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THE THIN END OF THE WEDGE:
THE 1970 SOUTH AFRICAN TOUR CONTROVERSY

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A Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment for a Post Graduate Diploma in History at the University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand 1990
Preface

In 1981 as a bewildered third former I marched up Queen Street in Auckland to protest against the Springbok tour.

At the time I knew it was for the better good, yet the next day at rugby practise I had trouble explaining why. Sporting contacts with South Africa has been a source of curiosity ever since, hence my reason for choosing a South African tour debate. 1970 was chosen for the simple reason that other major controversial tours have been done and, as it happened the 1970 issue turned out to be a crucial year for New Zealand and South African sporting relations. It was a learning and enjoyable study.

In writing this essay I must acknowledge the help I received from different quarters. To my supervisor John Omer-Cooper whose ideas and advice helped make my confused thoughts coherent, and to my typist Linda Bell, for her patience in transforming illegible handwriting into quality text. To this years fourth year class who taught me as much about interpreting my environment as any history course, and to Pam, Wendy, Paul and Mike for absorbing my stress and keeping me happy. And finally to the needy support and encouragement from my parents, Joanna and Bob, who remain the most selfless people I know.
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<td>Citizens All Black Tour Association</td>
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<td>CARE</td>
<td>Citizens Association for Racial Equality</td>
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<td>FOL</td>
<td>Federation of Labour</td>
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<td>HART</td>
<td>Halt All Racist Tours</td>
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<td>HNP</td>
<td>Herstigte Nasionale Party</td>
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<td>International Rugby Board</td>
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<td>Marleybone Cricket Club</td>
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<td>Maori Organisation on Human Rights</td>
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<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Council of Churches</td>
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<td>New Zealand Amateur Athletics Association</td>
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<td>NZMC</td>
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<td>New Zealand Rugby Football Union</td>
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<td>NZUSA</td>
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<td>SAN-ROC</td>
<td>South AFRican Non-Racial Olympic Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAONGA</td>
<td>South AFRican Olympic and National Games Committee - also referred to as the South African National Olympic Committee</td>
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<td>SARB</td>
<td>South African Rugby Board (white)</td>
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<td>SASA</td>
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<td>SCSA</td>
<td>Supreme Council for Sport in Africa</td>
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<td>STST</td>
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Chapter One
RUGBY, RACE AND REACTION

Introduction

1969 and 1970 were interesting years in New Zealand. From the comfort of living rooms folk watched on television the US Intrepid landing on the moon. From the same chair they saw massive and violent demonstrations in America protesting against United States involvement in Vietnam. By driving into town they witnessed unrest at home as university students marched down the main street for similar reasons. In 1969 New Zealand celebrated the bi-centenary of Captain Cook's first visit. The Dominion printed Cook's diary day by day while in Gisborne they re-enacted his discovery. In late November the National party was returned to office by the narrow margin of four seats and Prime Minister, Holyoake continued for another term. 1970 saw the arrival of Queen Elizabeth II, the Duke of Edinburgh, Prince Charles and Princess Anne. New Zealand had prepared for months for this royal tour which received front page status for its duration.

And most importantly in 1970 the All Blacks were invited to play South Africa, a tour considered more significant than the first tour ever made.¹

By 1970 a new social pattern was emerging distinctly different from yesteryear. The 1960's has had a profound social impact on New Zealand tending away from conformity, uniformity and simplicity and steering toward diversity, complexity and change. Society began to question aspects of New Zealand's character that had previously gone unchallenged. The rising youth counter culture in protest to Vietnam was in part an expression of this re-evaluation.

Major cities expanded as home ownership lay at the heart of the prevailing ethos. Occupational mobility was given new life and New Zealand moved into line with America becoming a while-collar society, with jobs totalling 41% of all occupations. Although farming still remained the single largest occupation and the country's biggest earner. And irregularities in wealth, expressed through conspicuous consumption of material goods

had developed, eroding New Zealand's proud egalitarian myth.\textsuperscript{2}

Despite these changes to the social fabric many New Zealand norms remained resistant to change particularly aspects of New Zealand's male culture. Rugby, the first pillar of this male stereotype (the other two being "....racing and beer") was questioned and weakened but did not lose its place. To appreciate the debate in this essay on understanding of rugby union and the place it held in New Zealand society is vital.

Rugby, considered the 'best medium of expression for New Zealand nationalism'\textsuperscript{3} was first played in New Zealand on 14 May 1870 in Nelson, and since has been enthusiastically embraced by New Zealand males.

It took root in New Zealand early as it fitted the values of a pioneer male culture, and encouraged the less desirable elements of it - fighting, drinking and swearing. Before rugby became civilised the game resembled a disorganised melee of an undetermined number of players, brutally wrestling for a ball and frequently degenerated into a pugilistic scramble. The respectable classes disliked what they saw and by 1892 formed the New Zealand Rugby Football Union (NZRFU) and imposed upon the game strict laws and order.\textsuperscript{4} The game was transformed into an exercise extolling the virtues of civilised gentlemen. It graduated from an undisciplined leisure-time pursuit to a vital necessity. As New Zealand became a nation of urban dwellers, deep concerns were raised over the stature and physical strength of the male populous. Town life would deprive men of the physical capacities once found in the backblocks which were so crucial to the male identity. The material luxuries of urban life were making men soft and effeminate. Muscular sports like rugby were needed to re-instill a threatened male virility.\textsuperscript{5} As late as 1970 these fears of urban effeminacy were still prevalent.

The welfare state and the comforts of modern living are producing a softer breed - less inclined towards the hard grind of rugby and more inclined towards the solo skills of other winter pastimes.\textsuperscript{6}

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\textsuperscript{2} G. Dunstall, Geehom "The Social Pattern" \textit{Oxford History of New Zealand} Chapter 5, pp 397 - 429
\textsuperscript{3} G. Slatter, \textit{On the Ball} p.362
\textsuperscript{4} J. Phillips, \textit{A Man's Country?} p.94-97
\textsuperscript{5} Ibid, p.97-99
\textsuperscript{6} Slatter, p.361
Rugby was strictly the preserve of males. It was considered the "manliest" sport having no place for girls or 'cissies', and has successfully perpetuated the bawdy male culture of drinking swearing and violence. On the field respect is accorded for toughness, sublime commitment and the denial of pain. Foul play was frowned upon, but those who "sorted it out", admired. Off the field, the association between beer-drinking and rugby has flourished at all levels. After games copious quantities of beer is swilled while singing bawdy songs, telling dirty stories, physical ribbing and occasionally the wanton destruction of property were sources of amusement. Swearing was prolific and became more violent with intoxication. Within the male preserve of rugby, women had no place and through chauvinistic practises and unwritten rules, administrators and players aimed to keep it that way.

Rugby, it was maintained, taught the necessary skills for life hard work, determination, working for the larger good, and personal discipline.

Throughout the twentieth century the New Zealand rugby team, the All Blacks have served to exemplify and also reinforce the value system of New Zealand men. All Blacks became role models and boys saw manifest in them the ideal New Zealand male. The glorious aura created by the 1905 All Blacks, whose outstanding victories over Britain did so much for New Zealand's embryonic self confidence, was maintained by consecutive All Black teams for the next 70 years. They were more then a rugby team. The All Blacks travelled as the showcase of New Zealand national development and functioned as a barometer of the nations health.

If the All Blacks stood above all else important, individual players stood higher, assuming a mythical status. During the 1960's and early 1970's Colin Meads was the greatest of them all. A farmer from the rugged King Country, Meads had....

a massive frame, hammerlike head, tall muscular legs and talonlike hands which could hold the ball aloft in one grasp.

He was hard and unremitting - reluctant to yield. His physical strength being superhuman. In the field of play Meads was uncompromising but in the comfort of his home he was gentle and modest, and a family man. 

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7 Phillips, p.109
8 Ibid, p.111
9 Ibid, p.120
stereotype was the finest personification of the New Zealand male.

Of particular note in understanding this essay is the rugby relationship between New Zealand and South Africa. As both countries belonged to the Commonwealth it is not surprising that rugby found its way from Britain to the veldt of Southern Africa where it is was adopted with even more vigour than in New Zealand. Of all international encounters, those between the All Blacks and Springboks were the most highly rated by both countries. Hence it need hardly be said the two nations have a respected rivalry for each other. The results bear this out. Of seven series between 1921 - 1965 two have been drawn, New Zealand has won two and South Africa has won three, having achieved the only series victory on foreign soil. Gordon Slatter in his centenary book of New Zealand Rugby On the Ball describes the intensity of rivalry that exists -

So intense has been the rivalry between New Zealand and South Africa that a whole series of tour tests may be decided by one wheeled scrum on the line or one dropped goal on the twenty five. One could never say that in these tests tries are handed about like Christmas cards. Thousands of people lose all sense of proportion when a tour is taking place. Players are spiritually prepared for the ultimate sacrifice of patriotism. It would be far better for them, for all of us, when given to frantic boast and foolish word, to recall the sane and simple statement of Phillip Nel, Captain of South Africa's greatest Springboks. He said that test matches are not won by guile or strength or speed. They are won on mistakes.\(^{10}\)

One only needs gloss over biographies of All Blacks who have played South Africa to see this rivalry reiterated time and again.

Everyone could play rugby. Unlike Britain where wealth or schooling determined opportunity, the structure of New Zealand's rugby fraternity reflected egalitarian values. The drain layer could well lock the scrum with the local practitioner and during the game or socially afterward, little is made of it. Rugby in this way transcended the barriers of ethnicity, class and religion.

Maoris quickly adopted rugby with a similar passion. It was one area where Maori and Pakeha participated on an equal basis. They played - unique, open, uninhibited brand of football which is preserved through the formation of a New Zealand Maoris team. Maori representation at national level had remained prominent from the beginning and Maori All Blacks such

\(^{10}\) Slatter, p. 355
as George Nepia, Charlie Smith, Mac Herewini, Tiny Hill and Nake Nathan ranked as some of the finest All Blacks to wear the sacred jersey.\textsuperscript{11}

The prominence rugby held was unsurpassed. Frequently rugby in New Zealand was likened to a religion by resident and visiting observers. When challenging for the Ranfurly Shield, a trophy contested amongst provincial unions, whole towns would stop, when international matches were played, the whole country would stop. When asking middle aged citizens what vivid memories 1956 hold, few would deny the epic Springbok tour of New Zealand. Great All Blacks often held more mana than political statesmen, and during winter rugby occupied the front and back pages of newspapers and with television, monopolised whole afternoons with live coverage. Rugby, rightly or wrongly, remained in 1970 the undisputed national sport of New Zealand.

Further to understanding a debate of apartheid and sport is a need to outline briefly the extent of New Zealand's race relations. Over the decade 1960 - 1970 important changes occurred concerning Maori-Pakeha relations. Up until the late 1950's New Zealand considered itself, and was recognised as, a model for race relations in the developed world. However from around 1960 onwards this accepted notion, which New Zealand flaunted proudly to other countries, came under scrutiny, revealing racial problems extending well beneath the surface. Two major factors are responsible for exposing these ills to the Pakeha majority. The Hunn Report and Urbanisation.

In 1961 a report by Jack Hunn on the Department of Maori Affairs was submitted to the government and was later published. In it, Hunn identifies areas of Maori inequality within New Zealand. Eye opening disparities in housing, educational attainment, employment and income were revealed and conclusions providing remedies to needy areas, offered. Hunn saw the scale of activities for the Department of Maori affairs as

'not nearly large enough to cope with the explosive growth of population.....Relatively the Department is falling behind and needs to redouble it activities'.\textsuperscript{12}

The report identified housing and education as the two best

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid, p.169 - 170
\textsuperscript{12} Report on the Department of Maori Affairs J.K. Hunn Wellington 1960
measures "calculated to equip the Maori to compete on equal terms".\textsuperscript{13} Urbanisation of Maoris was inevitable and was 'actively nurtured' thus preventing a 'colour problem' arising.\textsuperscript{14} Urbanisation correlated closely with Hunn's policy of "integration". He said of it -

> Official policy can accelerate or retard, but not thwart or divert, the process of self determination. Evolution governs policy, not vice versa.... Evolution is clearly integrating Maori and Pakeha consequently integration is said to be the official policy whenever the question is asked.\textsuperscript{15}

He intended "integration" to mean -

> To combine (not fuse) the Maori and Pakeha elements to form one nation wherein Maori culture remains distinct.\textsuperscript{16}

Hunns' recommendations became the basis of National's policy in the 1960's. To meet the shortfall in housing the Government determined to provide state houses and simultaneously encourage integration by "pepper potting" Maori families among Pakeha communities. In education a Maori Education Foundation was set up to aid Maori pupils through the secondary and tertiary levels.

