list of all iwi members. This list became known as the Blue Book (Dacker, 1994, 96). Evison doubts the correctness of the membership data gathered for the Blue Book, mentioning contradicting data from Mackay, who suggested that Mantell

\textsuperscript{18}See for example Kiriona Pohau’s statements at different claims regarding the Kaitorete spit near Christchurch. To the Smith-Nairn commission Pohau claimed that he had specifically discussed the boundaries of the sale with Mantell and that the spit was not included, whereas 12 years earlier he made the statement that he had not discussed anything with Mantell (Belgrave, 2005, 190).

\textsuperscript{19}The ‘fervent belief by all the participants that the history was a done deal’ (Belgrave, 2005, 197) led the Crown to appoint only one historian, Alan Ward, to research the historical facts at the beginning of the hearings for the Ngāi Tahu claim. This situation has changed considerably with historians later becoming a fixture during these hearings.
under-counted the population. Mantell, according to Evison, also never counted Ngāi Tuahuriri, traditionally a large fraction of the tribe. Ngāi Tahu themselves might have added a further error to the count by deliberately giving Mantell false information (Evison, 1993, 312). Today’s membership of the tribe is based on the Blue Book. Applicants have to prove a connection to a tribal member mentioned in this membership list. Two of my interview partners voiced doubts about the reliability of the current membership list. One of them mentioned that ”at the moment 10% of the enrolled haven’t supplied sufficient information to be enrolled” [33]. The sufficient information the participant referred to is a birth certificate. Both participants knew of people on the membership list which were not Ngāi Tahu by genealogical definition alone.

The common ancestry, as it is laid out in the Blue Book, did not dampen the strong hapū affiliations that have always been prevalent in Ngāi Tahu history. Hostilities between the different hapū were frequent and ferocious (Anderson, 1998, 205; see also Taylor, 1952, 171). The central hapū, Ngāi Tuahuriri, was seen in a less than favourable light by the neighbouring hapū. Mainly Otakou, but also the other southern hapū, had a strong interest in the land sales and in achieving a fair outcome for Ngāi Tahu. Ngāi Tuahuriri were held in low regard at this time because Te Rauparaha had captured and later released large parts of the hapū (Anderson, 1998, 98). The relationship with the hapū based around Akaroa was equally strained since the Akaroa hapū did not help Ngāi Tuahuriri against Te Rauparaha’s attacks and the latter obstructed the former’s defence (Evison, 1993, 62).

Despite these animosities the importance of Tuahiwi, the location of the Ngāi Tuahuriri marae, grew in the 1880s. Hui concerning Te Kerēme were held more frequently at Tuahiwi than at the more southern marae, the traditional locations for Te Kerēme hui (Dacker, 1994, 69). The first Te Kerēme committee in 1907 mirrored the rising importance of Tuahiwi and the region around Christchruch: The Chairman and the secretary were from Tuahiwi, while the treasurer was from Rapaki (Evison, 1993, 481).

The Settlement

In 1944 the government passed the Ngai Tahu Claim Settlement Act, which granted Ngāi Tahu the sum of £300,000 in yearly instalments of £10,000 over 30 years. This was to be a ‘final settlement’ and the figures were based on the recommendation of the Jones, Strauchon and Ormsby Commission from 1921. The settlement was decided upon by the government without consultation with Ngāi Tahu and many tribal members saw the settlement as a less-than-ideal solution. The parliamentary
5.4. TE KERÊME AND THE SETTLEMENT

Member for Southern Māori, E. T. Tirikatene, coined the name of the settlement, by arguing that Ngāi Tahu should accept the settlement, because 'half a loaf is better than no bread' (Tirikatene cited in Evison, 1993, 486; see also Dacker, 1994, 118).

In 1946 the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board was established and authorised to administer the 1944 settlement. The eight members of the board were elected by the iwi, one for each district. Despite administrative problems in the beginning the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board managed to grow the assets of the tribe and administer grants for the elderly and study grants. Te Wai Pounamu House in Christchurch, which is to this day the headquarters of Ngāi Tahu, was built with the assets accumulated under the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board (Dacker, 1994, 118, f.; see also Evison, 1993, 486).

The acceptance of the settlement and the setting up of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board should have been the end of the Ngāi Tahu claim, and according to one of my participants "the majority of Ngāi Tahu signed off on the claim in 1944, 1946 ... our rūnanga [Tuahiwi] didn’t" [52]. The lack of consultation with the tribal members was the reason why the rūnanga in Tuahiwi refused to accept the settlement as final. In 1986 Henare Rakihia Tau from Tuahiwi and the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board filed Te Kerēme with the Waitangi Tribunal under the official title of Wai 27 (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 9, 61).20

The hearings of the Waitangi Tribunal started in August 1987 and brought to light many issues with the existing narrative of Ngāi Tahu history. Within little more than a year the Waitangi Tribunal produced a voluminous report — 1254 pages — which refuted many of Ngāi Tahu’s ‘cherished historical narratives’ (Belgrave, 2005, 208). Nonetheless the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the Ngāi Tahu claimants had indeed as the claimants argued fared far worse from the land sales than could have been predicted, particularly in regard to access to food. But, to the defence of the Crown, the Tribunal found ‘no great evidence of pressure or threats’ on behalf of the Crown to force individual Ngāi Tahu or Ngāi Tahu as a collective into selling land (Belgrave, 2005, 209). Ngāi Tahu accepted the Tribunal’s report and entered into negotiations with the Crown to achieve a mutually acceptable settlement. The negotiation process occurred ‘behind closed doors’ (Belgrave, 2005, 214).

The Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board was not accountable to the members of the Ngāi Tahu iwi but to the Crown. It was also not a legal personality. The Waitangi Tribunal

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20Any person of Māori descent can lodge grievances with the Waitangi Tribunal but the Tribunal ‘is not required to check that a claimant has a mandate from any group, but it may refuse to inquire into a claim that is considered to be frivolous or vexatious’ (Waitangi Tribunal, 2009). The website can be accessed on <http://www.waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz>. The quote, however, has been removed with the last update. Although it is not a requirement I have been assured by a former employee of the Waitangi Tribunal that it is standard procedure to check whether or not communication processes are in place when claims for larger entities are filed.
recommended to the Crown that Ngāi Tahu should be given legal status in the form of a legal personality to enable Ngāi Tahu to enter into negotiations with the Crown. The development of the structure of the legal personality – Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu – took 10 years. In 1992 at the Hui-a-tau in Kaikōura all but one of the present tribal members voted for the new structure of the legal personality. The charter of Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu was adopted by all 18 papatipu rūnanga in 1993. The legislation to establish a legal representative body for Ngāi Tahu was introduced to Parliament in 1992 and finally passed in 1996 as Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu Act (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 49-51). This gave the iwi ‘its legal entity and ... legal independence from the Crown’ (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 61).

In 1997 the negotiations between the Ngāi Tahu tribe and the New Zealand government finally came to a conclusion. The government offered a settlement and parliament passed at the same time the Ngāi Tahu (Pounamu Vesting) Act – returning the ownership of greenstone to Ngāi Tahu (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 9, 61).

The Crown offer was accepted by Ngāi Tahu in 1998. The offer consisted of five different aspects:


- **Aoraki** – Aoraki/Mount Cook plays an important role in Ngāi Tahu’s creation myths. Aoraki/Mount Cook, was handed back to Ngāi Tahu, who in return gifted it back to the people of New Zealand (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 16).

- **Economic Redress** – A compensation for the economic loss Ngāi Tahu has sustained since the arrival of the European settlers. The compensation consisted of four parts:
  - A cash compensation of NZ$ 170 million (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 17, f.).
  - A deferred selection process, which allowed Ngāi Tahu to buy Crown property up to 12 months after the settlement legislation had been passed (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 18).
  - A right of first refusal, which enforces that Ngāi Tahu has the first buying right for certain Crown assets at market rate when the Crown decides to sell these assets. The right of first refusal applies to ‘a large range of Crown assets’ and will last in perpetuity (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 19).
5.4. TE KERÈME AND THE SETTLEMENT

- A relativity clause, which guarantees Ngāi Tahu a further monetary compensation, a ‘top-up payment’, in case all Treaty settlements in New Zealand between 1994 and 2044 are together worth more than NZ$ 1 billion. This relativity clause ensures that the Ngāi Tahu settlement maintains its relative value compared to all other settlements (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 21).

• Cultural Redress – A restoration of Ngāi Tahu’s cultural autonomy consisting of four parts:

  - Ownership and control over pounamu and areas special to Ngāi Tahu, for example the islands where tītī are harvested (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 25-30).
  
  - The recognition of mana through consultation with Ngāi Tahu over the management of specific areas, the use of Ngāi Tahu values on these areas, and the use of dual place names (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 33-37).
  
  - Mahinga kai are acknowledged as culturally relevant and are made accessible to tribal members (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 37-41).
  
  - Management input by Ngāi Tahu is guaranteed and will ensure that Ngāi Tahu cultural values are taken into consideration in the management of the South Island (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 42, f.).

• Non-tribal redress – A guarantee that private claims of Ngāi Tahu tribal members will be processed or, where the Waitangi Tribunal had already published a report, that the recommendations of the Tribunal will be implemented as far as possible (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 45-47).

Besides establishing reparative actions by the Crown the settlement also undermined any threats to the mana of Ngāi Tahu. The borders to the lands conquered by northern invading tribes or other tribes living in the South Island became legally binding through the settlement. With the settlement Ngāi Tahu has become a political, economic and cultural entity of considerable power, a large transformation for the tribe which was seen as having undergone complete assimilation and a loss of culture and language (Belgrave, 2005, 202). By 2007 the assets of the Ngāi Tahu tribe had grown to NZS 567,060 million (Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu, 2007) and in 2008 they were estimated to be in excess of NZ$ 600 million (NA, 2008a, The Press).
COMMUNICATIONS

For the negotiations and the settlement itself communication within the iwi was necessary. On the one hand tribal leaders were certainly interested in informing tribal members about the current state of affairs and in getting opinions about how to progress with the negotiations. On the other hand accountability is one of the interests of the Waitangi Tribunal. In the words of one interview partners, who worked at the Waitangi Tribunal: ". . . we want to make sure that when we’re doing the negotiations that they’re bringing the people with them . . ." [30].

To inform members several different communication technologies were used. Two publications, Te Pānui Rūnaka and Te Karaka, were established in the late 1990s. Te Pānui Rūnaka is a monthly magazine in which all the 18 papatipu rūnanga can present their current affairs, such as births, marriages, deaths, marae activities and success stories of hapū members. All registered tribal members receive Te Pānui Rūnaka. Te Karaka is published every three months and is produced by Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu. The content is directed at tribal members, but also at the general public. Registered tribal members receive this publication, but it is also available in stores now and excerpts can be downloaded on TRoNT’s website. A radio station, Tahu FM, and a TV station were also established and have been running successfully for several years now.

Hapū administrations have begun to use email lists to inform members about upcoming events and current affairs. Most of my participants were happy to receive information via email and often questioned why other members wanted to use phone trees to inform everyone about upcoming tangi.

TRoNT does not yet email out information to members directly, but rather sends emails to the 18 papatipu rūnanga, who then forward the information to their members. At the time of my research the email addresses were held by the rūnanga, whereas other contact information was usually also stored at the Whakapapa Unit. This has changed with a new central data storage system under way during the time of the research.

Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu also maintains a website, which is used to give general information about Ngāi Tahu to prospective members and to the public. Many of my interview partners who were locally active questioned the use of the website, saying it was outdated and that the information was too general to be of any use to them. This contributed to a downward spiral with members lacking interest to check whether the website had been updated and whether the content was now more interesting to them.
5.5. **CONCLUSION**

The use of online communication tools raises the question over how widespread CMC is among tribal members. *Mō Tātou*, the latest survey of the Ngāi Tahu tribe, was commissioned by Ngāi Tahu Development Corp\(^{21}\) and published in November 2004. With two thirds of the respondents reporting access to CMC the number of online users was relatively high among the respondents of *Mō Tātou*. Age had an influence on access to CMC, albeit only in later stages in life. This is visible with the youngest age group, the 16 to 19 year olds, having the highest access rate with 75%, followed by the three age groups 20-29, 30-39, and 40-49 all with levels of access slightly above or below 70%. The next age group, 50-59, shows a noticeable decline with only 60% of the participants in this age group reporting access, followed be a steep decline with only 40% of the participants in the age group 60-69 having access to CMC. The oldest age group, 70 years and older, was the group with the lowest level of access. Only 10% of the participants in this age group had access to CMC (Ngai Tahu Development Corp, 2004, 83).

The *Mō Tātou* report does not go into details why tribal members prefer certain means of communication over others, but gives figures about preferences. Most participants, 83.7%, wanted to be informed about tribal events, like iwi or hapū hui, through a letter. Slightly over 30% of the participants would accept invitations or post-event reports via email (Ngai Tahu Development Corp, 2004, 84). The tribal publications *Te Pānui Rūnaka* and *Te Karaka*, which are currently used to advertise events, were only favoured as means of communication about tribal events by 20% (Ngai Tahu Development Corp, 2004, 85). Overall most members were satisfied with the tribal publications, with 79.5% of the participants reporting that they were ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’ with *Te Pānui Rūnaka* and *Te Karaka*. Age was, again, an important factor, with satisfaction levels rising from the youngest to the oldest age group. A quarter of the respondents wanted to receive the publications through the website of TRoNT (Ngai Tahu Development Corp, 2004, 85).

Expanding the tribal communication to include more CMC was requested by 16.2% of the respondents and 7.1% voiced their hopes for more involvement possibilities for those members living outside the tribal area (Ngai Tahu Development Corp, 2004, 86).

5.5 **Conclusion**

In this chapter I have given a short historical background of the Ngāi Tahu tribe. The two foci of the chapter were the adaptation of new technologies introduced by Europeans and the effects of the loss of land on tribal members. Handler (1985, 180)

\(^{21}\)Ngāi Tahu Development Corp has since been disestablished.
argued that the ‘Western conventions of storytelling inevitably constitute protagonists as bounded, individuated actors’. His contention was with the use of ‘historical background’ as proof of the existence of the subject of a particular anthropological study (Handler, 1985, 180). In the case of Ngāi Tahu two arguments speak against Handler’s objections. First, the Ngāi Tahu tribe, at least from a legal perspective, appears to be a clearly delineated, single actor. The historical background given in this chapter, however, shows that the Ngāi Tahu tribe is a social construct. Anderson (2008, 20) argued that tribal cohesion was only achieved once the ‘colonisation of the South Island was almost over’. Anderson (2008, 26) further argued that:

the campaigns, skirmishes, battles and sieges of the migration history were not part of a concerted invasion in the usual sense, but were conducted mostly at the family level, and for personal or family reasons. The hapū migration can be seen, at least in part, as aggregated movements resulting from the pursuit of numerous individual causes or vendettas which could flare up across generations.

Further, this chapter has shown that intermarriages with other, preceding tribes, were common and have created a tribe with amorphous boundaries. The arrival of Europeans had implications beyond the introduction of new technologies. New diseases, and weapons, decimated Māori on the South Island. Through intermarriages with European sealers, whalers and later settlers the boundaries of the Ngāi Tahu were further blurred. The nation-wide urbanisation process saw the sizes of rural and urban Māori populations reversed between 1945 and 1966 and by the 1990s 82% of Māori lived in urban centres (Metge, 1995; Pool, 1991). The historical background presented here can then indeed be seen as proof of the existence of the Ngāi Tahu tribe as Handler (1985) argued. In light of the historical information the Ngāi Tahu tribe, however, can only be understood as a continuously contested entity, not as a geographically and physically bounded group.

Second, the historical background given here has shown that the tribal history is indeed as Handler (1985, 179) argued a ‘construct’ rather than fixed. Tribal historical narrative was based on court documents, documents which reflected the complainants and defendants will to achieve a certain outcome. As Belgrave (2005) argued, the resulting understanding of past events is debatable and large parts of commonly held knowledge about the tribal past have been questioned by the Waitangi Tribunal. Tau (2008a, 17) argued that even before the advent of European court systems ‘objectivity’ and any form of ‘historical accuracy’ were ‘secondary to maintaining tribal prestige’.
Despite questioning tribal historical common knowledge the Waitangi Tribunal recommended that the Ngāi Tahu tribe enter into negotiations with the New Zealand government. A description of the resulting settlement and the changes to inner-tribal communication formed the last part of this chapter.

Against Handler’s (1985) call for abandonment, I argue that the historical background information given in this chapter will strengthen the following chapters by pointing out the contested nature of the tribe and the historical narratives surrounding it.
Chapter 6

Bureaucracy and its lures

6.1 Introduction

Vignette 1

One of the few short periods of participant observation occurred at a conference in the heartland of Ngāi Tahu country, Christchurch. The conference coordinators had invited me to give a presentation about my research. Having just scaled the peak of my anthropological depression I was set to give a presentation critical of everybody in ‘my’ tribe from the tribal governance down to the active and inactive tribal members. Money and influence were the only motivating forces I could make out in the bulk of my data. Listening to other presentations I began to feel that I was quite possibly the sole presenter critical of inner-tribal politics and the shuffling and re-shuffling of alliances.

My presentation ended up in a block of three presentations including a presenter talking about the future of the Maori economy, and, of all possible other presenters, the same presenter of the Ngāi Tahu Research Consultation Committee (NTRCC) I had encountered earlier (see the vignette in chapter two). The first presenter used up most of the 90 minutes block. With only 15 minutes remaining the NTRCC presenter sped through his presentation to give me 7 minutes for mine. My presentation was not the one I had prepared but an off the cuff abbreviated version. Stepping down from the podium I came face to face with one of Ngāi Tahu’s most publicised and knowledgeable people. In a rapid-fire round of questioning he tried to establish tribal links. Was I sure I wasn’t a tribal member? Maybe a Hoffman from Horowhenua? Did I know such and such? What was my mother’s

\[1\text{I am guessing that this is the correct spelling rather than the less usual ‘Hofmann’.
}
maiden name? Had I had contact with any Ngāi Tahu in Germany? Sadly, he was unable to establish any connections. I could tell it would have been a small victory if he had been able to welcome this German researcher into the tribe right there and then.

Vignette 2

Tremewan (2005a) argued that, sadly, only Rata with her concept of the neotribal elite had understood the current situation within Māori tribes. Sissons (2005a, 29) replied that the concept was overly simplistic and suggested "that anthropological critiques of culture are better understood within this tribe [Ngāi Tahu] than they are within Political Studies!"

The following is my take on this awareness. Waiting in the corridors of Te Waipounamu House in Christchurch I was somewhat awed by the hectic activity of a busy bureaucratic institution. People walked in and out of offices with reams of papers, discussed reports on their way to meetings and exchanged short-hand references to some legal precedent or other. When my interview partner turned up he immediately spotted a co-worker and bustled us all into an empty conference room. After short introductions my interview partner and his female college quickly changed the subject to yet another colleague, who had supposedly slept with several of the female staff. These incidences, the two colleagues quickly surmised, were not to be read as typical male behaviour. Instead the cultural component was the explanatory factor. He was white the women were not, thus it was the "Lawrence of Arabia" issue all over again.

Intrigued about this exchange I later asked my interview partner off the record how this colleague’s actions were connected to the Lawrence of Arabia issue. He replied that it was not just a question of what Lawrence had thought but also what all the Arabs thought about the Englishman on a camel.

As we have seen in the last chapters individual Ngāi Tahu use CMC extensively: to research information, for entertainment reasons, and to stay in contact with their families. In this chapter I will demonstrate how the bureaucratic structure of the iwi, in most cases simply called TRoNT, although this somewhat oversimplifies the vast structure, is trying to gain more information about and influence on tribal members. The two vignettes set the ground for this chapter. The first vignette shows what I term the inclusive discourse in action. All members are welcome and genealogical links alone are seen as sufficient for tribal membership. The second vignette is an example
of the awareness of cultural issues and their potential effects for the tribe within TRoNT.

In this chapter I will first show that iwi and tribal bureaucracies have become important politically and are a response to specific economic and political circumstances. Then I will describe the creation of the bureaucratic structure within Ngāi Tahu. This structure is nowadays deeply enshrined in the understanding of the tribe, both by tribal members and by the wider public. Following this I will explain what I have termed the inclusive discourse, a discourse which emphasises the rights of the individual tribal members based on whakapapa connections rather than merits and participation. Emphasising tribal members’ rights also cements the importance of the bureaucratic structure as distributive agency. Lastly I will show how all these efforts are mirrored in online strategies.

6.2 Iwi and tribal corporations

As shown in the literature review there are numerous interpretations of the revival of tribes in Māori society. For some authors tribes have returned to fulfilling the important task of providing the skeletal framework of Māori society (e.g. Mead, 2003; O’Regan, 1994; Walker, 2004). For other authors the contemporary understanding of iwi as tribes is based on early anthropological understanding of Māori society and tribes have grown to a level of importance previously unknown. Governmental policies are given as the reason for this growth by some authors (e.g. Bargh, 2007; Birdling, 2004; Maaka, 1994), other authors have identified economic or political interests of elites as the driving force behind the rise of tribes (e.g. Levine and Henare, 1994; Rata, 2000). Some authors have combined economic and political reasons. Governments were described as having specific agendas, such as creating divisions within Māori society (van Meijl, 1997, 2003), or the search for a single point of contact (Sissons, 2005b), Māori leaders in turn were presented as equally interested in the strengthening of the tribe to gain political powers (Ballara, 1998; van Meijl, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2003; Sissons, 2005b).²

With the devolution process introduced by the Labour government in the 1980s the introduction of tribal bureaucracies followed the (re)emergence of tribal leaders. While arguing for the devolution of power to the iwi, tribal bureaucracies in turn monopolised the newly devolved political power (van Meijl, 2003). This centralisation of power and the wholesale adoption of Western business ideas without regard to the

²The government even amended the Treaty of Waitangi Act in 1995 to the effect that the Waitangi Tribunal can decline hearing any claims made by sources other than hapū or iwi (van Meijl, 2003, 17).
effects on and the ideas of tribal members raised criticism within the tribes (for Tainui see van Meijl, 1997, 92, ff.; for Ngāi Tahu see Kelly, 1991).

Before beginning to show the construction of a unitary tribal entity I will clarify my stance regarding the cultural authenticity of such political endeavours. The debate regarding the invention of tradition has helped to highlight the shortcomings of ahistorical functionalist and structural-functionalist analyses. While some of the participants have declared stasis to be the exception rather than change (e.g. Handler, 1984; Hanson, 1989; Keesing, 1982, 1989, 1993; Linnekin, 1983, 1990, 1991) others have revealed the internal differences of the political use of culture (e.g. Babadzan, 2000, 2004; Sissons, 1993). Other participants in turn have pointed out that change is regarded as progress in Western societies and as ‘inauthenticity’ elsewhere (Jolly, 1992, 52), and that the notion of authenticity itself is inextricably linked to the Western concept of individual possession (Handler, 1986). I want to further point out that the cards are heavily stacked against indigenous populations all over the world as, for example, Sissons (2005b) showed. Expectations of cultural purity need to be satisfied, indigenes need to become ‘hyperreal’ (Ramos, 1994, 161), while simultaneously stringent rules of engagement, such as the creation of a bureaucratic structure, are dictated by the nation-state.

6.3 Centralisation

In his article about the origins of nations Smith (1989, 344, f.) defined an ‘ethnie’, an ethnic community, by six characteristics:

1. a common name for the unit of population included; 2. a set of myths of common origins and descent for that population; 3. some common historical memories of things experienced together; 4. a common ‘historic territory’ or ‘homeland’, or an association with one; 5. one or more elements of common culture — language, customs, or religion; 6. a sense of solidarity amongst most members of the community.

Smith (1989, 347) further divided ethnic communities into ‘lateral’ and ‘vertical’. Lateral ethnies are ethnies which are ‘as territorially wide as [they are] lacking in social depth’, with aristocratic upper strata creating a sense of belonging which is imposed on the lower strata (Smith, 1989, 347). In ‘vertical’ or ‘demotic’ ethnies social cohesion is stronger, the commonality of historical experiences is more obvious and the ethnic and geographical ‘boundaries’ to the outside are clearly marked and defended (Smith, 1989, 347).
Smith’s characterisations provides a framework for the analysis of past and present endeavours to create a unified iwi. Ngāi Tahu fit within Smith’s description of a lateral ethnie and the membership can be divided into different levels of engagement with the tribe. To describe different levels of participation of American Jews in their Jewish community Elazar (1976) used seven concentric circles, each circle describing a different level of participation. The inner-most circle being ‘Integral Jews’, to whom their Jewishness is the ‘central factor of their lives’, surrounded by circles of less and less active Jews, whom Elazar (1976, 71-74) called ‘participants’, ‘associated Jews’, ‘contributors and consumers’, ‘peripherals’, ‘repudiators’, and ‘quasi-Jews’. In a paper circulated within TRoNT Mantell (described in O’Regan, 2001, 93, f.) applied Elazar’s concept to Ngāi Tahu. Mantell further added a new circle between peripheral Ngāi Tahu and repudiators, with the new circle representing Ngāi Tahu who identify as Ngāi Tahu yet have no links to the tribe. An important aspect, which is not part of Mantell’s argument but a finding of my research, is that membership in one of the circles does not equate to a specific stance towards the iwi. In other words some of my participants who could be classified as integral Ngāi Tahu are in fact by their own choice integral hapū or in some cases even integral whānau members. On the other hand little knowledge about cultural heritage was often accompanied by a pro-iwi stance. This leads to the conclusion that the tensions described in the following sections mostly arise within levels very close to the core of Elazar’s concentric circles. Those who have little to do with their hapū and iwi either do not know or do not care about the differences. It follows that the rising number of members will lead to a strengthening of the iwi as a main source of identity, should the new members stay on the outer circles of Elazar’s concept. This would mean a deepening of the schisms described in the following sections.

Independent nationhood does not appear to be the goal of leading Ngāi Tahu, rather the goals are an increased cultural autonomy and more political influence through political and economic means within the relative economic and political security of the New Zealand state (for a more generalised argument see Sissons, 2005b, 122 ). In Sir Tipene O’Regan’s (1994, 255) words:

The Ngāi Tahu leadership has consistently stressed that it does not want to wreck or damage the regional economy. It is that economy in which the tribe wants to be restored as full and significant participants.

The techniques used to forge a unified tribe are, however, the same as those employed to achieve nationhood. The leaders of lateral ethnies employ ‘bureaucratic incorporation’ to bring lower strata into the ethnie of the upper strata (Smith, 1989, 349). Ngāi Tahu tribal leaders have progressed further down the path of tribal unity
than locally active tribal members by emphasising the unifying factors between the hapū. Techniques used to forge nations out of vertical ethnies are used as well, such as the creative interpretation of landscape and history to create a nation out of a vertical ethnie. Landscape is used as ‘poetic spaces’, ‘turning bare nature into poetic history’, showing the interaction between the community and its environment and naturalising ‘historical features’ until space turns into place and the landscape is overlaid with a map of cultural interpretation. History is employed in similar ways, with the creation of the ‘cults of ‘golden ages” which explain the origins of a community, in a physical and a cultural sense, and set historical boundaries between insiders and outsiders to allow for a feeling of uniqueness (Smith, 1989, 356-359). The methods of bureaucratic incorporation and the (re)interpretation of landscape and history will be visible throughout the remainder of the chapter.

Elements of fission and fusion are visible in today’s tribe and in the past. The divisive feelings are mostly shown in face-to-face interaction, as for example the research interviews for this thesis, but are also visible in the need for constant efforts to unify the tribe. The ongoing efforts by Ngāi Tahu leaders to either extinguish previous occupants of the South Island from the public knowledge or incorporate them under the name Ngāi Tahu shows that the tribal boundaries, geographically and culturally, are far from stable. Although even today there are ‘strong Ngāti Māmoe-Waitaha strains in Ngāi Tahu’ these are not prominent any more in the public image of the tribe, partially because claims to land by members of these predecessor tribes were ‘satisfied... through their Ngāi Tahu ancestry’ (Tau, 2003, 242; see also Anderson, 1998, 92).3

The creation of a single tribe out of three intermingled tribes occurred through different processes resulting in the accomplishment of the first two characteristics, the common name and descent (Smith, 1989, 347). Intermarriage between the chiefly families of Ngāi Tahu, Kāti Māmoe and Waitaha was one of the main ways, combining the ancestry of all tribes and thus giving the older īwi a sense of control, while at the same time giving the children of these inter-tribal marriages a claim to the land as tangata whenua, people of the land. An example of whakapapa

3It is likely that Waitaha and Kāti Māmoe incorporated earlier arrivals in much the same manner. Anderson (1998, 21, f.) described this process for Waitaha and Ngāi Tahu:

Since tribal societies are usually named for eponymous ancestors, and different names are taken as tribes grow and separate into descendant tribes, it is quite likely that the name Waitaha only came into general usage after [the fifteenth century] and was gradually extended to include all of the earlier streams of ancestry, as occurred later with Ngai Tahu.

The use of common whakapapa back to an eponymous ancestor provides a cohesive force uniting all the different people. It seems logical that the more diverse the range of people who have to be incorporated, the further back the ancestor needs to be placed.
amalgamation is Tuhawaiki. A chief in the 1840s, he combined through his whakapapa senior lines from both Kāti Māmoe and Ngāi Tahu. He advanced the idea of a single Ngāi Tahu chief and, naturally, put himself forward as the best choice. His idea did not come to fruition, not because the advantages outlined by Tuhawaiki were not persuasive enough, but rather because a different chief, Iwikau, claimed more rights to the role of sole chief of Ngāi Tahu (Anderson, 1998, 95, ff., 205, f.).

A further way of building a single tribe was warfare. Conquests established binary relationships between the war parties, the defeated party lost land, possessions and mana. To regain mana after inter-tribal warfare later generations neglected their Kāti Māmoe ancestry and highlighted the Ngāi Tahu strands in their whakapapa (Anderson, 1998, 26, 92). Beattie (1954, 79) equalled the arrival of Ngāi Tahu to the Norman invasion of England, with all chiefly families claiming Ngāi Tahu descent afterwards. This choice furthered the decline of Kāti Māmoe in official records. Additionally Beattie (1954, 79) observed that ‘in every transaction with white men the Kaitahu voice has been loud, insistent and powerful. To foster their own ends they represented the Katimamoe as extinct, or as being the Lost Tribe ... ’. Seeing Kāti Māmoe as extinct served the Crown well, a lower number of remaining tribes meant less complications to obtain land titles had to be expected. This could be the reason why under Mantell, appointed Commissioner for Extinguishment of Native Titles in the South Island in 1848, ‘the fable that the Katimamoe were extinct flourished unchecked’ despite the fact that during the lifetime of Harris Beattie (1954, 83) ‘isolated individuals’ claiming Waitaha descent could still be encountered and ‘Katimamoe [were] far from extinct’ (see also Anderson, 1998, 105).

Warfare was a way of physically defeating earlier tribes and subsequently capturing the chiefly whakapapa through the steps described above. Simultaneously it also offered a potent adhesive for the spreading hapū. According to Anderson (1998, 26) the name Ngāi Tahu was possibly only used after the entire South Island was occupied by the different hapū today seen as constituting Ngāi Tahu, and then only after an external threat, the attacks lead by Te Rauparaha around 1830, created ‘a real sense of tribal unity’ (Anderson, 1998, 205)."}

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5To further complicate matters hapū affiliations were, and still are, situationally dependent, with some individuals changing their preferred affiliations in different official records. By the 1860s tribal members chose to affiliate to a smaller number of hapū in official records, reducing the diversity and creating hapū strongholds. In a similar manner as argued here for the wider iwi, smaller hapū were subsumed under larger and politically dominant hapū (Anderson, 1998, 105).

6O’Regan (1992, 7) placed ‘the bonding into a reasonably unitary tribe’ at the beginning to middle of the eighteenth century.
CHAPTER 6. BUREAUCRACY AND ITS LURES

The incorporation of interests of previous tribes under the banner of Ngāi Tahu was a further way of widening the base of the tribe. As already stated above the land claims of both Waitaha and Kāti Māmoe were satisfied through their land claims as affiliates to the Ngāi Tahu whakapapa. The official name of Ngāi Tahu has changed several times and although the number of people included might not have changed the naming has become more specific over the years. In the 1850s the name used by Ngāi Tahu themselves was ‘Kai Tahu me Kati Mamoe’, a few decades later it was ‘Kai Tahu me Kati Mamoe me Waitaha’ (Dacker, 1994, 4). In Te Karaka Special Edition explaining the Crown’s settlement offer ‘Ngāi Tahu whānui’ was used to describe all those who would profit from the settlement (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998). This group is defined in the Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu Act 1996 (NA, 2008b, section 2) as:

the collective of the individuals who descend from the primary hapu of Waitaha, Ngati Mamoe, and Ngai Tahu, namely, Kati Kuri, Kati Irakehu, Kati Huirapa, Ngai Tuahuriri, and Kai Te Ruahikihiki.

This growing specificity shows that there are certain centrifugal forces at work within the iwi which have to be acknowledged. The political strength of representation as a single unit, and the potential material gains this might bring, are strong incentives for many of those subsumed under Ngāi Tahu to remain under this banner, but deeply rooted feelings still remain:

"Now, we have a policy, now that sounds strange, it’s not a written policy, but the policy is to always support Ngāi Tahu. Ngāi Tahu have tried to accommodate the wishes of many of us, by extending their name to mean ‘Ngāi Tahu whānui’. Now ‘whānui’ means ‘Ngāi Tahu and all the rest of the associated peoples who have ever lived in proximity with or have inter-married into Ngāi Tahu’. And that is wonderful, but notwithstanding, the name still remains Ngāi Tahu. And we place our names to remind us of our history and who we are and Ngāi Tahu, the name Ngāi Tahu does not tell us who we are. It tells us who we aren’t. And that is the important thing." [20]

6.4 Bureaucratisation

The creation of centripetal forces is an ongoing process. Tribal leaders with their vision of a large network have to reinforce the reasons for all parts to stay within the

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8 In 1998 the itemisation ‘Waitaha, Ngāti Mamoe, and Ngai Tahu’ was replaced by ‘Ngai Tahu and Ngati Mamoe’ (NA, 2008b, section 2).
9 See O’Regan (1992, 15-21) for an account of how various Waitaha groups have tried to gain public acknowledgement and by doing so threatened to undermine Ngāi Tahu’s status as tangata whenua.
network. Historically ‘Ngai Tahu has never been a united iwi...’, but rather an agglomeration of hapū forging temporary alliances (Kelly, 1998, 86). Anderson (1998, 26, f., emphasis mine) for example, gave the following definition of Ngāi Tahu:

In historical narrative, Ngai Tahu can be used to refer generally to any individual or group who are likely to have argued a primary claim to descent from Tahu Potiki, and where no more precise ascription is available.

The last decades, however, have seen the ascent of the iwi as a main source of identity with ongoing resistance against this tendency by locally active members. Te Kerēme, Ngāi Tahu’s fight for recognition as indigenous people of the South Island, lay the groundwork for the generalising forces, which are at work within the tribe today. The trend towards a generalised iwi identity continues despite attempts by some members to negotiate an indigenous identity grounded outside tribal identity. The main factors are the ongoing bureaucratisation and corporatisation since the settlement and the attempts of the bureaucratic structure to create a tribal identity, Smith’s (1989, 349) ‘bureaucratic incorporation’.

What is at stake is not only tribal identity, but also the right to represent a united iwi. Chief Taiaroa’s actions in 1875 are a historical example. Taiaroa, seeking the support of the entire iwi, convened a hui of all Ngāi Tahu and Kāti Māmoe chiefs in Otakou. He was appointed ‘permanent treasurer’ and given ‘sole charge’ over the campaign for the claim. Only 63 persons signed the parchment produced at the hui, yet Taiaroa saw this as a sign that he had the support of the entire tribe (Evison, 1993, 439).

The 18 papatipu rūnanga

In the 1860s ‘the age of the warrior chief’ was replaced by the age of the ‘bureaucratic institution of rūnanga’ staffed with ‘literate, mission-educated, pragmatic men’ (Anderson, 1998, 103).10 Rūnanga, originally an idea of Governor Grey to speed up the assimilation of Māori, introduced a new form of leadership paradigm, one of democratically elected leaders with territorially defined constituencies rather than geographically dispersed groups bound by kinship ties. Although Grey’s plan did not pass into legislation Ngāi Tahu still adopted and modified the concept of rūnanga (Waymouth, 2003). The rūnanga, ‘village council[s] of elected leaders’ became the bureaucratised form of chiefly powers (Anderson, 1998, 103). The purpose of rūnanga was to ‘administer the affairs of the hapū and kāinga’, kāinga being settlements and villages with Ngāi Tahu population (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 60). The

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10\textit{Te Karaka Special Edition} placed the introduction of rūnanga in the year 1874 (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 60).
intention was to create a tribal parliament, based on the 18 papatipu rūnanga, which was to be established at Kaiapoi, Tuahiwi. The creation of this parliament would also allow members to participate on a local level in the decision making process for Te Kerēme through their local representative. According to Te Karaka Special Edition (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 61) the intention to create this tribal parliament was voiced in 1879 already and reaffirmed in 1907. It took another nine decades, till the Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu Act in 1996, until a tribal parliament based on the rūnanga was created.