The Hunn Report was a Pakeha administrators report based on pragmatic Pakeha philosophies, offering Pakeha answers to Maori problems.\textsuperscript{17} The central policy of integration (which Hunn admits could be the stepping stone before assimilation, to the demise of Maoritanga) was rejected by Maoris who claimed Hunn took a shallow view of Maori culture overlooking "the basic and ingrained personality traits that make a Maori a Maori".\textsuperscript{18} Hunn, as with most Pakeha's failed to perceive the strong Maori desire for a separate cultural identity. Despite rejection from Maoridom, the Hunn Report was useful in drawing attention to Maori needs and illuminating the yawning disparities that existed between Maori and Pakeha.

Urbanisation also enhanced Pakeha awareness of Maori needs, Between 1961 and 1971 the percentage of Maori population living in urban

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid, p.17
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{17} J. Booth, "The Hunn Report in Retrospect" \textit{Te Maori} Summer issue 1970 p. 3-7
\item \textsuperscript{18} Ibid
\end{itemize}
areas increased by 24.2% rising from 46.0% to 70.2%. The net effect of this post war urbanisation reduced the social separation of Maori and Pakeha. Close quartered living brought before Pakeha’s serious shortfalls in the system especially for the young urban Maori. It highlighted Maori/Pakeha educational imbalances: Professor J.E. Ritchie quoted 91% of Maoris left school without qualifications compared to 58% of pakehas. And high crime rates: one in four male arrest cases was Maori in 1965. These and other social problems of unemployment and housing were symptomatic of an inadequate bureaucracy and Maori social dislocation, with heightened concerns over the maintenance of Maori identity.

Through deliberate re-establishment of urban marae structures and the emergence of a culturally strong Maori youth movement, Maori heritage within cities was successfully fostered. Urban Maori ignored Hunn’s “pepper potting” policy and settled together in concentrated areas like Otara, Mangere and Te Atatu in Auckland and Porirua in Wellington. These groupings then set about re-building urban marae structures which served as the focal point of the community. It provided a forum for:

- continuing the concept of Maoritanga so second generation city born Maoris can imbibe in their culture and take pride in the identity.
- for discussion between new Maori protest groups and elders of new ideas than can be put through the “kill or cure” test of the truly democratic processes of Maori society.
- and to help breach the social separation of the Pakeha and integrate him into Maori society.

This desire for a separate cultural identity saw the emergence in urban areas of young Maoris re-asserting issues of cultural concern and authority. In 1970 Nga Tōmata was formed in Auckland as a Maori action group to press for the preservation of Maoritanga particularly in urban areas and the

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19 New Zealand Official Yearbook 1974 p.65
20 The Dominion, March 20 1970 p.20, col 1-2
21 Ibid
22 G. Dunstall, p. 424
23 R. Walker, “Te Marae -Traditional Form with Modern Relevance”. Te Maori Oct-Nov 1971 p.41-47
24 Ibid
elimination of racial discrimination. Nga Tamatoa translates to either 'the brave sons' or the 'young warriors' representing 'action, courage and continuity with the ancestors'. Led by university and teachers college students, it adopted conventional Pakeha demonstration techniques to champion its cause. With strong personalities and the gift of trenchant expression the young Maori leaders exploited the news media and television, heckled government spokesmen, marched on parliament and distributed pamphlets as it successfully communicated to the Establishment long standing Maori grievances, such as the loss of land, the declining use of Maori language, the racist bureaucratic structures of Education and Justice and later organised protests at Waitangi Day. Nga Tamatoa was the largest young Maori cultural group (the other notables being Te Reo Maori and Te Roopu o te Matakite) and succeeded in shedding political light on vital maori issues. Now, the Maori could be heard in a voice the Pakeha could understand.

Racial discrimination in New Zealand generally existed in covert forms and was expressed in public areas of contact - in housing employment and certain types of commercial service. One to one racism was not common - or if it was, remained unheard. With the help of pressure groups, evidence of racial discrimination became big news. During the period researched two notable examples received widespread attention. The first concerned pronunciation of Maori place names on public radio. The New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation decided to reverse its policy of correct usage to the accepted common usage. So "Paraparamu" for instance, becomes "Paraparam". The decision received intense criticisms from Dr R.J. Walker of Auckland University who claimed it represents the most serious affront to the Maori people since the No Maori No Tour fiasco. In the second incident a Wellington estate manager refused to let a house to two Maori women on the grounds of their race. It received widespread criticism and made press stories in the main dailies. Race issues were clearly a topical issue and featured in correspondence columns under a general heading of 'Racialism'. The public mostly remained sympathetic to this issue however

25 J. Metge, *The Maoris of New Zealand* p.177-178
26 *Ibid* p.177-178 and Dunstall p. 424-426
27 Walker to Newnham 3 April 1967 (CARE, Records, NZMS 845)
28 *The Dominion*, Sept 18 1969. p.3 col 1-3
occasionally angry letters, intolerant of racial concerns appeared. 29

With over 50% of Maori people living in close proximity to Pakeha in urban areas combined with a strong urban cultural resurgence, the real Maori plight was laid at the doorstep of white New Zealand. It had an educative effect removing ignorant mistruths dwelt on for so long and while most Pakeha remained inactive to Maori concerns, they could no longer ignore them. Some however, learnt from what they saw - developing a deeper understanding of racial issues and what they meant. Their voices were to get more numerous and louder.

The rugby relationship between New Zealand and South Africa had run into difficulties before 1970. These difficulties had their origin in the differing pattern of race relations in the two countries in so far as these affected selection of representative teams. In New Zealand where unlike South Africa, there is no segregation under custom or formal law national sporting teams to travel abroad were normally chosen on merit alone without regard to race.

When touring South Africa however, this had not been the case. Due to the peculiar segregated way of life, South African invitations insisted New Zealand send white-only teams. The NZRFU respected this condition when selecting its teams. The compliance to South African wishes by the NZRFU had been increasingly disputed by concerned New Zealanders who questioned the discriminatory nature of these conditions to non-white races, in what should be a representative team chosen without race considerations. With Maoris identifying very quickly with rugby, All Black rugby tours of South Africa, by and large became the focus of the dispute.

Before World War II New Zealand's contacts with South Africa went relatively unchallenged, and on each occasion only murmurings of disapproval were heard.30 In 1949 New Zealand was to tour South Africa. Many Pakeha, having witnessed or heard about the brave Maori battalion exploits in WWII, believed Maoris had earned their citizenship 31 and must take their rightful place beside the Pakeha in all aspects of life including

30 R. Thompson. Retreat From Apartheid p.14
31 An absurd assumption considering New Zealand was the Maoris home before any one else.
representation in national sporting teams, should their skills merit selection. 32 Maori MP E T Tirikatene, and the trade unions both objected strongly to Maori exclusion and suggested the South African Rugby Board be informed it was not a representative team of New Zealand. 33 Tirikatene, in a parliament speech also put to the NZRFU; on whose initiative were Maoris excluded? Had the NZRFU of 'its own volition' or had South Africa specified Maori exclusion in the invitation? The NZRFU did not answer replying that 'busy-bodies' were trying to bring 'extraneous' issues into what was 'purely a rugby matter'.34 This "no comment" response by the NZRFU on matters relating to South Africa became a familiar pattern in later debates. The controversy soon passed and the All Blacks received a state farewell at Parliament before leaving for the republic.

The Springboks, white South Africa's national rugby team, toured New Zealand in 1956, playing a Maori team as part of their itinerary. Little was heard controversially as the Springboks had to abide by New Zealand's customs, which do not recognise Apartheid.

In 1958 the All Blacks received an invitation to tour South Africa in 1960, again raising the issue of the NZRFU selection policy. In June the next year the NZRFU announced that Maori players would be excluded from the All Black team. As in the past, the Union expected a small protest and were confident it would peter out quickly. 35 This was not so. The churches, considered the "vanguard of protest" 36 had already issued a joint statement in disapproval of Maori exclusion. It said in part:

that in selecting a team that is to represent New Zealand, no player should be excluded on the grounds of race.37

The churches spoke up early and strongly bringing peoples attention to the problem. The NZRFU felt compelled to justify their stance. In reaching the decision the union was concerned 'with the best interests of its Maori players'. The NZRFU claimed to include Maoris may expose them to the

32 Thompson, *Retreat From Apartheid* p.15-16
33 Ibid
34 Ibid p.16-17
35 Ibid, p. 19
37 Ibid
intolerable indignities of South African Apartheid.\textsuperscript{38} To reinforce their position the Maori Advisory Board of the NZRFU unanimously reaffirmed its support for the exclusion of Maori players from the tour.\textsuperscript{39} The public remained unconvinced and soon the Trade Unions, University Students Associations and members of the Maori community swung in behind the churches. \textsuperscript{40}

Of greater significance was the formation in June 1959 of Citizens All Black Tour Association (CABTA) whose aims were 'To combat racial discrimination in the selection of the 1960 rugby team to tour South Africa, and to demand the abandonment of the tour if absolute equality of treatment cannot be assured'. In short, if Maoris were not eligible for selection then the tour should not proceed. As New Zealand's first organised sporting pressure group CABTA saw themselves as a focal point from which the protest would gain strength.\textsuperscript{41} This it did. CABTA, deliberately non political and non sectarian, spread throughout the country rallying support from all sectors. Along with the groups already mentioned; public servants, staff of universities, teachers colleges, and a number of civic and professional bodies all supported the CABTA objective. \textsuperscript{42} The focus of protest, for the main part was, the NZRFU with a reluctance by CABTA to target the political field.\textsuperscript{43} Yet by the end of 1959 the movement had made little headway due mainly to the NZRFU's obstructive 'no comment' stance. The Rugby Union refused to discuss the implications of its decision.\textsuperscript{44} CABTA then turned to political party leaders and presented a petition with 153,000 signatures calling for non-racial selection while pleading for moral support and demanding no State farewell be given to an all-white team. \textsuperscript{45} With elections looming nine months away neither the Prime Minister nor Leader of the Opposition were prepared to commit themselves. Despite a heated debate both showed an overt reluctance for involvement claiming the issue was not the concern

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid, p.24
\textsuperscript{39} Thompson, \textit{Retreat From Apartheid} p.21
\textsuperscript{40} Redpath, pp 45-50
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid
\textsuperscript{42} Thompson, \textit{Retreat From Apartheid} p.22
\textsuperscript{43} Redpath, p.60
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid, p.67-69
\textsuperscript{45} Thompson, \textit{Race and Sport} p.45
of parliament and reiterated their official helplessness.\textsuperscript{46}

This failure to gain the vital support needed, saw protest moral drop -
the tour looked unstoppable.

The Sharpeville Massacre and the declaration of a state of
emergency in South Africa altered the situation overnight.\textsuperscript{47} The Trade
Unions called for cancellation and the Prime Minister, Walter Nash
redeclared Government opposition to racial discrimination and confirmed
the onus of cancellation was upon the Rugby Union. After two weeks the
NZRFU announced that failing further disturbances the tour would continue as
planned. The all-white All Blacks were given a state farewell and left for
South Africa.\textsuperscript{48}

The protest movement was noted for its sincerity and the dignified
way it was conducted. Rugby matches were the venues for the non-
disruptive, formal demonstrations. The only unorderly protest of the
controversy occurred when two people evaded police and rushed onto
the tarmac to stop the All Black plane leaving.\textsuperscript{49}

The issues involved in 1960 were simple and understood by opposing
sides. The controversy was wholly domestic, concentrating on the moral
issue of racial discrimination practised within New Zealand. Racial guidelines
were unacceptable in selection procedures of a national representative
side and complying to South Africa’s Apartheid wishes would no longer be
tolerated. CABTA and supporting organisations campaigned for this. The
Government absolved itself by passing the buck to the NZRFU who
maintained compliance justifying it on paternal protectionist grounds.