The creation of the rūnanga allowed Ngāi Tahu to fight Te Kerēme through parliament rather than through the unsuccessful process of Land Court claims. Therefore rūnanga can be seen as a direct response to the legal system introduced by the very people Ngāi Tahu demanded justice from. By creating legal entities in the form of rūnanga Ngāi Tahu pre-empted Prendergast’s ruling of the Treaty as a legal nullity due to the fact that Māori lacked any form of ‘body politic’.11

**The Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board**

Without prior consultation with Ngāi Tahu the Ngai Tahu Claim Act from 1945 established the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board (NTMTB) in 1946. It further awarded the tribe a settlement of £354,000, as previously explained.12 The board consisted of eight members, seven members representing the tribal members of the South Island and one member for the North Island and overseas tribal members (Dacker, 1994, 118, f.; see also Evison, 1993, 486). This matter of representation is significant in that today’s rūnanga are all located in the South Island. There are communities of Ngāi Tahu in the North Island, e.g. Auckland, but these communities are not represented in TRoNT, rather the individual members of these communities are represented through their preferred rūnanga instead.13 Being represented from afar and getting recognition without being physically present at meetings and working around the marae presents difficulties. These difficulties are described in the following chapters.

The other significance of the NTMTB is the single point of contact approach the government introduced. Sissons (2005b, 124) argued that governments prefer to deal with a single indigenous body, a tribe, or even just the tribal leader, who is then

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11 Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 72, 78.
12 The settlement money was still seen as public money — which Ngāi Tahu argue was erroneous — and a policy was put in place forcing the NTMTB to seek approval from the Minister of Maori Affairs for any spending in excess of $400.
13 Mead (2003, 204), otherwise a strong supporter of whakapapa as the characteristic of membership in any social group or category within Māori, made it clear that it is only the links to the home community which give these distant groups, ‘taura here’ groups, a standing within Māori society.
6.4. BUREAUCRATISATION

entrusted with the task of dealing with the ‘messier reality’. Using the name Ngāi Tahu and subsuming the different groups, including Kāti Māmoe and Waitaha, created a single point of contact. But not only subsumption occurred. Kelly (1991, 205, f.) in her analysis of the NTMTB showed that one source of power was the ability to define general and sectional interests. Rūnanga interests, defined as sectional, were put behind tribal interests. Through this the NTMTB accumulated more power and focused the attention of the tribal members on the iwi.

As described above the naming of the Ngāi Tahu community has been increasingly specific to incorporate and satisfy a growing number of centrifugal forces. The subsumption under one single name, Ngāi Tahu whānui, however, erased traces of Kāti Māmoe and Waitaha, who had still been incorporated in the tribal name used in the middle to late nineteenth century: ‘Kai Tahu me Kati Mamoe me Waitaha’ (Dacker, 1994, 4) and in the name ‘Te Kereeme o Ngai-Tahu raua ko Ngati-Mamoe’, later to be shortened to Te Kerēme, which had been used from 1907 onwards (Evison, 1993, 480). Internally increasingly specific naming conventions have helped to gain support from other, previous tribes. Externally the shorthand Ngāi Tahu has lead to a continuous decline of public knowledge about other tribes.

The revival of the rūnanga

One of my participants who had been present at the time, explained that in the 1980s the rūnanga had to be revived, since only a few villages had survived the ”huge depopulation” during the ”urbanisation process” [39], a process affecting the whole of New Zealand (e.g. Kawharu, 1975; van Meijl, 2002; Metge, 1964, 1995; Walker, 2004). The rūnanga revival was driven by the need to be able to show a ”demographic consolidation” [39], without which the Crown would possibly not have entered into settlement negotiations with Ngāi Tahu. My participant stated that political interests were the driving forces behind the process of reviving, and in some cases creating rūnanga. Likening it to ”breath[ing] life into a dead horse” [39] my interview partner argued that rūnanga locations, i.e. villages, were chosen over others without any other ”real criteria” [39] than geographic considerations.

Not all rūnanga had ceased to exist due to the depopulation of the villages. The villages which had survived often transformed the rūnanga into Māori committees. These committees sent representatives to the Māori Councils, in the case of Ngāi Tahu the Te Wai Pounamu Council [39]. The Councils and committees had been created by the government in 1962 through the Maori Welfare Act, which was initiated by the Hunn Report in 1960. This report saw the integration of Māori into the Pākehā society as the best solution to Māori needs (Dacker, 1994, 117, f.). According to my interview
partner the Māori committees were retransformed into rūnanga [39]. This transformation is also mentioned by Dacker (1994, 139), who dated the transformation process to the period from August 1987 to November 1989, the time of the Tribunal hearings for the Ngāi Tahu claim.

The same interview partner also raised doubts about the existence of rūnanga south of Dunedin, explaining that, in his view, "rūnanga are a Canterbury phenomenon down to Otakou really" [39], with other Māori communities using different forms of political organisation (see also Anderson, 1998, 110). This created an obvious problem: rūnanga, as stated above, were created to fight the land claims, which were predominantly in the Canterbury and Otago region. Without major land claims there was no reason to create a rūnanga, without a rūnanga there would not have been any representation on any iwi-wide board. To rectify this imbalance and create an "equilibrium" rūnanga had to be created where previously there had been none [39].

The process of rūnanga revival and creation took place during the time of the upsurge in cultural awareness and demands for increased opportunities in political participation in the 1980s, the ‘Maori renaissance’ (Sissons, 1995, 63). People of Ngāi Tahu descent began to regain interest in their cultural heritage. Yet, in the eyes of my interview partner, many of those whose interest had been recently raised were "weekend Māori", who visited the rural marae to learn about themselves, but did not live in the villages to be in contact with, or create Māori communities [39].

**A central governing body**

According to *Te Karaka Special Edition* the need for a central governing body became apparent at the beginning of the twentieth century. The idea never eventuated until *Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu Act* in 1996 created *Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu* (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 61). In 1989 the Department of Maori Affairs was replaced by two government agencies, the smaller Ministry of Maori Affairs and the Iwi Transition Agency. The Labour government steered towards the devolution of tasks to recognised iwi authorities. Against this backdrop the members of the NTMTB saw the need for a tribal structure fully accountable to tribal members. At the same time this structure needed to distinguish between compensations given to the tribal members due to their special status as tangata whenua — Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi — and any services given to the tribal members through the devolution process due to their status as New Zealand citizens — Article 3 of the

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14 As this comment shows urban Māori, irrespective of whether they are tribally affiliated or not, create the need for a new concept of indigeneity, since current forms of indigeneity are contested from within indigenous communities and from the outside.
6.4. **BUREAUCRATISATION**

Treaty of Waitangi. The idea of Runanganui o Tahu was born, a council consisting of representatives from the local rūnanga. The Runanganui o Tahu was intended to fulfil the needs of the tribe for accountability to tribal members and at the same time grassroots participatory democracy, but also the government’s need for a legally recognised bureaucratic body which could distribute services among tribal members. The idea of the Runanganui o Tahu ‘was widely supported by the tribe’ (Sissons, 1995, 67).

The government lost support for the devolution process during the second half of 1990 and many Māori saw the task of delivering services to urban Māori as overly difficult. After winning the elections in 1990 the National Party abolished the devolution process and repealed the Runanga Iwi Act. Iwi authorities, like the Runanganui o Tahu, were thus without legal standing and had to be redefined. By introducing Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu Bill into Parliament in 1993 Ngāi Tahu as an iwi tried to gain legal recognition and fiscal autonomy for the new tribal structure, a purpose not forgotten by critics:

"And ‘Ngāi Tahu’ remember is a name given to us by others, it’s not the name we call ourselves. Necessary, but it’s an Act of parliament that allows us to trade commercially and make fiscal decision for ourselves over $30,000, because up to that point we couldn’t." [26]

Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu’s purpose was the same as Runanganui o Tahu’s, but the structure was markedly different. The new structure combined both functions of the NTMTB and the Runanganui o Tahu, with one corporation of TRoNT managing the growth of the tribal assets, Ngai Tahu Holding Corp, and the other, the Ngai Tahu Development Unit, ensuring the distribution of the wealth (Sissons, 1995, 69, f.).

Those tribal members with influence on an inter-hapū level, who saw a unified iwi as the only way to a settlement with the government, pushed for the creation of a central tribal authority. This becomes clearer in the light of the claim process. Henare Rakihia Tau filed the Ngāi Tahu claim with the Waitangi Tribunal and the NTMTB was the second claimant. This, in the eyes of one of my participants was not the correct, but the only possible, way of dealing with the situation. He argued that "... the tribe should have taken the claim. But the tribe didn’t exist" [52]. To remedy this situation an iwi-wide rūnanga was created during the negotiation process with the Crown. A "civil society" with the task to manage the funds for the iwi. My interview partner went further by questioning whether Ngāi Tahu was a "real tribe", able to handle assets in a customary way without repeating the mistakes of the past. Mistakes which were signified, according to my interview partner, by the blue beads
Ngāi Tahu had received as part of the payments for the land purchases. My reading of the situation as a typical post-colonial situation was strongly rejected by this particular interview partner, who did not see a governmentally imposed structure but explained that "you could have done it in a customary way, we didn’t even trust ourselves, that’s why we went for a rūnanga" with the idea that a rūnanga would be a "body for the assets to go back into ... a tribal body recognised by the state". This decision amounted to "admitting that Prendergast was right" that a civil society cannot enter into treaties with a non-civil society, a step which, particularly in the 1980s, must have raised emotions and concerns among Māori in New Zealand. My interview partner insisted that "they [the government] didn’t impose on us, we played into the game this time"[52].

**Stasis**

During the time of my research, criticism against TRoNT was a dominant feature within the tribe, in general and during the interviews. The criticisms told a different story about TRoNT, about how ideals were not met and how TRoNT was not necessarily doing the best job. The harshest critique often came from within TRoNT.

As I have argued elsewhere (Hofmann, 2003, 56) the main fear within the tribe should be that members of the central tribal governing body become ‘traditional intellectuals’ in the Gramscian sense and I believe the criticism of tribal members towards TRoNT often implies exactly that (Gramsci in Hoare and Smith, 1971, 15). In Gramsci’s understanding traditional intellectuals first flourished in the Roman Empire, where a climate of high intellectual debate attracted further intellectuals. Intellectual endeavours became an end in themselves instead of a means to an end, the end in the Gramscian reading of any political situation being hegemony. ‘Organic intellectuals’ (Gramsci in Hoare and Smith, 1971, 15) are those intellectuals who have organically grown out of a ‘social group’ with the function to give the social group ‘homogeneity and an awareness of its own function’ in social, political and economical spheres (Gramsci in Hoare and Smith, 1971, 5). Organic intellectuals are ‘permanent persuader[s]’, who, by virtue of actively participating in the ‘practical life’, know about the lived realities and do not have to rely on ‘eloquence’ to ‘assimilate and to conquer ideologically’ the traditional intellectuals’ (Gramsci in Hoare and Smith, 1971, 10). Traditional intellectuals can thus be seen as former organic intellectuals who either have lost contact to the social group they grew in or belong to a group which no longer holds hegemony (Simon, 1982, 95, f.).

In Kelly’s (1991) description of the NTMTB its members became traditional intellectuals. Kelly (1991, 163, 211, ff.) found that the members of NTMTB were proud
of the bureaucratic achievements of the governing body and that the ideology of the NTMTB as a well functioning bureaucracy was deeply enshrined in the NTMTB members. Some even seemed to be beyond accepting any advice from tribal members, the very people they were supposed to represent. Even the then kaiwhakahaere, Mark Solomon, commented on this situation, stating that ‘We [the NTMTB] built a sort of multinational empire, and we left our people behind’ (Kelly, 1991, 163). Members perceived the situation in similar terms and addressed their concerns at a hui in Arowhenua in September 1990 (Kelly, 1991, 166).

The ‘iron cage of bureaucracy’

One of my participants described the situation the tribe was in as ‘the iron cage of bureaucracy’ [39], alluding to Weber’s notion of the stahlhartes Gehäuse, a shell as hard as steel, which Parsons translated into the now ubiquitous ‘iron cage’ (Weber, 1930, 181). Baehr (2001, 160) offered an insightful commentary on Parsons’ translation (Weber, 1930, 181), arguing that it has now acquired a life of its own but does not convey what Weber wanted to express, a shell which ‘has not been freely chosen, [but] is willingly accepted, and is by no means a punishment’. The ‘iron cage’ of Parsons’ translation (Weber, 1930, 181) is likely to have been inspired by the man in the iron cage from the Puritan preacher John Bunyan, publicised in the book The Pilgrim’s Progress in 1678. Bunyan’s man in the iron cage had lost his belief and was thus punished, whereas Weber’s subject was a ‘hedonist motivated by the quest for materialistic consumption and confident in his superiority’ (Baehr, 2001, 160).

Parsons’ translation is misleading in two further points. Iron is an element whereas steel — part of the adjective stahlhart, as hard as steel — is a man-made product, which can be made to meet certain specifications. The second part of the translation, cage, does not fit either in that Weber alluded to Baxter’s book Saints’ Everlasting Rest published posthumously in 1829. Baxter described a cloak of mundane goods a saint should wear lightly and cast away when he or she deems appropriate. A cage — unlike a cloak — is not something the incarcerated can cast away. Therefore shell is more appropriate in that a shell does not incarcerate but only constrains, yet also protects the bearer. A shell can also not be thrown off by the bearer, the original cloak has become an organic part of the bearer. Weber used the shell as hard as steel as a ‘symbol for passivity, the transformation of the Puritan hero into the figure of mass mediocrity’ (Baehr, 2001, 164).15

It is this notion of a shell as hard as steel, a situation willingly accepted that has become a protective constraint, that conveys in my eyes best the feelings of most

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15I am aware that parts of the quotes, e.g. mass mediocrity or hedonist ... confident in his superiority, could be construed as a critique towards tribal members or members of TRoNT. This is not intended.
tribal members towards the bureaucratic structure at the current point in time. My argument is firstly that bureaucratic methods have become deeply entrenched in the tribe, not just TRoNT, and secondly that the financial success now enforces a bureaucratic structure. These two points constitute, I believe, another centripetal force operating within the tribe.

My first point is that most tribal members have accepted and now reinforce the bureaucratic tendency of the TRoNT within the different hapū. This was stated by one of my interview partners who explained that "we are quite procedurally orientated" with for example meeting minutes being confirmed at the following meeting [41]. At the same time the procedural orientation was regarded as a sign that the tribe was very democratic and that members were adverse to the idea of change without prior consultation. According to my interview partner the reason for the "strong tendency towards meeting orders, meeting procedures" was the level of integration into the Pākehā community [41]. Another interview partner talked about the debate within the tribe whether or not to store tribal records in the Hocken Library in Dunedin, with tribal members fearing for the safety and dissemination of the information [14]. The point I would like to make here is that tribal records do exist, the private conversations or "cups of tea" [39], have been replaced — at least to some extent — by meetings with agendas and minutes. The minutes according to one rūnanga manager should be electronically available to the members [24]. One of my interview partners was interested in the meeting minutes to stay informed, but was also sceptical about how well the minutes reflected the actual proceedings at the meeting [31 fem]. Others saw troubles with outsiders, in this case non-Ngāi Tahu, who could read the business interests of the specific rūnanga [38], which brings us to the management of the tribal assets.

My second point is that the current assets enforce a bureaucratic structure, leaving aside the question whether or not the Crown would have entered into settlement negotiations with a tribe lacking a bureaucratic structure. The assets need to be managed and the dividends have to be distributed among the beneficiaries of the tribe. This is true on the iwi level, with TRoNT administering the tribal assets, and the rūnanga level, with the rūnanga administrations receiving funds from TRoNT. There is considerable debate within the tribe — among tribal members and within TRoNT — how the assets should be administered and about the best way to distribute money among the tribal members. Many of my interview partners replicated the debate in the research interviews, but none of them questioned the need for TRoNT, or any bureaucratic structure for that matter, accepting the shell as hard as steel, yet at the same time often resisting it. Tribal leaders or ‘intellectuals’, to use a Gramscian (in Hoare and Smith, 1971, 10) term, derive part of their political power within the tribe
6.4. BUREAUCRATISATION

and outside it from their association with the central governing body, and will therefore not ask for the abolition of it. In his article about the Ngāi Tahu claim and the future challenges the tribe has to face O'Regan (1994, 255), for example, never questioned the need for an administrative structure, but rather pointed out, that the administrative body had to be ‘capable of creatively managing a real capital resource over a wide range of assets and environments’.

Inbuilt in the idea of a central governing body is the need for this body in the future, all possible members have to be reached and given the chance to participate in the benefits of the tribal assets. The economic success has led to a significant rise in membership numbers, further increasing the need for a bureaucratic structure, thus strengthening the position of TRoNT as an important part of the iwi.

The rise in membership

A dramatic rise in membership numbers has further consolidated the need for a corporate and bureaucratic structure for the entire iwi. The increase in numbers has, I believe, three causes: Firstly the need for a constituency to achieve a settlement in the first place, secondly, and related to the first point, the above mentioned magnetism of economic success, and thirdly the coverage in the national media. The three causes are not clearly separable, thus a numerical answer as to which cause had the most effect is not possible.

One of my interview partners explained that before a settlement could become a real possibility a constituency needed to be developed and a way to redistribute redress payments and other benefits among tribal members. This meant urging tribal members to become publicly known as Ngāi Tahu by having their whakapapa registered in the tribal whakapapa database. A large tribal membership meant that negotiations with the Crown could be lead from a position of strength. Equally a higher number of tribal members equates to more political influence for TRoNT should these newly gained members be more interested in tribal rather than local politics, which often seems to be the case.

My second point, the magnetism of economic success, is visible in the rise of membership numbers before and just after the settlement, with Ngāi Tahu signing up to the tribal whakapapa database creating a "paid membership" [26]. In the words of one of my interview partners, who at the time worked for the Whakapapa Unit:

"... there is a major influx of registration from 1994 onwards, when word got out there, there is gonna be money made, you know, there was gonna
be a big, big cheque written out to Ngāi Tahu, ‘cause of the wrongs, the wrongs and what not. And uhm well that went from, it went from about 12,000 up to, went up to around 30, 30 something thousand in the space of four or five years. ‘Cause everyone was told that ‘Get in line, enrol ...’” [38]\textsuperscript{16}

As this quote shows the reasons for enrolling are closely related. People were asked to join to create a bigger tribe for settlement reasons or joined to receive a share of the ‘big cheque’. Already during the times of the NTMTB money had a significant influence on membership numbers. Mark Solomon, the kaiwhakahaere, stated in 1990 that the resources available through fisheries and land claim settlements to the rūnanga had boosted the membership and the participation in his rūnanga, Kaikoura (Kelly, 1991, 161). The situation in the 1990s was somewhat different to the current situation in that the rūnanga had more money than the NTMTB. At the same time the relationship between most rūnanga and the NTMTB was uneasy with the exception of Kaikoura, a situation arguably very similar to the situation today (Kelly, 1991, 159, f.).

How literally people took the idea of a pay-out is visible in the following quote:

"I remember working for Ngāi Tahu and after the settlement, I don’t know how many phone calls that we got saying: ‘This is such and such, uhm, I am Ngāi Tahu and, uhm, here’s my bank account to put the money in from the settlement.’ [...] We had hundreds of calls, straight after the settlement. Incredible." [19]\textsuperscript{17}

My third point is that national media coverage of topics related to Māori — including settlement negotiations and ongoing business stories about iwi — and positive or negative images of Māori have raised awareness among Māori, with the effect that some have re-established, or in some cases newly established, connections with the Māori part of their identity. Being Māori was perceived as being ‘cool’in the 1990s (Walker, 2004, 402), an effect a Māori researcher coined the ‘Shortland Street or Dr Ropata effect’ in the media (Sporle in Collins, 07.12.2007, The New Zealand Herald). Whether or not this change in perception is as durable and influential as the Māori renaissance in the 1970s (Greenland, 1991, 90) remains to be seen.

\textsuperscript{16}It is important to remember that being Ngāi Tahu is not equivalent with being registered in the whakapapa database, in other words people did not decide to become Ngāi Tahu but rather decided to make their connection publicly known, for the reasons mentioned. In the words of one participant "the numbers haven’t changed, it’s just the number of people [who] have decided to enrol" [19].

\textsuperscript{17}In interview citations ‘[...]’ indicates omissions whereas ‘...’ indicates a break in conversation.
Ongoing efforts

TRoNT has since its inception followed the tradition of the NTMTB and steadily increased its efforts to produce the picture of a unified iwi. Smith’s (1989, 344, f.) characterisation of ‘ethnie’, as quoted above, offers a good framework to show the efforts of TRoNT.

Common name

As previously shown the common name for the tribe has been strengthened since the suffix ‘whānui’ has been added to include Ngāti Mamoe and Waitaha strands of whakapapa into Ngāi Tahu.

Common descent

The common name is in the case of Ngāi Tahu closely related to the myth of common descent and origins. Smith (1989, 344) explicitly used ‘myth’, which however does not imply that historically the common origins are not true. As mentioned in chapter five it is likely that the ‘skeletal framework of Ngāi Tahu’s tribal whakapapa’ has been manipulated for political and other reasons from an early stage onwards (Tau, 2003, 262). Even today when whakapapa is stored in written form rather than being transmitted orally the possibility of further minor or major changes to exclude or incorporate certain persons still exists. One example are whāngai, adopted children without any Ngāi Tahu descent, which some members would accept into the tribal whakapapa "just because they’ve lived in the area, they’ve been brought up by a Ngāi Tahu woman" [33]. Other interview partners spoke of persons publicly claiming Ngāi Tahu descent without actually being in the Ngāi Tahu whakapapa database [37] or even being Māori [39]. These few examples suffice to show that whakapapa is still subjected to present day politics.

As with all myths the myth of common descent needs to be retold time and time again. Regular reminders that all Ngāi Tahu have a common ancestry can be found in TRoNT publications such as Vision 2025 and the consultation document for the settlement, the Crown Settlement Offer. In Vision 2025 the emphasis is laid on creating a feeling of belonging:

Our whakapapa is our identity. It makes us unique and binds us through the plait of the generations — from the atua to the whenua of Te Waipounamu (TRoNT, 2001, 4).

Whakapapa is the foundation of our identity as Ngāi Tahu, Kāti Māmoe and Waitaha (TRoNT, 2001, 14).
In the *Crown Settlement Offer* (Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 49) the description of common descent is not geared towards creating a sense of belonging in existing tribal members. It appears that the aim is to attract new members by explaining that enrolment is a simple procedure. At the same time the common descent is moved from the distant eponymous ancestor to those ancestors mentioned in the Blue Book. This change has not been introduced by TRoNT, as the Blue Book was created already in 1925. The connection to an ancestor mentioned in the Blue Book is more personal than the connection to the distant ancestor all Ngāi Tahu hail from. At the same time Kawharu (1975, 22, f.) correctly pointed out that ‘kinship’ is inclusive by virtue of its ambiguity and generality, whereas ‘descent’, by definition precise, is divisive.

**Common memories**

The major common memory for Ngāi Tahu these days is the fight for justice, Te Kerēme. One who has been at the forefront of the legal battle described it even as the ‘culture’ of Ngāi Tahu:

For Ngāi Tahu their land claim, "*Te Kereeme*", then became their culture. The grievance of dispossession became our focus and a source of group identity. We were nourished by that grievance, through grinding generations of perseverance with the "due process" of the courts and parliament. It was enough, though, to sustain us and the core of our tribe never succumbed to despair. (Sir Tipene O’Regan, Chairman NTMTB, July 1993 in Evison, 1993, v)

The use of the word ‘culture’ in this context is informative. First, Te Kerēme certainly offers many ‘common historical memories’ (Smith, 1989, 344), even if only a minority of the tribe has actually experienced this era. The large majority can still partake in these memories, as descriptions of past efforts are often retold, however, these memories are also a constant reminder of what others, but not "Johnny-come-latelies" [18], have gone through. To give just a few examples:

Generations of Ngāi Tahu have devoted their lives to the pursuit of justice, to Te Kerēme. (Former kaiwhakahaere Charles Crofts in Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 4)

The generations of our old people who travelled from hui to hui, year in year out, debating and petitioning, raising their meagre funds and going without ... (Sir Tipene O’Regan, Chairman of the Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group in Ngāi Tahu Negotiation Group, 1998, 6)
Second, anthropologists have pointed out that culture emerges within political and historical contexts (e.g. Babadzan, 2000, 2004; Friedman, 2001, 2008; Keesing, 1982, 1989, 1993; Linnekin, 1983, 1990, 1991; Sissons, 1993, 1995, 2005b; Trask, 1991). Through retellings of ‘common historical memories’ (Smith, 1989, 344) Te Kerēme becomes the officially accepted Ngāi Tahu culture. Two issues are inherent in this discursive move: a centre and periphery conflict is established and private and public experiences are set into direct competition.

Many of the locally active interview partners saw themselves as members of a specific family, and one or more rūnanga, whereas TRoNT represented the “big smoke” [9] in Christchurch and decisions made during Te Kerēme weren’t always seen as democratic or grass-roots oriented: “You get Tipene O’Regan strutting around for years, making decisions on behalf of us and they’ve never spoken to us” [9]. There is then a perception that the geographical periphery is also the political periphery.

The fragmented nature of the tribe was also frequently mentioned. Groups such as whānau and hapū were often more highly valued than the iwi. One interview partner pointed out that “[…] ‘Ngāi Tahu’ remember is a name given to us by others, it’s not the name we call ourselves. Necessary, but it’s an act of parliament that allows us to trade commercially and make fiscal decision for ourselves over $30,000, ’cause up to that point we couldn’t” [26].

Arguing that Te Kerēme has become Ngāi Tahu culture is to gloss over the internal disputes going along with Te Kerēme, disputes for example regarding the decision making processes but also disputes over the very existence of a unified tribe. Hana O’Regan (2001, 156), for example, pointed out that the demands of Te Kerēme such as the introduction of a centralised bureaucracy for the purpose of a settlement, had placed considerable strain on tribal unity and identity.

Sir Tipene O’Regan’s comment is then also reminiscent of Handler’s (1986, 4) finding that ‘we are a nation because we have a culture’. Establishing Te Kerēme as the officially accepted Ngāi Tahu culture is then an attempt to bring all divergent histories under the umbrella of one iwi-wide history (Gupta (1992) has shown this for nation-states). The capacity to prioritise iwi aspirations over hapū aspirations is not new. Kelly (1991) pointed out that TRoNT’s predecessor, the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board, used the same power to elevate iwi over hapū aspirations.

This ‘going without’ because private money was used to pay legal fees, travel costs and other costs related to Te Kerēme was mentioned by some of my locally active interview partners as well. The economic factor of tribal membership, staying loyal to an economically disadvantageous heritage, is brought into focus here. Some locally active members regarded those who left to be financially better off as disloyal. In return some of the distant members whose families had left decades ago pointed out that leaving was often an economic necessity not a choice and that the presumed wealth of those who had left was a myth in itself.
O’Regan’s statement also sets private and public experiences into direct competition. In this research, but also in Russell’s (2000, passim) auto-ethnographic research, ‘Tahuness’ was not necessarily focused on being officially recognised as a tribal member. In fact, in my research some interview partners pointed out that for their grandparents’ and parents’ generations economic success was dependent on being accepted as a “sunburned Pakeha” [7]. While this is a sad reminder of past and present negative perceptions it is also a lived reality. Establishing an officially accepted tribal culture then polarises tribal members into those who participated in the tribal claim and those who did not. As a result new members have a further point of reference – additionally to the lack of knowledge of tikanaga (see chapter seven) – against which their past behavior, or in most cases their grandparents’ behavior, does not ‘stack up’ against the officially accepted version of Ngāi Tahu history.

As the tribal historian Tau (2003, 261) pointed out that: "Tohunga were not concerned with recording facts of the past. [...] Thus oral traditions are subjected to group dynamics and needs, in order to create communal myths by which to live." While Te Kerēme is certainly not a myth it does however have a similar purpose: To be Ngāi Tahu means to have been involved in Te Kerēme, to have undergone physical hardship to provide money for the claim, to have visited as many hui as possible. The understanding of being a Ngāi Tahu tribal member in the past is then centered on a series of public events. Arguing that Te Kerēme has become Ngāi Tahu culture then forces personal, private experiences into direct competition with public experiences with public experiences carrying a far greater weight as recognising features of tribal belonging. Private knowledge of personal or ancestral boundary crossings are, sometimes, difficult to match up with this officially accepted view of tribal culture.

Common ‘historic territory’

The ‘common ‘historic territory” of Ngāi Tahu is the South Island of New Zealand (Smith, 1989, 344). Repeated legal struggles with other iwi show that the northern boundary is somewhat fluid. For one of my interview partners securing the historic territory, or creating it in retrospect, presented an area of friction between capitalist and cultural goals. The latter, however, were regarded as more important:

"[...] trying to have that discussion with a company, who’s acting in the best interests of the company, they’d say ‘Well, the value of the land doesn’t equate, because I think I could get a 9% return and that will only give me a 4% return.’ [...] But we would say ‘Well, for 5%, we’ll own our boundary, thank you.'" [14]

The close relationship between the tribal members and the South Island is based on the tradition of mahinga kai. It is this tradition that TRoNT tries to strengthen and
with it the connection of the tribal members to Te Wai Pounamou. Mahinga kai were a part of the Ngāi Tahu Settlement Act in 1998 under the cultural redress section of the Act. Although probably most members feel no inclination to "hang out in shingly drains at [...] four in the morning pulling eels out of a hole in the ground" [14] the status as a tribal member brings with it the role of a kaitiaki, a steward of the land, who manages the naturally occurring resources wisely. Ngāi Tahu culture is depicted as inextricably linked to the common historic territory, the South Island. Under the section ‘About Ngāi Tahu’ on the official website of Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu the following explanation for kaitiakitanga — stewardship of the earth — was given: ‘We are part of the landscape and therefore have a responsibility to ensure its sustenance for this generation and for those to come’. This has since been replaced by ‘Ngāi Tahu, gatherers of resources, resources of lasting endurance’. In another part of the website the bond was emphasised furthered: ‘Ngāi Tahu’s relationship with the natural environment is fundamental to its culture and identity’ (TRoNT, 1998).

No numbers are available regarding how many Ngāi Tahu are using natural resources regularly or exercise their right to camp on nohoanga. More important than the number of members actively pursuing this important part of Ngāi Tahu culture is that not only the rights but also the traditional concepts have to be explained on the website of TRoNT. The Pākehā or non-Ngāi Tahu audience could be claimed as the reason for this. At the same time comments by my interview partners suggest that some tribal members are part of the landscape more so than others.

The historic territory invoked has then a dual nature. For locally active members, mahinga kai practices are one of the many sources of their Tahuness. Precise locality is of importance, food-gathering rights are passed down through the generations and specific localities and geographical features are endowed with certain meanings (Russell, 2000, passim). For all other tribal members TRoNT creates a mythical homeland. Rather than specific localities the South Island as a whole becomes the home of Ngāi Tahu.

Several observations are of importance here. First, this creation of a mythical homeland is only possible because of the inclusive discourse, described below. The reliance on a single individualised and internalised entry criterion, genealogy, allows for a disentanglement of identity and locality. The current locale of the tribal members is no longer connected to their Tahuness. The homeland is one which some will never see.

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19. Literally ‘nohoanga’ is a ‘place to sit’. In their contemporary form nohoanga are areas next to food sources which tribal members are allowed to occupy temporarily.
20. Several TRoNT employees pointed out that a family in Greenland had connections to the tribe through, if memory serves correctly, a whaler, who had visited and taken his Ngai Tahu wife with him.
Others, even if they live on the South Island, will never become attached to the island beyond a vague sense of belonging.

Second, the creation of a mythical homeland is a response to modern tribal life. There is an acute awareness of cultural issues within TRoNT as the second vignette at the beginning of this chapter shows. This awareness allows TRoNT members to fulfill certain needs within the tribe. In this case the need is for a suitably abstract point of reference for members world-wide but also for many of those living on the South Island. Tau (2008b, 9), for example, stated that: ‘[f]ood-gathering expeditions now tend to be family picnics rather than week-long camps, and communal living is regarded as an uncomfortable activity, to be undertaken reluctantly.’ Or see the comment above about catching eel, a comment made by an interview partner, who worked for TRoNT at the time of the interview. Actual physical interaction with locality, be it through mahinga kai practices or other forms of interaction with the environment, is then not necessarily something many members want.

Third, the geographical situation of the Ngāi Tahu tribe is unique. The Ngāi Tahu rohe, the tribal area, spans most of the South Island. This makes for clear geographical borders. As indicated above the only land border is also the one, which is contested: the small v-shaped part at the top of the South Island, which is inhabited by several other tribes. Due to the geographical situation a sense of belonging, I argue, can develop, which is less localised than on the North Island. Going further, the situation of an island as homeland also offers the powerful metaphor of the beach, a transient place. Praising Denning’s (1980) work on the Marquesas, Island and Beaches, Clifford (1992, 100) pointed out that beaches are ‘sites of travel interaction’ and thus ‘half the story’ about ‘external relations and displacements’. Despite offering clear geographical borders beaches are then also places of arrival and departure and ongoing cultural interaction.

As we will see in chapter seven many locally active members do not hold with this vague reference to the entire South Island as home. Instead many locally active members are far more specific about locality and regard tūranga waewae, ‘places to stand’, as “home”.

Common culture

TRoNT is currently working on several elements of Ngāi Tahu’s ‘common culture’ (Smith, 1989, 344). As described above the custom of gathering food and resources is promoted, as is the use of te reo Māori, specifically the Kai Tahu dialect, which replaces the softer ‘ng’ with the hard ‘k’. The Kotahi Mano Kāika, Kotahi Mano Wawata

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21 I wish to thank Dr. Goldsmith for making me aware of the importance of this geographical factor.
22 I wish to thank Dr. Walter for making me aware of the differing situation within North Island Māori tribes.
6.4. BUREAUCRATISATION

— One Thousand Homes, One Thousand Aspirations — program was created in 2000 when several highly motivated tribal member decided to revitalise the Kāi Tahu language and culture because of the importance of these two components for ‘our future tribal development’. The program aims to bring te reo Māori back to Ngāi Tahu whānau. The goal is for te reo Māori to be spoken in 1000 homes by the year 2025. By strengthening the language, or rather stemming the language loss among Ngāi Tahu whānau TRoNT attempts to preserve part of a common culture. But even in regard to language different groups within the tribe, as represented by hapū and sometimes whānau, are divided and unity needs to be fought over:

Despite the popular comment from many marae and kāika that, "We didn’t use the k here," there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Some believe the use of the k was universal across the Kāi Tahu rohe.

The re-introduction of the ‘k’ seems to be a slow process, as even tribal governance still operates under Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu, and the website regularly refers to Ngāi Tahu, instead of Kāi Tahu.

Although language is a strong cultural adhesive other elements of the common culture are important as well. In the case of Ngāi Tahu these other elements might be even more important, since only a fraction of tribal members are actually fluent in te reo Māori. In fact so few Ngāi Tahu speak te reo Māori that according to the makers of the Kotahi Mano Kāika website the language is on ‘the brink of extinction’, on the ‘threshold of endangerment’. The now extinguished TRoNT subsidiary Ngāi Tahu Development stated in the Mō Tātou report that 87.9% of the respondents knew nothing more than a ‘few words or phrases’ and only 4.6% regarded themselves as ‘very able’ to converse in te reo Māori (Ngai Tahu Development Corp, 2004, 68). O’Regan (2001, 62) already three years earlier wrote that ‘[i]t could be argued, in the Kāi Tahu case, that whakapapa and mahika kai rights such as tītī harvesting are as important as language’ to preserve culture, but also explained at another point that the Kāi Tahu dialect was an important boundary marker between the tribe and other northern tribes (O’Regan, 2001, 69, f).

The Ngāi Tahu Fund, to provide Ngāi Tahu whānau with the necessary monetary means to ‘strengthen Ngāi Tahu cultural excellence’ (TRoNT, 1996), is a means TRoNT uses to devolve the production of culture from the bureaucratic core to the

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23The website can be accessed on <http://www.kmk.maori.nz>. The quote, however, has been removed with the last update.
24The website can be accessed on <http://www.kmk.maori.nz>. The quote, however, has been removed with the last update.
25The website can be accessed on <http://www.kmk.maori.nz>. The quote, however, has been removed with the last update.
periphery, from TRoNT to the patapu rūnanga and the whānau. The former CEO, Tahu Potiki (2005a), in his speech to the Ngāi Tahu Summit 2005 argued that

>although TRoNT should have certain expectations of the corporate and the cultural knowledge, standards and behaviours it should not promote and support the growth of cultural experts for the tribe exclusively within the corporate entity.

Instead, Potiki suggested, TRoNT could adopt the role of a cultural validator, deciding whether traditions were correct or ‘false’, a role TRoNT already holds in relation to whakapapa and boundary disputes. To decide the validity of a tradition TRoNT employees did not need to be the experts, but could draw on the opinion of experts within the tribe, Potiki argued. It is unclear how this centralised validation role sits with Potiki’s (2005) expectation to grow cultural expertise within the tribe to achieve a situation of ‘less centralisation of cultural production’. While the production might be less centralised the validation will still be.

**Solidarity**

Smith’s (1989, 345) ‘solidarity’, his last characteristic, is based on the good will of the members, an area outside of TRoNT’s control. At the same time ‘a sense of solidarity’ is the distinguishing feature between ‘ethnic communities’, the more abstract ‘categories’, and ‘groups’ which offer a weaker ‘sense of belonging’ than communities (Pearson, 1991, 196).

### 6.5 Corporatisation

While solidarity between tribal members is outside TRoNT’s control solidarity towards TRoNT is not. Relatively steady growth of the tribal assets have led to an increasing corporatisation of TRoNT. Continued scrutiny from the public and tribal members have furthered this process of corporatisation with "brand reputation management" [36] becoming a priority. "Reputation management" [35], going far beyond the subsumption of different groups under one collective logo, was described as steering perceptions: "What images we want to bring to mind when someone says Ngāi Tahu" [35], "How do we want the world to see us" [36].

As one of my interview partners at the heart of the process explained getting a certain "reputation" was the aim of the corporate "reputation management strategy", however, the corporate itself "shouldn’t necessarily be the embodiment of what makes someone Ngāi Tahu at all" [36]. This separation of corporate and cultural
world was repeated by many other interview partners. The outcome of this separation is an increased solidarity towards a brand rather than a tribal community, towards TRoNT as a corporate entity rather than persons of Ngāi Tahu descent. The hope within TRoNT is that members are "proud to be associated with the organisation". TRoNT’s "job" is then to attract members and make them "want ... to be engaged". This is a difficult process since the easily recognisable commonalities are few: "there is no one thing that says Ngāi Tahu" [36]. A further hope implied in my interview partner’s statement is that increased interaction with TRoNT leads to increased interaction with other tribal members. As will become obvious below not all members and not all hapū want to be subsumed under one brand even it is just in terms of online representation. Further, attempts of the iwi corporate to start processes of communication between tribal members were sometimes regarded as imposing on the freedom of tribal members. TRoNT’s work then is a difficult balancing act between all members’ expectations.

One factor which does play a significant role in binding members to the iwi corporate is money. As another interview partner observed the introduction of programs such as Whai Rawa changed the perception of the iwi corporate by tribal members and the relationship between the two considerably. While so far the "corporate entity" represented an "overhead" the introduction of direct "financial benefits" changed this perception. As the interview partner observed somewhat laconically: "... I think the whole game changes when you’re starting handing out money" [35] Again, the focus of solidarity changes from a group of people towards the distributing agency.

6.6 The inclusive discourse

The inclusive discourse is another factor which has helped cement TRoNT’s status as the central governing body of the iwi. The discourse became obvious during the research interviews. In short it consists of two parts. First, the iwi is portrayed as a democratic construct and TRoNT as its governing body is therefore the sole representative towards the Crown in matters pertaining to the entire iwi. Second, tribal members are portrayed as individuals with individual rights in a democratic tribe as opposed to tribal members who receive rights on the basis of regular local participation.

Thaman (2000, 2) argued that Pacific cultures entered late into the ‘international debates on human rights’, because the human rights discourse was focused on ‘individual human rights rather than community or collective rights’. The Western view beholds the individual as the unit of reference rather than a larger group. She
further argued that ‘cultural rights’ as ‘collective rights’ needed to be approached in a way which recognised ‘the duties and obligations of the individual to the group, as well as vice versa’ (Thaman, 2000, 3) The inclusive discourse replicates the focus on the individual. Tribal membership, in the understanding of proponents of the inclusive discourse, is obligation-free for the individual, an expression of interest and identity. This is in stark contrast to the understanding of the iwi used in the hearings of the Waitangi Tribunal and the settlement negotiations where Ngāi Tahu as an iwi received recognition as a group rather than as individuals and where the effects of the loss of tribal lands for the iwi as a whole had been argued. What is then the use of the inclusive discourse?

To invoke political and legal rights for individual iwi members rather than rights borne out of merits and participation fulfils several purposes. These purposes can best be seen in the speeches of the former CEO of TRoNT, Tahu Potiki (2003a,b, 2005b,a).

First, iwi are shown to be the Treaty partner to the Crown with legal rights based on the Treaty of Waitangi, which did not introduce new rights and laws, but rather protected the ‘common law principles that existed at 1840’ (Potiki, 2003b, 10). Potiki (2003b, 15) further argued that trading ‘Treaty rights of individual iwi … for the collective rights of an ethnic group’ depicts Māori as an ethnic group in need of special governmental support and thus, by discriminating against all non-Māori, is most likely a breach of the Bill of Rights Act 1990. Simultaneously he argued that this view of Māori allows the government to disregard iwi as ‘constitutional entities in their own right’ (Potiki, 2003b, 14, f.). This strengthens the stance of iwi as the only legal representatives for Māori and in return undermines the status of non-tribal, mostly urban Māori. Potiki (2003a) mentioned Te Whānau a Waiparera, who achieved a ‘farcical … Tribunal finding’, in which the power of rangatiratanga — sovereignty — was granted not only to iwi, but also to other Māori groups. Clearly Te Whānau a Waipereira is endangering the carefully crafted argument that iwi bureaucracies are the sole representatives of Māori. On the other hand to strengthen the stance of iwi and demanding sole power of representation inevitably also strengthens the position of tribal leaders. Elizabeth Rata has shown in her publications on neotribal capitalism how this view of iwi as sole representatives was borne out of specific circumstances, among others the liberal guilt of ‘Pakeha biculturalists’ (Rata, 2000, passim), rather than following a historical and logical path.

Second, to call for legal and political rights further strengthens the stance of iwi internally by tying hapū and whānau stronger to the iwi. Treaty rights have been bestowed upon iwi, not single whānau or hapū, although the Treaty protects the rights of the hapū. As will be described in later chapters not all tribal members see the dominance of the bureaucratic structure in a positive light.
6.6. THE INCLUSIVE DISCOURSE

Third, by calling on legal and democratic rights of individual members a moral dimension is introduced into the discourse. ‘[N]on-inclusive membership policies’ are then undemocratic and immoral (Potiki, 2003b, 6). Further Potiki (2005b, 3) argued that culture is ‘not static’. Describing and applying three processes of cultural preservation and adaptation to the case of Ngāi Tahu, ‘conscious traditionalism’, ‘cultural revitalisation’ and ‘cultural invention’, Potiki (2005b, 5-10) explained how Ngāi Tahu culture should be preserved and at the same time adapted to the current circumstances. He called on the individual members, hapū and whānau who hold the ‘real cultural strength’ (Potiki, 2005b, 11) and explained that the role of Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu will have to shift from being a producer of ‘cultural products’ to being the facilitator of the production of culture ‘in the regions’. From Potiki’s (2005a) view that ‘the new population ... are the democratic voice’, it becomes clear that he managed to bridge a gap between all potential tribal members by using the democratic and legal rights argument. He reassured locally active members that their role is most important in the production of culture, but at the same time made these members aware that due to democratic rights less active tribal members will have a stronger influence in the tribal decision making process in the future. Thus locally active tribal members need to adapt to the new situation and the tribe as a whole needs to develop mechanisms to cope with the influx of less interested members. The question whether or not these members should be incorporated does not arise, it is their democratic and legal right to participate in the iwi. In an ironic twist this also means that should the integration of new members fail it is not the fault of those who profit from the influx, tribal leaders who can claim a larger constituency and new members who profit economically and by identifying their roots, but those who resist it, the ahi kā, since they possess ‘real cultural strength’ and should create an environment conducive to the incorporation of new members (Potiki, 2005b, 11).

Wilson (2000, 20) posited a view different to Thaman’s and did not see ‘why individual and group rights need to be constructed in oppositional terms’. Similarly Hunt (2000, 29) pointed out that it ‘makes no sense for a single individual to speak his/her language or for one person to engage in a communal religious ceremony’, thus ‘culture rights... have both an individual and collective dimension’ for Hunt. I agree with Wilson and Hunt that indigenous rights need not necessarily be constructed in oppositional terms but are situationally dependent. To the outside tribal members are protective of their common culture, and their common whakapapa. Ngāi Tahu as a group is seen as distinctive and as having a right to redress. Lewis (1976, 355) called this ‘a declaration of identity’:

Even those who traditionally devote so much energy to killing each other still acknowledge a common bond that is unique and totally distinctive.
Internally the differentiation into ahi kā and "Johnny-come-latelies" [31], tribal members and TRoNT employees, whānau, or individual members breaks down the group into ever smaller entities. For some, as shown above in the case of TRoNT, this is a way of making sure everybody gets a fair share of the tribal assets and a way to cement political leadership, because TRoNT’s democratic consolidation rests on the level of the individual, not the whānau or the hapū. For others, mostly members considering themselves locally active, breaking down the group into ever smaller entities has to do with the will to keep the circle of members small, confined to those who actually participate rather than seeing the tribal assets being distributed out to faraway members. Thus these members reject tribal membership based solely on ancestry and the inclusive discourse.

While the inclusive discourse is focused on breaking down the tribe into individuals it is not the source of the individualising process. The entry into the new economy seems to have had a profound effect far earlier, as did the creation of the Blue Book. Some of my interview partners reported that their parents and grandparents had deliberately left their Māori side behind to avoid poverty through family obligations and to advance in a Pākehā dominated world rather than being confronted with prejudice and being forced to remain "another lazy Māori leaning on a shovel" [7].26 The inclusive discourse then is simply a method of gaining acceptance for new tribal members with equal rights despite a very short history of tribal involvement and acceptance for the bureaucratic apparatus of the iwi. While the leadership of single leaders might be questioned the actual bureaucratic structure is largely accepted.

### 6.7 Online fusion

How are all these efforts to create a unified iwi visible in the use of CMC? Two examples are given here. The first example is the efforts to create a common branding of all rūnanga websites. While the first example still leaves a large part of the decision-making power in the hands of the rūnanga the second example is far more centralised. It is the World of Information project, which is aimed at creating and maintaining a single database of all tribal members. Whakapapa, contact details, information about interaction with the tribal bureaucracy and interests of tribal members were planned, at the time of the interviews, to be incorporated in this database.

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26 Speed (2002) described the same process of abandonment of indigenous identities for the sake of economic success for the community of Nicolás Ruiz, Chiapas, Mexico.
6.7. ONLINE FUSION

Rūnanga online communication

Rūnanga websites

At the time of the interviews rūnanga had their own section on the website of TRoNT, but few chose to do so. A lack of technical knowledge or enthusiasm among the members and the staff of rūnanga administrations were mentioned, as was the lack of perceived "benefits" [34] of having a website. At the time of writing the rūnanga links have been removed from the public part of TRoNT’s website.

To have a website of their own, or a page on TRoNT’s website means that a rūnanga is able to disseminate information pertaining specifically to its members. It is also offers a level of autonomy, distinguishing the rūnanga from the wider tribe. But, as mentioned in chapter five and laid out more clearly above rūnanga and hapū are not equivalent. Since rūnanga were in themselves seen as a form of centralisation created as part of the tribal bureaucracy, the more autonomous unit of hapū was sometimes preferred, despite the fact that for purposes of political representation the power of the rūnanga had to be used. 27

"... even this rūnaka for example doesn’t necessarily want to be recognised as Ngāi Tahu. They want to be known as Kāti Huirapa ki Puketeraki as opposed to Ngāi Tahu rūnaka." [24]

"Because the local ones that live out here [Tuahiwi] are very proud of this place and they see uhm TRoNT and Ngāi Tahu and all that as being sort of the corporate side." [38]

Both quotes show a strikingly similar attitude towards TRoNT and Ngāi Tahu. The first quote describes the hapū based around Puketeraki, a hapū which in the words of another tribal member "actually didn’t need" TRoNT [26] because it had always done those things some northern neighbours had relied on TRoNT or the NTMTB to do. The second quote describes Ngāi Tūhuriri, a hapū geographically close to Christchurch and one of the driving forces behind the settlement. 28 Despite pushing the settlement and with it the centralisation and bureaucratisation of the tribe Ngāi Tūhuriri hapū, as described by some of my interview partners, also grapples with issues of democratic representation and openly counters TRoNT decisions. 29 The two

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27Obviously it could also be argued that hapū are taking their political power back from the rūnanga.
28The main claimant, Henare Rakihia Tau, is a member of Ngāi Tūhuriri hapū.
29This is not surprising in the light that the representative of Ngāi Tūhuriri rūnanga is part of the ‘tight nine’ as Richard Parata called the group on his website <www.ngaitahushareholders.co.nz>. This group is seen as bringing TRoNT to the brink of disaster, creating an impasse by casting votes as a group. A differing view, from within the group Parata called the ‘tight nine’, is that this group is seeking a clear direction for the tribe.
hapū described in the quotes above are not the only hapū with a strained relationship to TRoNT. Members and officials of other hapū gave similar accounts of the relationship between their hapū and TRoNT. To achieve a sense of autonomy and hapū identity, differentiation between hapū was needed. As one interview partner put it: "... they [the rūnanga] like to be individual even though they’re one iwi" [24].

It is partially due to this process of differentiation that members are concerned about revealing information to members of other rūnanga or even members of the same rūnanga who had not been present at meetings. Two employees of the rūnanga administrations of Puketeraki and Tuahiwi marae described the situation and again, despite differences in other areas, the concerns of tribal members of these two marae were largely identical. Members of both rūnanga were cautious about allowing access to meeting minutes to avoid other tribal members gaining knowledge about the "business"[38] of their rūnanga, because "each rūnaka doesn’t really wanna tell other rūnaka what it’s doing" [24]. The concerns about information leaks were not restricted to the use of CMC only, hardcopies of minutes and other records were also mentioned. The idea to store "tribal records" [14] in "the most credible archival institution in the South Island", the Hocken Library in Dunedin, was opposed by many members of the Puketeraki rūnanga administration. My participant could not understand why people opposed the archiving of the records and thought it a loss to the tribe that these records were not indexed and "accessible to our people whenever they wanted to" [14]. What this interview partner perceived as a major benefit could also be seen, I argue, as one of the biggest fears of hapū members: accessibility of rūnanga internal information to everybody at all times.

Of those rūnanga who had websites the search for a hapū identity positioned outside the wider tribal identity was curbed by the limitations of the websites offered by TRoNT. The template for the rūnanga websites was seen as "very restrictive" [1] and had to be "consistent with the Ngāi Tahu website. ... In terms of look and feel" [34]. At the time of the interviews a trial for a new template was being conducted, but the limitations of the existing sites were for at least one rūnanga an impediment. No security was offered to allow access restrictions to rūnanga internal information. Also the "current needs" [1] of this particular rūnanga, identified through a survey, could not be met with the template, which did not offer enough space or the capability to link to websites stored on external service providers. My interview partner was quick to address that the rūnanga might have more specific and far reaching needs than other rūnanga, with the "needs of many of the rūnanga" being met by the offered template. Again the hapū was portrayed as different to all other hapū by having particular needs.
The trial under way at the Puketeraki marae during the time of the interviews was aimed at creating a new website template which was suitable for all rūnanga. Where the hapū would have most likely protested and argued for very specific needs of each hapū TRoNT searched for a template which offered enough individuality, but also tied in with the "Ngāi Tahu brand" [24].

Not enough interviews were held with staff from different marae administrations to establish whether or not more rūnanga will in the future take up the offer of a webpage on TRoNT’s website and by doing so, to a certain extent, become more centralised. Despite this I believe two of my interview partners were correct in their view of the situation. Both had been active in their hapū for their entire life and were probably in their views unwillingly very much the same as their counterparts in other marae despite claiming very specific needs for their rūnanga. Both were adamant that initiatives such as websites and chat rooms only ever stood a chance to be used regularly by tribal members if initiated by members for members. Taking ownership was the only way to avoid that “they [TRoNT] […] decide what’s on it, not the grass roots” [26]. Otherwise members would perceive the websites as "just another TRoNT thing" [2] and withdraw participation. According to one of the two this was the case for the language website Kotahi Mano Kaika:

"They [TRoNT] provided Kotahi Mano Kaika, in which lot of people are not engaging, because it’s telling them how they’ll engage." [26]

Rūnanga email lists

At the time of the research interviews TRoNT was not in possession of an email list of all tribal members. Emails from TRoNT to the members were sent to the rūnanga administrations, who in turn forwarded the emails to their members on their email lists. While curbing TRoNT's possibilities to sideline rūnanga administrations by directly contacting members this approach had several disadvantages. Not all rūnanga administrations were equally diligent in emailing information out to their members and in keeping their email lists up to date. Some of my interview partners received regular emails from one rūnanga, but not from other rūnanga they belonged to. The opposite was also true for other participants, who received the same email from all rūnanga they belonged to, resulting in a "double up" [5] of information. This was not seen as a problem but only as a "minor irritation" [41].

With the World of Information project this has changed. TRoNT is now, to the best of my knowledge, in possession of the email addresses of all tribal members. I do not know, however, whether or not mass emails are sent out directly to tribal members, circumventing the rūnanga entirely.
World of Information

The World of Information project was triggered by two other projects: Whai Rawa, a saving scheme for tribal members, and the Ngāi Tahu Fund, a fund for any project by tribal members deemed to enhance Ngāi Tahu culture. What these two projects have in common is the need for an increased amount of individual member interaction with TRoNT.

Whai Rawa for example is geared at increasing individual wealth. The idea is that the tribe matches the private savings "dollar for dollar" [39], but certain conditions are attached. Not all TRoNT employees and tribal members were happy with these conditions. The dividing question among board members was to what extent TRoNT can direct tribal members in their personal decisions. The outcome was a "good compromise" [39] as one TRoNT member called it. Another entirely different view was offered by a tribal member. To this interview partner Whai Rawa had conceptual flaws. Those most in need did not get as much as those least in need. As there was no "cap limit" [37] for the savings high income earners received more from the tribe. Further the money can only be withdrawn for specific purposes such as paying for education costs, payments for a house, or as retirement money. This particular interview partner had differing ideas about what should be done and proposed an annual dividend pay out:

"Every year you send us a cheque of our dividend as a shareholder. Simple as that. Every person who is registered is a shareholder. Simple as that. We all get the same amount of money regardless of status, age, gender, whatever." [37]

To tie this excursion back to the World of Information project the idea of the annual dividend cheque has one advantage or flaw. This advantage is that once people have received the cheque they are free to use the money as they want, which, as my interview partner called it, is "their tino rangatiratanga" [37]. This also means that no further information flow back towards the bureaucratic structure is necessary, information which is highly sought after as the following will show.

The aim of the World of Information project was to implement a new "IT strategy" [35] which was able to support the two financial schemes and other initiatives under way at the time of the interviews. One part of the new strategy was to create "one version of the truth" [35], a single database of tribal members. All information known about tribal members was to be stored in this "single source of data" [35]. The single

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30 This was also the view of a fraction of the TRoNT board and the TRoNT member who saw the outcome as a "good compromise" [39].
database would guarantee that updates entered by TRoNT employees, and possibly rūnanga administrations and tribal members themselves, were available to all those who had access to the information rather than having to update several sources.

The other part was the establishment of digital links to those members which TRoNT had so far not been able to reach. Once the e-mail addresses of those members who live in the North Island and the "hell of a lot that live overseas" [35] had been gathered the intention was for information to go out to the members, but also to come back to TRoNT. Showing a hunger for information characteristic for all bureaucracies TRoNT, at the time of the interviews, was toying with the idea of making it possible for members to record a large amount of personal information, ranging from address information to declarations of skills in areas such as language and crafts. The ideas, at least in the description of one of my interview partners working on this project, were far reaching:

"Uhm, what we [TRoNT] want to be able to do is to record various competency levels of the language, so that down the track we can identify those people who are very competent, some or little or none at all and potentially target those that we need to increase the overall knowledge of the language. Uhm, could be the same thing done for other activities such as, you know, carving or art or that sort of stuff. So we’re gonna be encouraging the members to register their expertise or skills in particular cultural fields. So again they’ll be able to just pop that information across the web if they want to and we can pump it out to other people. Eventually come up with a business directory." [35, emphasis mine]

It is visible in this quote that TRoNT’s intentions reach further than simply administering the settlement money. As one interview partner pointed out TRoNT’s "implicit" agenda was "radical", but "radically good" [15]. Change was sought, which could more easily be achieved when administered from above. Another participant, employed by TRoNT at the time of the interview, spoke of even further reaching changes. Changes to economic and social situations of entire areas:

"[...] it becomes an economic development, it becomes a community development, a cultural development, a social development exercise well beyond, you know, [...] it’s social engineering. It’s extreme." [14]

All these ideas and intentions need information, centrally stored and accessible information. The World of Information project is the answer to these information needs.
Although certainly offering technical benefits the single database and the various applications connected to it also mean a further step towards a centralised tribe:

First, irrespective of the amount, quality, and kind of data stored the question of democratic mandate has to be raised. When discussing the Whai Rawa scheme, one interview partner, quoted above, was opposed to the scheme and called TRoNT members "the wise ones" [37] who made decisions on behalf of the members without necessarily having the backing of the tribal members. While the World of Information project allows for increased interaction and thus a more stringent consultation process the question remains to which degree TRoNT should or shouldn’t interfere in the private lives of the tribal members. With the information gathered interference can be directed more towards those who need help, but it is unclear if these members want help.

Secondly, information about tribal members is intended to be held in one centralised database, "a single version of the truth" [35]. For this particular interview partner a "single point of updating" [35] had only upsides, an understandable argument from an administrative point of view. Changing "the truth" [35], accidentally or on purpose, is then, however, far less complicated. One interview partner pointed out that political motivations and family truths could mean that previously accepted truths had to be "rubbished" should one particular family raise to power within the iwi [41]. Thus while a singular truth is an administrative dream it also means a denial of the "widely accepted rules in Māori [...] that every family has their own sense of truth" [41]. The iwi relied on this important rule when Waitangi Tribunal members were unsure how Ngāi Tahu’s whakapapa could be reconciled with the differing versions from other tribes but accepted it on the basis that every iwi has its own historical recollections (Belgrave, 2005).

Lastly, creating a unique identifier for each tribal member used for the tribal savings scheme, Whai Rawa, and as the login into the members only section of the web site makes every tribal member exactly that, uniquely identifiable. It also means that only members who have signed up for the Whai Rawa scheme can participate in the members only section ‘Community Net’. Anonymity, one of the characteristics many interview partners liked most about an online forum, is replaced by accuracy. Even if this is not used to identify critical members a unique identifier still offers the potential to do so.

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31 Once information is stored in one location withholding information to remain less transparent becomes increasingly difficult since cross-referencing is made easier.
6.8 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that centralisation and bureaucratisation have a long tradition within the tribe. Subsumption of autonomous units under a single name began after an external threat, Te Rauparaha's attacks in the 1820s (Anderson, 1998, 205). The prior occupants Waitaha and Kāti Māmoe were slowly incorporated in the tribal name. Today members of other tribes are subsumed under the suffix whānui. Bureaucratisation began with the introduction of the territorially based rūnanga administrations in the 1860s. The introduction of a new economy and a new legal system emphasising private property furthered the bureaucratic administration of the tribe with tribal members slowly becoming individually registered and later, possibly not until the settlement in 1996, turning into 'beneficiaries' (Waymouth, 2003, passim; O'Regan, 2001, passim).

The corporatisation of the iwi bureaucratic structure is a relatively recent process beginning with the creation of TRoNT. Brand reputation management strategies are developed and put in place to heighten the appeal of the bureaucratic structure to tribal members and the public. As a result the relationship between the iwi corporate and tribal members is further individualised with the hope that members will be "proud to be associated with the organisation" and will "want ... to be engaged" [36]. While rūnanga, hapū, and whānau are frequently invoked as the places where culture is created the main focal point is the corporate with its mixture of cultural and business practices presented as specific to Ngāi Tahu.

Forde (1938) and Middleton and Tait (1958) distinguished between a temporary segmentation and a permanent rupture within a tribal community. This chapter has shown that the case of Ngāi Tahu then presents an example of the opposite process. Rather than temporary alignment to achieve certain goals the tribe has become a fixture through centralisation, bureaucratisation, and, ironically, through a successful settlement. Internal segmentation over inner-tribal issues is possible, yet fission would come at the price of losing access to tribal money and possibly credibility, since the tribal collective offers political power (Sir Tipene O'Regan in O'Regan, 2001, 169).

Embedded within these processes are the attempts to create an easily recognisable web presence with TRoNT's offer of a web page template extending to all rūnanga. The creation of a database spanning all tribal members, again creating an individual relationship between TRoNT and members, is a further step towards centralisation, bureaucratisation, and corporatisation. This chapter then also tells a story of adaptation of a new technology to existing processes.
Embedded in this chapter, however, is also the seed for the opposite story told in the following chapters, the demand for new decision-making processes based on the introduction of new technologies and the resistance against these new possibilities. The iwi corporate uses the inclusive discourse to defend participatory rights of distant members. But as van Meijl (1998) has pointed out democracy has many meanings. CMC is then, for some members, the solution to the iwi corporate’s centralised decision-making power. More information and interaction between the iwi corporate and the tribal members is regarded as a high priority, one easily satisfied through the use of modern technologies. For other members the use of these technologies presents a form of historical continuity, foreign rule, this time by distant and non-active tribal members.
Chapter 7

Whakapapa and CMC

7.1 Introduction

Vignette 1

Following the invitation of my cultural advisor I visited a hui on a nearby marae. My introduction did raise some eyebrows at first, a social researcher in our midst? But I was soon dismissed as just another person in the room. My impression was one of tension interspersed with laughter. At one point during the hui a pair of dentures were lost and, in a memorable acrobatic feat, recaptured in mid-flight during a singing performance.

The following incident then seemed particularly harsh, acting as a lightning rod for the underlying tensions. At the end of a presentation about funds available for projects aimed at perpetuating Ngāi Tahu culture a member of the audience stood up and urged everybody present to keep te reo Māori alive. He repeatedly pleaded "Do it for the children, do it for our youngest" and then went on to explain that in his own home te reo Māori was spoken on a frequent basis. Outside his own home though he had, sadly, little influence on the dismal situation of language decline since he lived in Auckland. Clearly upset by this request a female member of the audience rose and challenged the first speaker. Being heavily involved in the affairs of the local rūnanga herself, she reprimanded the man for airing his opinions about what locally active members should do if he himself was not available to do the work. In a cutting remark she pointed out that if he thought language conservation was important then he should "come home" and do something about it rather than telling others what to do. The first speaker’s reaction was one of indignation at this form of public humiliation, a reaction, which quickly turned to withdrawal when several locally active members showed their support for the woman’s opinion by silently staring at him.
CHAPTER 7. WHAKAPAPA AND CMC

Vignette 2

During another part of the hui a kaumātua rose and pointed out that the central tribal governance structure was clearly overstepping its goals. Rather than dictating tribal members and rūnanga what to do the governance structure had been established to fulfill the wishes of the locally active members and the 18 rūnanga. Being a locally active member himself, heavily involved in rūnanga affairs as well, he clearly saw his right to self-determination being threatened on what he considered was his own marae. Others rose to speak, in favor of the first speaker’s argument or against it. The discussion slowed when a member of the governance level rose and quietly pointed out the first speaker’s instrumental role in the introduction of the governance structure years earlier.

This chapter is focused on the understanding that CMC within the tribe "doesn’t bode well with the whole oral tradition" [30]. In this chapter I will show that the use of CMC within the Ngāi Tahu tribe has not caused but fuels an ongoing debate about tribal membership. The debate is centred around the questions of what it means to be Ngāi Tahu, and the differences between the different understandings (for more generalised differences pertaining to Māori see van Meijl, 2002, 60). As the first vignette at the beginning of this chapter shows different levels of participation are common within the tribe. Some members are heavily involved in tribal affairs, some focus on whānau activities, and others are hardly involved at all yet have a right to claim tribal membership on the basis of biological links. With these differing levels of involvement come divergent interpretations as to the role of the tribal bureaucracy. And over time, as shown in the second vignette at the beginning of this chapter, understandings of this role can change.

In the case of Ngāi Tahu — and I would suggest in the case of most indigenous populations — use of CMC for inner-tribal communication highlights issues surrounding the concept of indigeneity. If tribal membership is simply based on biological links then indigeneity is disentangled from local roots, leading to the question if culture is moving freely in Appadurai’s (1991, 192) ‘ethnoscape[s]’, or as Mintz (1998, 126) called the phenomenon people who are ‘simply being international’. The question then is also whether people — indigenous or not — want their culture to be on the move, free of localised content. Castells (2004a, 38) called this

1 A statement made, ironically, by a distant member who used CMC extensively and was uncertain "how people used to function without it" [30].
counter-process the ‘grass-rooting’ of the space of flows’, local communities trying to maintain a sense of locality and with it local boundedness.

Waymouth (2003) pointed out that the establishment of TRoNT has led to substantial changes within the tribe regarding the importance of whakapapa. Waymouth (2003, 3) argued that whakapapa creates ‘layers’ which are interrelated, functioning as the connection between all things living and dead, while simultaneously establishing a hierarchy between the different actors within layers and the different layers themselves. With the introduction of TRoNT the internal organisation of the tribe has changed from ‘a political, economical and social system ordered by traditional kinship relationships’ to a ‘legal-rational bureaucracy’ with all the potential benefits and drawbacks of bureaucratic structures (Waymouth, 2003, 7).

In the following I will distinguish between two different concepts: Genealogy is the biological connectedness of relatives and whakapapa as the added meaning to genealogy, which explains the world as a set of relationships. The distinction is drawn to clarify the different approaches to iwi membership. My interview partners did not always use the two concepts separately as whakapapa can be used to mean both "a list of names and words" [16] and an understanding of the world that "relates everything that you hold dear" [51].

It is self-explanatory that the possibilities of participation offered by CMC do not necessarily engender increased participation. At the same time cultural change as described and recommended by Potiki (2005b) will be necessary to accommodate these new forms of participation. The changes will be most apparent to ahi kā, as these are the people who have upheld their Ngāi Tahu-ness during times when acceptance of Māori by Pākehā was lower than today. Although all my interview partners were adamant that Ngāi Tahu should be allowed to live in “today’s world” and were technologically "savvy"[35] the changes necessary to adapt to the new possibilities were opposed by many ahi kā. In the following I will show through the example of whakapapa that different groups within the tribe have different agendas, which in turn affect how members of these groups use and perceive CMC.

It is important to note that the large area occupied by the Ngāi Tahu tribe, populated by politically autonomous hapū and whānau, was perceived by my interview partners as having influenced the inner-tribal communication substantially:

"But the form of communication was always, has always been spread out, we’ve always been really spread out. So the notion of communication with Ngāi Tahu is, has always been probably quite different from other tribes, where you’re in a small area and you know, you’re in each others faces all
the time. [laughs] [...] you probably communicate less in some ways, you
know, ‘cause everyone’s there and it’s like, whereas you make the effort
when you’re further away sometimes [...] That whole you don’t have it [...] or the less you’ve got the more you hold onto it, you know.” [19]

It is difficult to establish whether in pre-European times there was any difference
between Ngāi Tahu and other tribes regarding inner-tribal communication structures.
Ngāi Tahu today certainly claims a vastly larger area than most other tribes in New
Zealand. Historically, however, Ngāi Tahu was not a strong cohesive tribal unit but
rather as loosely connected group of politically and economically independent hapū
(Anderson, 1980). As described in chapter five, Ngāi Tahu also had to rely more on
seasonal gathering of food than on crops, resulting in regular journeys to remote
mahinga kai, necessitating a larger area per head than stationary crop-growing.
Today many members are aware of the wide spread of the Ngāi Tahu tribe. While this
is a source of pride for some, others feel that a further spread offshore — to the North
Island and overseas — is not in the best interest of the tribe, which is where the
exclusive discourse comes into play. In chapter six I have shown that the inclusive
discourse furthers a specific relationship between locality and tribal identity, namely
the creation of a mythical homeland. For the exclusive discourse explained in this
chapter the relationship between locality and identity on the level of hapū, whānau
and individual tribal members is important. The marae plays a significant role within
this relationship.

7.2 The interaction of locality and identity on the levels
of hapū, whānau and individuals

Hapū

In this research very few interview partners talked about hapū as part of their identity.
As Anderson (1980; 1998) pointed out hapū affiliation was historically spread out over
the South Island. Hapū, despite having strongholds in certain regions, were not locally
fixed. Hapū were most often mentioned in the interviews when locally active mem-
bers argued for the preeminence of hapū over iwi. Rūnanga, today’s inner-tribal polit-
cal structure, were from the beginning based on locality and clearly defined rūnanga
boundaries, and deliberately so. Insisting on hapū rather than rūnanga affiliations,
such as in the case of Kāti Huirapa ki Puketeraki quoted in chapter six, is then a way
of resisting the political bodies within the iwi.
7.2. THE INTERACTION OF LOCALITY AND IDENTITY ON THE LEVELS OF HAPŪ, WHĀNAU AND INDIVIDUALS

In this study allegiance to rūnanga seemed to be fluid. If people did not feel welcome at one rūnanga they moved their participatory base to another rūnanga. On the basis of this it appears that exact locality is not a large issue for many, in particular new members. For many longstanding members this is of course not the case, with the landscape being integrated into the history of the self (Russell, 2000). In some cases this is even the case with new members, who have resided in the same area for years, but have only recently connected with their Ngāi Tahu identity.

Whānau and individuals

Distance plays an important role when it comes to perceptions of "home" and the construction of identity. Many locally active members saw the area they lived in as home, which is hardly surprising. Some participants, though very few, mentioned a connectedness to local geographical features such as mountains. With increasing distance my interview partners’ perceptions shifted. The rūnanga area was no longer "home". Instead it was perceived as a long car or even plane trip away. Only one member from Wellington talked about the rūnanga area as "home", all others either did not talk about "home" at all or did so in relation to their Wellington abode. Overseas members used "home" as a fluid concept. Home ranged from the parents’ place to specific areas and in some instances to the whole of New Zealand.

Russell’s (2000) thesis offers valuable insider insights into the role of land in the identity construction of individual Ngāi Tahu. Russell’s main argument is that a conceptual and qualitative difference exists between being of the land and being with the land. Russell (2000, 40) specifically points towards the importance of an ‘experiential connection’ to the land. This connection allows for the feeling of being of the land. For Russell (2000, 48) local participation is the only way to gain ‘daily and lifetime experiential and intimate knowing of place’. This knowledge of place/landscape is important to fully appreciate whakapapa, which integrates all actors (humans, animals, plants, the land, and the gods) into a web of interrelated parts, a point further explained below.

Russell’s thesis offers a very insightful look into the perspective of some local Ngāi Tahu. It also epitomises in its conclusion the exclusive discourse described in this chapter. My thesis shows a different side to tribal belonging and how the differing perspectives are tied together via the inclusive and exclusive discourses. Considering

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2This is a finding influenced by the sample. Moving one’s participatory base from Otakou to Puketaki is easily possible. In the case of remote rūnanga this is, of course, a different story.

3Mountains, weather patterns and vistas offer powerful markers in the search for a sense of belonging (Easthope, 2009). But see also Russell’s(2000) distinction between being of the land and being with the land, discussed below.
Russell’s own engagement on the local level I believe that the general argument made in her thesis is also a political one.

The role of the marae

The marae offers an important point of reference in the interplay between locality and identity. The marae bears great importance, especially when it comes to ceremonial and symbolic interactions. For Ngāi Tahu, at least in the case of this research, the marae has several connotations precisely because it is linked to ceremonial and symbolic interaction. Locally active members saw their marae as an important point of reference. One woman, for example, reported going down to the marae to do some weaving whenever she felt the need to “touch base with who I am” [5]. Many of the international members in my study had been brought up within a Ngāi Tahu cultural frame of reference and had then moved abroad. These members also saw the marae as an integral part of Ngāi Tahu tribal life, despite being unable to regularly visit. Members living in the middle-distance, i.e. Wellington, mentioned the marae far less. These members visited their marae very irregularly and, in some cases, reluctantly.