The 1960 protest had two lasting effects. Firstly, within rugby, 1960 could
be seen as the watershed year of rugby’s politicisation.\textsuperscript{50} Public opinion
was extremely strong in support of Maori inclusion, something the NZRFU
could not ignore. Cuthbert Hogg, Chairman of the NZRFU Council made it
clear the NZRFU was not prepared to go through the “same performance”,
and future All Black teams will include Maoris or otherwise a European only

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid
\textsuperscript{47} Thompson, Retreat From Apartheid p.23
\textsuperscript{48} Thompson R. Race and Sport p. 47-48
\textsuperscript{49} Redpath, p.62-64 and p.83
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, p.84
team with less than the All Black status would be the only compromise.\textsuperscript{51} The possible consequences of this public pressure is borne out later. Secondly, it served to bring New Zealand's race relations problems into the open. The exclusion of Maoris from the All Blacks led discussion into other areas of racial discrimination against Maoris, revealing uncomfortable truths. It caused many to reconsider New Zealand as a model of race relations.\textsuperscript{52}

In 1961-62 the New Zealand Cricket team toured South Africa. An all-white team was chosen due to a) South African requirements and b) a total lack of first class Maori cricketers from which to choose. Due largely to the later reasoning the issue failed to arouse New Zealand public interest. The small protest did not raise the question of excluded Maoris, but on the exclusion of non-white South African players from their national side which New Zealand was to play.\textsuperscript{53}

Then in 1964 New Zealand hosted the reciprocal tour of the all-white South African team. Considerable pressure was placed on the New Zealand Cricket Council by South African protest groups who impressed on the Council the exclusively white selection standards of the touring team. This inspired a New Zealand protest which again was restrained and orderly. The lack of interest was attributable to the vital issue being concerned with South African discrimination which New Zealanders knew little about, the short duration of the tour, and bad weather which cancelled some matches and reduced the impact the tour had on New Zealand.\textsuperscript{54}

The next major contact with South African sports teams was the 1965 Springbok rugby tour of New Zealand. While opposition to the visit was substantial the overwhelming reaction was ready acceptance. The all-white Springbok team, aware of the political overtones endeavoured to establish a favourable rapport with their New Zealand hosts. They accomplished this mission easily. The tour held massive interest nationwide and the Springboks were wined and dined throughout their stay with a total of 700,000 spectators paying to see them play.\textsuperscript{55} The protest movement, although active, was overshadowed by enthusiastic support for the tour.

\textsuperscript{51} Redpath, p.86  
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid  
\textsuperscript{53} Thompson, \textit{Retreat From Apartheid} p.27  
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid p.30  
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid pp.31-38
1967 and the proposed rugby tour of South Africa by New Zealand brought the 'No Maori No Tour' issue back into the headlines. Speculation concerning Maori acceptability began early, as New Zealand journalists sought confirmation from South African rugby boss Dr Danie Craven the terms of the invitation. On the one hand Dr Craven implied the team may include Maoris yet on the other South African Prime Minister, Dr Verwoerd implied they could not. The ambiguity was cleared when Senator De Klerk, Minister of the Interior issued the following statement.

The Cabinet had decided earlier, and now again unanimously, against the reception of mixed teams. Recently I also discussed this matter frankly with Dr Craven and others and informed Dr Craven unequivocally that Maoris would not be acceptable as members of a touring team....

This announcement struck New Zealand's moral nerve. Newspaper editorials up and down the country called for an unqualified No Maori No Tour stand. Community groups also felt compelled to issue statements in opposition. The Rugby Union however looked to continue rugby exchanges between the two countries. Mr Pearce, President of the NZRFU claimed;

We have a duty to the Maoris but we also have a duty to the game of Rugby. Their will be a good deal of agitation, but we must do what is best in the interest of Rugby. 

If Maoris were refused inclusion they would understand the reason for this 'because they are a most understanding people'. Soon after Prime Minister Holyoake delivered an important policy speech. It stated New Zealand considered the principles of full racial equality as a basic tenet of 'New Zealand's way of life' and this principle could not be outweighed by 'special considerations which have domestic application elsewhere'. Holyoake had in effect given the Government thumbs down to the NZRFU.

In addition the protest machine started up again and the F.O.L. threatened a boycott to any team racially selected. Following this the NZRFU stated it was 'unable to accept in its present form' South Africa's

56 Ibid, p.38-42
57 Ibid
58 Ibid
59 Ibid
60 Ibid
invitation. The tour was cancelled. 61 What exactly prompted the Rugby Union to cancel remains difficult to know. Was it public pressure? Was it government disapproval, or was it the NZRFU refusing to act on South Africa's orders? Possibly one, but more likely to be a combination of these.

Up till this time the central controversial issue remained constant. Only the threat of official domestic, racial discrimination would mobilise the greater public to protest. New Zealand would no longer acquiesce to the racial policies of another country in choosing a national team. The precedent had now been set.

61 Ibid
Chapter Two
THE ISOLATION OF SOUTH AFRICA: 
THE GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID SPORT

By 1970 opposition to white South Africa's sporting policies had become a prominent topical issue in world affairs. Consequently to examine New Zealand's approach to the controversy a brief examination of the rise of the wider opposition is necessary. How extensive was it? What forms did it take, was it successful?

The development of Apartheid in sport was consistent with the development of South African society in general. Before the second world war and the emplacement of rigid Apartheid laws, South African racial discrimination was ruled more by customs and tradition. And while no formal law was directed specifically towards preventing black and white sportsmen at this time from playing sport against each other, organised sport was generally subject to the same racial segregation as other social activities and most clubs had racially exclusive membership rules.1 2

Occasionally racial barriers would break down. There is evidence to suggest mixed sport did occur but was restricted to less formal occasions like factory lunch-hours and not on an organised basis.3 A further pattern also developed, where whites had facilities, money, schooling and opportunity, the non-white community had few facilities, little money, inadequate schooling and virtually no opportunity.

Money, the basis behind any sporting enterprise was, for non-white communities, very difficult to obtain. The rare sporting facilities which did exist in the townships were generally financed by the sale of beer and spirits. Huge profits from the sale of alcohol were almost the only funds which the municipalities running the townships made available for social and housing development. Residents strongly disapproved of this system claiming it was morally and socially unacceptable to finance their tennis courts with profits

1 Due to limitations of time I have been unable to conduct the necessary primary research into the vast field of international opposition to apartheid sport. Thus there is substantial need to rely on secondary sources for information.

2 R. Archer, and A. Boullon, South African Game: Sport and Racism p.40

3 P. Hain, Don't Play with Apartheid p.49
denied from the alcoholism of the mass of African workers. 4 This situation was exacerbated when the government removed all restrictions on the sale of alcoholic drinks to Blacks in 1961 and 1962.

Facilities were most often an improvisation of local resources. Non-whites would 'take over' open spaces outside towns and make them usable. With time, some local councils made available areas for non-white sport even contributing small grants for basic facilities. For non-whites though there was no point in constructing large and permanent structures because a) permission to build was denied and b) a condition of tenure stated permanent possession was disallowed so, as was often the case, when they lost the ground they lost whatever facilities were erected upon it. 5

Schools, provided by far the greatest sporting opportunities for Black children. Yet only 18.1% of children the school age attended classes in 1936, and rose moderately to 27.1% ten years later. The vast majority of those in attendance completed a four year primary education before dropping out. Beyond school, sporting opportunities were non-existent, for non-whites, and those who were lucky or particularly gifted athletes took their skills abroad. 6

Being a Commonwealth country South Africa has traditional ties with other member countries and has, through these contacts adopted similar sporting pursuits.

Socially games like tennis, cricket, rugby, bowls, golf, surfing, motor-racing, yachting, hunting, fishing, climbing and shooting were all popular pastimes. In the realm of competitive sport rugby, cricket, tennis and athletics remained very prominent and attracted the largest crowds. Due to the nature of these chosen sports, when South Africa competed internationally it was very often with her Commonwealth members. 7

After the war and the election to office of the National Party in 1948 the tradition of segregated sport hardened under the Apartheid laws. Though no specific law prevented mixed sport a number of other general and specific laws were passed which effectively rendered the playing of multiracial sport illegal. The imposition of Apartheid reduced the rights and

4 R. Archer, p. 40
5 Hain, p.50
6 Archer, p.40
7 Ibid, p.38
opportunities of black people in all domains and therefore in sport as well. 8 All mixed sport came to an end, and bodies which had mixed membership before the war required immediate alteration.9 Segregation in sport under law saw non-whites set up new bodies with non-racial constitutions. They became stronger and formed into multi-racial national organisations with large memberships.10 There were however significant difficulties which faced these new sporting bodies. They demanded to be recognised on terms of equality with other white sportsmen and questioned the affiliation of the white bodies to international associations. This was not easy. White sporting affiliations already had long standing links with their respective international bodies some even being the founding member. White organisations were established as the South African delegates and international constitutions excluded the possibility of recognising more than one affiliate from each country.11 The attempt to dislodge white representatives in favour of non-white bodies met opposition from white South Africa and apathy from international bodies who were reluctant to listen to non-white requests. For the moment, non-white bodies looked to secure international sports recognition with or over their white counterparts. The first organised attempt to do this was the formation in 1955 of the Committee for International Recognition. This group failed according to Brutus "largely because of timidity. People feared to reply" But its very formation and function was crucial to the subsequent formation of sports protest groups later.12 Success for the non-white cause came in 1956 when the International Table Tennis Federation expelled the racially exclusive white body and gave affiliation to an organisation representing non-whites but pledged to non-racism.13 This exclusion of a white South African team drew angry responses from the Government which threatened to... withhold support from any non-white sports body which sought international recognition and would not grant passports to non-

8 Ibid, p.42
9 Hain, p.30
10 Ibid, p.51-53
11 Archer, p.187
12 R. Lapchick, The Politics of Race and International Sport, p.40
13 Hain, p.52
whites guilty of such subversive intentions.\textsuperscript{14}

White South African sporting bodies were determined to fight any challenge to their exclusive rights to send teams abroad and receive visiting sides.

1958 saw the formation of the South African Sports Association (SASA) which brought together many larger non-white sports bodies under one unified organisation, it's aims were to;

Co-ordinate non-white sport, to advance the course of sport and the standard of sport among non-white sportsmen, to see that they and their organisations secure proper recognition (in South Africa) and abroad, and to do this on a non-racial basis.\textsuperscript{15}

SASA represented over 70,000 black sportsmen and women from athletics, cycling, cricket, football, weightlifting, tennis, table tennis, softball, netball and baseball.\textsuperscript{16} Now under the guild of one unified movement non-white sporting interests could focus upon achieving recognition and removing racism in sport with greater proficiency. At this stage SASA and non-white sports interests pressured for international participation for black sportsmen and women within the framework of segregation in national sport.\textsuperscript{17} Along with some minor international successes SASA looked to consolidate non-white sport organisation in South Africa.

In fulfilling its aims SASA appealed consistently to white South African sports bodies to reject race discrimination and to include non-white players in representative teams. It has appealed to white South African sports bodies to eliminate all racial exclusiveness and to form genuinely national and non-racial organisations. It has appealed to the international bodies governing each sport to insist that their South African affiliates be fully representative, and even to the people of countries with which exclusively white South Africa has reciprocal tour arrangements, not to condone race discrimination.\textsuperscript{18}

For four years appeals to the South African Olympic and National Games Association (SAONGA) to end its racial restrictions were ignored or evaded.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid
\textsuperscript{15} Speech of Alan Paton at Opening ceremony of the SASA, 10 January 1959 cited by Archer p.191
\textsuperscript{16} Archer, p.191
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, p.141
\textsuperscript{18} Thompson, \textit{Race and Sport}, p.18
With each appeal developed a familiar pattern of opposition. When a national non-racial body contacted the all-white organisation in a particular sport, it was referred to the all-white SAONGA which confirmed membership for their affiliates was for white amateur sportsmen only. When the international body in a sport was contacted they referred the matter to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) which in turn referred it back to the SAONGA, which replied as before. Clearly a new approach was needed.

In 1962 at the SASA October conference a sub-committee was set up called the South African Non Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC) which had the specific target of working for non-racism in the Olympic field. Its chief aim was to seek from the IOC the right to represent South Africa and to bring about the expulsion of the South African Olympic and National Games Committee. Thus the creation of SAN-ROC marked the end of fruitless attempts to negotiate with white Associations and the opening of a full blooded campaign to destroy the racial structures in South African sport and to replace them by a system based on merit alone, in line with the Olympic principles. SAN-ROC openly called for an international boycott of South African sport, in the name of non-racial principles and declared itself ready to expose and fight racial discrimination wherever it exists in sport.

Reaction from White South African authorities to the increasing pressures placed on their international sporting status came from white sporting bodies and Government alike.

While the white committees championed their traditional sporting opponents for continued recognition, the Government took more drastic measures instructing the Special Branch of the South African Police to intimidate and harass SASA and SAN-ROC officials. In April, 1960 shortly after the Sharpeville shootings the government used the state of emergency laws as a pretext to raid the SASA offices and seize all its archives. Secretary, Dennis Brutus, SASA's prime mover and inspirational figure was

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19 Hain, p. 54
20 Ibid, p.56
21 Thompson, Race and Sport, p.19
22 Archer, p.193
23 Hain, p.193
24 Hain, p.55
singed out for additional attention receiving "banning orders" restricting him to the magisterial district of Johannesburg. 25 When SAN-ROC expressed their intentions to exclude South Africa from the Olympics, state pressure intensified. In July 1963 Brutus was arrested for breaking one of the banning orders. While on bail he escaped over the Swaziland border into Mozambique but was caught and returned to South African secret police by Portuguese police (in defiance of international law). To attract attention, for his friends, family and colleagues were not aware of his plight, Brutus leapt from the escorting police car but was shot from point blank range in the stomach and left to bleed on the street in rush hour traffic. When finally an ambulance arrived, it was discovered to be white and drove off leaving Brutus to wait till a coloured ambulance could be found to take him to hospital. Once released from hospital Brutus was sentenced to 18 months hard labour on Robben Island which he duly served. 26

All SAN-ROC committee members were subjected to special agent intimidation. When leaving South Africa SAN-ROC officials either had their passports denied or seized. Banning orders were served on them, they were picked up for interrogation, and pressure was brought to bear on their employers. Brutus the president was banned, the SAN-ROC secretary was banned, Christ de Broglio who was active behind the scenes had to leave after police pressured his employers. 27

Due to Government instructed pressures SAN-ROC's leading players had either been deported or were under heavy restrictions bringing to a halt SAN-ROC activity within South Africa.

All was not lost for SAN-ROC and the non-white sporting campaign. In June, 1962 the IOC warned the SAONGA that its membership would be suspended unless an assurance could be given that any non-white sportsmen or women who reached the required standard to represent his country would be permitted to do so. the warning turned ultimatum at the IOC's October meeting at Baden-Baden in 1963 when a resolution was passed declaring that SAONGA would be forced to withdraw from the games unless it a) makes a firm declaration of its acceptance of the Olympic code (forbidding discrimination on the grounds of race) and b)

25 Ibid, p.55
26 Archer, p.193
27 Hain, p.57
obtains from the South African Government a change in policy regarding colour discrimination in sport.\textsuperscript{28} Early in 1964 at the Innsbruck meeting of the IOC South Africa's invitation to the Tokyo games was withdrawn when she failed to comply with these two criteria. It was a significant victory for SANROC who had badgered the IOC to reach a verdict on South Africa's peculiar sporting policies. The decision by the IOC however, surprised SANROC members who had previously found the IOC unco-operative. SANROC believed the decision was prompted by a combination of shock at the shooting of Dennis Brutus and the worry by the IOC establishment of the growing strength of the African countries.\textsuperscript{29} Over the period 1964 to 1965 the international campaign slowed almost to a stop with SAN-ROC dislocated by members guarded, expelled or jailed. However, on his release Brutus joined de Broglie in London and re-established the organisation in exile launching a more determined effort to exclude South Africa from the Olympic Movement.\textsuperscript{30}

A decisive development in achieving this aim was the formation of the Supreme Council of Sport in Africa (SCSA). Thirty two African nations and delegates from SAN-ROC met, at Bamako in December 1966 and agreed upon SCSA's main resolution.

\ldots to obtain the expulsion of South African sports organisations from the Olympic Movement and from International Federations should South Africa fail to comply fully with the IOC rules.\textsuperscript{31}

The African nations also agreed not to participate in the 1968 Mexico Olympic Games if a 'racialist team from South Africa takes part'.\textsuperscript{32} It was a powerful show of strength from the African nations who were unified in their opposition. The commitment and influence of SCSA was not initially appreciated by South Africa and the IOC, yet was instrumental to South Africa's final expulsion from the Olympics.

South Africa meanwhile, realised changes were needed to gain readmittance at the next Olympic meeting. Over the next two years the South African National Olympic Committee (which is the South African Olympic and

\textsuperscript{28} Muriel Horrel. \textit{South Africa and the Olympic Games}, p.12-14
\textsuperscript{29} Hain, p.58
\textsuperscript{30} Archer, p.194
\textsuperscript{31} Lapchick, p.80
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid
National Games Committee under a new name) used all its political skill, on the one hand to placate world opinion by deceptively creating seemingly genuine mechanisms to bring its selection policy into line with the IOC charter, while on the other, but with the same mechanisms, circumventing the non-racial requirement. At the 1966 Rome Conference South Africa proposed a multiracial committee which consisted of three non-whites, three whites and presided over by the President of SANOC to choose the South African teams for the 1968 meeting. The IOC agreed, effectively surrendering the control of fair selection of South African teams to SANOC because the presiding president Frank Brown had the casting vote thus loading the count 4:3 against the non-whites.33 Such a multi-racial committee gave the appearance of fair and equal selection procedures, while also portraying a conscious attempt at improving the segregated system in sport.

In addition to this committee, the IOC ordered a three-man commission to investigate the situation in South Africa and report back at the next IOC meeting. Between Rome and the next meeting in Teheran, Prime Minister of South Africa, Vorster, made an important policy speech. He said inte alia;

That policy for internal sports relations between the races had to be separated from the countries sports relations with other countries: in domestic sport, each race must continue to practise and administer its sport separately; and, just as it was good for Nigerians, Ethiopians and other non-white states to participate in the Olympics, South Africa would allow its non-whites to participate, but this had to be within the framework of Apartheid in domestic sport.34

With this announcement Vorster created a dual stand on South African sport. And in a latter speech he unequivocally declared that Apartheid would continue to be strictly applied within South African sport. 35

The Teheran Conference in April, 1967 failed to decide South Africa’s fate for the 1968 Olympics despite Braun’s special plea for readmittance. He told the conference that after “protracted negotiations with the Government” South Africa was able to meet “the basic requirements of the IOC as they effect our participation in the Olympic games”. He then listed

33 Horrell, p.17
34 Hain, p.62
five concessions regarding the composition, travelling arrangements, representation, competition and selection of the South African team as evidence of rightful changes in South African sport.36

While no decision was reached, the IOC announced that its three man commission which had not yet visited the Republic would do so and report back to the Grenoble session in January 1968.37 The commission returned from its nine day fact finding mission and reported that while sport in South Africa was racially separated and non-whites had inadequate sporting facilities, white sports officials were doing their best to select a fully representative team.38

In light of the concessions proclaimed by Braun and the findings of the commission the IOC moved to settle the matter by conducting a postal vote among all its seventy members. This resulted in a 38 to 27 vote in favour of re-inclusion. South Africa would be allowed to enter a team at the Mexico Olympics on the understanding that vigorous efforts would be continued, to remove all forms of racial discrimination in amateur sport.39

International reaction to South Africa's inclusion was swift. Within two days, ten countries announced they would not take part in the Olympics. The SCSA immediately convened in Brazzaville to discuss the situation. Thereafter one African nation after the other announced their boycott from Mexico. Iraq, Malaysia, Syria, Saudi Arabia, India, and Kuwait supported the protest as did Italy and later the Soviet Union. By mid April over 50 countries had expressed their opposition to South Africa's readmission. In contrast Britain openly supported the IOC's decision while America fell conspicuously silent. America's black sports community though threatened to join the boycott. With the Mexico Olympics disintegrating the Executive Board of the IOC met and issued the following cable to all IOC members.

In view of all the information on the international climate received by the Executive Board at this meeting, it is unanimously of the opinion that it would be most unwise for a South African team to participate in the games of the XIX Olympiad. Therefore the executive Board strongly recommends that you endorse this unanimous proposal to

36 Ibid, p.63-65
37 Ibid
38 Horrell, M. p.22-23
39 Ibid
withdraw the invitation to these games. 40
Publicly, Avery Bundage the IOC's president told the press "we thought the safety of the South African team and the success of the Games were in grave doubt". Yet behind closed doors it was believed South Africa's presence at the games would have been attended by demonstrations and perhaps violence. On the 26th April, 1968 the IOC announced the vote for withdrawing South Africa's invitation to the games had been 46 against 14 for with 2 abstentions.41 42 South Africa was out of the Mexico Olympics. South Africa was outraged at the decision. The Johannesburg Sunday Express maintained that...

politics, not the Olympic Ideal, mob law not the Olympic Movements legal procedures had won the pre-Olympic test...
It has been shown that validly taken decisions...can be reversed because of the vile threats of a venomous and vociferous pressure group.43 Vorster equally outraged then proposed to organise a 'mini-Olympics' as compensation for white South Africa's expulsion. Evolving into a whites only event, it quickly became a sham, with most invited countries pulling out, causing great embarrassment within South Africa. By 1970 at the IOC conference in Amsterdam world opposition had escalated against South Africa beyond further equivocation. On the 15th May 1970 South Africa was expelled from the Olympic Movement. 44

Since 1896, the Olympic Games have been held every four years inviting nearly every country to compete together in what is frequently lauded the greatest sporting occasion in the world. South Africa became the first country in the history of the Olympic Movement to be expelled. Consequently, the ramifications of expulsion were far-reaching. Because the Olympics touch all nations in numerous sports the influence the IOC has on sporting policy is greater than any other sport organisation. The rulings of the IOC set persuasive precedents to other sporting code affiliations and while not all organisations feel the need to follow IOC rulings in regard to South Africa, many did. From the beginning of the debate on South Africa's

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40 Lapchick, p.119
41 Horrell, p.25
42 Lapchick cites an IOC newsletter No.8 p.150 which records a different result being 47 for, 16 against with 8 abstentions.
43 Lapchick, p.121
44 Hain, p.69
Olympic eligibility to 1968 they had been excluded from many international federations and competitions - table tennis, football, basketball, volleyball, swimming, fishing, sea fishing, fencing cycling and amateur boxing. In 1969 South Africa was expelled or suspended from netball, cross country, presentation gymnastics, judo and weightlifting, and early in 1970 from international tennis. With the IOC reviewing South African Olympic status it prompted other sporting affiliations to assess for themselves South Africa's involvement within their own pursuits. Further, the swing of opinion against South Africa combined with numerous exclusions meant those sporting affiliations which neglected to decide or voted favourably for South Africa's inclusion and continued contact appeared to travel against the tide of public opinion making themselves targets for increasingly stronger protest movements.

For SAN-ROC and the protest movement the Olympic expulsion was the culmination of eight years constant campaigning. While assessing how much SAN-ROC influenced the IOC decision will remain impossible, what is certain is SAN-ROC never let the IOC forget the South African issues. The apparent success of their efforts served to spur other anti-Apartheid protest groups elsewhere. In the last years before the Amsterdam decision the current of anti-South African sentiment became considerably stronger, making 1970 for South African sport a disaster. An examination of the major events is required to understand more fully South Africa's predicament by 1970.

Aside from the Olympics white South Africa's two most favourite sports are the Commonwealth pastimes of rugby union and cricket.

Rugby in South Africa...

is one of the three cultural activities of the white population, the other two being lying in the sun and eating. 45

It is the national sport, South Africans are devoted to it and the game and players hold the grandiose qualities of myth. As with New Zealand rugby, white South African rugby has been accorded religious status. Introduced to South Africa in 1862 by Canon George Ogilvie it had immediate widespread appeal, with the Afrikaner population identifying particularly so. The Springboks are the highest expression next to the Dutch reformed Church

45 Archer, p.79
and the Nationalist Party, of the Afrikaner spirit.\textsuperscript{46} South Africa was one of the original International Rugby Board (IRB) member countries and during the first half of this century reigned undefeated rugby champions over all other affiliate members. Non whites adopted rugby concurrently with the white populous however due to the segregated traditions and general ignorance to the existence of non-white rugby in and outside South Africa, it has been refused recognition by the white South African Rugby Board (SARB) and hence holds no place internationally.\textsuperscript{47}

Cricket, likewise shares center stage with rugby in South African sport. Until the 1950's cricket was considered an English game. Afrikaners were reluctant to play a game so closely aligned with British imperialism and only when South Africa departed from the Commonwealth could the Afrikaner play with "a quiet conscience". Between 1955 and 1970 the number of white cricketers more than doubled. The successes of the national side helped promote cricket in South Africa till it also acquired national game status.\textsuperscript{48} During the 1960's South Africa looked to protect these sports from the imposing boycotts however the events from 1968 to 1970 saw these stronger sporting bonds begin to disintegrate. Creating a situation of near complete sporting isolation for the apartheid Republic.

As previously outlined the first decisive blow against the sanctity of these treasured sporting contacts come when statements from Prime Minister Dr Verwoerd relinquished any possibility of Maori travelling with the All Blacks to South Africa in 1967. The NZRFU under pressure from the public and Government finally called off the tour. The following year South Africa received a further more damaging blow to Apartheid sport. It came with the Basil D'Oliveira affair.