This reluctance brings me to my second observation. I do not think that the ceremonial roles and the marae have been ‘disentangled’ from each other. Rather I believe that for some the marae is a place where they are inherently uncomfortable precisely because of this entanglement. The marae then becomes a stage for the “exclusive discourse in action”. Metge’s (1986) work on feeling ‘whakamā’ is helpful here. The marae is then a place where the lack of knowledge regarding tikanga is the most apparent and therefore creates a dreading sensation in members inexperienced in tikanga. One interview partner explicitly mentioned that “How To” [19] guides for these and other situations should be published on the website alongside “testimonials” of “success stories” from new members, who had rekindled their connections. He wanted other members to be able to read about “[...] what it means to be Ngāi Tahu [...] and not just the political bull[...]”. He wanted to give new members as much information as possible before immersing themselves into an entirely new situation. Interestingly he himself had only begun to explore his “Māoritanga” during his overseas deployment as a soldier. There he joined the kapa haka group and toured Asia. To him

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4I wish to thank Dr. Barber for challenging me on this point and asking for further clarification.
5Russell (2000, 240) pointed out that Ngāi Tahu culture ‘is not merely a marae-based one (even if some of our power brokers believe it should be)…’. In the case of this particular research participant going to the beach, at a specific location, offered the same sense of grounding as going to the marae to do some weaving.
6I wish to thank Dr. Barber for this wording.
7See also van Meijl’s (2000) description of Māori youths when confronted by tribal elders about their lack of te reo Māori and tikanga knowledge.
8Goldsmith (2003) pointed out that all armed forces have to learn the kapa haka.
this was "sort of my birth, or re-birth, or whatever you want to call it, uhm back into Māoridom" [19]. This experience was the source of his strength, which allowed him, upon his return, to step onto a marae with confidence.

Whakamā can also be experienced for somebody else (Metge, 1986, 54, f.). In the Ngāi Tahu case this form of whakamā, I argue, is part of the reaction of some locally active members, who feel whakamā for newcomers who are unknowledgeable in tikanga. There are two different sources for this form of whakamā. One source is the reflection this lack of knowledge has on the entire tribe. O’Regan (2001, 160) argued that Ngāi Tahu are perceived as ‘plastic’ Māori, both by Pākehā and other Māori. Members without tikanga knowledge further support this view of the Ngāi Tahu tribe. The other source of whakamā is, I believe, the lack of preparation on the part of the newcomers. This is best shown in the answer of one interview partner, who vehemently argued against ‘How To’ guides. Instead, newcomers should "read a book" (26). She pointed towards the lack of preparation of many new members: “people don’t make you deliberately uncomfortable, but you don't go ill-prepared in any situation…” This lack of preparation reflects on the newcomers but also on the locally active members, who have no power to refuse entry, thus further increasing the whakamā. As we will see in this chapter one way of shunning new members from participating in tribal life is the exclusive discourse, however, tribal membership and with it membership rights is not something locally active members can revoke.

### 7.3 Exclusive tribal membership

The exclusive discourse counters the inclusive discourse. Where the inclusive discourse is aimed at achieving inclusion of the largest possible number of tribal members the exclusive discourse is aimed at peripheralising and curtailing the participatory possibilities of currently distant and non-active members. It is important to note here that exclusion of non-active members is not the aim of the exclusive discourse. Rather the aim is to distinguish between different forms of membership. This distinction is along the lines described by Metge (1995, 77), who differentiated between ‘full’ members of a whānau and those holding ‘nominal or potential membership’ through their whakapapa. Where the inclusive discourse highlights the tribal members’ rights based on a purely biological connection the exclusive discourse highlights the obligations within whānau and hapū and therewith local participation, which in turn rests on a geographical and a temporal factor. Locally active interview partners regularly emphasised the need to participate on a local level. Distant members added that by virtue of living elsewhere local participation was made difficult, not only by long travel times but also by the
resistance of locally active members. This issue is neither new nor caused by the use of CMC. Scheffler (1964) and Webster (1975) discussed this point decades before CMC had become common in New Zealand.

As Friedman (2004, 164, see also Friedman, 2001) pointed out ‘roots tend to gravitate to the bottom of the social order while hybridity is more common at the top where cosmopolitanism reigns’. As we have seen in Chapter six the bureaucratic structure is built to accommodate a widely dispersed tribe and the definition of tribal membership is sufficiently inclusive to allow for a dispersed, non-active tribal collective. The importance of locality, Friedman’s roots, then is emphasised through the exclusive discourse. Insistence on local participation and local knowledge also creates the kind of community which scholars have long argued against: Locally bounded communities which are maintained through face-to-face contact, thus clearly marking insiders and outsiders. Similarly culture is rooted in the soil as explained below. While this form of community could be described as a post-modern scholar’s nightmare it also reveals the inherent problematic of the current situation regarding indigeneity in New Zealand and in other parts of the world: for the purpose of settlements clear-cut membership definitions are demanded resulting in an influx of formerly inactive members and in large, unbounded and democratic yet not necessarily participatory communities. It is hardly surprising that locally active members are reluctant to accept this new understanding of tribal membership. The internationally operating tribe calls into question the importance of locality for indigeneity, the very same locality and spiritual and physical connectedness to this locality which has been attested to in the hearings of the Waitangi Tribunal.

Although it is easy to empathise with locally active members it is also important to see that the exclusive discourse is intended to peripheralise a large number of the tribal members. The number of those participating on a local level is reasonably small. One of my interview partners estimated that of the over 30,000 tribal members 1,000 were locally active "at the most" [2] with his local rūnanga faring even worse with an estimated 20 out of 3,000 members being active. The low number of participating members, however, is not only due to the neglect of their Ngāi Tahu culture by inactive members but also due to the active resistance of some local members against distant members. Different rūnanga reacted differently to requests from distant members with some rūnanga taking an interest and being welcoming, possibly to

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9 Between tribes this form of boundary maintenance is also practised as the following interview part shows:

"... cause she’s from Ngāi Tahu and she is looking after another tribe’s money, people are often at her ‘Oh, you don’t know what you’re doing because you’re from somewhere else and you’re not doing it right’ type of thing." [48]
widen their membership base and gain more political leverage within the tribe, while other rūnanga were "rude" [42] in their answers to these requests. Some distant interview partners, mostly overseas, mirrored the locally active members’ response by seeing themselves as being too far away and not participating enough to comment on inner-tribal or rūnanga affairs. At the same time negative responses to participation by distant members were expected or had been experienced in the past and led some distant members to circumvent these responses by either refraining from participation or by speaking through locally active family members rather than having to face accusations of having "let us down" [48] by migrating away from the tribal lands.

The exclusive discourse is constructed out of a geographical and a temporal component. The geographical part of the discourse refers to increasingly smaller areas of land. Not only are tribal members expected to live in the South Island, but if possible also near their local rūnanga. Local decisions then should be made by locally active tribal members who will also have to do the work. Distant participation in local activities is often seen as an interference, annoyance, or even a threat. It is responded to swiftly by making distant members aware that the actual work has to be done locally:

"But I remember there was one guy who came down for the cultural summit and he said something like 'I've got a plea, do this for the young ones' and I said 'Come home and do it yourself'. [...] Because if you're that committed that's how committed you are. You come home and you do it. Don't be sitting somewhere miles away telling us how to do what we've always done. And how do you know what it is we do if you don't participate?" [26]

Rūnanga are regional authorities of clearly defined areas, so coming home is then a simple exercise. Hapū had and still have strongholds in specific areas. Hapū affiliations, however, were and still are distributed all over the South Island, as we have seen in chapter five. Coming home is then more difficult for tribal members as the area is a lot less clearly defined and choices have to be made about which whakapapa lines to favour over others.

But not only living overseas or in the North Island, even within different regions of the South Island differences are visible to local members. Living on the other side of a river, "north of the Waitaki" [9], is, for example, used as an explanation why people in different areas are different. Behaviour, customs, and family traditions are delineated along locality and are seen as remaining with the members of these families even in case of a relocation.
The temporal factor of the exclusive discourse is closely linked to the geographical one. The land which Ngāi Tahu see themselves as rooted to has changed over time. Using the geological opposite of autochthonous, Ngāi Tahu, in regard to tribal mythology, can be considered allochthonous, originating from a distant part. Commonly in the Pacific the first arrivals on an island are said to have originated from another distant island with uncertain whereabouts. As part of the Māori population Ngāi Tahu consider themselves to hail from a mythical Hawaiki, thus being included into a wider cultural group. As a specific tribe, forming an exclusive enclave within the encompassing Māori cultural group, Ngāi Tahu’s migration from the North to the South Island occurred relatively recently, only roughly 350 years ago (Stack, 1994, 11), and then not as a unitary tribe. Politically the smaller constituent units of hapū and whānau were largely autonomous as we have seen in the chapter on the historical background of Ngāi Tahu and united into a tribe long after the arrival on the South Island (O’Regan, 1994, 237, f.; see also Anderson, 1998, 23-27). All these movements place a time limit to the idea of being of the land of the South Island, even if it is a hypothetical one.

Upon arrival on the South Island migratory movements for the purpose of food gathering were common and are considered part of Ngāi Tahu culture, if not the most distinguishing feature. As Belgrave (2005, 203) exclaimed, ‘[i]n many ways Ngai Tahu were their relationship with these natural resources’. Emigrating from the North Island meant to give up usage rights, establishing a system of usage rights at the new location meant that families were once again grounded in the land.

The introduction of a more sedentary lifestyle was linked to the arrival of a new people: European sailors with their need for food and labour force. Pākehā brought with them the idea that land rather than the resources stemming from it could be sold. As we have seen in chapter five Ngāi Tahu chiefs did sell land for a number of reasons, although it appears that at the time of the land sales the implications, i.e. the loss of access to these resources, was not clear to the sellers (Belgrave, 2005, 179). The connection between land and resource access became clear to all tribal members early on. As an outcome the idea that land could be possessed drove the metaphorical roots further into the soil: land could be owned and by selling it roots, in the form of resource access, could be cut off. As one of my interview partners stated: “Māori sell land, they sell their turanga” [39].

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10While in the past gathering food from the countryside was important for survival it is far less so these days but also far more difficult. I believe the function of the food gathering expeditions is today not only to reconnect to past ways of life, but also to differentiate tribal members from the wider New Zealand public. For this form of symbolic activity see Thomas (1992).

11‘Turanga waewae’ translates as ‘home ground’.
7.3. EXCLUSIVE TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP

The structure of inner-tribal relationships is in flux due to the changed understanding of access rights being tied to actual possession of the land rather than to regular use of these rights. Participation in regular food gathering activities has been replaced by legal possession, thus possessing land is now equivalent to rights to natural resources, which is equivalent to possession of a distinct Ngāi Tahu culture (see Belgrave, 2005, above).\textsuperscript{12} Ngāi Tahu culture is then firmly rooted in the ground, the South Island soil, the geographical factor of the exclusive discourse. Simultaneously the idea of possession puts a stop to further migration, one part of the temporal factor of the discourse. Putting his emigration to another country into a temporal context one of my interview partners pointed towards historical continuity of his actions:

"And I always say ‘What’s more Māori, what’s more Māori than migrating?’ We’ve been doing it since Hawaiki. We just continued the migration to here." [49]

To be Ngāi Tahu in a cultural sense rather than a biological sense hinges for many locally active members not only on the fulfilment of certain duties or on the execution of certain tasks, but also on the location where these duties or tasks are performed. Contemporary and historic migration is equated with leaving your roots behind, a statement, often an accusation, many of my interview partners had heard when trying to reconnect to specific hapū. Selling land, leaving a location was seen as a cultural sell out by many locally active interview partners.

The temporal factor of the exclusive discourse is the duration of identification as Ngāi Tahu. Tribal members who have joined relatively recently are "post-settlement Ngāi Tahu" [33], "Johnny-come-latelies" [18], or "Born agains" [31 fem] as opposed to those members who have upheld their Ngāi Tahu heritage in the face of economic and cultural pressure. Not only is the time important when a person has become a tribal member, whether officially or not, but it is also important how much time members spend on their Ngāi Tahuness. When discussing the resurrection of rūnanga, described in chapter six, one interview partner explained that few people were actually living the life of locally active Ngāi Tahu, instead most were "weekend Māori", the intention being to "[g]o to the marae to learn about yourself" rather than live a full-time life as a Ngāi Tahu [39].

The reality is messier than the description of the discourse given above. The inclusive and exclusive discourses represent poles of a continuum, thus allowing for many positions within the two discourses. Some interview partners were moderate in their

\textsuperscript{12}See Handler (1986, 4) on the connection between Locke’s idea that individual existence is based on the possession of private property and the understanding that culture can be possessed.
positions, seeking a middle ground between the two discourses, a reaction often based on past personal experiences of exclusion or inclusion. Some interview partners worked within both discourses. As members of TRoNT they argued that the tribe needed to become democratic, while simultaneously suggesting that only participation and face-to-face interaction would achieve any real inclusion.

In the following I will show how the exclusive discourse was presented in my research interviews. I will use the online dissemination of whakapapa information as an example.

### 7.4 Whakapapa

As noted participation is not necessarily sufficient to placate locally active members, choosing the right locality for participation is also important. The right locality is determined by whakapapa, not only the genealogical connection, but also the stories connected to the names. As described below many of my interview partners were firm believers in family truths, localised versions of whakapapa and events which were accepted when visiting these families but rejected otherwise. On a larger, inter-tribal scale, Sir Āpirana Ngata’s acceptance of Ngāi Tahu whakapapa as a ‘different tradition’ (Belgrave, 2005, 202, f.) is an example of these localised accounts. It is these localised accounts which mark the right locality. It does not suffice to know the names of ancestors. Without knowing the appropriate stories the names remain meaningless. But which stories are deemed appropriate depends on the family. Thus learning whakapapa from the wrong person, i.e. a person from a different family with a different understanding of the genealogical connections or a person who might not know the appropriate stories accompanying the names, can be detrimental.

Contemporary understanding of past Māori culture emphasises the importance of whakapapa. O’Regan (1992, 24, f.) for example explained that historical accounts can only be considered valid if they can be cross-referenced with whakapapa, but also adds that every whakapapa had a purpose and was recited to prove a specific point. Having an eponymous ancestor creates the foundations for a unified tribe. Every tribal member can claim descent from this ancestor and is thus part of the tribe. The eponymous ancestor is in general in the distant past, allowing for a far-spreading inclusive network of relations. Yet O’Regan’s own doubts about the correctness of whakapapa have to be remembered:

> even whakapapa, the bedrock of oral traditions, are subject to poetic and sometimes political manipulation. ... As Sir Tipene O’Regan has noted,
there is a strong possibility that orthopaedic surgery has been practised on
the skeletal framework of Ngāi Tahu’s tribal whakapapa. (Tau, 2003, 262)

Sutton’s (1990, 685, f.) description of the creation of the Ngā Puhi tribe at the
beginning of the nineteenth century in the northern part of the North Island shows
that Ngāi Tahu are not the only tribe with whakapapa which might have been
adjusted to suit political needs.

The creation of the Blue Book with the 1848 census did eradicate such creative
handling of whakapapa, although it appears not entirely. Whakapapa might be
"indisputable" [37] but it seems that political ends still justify the means and some
people claim Ngāi Tahu ancestry although none of their ancestors were Ngāi Tahu
[37, 39].

Of more importance here than possibly false whakapapa claims are the effects of the
Blue Book and government actions. The Department of Maori Affairs was abolished
in 1989 and government services were devolved to those tribes which had undergone
the process of legal recognition, forcing tribes to prove their accountability and their
geographical boundaries, but also to clearly define their membership (Sissons, 1995,
66), which was understood to be most convincingly and easily possible through the
use of ancestral lists. Creating lists, like the Blue Book, meant that ‘the fluidity of the
traditional system was frozen’ (Metge 1967 cited in Webster, 1975, 146). Segmentation
of hapū and iwi were made virtually impossible, although according to Webster
(1975, 146) small hapū and whānau are still undergoing processes of ‘segmentation
and fusion’.

Using genealogy as a single determining factor also eliminated most attempts from
urban, non-tribal Māori to settle past grievances with the government. In fact, the
only urban Māori organisation which was partially successful in demanding political
representation for urban Māori was Te Whānau a Waiparera, and only because it
achieved iwi status in 1996. For tribal Māori the exclusion of non-tribal Māori is a
matter of historical continuity as Mahuika (1998, 219) explained, because using an
approach for future development which is based on ethnicity rather than bloodlines
‘would be suicidal for iwi and culture, because whakapapa is the heart and core of all
Māori institutions, from Creation to what is now iwi’. A development away from iwi
to a concept of Māoridom which is more suited to today’s situation of mostly
urbanised and detribalised Māori is not considered an option. The side effect of the
genealogical entry criterion is the strengthening of the positions of tribal leaders and
bureaucracies described in chapter six.
CHAPTER 7. WHAKAUPAPA AND CMC

In the case of the Ngāi Tahu tribe the Blue Book is the sole entry key to tribal membership. Every new tribal member has to prove genealogical links to those ancestors mentioned in the Blue Book. According to O’Regan (2001, 96) Ngāi Tahu policy of resource allocation had to be clear since all beneficiaries are equally entitled to tribal benefits and any criteria other than tribal membership, e.g. participation or commitment, would have complicated matters unduly if not made decisions impossible.13

The use of genealogy as a biological entry key to tribal membership brought with it five changes concerning the use of genealogy. First, the need for a clearly defined membership also meant the need for the bureaucratic equivalent of a judge. Today’s Whakapapa Unit holds the same power that Kelly (1991, 101) ascribed to the NTMTB. Genealogy has been transformed from private knowledge — "... they may have to wade their way through their handbags and scraps of paper with whakapapa on it like every auntie’s got in their handbag, you know?" [9] — into official knowledge and official power. The database of today’s Whakapapa Unit is still the "Crown jewel" of the bureaucratic structure, the information only initiated have access to and the "perception that that is blocked away in a vault" needs to be maintained to guarantee peace of mind for tribal members [35]. With this centralised power TRoNT, or rather the Whakapapa Unit, is ‘the deciding point for any controversy in tribal whakapapa’ (Potiki, 2005a).14 The advent of the bureaucratically controlled membership brought with it the introduction of a membership proof. Ironically the proof requested is from the much dreaded ‘power culture’ (O’Regan, 2001, passim): a birth certificate, a "Pākehā piece of paper" [7]. Having to provide this proof for one’s ancestry does not sit well with the identity politics of those Ngāi Tahu who are biologically eligible, but are either unwilling to become members due to a variety of reasons or are simply not interested.

"Having on, having on a piece of paper saying that I’m Ngāi Tahu has never really worried me. [...] I am Ngāi Tahu and a piece of paper is only gonna sort of, I don’t know, is not gonna reinforce that fact, it’s just going to prove that fact to other people." [7]

Secondly, using genealogy to establish tribal affiliation allowed for the desired clear definition of tribal membership, yet this binary result also erased, at least in the

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13The exception to this rule are whāngai, adopted children, although again the situation is not clear. Sir Tipene O’Regan for example, as quoted in O’Regan (2001, 57), sees whāngai as members of the tribe, but does ‘not believe they should be able to carry that into inheritance of Article Two assets’, effectively giving these adopted children a status half-way between full tribal members and non-members.

14Interestingly Potiki does not specify the Whakapapa Unit as the deciding point, but uses the encompassing name TRoNT. It remains to be seen if genealogy disputes will be solved solely by the Whakapapa Unit and not by a political institution.
official records, the practice of adapting whakapapa to the circumstances. For the
tribal records only one way of interpreting genealogy is important, the way that
allows for an individual to be classified as a member. Ironically this use of a single
determining criteria has also the effect that in a culture in which for centuries people
have put emphasis on whakapapa now the potential for ‘genealogical ‘amnesia”
(Turner Strong and Van Winkle, 1996, 557) threatens to uproot ancestral links when
people are trying to connect with their roots. Only the ancestral line which leads to
membership is important, while other ancestors, particularly Pākehā ancestors, are
regarded as much less memorable. This is not to say that all members dishonour their
non-tribal ancestry. This was not the case for many of my interview partners, yet,
regularly tribal members immerse themselves completely in their new found Ngāi
Tahuness, "casting aside their Pākehā side” [39] and "walk[ing] around here as though
they’re full blooded Māori" [33]. This behaviour could be considered an "offence" to
the Pākehā ancestors [39]. Reactions to this form of behaviour came from proponents
of the inclusive and the exclusive discourse. The inclusive discourse aims towards
hybridity to allow maximum inclusiveness, thus over-emphasising one ancestral link
leads to the negation of this hybridity. From within the exclusive discourse pointing
towards genealogical amnesia fulfils the purpose of highlighting the shortness of
participation of these new members.15

Thirdly, the use of genealogy as a single determining factor for tribal membership also
changed the perception of whakapapa. For some members whakapapa is a source of
identity, maybe even the foundation of it, giving strength, reinvigorating the sense of
self and being, and as shown above sometimes overly so. For others genealogy is a
means to an end, the key to tribal membership. At times much can be at stake, not
least exclusive land and building rights. While whakapapa as a source of identity can
be considered over-emphasised in some cases the perception of genealogy as a means
to an end poses a far-reaching problem. Although it does not comply with one of the
main characteristics of Māori culture as it is described today, the honouring of
whakapapa and the tīpuna, the perception of genealogy as means to an end is
perfectly consistent with its bureaucratic use as the single determining factor for tribal
membership. The need for a clear division between insiders and outsiders in
combination with the resources now available to the tribe have brought with them a
wide variety of reasons to join the tribe, and all reasons have to be accepted by
members and the staff of TRoNT, even if these reasons are neither liked nor seen as
morally acceptable.

15Ryan (2005, 34, f.) called the use of this argument a ‘hoary old chestnut’, ‘Brashian gutter politics
at its worst’. I do concur with him, as I have made clear in the text, that genealogical amnesia was
not widespread among my interview partners. It was, however, noticed in other tribal members, thus
turning the aim of the discursive strategy on its head.
Fourthly, using genealogy as the single determining factor allowed the possibility to incorporate people living dispersed over a large area. This is not a new problem and different categorisations for active and inactive tribal members have been produced. Scheffler (1964, 131) described hapū as ‘a localized, major political, economic and religious faction’ and differentiated hapū internally into a descent group and descent category. The former are a localised active group and the latter are a network of genealogically linked people. Webster (1975) emphasised active participation rather than geographical proximity and described hapū as a ‘descent category’ with a ‘corporate core of tangata whenua’, a ‘descent group’ of dispersed but active hapū members (Webster, 1975, 144). It is noteworthy that both authors used examples from North Island based tribes, which suggests that Ngāi Tahu is not the only iwi facing a steady movement of tribal members towards and away from the tribal area.

Waymouth (2003) described whakapapa as having two correlating functions, creating layers of relationships and at the same time establishing the ‘organisational processes’ (Waymouth, 2003, 3) necessary to maintain the relationships between all actors incorporated in these different layers. Genealogical connection in this understanding is by no means sufficient to maintain any rights within the tribe since the duties towards the land, the relatives and the future generations, as specified in the larger framework of whakapapa, have to be maintained as well (Waymouth, 2003, 4). Living further away with less possibilities to fulfil or even actively abandoning these duties is in this more encompassing understanding of whakapapa equivalent with giving up the rights of an active member.16

Finally, the use of genealogy as entry criteria also allowed a means to overcome the difficulties posed by intermarriages. Ngāi Tahu are by many considered the white tribe due to the high number of intermarriages with early Pākehā settlers but genealogy allows for tribal affiliation, even in cases where the biological links are weak. O’Regan (2001, 88) stated that ‘[h]aving an understanding of who you are in a cultural sense may have little relation to what you are in a biological sense’. Genealogy in this case offers a secure identity, guarded against claims from Māori and Pākehā alike that Ngāi Tahu have been assimilated, biologically and culturally (O’Regan, 2001, 54, f.). O’Regan (2001, 97, f.) argued further that acceptance and acknowledgement within the iwi will only come with active participation and contribution. On a local level this is certainly correct and I partially agree with Webster (1975, 139) who described ‘tangata whenua’ as the ‘corporate core ... a kin group effectively rendered exclusive by the prerequisite of active support’.

16Ironically geographical dispersion also evoked a sense of pride in my interview partners. Ngāi Tahu was considered a "scattered"[41, 43] tribe, with tribal members "right across the world"[32].
local living. Nonetheless the iwi membership criterion allows for tribal members to have a largely differing understanding of who they are ‘in a cultural sense’ (O’Regan, 2001, 88) and where they are living, with many Ngāi Tahu members favouring little to no participation. As I have argued in chapter six acceptance from other tribal members is only marginally important once the concept of democratic rights enters the debate about tribal membership.

## 7.5 Whakapapa online

### Ahi kā and the Johnny-come-latelies

In my research interviews I asked whether or not my interview partners would be comfortable with genealogical information being made available online. What was initially intended as a question to gauge to which extent my interview partners trusted CMC and their own skills to use these technologies safely turned into an important theme of my research. Some of my interview partners were concerned about hackers altering or destroying the genealogical data. But more often than not other tribal members were seen as the bigger threat. Kuper’s (1994) reproduction of the scholarly arguments made for the use of native languages when publishing anthropological research is a worthwhile tangent here. The result, using native languages, would prevent the distortions of meanings introduced by translation and the result would also ‘protect the confidences of the family from prying eyes’ (Kuper, 1994, 544). But this view is focused on a Western audience. As Kuper (1994, 544, f.) correctly pointed out, this ‘mode of ethnography’ exposes the information most dear to the ‘families and communities’ to those who it is most valuable to, the ‘neighbours’. In the case of this research it was not a question of which language to use since language could not provide a safeguard. Rather it was a question whether to publish any form of family secrets at all. Kuper’s explanation also rang true for many of my interview partners: "[W]ho are we afraid of? I think it’s probably our own […]" [32]. Many of my interview partners felt that nobody should be able to see, let alone alter, anybody else’s stored genealogical information without prior consent. With genealogy rising to the status of sole entry key and the financial situation of the tribe changing, access to genealogical information has become more important and also more contested.

The use of genealogy as entry key to tribal membership has created a tension between those who consider themselves as living as Ngāi Tahu or would like to do so and those who are not interested in being active within the tribe. The former group was often referred to in the research interviews as ahi kā, those who keep ‘the home-fires
burning’ (Smith 1942 cited in Webster, 1975, 134). This kā status was seen as giving rights to land through prolonged settlement in one particular area. This group is far from homogenous, yet three characteristics apply to all those within this group: a) being Ngāi Tahu is considered a lived reality, and is expected to permeate all aspects of everyday live, b) all attend hapū or rūnanga activities regularly, and c) all live relatively close to the marae they choose to be active at and frequently travel large distances to participate in activities of other rūnanga they affiliate to. The second group consists of non-active, urban, international and new members, and those members who haven’t earned the respect of locally active members yet. The names used by ahi kā for new members are telling: "post-settlement Ngāi Tahu" [33], "Johnny-come-latelies" [18], or "Born agaisn" [31 fem]. A third group, acting as mediators yet at the same time profiting from this situation is the ‘neotribal elite’ (Rata, 2005, passim). This group consists of decision-makers within the tribe, mainly, if not exclusively, to be found within the tribal bureaucracy as described in chapter six. Some members of this group are able to claim ahi kā status, yet the significant difference to other ahi kā is the view on the distribution of tribal assets. The distinction of these three groups is important, since every group has specific interests in the tribe and the use of genealogy.

Statistical distribution

Potiki (2003a) argued that at the beginning of the nineteenth century ‘iwi and hapu were well positioned to benefit from the knowledge and technology recently introduced to them’. The situation does not seem to have changed significantly. In several reports of the Waitangi Tribunal, e.g. the Ngāi Tahu Sea Fisheries Report and the Muriwhenua Fishing Report, the right to development has been recognised as a principle of the Treaty of Waitangi, an idea underlying the actual written text (Hayward, 1997, 491). The Ngāi Tahu team of negotiators, according to one of my

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17 According to Smith neglect of duties and inactivity leads after two generations to ‘ahi tere’, the ‘flickering fire’ and after three generations to ‘ahi mataotao’, the ‘cold fire’, which gives the bearer only weak if any rights to land (Smith 1942 cited in Webster, 1975, 134). The extent to which these definitions of customary rights are applicable across all Māori tribes and if they adhere precisely in this way to Ngāi Tahu is unknown.

18 Mead (2003, 279) argued that the Maori Native Land Court had over-emphasised the ‘concept of ahi kā’ elevating it to the ‘supreme right to own a block of land’. Ballara (1998, 228) argued the opposite, namely that the Maori Native Land Court emphasised descent over residence as the ‘primary determinant’ for land rights, an emphasis which she deemed ‘likely’ to have had an effect on the ‘contemporary definition of hapu ownership’. Two different understandings of land rights are employed here, the concept of land ownership and the concept of land use. Both concepts were used in the research interviews.

19 Stewart-Harawira (2005, 190) pointed out that the ‘neoliberal reinterpretation of indigenous self-determination’ focuses on ‘economic development’.
participants, took special care that this right to development was enshrined in the Crown’s Apology in the Deed of Settlement.

"[...] the Crown had to acknowledge that Ngāi Tahu has a right to be in the twentieth, the twenty-first century. [...] That we don’t actually have to row a canoe to go up to Christchurch, we don’t have to live in a grass hut, you know, or run with bare feet. We can actually, we are entitled to be Ngāi Tahu and to access modern technology to help us in our, in our day to day, uhmm, activities." [3]

This view of a forward thinking iwi was reproduced by most of my interview partners who perceived their tribe as "onto it" [45] when it came to using the latest technology. Some also mentioned that the use of CMC within the Ngāi Tahu tribe simply showed that the tribe had enough money to invest in this new technology; a situation not all tribes were in.

Irrespective of the right of tribal development my interview partners were divided on the question whether or not genealogical information should be made available online or not. For some this was one step too far, development gone wrong. For others this was a natural progression from the time when their elders learned to write and started to write down all the genealogical lists they knew. Of all my research participants 44 were registered tribal members. [21] Three broad opinions existed regarding genealogies: One group believed genealogies should be openly available online, another group thought it should be made available online only to tribal members or only the specific member, and the third group was against any form of online dissemination of genealogical information.

Since the research participants were chosen on the basis of their knowledge and position within the tribe rather than their gender, age or income this research is not statistically significant. The figures are nonetheless interesting. Of the 44 Ngāi Tahu participants 12 were against the dissemination of genealogical information online, 15 wanted to see the information online with restricted access and 11 members were for

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20 The closest the Crown comes to the idea of tribal development in the Apology, the second section of the Deed of settlement, is in the statement:

The Crown expresses its profound regret and apologises unreservedly to all members of Ngāi Tahu Whānui for the suffering and hardship caused to Ngāi Tahu, and for the harmful effects which resulted to the welfare, economy and development of Ngāi Tahu as a tribe.(Office of Treaty Settlements, 1999, Section 2.1, paragraph 5)

While this is an apology for past suffering it can also be read as a tacit agreement that Ngāi Tahu will not be hindered in its cultural and economic development in the future.

21 Six participants of my research were non-Ngāi Tahu, working closely with the tribe, one of my interview partners had not registered with the tribe.
the display of genealogies online without any access restrictions. Four members were unsure whether they wanted genealogical data made available online with or without access restrictions. This means a little over 2/3 of all the tribal members in my research were interested in having access to their genealogies online. Interestingly gender or age did not seem to influence the decision. Of the 44 tribal members I interviewed 27 were female, equalling 61% — in rounded figures — of all Ngāi Tahu participants. In two groups this ratio was roughly maintained and in the third group, all those who argued for openly accessible genealogical information, the percentage was 72%. The different age decades — 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59 — were relatively evenly distributed over the three different groups.

On the first glance working for the iwi corporate did not seem to influence the decision either. Of the 44 tribal members 16 worked at the time for TRoNT or one of the rūnanga administrations, and only four of these interview partners were against the dissemination of genealogical information online. The other 12 employees either favoured open or restricted access. It is important to note here that two of the four employees of the tribal bureaucratic structure who were against open dissemination based their decision on legal considerations and fear for the integrity of the data rather than doubts about the cultural appropriateness.

I have separated my interview partners’ reasoning why genealogical data should or should not be displayed online into three different categories: The first category includes all those comments which attributed to whakapapa the function of creating a web linking people, places, and events. My participants talked about the emotional attachment to the whakapapa creating this web and to the web itself and all it included, fitting Waymouth’s (2003) description of whakapapa and its functions. This category will be referred to as ‘Creating a web’.

The second category comprises all those comments which related whakapapa to certain rights. In these comments it became clear that my interview partners did not only have an emotional connection to whakapapa but also saw rights and obligations as part of whakapapa. I termed this category ‘Rights’.

The third category incorporates all the comments about the dissemination of genealogical lists, how these lists are currently transmitted, what the kaumātua had done at the beginning of the last century and what they possibly would have done had they had access to CMC. This category is named ‘Dissemination’.

22Two members are unaccounted for so far: One interview partner could not decide whether genealogical information should be shown online without access restrictions or not at all. The last unaccounted interview partner was the one who I forgot to ask since other topics seemed more pressing during the interview.

23The two extremes outside the age decades mentioned were an 18 year old participant and a participant in the mid-seventies.
Creating a web

Emerging from the idea of whakapapa creating a web of relationships between the living, their ancestors, and the land is the understanding that a transposition of this web from face-to-face interaction to CMC is not possible. Without direct interaction with others and the land this web is not sustainable or the bearer of a certain whakapapa, most often the case with newcomers, does not fully become part of this web but only holds genealogical links to other members within the web. Whakapapa is seen by some as the "tribal fabric" [40], forming a bond between all tribal members by positioning each tribal member in a specific relationship to other members, genealogically, in terms of their rights and duties towards each other, historically and spatially.

Although all Ngāi Tahu are all seen as being closely related to the land, "We are of the land and the land is of us" [26], it is the precise location that shapes the perception tribal members have of themselves and of other tribal members in relation to them:

"[...] even though they’re our relations they’re north of the Waitaki, they’ve got different, they figured a third different line again, you know. This is our cousins, our family are right here. They’re distant ones up the road there, you know. [laughs]" [9]

The perception of tribal members, based on what is seen as their local roots, is reasonably persistent over time when it comes to boundary maintenance between inner-tribal groupings. To have whakapapa to a certain region marks tribal members as the “distant ones up the road” [9] irrespective of where these distant ones are currently living. Having whakapapa to a certain locality and living there is however not necessarily enough either. If a tribal member has not grown up in the area incorporation into the web will always be partial as one of my interview partners experienced, who, after having grown up in town and then moving near a rural marae and living there for over a decade, is still considered a "towny" and is "still not accepted as local" [37].

There is a wide variety of reactions to members returning to their rūnanga or hapū area. Some of my interview partners had little or no experience regarding tribal politics because their families had chosen not to affiliate with their hapū, or with Ngāi Tahu in general. Although not personally responsible for this long absence returning to the rūnanga or hapū was always a precarious task involving feelings of guilt about the long absence and insecurities about what reactions to expect from the existing community. The rūnanga have very different approaches to new members or members who have lived outside the area for a longer period of time. Some rūnanga
welcome these members, acknowledging them as a part of the web. The question in this case is not “[W]here have you been?” but rather “‘Well, who are you?,’ in a sense of ‘Who you are related to and how do you fit?’” [15]. Other tribal members were received less positively at other rūnanga, which influenced their interaction with the tribe, driving them away from the rūnanga level to the more inclusive and less personal iwi level. The following quote shows that some of those who stayed behind harbour feelings of betrayal against those who left. It also shows an intergenerational transfer of responsibility, with new members who are willing to be more active being held accountable for decisions made by their forefathers:

“He basically told me that uhm they differentiated themselves from us all, so this whānaungatanga thing was out the window [laughs], uhm, will look after their own and that we in the North made our decision to leave and we live with the consequences. The fact that my great-grandfather left is not my decision and uhm I was just really, really angry and really hurt and it took me a long time to sort of get past it.” [42]

The differing attitudes towards new members and members outside the tribal area are well known within the tribe. Vision 2025(2001, 21) clearly stated that: ‘The principle of inclusiveness will be entrenched in all papatipu rūnaka constitutions with specific mechanisms to involve Ngāi Tahu living outside the takiwā’. This is a reminder to all papatipu rūnanga that tribal members have democratic rights.