D'Oliveira was a coloured South African born in the Cape who from a young age developed into a top class cricketer. Restricted by cricket's segregationist practises D'Oliveira travelled to England to further his career. After several seasons he joined Worcestershire County Cricket Club and soon established himself as one of England's promising all-rounders. Having successfully performed for England against the West Indies in 1966 D'Oliveira

\textsuperscript{46} Chris Laidlaw "Mud in Your Eye" p. 187
\textsuperscript{47} Archer, p.60
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid, p.87-88
was expected to make the touring side for South Africa in 1968-69.49

Reaction from South Africa was instant. The then Minister of the Interior LeRoux said in January 1967.

Our policy is clear. We will not allow mixed teams to play against our white teams here. If this player (D'Oliveira) were chosen he would not be allowed to come here. That is our policy. It is well known here and overseas.50

The MCC (the ruling body for cricket in England) tried to defer the issue till the time of selection while South African Minister of Sport, Frank Waring hammered home South Africa's policy.

.....The government has on many occasions made it quite clear that it opposes mixed sport in South Africa.51

The MCC then replied to this uncompromising stand by stating its team would be chosen solely on merit and if D'Oliveira maintained good form it is likely he would be selected. If South Africa would not accept a team with D'Oliveira as a member, the tour would be cancelled. Battle lines had been drawn. If South Africa refused D'Oliveira, the tour would be cancelled.

There was concern in South Africa that, should the MCC cancel, New Zealand and Australian tour policy would follow suit. This resulted in contradictory statements as to South Africa's true position regarding D'Oliveira. Le Roux denied that he had said D'Oliveira could not go, Vorster sounded undecided one minute then confirmed his position the next and leading Dailies predicted an easing of Apartheid doctrines in sport.

To confuse matters further, D'Oliveira's cricketing fortunes took a turn for the worse. His form slumped through the 1968 season and he was dropped from England to play the home series against Australia in 1969. A late season return to form saw D'Oliveira re-selected for the final test against Australia. He scored 158 which put him back in contention for the South African tour.

On Wednesday 28th August the England team was announced. D'Oliveira was left out. The English cricketing fraternity was stunned. The distinguished cricket journalist John Arlott, wrote in the Guardian 'no one of open mind will believe he was left out for valid cricketing reasons.' On September 16 an injury to allrounder Tom Cartwright forced him to retire and

49 Hain, p.78
50 Lapchick, p.82
51 Ibid
D'Oliveira was selected to take his place. A situation that the MCC and South Africa had hoped would never eventuate was upon them. Vorster was outraged and the following day stated he was not prepared to accept an MCC team forced upon South Africa by people with certain political motives.

"It's not" he said, "The MCC team it's the team of the anti-apartheid movement...It is a team of political opponents of South Africa...who don't care about sports relations at all".

The MCC also remained unmoved declaring if the team is unacceptable the tour was off. On the 24th September after a final breakdown in talks the MCC announced the cancellation of the tour.

The manifestations of this result on world opinion were far-reaching. South Africa before all the world had exposed its racial qualifications for visiting teams and shown its absolute inflexible insistence of this. It provided an atmosphere of public awareness to Apartheid and sport issues and more importantly provided the initial impetus to England's first pressure group whose solitary aim was to stop tours with South Africa. On September 10, 1969 Peter Hain and Hugh Geach supported by Dennis Brutus formally announced the formation of the 'Stop the Seventy Tour Committee (STST) at the press conference held in a Fleet Street Pub, Hain who was initially responsible for handling press inquiries told reporters STST was formed to mount a sustained campaign against Apartheid in sport and were working for the cancellation of the 1970 tour of Britain by a white South African cricket team. Their tactics and commitment were aptly spelled out by Louis Eaks, Chairman of the Young Liberals when he said.

The era of petitions and reasoned debate has been rejected by those responsible for sport...our action is a response to this morally indefensible policy of Apartheid in sport...is there any justification for importing Apartheid into this country?...we are not committed to a programme of non-violent civil disobedience to disrupt the 1970 South African tour. I believe many people are prepared to risk arrest and even imprisonment on this crucial issue of principle. We have asked the MCC on numerous occasions to take a reasoned stand against Apartheid in sport. It is they who will be responsible if Lords becomes the Ulster of the sporting world next summer.

STST was advocating direct action because, Hain explains, 'other methods

52 Ibid, p.156 and Hain, P.122
have failed'\textsuperscript{53} Their announcement, intentions and tactics aroused a great deal of interest. Few could have predicted what was to happen over the next nine to ten months. Hain...

...we had no idea of what to expect: only a determination to succeed. If we had fully thought out the magnitude of the task ahead of us, perhaps we would never have started. If we had foreseen the mass movement that sprang and which led to a major domestic and international political upheaval, perhaps we would have been daunted. If I had seen my sudden thrust into the position of 'leading' this movement and the consequent complete upheaval of my personal life and that of the other members of our family, perhaps I would quietly have forgotten about the whole business.\textsuperscript{54}

The D'Oliveira affair had aroused concern over Apartheid in cricket and STST pledged a commitment to stop the South African cricket tour, but to remain consistent in their appraisals STST had to deal with the Springbok rugby tour first.

The South African Springboks embarked on a twenty-five match tour of Great Britain and Ireland which will be remembered not for the rugby played but for the demonstrations, marches and violence that occurred at every match. In all 50,000 demonstrators turned out 9,000 police were appointed to contain them and the official figure for police costs rose over £50,000. 400 arrests were made with a similar number detained. One match was abandoned and two were switched from their original venues. There was a fantastic drop in attendances and subsequently a drop in gate takings.\textsuperscript{55}

The campaign began before the first match. A week before the Springboks were due to arrive protesters ruined the playing field at Oxford with weedkiller, spelling out "Oxford Rejects apartheid". This, along with a police recommendation, saw officials immediately call off the first match of the tour. For STST it proved very important.

The calling off of the Oxford match was absolutely crucial to the fantastic growth in momentum of the campaign at this vital period just before the tourists were due to arrive.\textsuperscript{56}

The team was 'welcomed' by protesters at the airport who aimed to 'hound

\textsuperscript{53} Hain, p.123
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid, p.125
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid, p.126
\textsuperscript{56} Lapchick, p.157
them' everywhere they went'. At practises, games, social functions, protesting was present. The teams bus was frequently followed or became the target of flour bombs and stones. Initially the Springboks were unperturbed, dismissing the protesters as "just a bunch of kids". Later however, their tune changed. Corrie Bornman the Springbok team manager said of the last three months, 'they have been an ordeal to which I would never again subject young sportsmen'. He went on...

I would be a fool to deny this awful undercurrent didn't affect the team and their performances. We came very close to breaking the tour off after the International against England. Clearly, this sustained protest action had the unsettling effect desired.

Although STST achieved most of its aims in demonstrating the costs for doing so were extraordinarily high. Demonstrations at games frequently became violent as protesters clashed with police and, worst of all, fanatic rugby supporters.

STST looked to non-violent disruption of each game employing a variety of methods to do this. At Swansea, scene of the worst violence throughout the campaign, about 100 demonstrations invaded the pitch and sat down refusing to shift. The police which attended every match in plain clothes, tracksuits and uniforms then moved in to escort them off, helped by appointed rugby stewards who were more akin to rugby vigilantes than police helpers. Violence quickly ensued as police and stewards went to work on the protesters - men and women alike. Reports of protesters being dragged off the field and thrown amongst an angry crowd of rugby supporters to get beaten, or of women being dragged by their hair were aplenty. STST immediately demanded a full public enquiry which was denied but the incident was sufficiently serious to warrant the Home Secretary to call a conference of Chief constables 'to discuss the best way in which police responsibilities can be carried out.' The rugby steward concept remained in tact for two more games before the Home Secretary barred them on the 25th November.

When the South African's journeyed to Ireland the protest pressure was maintained. When the team arrived the trade unions blocked out the press at the airport and cut off telephone services at the hotel where the
team stayed as demonstrators chanted in the street throughout the night. For the international match against Ireland at Lansdowne Road ten thousand demonstrators marched to the ground, which was surrounded in coiled barbed wire with hundreds of police stationed behind it. By comparison to demonstrations in England there were few violent clashes, but the Springbok camp was under a virtual state of siege due to the deliberate widening of the protest focus to include all Springbok activity on and off the field.

The final match of the tour at Twickenham on 31 January was attended by 3,000 demonstrators outside and a further 500, who managed to get tickets, inside. Protesters inside threw dye and smoke bombs onto the field (invading the pitch was impossible because of barbed wire barriers and lines of police). Immediately fighting broke out on the terraces as plain clothed police and rugby fans took their own action to stop the disturbances. The police made 26 arrests and 46 protesters were ejected from the ground. In New Zealand *The Dominion* titled its report of this protest "the Battle of Twickenham". As the Springboks left Britain rugby reporters appeared unanimous in attributing some blame for the poor tour record, the worst by any South African side, to the effect of these demonstrations.

A vital component of the greater protest structure over which campaigning groups have no control, is the media. Press coverage for the rugby campaign was, Hain describes, ‘fantastic’ ‘one much better than that for most protest movements up till then’ Some newspapers gave accurate coverage to the intrinsic issues involved as well as day to day accounts of protest action. Others focussed primarily on sensationalising demonstrator activities and still others openly opposed STST’s motives and purpose. STST’s only complaint concerned distorted coverage given to the effects of demonstrations. Hain summarised it thus:

> If the demonstration outside was big but peaceful it would get only a brief mention; but if it was rowdy and violent it would get banner headline coverage with an editorial inside condemning such protests.

New Zealand protest groups were to experience similar difficulties in media reporting. Quantitative evidence for those supporting the STST cause at this
time could not be found but, needless to say, the extent of protest at every match venue over the entire United Kingdom combined with large numbers actively protesting are testimony to growing support for STST's ultimate achievement to seek cancellation of the 1970 cricket tour by South Africa.

The rugby campaign was for STST the 'trial run' for their main objective and by establishing the arguments, displaying effective non-violent disruptive demonstrations and threatening tours to the point of cancellation they had set a perfect spring board from which to work for the stopping of the cricket tour due to begin in early May. STST was now an undisputed force. However an opinion poll conducted in early January registered 62% in favour of the MCC's decision, to proceed with the tour. \(^{63}\) Soon after the two most important figures in British politics took opposite positions on the tour: Conservative Party leader Edward Heath stated his approval of the MCC's decision and Prime Minister Wilson questioned the wisdom of the tour adding that he would not attend any matches. Wilson claimed

> Once the South Africans have said that they were not taking a player we wanted to send, I would have rather thought that put them beyond the pale of civilised cricket.\(^{64}\)

While opposition to the rugby tour appeared to come from young people, protesting against the proposed cricket tour increasingly featured prominent members of the Establishment.

On the day of the MCC mid-February meeting, STST delivered a 13,000 name petition against the tour and demonstrated outside Lords \(^{65}\) during the meeting. Inside the MCC arrived at two significant decisions. Firstly that the tour had been reduced from eighteen weeks with twenty eight matches on twenty three grounds, to eleven weeks, with twelve matches on eight grounds and secondly that Lords was to be completely surrounded by barbed wire.\(^{66}\) The cricket council in reducing the number of matches was consolidating its resource to protect only eight grounds from demonstrators while still preserving the tour: Peter Hain said of these

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\(^{63}\) Lapchick p.169

\(^{64}\) Ibid, p.169

\(^{65}\) Lords is the home ground of the MCC and headquarters of English cricket.

\(^{66}\) Ibid, p.169
precautions 'This seems to be the first round to us.'

On March 7, STST held its own meeting announcing a fourfold strategy for the proposed tour, the most important of which aimed "to get the tour cancelled before it began" rather than after it started, as some wanted. In addition claims suggesting opposing factors were representative of only a small minority faced a direct challenge as a steady flow of community groups and individuals announced their support for STST movement. In mid-March the West Indian campaign against Apartheid cricket was formed to champion STST support from West Indians living in Britain, John Arlott the most prestigious British cricket commentator announced he would not cover the tour, Prime Minister Wilson stated in a television interview he hoped people 'would demonstrate against the South African cricket tour. Everyone should be free to demonstrate against apartheid'. Then toward the end of April came five major announcements on the tour issue.

On April 21 the British Council of Churches spoke for its six million parishes calling for peaceful demonstrations against the tour. The next day the Trades Union Congress joined in calling for a complete boycott. The Supreme Council for Sport in Africa then dropped its bombshell, stating if the tour proceeded its thirteen Commonwealth members would boycott the Edinburgh Commonwealth games in July. This would effectively leave the Edinburgh games an all-white affair destroying the spirit of the games and seriously threatening Commonwealth relations.