Whakapapa, however, is seen as creating far more than just democratic rights, it is seen as "more than just a bunch of names" [31]: Stories are attached to the names, whakapapa becomes a personal possession of the bearer who yields control over its dissemination, respect has to be paid to the bearer, the ancestors and those who know whakapapa, whakapapa receives a sacred status, and, lastly, whakapapa also has to be preserved for future generations.

Linking stories to the names transforms whakapapa, making it "richer", giving meaning and emotional depth to the list of names, because "without the stories names mean nothing" [18]. The importance of stories was interpreted differently by my interview partners. One of them elaborated that putting the names of the ancestors online was acceptable for the simple reason that it was "just a list of names" [16], the real wealth of whakapapa were the stories, transforming the list of names into a meaningful web. Most of my interview partners who were against the dissemination of genealogical data did not make this distinction between the biological link and the spiritual connectedness, between genealogy and whakapapa. To learn about ancestors, names and stories, face-to-face interaction was the only condoned form of
information transfer. This, obviously, is a deterrent for those who are not living close to their — preferred — papatipu rūnanga or cannot afford to visit often. As control is executed over how much information is given to others, trust building becomes the primary task for distant members if they want to know the stories about the personal life of their ancestors. Interestingly members living abroad — in my research — were not necessarily more inclined to demand genealogical data and the corresponding stories to be shown online. The dividing marker is not the distance from the marae, but rather the understanding of the tribe. Members with an inclusive understanding of the iwi mostly supported an open display of genealogical data. Some even saw the importance of making stories available online to new members, since the "traditional game" of learning the stories and other family related information "properly", i.e. face-to-face, was "just not feasible" for most members nowadays as they lived far away [39]. Most of my participants who saw the iwi, or more often the hapū, as a more exclusive group were determined that face-to-face interaction was the only appropriate means of knowledge transfer when it came to whakapapa, names and stories alike. Whether or not my participants saw the iwi or their hapū as exclusive or inclusive was largely depended on their upbringing with some of the members abroad having been brought up to respect their Ngāi Tahu heritage and aspiring to uphold this heritage, even if it meant that access to whakapapa information and acceptance within the tribe was always going to be very limited for them due to the large distance.

Whakapapa is also the personal possession of the bearer, irrespective of it being in large parts congruent with the whakapapa of others. While playing on the congruence "[w]e are also a large family, like people who are all related by whakapapa" [6], some of my interview partners insisted that genealogical information was too personal to be disseminated, especially via CMC. Many of these members were unsure as to how access could be controlled to guarantee that only persons with sufficient access rights could see the genealogical links of a person. Everybody had to be able to safeguard personal information. Giving this personal information away referred to as a "gift" [23] given from one person to another to show trust and affection.²⁴ Others understood this notion of a gift and were aware that free access to genealogical data would take away this opportunity to create stronger bonds with others by giving them access to "who you are" [51]. The loss of this bonding opportunity was by most of my interview partners seen as less significant than the loss of "personal mana" [28]. Whakapapa "relates everything that you hold dear" [51],

²⁴One of my participants explained that a family member with a large amount of whakapapa information had decided not to reveal any more information to others unless receiving information in return. This turns the notion of a gift into a non-monetary exchange. To which extent this kind of barter of genealogical information was practised by knowledge holders in the past is unknown to me.
it was considered "sacred" [32] by some, not to be shared with people outside the family since it explained the connection to the tipuna, the ancestors:

"[...] when you talk about who you are you talk about yourself being [...] the sum of your ancestors I guess [...] when you stand up at a marae you don’t stand up on your own, you stand up with all of your ancestors, so they are all behind you, they are always with you [...] it’s like you’re part of this big, big group, you’re not just an individual. And when you’re looking at [...] people’s whakapapa and if you kind of know something about where I come from and who my tipuna are, which I haven’t given to you it’s kind of like you’re taking away something from me, but it’s not, yeah. Because that’s my, that’s who I am." [28]

Other tribal members were often the main concern of my interview partners who opposed open access to genealogical data. Many held the fear that their ancestry could be disputed.

"[...] I wouldn’t want to see anyone else’s and I don’t think other people should be able to see yours, you know, there’s, it’s just a uhm ... in the Māori world your whakapapa is you. [...] And so therefore you should have complete and total control over that information. And I’ve been in situations where people, where people would say ‘Ah, you’re from so and so, you’ve got this and that.’ And you can counter them because you know your own whakapapa better than they do. Uhm, in an age of globalised information it’s quite possible that they will then start to know these things more than you do and I think that is wrong, you know, I wouldn’t want that." [41]

The fear reaches deeper, however, as another interview partner explained. It is the fear that genealogically affiliated yet culturally unversed new members might possess stronger genealogical connections to past holders of mana than locally active members, creating the "tricky" situation that "in Māori hierarchy" these newcomers would then possess a stronger claim to authority than locally active members [18].

Others, often proponents of the inclusive discourse and thus emphasising individual equality rather than traditional hierarchies, saw positive sides to having their genealogy accessible online. These interview partners saw no reason for safeguarding their ancestry and considered their ancestry not as whakapapa but as genealogy.

"I mean seriously what personal information are you giving away other than who your bloody father was or your mother was? [...] at the end of
the day if you’re trying to promote, you know, one-ness in the tribe or whatever, why wouldn’t you give the members the resources to do that? I don’t see any issues in it. I don’t know why anyone would have issues.” [47]

Not only were some members "proud as punch" of their ancestry, but also considered online dissemination as a fast and easy way to be recognised within the framework of tribal ancestry:

"I’m so proud of, it’s just, it opens doors, it saves time, ‘cause you don’t have to explain who you are. It’s already there, you’re labelled” [9].

Rather than loss of control this interview partner pointed towards the advantages of having your whakapapa out in the open.

Control over personal whakapapa was one form of control, the other form was external control. Those who know whakapapa can exert a large amount of control over those who want to know their whakapapa. Those of my interview partners who did not want to see whakapapa being disseminated online saw this form of control as positive. Kaumātua gave only small amounts of whakapapa at a time when the recipient was "ready" [30]. My participants were aware that they had to "earn" the whakapapa knowledge and that they in turn would play the same "games" with their children and grandchildren that kaumātua played with them [31]. It was the elders, the kaumātua, which were said to be against the open distribution of genealogical information, let alone whakapapa [31, 33]. In stark contrast to this one of my interview partners pointed out that it was because of the written sources of past kaumātua that today’s tribal members know about family histories and genealogy and that those who deny the power of the written sources live their "own mythology", hold a "romanticism about oral culture", whereas past knowledge holders used pen and paper to "start writing" [14].

With the creation of a centralised whakapapa database the situation has changed. Kaumātua do not necessarily hold the same power anymore since genealogical data can now be accessed directly at the Whakapapa Unit of TRoNT. The nature of the power has changed from a network of social control, with the kaumātua being embedded in a system of rights and obligations, to an openly accessible database. Potential members can discuss with members of the Whakapapa Unit if they have

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25The opposite is also true: "One day, you know I’m over 50 now, one day I’m actually gonna be myself. People are gonna go ‘Ah, look, there is Jack’, not ‘Ah, that’s Sandra’s son’ or ‘Ah, that’s Hirini’s brother’, but I’m gonna be Jack” [7]. (The names in this quote have been changed rather than omitted for the sake of clarity.)
tribal ancestry or access the name files to learn more about their ancestors. The creation and the existence of these files also, in some members’ eyes, invested tribal members with the right to access these files. "My name is on that whakapapa then why shouldn’t I be able to have access?" [49]. The right of each tribal member to see their genealogical data, reminiscent of the inclusive discourse, was not only a reason for access but also offered the possibility to break a monopoly on knowledge, creating a net of information sharing within the tribe. Genealogical information had "been lost" [18] for generations within some families, but was still available within other families. For the sake of the "next generations" tribal members had to "pull together" and "share as much of it as possible" to avoid further loss [18]. A loss all too visible to another interview partner who recalled that in her youth nobody "took the time with our elderly" [50]. This was mainly because the kaumātua "kept things to themselves, didn’t say too much to the younger ones", whereas today, "now that we’re interested", a large part of the information has died with the kaumātua of her youth [50]. While some interview partners saw these reasons as arguments for a dissemination of information within the tribe others saw this loss attributed to the lack of interest in local participation and turned the logic of the argument around. They considered that rather than making genealogical information openly accessible tribal members should return to their local rūnanga and hapū to act as a link in the intergenerational transfer of information.

Another reason why some of my interview partners opposed the dissemination of genealogical information through CMC were the technologies itself and the effects the dissemination would have on the balance of power within the tribe. Both kaumātua with their knowledge of genealogical data and the ancestors named in the lists had to be respected, something many of those who opposed the online dissemination of genealogical information saw as impossible within the context of CMC. Computers were perceived as transforming rich whakapapa into "bald data" without paying respect to the tipuna [28]. Respect also had to be paid because whakapapa was perceived as being "sacred" [32] a "taonga" [41], for some even the "ultimate taonga" [38]. Those of my participants who favoured whakapapa online saw the notion of sacredness as outmoded and not feasible in a time when most tribal members do not live on the marae any more.

For those members who were against the dissemination of genealogy through CMC the topics mentioned above were reason enough. The transposition of genealogical data into digitised form destroyed the web associated with whakapapa according to my interview partners. Stories would not be told, control over the dissemination of the genealogical data would not be guaranteed, kaumātua could not decide when a
younger member was ready for more information, the sacred status of whakapapa would be undermined as would the respect associated with knowing whakapapa.

Since all my interview partners insisted that Ngāi Tahu members had a right to live in today’s world the question is as to why some members were adamant that putting genealogical data online without access restrictions was one step too far in tribal development. The answer, I believe, lies in the distinction between whakapapa with its face-to-face emphasis and genealogy, and in the understanding of tribal membership; the exclusive discourse.

To strip whakapapa of all connotations and turning it into genealogies also undermines the concept of ahi kā. Without whakapapa and the connections it creates to the world and particularly the land the concept of ahi kā is not sustainable. For those who consider themselves ahi kā this means that their status within the tribe is at risk, as Waymouth (2003, 2) observed "TRONT ... threatens the continuation of whakapapa-based processes" within the tribe. At risk is not only the status as ahi kā, but also the cultural identity. What distinguishes new members from those who have fought legal battles for the tribe for several decades or have grown up celebrating their tribal identity? How can the efforts of ahi kā be valued if genealogical links are sufficient to become a member with all rights yet precious little duties? In the light of these questions it becomes understandable why many ahi kā championed whakapapa over mere lists of ancestral names and opposed a digitisation of whakapapa itself and all that goes with it, their foundation.

Yet some ahi kā were more than willing to disseminate their ancestry through CMC, enabling new members to get an understanding of the genealogical connectedness of the tribe and their place within these ancestries. In this case the understanding of tribal membership was the decisive factor, the inclusive discourse. For many members, for obvious reasons particularly recent arrivals, tribal membership was based on genealogical connectedness and brought certain rights and no obligations. Respect, participation, and observation of tikanga were replaced by a "democratic right" [33], a universal right by all Ngāi Tahu to "have a say" [33] about tribal affairs. The next section will elaborate on the rights of tribal members and why some of my interview partners were apprehensive about the claiming of these rights by “Johnny-come-latelies” [18].

**Rights**

The rights, for example entitlements to different forms of funding, were seen by many of the ahi kā in my research as the main reason why distant members and locally
living inactive members had started to revive their links to the tribe over the last
decade. To protect the assets of the tribe and their rights to a share of the assets and
maybe also because of the fear of the unknown many of the ahi kā in my research
were reluctant to use CMC as an inner-tribal communication tool to allow distant
members to participate in decision making processes within the tribe. Physical
presence and contribution to the community was seen as the best if not the only way
to become accepted within the community. Unfortunately contributing some "sweat
to the place" [43] is not always possible, even for those members who live within New
Zealand. The understanding of physical contribution being somehow more valuable
than distant interaction and help proved to be pervasive, with one of my interview
partners noting that helping out on site "feels like you’re making more of a
contribution to the place" [43], despite the fact that the visits of this particular
interview partner were infrequent because of the far distance.

Not all members felt that their distant interaction was less helpful or appreciated. In
the case of one marae a group of distant members worked on establishing the
whakapapa of the marae’s carvings. The communication between the group members
and other committees was in this case to a large extent through email [28, 29]. This
particular collaboration between local and distant members is a special case in that
the distant members were needed due to their expertise. In another case of successful
interaction between the local and distant members the representative to the TRoNT
table lived away from the community he represented. Again expertise played a
pivotal role for local members to accept the outside help. The distant member was
elected to the position of TRoNT representative on the basis of his knowledge of
policy making. Both cases have two features in common. First, the distant members
had expertise in areas useful to the locally active members, and second, the distant
members had been active in their rūnanga or hapū as much as possible with holidays
spent working on the marae and help offered for projects which could be supported
from afar.

Irrespective of whether my interview partners thought of ancestral links as genealogy
or whakapapa, rights were always associated with being Ngāi Tahu. Yet the
understanding of what these rights were and how they were constituted differed
fundamentally. For those who favoured whakapapa rights were only partially
dependent on the blood ties, with participation and local connection being an
important part as well. Those members who favoured the inclusive discourse rights
did not depend on any other criteria but descent. This obviously leads to differing
understandings of the situation. For ahi kā newcomers and distant members had
certain rights, but in the eyes of many of my interview partners these rights had not
been earned. For those who believed in the future of the tribe through democratic
participation the “Johnny-come-latelies” [18] and distant members had the same rights as locally active members. This is not to say that all of my interview partners who supported a democratic tribal structure held new members in high regard. Rather the influence of the distant members on the lives of the local members had to be accepted as one of the downsides of democracy, with distant members bringing in new ideas, which then often resulted in more work for the locally active members.

Being part of the tribe has for a long time meant to be entitled to certain financial benefits. Before the Ngāi Tahu settlement in 1997 these benefits were small as one of my participants recalled, "$25 a year" for every Ngāi Tahu child on the tribal registry in the days of the NTMTB. Before the introduction of the NTMTB tribal members supported the bureaucratic structure of the tribe financially rather than receiving money. Often the hard work of the older generation for the tribal settlement is mentioned and the mortgages taken out on private homes to support the rising costs of the legal battle. The hardship undergone to achieve financial compensation for past losses has become a regular reference and a source of pride among local members, a ‘communal myth’ (Tau, 2003, 261), retold to create a feeling of belonging and tribal coherence. The times of hardship, endured only by local members or their parents and grandparents, are one of the reasons why many ahi kā believe to have stronger claims to the tribal assets than distant members. Those who left had "a wonderful life away from politics and stuff" [31] and, as far as ahi kā are concerned, benefited financially from their decision to leave the tribal area with its often desolate situation in the rural areas. Others did not leave their hapū area, but did not further pursue their Ngāi Tahuness, since at times being Māori and part of a wide network of dependent family members was not perceived as the best option. One participant recalled an ancestor who "liked to be known as a sunburnt Pākehā" [7], which this particular participant identified as the reason why this ancestor had economic success with his company. Had he been known as Ngāi Tahu he would have become "another lazy Māori leaning on a shovel" [7] as my participant termed it. Another interview partner whose father had been brought up in "pretty full on poverty" saw this as the reason why her father chose to move away from the rest of his family to "get on with his own family and [...] get out of that lifestyle, trying sort of get a bit more money" [11]. For those who remained active tribal members the tribal assets are then perceived as a form of remuneration for those who remained loyal to the tribe in times of adversity. Following on from the understanding some local members held that tribal assets belonged to ahi kā was the demand by many local members to have autonomy over the usage of these assets. The demands of distant members were questioned, but also the administration of the assets by TRoNT, turning the assets into a commodity belonging to hapū or even the individual members rather than the
entire iwi. In the understanding of these members TRoNT is taking control over the investment of the assets and often spending the returns on distant members.

Those members who had left, or rather whose grandparents had decided to leave, obviously had a differing understanding of the situation. Again the economic situation was mentioned but depicted in a different light. First, not all distant members saw an improvement in their economic situation, particularly when moving to the North Island.

"The thing that annoys me about that is that there are many, many Ngāi Tahu in the North who are way more impoverished than those in the South and sometimes it seems to me that those that have, have more and really they should be looking after – and I’m not including myself in this, [?] – but those of Ngāi Tahu who don’t have.” [42]

Second, the hardships suffered by those who remained within the tribal area were acknowledged, yet it was also questioned how those who left could have survived within the tribal area during economically difficult times.26

As mentioned above many ahi kā saw the funding as the reason why distant and local inactive members had re-found their interest in the tribe. This search for monetary gains out of blood ties was seen as one of the reasons why genealogical data should not be displayed online, with some interview partners mentioning cases of misuse to receive money or services dedicated to tribal members and deliberate alterations to genealogical data.

Misuse was possible in different forms. Communal resources were appropriated by some members for private benefit — "I’ve got an uncle who sold land from out of under us who never even lived at home" [26]. In other cases Pākehā had tried to access Māori resources by providing false genealogical information, in some cases successfully. The Mormons and their ‘International Genealogy Index’ make for an interesting sub-category of perceived misuse. Some of my participants had had personal experience with members of the Mormon Church — officially the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints — trying to record their whakapapa. Others were generally suspicious about the idea of having an enormous database containing genealogical data accessible to everyone.

26One of the characteristics Ngāi Tahu members shared in the description of many of my interview partners was sound economic knowledge. Those who remained within the tribal area were economically savvy, those who had left, however, were, much like Rosaldo’s (1988, 78) ‘postcultural’ people, seen as governed by economic rationality as ‘people without culture’.
Alterations, or rather the possibility of alterations, were reason for concern for some of my interview partners. Although not necessarily done with financial gain in mind, hackers and viruses were the main concern of my interview partners, even small alterations could potentially have vast implications, particularly when going unnoticed and being incorporated in the canon of whakapapa knowledge.

The examples of misuse and alterations brought with them the question of factuality of oral traditions. Genealogical data needs to be accurate or at least all parties concerned need to believe in its accuracy. Without this belief in accuracy all claims to mana derived from a certain whakapapa and with them all resource rights become arbitrary. Some of my interview partners believed in the accuracy of orally transmitted whakapapa. Others were more sceptical, particularly with regards to the differing family traditions within the tribe. It was generally agreed that every family had its own stories and its own way of interpreting and remembering past events in light of and in relation to the family history. Information was omitted when necessary and probably still is to this day — "You leave names out, you leave stories out, you leave things out" [31]. To know your family’s stories you then need to have the trust of those within your family who hold the stories, the heart of the discourse which drives the roots of indigeneity further into specific locales.

Family traditions were not the only source of inaccuracies, power-holders within the tribe were also identified as a potential source of inaccuracy, impressing their reading of genealogical data and whakapapa upon the wider iwi. This process has been in place for a long time according to Tau (2003, 261):

Tohunga were not concerned with recording facts of the past. Tohunga were concerned with maintaining tribal identity and therefore tribal prestige. On this basis, oral traditions are vehicles by which one may establish and maintain tribal mana. Thus oral traditions are subjected to group dynamics and needs, in order to create communal myths by which to live.

Even if the genealogical data was handed down correctly, whakapapa according to O’Regan (1992, 25) has always been ‘assembled in a particular form for a particular purpose, to show a descent or a relationship’, which means that many lateral relationships were left out as they were of no consequence for the case to be made. Some of my interview partners mused if the practice of adapting genealogies to the circumstances would still be possible once they were written down, but also whether online display of genealogical data would establish one reading as the correct reading, irrespective of the accuracy of the reading: "So, you know, does [...] putting it on an Internet site make it correct, is that the correct one?" [19]
Being able to show descent has consequences. Supporters of the inclusive and exclusive discourse disliked giving money to new members they felt would never contribute back to the tribe. Some TRoNT employees confided that their initial reaction to some requests for money was “are we really giving money to that guy?” [14]. But where some ahi kā develop a strong dislike of the new members and TRoNT as representatives of foreign rule supporters of a democratic tribe accept members who only participate in the tribe by receiving money as an unavoidable drawback of democracy.

Dissemination

As I have shown on the previous pages many members, mainly ahi kā, opposed the use of CMC to disseminate genealogical data. This category, ‘Dissemination’, is about all those comments made by my interview partners how people, often kaumātua, used to freely disseminate genealogical data in the past. Further comments about how some individuals have started up their own websites to gather as much of their ancestral data as possible are included in this category as are comments about the positive sides of online access to genealogical data. This category shows several important points. First, today’s reluctance by many ahi kā to enable easy access to genealogical data was not shared by all their ancestors, raising the question as to what caused the reluctance. Second, when looking at the use of CMC within the tribe the use of TRONT’s official website and initiatives driven by TRoNT have to be distinguished from private websites of tribal members. Third, some members see the sharing of genealogical data as "part of the sharing thing" [50] among tribal members. In the following these three points are explained more in-depth.

Many ahi kā saw access restrictions to genealogical data as one way of forcing distant and non-active local members to return to their hapū or rūnanga to receive this information in the "traditional" way [39], face-to-face. But as one of the employees of the Whakapapa Unit observed:

"[...] when nineteenth century Māori learned to read and write I mean that was a new technology to them, uhm and this is the reason why we have all this whakapapa today, because they poured it out of their heads onto the paper. ... You know if these guys had had the Internet I’m sure they would have been dumping or uploading it or whatever, you know?” [40]

These written sources, such as the Blue Book, are the basis of tribal membership and in cases where genealogies are unclear TRoNT is vested with the decision-making
power over the question whether the applicant is Ngāi Tahu or not (NA, 2008b, Section 7 and Section 13).²⁷

Another source of genealogical data are old Māori newspapers. While working on the whakapapa of the carvings of a marae one of my participants used this source and made "fascinating discoveries" [29]. After the death of local people their connection to famous ancestors was often displayed in the obituaries.

It also seems that every family has some form of written source for their family history: books, "roles ... of wallpaper" [9], "scraps of paper with whakapapa on it like every auntie’s got in their handbag" [9], and computer files. In light of this the "mystique" [33] around the whakapapa files stored in the Whakapapa Unit appears unfounded, as one member observed "they’re just bits of paper with our family history written on it" [33].

As stated above the reluctance of many ahi kā to simplify the access to genealogical data can be read as a reluctance to incorporate distant and non-active local members. Placing dissemination of genealogical information into a list of past forms of dissemination is then also a discursive strategy. By emphasising kaumātua’s dissemination of genealogies in other ways than face-to-face this strategy normalises the digitisation of genealogies, presents resistance against this digitisation as resistance against progress, and, lastly, questions whether dissemination of genealogical information represents any breach of tapū. Several differences between the situation today and the situation several decades ago do, however, exist. First, the dissemination of paper copies is somewhat easier to control than binary data. Second, one of my interview partners was adamant that nineteenth century Māori were not committing whakapapa onto paper for future generations:

"Why were they doing that? ... I don’t think that it was to their descendants. I mean they may have been thinking that far ahead, but I’m thinking that they just sort of, the novelty of being able to do it that’s why they’d do it." [40]

Although their motivation might have not been the education of future generations nineteenth century Māori while producing volumes of genealogical data were still able to rely on the network created by whakapapa. The dissemination of the written sources can still be considered vertical as opposed to the horizontal dissemination

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²⁷ People applying for membership can also, if rejected by TRoNT, apply to the Maori Land Court for tribal membership. The Maori Land Court’s decision ‘shall be final and conclusive’ (NA, 2008b, Section 7 Subsections 5 and 6). This clause shows that genealogical data is far from unassailable and that the government has foreseen tensions regarding membership.
occurring through the use of CMC. The difference is visible in the way my interview partners talked about written sources of genealogical data in their family. The "whakapapa books" [39] created by an ancestor were regarded as a family treasure, handed down to those who had an interest in family history and who were seen as the appropriate candidate to guard the family history for the next generation. Further, as Metge (1995, 69) noted:

Such books are never complete in themselves. The Māori experts who compiled them omitted some details because they were highly tapu and rarely noted the source, date and place of the material they recorded, holding such details in their heads. This makes it imperative that access to whakapapa books is amplified by instruction and guidance from their custodians.

The third and probably most important difference between the production of written records at the beginning of last century and today is the intent behind the production. As noted earlier O'Regan (1992, 25) stated that whakapapa was always ‘assembled in a particular form for a particular purpose’. Private files were and still are assembled with private use in mind. In comparison public files, like the Blue Book at the beginning of the last century were produced with different purposes in mind. It is the control over the use of the information which many locally active members fear to loose when giving away genealogical information.

### 7.6 Conclusion

As I have shown in this chapter some tribal members are very reluctant to share genealogical information with other tribal members. I have argued that this reluctance can be interpreted as an attempt to stall further influence by distant and non-active members on the lives of locally active members. Further I have argued that the reduction of whakapapa to genealogical lists as part of the inclusive discourse leads to a negation of the status of locally active members. All tribal members then possess equal rights based on genealogical links rather than merits. The exclusive discourse is then a form of segmentation aimed at peripheralising distant and non-active tribal members through the retention of knowledge and through a definition of tribal membership rooted in specific locales. In other words, the exclusive discourse aims at transforming metaphorical indigenous roots into real connections, to move away from the genealogical membership proof back to modern ideals of localised cultures. Away from a post-modern ‘rhizomatic structure’ of knowledge back to an ‘arborescent’ one which allows for control and demands trust
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, passim). Away from Malkki’s (1992, 28, 37) ‘rhizomatic’ understanding of culture back to the ‘grand genealogical tree’ which was once used to describe nations and evoked ‘temporal continuity of essence and territorial rootedness’. While this movement towards localisation is hardly leading to inner-tribal harmony it is also easily understandable.

Briggs (1996, 448) argued that portraying a culture as ‘threatened with extinction due to its reliance on direct transmission’ is a discursive strategy. In Briggs’ example the discursive strategy is aimed at validating the position of those who represent culture in public. In the case of Ngāi Tahu it is used to validate claims of authenticity by those who see themselves as the guardians of tradition. Like Briggs for the case of Warao dances I cannot, and do not want to, pass judgement whether or not the reluctance to disseminate genealogical information via CMC is indeed based on tradition. Rather this chapter presents an example of the ‘grassrooting’ of flows’ (Castells, 2004a, 38), the struggle to retain control over culture by locally active members in the face of an increasing number of external influences.
Chapter 8

Creating a network of networks

8.1 Introduction

Vignette

After handing in my dissertation I decided to undertake some part-time volunteer work. Once I had found an organisation willing to take me on as a volunteer two things became clear early on. First, the manager of the organisation was a former important member of a Ngāi Tahu rūnanga. This stroke of luck gave me the opportunity to test my conclusions regarding the inner-tribal situation. And, second, researching was not going to be one of my tasks. Rather, I was to establish an online presence on a networking site for one of the organisation’s many projects.

I decided to finally give in to the tug of one of my acquaintances and join the Facebook frenzy to see whether this would be a beneficial solution for the research project. I slowly managed to bump up my ‘friends’ list to a rather dismal 12 friends. My manager quickly followed suit and created a Facebook account of his own. He knew from his children that their lists of friends on another networking site, Bebo, were in the triple digits. To him this was a “tribal whakapapa right there”, but in his view this online social networking was all about children and young adults. Knowing his children’s success he was rather skeptical about his own online social networking future. Surely he would never be able to gain enough online friends to get anywhere near his children’s counts?

What followed were several weeks of sporadic but informative talks about the Ngāi Tahu tribe. My manager agreed to parts of my reading of the situation, having himself undergone the daunting process of stepping onto a marae after a long absence and having faced what I have termed the exclu-
sive discourse in real life. During these weeks we also had a good-natured competition about the number of ‘friends’ we had acquired on Facebook. After a couple of weeks the gap opened quickly. My friend count was still barely in the double digits whereas my manager had acquired, seemingly over night, very close to triple digits. He had come to realise – much to his astonishment – that many of the kaumātua he knew were on Facebook. Once news about his Facebook account was out it spread like wildfire with several off-line acquaintances ‘befriending’ him every day.

In the previous chapters I have shown that CMC is widespread among members of the Ngāi Tahu tribe. I have also shown that the iwi corporation, TRoNT, is working on the creation of a unified iwi, emphasising similarities between the different hapū which together make up the iwi. Through bureaucratic centralisation and the emphasis of a common history TRoNT has cemented its position as the political and bureaucratic entity leading the tribe. I have also shown that not all members are interested in using CMC for inner-tribal communication, preferring instead to rely on and advocate face-to-face communication to emphasise the importance of local participation. Resistance against CMC is then not the result of a digital divide but of a process Castells (2004a, 38) called the ‘“grass-rooting’ of the space of flows’, a resistance against the digitisation of parts of Ngāi Tahu culture.

This chapter makes the networked character of the Ngāi Tahu tribe more obvious. As explained in chapter four the space of flows is constituted by three elements: the locality of activities, the physical network connections, and the ‘content and geometry of the flows’ of information (Castells, 2004a, 37). This chapter focuses on the last of these three elements: the information transmitted through private communication channels. Where the last chapter has shown the resistance of many locally active members against the use of CMC for inner-tribal communication this resistance was far less pronounced in relation to inner-familial communication.

First I will discuss the family focus of CMC use. This family focus, for example through family websites and mass-emails, softens the sharp distinction between active and passive members some of my interview partners evoked during the interviews. The chapter will also show that using CMC within families is not seen as part of the tribal experience. Iwi and whānau are conceptually different for my interview partners. As I have shown in the last chapter the use of CMC to digitise whakapapa information is also seen as a threat to existing structures of information retention, dissemination and control. This chapter further reinforces that the use of CMC, to a certain extent, changes the roles within families. Possession of information becomes more important than the age of the person who shares information. The
8.2. FAMILY FOCUS OF CMC

topping of a gerontocracy is of course a gradual process and is by no means the result of CMC use, rather CMC emphasises the changes which have occurred over the last century. At the same time this chapter will also show that the family focus of CMC shows a historical continuity reaching back to the time when Ngāi Tahu first settled the South Island. Following on from this I will discuss the use of CMC dedicated to tribal affairs. Locally active and distant members aim for more inner-tribal democracy, however, the understanding of democracy and therefore the use of CMC differs. I will show that members arguing from within the inclusive discourse of tribal membership see the use of CMC as a form of furthering inner-tribal democracy through computer-mediated consultation. Members favouring a more exclusive membership argue for the use of CMC only to get more information regarding TRoNT’s activities, however, consultation via CMC represents a form of foreign rule many locally active members do not condone. The differing expectations towards TRoNT are also part of these differing understandings of democracy.

It is important to remember that the World of Information project, described in chapter six, has resulted in ‘Community Net’, a members-only section on the official website of the tribe, more specifically members who have signed up for the Whai Rawa savings scheme. I never had access to this members only section and therefore can only comment on the publicly accessible pages of TRoNT’s website and other openly available websites focusing on Ngāi Tahu. Even with access, use of material published in the members only section would have raised ethical issues, necessitating consent from all participants of ‘Community Net’.

8.2 Family focus of CMC

Many of my interview partners used CMC to stay in contact with their families. Rather than replacing all other forms of communication CMC supplemented existing forms of inner-familial communication, as Wellman (2001, 36) stated: ‘people communicate ... by any means available and necessary, online and offline’. The use of CMC to stay in contact with family members was then strategic and accidental at the same time. It was strategic in the sense that many of my interview partners identified the advantages of the different technologies available. Emails, for example, were identified as a cost-effective, fast, and asynchronous way of communication which allowed the receiver time to word a reply without the time delay of letters. Simultaneously it was also an easy way to communicate out to many people. One interview partner for example mentioned that the family letters penned, copied, and sent out by her grandmother had turned into mass-emails dictated to an aunt. At the same time my interview partners perceived CMC as less personal than phone calls,
thus making CMC the second best option. Phone calls were not replaced by CMC but the time between calls was filled with CMC. Depending on the subject my interview partners also preferred one medium over another, emails in particular were seen as more subject directed than for example phone calls. Only a few of my interview partners used Voice over IP (VoIP) programs such as Skype to call family members overseas, combining cost-effectiveness and the personal touch of a phone call. Despite this lack, so far, of VoIP use, the use of CMC among my interview partners was also accidental in that the technologies involved had become ‘familiar and boring’ (Wellman, 2001, 18; see also Mosco, 2004, 19) or ‘mundane’ (Michael, 2003, passim), the stage at which new technologies effect the most change within society (Wellman, 2001). Interview partners were using CMC within families because the technology was available and offered a further communication channel.

The use of CMC within families was often presented as being unrelated to inner-tribal communication. In fact some of my interview partners mentioned that they did not use CMC at all in relation to the tribe. At the same time many of the locally active members pointed out that the tribe was merely an agglomeration of distinct families connected via whakapapa. Therefore the use of CMC within families can be seen as tribally oriented. Further to this many distant members also had family members who were active tribal members and communicated tribal information to their family networks, including passive members. Within the concept of the network society the active family members would be called ‘switchers’ (Castells, 2004a, 32). Inner-familial communication was then used to obtain information about tribal affairs, however, obtaining information about other family members was seen as more important. That the switchers introduced a certain bias was acknowledged and accepted: "... sometimes there is some bias, but there are amongst families [...] that’s life" [50]. The genesis of these switchers can be, very cautiously, seen as a slow demise of a gerontocratic structure. Where some locally active tribal members look to their grandparents for directions in tribal affairs other tribal members have begun to look for those family members they feel are best informed. This slow demise, if it indeed will lead to a demise, has not been brought on by the use of CMC, but is part of the increasing individualisation of Māori society. Webster (1998a, 19) argued along similar lines when he pointed out that chiefly authority waned after the introduction of a new economy, with young members earning income and status. Information has in the case discussed here replaced money. Most likely, however, the importance of grandparents and elders waxes and wanes much like chiefly status has over the last centuries.
8.2. FAMILY FOCUS OF CMC

The family oriented use of CMC by many tribal members represents a historical continuity reaching back through Ngāi Tahu history to the time when the different whānau and hapū first settled the South Island. Anderson (2008, 26) argued that:

... the campaigns, skirmishes, battles and sieges of the migration history were not part of a concerted invasion in the usual sense, but were conducted mostly at the family level, and for personal or family reasons. The hapū migration can be seen, at least in part, as aggregated movements resulting from the pursuit of numerous individual causes or vendettas which could flare up across generations.

Further to this, Anderson (2008, 20) argued that Ngāi Tahu saw themselves as one iwi only once ‘their colonisation of the South Island was almost over’ and then only in the face of external threats, the incursions made by Ngāti Toa and the loss of land to European settlers. Whether or not the orientation towards family is specific for Ngāi Tahu is debatable, but the similarities with past patterns of behaviour are certainly interesting. Again family ties are emphasised over iwi cohesion and inner-familial use of CMC is clearly separated from inner-tribal communication, even if other family members use the same networks to disseminate information about tribal affairs.

One of the outcomes of the family orientated CMC by many locally active members is the softening of the dichotomy between active and passive members. Many locally active members argued that distant or passive members have forfeited their rights to tribal participation and decision-making processes unless they participate locally. When it came to communication, however, family bonds tended to soften these feelings. As described above active members shared important information regarding the tribe via email, others used CMC to allow distant family members to still be part of family life from a distance. For example photos were mailed out or published on websites for other family members to see. All interview partners were adamant that this form of family, and thus tribal, participation was less personal than actually being there. Many, however, also acknowledged that being there was not always possible and that distant family members needed these little bits of information more than members living locally. Thus only the most ardent supporters of the exclusive discourse would deny information to their family members, more often than not the family ties cut across the negative feelings towards members seen as tribal newcomers.

A further outcome of the family focus of CMC was the increasing depth of family networks and the creation of new connections. One interview partner for example talked about new family members he met through the family website: "[...] I’m
CHAPTER 8. CREATING A NETWORK OF NETWORKS

meeting nieces and nephews, mate, that I’ve never even knew existed [...]" [37].
Although Hampton (2004, 223, f.) described this as a positive outcome of CMC use
there is nonetheless a negative side to this outcomes as well with "kids poppin’ up
here there and everywhere" [37], children hitherto unknown to the rest of the family.
Logins to this particular family website are only available from the web master, who
establishes the family connection of the applicant. In the case of illegitimate children
this can cause tense situations. Despite this potential downside those interview
partners who participated in family websites saw mainly positive outcomes. One
interview partner pointed out that due to the family website a family reunion had
taken place, organised online, culminating in a Christmas Dinner attended by "97
odd" [49] family members some of whom had travelled from Europe. For this
interview partner the family website had had a very positive influence on the family:

"I mean the benefit to us as a whānau from the whānau website has been
enormous in my opinion. Just, just from bringing us closer and giving us a
medium to communicate by and it’s such an instantaneous medium.
Right? So for example [family member’s name] had a baby, right? And two
days after the baby was born and they were up there, there is a story and
photos on the site telling everyone about it. I mean how good is that?" [49]

Other families had websites without password protection and family members were
therefore cautious as to what they put online. Nonetheless, the websites were seen as
a success:

"[...] I mean it is just us chatting, obviously you’re not going to put,
because it’s viewable, you’re not going to put real personal stuff in there,
but it’s just for myself and my first cousins and my uncles and aunts that
are in Melbourne. To keep in touch." [9]

In one, admittedly non-typical, case an interview partner kept Welsh heritage alive
purely via long distance communication, mainly emails. Despite never having been to
Wales this participant called distant Welsh relatives — geographically and
biologically — “family” and Wales "home" [5].