The television companies, Granada and BBC publicly refused to broadcast the tour games as it felt 'it would be wrong to present these matches as entertainment'. And, on 26 April it was announced the Queen would not attend any matches nor invite the touring team to Buckingham Palace as was the tradition.

In the face of this official opposition the MCC stood fast. Dire predictions of mass violence from right-or left wing extremists were heard on hearing the MCC uncompromising stand. The Cricket Council though, could have sought compliance from official opinion polls. On May 3 the Opinion Research Center for the Sunday Times (London) found 55% of the British public were against Prime Minister Wilson's anti-tour stand while only

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67 Ibid
68 Lapchick, p.170-172
69 Ibid, p.173-174
33% thought he was correct.\textsuperscript{70}

In early May a new pressure group emerged, namely the Fair Cricket Campaign (FCC) who appealed to those masses in Britain who did not want to join direct action demonstrators and would by a massive peaceful demonstration outside Lords on 20 June demonstrate to the authorities and to the wider public the strong opposition that exists among people from all walks of life who normally do not involve themselves in the more conventional type of protest.\textsuperscript{71}

Peter Hain saw this second group in a positive light

We don’t see this as a split. It is putting into organised form a difference in tactics which has always existed between more moderate demonstrators and militants over direct action. It will bring out people who would not want to be associated with us.\textsuperscript{72}

FCC gave the protest movement a vital valve through which the vast reservoir of anti tour moderate opinion could be expressed. It broadened anti Apartheid support.

A rising fear heard both publicly and in parliament, was the detrimental effects the tour would have on race relations. Home Secretary Callaghan said 'race relations in Britain would be so seriously damaged that the MCC should call off the tour immediately.\textsuperscript{73} Another equally widespread fear concerned the Commonwealth Games. By 15 May five more countries had withdrawn and it was feared the entire 'concept of the Commonwealth' could be wrecked if the tour proceeded.\textsuperscript{74}

Still the MCC would not budge. The Councils stand was faithfully supported by anti-demonstrator groups and the Conservative Party which actively campaigned for the tour. Despite their efforts public opinion had shifted dramatically, 58% of people supported cancellation increasing 25% in just over two weeks.\textsuperscript{75} In light of this, on May 19 the MCC astonishingly voted for the tour however Home Secretary Callaghan met with the MCC chairman and offered a face saving device in announcing the government was willing to take the blame and might defray some of the

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid
\textsuperscript{71} Hain, p.182
\textsuperscript{72} Lapchick, p.175
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid, p.175
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid, p.176
costs of cancellation. The following day the MCC cancelled the tour.

In a similar, but unrelated case was the Arthur Ashe affair. Ashe a black American tennis star applied to enter the South African open tennis championships but after speculation the South African Government denied him a visa of entry. Strangely enough in the same announcement the Government allowed Ashe to enter as part of the United States Davis Cup team. 76

News of Ashe’s denial hit headlines around the world. The United States, till now a silent voice in Apartheid controversies responded in saying the decision would damage "correct" United States - South African relations77 and George Hauser head of the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) called the decision 'a dramatic demonstration of the commitment of South Africa to a racist position.78 Alistair Marton, president of the United States Lawn Tennis Association (USLTA) called the decision 'a clear case of racial discrimination and the rules of the International Lawn Tennis Federation (ILTF) prohibit this'. 79 Ashe himself refused any comment. Previously he had voiced opposition to the South African Apartheid system, and was associated with the campaign against racialism both in America and internationally.

In the face of furious world criticism, South African Minister of Sport, Waring, blamed Ashe’s general 'antagonism toward South Africa' adding, his real motives in coming to South Africa were political.80 Publicly Ashe denied this allegation having signed notarized statements that he refused to discuss the political implications of the application and gave an undertaking that he would not make any statements on his reaction to South Africa until he had left the country.81 Ashe’s private feelings were somewhat different he recalls

I was personally being denied an opportunity to play in a tournament that, rightly or wrongly, was part of the international circuit. I felt I should have the right to play in this tournament, or the tournament shouldn’t have the right to be included in the

76 Hain, p.70
77 Lapchick, p.182
78 Ibid, p.182
79 Ibid
80 Ibid
81 Hain, p.70
International Tennis Federation circuit.\textsuperscript{82}  
Ashe was criticised by some for ever having applied in the first place to take part in a tournament from which Blacks in South Africa were excluded. In retrospect Ashe maintains his intentions were justified as a black athlete and black person:

I knew I could not go to South Africa solely for athletic purposes. I had to go there, look around, absorb all I could about the place and publicize my feelings.\textsuperscript{83}

The Ashe Affair had introduced the issue of Apartheid sport into America for the first time. South Africa's treatment of Ashe outraged American opinion and brought home the crudity of this system. His ban had an enormous impact on world opposition to South African sporting contacts.\textsuperscript{84}

The Ashe Affair combined with the threat of demonstrations to the Davis Cup culminated in the United States Lawn Tennis Association calling a special meeting of Davis Cup nations for March 23. Because fears that South Africa's inclusion would endanger the competition in boycotts and visa problems - South Africa was excluded.\textsuperscript{85} The exclusion from the Davis Cup must not be confused with International Lawn Tennis Federation the controlling world body. Due to the undemocratic structure of the ILTF South Africa remained an affiliated member. Four countries (United States, Britain, France and Australia) had 12 votes each followed by some countries who had eight votes and others with four or two votes. African countries were in the lowest category of associate members and had no votes. Britain, France and Australia were all traditional sporting allies of South Africa, so resolutions for white South Africa's expulsion were defeated by a majority of votes from a minority of countries.\textsuperscript{86}

By 1970 white South African sport was facing near complete isolation. Opposition to South Africa's sporting policies had steadily grown since the early 1960's and by 1970 most countries if not opposed were drawn for an opinion. South Africa's expulsion from the Olympic movement illustrated the extent of world opposition and had the further significance of expelling South Africa by constitutional means.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{82} Arthur Ashe \textit{Off the Court} p.146-149
\bibitem{83} Ashe, p. 148
\bibitem{84} Hain, p.71
\bibitem{85} Lapchick, p.185-186
\bibitem{86} Hain, p.72
\end{thebibliography}
In the Republic's cherished sports of rugby and cricket, contacts with sympathetic opponents ended when militant tactics were used successfully over persuasive pressure or legal means for the first time.

The protest movement had begun in South Africa, and with expulsion, spread internationally. It had developed organisationally and co-ordinated effective protest action. Expulsion of South Africa from each sporting body and the total isolation of South African sport were accepted common aims. By constitutional means and militant protest action this large movement was closing the door on South African international sport.
Chapter Three
THE ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE

In 1970 New Zealand's All Blacks were invited to tour South Africa. The invitation received, did not explicitly include racial qualifications and left selection entirely in the Rugby Unions hands. But after the cancellation in 1967 due to South Africa's acceptance of a white-only team it became accepted only a team selected on merit would be possible. All recent All Black tours of South Africa had raised this issue and each protest became progressively louder until in 1967 the Government stepped in indemnifying New Zealand's position beyond doubt, giving the NZRFU no option but to decline. Since 1960 public opinion increasingly rejected exclusion of Maoris from representative teams, in 1967 the Government affirmed a similar stance and the Rugby Union, like it or not, had to swallow it. New Zealand stood firm, in no way would it import racial discriminatory policies in choosing its national teams. All teams in the future must be selected on merit alone.

Yet this was not 1967, it was 1970 and a lot had happened since then. South Africa, suspended from the Olympics in 1964, was again in 1968 and finally expelled in early 1970. South Africa had refused tennis star Arthur Ashe visa entry, raising a storm of protest in America. The Springbok tour of Britain erupted into violence and demonstration, and Hain's STST threatened worse if the South African cricket tour proceeded. Numerous other South African sporting bodies faced expulsions, suspensions or protest.

So, South Africa, if New Zealand accepted the invitation, required a major policy change allowing a multi-racial team to tour. But how did New Zealand deal with this tour and why was there renewed protest vigour against a tour where the previous contention of merit selection was satisfied? An examination of the views taken in regard to the tour is necessary.

The loudest voice opposed to the tour continually reiterated the tour should not proceed at all. It was primarily led by the pressure groups Citizens Association for Racial Equality (CARE) and the student driven Halt All Racist Tours (HART) whose opposition to South Africa's Apartheid system was the fundamental 'raison d'être' of these organisations. ¹ They were opposed to racial prejudice in all its forms both in New Zealand and

¹ See Chapter four for a full description of these groups.
abroad. 2 This quote from the late African Chief Albert Luthuli used by the Chairman of HART, Trevor Richards in a speech, epitomised their attitude toward apartheid.

Do not deceive yourselves into thinking that racialism is just another tyranny like a political tyranny or religious tyranny. I know many men who have changed their religion and many men who have changed their politics, but I know of no man who has ever changed his race and that is the way to Armageddon, for racialism is the only absolute tyranny. 3

Any contact whatsoever with South Africa and Rhodesia was abhorrent and only served to advance this absolute tyranny. (Rhodesia had, under the Smith Regime declared unconstitutionally its unilateral Declaration of Independence and in 1970 renounced allegiance to the British Crown declaring Rhodesia a republic. The United Kingdom considered this an act of rebellion asking UN member states not to recognise Rhodesian Independence. Due to defiance of, and isolation from the rest of the world, Rhodesia sought comfort from South Africa who gave aid in exports, imports and military assistance. Minority white Rhodesian leaders subsequently copied South African racial policies in formulating their own legislation.) 4 Reform through the pressure of isolation however could be achievable.

In the context of this debate, critics disputed this line. Many instantly dismissed the idea claiming the practicalities in achieving total isolation of South Africa in an economic, social and political sense remained hopelessly idealistic. 5 The most convincing rebuttle came from Helen Suzman, South Africa's leading liberal politician. Asked if cancelling the tour to South Africa would help the liberals cause (who championed against apartheid) in South Africa, she replied...

Boycotting South Africa would in no way alter the internal situation there. 6

Her reasoning was in two parts. Firstly, the only people that would think again, and then only in the narrow field of sport, would be white spectator sportsman, "therefore not changing things that matter". And secondly,

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2 Critical Appraisal of CARE's activities against apartheid pp1 (CR)
3 Speech to Prime Minister by Richards July 14, 1971 reprinted (CR).
4 J.D. Omer-Cooper History of Southern Africa p.221-222
5 Laidlaw, p.191
6 The Dominion, May 11, 1970 p.5 col 1-2
7 Ibid
cancelling the tour could in some cases be counter productive to the liberal cause in so far as actions against South Africa abroad tend to harden white opinion within the republic.\(^8\) In spite of these views the advocates of isolationism maintained their views.

In direct contrast to isolationism were those adamantly in favour of the tour. Inactive in the controversy, but most active in supporting the tour was the New Zealand Rugby Football Union. As in the past the Union resorted to its "no comment" stance. Any attempt to discuss the issue raised by the tour was met with a set formula "as on previous occasions we are not prepared to enter into any public discussion on the matter" in responding to discussion it was agreed by the Union it would "only stir up trouble", and besides, the Rugby union was to administer rugby and not engage in political discourse. This was outside the realms of its function. In regard to the tour it would only deal with the South African Rugby Board. As far as the Rugby Union was concerned, nothing but sport was involved in the tour.\(^9\) The provincial unions and individual rugby clubs followed the practise of the national union. No matter how vigorous the attempts by outsiders to extract the justifications for touring the Union remained steadfast and would not be drawn into the debate thus absolving itself from addressing the central moral issues.\(^10\)

The closest the Union came to officially discussing the tour was in regard to the invitation. Due to the protests of 1960 and 1965 and the cancellation of the proposed 1967 tour the Union had this time secured an invitation from South Africa in keeping with the policy "No Maori No Tour". It made anybody in New Zealand eligible and no racial guidelines were employed in selection. Rugby officialdom felt this was a more than adequate resolution. Officials then became agitated at the continuing protest in 1970. They claimed the protesters had changed their ground - to the removal of discrimination in South African teams, so as to justify continuing the protest.\(^11\) Beyond this contention, the Union remained tightlipped.