From the above it appears that some of my interview partners’ families had started to
act in a way Webster (1975, 144) described for hapū, with a ‘corporate core’ of active
family members who were not bound to locality, particularly since CMC allowed for
communication over large distances.

Whether or not this family focus of Ngāi Tahu tribal member is specific to Ngāi Tahu
or not is debatable. The enthusiasm for the family websites in particular was clearly
obvious during the interviews. One interview partner called these websites an "organic community thing" [52], a form of communication members had appropriated without interference from TRoNT. Whether or not Ngāi Tahu tribal members are more up to date with technology is also debatable. One interview partner seemed to think so. Comparing her mother, of Māori descent but from another tribe, with her husband’s mother, of Ngāi Tahu descent, she concluded that Ngāi Tahu were generally more up to date with current technology. Whether this assessment of the situation is correct or not is speculation, what is however clearly obvious is that the use of CMC within families is seen by all concerned as a positive addition to the inner-familial communication.

### 8.3 Self-determination and the role of TRoNT

#### Information and consultation

In the last section I have shown that CMC is widespread within families. Although many of my interview partners said they had little to do with the tribal issues online many simultaneously reported to receive information regarding tribal issues from other family members through family networks. In this section I will show that there were numerous reasons why tribal members had at the time of the interviews little interest in the official tribal website. This attitude has most likely changed with the introduction of a members only section on the tribal website. I will further show that CMC is increasingly used for inner-tribal debates. Virtually all of my interview partners outside TRoNT, and some within the organisation, wanted to see more information disseminated out to tribal members. The question is then why so many interview partners relied on their family networks, off-line and on-line, to get information. Receiving information via family networks is convenient in many ways. The information is gathered and disseminated by others, thus circumventing the problem of information access, but also reducing the time members spend on searching for information. But, unlike much information disseminated by TRoNT and the rūnanga, the switchers within the family networks reduce the amount of information available by deciding which information is relevant. This issue of information overload was identified within the bureaucratic structure as well. Some rūnanga have acted upon it by reducing the emails going out via rūnanga email lists to one email containing all information under different headings rather than simply forwarding all emails coming from TRoNT to the rūnanga. Further the switchers mentioned above also put a certain bias on information, which is accepted and possibly even wanted by other less involved family members. The bias itself is useful
information for those less involved since it offers cues about the position the active family member holds in regard to certain topics and the iwi corporate.

Many locally active members also argued that there were no reasons for them to gather information on-line, since they saw themselves as producers of much of the information. This stance reinforced the understanding of TRoNT as a bureaucratic support structure rather than a governing body. Refusal to use CMC for inner-tribal communication was then also a form of resistance against TRoNT and those members who needed CMC to keep informed about tribal activities rather than participating in them. Considering that many distant and passive members received information through family networks locally active members were then more often disseminators of information, on-line and off-line, than receivers

The criticism that the official tribal website was not updated frequently enough and was lacking in interactive capabilities was raised by many interview partners, irrespective of their activity levels within the tribe. The official tribal website was often compared to other websites which were frequently updated and allowed for user interaction and frequently the examples were family websites. The question for many interview partners was why TRoNT did not use the new technology to its full potential. An interview partner argued that the website was "tokenism", a way to communicate to the tribal membership which had not been fully explored: "They whip up a website and then tick the box" [37]. The perception that the official tribal website was outdated influenced the frequency with which members visited the website. Those most disappointed with the website were those who had also not visited in months, sometimes years, missing updates and major changes to the site. The criticism regarding interactivity has become outdated with the introduction of 'Community Net'. At the same time the use of the members area is coupled to the use of the Whai Rawa savings scheme. The individual ID given to every tribal member participating in Whai Rawa is the login ID to 'Community Net'. Thus, the other important feature of CMC outside families, anonymity, is not given any more.

Nearly all interview partners outside TRoNT agreed that not enough information regarding TRoNT activities was communicated to members. The same was true for consultation. While most interview partners seemed to expect that consultation was meaningful a few pointed out that when consultation occurred it was again more a token gesture than actual information gathering. All but one of those who raised this concern worked for TRoNT at the time of the interviews or had worked for TRoNT in the past. The use of CMC as a consultation tool was regarded by these few members as being fraught with perils. The potential ease of consultation was offset against the use of this tool in a meaningless fashion such as a single mass-email to all tribal
members. During an informal conversation one of my interview partners called this form of consultation "email abuse". Another interview partner pointed out that online communication and consultation had to be "meaningful" and not along the lines of "a typical bureaucratic methodology" which is "all about covering your [posterior]" [14].

Other interview partners pointed towards the overall lack of consultation, mentioning times when emails about imminent changes were circulated without prior consultation regarding these changes. Even if interview partners did not disagree with the decisions made and actions taken they "disagreed with the fact that there was no process of consultation" [41]. One employee of a rūnanga administration commented upon this, saying that the meetings held at the rūnanga were attended mostly by local members, who were already active and whose views were not necessarily a "true representation of what the wider rūnanga members want" [1]. With a chat room or forum the rūnanga administration could post questions, for example concerning policy changes or implementation. From the answers posted by the members the administration would have a clearer picture of the members’ wishes than currently: "[a]t this stage we assume we know what their ... requirements are from the [annual hui] ..." [1]. At the time of the interviews none of these options were available to distant or less active local members.

The reverse of the lack of consultation is the lack of participation in consultation, as described by another interview partner: "How many people would have rocked up to the whole so-called consultation phase? You know? They had one in the building at Ngāi Tahu, think maybe, oh, 30 people there and half of them were us staff ..." [37] In other incidences the agenda was over-ruled by members attending consultation meetings, demanding that other issues were to be discussed, "issues that you people [TRoNT] were meant to sort out" [37].

TRoNT’s role

While most interview partners wanted to be consulted more often the difference between locally active and distant or passive members was the use of CMC. Where distant and passive members saw computer-mediated consultation as a step towards more inner-tribal democracy locally active members were adamant that consultation should occur face-to-face. The insistence on face-to-face communication was seen as based on Māori culture: ‘kanohi ki te kanohi’, ‘face-to-face’. But the resistance towards consultation processes via CMC also ties in with the differing understandings of TRoNT’s role within the tribe. Distant, local passive, and new members often used the inclusive discourse offered by TRoNT, which turned tribal members into beneficiaries, or shareholders to the tribal assets and TRoNT into a
service provider. Many locally active members saw TRoNT in a different light, rather than a service provider to individual members TRoNT was described as an entity necessary to achieve a settlement. The iwi corporate was then not a service provider but a bureaucratic structure with the task to safeguard tribal assets and to implement decisions made by the tribal members.

The answers given to the question whether or not a chat-room or forum would be useful are telling in this regard. Those interview partners who saw potential in computer-mediated consultation obviously saw potential in a forum or chat-room. Many interview partners who saw potential, however, also saw a need for TRoNT to monitor the forum or chat-room. TRoNT was in the eyes of many of these interview partners a service provider, while internal criticism towards the corporation or towards other tribal members was considered "not good form" [6] and potentially bad for business. The opposite view of TRoNT as a support structure resulted in some interview partners arguing that TRoNT should not be allowed to monitor the forum or chat-room. This is a logical conclusion, since a support structure cannot be given the chance to monitor those it is meant to support. In one extreme case an interview partner was adamant that TRoNT employees should not even be allowed to use the chat-room or forum.

A second example regarding the different understandings of TRoNT’s role are alternative websites. I will discuss two of these websites here, both show that the authors see TRoNT as a service provider and both website authors are supporters of an inclusive tribal membership.

The first website is the now defunct website of the former TRoNT representative for Tuahiwi, Dr. Te Maire Tau. The rationale behind tribalcafé — the name of Tau’s website — was according to "Okaihau", Tau’s online avatar, to distribute information: "The other danger [for the tribe] is lack of real communication from its [TRoNT] members to the people hence this site". The site never instigated large-scale debates during its time, the usual number of answers to posts ranged somewhere between one and three. One interview partner argued that the website contained useful and important information but suffered from a mismatch between target group and content: "it’s built for academics" [37]. In an interview the author explained that he closed down the website because it was too time consuming to update and but also because he wanted to discuss "the serious issues" the tribal membership had to confront, but he felt that contributors appeared to be more interested in staffing issues within TRoNT.

Richard Parata’s website appeared nearly three years after Tau had taken his website off-line. It is possible that this time was enough for people to become more
accustomed to the medium and the idea of using CMC to discuss inner-tribal issues. Parata’s website, ‘Ngai Tahu shareholders’ under
<http://ngaitahushareholders.co.nz>, is also of a less academic nature than Tau’s. Parata, like Tau, sees a need for communication between the iwi corporate and the tribal membership. The website is entirely focused on the immediate activities within the tribal bureaucratic structure and the implications for tribal members. Where responses on Tau’s website were slow to come Parata’s website is vibrant. The discussion style is reminiscent of the heated inner-familial debates my interview partners frequently described. The website also shows the clustered nature of CMC, members refer to other websites discussing issues relevant to Ngāi Tahu. One other site in particular has attracted attention, ”roarprawn”, the blog of a person using the avatar “bustedblonde”.

As we have seen in the description of these two websites the use of CMC has increased significantly during the course of this research. Leading debates about tribal issues online has become commonplace. So commonplace in fact that “bustedblonde” in her/his blog ”roarprawn” made a case of pointing out that TRoNT should adapt to new technologies and allow for consultation processes via CMC. This argument was also made by many of my interview partners. To strengthen her/his case ”bustedblonde” pointed out that while roughly 200 members physically attended a hui in Kaikoura, which was seen as a satisfactory level of participation, more than five times that number accessed the ”roarprawn” blog the very same day.

The authors, and users, of both websites argue from within the inclusive discourse with the understanding of tribal members as beneficiaries with democratic rights. But where TRoNT employees often use this discourse to explain why all members should have equal rights the website authors, and users, turn the discourse against the iwi corporate and demand the democratic participation and inner-tribal discussion.

Although divided over the question regarding TRoNT’s relationship to members none of my interview partners saw TRoNT as a producer of culture. One interview partner argued that TRoNT was ”off beam” [26] when dealing with culture, an area reserved for whānau and hapū. From within the iwi corporate came, however, the same view. One interview partner pointed out that culture was not something members could get from an iwi corporate: ”... you can’t come to a corporation and learn it, that’s ridiculous” [39].

One of the goals of the tribe within the next 25 years, however, is that all ”Ngāi Tahu can easily access, be enriched by and contribute to the ongoing development of our culture from anywhere in the world” (TRoNT, 2001, 17). Requests for knowledge
about Ngāi Tahu culture were one of the reasons why the first official tribal website was launched, aimed at an internal and external audience (Hofmann, 2003). With the increase in family websites and the strengthening of the computer-mediated networks within families these requests for cultural knowledge might be posed within family networks in the future rather than being directed at the iwi corporate. TRoNT, through the Ngāi Tahu Fund, offers grants for the development of family websites. In the light of this the aspirations of tribal members for self-determination in terms of culture are probably mirrored from within the iwi corporate. As I have shown in previous chapters this emphasis on the production of culture outside TRoNT does, however, also mean that whānau carry the responsibility that comes with self-determination. With the discourses of inclusive and exclusive tribal membership in place family websites then offer a possibility to soften the segmentation of tribal members into active and passive or distant members.

8.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I have shown that the use of CMC within the tribe was for many of my interview partners focused around their families. Many of the locally active members distinguished their use of CMC to stay in contact with their families from the use of CMC to get involved in the tribe. At the same time these locally active members emphasised the fragmented nature of the tribe, arguing that whānau and hapū created the iwi. The iwi then relies for its existence on the constituting whānau and hapū, rather than vice versa. The neat distinction between iwi related CMC and inner-familial communication and active versus passive tribal members is then broken down by active family members communicating out to passive family members, creating a trickle down effect of information. Simultaneously this form of information dissemination also represents a threat to the principle of gerontocracy, although, as I understand it, this threat is so far only small. I have further argued that this family focus was already present at the time when Ngāi Tahu settled the South Island and that the use of family oriented websites has led to new connections between family members. Following on from this I have argued that proponents of the inclusive and exclusive discourse alike are concerned about democratic participation. While the former demand democratic participation possibilities via CMC the latter aim at a peripheralisation of distant and inactive members by arguing that CMC for inner-tribal communication should be kept at a minimum. I have further argued that many locally active members see TRoNT as a corporation which should not participate in the production and dissemination of Ngāi Tahu culture. Distant and new members on the other hand demand exactly this. I have ventured a
8.4. CONCLUSION

cautious guess and predicted that with the reliance on family networks these requests for cultural information might be directed more towards family networks in the future rather than TRoNT.

So far the thesis has been concerned with CMC within the Ngāi Tahu tribe and the process of "'grass-rooting' the space of flows" (Castells, 2004a, 38). In the next chapter I will show that the tensions between active and passive members occur in other tribal societies as well. I will further argue that capital gains, in the form of government settlements or in the form of income possibilities open only to indigenous populations, appear to increase the tensions. From this follows that the use of CMC does not cause these tensions, but merely exacerbates them.
Chapter 9

Indigeneity and CMC

9.1 Introduction

In this chapter I will argue that the form of segmentation I have described in the preceding chapters is not confined to Ngāi Tahu. Further I want to argue that boundary drawing from inside and outside indigenous populations is not caused by but the use of CMC emphasises the tensions.

Despite the uniqueness of the specific details of Ngāi Tahu tribal history, relation to land, and legal turmoil, the overall patterns are recognisable in other iwi in New Zealand and other indigenous populations around the world. The continuous reconfiguration of alliances described in previous chapters are not unique to Ngāi Tahu. Sissons et al. (1987) for example have described the emergence of the Ngā Puhi iwi out of several formerly hostile hapū (see also Sutton, 1990). As Lewis (1976, 323) pointed out, within Nuer society ‘political loyalty is almost infinitely elastic’, making each individual Nuer a ‘born situationalist’, at least in Evans-Pritchard’s description.

As Anderson (2008, 23) pointed out the elasticity has worn off with ‘modern iwi’ being ‘more or less fixed’ in regard to the affiliating hapū. Although members still sometimes shift their hapū preference the bureaucratic umbrella of TRoNT casts its shadow no matter which hapū tribal members choose to affiliate to. More importantly, however, the shift of focus away from hapū to iwi membership has freed the path for an inclusive membership, a move also visible in other locales of the world. The same is true for the exclusive discourse. With the possibility of globalised membership turning into a reality locally active members of indigenous groups have begun to assert their rights in relation to other, non-local members.

Tribal centralisation and bureaucratisation can also be found elsewhere, both as an outcome of government policies and the interests of tribal chiefs (for the ascent of
CHAPTER 9. INDIGENEITY AND CMC

chiefs see Sissons, 2005b; van Meijl, 1997, 1998). The exploitation of natural resources and traditional knowledge by elites within tribes, Rata’s (1999; 2003c; 2003b) ‘neotribal capitalism’ can equally be found at work among Tainui on New Zealand’s North Island (NA, 2000, *Waikato Times*) and tribal gaming operations in Texas (NA, 2002, *Time*). Like some of my interview partners locally active members elsewhere also discredit tribal corporations as money squandering, power hungry, and out of touch with the grassroots, a discursive strategy aimed at winning back political autonomy.

The capitalist exploitation of the special status of indigenous populations constitutes an important background to the comparison. The potential for exploitation is hidden within the understanding of indigeneity. Sissons’ definition of indigeneity and his accompanying argument are insightful here. Using a ‘relational approach’ (van Meijl, 2006, 68) Sissons (2005b, 15) defined indigenous populations narrowly as ‘... cultures that have been transformed through the struggles of colonized peoples to resist and redirect projects of settler nationhood’. He then argued that such a narrow definition is needed because settlers typically came from Europe and that under these circumstances ‘indigeneity clearly references the other side of settler nationhood and serves as a powerful moral and political marker of cultural distinctiveness’ (Sissons, 2005b, 16). This as opposed to cultural struggles between local cultural groups on the African and Asian continent where, due to the local origin of the different groups, ‘indigeneity is of little or no value as a marker of cultural or political distinctiveness’ (Sissons, 2005b, 16). Sissons’ (2005b, 28) narrow definition further excludes ‘eco-ethnicity’ a form of identity project which ‘emphasizes the relationship between peoples and their natural environment’, because ‘indigenism within settler nations is as much about the changing relationship between urban and rural communities and the emergence of indigenous urban cultures’. While these observations are correct it is also only within settler nations that this marker of distinction can be turned into economic gains. As I have shown in previous chapters, the question over whether or not these gains have to be shared reoccurs in the tribal politics of Ngāi Tahu. Again, local tribal members all over the world use the same eudaimonist position, the understanding of society antedating individuals rather than vice versa (Norton, 1995), to argue for the importance of the local and thus the need to peripheralise distant members.¹ As was the case in the research interviews, this line of argument is abandoned when locally active members insist on their indigenous rights as individuals towards the non-indigenous population (e.g. Nadasdy, 2002).

¹The Greek term *eudaimonia* describes on the one hand a state of spiritual fulfilment, which is reached through the actualisation of the “individual’s innate potentialities”, on the other hand the term also applies to a life lived to reach the actualisation of these potentialities (Norton, 1995, 3).
9.2. INDIGENOUS AUTHENTICITY

In the following I will show that the discursive practises used in the research interviews can be found elsewhere. First a detour concerning indigenous authenticity is necessary, following the detour I will discuss several tribal cases in the USA and Canada.

9.2 Indigenous authenticity

Despite a conspicuous absence of the actual terms the concept of indigeneity and the notion of authenticity were ever present during the interviews. Before presenting several cases on the North American continent a detour is therefore necessary. The detour will show that indigeneity is linked to the nation-state, further the notion of authenticity is used from the outside to discredit indigenous aspirations for self-government, whilst from inside the indigenous community authenticity is used to advance the segmentation described in this thesis.

The concept of indigeneity, the ascription of political rights to individuals on the basis of category membership, is at odds with the libertarian political philosophy it was borne out of (van Meijl, 2006; Winthrop, 2002). This understanding of indigeneity presupposes that indigeneity is not based on isolation but on interaction, in a ‘global systemic context’ (Friedman, 2008, 35) indigeneity is then a ‘political identity’ linked to the ‘structure of the state itself’ (Friedman, 2008, 42) and the decline of the ‘hegemony’ of state-based identities (Friedman, 2008, 39). The increasing emphasis on locality is replicated by non-indigenous groups, with peoples around the world searching for ‘the indigenization of modernity, their own cultural space in the global scheme of things’ (Sahlin, 1999, 410; see also Gupta and Ferguson, 1992, 10).

Aimed at the (re)acquisition of political powers indigeneity has also acquired an important monetary component, due to the ‘neoliberal reinterpretation of indigenous self-determination as economic development’ (Stewart-Harawira, 2005, 190; see also Sissons, 2005b, 146). This component further contributes to the continued division of the public and scholars over the question whether or not today’s indigenous identities are authentic or not. Kuper (2003) for example pointed towards a historical discontinuity in current indigenous claims, whereas Barnard (2006) and Guenther (2006) saw a moral obligation of past colonisers, Friedman (2008, 40) further pointed out that claims of inauthenticity paid insufficient attention to the fact that local experiences did indeed exist outside the realm of invention, and Sissons (2005b, 37) argued that a demand for ‘indigenous authenticity is racism and primitivism in

\[\text{2Dombrowski (2002) argued that conflict, internal and external, is part of the concept of indigeneity, whereas Wolfe (2006) argued that indigeneity is the conflict.}\]

\[\text{3That few indigenes actually see these monetary gains is another issue entirely.}\]
disguise’. Denial or assertion of authenticity are then discursive strategies in a struggle for rights, especially since culture has become the ‘arbiter of humanity and animator of human rights’ (Markowitz, 2004, 332). This is despite the fact that the cards are heavily stacked in favour of Western conceptions as Handler (1986) showed, since the notion of authenticity and the Western understanding of the individual are linked. Culture, authentic culture, can therefore be possessed as private property and, through a Lockean meditation on private property as the basis of individual existence, possession of a culture calls groups into being: “we are a nation because we have a culture” (Handler, 1986, 4). But, emphasising a different aspect than Handler, I want to point out that claims to nation status rely on the absence of plurality, i.e. the correspondence between one nation and one culture. Becoming a nation then, to some extent, dampens the possibilities for diversity. Since the identification of culture is a social process boundaries are drawn on the basis of ‘[s]ocially relevant factors’ rather than ‘objective’ differences’ (Barth, 1996, 300). Sahlins (2000, 56) pointed out that this process of ‘construction-of-the-Other’ pre-dates the expansion of the West and that non-Westerners were by no means ‘amateurs’ at it.

Hybridity, not the “osmosis” from one category into the other (Barth, 1996, 306), then generates issues with any understanding of authentic indigeneity through the creation of fluid categories, categories which are perceived as ‘better left alone’ (Markowitz, 2004, 343). But, as Sissons (2005b) and Friedman (2008), among others, have pointed out the reality of indigenous living is far less clear cut and the array of possibilities is only reduced by legal definitions. A ‘binary of indigenism’ (Sissons, 2005b, 31) is created with defined differences between indigenous and non-indigenous populations and similarities between indigenous populations.

With clear, and problematic, legal definitions of indigeneity, such as ancestry, the influences of colonial encounters on indigenous cultures are largely neglected. Fulfilment of legal requirements brings with it legal authenticity. Social acceptance of the indigenous status, however, is bound to the fulfilment of standards created from within the group and from without (Barth, 1996, 299; see also Sissons, 2005b, 30). Certain ‘culture traits’ are codified as relevant and authentic during this process and boundaries and workable categories are created (Barth, 1996, 320). Simultaneously, since ‘boundary is consciousness’ rather than ‘fact’ (Cohen, 1998, 29), a certain vagueness surrounds the boundary markers, allowing for interpretive variance (Cohen, 1998). During the process of codification authenticity plays a pivotal role in that, again, hybridised forms are avoided. Cultural traits best representing difference are presented as authentic although these traits often stem from a process of

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4For Barnard (2006, 7) the concept of indigeneity itself is ‘messy’, even more so when he attributes a ‘mystical, additional factor’ to indigenes (see also Thuen, 2006).
9.3. US AMERICAN NATIVE AMERICANS

interaction with and resistance against ideas held by members of other cultures (Thomas, 1992; Keesing, 1982, 1989; Sissons, 2005b). Compliance with these standards then produces indigenes ‘more real than the real’ indigenes, ‘hyperreal’ (Ramos, 1994, 161; see also Mato, 2000, 348). But, as stated above, the definition of indigenous authenticity relies on boundary markers identified from within the indigenous community and from without. An emphasis on locality by locally active members is then a discursive strategy as is the reliance of bureaucratic structures and tribal leaders on clear-cut legal membership criteria allowing for non-localised indigenism (e.g. Sylvain, 2002). Pointing out the ‘retrenchment of the elites’ (Friedman, 2004, 162), as many of my interview partners did is then also a way of reaffirming the importance of the local and an attempt to end non-local influences.

9.3 US American Native Americans

General situation

The situation of Native Americans in the USA is somewhat different to the situation of Ngāi Tahu described in this thesis. Naturally the following will not be an in depth comparison of all facets of Native Americans and Ngāi Tahu tribal life, since this would go beyond the scale of this thesis. One significant difference however has to be mentioned here.

With the introduction of the General Allotment Act in 1887, commonly referred to as the Dawes Act, the idea of a ‘blood quantum’ had entered the relationship between the federal US government and Native American populations. Land was allotted to all those Native Americans living in reservations with a certain amount of Native American blood. By enforcing a threshold — 50% Native American blood — the federal government was in a position to dismiss land claims from a large number of Native Americans and subsequently administer the resulting surplus land to white settlers (Sissons, 2005b, 46, f.; see also Meyer, 1999, 232, f.). The situation is further complicated by the labelling process of the first Native Americans. The Dawes Commission travelled the country in an attempt to establish who should receive a CDIB, a Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood. Without any possibility to scientifically

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5Dealing with the federal government rather than the respective state government(s) is also ‘symbolic’, a reminder that nearly the entirety of all wars and treaties had been between tribes and the federal government (Greaves, 2002, 130). It also offers a ‘relative security’ (Greaves, 2002, 130) against vested state interests in tribal lands, taxes, and the threat of election promises to white voters.

6Fenelon (2006, 394) pointed out that the Bureau of Indian Affairs, at the time it controlled all reservation land, also only allowed single reservation membership, thus cutting out ancestral links to any other reservations.

7Different versions exist: ‘Certified Degree of Indian Blood’ (Hamill, 2003), ‘Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood’ (Villalon, 2009, 209), whereas the Bureau of Indian Affairs refers to the CDIB as the
establish whether or not a person had minute traces of Native American or African American blood local knowledge was enlisted. As a result ethnic ascription, fluid in real life, became fixed (Villalon, 2009).\(^8\) In 1914 two anthropologists, Dr. Hrdlička and Dr. Jenks, attempted to devise blood tests to prove the identity of Native Americans. Despite failing to produce conclusive results the tests were introduced, for Meyer (1999, 240) ‘racism received the imprimatur of academia’.

The politically motivated decision to introduce blood quanta is still affecting Native American populations today. Access to government services aimed at Native American populations is via the CDIB. This in return means that the federal government has a vested interest in keeping the number of beneficiaries low, which is easily possible by keeping the necessary blood quantum of Native American blood high (Sissons, 2005b, 47, f.). The court case *Waldron v. United States* in 1905, however, set a precedent in that ‘tribal rights to determine membership based on their own laws and customs’ were upheld (Meyer, 1999, 233). As a result all tribes require genealogical links to one of the persons named on the Dawes Roll, but some tribes have no blood quantum criteria, such as the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, whereas others, such as the Hopi Nation demand 50% Native American blood (Meyer, 1999). While the national government does play an important role other actors, such as tribal bureaucracies and tribal members, also play an important part in the deliberate inclusion and exclusion of potential members.

The federal and state governments’ interest in keeping the numbers of Native Americans low is an important difference between Native Americans and Ngāi Tahu. In New Zealand tribal membership does not lead to any benefits distributed by the government, only to benefits administered by the iwi administration. This in turn means that once a tribe has achieved a settlement a rise in numbers of tribal members is of no further interest to the government. But the situation of Native Americans and Ngāi Tahu also shows similarities.

**Tribal examples**

One commonality between indigenous populations in the USA and New Zealand is the need for governmental recognition. Without recognition tribal members are unable to access benefits in the USA and thus tribes struggle to adhere to the criteria set by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, in many cases this is a difficult enterprise. With governmental recognition comes increased security in the indigenous identity of the

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\(^8\)According to Meyer (1999, 232) tribal members were ‘given the opportunity to voice objections to these decisions, but not always’.\(^9\)
tribal members. But to achieve recognition ‘social reality’ changes into ‘legal fiction’ with indigenous populations assuming organisational patterns recognisable by white settler nations but with little historical continuity (Anderson Matte, 2006, 196). Because as Sissons (2005b, 52) pointed out ‘[c]hiefs, tribes and mapped territories were among the essential conditions of empire’, non-territorial organisation was and is incommensurable with the concept of the nation-state.\(^9\)

Exercising the right to self-determination some tribes have dropped the blood quantum criteria, such as the Cherokee Nation. Some Cherokee, however, argue for the re-introduction of a threshold, since the Cherokee nation has grown fivefold within the two decades since the criteria of a blood quantum was abolished in the 1970s (Sissons, 2005b, 48). On the other hand the understanding of tribal members as beneficiaries is present among the higher echelons of Cherokee bureaucrats. This can be seen in the assistance offered to all potential tribal members to receive a CDIB (NA, 2009b, Targeted News Services). The openness of the Cherokee Nation has motives beyond an altruistic urge to help potential beneficiaries with federal funding being directly correlated to the size of the tribal membership (Villalon, 2009).

Not only contemporary politics are of importance when considering the reasons behind the openness of the Cherokee Nation. A historical perspective offers further insights and shows that what I have termed the inclusive discourse has been deeply entrenched in the tribe for more than five decades. The Cherokee Nation was revived by Keeler, president and CEO of the Phillips Petroleum Corporation in Texas, who was appointed ‘principal chief’ of the Cherokee Nation by the federal government in 1948. Similar to the Ngāi Tahu iwi the Cherokee Nation changed under Keeler’s leadership into a bureaucratic structure wielding substantial economic power. Sturm argued that ‘racial hegemony’ had been challenged when the blood quantum requirement had been dropped and that this had led the way to fight the government with its own weapons (Sturm cited in Saunt, 2003, 364). An alternative reading is that Keeler and his allies turned tribal assets into lucrative business opportunities, distancing the tribe from ‘traditional Cherokee communities in Oklahoma’, a move so successful that today’s tribal members mostly reside in California (Saunt, 2003, 364).

Meyer (1999, 242, f.) added a further dimension to the complex issue by pointing out that the size of the tribal population living in reserves is correlated with blood quantum requirements. In reverse those tribes which don’t have reservation land tend towards a more inclusive policy, such as the Cherokee Nation, to simply survive.\(^10\) In

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\(^9\)A further issue in the US is that recognised tribes fear for their gaming operations’ revenue and thus actively oppose the federal recognition of other tribes (Anderson Matte, 2006, 204).

\(^10\)In comparison entry into the tribal registry to the Eastern Band of Cherokee requires a 1/16 blood quantum, and to the Hopi Nation a 1/2 blood quantum.
the case of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma the requirement resembles the way Ngāi Tahu deals with tribal membership, ancestral links to a tribal member shown on the Dawes Roll assembled in 1907 (Meyer, 1999, 234). But while this form of entry criteria is more appealing to the Western democratic sense it has to be remembered that the Dawes Roll can only be considered partially correct due to reasons given above, but also due to the question why somebody would put their name down on a roll after years of negative treatment by bureaucratic structures. Neither blood quantum requirements, ancestral links nor social embeddedness in a specific, localised community will ever be able to guarantee the inclusion of all descendants.

Meyer (1999, 241), writing about Native Americans in general, pointed out a further issue regarding the relationship between authentic Native Americans and non-authentic ones, however either group is defined. It is the issue that colonial practices have had unintended consequences, in this case the blatant use of ‘half-bloods’ (Meyer, 1999, 241) as examples for other native Americans. By giving preferential treatments to those individuals who were of mixed descent the government at the time acted on the belief that mixed descent meant a greater appreciation of Western business ideas and culture and would lead to a faster Westernisation of full-blooded, and thus presumably full-savage, Native Americans. The unintended consequence was that at the time the dictum among native Americans was that ‘those with white ‘blood’ were unfairly rewarded’ (Meyer, 1999, 241).

Summarising the difficulties all recognised Native American populations within the USA face Meyer showed that the inclusive and exclusive discursive practices are prevalent:

> Never-before-seen ‘relatives’ emerge as claimants every time any tribal group receives a court settlement or royalties from economic development.  
> ... [But] many unenrolled people who claim Indian descent do not have exploitation on their minds; they are the victims of racist politics. ... It still remains to be explained how people who value family so dearly rationalize tribal enrollment criteria that operate to exclude so many family members. (Meyer, 1999, 241, 243)<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup>The behaviour of Meyer’s never-before-seen relatives has historical precedents in US-American legal history. Pascoe (1999) argued that miscegenation laws in the USA were not aimed at miscegenation but rather at the transfer of property from white partners to non-white partners. In a reversal of Meyer’s long-lost relatives white families often attempted, more often than not successfully, to disown the non-white individual of the marriage after the death of their partner. Miscegenation and the claim that the marriage had never been lawful were then used as arguments as to why the non-white partner should not receive any parts of the estate.
In Dombrowski’s (2002) analysis of the logging practices in Alaska Meyer’s unheard of family members are common place. With their eyes firmly set on profit-margins non-local tribal members of Alaskan tribes lobby the clear cutting of large areas of forest, while their local counterparts argue for long-term planning.

The Washoe tribe on the shores of Lake Tahoe offers another example. Theorising the boundary maintenance necessary within the tribal community Turner Strong and Van Winkle (1996, 558) argued that two distinct discourses are at work regarding tribal membership: ‘an unofficial discourse of self-identification and attributed identity ... and the discourse of official tribal membership’. Naturally the two groups are far from congruent with members being accepted as Washoe through one set of criteria but not through the other, members being more Washoe in one discourse than the other and so forth. The similarities to the double movement described in this thesis are obvious. Beneficiaries are defined by the official tribal membership discourse, whereas locally tribal members are accepted on the basis of the unofficial discourse. The official discourse based on the North American blood quantum criteria has interesting side effects, which are also possible with Ngāi Tahu’s sole criterion of ancestral links. Not only are the two groups within the Washoe tribe incongruent, membership through official criteria also allows for membership in several cultures. Although this would be consistent with post-modern beliefs of fluidity it also means that one person can ‘be the sort of victor who can claim to be the vanquished also’ (Kincaid cited in Turner Strong and Van Winkle, 1996, 552). This is countered by the social reality that being ‘part Indian’ does not correspond to receiving only a part racist ‘treatment’, because ‘when you experience racism — it is always 100%’ (Cardinal-Schubert cited in Turner Strong and Van Winkle, 1996, 547).

The experience of racism and of misuse of rights by eligible yet inactive members has furthered the critical stance of Native Americans to be identified through blood quantum. While the CDIB is then used to define, from within the inclusive discourse, who is allowed access to which governmental subsidies, some native people see few positives in the CDIB other than the physical uses of the card. Apparently it makes a good ‘scraper for your windshield but it is not enough to be an Indian’ (participant cited in Hamill, 2003, 280). Clearly for this particular person to be a Native American goes beyond the possession of a card, similar to the words of one of my participants: "having on a piece of paper saying that I’m Ngāi Tahu has never really worried me [...] a piece of paper is [...] just going to prove that fact to other people" [7]. In Hamill’s example of indigenous people in Oklahoma many Native Americans see the CDIB then as a possibility ‘to make bogus claims to Indian identity’ to take resources adjudicated or generated by indigenous populations (Hamill, 2003, 281)
In the USA one of the most lucrative sources of income for Native Americans and First Nations are casinos on tribal land, often with negative consequences. As Fenelon (2006, 393) remarked: ‘Complex interplay between resistance, survival, economic betterment in both Indian and mainstream modern worlds has been disrupted by the sudden presence of profitable casinos.’

For patrons the attraction of casinos on reservation land is the federal recognition of tribes, which means that tribally operated casinos are not bound to the upper-limit of gambling jackpots codified in state laws (Kotlowksi, 2008). But, as Kotlowksi (2008) pointed out the revenue from gaming and the gaming itself has engendered problems. Most interestingly for the current argument is that many tribes, so Kotlowksi (2008, 648), have shunned tribal gaming after seeing the inner-tribal disputes arising in other tribes (see also Fenelon, 2006). Further pressure is mounting with the perception rising throughout non-indigenous populations in the USA that all Native Americans profit unduly from tribal gaming enterprises (Kotlowksi, 2008; see also Wacker, 2006, 377). This is certainly not the case with smaller indigenous groups being less successful and larger tribes through ‘their size and cohesion’ and ‘the requisite leadership’ benefitting more from their casino ventures (Wacker, 2006, 379).\(^{12}\)

Wetzel’s (2006) discussion of land and casino occupations offers further examples of inner-tribal segmentation. The economic factor, the important parameter of this comparison between Ngāi Tahu and other indigenous nations, is ever present in the form of casino revenues. The segmentary movement described in this thesis is at work in the cases described by Wetzel. In the first case, the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, the tribal leadership disenfranchised its critics on the basis of questionable tribal affiliation. In the second case, the Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas, the argument was used by local members of the tribe, who pointed towards the lack of local links of the current tribal leaders. What both cases have in common is the claims to tradition. All parties involved claimed to be traditional and to employ traditional means to achieve their goals. Another common factor is the economic situation within the tribes. With the establishment of casinos on reservation land the income of the tribes is considerable, however the distribution of this wealth is an issue of contention (Wetzel, 2006; see also Fenelon, 2006).