Outside official circles a strong argument in support of the tour, which grew steadily louder as the controversy developed was that which aimed

\(^8\) Suzman to Innes May 15, 1970 (CR)
\(^9\) Thompson, *Retreat From Apartheid* p.56-57 T. Newnham Oral Interval, 23 May 1990 at 52 Customs St. East Auckland, 10 a.m.
\(^10\) Ibid, p.57
\(^11\) Ibid, p.88
to keep politics and sport quite separate. It was used by a large cross section of the sporting community. From the quiet unobtrusive armchair critic to ardent and stolid sports fans. For most who refused to see beyond the touchlines of their field, politics had no part in the playing of sport. Politicians and Government belonged in the eschelons of bureaucracy, running the country, its exports, imports, economic and foreign policies and jostling by parties for political power. It had no place in the administration of sport, on deciding who plays who. Sport after all was a leisure time pursuit whereas politics was the serious business of diplomacy - the two were poles apart. Driven by a competitive spirit and the thrill of victory, sportspersons had no time for political implications, nor did they believe them important. Keeping politics out of sport was, as far as they were concerned, a just claim.

Others to push the same line included firstly, elements of the media as Wellington’s leading daily *The Dominion* states,

> This is one sporting organisations affair, that even rugby’s place in New Zealand life does not make an All Black tour an official act involving the Government, the people of New Zealand or anyone outside the field concerned.  

And secondly politicians themselves. Increasingly bureaucrats came to use this rhetoric. Norman Kirk M.P. and leader of the Labour Party in March 1969 claimed,

> 'the decision to tour lies with the NZRFU'

and added

> 'it is desirable that there should be no politics in sport'  

The front benches of the National Party echoed these sentiments. Deputy Prime Minister J.R. Marshal:

> The Government is not involved in the administration of sport and I believe that most New Zealanders would want to keep sport free from Government control or intervention.  

and Prime Minister, Keith Holyoake:

> I do not believe and I am sure this view is shared by most New Zealanders that New Zealand Governments should interfere in activities of sporting bodies.  

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12 *The Dominion*, May 2, 1970 p.12 (editorial)
14 *The Listener*, March 20, 1970 vol 63 p.7
15 Ibid
FIGURE 2

POLITICAL FOOTBALL

To hell with the ball — let's get on with the game.
M.P.'s found using this argument was a skillful way of side-stepping the real issue. Keeping politics out of sport washed their hands of the problem without losing electorial support from the sporting public and had the double effect of making the NZRFU responsible for the final decision to tour. It was effectively a political cop out.

To consider sport was, is, or ever will be kept out of politics is akin to imagining that avarice can be kept out of real estate or accountancy out of marriage. 16 Sport has been political since Pelops defeated Oenamaus in a chariot race and took his kingdom as part of the prize, or when Sparta used victories in the (ancient) Olympic Games as tests of her vitality and prestige. 17 And more recently when Hitler used the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games to exhibit Germany's Finest Aryans. The New Zealand Listener saw political implications in sport with a different slant again.

To compete is to seek victory and the prospect of victory is exciting. But winning itself is the best of all for to be victorious is to be liberated from the threat of failure. Huge crowds as well as individual athletes can experience this sense of deliverance. Thus sport in a very real sense is akin to the pursuit of freedom. 18

Within New Zealand and within rugby in particular sport and politics have invariably been mixed. It is customary to attribute informal diplomatic functions to touring sports teams. Of the 1949 All Black team to South Africa the team was considered "ambassadors and emissaries of New Zealand the honour and prestige of the whole of New Zealand were in the teams hands.19

South Africa was the first of the two countries to cause serious divisions by bringing politics into rugby. In 1921 when a Maori team played the touring Springboks at Napier the local Daily Telegraph published a report by a South African journalist. It expressed outrage at the sight of Europeans supporting the Maoris against the white South Africans. Despite Maori and Pakeha opinion being unequivocally opposed to the South African viewpoint, New Zealanders continued to tolerate South Africa's dictation of the racial composition of the All Black teams touring that country. 20

16 Laidlaw, p.195
17 The Listener, Oct 31, 1969 vol 62 p.5
18 Ibid
19 New Zealand Press Association April 11, 1949 : cited by Thompson, Race and Sport p.6
20 M. King, "Between Two Worlds" The Oxford History of New Zealand p.298
Because they were Maori, South African politics forbade All Black greats like George Nepia, Johnny Smith, and Naka Nathan from entering the Republic on the tours of 1928, 1949 and 1960 respectively.

Having already experienced a tour cancellation due to political pressure in 1967, it may explain why agitated sports lovers used the *no politics in sport* drive, so fervishly without really understanding the whole picture, and while conspicuously reinforcing this line politicians remorsefully hid behind the transparent ideal for their own survival. But as a valid argument, it was found wanting. Politics and sport in regard to rugby is adequately summerised herein.

Rugby though an amateur game,
Is Nationalism by another name,
The lot of all our games these days it seems:
For sport as everyone admits,
To paraphrase Von Calusewitz,
Is politics by more ferocious means.21

Another proposition aligned closely with the no politics in sport issue was the sport for sports sake idea. It was based on the premise if the team goes it will do so to engage in a sporting contest, for no other basic reason.22 Again it was supported by the sporting public with numerous letters to The Dominion who pushed the same barrow.

New Zealanders prefer to engage in international sport without conducting suitability tests on opponents other than their ability to compete.23

It is worth pausing momentarily to consider more fully this argument, and indeed the no politics in sport contention for both are not totally invalid.

If sport was played for sports sake only or divorced completely from politics, then any team could play any other team regardless of political or social considerations. This to a certain extent happens. The field of International sport pits East against West, right versus left, rich against poor and big against small and little politically is made of it. Countries compete against other countries whose political systems are disagreeable, even cold enemies without a voice raised. To this end politics are kept out of sport and the morality of sport exists in its own compartment.

Why then, the sports world asked, if you let us play the oppressive

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22 *The Dominion*, Dec 31, 1969 p.16 (editorial)
regimes of Spain or Russia will you not allow us to play South Africa? Unlike other countries South Africa’s sports system is intricately bound to its political Apartheid system based on racism. It is uniquely abhorrent. In any other oppressive system sportsman have the option, albeit a limited one, to change their politics, it is not impossible. In South Africa, as Luthuli states, no man can change the colour of his skin. It is impossible. He suffers under an absolute tyranny.

By far the most convincing argument which those in favour of the tour used is termed "the thin end of the wedge". It was based on the premise that sending a mixed team (racially) to South Africa might show South African’s that people of different races can successfully participate together in sport. In doing this it might begin to break down the Apartheid system. 24 The acceptance of Maoris within the team as a concession was the aim, and as Mayor of Glen Eden, Dr H.E.A. Moody stated:

Maybe, just maybe this is the thin end of the wedge and for the benefit of mankind we cannot afford to pass it over for we may be striking the first positive blow against Apartheid. 25

It was hoped the largest gains would be in breaking down segregated sport, with the additional effect of dismantling in some small way the Apartheid regime. Chris Laidlaw, All Black and Rhodes Scholar who toured with the 1970 All Blacks summarised the argument thus:

Moreover I saw it as a chink in the armour of apartheid through which a wedge could be driven resulting in a progressive tightening of the conditions under which we, the rugby world at large would be prepared to play rugby against South Africa. It was in short, the basis from which further concessions would be won and the gradual dismantling of Apartheid in sport achieved. 26

It was a strong case. Up till then no precedent had been set whereby a multiracial sports team had played in South Africa. South African Government policy had disallowed it. The Arthur Ashe and Basil D’Oliveira affairs vividly revealed the extent South Africa would go to preserve Apartheid. Yet it appeared the gate was open. For the first time a non-racially selected team was allowed to tour the Republic. Optimistic questions were asked. Had cracks already appeared in Apartheid before

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24 The Dominion April 4, 1970 p.10 col 3-4 (letter)
25 The Herald, March 26, 1969 (CR)
26 Laidlaw, p.190-191
the team arrived? How much more would these cracks widen with the arrival of the All Blacks. Helen Suzman endorsed this argument adding she was "against isolating South Africa and hopes to obtain reform from within."²⁷

What benefit the tour would have had on segregated sport remained a moot point. On the one hand, the skeptics denied any benefit whatsoever. They held that any pseudo-pragmatic notion that a bi-racial tour may help to break down Apartheid was myopic.²⁸ Listener correspondent Pamela Searell, who had recently visited South Africa claimed,

But seeing how short a time it took me to become colour conscious I could understand the feelings of a South African born, bred and educated in superiority. No visit by a few Maoris to his country is going to change his attitude to coloured people and anyone who thinks it will be deluding himself.²⁹

Further South African authorities had implied the inclusion of Maoris in the team, did in no way show a weakening of their racial policies, and, while the All Blacks were in South Africa these three conditions applied:
1) That the New Zealand side does not create any internal difficulties for the South African Government.
2) That politics should be kept out of sport and most importantly,
3) That sport should not be used as the thin end of the wedge for other motives.³⁰

Vorster had already declined entry to Arthur Ashe for contravening these conditions and would only allow the All Blacks if he felt there would be no damage to the existing regime.³¹ Thus the express intent of the tour as "the thin end of the wedge" so held those in favour, was flatly denied by South African's themselves.

On the other hand, however, were those who believed the tour may have achieved the desired result. Laidlaw, who was later to change his views on touring, found it;

Heartening to be told by several hard-lined Afrikaners that they had been convinced before the tour that multiracial sport,

²⁷ Suzman to Innes May 15 1970 (CR)
²⁸ The Listener May 23, 1970 vol 61 p.6 (letter)
²⁹ Ibid. April 10, 1970 Vol 63 p.10 (letter)
³⁰ The Dominion, May 29, 1970 p.2 col 1-5
³¹ Ibid
regardless of where, or by whom it was practised was physically and emotionless impossible.\textsuperscript{32}

And added the example set by the All Blacks must in the long term have had an educative effect.

Branching from "the thin end of the wedge" argument came a further contentious issue. Concerns had arisen in New Zealand that Maori players and supporters travelling around the Republic might be subjected to the oppressive racial laws, or that whites of the touring party would be treated better than non-whites. Leading this query was the New Zealand Maori Council. (NZMC) Before giving consent to the tour the council required to know "whether or not the principle of equality between Maori and Pakeha is maintained."\textsuperscript{33} In March, 1969 the Consul General for South Africa, Mr P.H. Phillip gave the assurance the Maori Council needed stating "all will be treated as New Zealanders without discrimination".\textsuperscript{34} In view of this "clear and cordial statement" the president of the New Zealand Maori Council, Sir Turi Carroll announced Council support for the tour.\textsuperscript{35}

The announcement immediately drew widespread criticism and claimed in according Maoris the same rights and privileges of South African whites, the Maori were being given "honorary white" status. That South African beneficence extends to a single occasion only, a tour of South Africa, and no promises are held out to Maoris who wish to travel to South Africa after 1970. The Maoris can be regarded as "honorary whites on licences of rapid expiry".\textsuperscript{36} When the tour finishes suddenly Maoris become brown again curtailing under the auspices of apartheid once more. Thus the concession accepted by the Maori Council is not a concession at all but "cynically conceived temporary accommodation."\textsuperscript{37}

The controversy in 1970 was uniquely different than previous years. The contention of racial discrimination in New Zealand's selection policy, to everybody's satisfaction had been removed yet the problems continued. Many sports lovers felt a sense of frustration having seemingly resolved the

\textsuperscript{32} Laidlaw, p.191
\textsuperscript{33} Te Kaunihera Maori, March 15, 1969. Policy statement p.1 (CR)
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid
\textsuperscript{35} T. Carroll, 'The South African Tour Pro and Con' Te Kaunihera Maori, Autumn 1969 p.9
\textsuperscript{36} The Listener, April 3, 1969 vol.60 p.5 (editorial)
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid
difficulty were still faced with protest action. Consequently arguments claiming "no politics in sport", and "sport for sports sake", became louder as sports people tried to fend off the moralists. However for those who listened rationally to both sides of the argument, 1970 posed a brand new question which involved choosing one of two alternatives, either -

refuse to tour at all in the hope that enforced isolation would provoke a breakdown in apartheid

or

maintain contacts in order that direct persuasion could take place with rugby acting as the catalyst.\textsuperscript{38}

The evil was no longer racial discrimination at home but the practising of it in South Africa, in selection of its sport teams and apartheid in general.

Important in understanding the effects of the 1970 tour, was the debate in South Africa. With rugby union holding the same revere in South Africa as in New Zealand the cancellation of the tour could have serious political implications which South African Prime Minister, Vorster, knew well. Yet tampering with the Apartheid system to accommodate a rugby tour held equal, if not stronger political risks. Numerous precedents had been set preventing the inclusion of coloured players in touring teams to South Africa with D’Oliveira’s demise exemplifying the Republic’s obdurate stance.