\(^{12}\)The counter-example to Wetzel’s claim is, however, not far: Considered extinct for more than 300 years a small but ‘persistent’ number of Pequots in Connecticut won recognition by the BIA and subsequently opened the ‘most renowned, and profitable Indian gaming operations’, Foxwoods Casino (Fenelon, 2006, 386, f.).
9.4 Canadian First Nations

General situation

In Canada the situation is very similar to the situation of Native Americans under US federal jurisdiction. Members of Canadian First Nations lose their special status if two successive generations marry non-status members who were not recognised as such under the Indian Act of 1876. To be recognised applicants at the time had to live on a reserve and did not belong to a specific band.\(^{13}\) Obviously this is an incentive for officially recognised members of First Nations to marry other officially recognised members of First Nations to not lose their special rights. Sissons (2005b, 51) called this policy, Bill C-31, a ‘generational time-bomb’. While I concur that Bill C-31 is by no means the solution to the issue lowering entry criteria into indigenous communities can hold equally explosive potential as can be seen from the examples given later in the chapter.

To complicate matters further there are also treaty rights, rights which have been granted to members of bands or First Nations by the Crown. In the court-case \textit{R. v. Fowler} heard in a New Brunswick court in 1993 the Court held, however, that it was not necessary to be formally affiliated with a First Nation to have the right to exercise treaty rights. Rather, the Court found that it was only necessary to prove ancestry to a member of a signatory First Nation. As a result neither governmental recognition under Bill C-31 nor official recognition by a First Nation is necessary to exercise treaty rights. But fears of a flurry of false claims were placated by the Court with reference to the difficulty of proving First Nations ancestry if no ancestor had been formally recognised, a conclusion which the Ontario District Court had reached already in 1989 in the case \textit{R. v. Chevrier} (Palmater, 2000, 124, ff.).

To situate the issue of urban indigeneity in the Canadian case: In the 2006 census nearly 1.2 million people considered themselves an Aboriginal person, a category including ‘North American Indian (First Nations people), Métis and Inuit’ (Cloutier et al., 2008, 6). More than half, 54%, of the aboriginal population were living in urban centres. The increase has been dramatic in the last decade with a growth of 45% of the Aboriginal population between the census years 1996 and 2006. Aboriginal people, however, still constitute a minority in Canada with 4%, which makes it the second largest in the world after New Zealand with Māori constituting 15% of the population (Cloutier et al., 2008).\(^{14}\)

\(^{13}\)Members of First Nations could claim affiliation to one band only. The same was the case for Native Americans and for Ngāi Tahu in hapū censuses.

\(^{14}\)Due to URL length and complexity the search path for this publication rather than the URL is given in the bibliography.
Of course court decisions such as the above are only necessary because the narrative of nationhood, as used by aboriginal leaders all around the world, is in itself exclusionary. It is based on an understanding of territorially stable communities, however large the territory, rather than the reality of urban indigeneity and the emergence of new forms of indigenous identity. While every nation-state has an interest in creating clearly defined areas of political representation this form of boundary creation brings with it the issue of excluding urban indigenes, who, although often politically represented by reserve authorities, have little or no connection to the reserve and little or no say in political matters. Governments thus live in ‘hope’ that the ‘messier reality of transitory and relocated lives’ will be addressed by the ‘rural leadership’ of reserves (Sissons, 2005b, 124, for the Canadian case see Andersen and Denis, 2003). The other option is of course to do away with all future First Nations’ treaty and land claims by creating ‘fantastic topographies’, spaces without history, open to economic development (Rossiter and Wood, 2005, 358). The government of British Columbia attempted this sleight of hand in 2002 via a referendum on the negotiation process of First Nations claims for treaty rights or land. The hope was that ‘economic certainty’ (Rossiter and Wood, 2005, 363) would replace the possibility of land claims in the far future, while at the same time turning First Nation members into tax payers with rights rather than a group with special group status. Accompanied by protests from many sides the referendum had the intended outcome, hardly surprising with biased questions being posed. The voter turn-out was 35.8% and several agreements in principle for land claims followed soon after the referendum, however, these agreements were hailed for the future economic growth they promised while tensions between First Nations and the Canadian federal government and the government of British Columbia were glossed over (Rossiter and Wood, 2005, 363).

Economic and political stability is not the aim of the government of British Columbia alone. The Canadian federal government is likewise interested in stabilising the situation. When indigenes can be enlisted for this quest then collaboration is guaranteed and fruitful. As Sissons (2005b, 122) pointed out the ‘term ‘indigenous sovereignty’, ... is often ... quite ambiguous’. Rather than seeking ‘full sovereignty’ leaders of indigenous movements aim for partial sovereignty embedded within the economical and military security of the larger nation-state (Sissons, 2005b, 122). Whether for economical or ideological reasons the representatives of the Inuit Tapiriit

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15Ironically indigenous nations and governments, in this case the one of British Columbia, have the same goal, a different future. While the government of British Columbia imagined a different future by ridding itself of the ‘messy history’ (Rossiter and Wood, 2005, 362) indigenous nations attempt to move forwards on the basis of the past. As Sissons (2005b, 11) pointed out ‘[n]owhere in the indigenous world are cultural reappropriations regarded as returns to the past: rather, they are always reimaginations of the future’.
Kanatami, the Inuit of the Canadian far north, declared on the Inuit Circumpolar Conference that the new emblem of the organisation represented the ‘commitment to Canada’ and followed up with the declaration ‘We are more than First Canadians, we are Canadians First!’ (cited in Shadian, 2007, 323). The Canadian government welcomed this claim, particularly since the Inuit of Canada’s far north are anything but urbanised and thus fit neatly into the ideal of indigenes in remote locations. As John Amagoalik, a Inuit political leader pointed out ‘Our luck was to inhabit a land that no one coveted’ (cited in Marecic, 1999/2000, 279). Land claims made by Inuit in Canada’s arctic region have become the ‘dominant arguments’ of Canadian politicians for Canadian claims to the ‘Arctic North’ (Shadian, 2007, 343). Thus in collaboration between the Canadian government, the Inuit Tapariit Kanatami, and the Inuit Circumpolar Conference a ‘new Canadian ‘northern’ identity’ has been created, an ‘indigenized Canadian identity’ heavily drawing on the notion of symbiosis between humans and the environment, simultaneously this new identity has become somewhat of an export hit as a ‘role model for multiculturalism’ and ‘liberal humanism’ made in Canada (Shadian, 2007, 343). As Williams (1996, 12) argued for the case of New Zealand a positive ‘national self-image’ is ‘advantageous’ in a market driven world whereas ‘colonialism and racism are bad for business’.16

Within Canadian borders the situation is far from satisfactory. Maxim et al. (2001) pointed out that aboriginal people are economically disadvantaged (see also Hanselmann, 2001).17 More specifically Inuit face the greatest inequality within Canadian borders due to geographical isolation, closely followed by recognised members of First Nations. Non-recognised members of First Nations and Métis in comparison are far less disadvantaged. For the case of the Métis Maxim et al. (2001, 475) ventured the guess that visibility of difference, or the lack thereof, allows Métis to live unrecognised among non-aboriginal Canadians.

Canada’s non-aboriginal citizens alternate between support and rejection of the aboriginal cause. According to Langford and Pointing (1992, 145) ‘ethnocentrism’, although a likely culprit, has little explanatory value. Rather it is the interaction between two other factors which causes rejection of First Nations special status and self-government. These factors are high levels of ‘group conflict perception’ and ‘prejudice’, only when both are present the aboriginal cause is rejected (Langford and

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16Hanselmann (2001) dissected the political situation in the Canadian west by further differentiating between federal, state governmental, and departmental policies regarding urban Aborigines. In 2001 efforts on all three levels had been made Hanselmann, however, pointed out that recognition of issues on one of the three levels did not and does not preclude neglect of these issues on the other two levels.

17For further information on the economic disparity between non-aboriginal Canadians and First Nations and economic differentiation between First Nations see Armstrong (2001, 1999). (Due to URL lengths and complexity the search paths for these publications rather than the URLs are given in the bibliography.)
Pointing, 1992, 156). For Langford and Pointing (1992, 159) the message of their research is clear: ‘Economic Conservatism’ is the ‘ideological axis’ along which Canadians without aboriginal ancestry ‘align aboriginal issues’. Langford and Pointing (1992, 159) suggest ‘aboriginal leaders’ should attempt to achieve maximum support from those non-aboriginal Canadians who are adverse to economic conservatism by playing on the common theme of the fight for ‘economic justice’.18

It is before this background of uncertainty that the following examples of inner-tribal contention are played out. Little written evidence of a discourse akin to the exclusive discourse is available for Canadian indigenous populations. It appears that in Canada the norm is more towards an all out negation of rights through the negation of the beneficiaries status. In other words the tendency is more towards a lasting fission in Forde’s (1938) understanding between locally active and new distant or inactive members than a temporary segmentation between the two.

**Tribal examples**

Nadasdy (2002) argued that the concept of property is entirely foreign to Yukon First Nation people in Canada, such as the Kluane First Nation. This means that to achieve recognition and settlements indigenous populations have to adapt to white settler nations’ ‘legal language’ (Nadasdy, 2002, 248) and thus transform their own understanding of human-land relations into the ‘language of property’, a language which Europeans have cultivated for centuries (Nadasdy, 2002, 253). Unlike in the USA where the government can unilaterally declare treaties with indigenous nations void the Canadian government cannot unilaterally extinguish indigenous rights, including ‘aboriginal title’ to land (Nadasdy, 2002, 248). This title goes back to the aboriginal rights King George III laid down in the Royal Proclamation in 1763, stating that all lands which had so far not been claimed either by the Hudson’s Bay Company or settlers ‘were to be reserved and held by the Crown on behalf of First Nations’ (Saku and Bone, 2000, 261).

Through the process of ‘compartmentalization’(Nadasdy, 2002, 256), the separation of different forms of land use such as hunting, logging, or mining, the Crown can still allow other forms of use and might even be able to sell the land without consent. This undermines the special status of the aboriginal title in the Canadian constitution. Further compartmentalisation introduces the idea of ‘rights’ (Nadasdy, 2002, 257), fundamental to the beneficiaries discourse. Rights are a concept alien, for example, to

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18In essence Langford and Pointing (1992) suggested that aboriginal leaders strive to achieve ‘hegemony’ as it was defined in the Russian labour movement where it meant the ‘need to form a revolutionary awareness and political will amongst the proletariat that went beyond their narrow corporate interests’ (Bellamy, 1994, xxvii).
members of the Kluane First Nation, where practices such as hunting and fishing are not based on rights by virtue of tribal affiliation but are the outcome of a complex interaction between humans and animals. The important distinction here are the underlying expectations, also underlying the inclusive and exclusive discourses. With rights come expectations, the fulfilment of the rights is expected from a source outside the self. As an outcome Nadasdy (2002, 257) reported community members persisting on their ‘hunting rights’ against the resistance of other community members who highlighted the traditional obligations towards animals which remained unfulfilled by the former members’ hunting practices. The similarities to the situation among Ngāi Tahu are clearly obvious with tribal members enrolling to access their rights and long-standing tribal members defending tribal membership status by claiming that all rights are the only reason why new members do sign up.\textsuperscript{19}

In regard to Nadasdy’s example of the unrestrained hunter it has to be pointed out that this hunter was embedded in the community and was reprimanded in a public meeting. In the case of unrecognised members of First Nations or recognised members living off the reserve interaction with reserve communities is often through courts. As mentioned earlier Canadian courts have found that ancestry to a member of a signatory tribe sufficed as proof of being a beneficiary and thus allowed to exercise treaty rights (Palmater, 2000). The responses of many First Nations members are a denial of beneficiaries status. So, rather than denying the rights due to lack of participation in a community individuals’ rights are denied based on the lack of state or tribal recognition. This can be seen in the remark of an Aboriginal lawyer commenting on the \textit{R. v. Marshall} case mentioned above: ‘As far as we are concerned, they are fishing illegally’ (cited in Palmater, 2000, 128). They in this case are officially unrecognised members of First Nations or recognised members living outside the reserve boundaries. These two groups are denied any rights although the court found that off-reserve unrecognised members who can prove ancestry to a member of a signatory tribe are allowed to exercise the rights granted in the treaties.

The commissioners of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples argued in 1996 that although First Nations should be allowed to determine their membership this right to create membership criteria ‘should not be an unfettered right’ (Palmater, 2000, 116). The reason behind this explicit curbing of First Nation powers was the acknowledgement of the commissioners that the difficult economic situation and the lack of land would lead to exclusionary criteria to keep the overall membership of

\textsuperscript{19}With rights, of course, also comes the question as to whether special group rights allow the bearer of rights to execute these rights to the detriment of others. Non-native fishermen have long made the case that Aboriginal fishing practices today are not necessarily sustainable any more (e.g. Obeidi et al., 2006).
eligible members small (Palmater, 2000, 116). Simultaneously, should the membership
criteria be too exclusive First Nations will in the near future have no more members to
distribute benefits to (Palmater, 2000, 118).²⁰

Also, to complicate matters further, section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
 Freedoms (Part I of the Constitution Act from 1982) is in direct opposition to section
77(1) of the Indian Act. As a result the claimants in the case Corbiere v. Canada (Minister
of Indian and Northern Affairs) in 1999 argued that they should be entitled to vote in the
elections of the Batchewana Band despite living off the reserve. The Court in this case
found that the criteria of living in reserves, as demanded in section 77(1) of the Indian
Act, was for many off-reserve recognised members only possible with huge expenses.
Recognised members living off-reserve and unrecognised members of First Nations
should be allowed to participate in their specific Aboriginal culture, irrespective of
recognition by the federal government or First Nations (Palmater, 2000, 131, f.). What
this also means is an implicit acceptance that aboriginal culture, whichever way
defined, happens within the boundaries of reserves or First Nations. Thus arguing for
the inclusion of Métis, unrecognised, and members living outside the reserve
boundaries into the reserve communities or First Nations can easily juxtapose two
localities against each other: the reserves as the lands of aboriginal culture and all
other parts of Canada as the lands of the white man’s culture. It is then not members
of the indigenous community who create a hierarchy of localities but the nation-state
and the social commentators. This argument is not intended as a denial of access for
all unrecognised members and those living outside the reserves, rather it points
towards the convergence of goals of the most unlikely of allies: locally active
indigenous peoples arguing for exclusive membership criteria and non-indigenous
critics. The aim is a continued hierarchy of places, with indigenous activities
occurring in specific locales only, most often at the geographical periphery of the
nation-state.

That not only membership in First Nations but the geographical boundaries as well
are contested can be seen in Hume’s (2000) description of the ever-widening claims to
land by the Nisga’a First Nation in Nass Valley, Canada. Far from unique the situation
is mirrored in other boundary disputes between First Nations as for example in the
case of Nunavut and neighbouring First Nations. Naturally this form of expansion
leads to friction between legally recognised First Nations and other First Nations in
the process of reaching agreements with the state.

²⁰Palmater’s argument reflects Kawharu’s (1975) explanation that genealogy and descent are oppo-
sites with the former producing group cohesion and the latter group division.
The young nation of Nunavut in Canada’s north, created in 1999, also shows that legal recognition is by no means the end of the struggles. Internal problems arise, or have already arisen before and during the negotiation process, as to how settlement money should be spent and to which degree Western certificates and standards have to be accepted within the territory of First Nations. One side argues that employment of outside specialists in professions such as nursing and administration is necessary while competency levels are built up among Inuit citizens of Nunavut, who make up 85% of the population. Opponents argue that such an undertaking is an acceptance of Western, more specifically Canadian, values and that it is questionable why traditional knowledge, e.g. healing practices, are not acknowledged (Geddes, 2001). This problem does not fit neatly into the inclusive or exclusive discourse or the broader issue of tribal segmentation it nevertheless contributes to friction within First Nations. While at the moment it appears the issue within Nunavut is directed towards non-Inuit living in Nunavut the same could easily be argued for returning Inuit who had lived outside Nunavut and are presented as having only limited knowledge about local practices.

Being a recognised Inuit in the area of today’s Nunavut nation is on the surface quite profitable: The 1993 land claim has brought nearly two million square kilometres under the control of the Inuit, ensures Inuit a percentage of the resource royalties the Canadian government collects, and ensures a share in the pay-out of C$1.148 billion stretched over 14 years. In reality, however, neotribal capitalism is at work with beneficiaries holding no personal land titles but a collective title and shares in a project which exploits, privately and for profit, the existing public resources. This private mining company also needs a road to, and a harbour in, Bathhurst Inlet. Representatives of the bureaucratic structure representing all Inuit in Nunavut, Nunavut Tunngavik Inc., argue that the bureaucratic structure has a responsibility to provide all Inuit with waged employment. Members of the community however remain unsure whether they will actually benefit from the construction of the road and the harbour or loose natural resources such as the caribou herds in the region (Boychuck and Di Menna, 2004; see also Marecic, 1999/2000, 282).

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21 Inuit never signed a treaty with the federal Canadian government and remained largely autonomous. After the collapse of the fur trade in the 1940s the Canadian government took measures to keep illnesses and famines in check and thus gained, in combination with a court case of the Canadian Supreme Court in 1939, a ‘de facto jurisdiction over the Inuit’ (Marecic, 1999/2000, 281). To achieve settlements Comprehensive Land Claim Agreements had to be signed by Aboriginal people. The agreements were in essence a waiver of all claims to ‘traditional hunting, fishing and gathering lands’ a for which in return the signatories received ‘legal title of selected lands, cash payment, rights to manage natural resources, hunting, fishing and trapping privileges, and the formation of economic development corporations’ (Saku and Bone, 2000, 262). The waiver of aboriginal rights is meant to guarantee the government a stable relationship in the future.

22 Usher (2003, 371), as the archetypical participant observer in his youth working as a surveyor for a large-scale dam project, pointed out that ‘for a good chunk of the twentieth century, you did not have to
9.5 CMC and inner-tribal segmentation

On liberal rights and eudaimonist responsibilities

So far the comparison has not involved CMC. I agree with Agre (2002b) that CMC does not create new issues but amplifies existing ones. As we have seen in previous chapters ideas about inner-tribal CMC depend on the individual’s understanding of tribal membership. For those members who see themselves and other members as beneficiaries by right of heritage using CMC to disseminate information is a useful and desirable option. For those members who see tribal membership as resulting from active and physical participation the use of CMC is seen as a more perilous undertaking possibly resulting in a reshuffling of inner-tribal structural relationships. Thus I argue that it is not CMC which causes the tensions within the tribe, but rather CMC amplifies the issues at hand. To clarify this position I will take a detour to the understanding of individuals in classical liberal and eudaimonist moral thought.

It is not the globalisation of tribal membership which causes issues within Ngāi Tahu and all the other examples mentioned in the above comparison. Rather, I believe, inner-tribal contention is caused by a) the centrality of rights and b) the separation of morality from politics in classical liberal thought (Norton, 1995). The possibility of world wide participation in inner-tribal affairs through the proliferation of CMC merely exacerbates the issue. Norton’s (1995) exegesis of moral philosophy since Machiavelli and the ethical theory of Greek philosophers is of help.

Classical liberalism holds that individuals possess indefeasible rights and the state’s primary task is to safeguard these rights, Norton (1995, 106) called this the ‘‘rights-primitive’ conception of the individual’. In opposition to this a eudaimonist understanding of society is based upon a ‘responsibilities-primitive’ understanding of the individual (Norton, 1995, 106). While modern moral thought derived individual responsibilities from the inalienable rights eudaimonist ethical thought derived rights from the individual responsibilities. The significant difference is the departure point. A departure point which in the case of liberalism is axiomatic, carrying the troubling issue that no real basis for these rights can be given. The historical situation explains why rights are axiomatic in classical liberalism: to break the hold of clerical and political institutions a ‘manifesto’ was needed rather than an argument which could be countered (Norton, 1995, 106).

Rather than furnishing individuals with inalienable rights a eudaimonist conception of the individual proposed responsibilities. We need to keep in mind, however, that

be Aboriginal to be pushed aside for progress’. It appears that there is a trajectory in settler nations from all citizens being subjected to progress to Natives/Aboriginal communities only and from state-driven to private programs.
— even today — responsibility is generally only awarded to those regarded as capable of carrying responsibility. Where modern authors such as Machiavelli saw individuals as self-centred and capable of any (un)thinkable morally depraved act — possibly quite fitting the time and environment in which Machiavelli wrote his *Il Principe* — eudaimonist conception of the individual started from a positive conception of the individual as having worth in itself. Thus the solution employed by many thinkers following Machiavelli is ‘moral minimalism’ (Norton, 1995, 20), adherence to rules. This form of morality can be expected from any individual, either on the basis of intrinsic morality or on the basis of fear of punishment. The primary responsibility of the individual in eudaimonist thought in contrast is moral development over a life time.

In Machiavelli’s time the divorce of private life from church rule and state influence through the introduction of axiomatic individual rights and the separation of moral issues from everyday life was a novelty. Today however individual rights have become, in the case of many indigenous nations, the issue members are faced with. Rights to special treatments are then based on ancestry or blood quanta, and, since they are inalienable, are not bound to any moral obligation. Inherent in the concept of rights is the expectation of the fulfilment of these rights by a source external to the individual.

As I have stated in previous chapters some locally active members emphasis the importance of local participation as criteria of tribal membership whereas other members focus on ancestry alone. The above detour into liberal and eudaimonist thought makes it clear that the exclusive discourse is based around an understanding of society similar to the understanding held by classical Greek philosophers, whereas the inclusive discourse is based on a modern liberal understanding of individual, inalienable rights. Two contentions are important here: The exclusive discourse with its aim of segmenting the tribe by peripheralising non-active and distant tribal members only fleetingly aligns itself with the eudaimonist conception of the individual, if necessary or useful locally active members will equally insist on a liberalist understanding of inalienable, individual rights. Further, supporters of exclusive membership criteria also, at least in the research interviews, reduced new members’ intentions to an economic level. This discursive strategy justified the more exclusive membership criteria.

**Indigenous use of CMC**

Following from the above several points have to be clarified in regard to indigenous use of CMC. First, the qualitative difference between the use of CMC within
CHAPTER 9. INDIGENITY AND CMC

indigenous and non-indigenous communities. Second, use of CMC is context-dependent. Third, the expectation of indigenous purity and the employment of the latest technology. Fourth, the issue of sacred knowledge. And fifth, the importance of distance.

Qualitative difference

The first point is that there is a qualitative difference between the use of CMC within indigenous settlement communities and non-indigenous communities. Indigenous settlement community is here meant as the members of the group which all share in government settlement benefits stemming from group affiliation. The need for a clearly defined membership in indigenous groups for the purpose of settlements has made non-localised indigeneity a possibility and reality. It has become, for some, a virtual identity ‘‘disconnected’ from its formal referent’ (Geschiere and Meyer, 1998, 606). This virtuality is in itself not particular to indigenous settlement communities. To name just a few other examples: expatriate Canadians try to stay in contact with other expatriate Canadians and some will possibly never return to Canada (Hiller and Franz, 2004; Winland, 1998), participants of the Kamehameha Roundtable or the Kava Bowl online discussion fora create a diasporic community of expatriate Polynesians (Franklin, 2003), many Native Americans and Aboriginal people of Canada partake in list serv discussion groups across tribal and ethnic boundaries (Iseke-Barnes, 2002), and Miller and Slater (2000) have shown that Trinidadians share a fondness for online encounters. Indigeneity and authenticity are topics of heated debates in many of these digital encounters and numerous rhetorical tools are used to identify discussion participants as frauds or as genuinely heralding from a certain locale. I still believe, however, that there is a fundamental difference between this use of CMC to create an identity and the use within indigenous settlement communities. The difference I am referring to is the reality of having to share and communally manage settlement benefits such as redress payments, landownership, and special rights. This means that distant or new members are caught in a bind. These members can either be inactive, thus reinforcing the stereotype created by some locally active members, or these members have to continuously face criticism until they are fully accepted by supporters of more exclusive membership criteria. With acceptance being based on physical participation it is difficult to see how distant members will be able to gain acceptance.

It is the understanding that tribal membership is based on physical participation which brought Howe (1998) to conclude that and entitle his article Cyberspace Is No Place for Tribalism. He pointed out that ‘the American Indian ‘technogentsia’ ’ made CMC appear inherently positive and thus take the choice of use away from the user
(Howe, 1998, 21). Non-use is seen as detrimental to the survival of the person. For Howe (1998, 22) individual ‘[s]urvival in the modern world may be dependent on one’s ability to navigate in cyberspace, but the survival of tribalism could conceivably be contingent on tribal communities’ [sic] refusing to connect to the Internet’. The basis of Howe’s argument is that it is not the individual Native Americans but the tribes which ‘are sovereign’ (Howe, 1998, 22) and the use of CMC to the ‘personal aggrandizement of tribal members’ (Howe, 1998, 23) might therefore not be in the best interest of the tribe, a community which ‘requires full sensory interaction between tribal members, on the one hand, and between tribal communities and their surrounding environments, on the other hand’ (Howe, 1998, 23). For Two Horses (1998, 38, f.) Native Americans with ‘this level of technological access’, access to CMC at home, are an anomaly, and are most definitely too far removed economically and socially ‘from the bulk of the reservation populations’ to possess the ‘type of [interpersonal] connection required to know the tribal mind-set’.23

In line with my argument in this thesis statements like these are part of the exclusive discourse pointing towards a specific locale and the lived community as important constituting factors of the tribal experience rather than the mere exchange of words on a computer screen. The downside is the exclusion of urban indigeneity, a downside which is quite possibly the reason for statements like the above.

**Context-dependent use**

The second point I want to make considers the different uses of CMC within different contexts. As we have seen in previous chapters the vast majority of my interview partners were using CMC on a regular basis. Further I have shown that within families CMC was not only accepted but strongly advocated. Many of my interview partners, mostly those who opposed the inclusive discourse, however, insisted that face-to-face conversations were the best way to deal with issues within the tribe, a stance hardly unique for Ngāi Tahu or Māori. Sherry (2002) for example described the Dine’s struggle for recognition and sustainable forestry use. The stance towards modern technologies of those tribal members involved in the struggle with bureaucratic hurdles and preconceptions was summarised by one of his participants: ‘city people have phone trees and E-mail. Adella has her pickup’ (Sherry, 2002, 206, f.). The point here is that while new technologies are used within some contexts in other contexts these technologies represent undesirable philosophies. In other words while many supporters of exclusive membership criteria were privately participants

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23Ironically Michael Two Horses was also the author of *The Official Wanabi Tribe Homepage* listing other websites about Native Americans hosted by non-native people. Since his death in 2004 the website has been discontinued.
of the ‘network society’ (Castells, 2004a) the same people rejected the advantages of this form of communication in other contexts and highlighted the potential downside.

The reasons for the context-dependency lies, I believe, in the construction of the self through a distancing towards the other. In the current ‘thickening global landscape’ (Poster, 1998, 186) and the emphasis of global influences on the local, it is then particularly important to look within the boundaries of ethnic groups. For the situation in New Zealand this means a struggle for fiscal retribution to the point that several tribes, including Ngāi Tahu, have relativity clauses into their settlements, which means the redress payments of tribal settlements have to be in proportion to the overall settlement money paid out. The point of reference then becomes the tribe rather than the ethnic group or category. The other is not necessarily always the obvious choice, Pākehā, but is also located within the same ethnic group. Further, within these tribes, or at least within the Ngāi Tahu tribe as portrayed by my interview partners, Poster’s (1998, 186) ‘self-construction through the other’ has become increasingly volatile due to the ease of transcontinental communication. The other is searched and found not only without and within the ethnic category, but within the tribe in its new, bureaucratised form. For many to use CMC for communication within the family is acceptable, to use it for communication with the other, however, is not.

Purity and progress

The third point is the expectation of indigenous purity and the employment of the latest technology. Sissons (2005b, 38, f.) used Douglas’ idea of dirt as a ‘matter out of place’ to show that many indigenes are ‘caught again in a binary not of their own making’ (Sissons, 2005b, 40). Urban indigenous populations are then inauthentic and in fact endanger the binary of the ‘pure and natural’ indigenes (Sissons, 2005b, 40) on the one side and non-indigenous, urban citizens on the other.

The situation in regard to technology, especially CMC, is similar. Some argue that CMC will ultimately not help indigenous populations but rather, to stay with Douglas’ terminology, sully the indigenous mind. Savard (1998, 89; see also Two Horses, 1998; Howe, 1998) for example pointed out that although hopes for the preservation of Inuit culture through the use of CMC is high: ‘... when all is said and done, what we are left with are issues, ways of doing things, and rhetoric that are essentially Anglo-European, rather than Native’. Others, often indigenes themselves, demand that latest technologies are made available to indigenous populations: ‘We don’t want to see Indians or tribal governments in the future becoming technopeasants to the new information robber barons’ (Randy Ross cited in Rayl and
Bleck, 1993, No page numbers). Some have argued that the use of specific technologies, e.g. email, is due to a ‘distinctly cultural propensity for staying connected’ and thus constitutes not a ‘disruption’ but an ‘extension ... of historical interaction patterns’ (Monroe, 2002, 286). Ginsburg (1994b) argued strongly for the use of all new media by indigenous populations, not least to show the limits of knowledge and the depth of misunderstandings (Ginsburg, 1994a). She also used the Aboriginal nickname for television as ‘the third invader’, after Europeans and alcohol, to point to the uneasy relationship between indigenous populations and media usage (Ginsburg, 1991, 106).

**Of sacred knowledge and sacrificial lambs**

The fourth important point is the issue of knowledge sharing and sacred knowledge. Forte (1999, 2002) researched the use of CMC in South America, specifically among native communities in the Caribbean. He pointed out that ‘we may be starting to witness a pattern whereby the network itself becomes the Indigene, with the many local groups serving as almost or potentially interchangeable platforms’ (Forte, 1999, 10), the creation of an ‘indigenous macro-community that is trans-local and constitutes a virtual meta-indigeneity’ (Forte, 2002). Indigenous populations off-line are being transformed into online ‘N-digenes’, the ‘particular electronic landscapes’ these groups ‘inhabit’turn into ‘iScapes’, and the production and consumption of material available online is part of the ‘V.E.R.A.city loop’, a continuous feedback loop of Visibility, Embodiment, Recognition, and Authenticity (Forte, 2002). For Forte (2002) ‘symbols and discourses’ are shared between indigenous groups around the world. This sharing goes to the extent that rituals are created which are considered and presented as indigenous in general, however not necessarily for the area they are presented as indigenous to (Forte, 1999).

I agree that discourses and discursive strategies are shared and have been long before CMC. One example here is the reliance, and subsequent dismissal, of Māori protesters on terminology borrowed from the African-American movements. This form of sharing however is distinctly different to the sharing of symbols which Forte described as ever present in South America. Again I believe the economic situation is the explaining factor here. In the situation of South American native communities economic redress for past mistreatment lies in the distant future, at best.

Distinctiveness between native communities is sacrificed for any recognition at all. In countries where recognition for a broader group is however achieved and economic redress is becoming a reality distinctiveness within this larger group is of importance.

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24Ross was at the time part of AIT, American Indian Telecommunications, ‘the first nonprofit group dedicated to promoting the grass-roots Native American computing movement’ (Rayl and Bleck, 1993, No page numbers).
Consider the example of chief Blue Snake, a computer consultant without Native American descent, who initiated individuals into his particular tribe through a set of online rituals, which were a mixture of rituals belonging to several tribes. Exposed as a fraud, Blue Snake’s account was terminated by his ISP, after the intervention of tribal authorities which pointed out that the rituals had indeed been a mixture rather than one specific tribe’s rituals (Zimmerman et al., 2000). Another example was given by one of my interview partners who explained that he continuously had to keep "an eye" [18] on the graphic designer of the website, who was of Ngāti Porou descent and attempted to incorporate symbols relevant to Ngāti Porou on the Ngāi Tahu website.

Also, not part of Forte’s (1999; 2002) discussion at all, is the issue of sacred knowledge. Sacred and private knowledge has become an important topic among indigenous and non-indigenous peoples with the latter often demanding access. In the case of this research one interview partner argued that due to the current circumstances, i.e. urbanisation and the need to make a living, old ways of information dissemination were no longer viable, which is why he decided to publish a book on his family’s traditions, usually considered private. Of course other interview partners were strongly opposed to such measures and so are many other indigenous people around the world (Two Horses, 1998, 34, f.; Zimmerman et al., 2000; Iseke-Barnes, 2002; Leclair and Warren, 2006; Roy and Alonzo, 2003).

The resurrection of distance

The fifth point regarding the use CMC within indigenous settlement populations is based solely on the findings of my research. It is the argument that distance is still very much a factor. The point I want to make here is a simple one. It is the correlation between increasing distance and acceptance of segmentation attempts by supporters of the exclusive discourse. Most overseas interview partners accepted that their input was not necessarily welcomed by locally active members. The group with the most trouble accepting refusal were those members who lived away from their hāpu, whether still on the South Island or on the North Island, but attempted to participate remotely and visited regularly. Feelings of being rebuked despite regularly contributing some "sweat to the place” [43] is an important part here, but it is also the differing perceptions of local knowledge. Many local members in the interviews held the belief that only locals can really know the issues, whereas many non-local members maintained that more information would help people understand the local situation better, but also that they still had enough knowledge to contribute meaningfully. Distance then seems to have a curious effect: Remaining within the country lead, at least in my research, to a longing for connectedness and a feeling of
9.6 Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued two related points. First, attempts at segmenting indigenous populations from within and centralisation and bureaucratisation, as described in the previous chapters, do occur in other nation-states as well. Second, CMC is not the cause of the segmentation, but it fuels the discursive strategies aimed at segmentation. To arrive at these conclusions I have shown that the notion of authenticity is used by non-indigenous and indigenous populations alike. When invoked as criteria from non-indigenous populations the notion of authenticity is used as a way of questioning the legitimacy of indigenous claims to redress. Historical continuity and geographical remoteness become the standards against which indigenous claims are measured. From within indigenous populations some members use the same arguments to discredit new members. Indigeneity is then portrayed rooted in locality, more often than not peripheral locality. A result of this understanding is that clear legal definitions and relational approaches to indigeneity, emphasising the interaction between nation-state governments and smaller groups, are shown as being incommensurable with the reality of indigenous life. Consequently urban or internationalised indigeneity, even if relying on reservations or particular areas as ‘homelands’ (Greaves, 2002, 122), is then deemed inauthentic. There are many reasons for the attempted segmentation two, however, do stand out. The first reason is the change in the economic situation resulting from settlements with the nation-state, the second is the striving for political autonomy, both from the nation-state and distant or non-active tribal members.

As I have pointed out earlier the situation in the USA and Canada are in many aspects similar to the situation in New Zealand. There are, however, also differences. In the USA and in Canada clear legal definitions of indigeneity relying on blood quanta do exist. In both countries, however, courts have ruled that tribes can define, to a certain degree, their own entry criteria and that recognition as an indigene is not reliant on recognition by tribal authorities. But, equally, the courts in both countries have pointed out that only a limited number of cases of governmental recognition without tribal recognition will occur, in fact be possible, since the tribal registers created in the heyday of Western classificatory endeavours are the only way to gain recognition. A further difference is that members of Canadian First Nations appear to aim at a fission

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25Since the group of overseas participants was reasonably small this finding could have been produced by the sampling technique rather than being a feature of overseas members.
with members who only fit the legal definition of indigeneity, rather than at a peripheralisation of these members.

Lastly I have shown in this chapter that indigenous pre- and post-settlement populations use CMC in a specific way. Forte’s (1999; 2002) indigenes in South America mix and match rituals, symbols, and behaviour seen as generically indigenous and easily identifiable as such to gain any recognition at all. Unlike this, I have argued, indigenous settlement populations, both before a settlement is achieved and once it has been achieved, use CMC to portray their cultural difference and that therefore, twisting Handler’s (1984, 4) logic of cultural possession as precursor to national existence on its head, the settlement is/was justified. This brings with it the singularity of culture, one nation has one culture, and thus cultural diversity is, to some degree, a dangerous good to have when attempting to achieve a settlement.
Chapter 10

Conclusion

10.1 Introduction

In this concluding chapter I will provide a quick summary of the thesis argument, and the preceding chapters. Following this I will draw attention to several issues. First, I will reiterate the fluidity of the discursive positions described in this thesis and the influence ethical scrutiny has in a factionalised tribe. Secondly, I will discuss the question whether or not the use of CMC within the Ngāi Tahu tribe will bring changes in the future, short-term or long-term. Thirdly, I will discuss whether or not the situation described in this thesis is specific to Ngāi Tahu or not. In the last section of this chapter I will outline the limitations of this research and possibilities for future research.

10.2 Argument and chapter synopsis

In this thesis I have argued that CMC within the Ngāi Tahu tribe emphasises existing inner-tribal tensions but at the same time offers opportunities to ease these tensions. To develop this argument the thesis was structured as follows.

In the second chapter I described the methodology underlying the research strategy and how this methodology has influenced the research process. Following on from this I gave an in-depth description of the interviews, including the sampling strategies, the interview process, and the interview statistics. Next I described the archival research, and why some of the research methods failed. Further I explained a) the issues involved in the use of computers for the analysis of qualitative data and how I countered these issues, b) the ethical considerations involved in anthropological research in general and research into the use of CMC in particular, and c) why the research findings are valid.
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The third chapter set the larger background for this research: tribal segmentation. In the first part of the chapter I focused on some of the works on Māori society published at the beginning of the twentieth century. These early works and the three-tier structure of Māori society proposed in them remain influential to this day. Turning away from the New Zealand context I then presented some of the most influential anthropological works on tribal segmentation, a concept ‘indigenous’ (Strathern, 1988, 90) to the African continent, in particular Tiv and Nuer culture. Following on from this I discussed criticism regarding the concept of tribal segmentation, in particular Sahlins’ (1961, 322) widening of the analytical gaze to the use of the segmentary lineage system as a form of ‘predatory expansion’. Sahlins argued that tribal unity was a response to external threats and therefore temporary rather than static. In the next section I discussed works focusing on the early concept of Māori society and the impact European arrival had on this structure. The distinction of potential and actualised membership in tribal communities formed an important part of this section since an ‘ambilateral’ (Firth, 1973, 112) or ‘optative’ (Firth, 1957, 5) system of affiliation is largely based on choice (Firth, 1963, 28). The other important part of this section was the change introduced to what was understood as the pre-European structure of Māori society by the individualisation of the labour force and urbanisation. In the following section I presented works criticising the functionalist framework of anthropological analysis of Māori society. Large-scale theories aimed at explaining social cohesion were replaced by a focus on individual actions (Barnard, 2000, 80). The return of tribes and their influence, political, economic, and cultural, were the focus of many of the works presented in this section. In the last section of chapter three I discussed works specifically focusing on the Ngāi Tahu tribe, in particular the rise of the centralised bureaucratic structure. The theme running through the third chapter was the ongoing process of inner-tribal segmentation, i.e. the constant waxing and waning of groups and their political influence.

Chapter four gave an overview over the existing literature on CMC and societies. First I discussed some of the works regarding the influence of CMC on communality, the political process, and on social science in general and the process of social research in particular. The wide variety of interpretations presented in this section of chapter four highlighted the fact that social appropriation of technology varies widely. Due to these variances in appropriation there are few universal effects of technologies on social processes and the study of these processes. In the following section I introduced the ‘network society’ (Castells, 2000a, 2004a), in particular the groundedness of the network society in the struggles specific to the individual nation-states. After the short introduction I used the concept to give an overview over
New Zealand’s situation, and to establish whether or not Ngāi Tahu tribal members are part of a network society.

In the fifth chapter I gave some historical background information on the Ngāi Tahu tribe. I described the settlement of the South Island by the tribes preceding Ngāi Tahu and the incorporation of these tribes into the newly created Ngāi Tahu tribe. I then described the ecological circumstances encountered by Ngāi Tahu and the strategies to cope with them. Following on from this I explored some of the effects of European colonisation. I argued that tribal members adapted quickly to new technologies, but that Ngāi Tahu culture was deeply affected by the sale of large parts of the South Island, the loss of many tribal members to introduced diseases, and later the nation-wide process of urbanisation. The last section of chapter five focused on the legal battles with the Crown from 1840s onwards and the settlement in the late 1990s. With the settlement the centralised bureaucratic structure gained in importance and I described the professionalisation of inner-tribal communication processes. Handler (1985) argued that historical information was often misused to create the picture of a geographically bounded and historically continuous entity. Against this I argued that the historical information given in chapter five showed the fragmented nature of the Ngāi Tahu tribe with the different segments often pursuing divergent or even opposing goals, but also at times entering into alliances to pursue common goals.

Chapter six focused on the efforts of TRoNT to centralise, bureaucratise, and corporatise the tribe. First I focused on the centralisation of the iwi, the subsumption of earlier tribes under the single name Ngāi Tahu. Historically and in the present, dealings with the government were only successful through an alignment with Ngāi Tahu, due to this potential members of earlier tribes often trace their whakapapa to their Ngāi Tahu ancestors rather than their ancestors of other tribal traditions. Following on from this I showed the increasing bureaucratisation of the tribe, starting with the introduction of Governor Grey’s rūnanga, territorially organised institutions cutting across the less static boundaries of the pre-European hapū. Next I described the introduction of the first centralised Ngāi Tahu body, the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board, the revival of the by then abandoned rūnanga in the 1980s, and the need of a centralised bureaucratic body for the purpose of a settlement. Further, I explained that today the tribal bureaucratic structure, TRoNT, has become a necessity, i.e. few tribal members can see a future for the tribe without TRoNT or some other form of centralised bureaucracy. Following on from this I used Smith’s (1989) six characteristics of ethnic communities to describe the efforts by TRoNT to increase tribal centralisation and bureaucratisation. Then I showed the increasing corporatisation of TRoNT and the discourse building on this corporatisation and the centralisation of the iwi, the inclusive discourse. The last section of chapter six
focused on the use of CMC to increase the centralisation, bureaucratisation, and corporatisation of the iwi. Further I showed that CMC is advertised as a tool which allows distant and passive members to participate in the tribe.

The seventh chapter described the resistance of many locally active tribal members against inner-tribal CMC. Castells (2004a, 38) called this the ‘grass-rooting’ of the space of flows’, an attempt of locally active members to emphasise the importance of locality. Following on from this I argued that locally active members use this emphasis on locality as a discursive practise to retain control over their lives through a peripheralisation of distant and passive members. I used the views on the dissemination of whakapapa information as the basis for this argument. Firth (1963) pointed out that in an ‘ambilateral’ (Firth, 1973, 112) or ‘optative’ (Firth, 1957, 5) system of affiliation all parties involved have a choice, thus giving locally active members the opportunity to reject new tribal members. I argued that many locally active members emphasised local participation as criterion for tribal membership, thus creating an exclusive discourse to counter the inclusive discourse proposed by TRoNT. For many locally active members ancestry was not sufficient and rights within the tribe were tied to the fulfilment of other conditions. CMC and the possibilities it offers are then seen as undermining the status of locally active members and as a threat to hapū and whānau culture.

Chapter eight focused on the opposite movements to the previous two chapters, the creation of family-oriented networks. Many interview partners reported staying in touch with their families, often over great distances, via CMC. In this chapter I have shown that most proponents of the exclusive discourse did not maintain their expectations of local participation when communicating with family members. The result of this, I argued, is the creation of many smaller networks, family networks clustered around family websites. Consequently the peripheralising force of the exclusive discourse is lessened, with distant and passive family members being able to communicate with other family members. I further argued that the inclusive discourse is also weakened, since family communication is regarded as unrelated to the tribe. CMC within the Ngāi Tahu tribe then shows the fragmented nature of the tribe. The tribe as a network of many smaller largely autonomous networks, rather than a unified and homogenous tribe.

In the ninth chapter I gave some comparative material, focusing mostly on the USA and Canada. I argued that the inclusive and exclusive discourse can be found in these states, and that settlement processes are fuelling these discourses through the need for clearly defined tribal boundaries. For Ngāi Tahu ancestry is the entry criterion into the tribe. In the case of Canada and the USA additional blood quanta introduce
further pressures. I argued that CMC does then not create the tensions resulting from situation but only amplifies these tensions. In the last section of the chapter I presented several general findings regarding the influence of indigeneity on the use of CMC and vice versa.

10.3 Groups

As already mentioned in the introduction to this thesis the groups presented in this thesis are far from stable. Metge (1995, 78) described the Māori whānau in detail but at the same time argued that ‘[r]eal life whānau do not and should not be expected to conform too closely to the constructed model’. This is also true for the groups I have described in this thesis. Some locally active members were at the same time employees of TRoNT, and some distant members argued from a position within the exclusive discourse despite knowing that it would greatly reduce their possibilities to participate in tribal affairs. The variation is even greater when regarded over a life-time. Some formerly passive members began to revive the links to their scattered whānau and to their hapū, while other passive members remained passive after being criticised by locally active members. As I observed at a hui, some locally active members had previously argued for the creation of a centralised bureaucratic structure but had since become vocal critics of TRoNT. Their earlier engagement, however, was noted by others who reminded these critics of their role in founding the bureaucratic structure. The terminology used in this thesis is then generalised and does not fit all tribal members and many interview partners lived their tribal lives in the spaces between the groups, sometimes passive, sometimes active, at times arguing from within the exclusive discourse but then switching to the inclusive discourse. Which discursive strategy is used is then dependent on the topic and who the person is talking about or talking to.

The groups described are also reliant on each other, structurally bound together. Without the steep increase in tribal members in the 1990s the tribe would have had a difficult stance in settlement negotiations with the government. Thus for all their resistance against distant and passive members locally active members are indebted to these members. Equally the distant and passive members rely on the locally active members, without whom a settlement would have not occurred at all. Above all the family networks cut across these distinctions with some family members being active and others remaining passive. For most interview partners family ties were stronger than negative perceptions and only a very few locally active members stated that they would deny any information to other family members unless these family members participated actively in the family and tribal life.
Before this backdrop of inner-tribal tensions, factionalisation, and fluidity of group membership the influence of the Ngāi Tahu Research Consultation Committee (NTRCC) and the Human Ethics Committee of the University of Otago pose several questions. Obtaining ethical approval has become one of the most important steps in the progress in many research projects. In the case of my research obtaining ethical approval was, in comparison, a reasonably straightforward matter. On a recent symposium on the employment options for PhD candidates other social researchers reported long waiting times and several re-writes of the applications. In the case of this research the entire process from the writing of the application to the final acceptance took just over six months, if memory serves correctly. This, in retrospect, fast turn around was, I believe, largely due to my supervisors’ experience with the wording of applications to the ethics committee.

I do believe that ethics committees serve a useful purpose in upholding ethical standards. There are, nonetheless, several issues worth noting. First, ethical research needs to take into consideration the agency of research participants, especially so in anthropology where the focus of inquiry often shifts between individuals’ actions and larger, cultural or societal forces. In the case of my research waiting to obtain ethical clearance from the Human Ethics Committee and the NTRCC meant reducing my research participants to a state somewhere between minors and adults capable of making their own decisions. Only one research participant was aware of the involvement of the NTRCC. He argued that as an adult he should be allowed to partake in a study irrespective of the views of any committee, particularly when some of the members on the NTRCC were, in his view, more concerned with the accumulation of influence than with the well-being of other tribal members. There are two parts to this argument. One part questions the committees’ powers to interfere with an individual’s decisions. The other part leads to my second point, the tribal politics influencing the process of gaining ethical clearance.

This research examined the inner-tribal tensions of the Ngāi Tahu tribe, therefore obtaining consent from the NTRCC and listening to the objections of one interview partner were further grist for the anthropological mill. The participant’s objections highlighted many of the inner-tribal tensions, such as the dislike of any form of bureaucratic authority by many tribal members and the long-standing conflicts between some rūnanga. These tensions were the focus of this research and were later confirmed in other research interviews. Since the NTRCC had only one demand, the use of a cultural advisor, I am not sure to which extent other research questions will be hindered by the additional scrutiny of the NTRCC at all. Other researchers concerned with other questions, however, might find it more difficult to understand the underlying inner-tribal group dynamics and how these dynamics can influence the NTRCC.
The above point leads to the third issue, the potential ‘balkanisation of social science’ (Merton 1973: p 13), a view, which only grants insiders the capability to understand a specific culture. My research proposal was accepted by the NTRCC. This, however, does not mean that other proposals will be accepted as easily. This might sound like a conspiracy theory, I was, however, frequently reminded during the interviews that only Ngāi Tahu themselves are able to understand Ngāi Tahu culture. These assertions can be read as a declaration that my findings can be questioned due to my status as an outsider. Considering the factionalised state of the tribe even tribal members from other rūnanga or distant, non-active members could be seen as outsiders. Thus the label of ‘outsider’ research can be potentially attached to most research concerning Ngāi Tahu. This criticism is common. More worrying is the capability of the NTRCC to influence or even stop research from the design stage onwards. An option, which is used all too frequently by ‘elite’ groups’ of any cultural background (May, 1993, 37).

The fourth issue concerns the use of anonymity and the field of online research. Anonymity of the research participants was the ethics committee’s main concern for this research. While ‘external confidentiality’ is relatively easy to achieve ‘internal confidentiality’ is far more difficult (Tolich 2004, 101). This is especially the case in a text-based medium, such as an online forum, with a selected membership. In the case of this research access to the tribal online forum was not sought, since I cannot claim any tribal ancestry. For researchers with access to online fora with selected membership the issue is to find a way to use information from these fora without disclosing too much information about the original poster. It will be interesting to see what techniques will be used to avoid the ethical pitfalls of internal confidentiality. The role of ethics committee might shift a guardian of research participants to a more active role, instigating and advising on possibilities for ethical research in online encounters. Considering the resistance of many locally active members against distant and non-active members, the role of the NTRCC, a local committee making decisions for an entire, heavily factionalised tribe, is then debatable. We can only hope that local, tribal, and research interests receive equal consideration.

One possibility to achieve internal confidentiality is to attribute one participant’s answers to one or more ‘invented’ participants. This technique avoids recognition through the cross-referencing of quotes, but also distorts the ‘n’, the number of research participants stated in the study write-up (Tolich, private conversation, 2006). For online fora this technique is only of limited usefulness since it is possible to search for comments made by posters. Thus claiming a different source for a specific quote can easily be falsified.
10.4 Revisiting the literature

Galston (1999, 59) argued that it is ‘far too early’ for reliable predictions about the influence of CMC on societies. As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, a certain scepticism regarding the impact of new technologies is necessary. Mosco (2004, 119) put this scepticism into words, arguing that from a historical perspective ‘... the rise of cyberspace amounts to just another in a series of interesting, but ultimately banal exercises in the extension of human tools’. Whether or not the possibilities offered by the new tools will be taken up by users is again a different question (Bimber, 1998; Ranerup, 2001). Further, as I have shown in this thesis, CMC is perceived and appropriated in many ways. In this section I will revisit the literature presented in chapter three and four. I will begin with the literature concerning CMC, since this thesis has shown that the use of CMC is embedded in existing structures and tensions.

Computer-mediated communication

Communality

Early within the history of CMC Licklider and Taylor (1968) argued that this new form of communication would change the way humans interact. Friends and acquaintances would be chosen because of a ‘commonality of interests’ rather than due to ‘accidents of proximity’ (Licklider and Taylor, 1968, 31). Nearly two decades later Wellman et al. (1996, 231) argued along the same lines, as did Hampton (2004, 217), who pointed out that CMC overcomes the ‘friction of space’ which had thus far constrained human interaction. Wellman et al. (2001a,b) further argued that the new form of communication brings with it an increased level of participation in on-line and off-line communities. But Wellman et al. (2001a, 448) also stated that ‘community commitment’ is on the decline due to what Galston (1999, 59) called the ‘cost-free entrance and exit’ options of communities based on CMC. For Hampton (2003, 418) these ‘dense networks of weak social ties’ were one of the main characteristics of the communities based on CMC. But, as Hampton (2004) pointed out in an other publication, stronger links also developed through CMC with members of far-flung families discovering hitherto unknown family members. Putnam (2000, 411) argued against all this that CMC was only capable of reinforcing rather than replacing ‘place-based, face-to-face, enduring social networks’.

Based on the findings of this research we can see that all of the above scenarios are possible. The actual outcomes, however, rely more on people’s intentions than the capabilities of CMC. In this research family websites and the alternative websites
discussing inner-tribal affairs are examples for the negation of space, and, as described in chapter eight, family members found each other online. But on the other side other tribal members attempted to increase Hampton’s (2004, 217) ‘friction of space’. Equally many interview partners hoped for an increase in participation through CMC, but simultaneously many interview partners regarded themselves as insufficiently informed to participate in inner-tribal debates and were quite content to remain inactive. At the same time Putnam’s (2000, 411) idea that CMC is incapable of replacing off-line communities is not quite correct either, at least for this research. As described in the previous chapters some families used websites to communicate across long distances and only visited infrequently. This brings us to a distinctive feature of the Ngāi Tahu online community. Unlike other online communities entry and exit into the Ngāi Tahu tribe is not easy and different rules might apply to Ngāi Tahu than to other online communities.

Political process

Lewis (2000) and Siapera (2006) pointed towards the use of CMC to subvert dominant discourses. Coleman (1999) argued the opposite, namely that political elites used CMC to strengthen their positions of influence. Bimber (1998) pointed out that opportunities are not equivalent with the actualisation of these opportunities. Thus, an increase in opportunities to communicate does not necessarily lead to an increase in communication. Ranerup (2001) made the same finding and further questioned whether the CMC which had occurred indeed make any difference to the political processes within the community she had studied. For other authors CMC and the political process are more encompassing than the immediate political activities such as elections. Ronfeldt (1992, 283) introduced the idea of a ‘cyberocracy’ and pointed towards divergent effects of the increased use of information sharing. He argued that for some parts of society new ways of political participation would become available, whereas other parts of the population would experience more state surveillance than ever. Mehta and Darier (1998, 155) argued similarly that CMC offered opportunities for control but also for resistance.

This embeddedness of technology in cultures and their political conflicts has been visible throughout this thesis. As van Meijl (1998, 391) argued, democracy is a ‘multivalent concept’, which is used as the justification for a great variety of ‘political and cultural practices’. An answer to the question regarding the democratising effect of CMC on the tribal community then needs to take into consideration that democracy is understood differently among tribal members. As described in chapter six and seven turning the iwi into a democratic community with individual rights for tribal members has different effects on all tribal members. For distant and passive
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Tribal members individual and democratic rights are an important pathway to participation in the iwi. For the iwi corporate an individualisation of tribal members leads to an increase in political influence over the iwi membership. Lastly, for locally active tribal members a democratisation of the iwi means an increase in influences from the outside. It is not surprising then that some locally active tribal members resist the democratisation of the iwi. To avoid confusion: Currently democratic elections are already taking place, with election papers being mailed out to distant tribal members. Increased democratisation in this case means the gathering of further information from the tribal members. One interview partner for example saw potential uses for CMC in the area of policy generation. Dombrowski (2002) analysed logging practices in Alaska and argued that non-local tribal members of Alaskan Native American tribes lobbied the clear cutting of large areas of forest to raise profits whereas locally active members preferred long-term planning. Citing conservation policies affecting local Ngāi Tahu fishermen the interview partner pointed out that the opposite to Dombrowski’s example could also be the case.

Again, as for the question regarding communality, this thesis gives examples for different conclusions. Dominant discourses are threatened through the use of CMC on alternative websites, while the iwi’s bureaucratic structure uses CMC to further tribal centralisation, and corporatisation. It is too early to say whether or not the use of CMC has any influence on the political processes within the tribe at all.

**Network society**

Castells (2004a) argued that the network society builds on existing social structures and institutions. From the above, and the previous chapters, it is obvious that this is the case for Ngāi Tahu. Other authors have also argued that CMC is embedded in social structures. Escobar (1994, 211) pointed out that ‘cyberia ... emerges out of particular cultural conditions and in turn helps to create new ones’, Miller and Slater (2000, 5) argued that CMC happens ‘within mundane social structures and relations that they may transform but ... they cannot escape into a self-enclosed cyberian apartness’, Agre (2002a, 185) pointed out that ‘culture runs deeper than any technology and so do its conflicts’, and Kling’s (2000, 218; see also Kling, 1999, 1980) ‘social informatics’ are aimed at deciphering the interplay of humans, machines, information, and locality.

As I have shown in this thesis tensions arise around the topic of cultural knowledge, particularly the dissemination of this knowledge. It is also the area in which CMC can offer many opportunities and thus poses the greatest risk to those who resist a digitisation and world-wide accessibility of their culture. Many interview partners
pointed towards past methods of information dissemination to justify digitisation of cultural information such as family histories. As mentioned in chapter seven one interview partner had published a book on family traditions. This interview partner regarded the "traditional game" of learning family stories and other family related information in a face-to-face setting as "just not feasible" anymore with family members being dispersed all over New Zealand and in some cases even, if only temporarily, all over the world [39]. Another interview partner pointed out that a lot of tribal history had been recorded and is accessible to all tribal members, who, according to this interview partner, are not actively looking for the information, preferring to consider the information secret and perhaps long lost. A third interview partner argued that all tribal and family knowledge should be brought together because knowledge had "been dispersed and scattered [...] and hidden" [18] and important information had been lost because of this. Introducing historian Carrington’s writings on Ngāi Tahu history Tau (2008b, 9) described Ngāi Tahu as...

... a modern urbanised people scattered throughout the North and South Islands of New Zealand, with significant populations in Sydney, Brisbane and Melbourne. Food-gathering expeditions now tend to be family picnics rather than week-long camps, and communal living is regarded as an uncomfortable activity, to be undertaken reluctantly.

Despite these changes, or because of them, Tau (2008b, 9) argued that there was a need for books such as the Carrington text:

The Trust Board agreed to publish the manuscript to meet a real desire by tribal members - many of whom were dislocated and assimilated into mainstream society - to learn about their past.

One group of interview partners argued then for open information dissemination. Further, with the accumulation of information about tribal members through such means as the World of Information project, described in chapter six, it becomes possible to provide new members with a large amount of information about their family members, past and present. Legal considerations, such as the Privacy Act, however, form a framework to which TRoNT is bound.2

Another group of interview partners argued that family and other cultural knowledge should be guarded and only disseminated face-to-face. Kamira (2003, 473) posited that Māori possess ‘specific cultural features that align with information technology’, namely the knowledge of ‘networks’, since ‘Māori ... live in a culture that

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disseminates knowledge through networks’. Against this I have shown in this thesis that a) the entry criteria to these networks are often high, i.e. local residence and participation, and that b) not all members of these networks see CMC as a positive contribution to their tribal lives. Metge’s (1995, 69) description of whakapapa books as ‘never complete in themselves’ further substantiates my claim of high entry criteria. Only further instructions and ‘guidance’ from the ‘custodians’ of the books make the information accessible (Metge, 1995, 69), but whether or not the custodians are willing to share information is a different question altogether.

The scenarios described in chapter six and seven then fit into Castells’ (2004a) description of the network society as based on existing social structures and the power struggles inherent in these structures. The scenarios also fit the second characteristic of the network society, the ongoing reliance on the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, which are part of every form of communication. The third scenario, the creation of a tribal network of family networks, shows the work of ‘switchers’, nodes connecting several networks (Castells, 2004a, 3). In the case of this research these switchers are family members active in several networks. Many interview partners had family members working within TRoNT providing families with useful information. In other cases active family members participated actively in several families and created the connections between these families. Castells (2004a, 32) identified a second form of influential nodes, ‘programmers’, nodes with the capability to redefine network goals. Rather than full-fledged programmers chapter eight offered examples of nodes with the potential to become programmers. One example is the website of Richard Parata, former head of Ngāi Tahu Holdings. While not capable of single-handedly changing the goals of the tribal network or the course TRoNT follows, the website nonetheless creates a large amount of computer-mediated debate. Whether or not the discussions will lead to inner-tribal changes and of what magnitude these changes will be is not clear yet.

Segmentation

Iwi

In chapter three I have shown some of the main works on pre-European Māori society. A three-tier structure consisting of iwi, hapū, and whānau was proposed by authors such as Best (1974), Hiroa (1982), and Firth (1973). While the three-tier structure was considered static the segments were considered to be mobile, ascending through the structure due to growth in membership. This three-tier structure, although criticised from the 1970s onwards, is deeply ingrained in New Zealand’s population, Māori and non-Māori alike. It is still proposed by Māori scholars such as
Mead (2003) and Walker (2004). Part of the three-tier structure, the dominance of iwi over the lower two levels, is also the goal of ‘iwi fundamentalists’ (Webster, 2002, 355), who wish to see iwi acquire, or as iwi fundamentalists argue reacquire, more political and economic influence.

In this thesis I have shown that the iwi corporate, TRoNT, is working on the centralisation of the tribal membership. The Ngāi Tahu iwi has in many ways reached the goal of one of its knights, Sir Tīpene O’Regan, who argued that a division of the iwi into smaller segments should be avoided to retain the greatest possible influence (in O’Regan, 2001, 169). As I have shown in chapter five and six the iwi has become centralised and bureaucratised, as Kelly (1998), Sissons (1995), and Waymouth (2003) have shown before me. Going further I have pointed out that the iwi has also become increasingly corporatised as is visible in such efforts as brand management. But, as I have argued in chapter six, centralisation and bureaucratisation are largely due to the expectations towards iwi, which, from an early date onwards began to emulate the tribes of the official records, large corporate groups with a clearly defined membership, to retain some control over the remaining lands (Ballara, 1998, 279).

The iwi has then changed since the days of Firth’s (1973) and Metge’s (1964; 1995) research. Firth (1973, 139) argued that pre-European iwi had few functions other than ‘participation in huge feasts’ and an ‘all-embracing over-right to the land within its borders’. And Metge (1964), researching the impact of urbanisation on Māori social structure, found that iwi affiliation was still known among both rural and urban Māori, despite there being no ‘material advantages [or] specific obligations (Metge, 1964, 58). This lack in economic returns for tribal members is clearly not the case any more. Iwi have turned into large entities, often overseeing millions of dollars, where a settlement has been reached with the government. But, as many of my interview partners argued few of these enormous sums trickles down to the membership. This is not new. Rata (2000) has conceptualised the changes of the iwi into a primarily economically interested upper class controlling all the means of production and an impoverished lower class. But, as Sissons (2005a) and Ryan (2005) have pointed out, Rata’s concept of the neo-tribal elite is somewhat simplified, and the reality is far more complex.

Today the Ngāi Tahu iwi is no longer an uncentralised political system consistent of a large number of largely autonomous groups, forming and reforming according to temporary needs. The constant state of ‘change and instability’ (Middleton and Tait, 1958, 25) is no longer prevalent. The iwi has become a stable, clearly defined entity (Anderson, 2008). Whether or not the tribe will remain in its current form in the future is unpredictable. Considering the large changes which have happened over the
last three centuries a regrouping in the future seems likely. This is especially so, if we take Webster’s (1995; 1997; 1998a) criticism of the three-tier structure into account, where he argued that Māori society had structurally changed rather than being a static system with internal flexibility which had survived the large-scale changes introduced by the arrival of Europeans.

Van Meijl (2000, 101) argued that in the political climate prevalent in New Zealand at the turn of the millennium ‘tribal interests’ often clash with the interests of non-tribalised Māori to find their ‘roots’. Sissons (2005b) argued that governmental interest in a single point of contact also contributed to this tension between tribalised and non-tribalised Māori, as did the interest of tribal leaders to retain political influence by ‘preserving the appearance of tribalism’ (Sissons, 2005b, 82). This research has shown that the tension between tribalised and non-tribalised Māori is replicated to some extent between locally active and new or distant tribal members. As I have argued in chapter seven the use of a single entry criteria, ancestry, has created a pronounced division between Ngāi Tahu and non-Ngāi Tahu, thus allowing for a clearly defined membership, and, as I have argued in chapter six, for the largest possible membership number and influence for the iwi corporate.\(^3\) But as the thesis has shown this clear definition has also brought with it the issue of tribal membership being under-defined. Actualised and potential membership is understood differently among tribal members. For some registering with the tribe is the actualisation of membership. For others this is only a different form of potential membership and actualisation is dependent on physical, local participation. Sissons (2005b, 63) proposed to re-conceptualise the understanding of urbanised indigenous populations into one of ‘relocation of indigeneity’ rather than a loss of culture. While the proposed re-conceptualisation offers a way forward this research has shown that there is still resistance against a change of the understanding of tribal membership.

Sissons (1995, 63) conceptualised the revival of Māori culture in the 1980s as a ‘political phenomenon’, aimed at gaining access to political and economic power, rather than a cultural revival. Van Meijl (2000, 89, see also van Meijl, 1997) similarly pointed towards the use of culture by Māori activists and tribal leaders to achieve political ends, first and foremost a justification of the claims for ‘political autonomy’. Webster (1998b, 19) also concluded that ‘opportunistic patrons, Maori as well as Pakeha’ were the ‘beneficiaries’ of the cultural revival, with little benefits for the ‘majority of Maori themselves’. Chapter five and six have shown that there are clearly political and economic gains in becoming a strong iwi. Further, I have shown in

\(^3\)Mead (2003, 218) argued that today’s tribes have grown to such proportions that segmentation into smaller tribes is the necessary next step. Iwi corporates will certainly resist segmentation because a large constituency brings with it, potentially, a large amount of political influence.
chapter six that the revival of the rūnanga all over the South Island was not related to a sudden increase in cultural interest, but a movement to create a democratic base for Ngāi Tahu, a base needed if the Ngāi Tahu claim was to have any chance to eventuate in a settlement. It is clear that not all members benefit equally from the economic gains. In this research some interview partners, most often locally active members, complained about the lack of control over the tribal assets, but these complaints were linked in with the resistance against a centralised, influential iwi corporate.

Hapū

Sissons (2004, 22, 25) argued that Ngata’s ‘idealised tribalism’ was intended as a counter-measure to the individualisation of land titles in 1865 and the individualisation effected by the new economy. Sissons further argued that Ngata’s tribalism was only possible after hapū lost their former importance. Many interview partners for this research identified with rūnanga rather than with hapū. But this re-direction of identification was not pervasive with many other interview partners still holding onto their hapū affiliations. There is also the example of the tribal members around Puketeraki, who prefer to identify as "Kāti Huirapa ki Puketeraki" rather than as a "Ngāi Tahu rūnaka" [24]. It would be ironic if rūnanga affiliations replace hapū affiliations in the future. The idea of rūnanga was introduced by Governor Grey in the 1860s. The intention was to create territorially organised rather than lineage oriented political structures, thus accelerating the assimilation of Māori (Waymouth, 2003). A strengthening of these structures for the purpose of political influence and with the result of cultural revival would then counter-act the idea of assimilation.

Kawharu (1975, 32) argued that the criterion of local participation allowed for stable communities. He logically deduced that frequent participation and therefore strong rights in one hapū must have been more often the norm than infrequent participation and therefore weak rights in many hapū. This logical explanation is further supported by Barnes’ (1962) criticism of the use of segmentary opposition for the cultures of New Guinea. He pointed out that unilineal descent systems emphasised ‘group solidarity’ whereas systems of ‘unbounded affiliation’ furthered ‘network cohesion’ Barnes (1962, 8). Further, and more importantly here, a ‘multiplicity [of allegiances] in New Guinea is largely a result of individual initiative and is not due to the automatic operation of rules’ (Barnes, 1962, 7). The same was true for many interview partners. One person in particular reported participating in 13 rūnanga, whereas many others participated in only one rūnanga. The frequency of participation was, however, not inversely correlated to the number of rūnanga interview partners participated in. The
opposite appears to be the case with active members participating frequently in many rūnanga and less active members participating infrequently in few rūnanga.

It appears that locality has become a more important factor. Rūnanga with their territorial base are more stable than hapū. The latter, according to Anderson (1980, 9), never possessed and were possibly never meant to possess ‘territorial integrity’ ‘in the proto-historical period from 1810 to 1850. On the basis of this, Anderson (1980, 9) questioned the ‘social coherence’ of proto-historical hapū. As I have shown in this thesis regional and historical differences were frequently invoked to differentiate rūnanga. Although historical differences pre-dated the existence of rūnanga these differences were used as explanations as to why things were done differently within each rūnanga. A factor in this is also that rūnanga offer political representation within the wider iwi, whereas hapū do not. Further, the creation of a new hapū, organised around a local ancestor (Schwimmer, 1978, 1990), is, I would argue, far more complicated these days then it might have been one or two centuries ago.

If we follow Webster’s (1975) argument the attempts at segmentation described in this thesis are far from new. Webster (1975, 143) argued that the expansive tendencies of the ‘descent category’ were contained by the ‘descent group’ which, additional to descent, relied on active participation as validation of group membership. The former, so Webster argued, was necessary to ensure the continued existence of hapū, whereas the latter ensured continued activity. This means that the segmentation attempts described in this thesis are not new, at least not at hapū level. With the current singular criterion of tribal membership locally active members have few grounds on which to resist against non-physically active tribal members particularly once membership is redefined as participation in discussions via CMC.

**Whānau**

This research supports Metge’s (1995, 40) finding that whānau no longer constituted a ‘single unit of economic production’. Tau (2008b, 9) further added that ‘communal living is regarded as an uncomfortable activity, to be undertaken reluctantly’. This situation means that today’s whānau are often in need of distance communication technologies, such as CMC. Two opposing ways were visible during this research and within this thesis. Some whānau reduced their communication to a small circle of family members, whereas in other whānau participation grew exponentially through the use of CMC with distant and sometimes previously unknown family members making contact with other whānau members, becoming more like the hapū Webster (1975) described with a focus on participation rather than locality.
10.5 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Kawharu (1975, 22, f.) argued that ‘kinship’ provides a cohesive force, whereas ‘descent’ is ‘divisive’. This is partially correct with some interview partners choosing to participate in one whānau but not the other. At the same time the descriptions of whānau website activities given in the research interviews showed that tribal activities are the focus of frequent discussions on these whānau websites. These websites are also a way for new family members to learn about the wider tribe and receive information about tribal activities. It was known that the information given by other family members is necessarily biased and this was accepted by many interview partners with the interested and active interview partners venturing out to get further, independent, information. This suggests that Kawharu’s (1975) argument of descent creating opposition and kinship furthering inclusion might have to be modified. In this research, descent only created opposition amongst families, which for their own reasons – through heredity or otherwise –, were uncomfortable with iwi membership in the first place. For many others descent created an entry into the wider kinship network.

In general this thesis has shown that continuous expansion and contraction of the ‘level of political consolidation’ is at work within the Ngāi Tahu tribe (Sahlins, 1961, 326). The settlement, a form of external threat, has long been achieved and the centralisation and unification attempts of TRoNT are now resisted by many locally active members but supported by many distant members.

10.5 Limitations and future research

To conclude this thesis I want to present once more the limitations of this research. An outcome of these limitations are several areas for future research.

First, this is a study on tribal CMC within the Ngāi Tahu tribe not among Māori as an ethnic group. Second, it is not a study of pan-tribal CMC. An example of pan-tribal use would be a co-ordinated effort of two or more tribes to present a coherent framework for CMC between members of the two or more tribes. Third, it is not a comparison of CMC between different tribes. Although I have given general comparative material in chapter nine I did not present an in-depth comparison of two or more tribes in regard to the use of CMC and the resistance against CMC. Fourth, gender did not play a role in this thesis. Many interview partners stated that the workplace was the first point of contact with CMC. Due to this I assumed that any gender imbalance in regard to computer literacy was based on the different workforce requirements for females and males rather than any culturally relevant factors. Fifth, it is not a comparison of the use of CMC between Ngāi Tahu and other groups,
culturally, religiously, or otherwise defined. Although I have shown that Ngāi Tahu have adapted to new technologies quickly and successfully this thesis does not support any form of comparison between Ngāi Tahu and, for example, Pākehā. The sixth limitation is the lack of fieldwork, a method which is a remnant of functionalist era but also the most distinguishing feature of anthropological research. As stated in the introduction to this thesis fieldwork is difficult when it comes to CMC, especially when people avoid contact with each other.

The six limitations described also offer possibilities for future research. First, in-depth comparisons in different areas would present answers to the question whether or not Ngāi Tahu represent a special case among indigenous communities in regard to inner-tribal CMC. Comparisons could take the form of an intra-tribal comparison, a comparison with the ethnic community of Māori, a comparison to a local, multi-ethnic community, or an in-depth comparisons with tribes, both in New Zealand and abroad, without settlement opportunities. Further family interaction could be compared between families relying on CMC and families using other forms of communication.

Second, access to ‘Community Net’ on TRoNT’s website and to family websites would offer interesting insights into the actual use of CMC within the tribe. The ethical issues involved, i.e. the need for informed consent from every single participant of the website, are, however, obstacles which are difficult to navigate.

Third, a longitudinal study of CMC within the tribe would offer insights into whether or not a) Ngāi Tahu culture can be or is created on-line, b) the inner-tribal tensions described in this thesis remain unresolved, and c) inclusive tribal membership criteria in connection with CMC actually do help distant and hitherto passive members to reconnect to the tribe. A longitudinal study would also reveal whether or not the use of CMC furthers the segmentary movements described in this thesis to the point where the tribal community breaks apart into its constituting smaller segments and whether or not these smaller segments would be hapū, rūnanga, or whānau.

These three possibilities for future research do not comply to the post-modern dictum of returning information back to the community. Comparative studies would be mostly for the sake of the research community rather than the participants.
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