The problem for Vorster was two-fold. Firstly due to circumstances in New Zealand, South Africa in order to preserve rugby ties had to accept a team selected on merit only, risking the distinct possibility of Maori’s being included in the All Black touring side, and second, Vorster had to placate the hard line Africaner Nationalists within his party who insisted on absolute Apartheid dogma. The situation remained delicate. In April, 1967 Vorster delivered a major policy speech interpreted as making possible the visit of Maori rugby players to the republic or members of the All Blacks.\textsuperscript{39} He claimed, in the past Maori rugby players had toured South Africa and were received in the traditional respectable manner.

It is true that in the 1929 (All Black) team which toured South Africa, there was at least two people with Maori blood while the 1949 team there were at least three with Maori blood. We accepted these people and treated them like any number of the New Zealand touring team, there were no problems or

\textsuperscript{38} Laidlaw, p.190

\textsuperscript{39} Thompson, Retreat From Apartheid, p.49
The claim was totally erroneous and fabricated by Vorster to serve his political ends. By asserting that Maoris had already toured South Africa, allowing them in 1970 would be no different, and in keeping with normal practise. By 1969 Vorster received support from Waring, the Minister of Sport and Dr Danie Craven president of South African Rugby Board who claimed,

New Zealand will pick their best team and irrespective of who is in the team they will come on tour.

However the ruling Nationalist Party was developing increasing divisions. On the one hand were the hardliners known as Verkramptes (the cramped ones) representing the interests of Afrikaner manual workers and poor whites and looked to maintain Apartheid in its purest form while advancing Afrikaner Nationalism. On the other were the more pragmatic and reformist Verligtes (the enlightened ones) who represented the middle class and professional liberal Afrikaners. At the Transvaal Nationalist Congress in September, 1969 Albert Hertzog, leader of the Verkramptes and ten other delegates voted against Vorsters sports policy. Hertzog said of it -

the question that troubled him was that if Maori's came with the All Blacks they would take part in social activities with white South Africans. They will sit at tables with our young men and girls and they will dance with our girls. If Maori's were allowed into South Africa with these rights, it might be said by coloured students at the University of the Western Cape that they were being discriminated against if they were not afforded the same privileges as the "Uitlander" Maoris. Dancing with white South African girls would set a precedent and would become the thin end of the wedge. If you have that wedge once in a door you can never close it again.

For the Verkramptes, a multiracial touring team unacceptably comprised the principles of Apartheid. A week later, fearing a dangerous split within Nationalist ranks was imminent, Vorster called for an early general election. He said,

Nothing can ever damage us more than if the outside world were to get the idea that there is not a strong Government in

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40 The Dominion, April 13, 1967 p.1 Col 1-4
41 Ibid, Nov. 6, 1969 p.43 col 4-7
43 Omer-Cooper, p.219
44 Thompson, Retreat From Apartheid, p.52
power in South Africa. \textsuperscript{45}

On October 25, Hertzog broke from the National Party and led a thousand delegates to Pretoria, where they formed the Herstigte Nasionale Party (the Reformed National Party). With little time to organise the HNP faired poorly in the election, failing to win even a seat. It continued nevertheless, as a significant extra-parliamentary voice condemning government reforms from a standpoint of white racist extremism.\textsuperscript{46}

With the split by the HNP and their subsequent defeat, the tour based on Vorster's principles looked safe. He had conceded enough ground regarding Apartheid doctrines to allow Maori rugby players, without losing vital support in the Volksraad, and Vorster, as a safeguard set New Zealand the proviso not to play politics when selecting its team. Such a proviso left Vorster free to read the political temperature in South Africa and, if it suits his cause to announce an evidence of agitation in New Zealand, the tour is off because New Zealanders refuse to abide by the conditions he has set. \textsuperscript{47} Vorster had insured his position, with a power of veto from any real threat that may follow a possible HNP swing.

Ironically or not, the All Black tour of South Africa had helped to precipitate open conflict in South African politics to the point of division. Why Vorster chose to relax the principles of Apartheid sport specifically with the All Black tour remains difficult to tell but seems probable the importance of rugby, being the national sport, may explain the change. Having suffered expulsions in other major sports, South Africa had to compromise its laws or allow the cherished rugby relationship with New Zealand to evaporate.

What is extraordinary about the debate in both countries was while it concerned exactly the same issue - Apartheid sport, in New Zealand the argument centered on the best way to \textit{dismantle} apartheid sport, yet in South Africa the argument concerned the \textit{preservation} of apartheid sport. It was a most unusual paradox.

\textsuperscript{45} Lapchick, p.150-151
\textsuperscript{46} Omer-Cooper, p.219
\textsuperscript{47} \textit{The Dominion}, Oct 21, 1969 p.11 col 1-6
Chapter Four
PROTAGONISTS, ANTAGONISTS AND FENCESITTERS

An examination of who became embroiled in the controversy reveals three distinct groupings. Those who were uncompromisingly in favour of the tour, those who were unequivocally opposed and by far the largest group were those that lay somewhere between the two. For the first two groups the battle lines are clear, but division in the last group is not so distinct. What is certain however is that everyone had an opinion. From the pub to the boardroom, few could escape the tour issue, be it a debate in the school lunch hour, an argument at the rugby club, the subject of a hui or the sermon at Sunday service - involvement became compulsory.

On one side of the fence developed a loosely bonded community in opposition to the tour. The movement was led by two pressure organisations totally committed in their opposition to the tour. Citizens Association for Racial Equality (CARE) was the oldest and largest of the two, remaining at the fore-front of the protest. Halt All Racist Tours (HART) was a new organisation whose objective was specifically concerned with Apartheid sports tours. There were distinct similarities between each organisation as there were differences. Each then, will be dealt with separately.

Citizens Association for Racial Equality was set up in October, 1964. It was formed as an association to promote racial equality and coined the felicitous acronym CARE at its first meeting. ¹ The stated aims of CARE were four fold and read as follows:

1) To promote research into all aspects of Race Relations in New Zealand and to help educate public opinion in matters of racial equality.

2) To oppose racial prejudice in all its forms both in New Zealand and abroad.

3) To give support to the Defence and aid fund for the succour of those convicted by South Africa’s Apartheid laws.

4) To persuade the New Zealand Government to take a stronger stand

¹ M.P.K. Sorrenson Ten Years of CARE p.3
against Apartheid at the United Nations.²
It was often thought by those looking in that CARE's only interest was the prevention of rugby tours, largely due to the increased press coverage they received because of rugby's high profile image. But while the South African rugby tours did monopolise a lot of time, CARE did devote its energies elsewhere.

In the years leading up to the 1970 campaign to stop the tour CARE achieved a number of small successes. It launched a strong and effective campaign against the tacit support the New Zealand Government was giving to the Smith regime in Rhodesia.³ It was the only Pakeha based organisation that made submissions in opposition against the Maori Affairs Amendment Bill which was quickly tagged the "last great land grab".⁴ And, after continuous government inaction CARE set up New Zealand's first Citizens Advice Bureau on July 19, 1967.⁵ CARE also saw as its duty the policing of race discrimination within New Zealand and in 1970 through constant lobbying in conjunction with other organisations, helped to formulate New Zealand's first Race Relations Council.⁶

The Council, to which CARE became closely associated, aimed to promote and extend the understanding, co-operation and harmony between races.⁷ It was launched at a two day conference and representatives from the Maori Womens Welfare League, CARE, NZUSA, and the Northern Drivers Union were among those present.⁸ Despite having the respected personalities Sir Edmund Hilary and Professor Quentin Baxter⁹ among its patrons, the press quickly condemned it.¹⁰ The Dominion said of the council "it has adopted the "negative isolationist" policies of the extremist groups of CARE and HART" ¹¹which stood behind this thinly veiled council.
short it was CARE in a new guise. Jim Gale, a CARE member, and newly elected president of the New Zealand Race Relations Council answered these critics swiftly. The criticisms were unjustified. They failed to consider that not two, but thirty other organisations are affiliated to the council. That the councils has taken up activities once the concern of CARE was not an attempt to superimpose this organisation but was due to parallel aims. 12

The Race Relations Council was one of CARE's most significant successes and helped to convince skeptics that CARE was not anti-rugby but had stronger and wider motives.

These were the main achievements, but other examples exist. They helped to build the confidence of CARE as an organisation. Tom Newnham the Associations Secretary for many years recalled of their successes 'it was the small victories that kept you going.'13

As a pressure group CARE never intended becoming a large organisation. From the outset the members regarded themselves as 'catalytic agents', aiming to initiate a movement not generate it.14 Consequently numbers remained small. A year after conception membership stood at 133 and at CARE's high point, reached approximately 1,000.15 It comprised of teachers, politicians, clergy, trade unionists, sportspeople, current and former rugby players, students and even businessmen. The components of its membership enabled CARE to influence a large community.16 It featured prominent citizens, including MP's Mat Rata and Mrs Whetu Tirakatene-Sullivan. The Anglican Bishop of Auckland, Bishop Gowing, University of Canterbury lecturer Richard Thompson, Sir Edmund Hilary, and All Black forward Ken Gray to name some.17 The high calibre of these citizens coupled with the broad community base, projected for CARE a credible and respectable public image on which to protest.

By 1970, CARE had kindred organisations bearing the same name in Auckland, Hamilton, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin. Each center was

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12 Sorrenson, p.13
13 Newnham, Oral Interview
14 Sorrenson, p.4
15 Newnham, Oral Interview
16 Newnham, Oral Interview; Thompson, R. _Retreat From Apartheid_ p.55
17 CARE records - various letters. Newnham, Oral Interview
autonomous and controlled their own protest action, while Tom Newnham the Auckland based secretary was accepted as the national spokesman.\textsuperscript{18}

In their actions, CARE aimed to appeal to the broad middle ground which subsequently limited protest options. Still, within constitutional limits they sought to exploit every avenue at their disposal, short of violence. \textsuperscript{19} 'It may have been violence if you call spraying football pitches violence' \textsuperscript{20} stated Newnham. Yet civil disobedience was rare and CARE's protesting drew upon conventional methods of marching, demonstrations, petitions, deputations, speeches, protest letters and the like. Through organising the forces of protest in this way CARE created opportunities for citizens to voice their objection in a respectable and meaningful way.

CARE was a voluntary organisation.\textsuperscript{21} It elected a conventional committee consisting of a president, secretary, treasurer and general committee of seven who perform the necessary functions in running the organisation on a voluntary basis. This work entailed the endless correspondence in received and answered letters, organising and partaking in speaking engagements, supply of material on racism both in New Zealand and abroad, meetings, advice, the co-ordination of the various protest activities and the regular production of newsletters. The commitment needed of those close to the center was very substantial and needed long hours of unpaid work in order to maintain continued action.

On a wider scope than ever before, and in accordance with CARE's fourth stated aim, the organisation expanded its international rapport with other countries and equivalent organisations. The protest against the 1970 tour greatly expanded CARE's international contact. In 1968 at the United Nations Human Rights Conference in Iran the local newspaper "The Tehran Journal" featured an article on the New Zealand Federation of Maori Students conference at which a motion was carried to the effect that even if Maoris were to be included in the side they were not to go to South Africa. Dennis Brutus, active campaigner and president of SAN-ROC saw the article and wrote his congratulations and support.\textsuperscript{22} This overseas recognition

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, and Thompson, Retreat From Apartheid p.89
\textsuperscript{19} Newnham, Oral Interview
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid
\textsuperscript{21} The organisation remains alive and well today.
\textsuperscript{22} Brutus to Jackson, May 5, 1968 (CR)
A VOICE HEARD ROUND THE WORLD!

TEHRAN PALACE

May 6, 1968.

S. K. Jackson, Esq., President
Auckland University Maori Club
Auckland, New Zealand.

Dear Mr. Jackson,

This is just to say that I was delighted to see the enclosed clipping in the "Journal" here where I am attending a Human Rights Conference.

I hope you will campaign vigorously. I can assure you of the support of South African sportsmen opposed to racism.

I shall write again and would be glad to hear from you whenever you can write.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Dennis Brutus
President, SANROC
(South African Non-Racial Open Committee
28 Seymour St., London, W.I., U.K.)

96 Shadwell Ave, Tehran, Iran. Tel. 42384-91155: 52 - 55 - 56 - 57
Telex 2073, Cable Address: KAMFF, P. O. Box 1320

FIGURE 3
effectively started the domestic campaign against the 1970 tour.

CARE established close links with Australian pressure groups and worked together to co-ordinate protests and share information. In 1969 CARE and their Australian counterpart jointly organised a speaking tour for Dennis Brutus. The tour included both countries which had the double effect of allowing Brutus to reach a greater population and reduced expenses having two countries pay his way, not one. The New Zealand protest movement established a working dialogue with Britain at a time when both countries were embroiled in South African tour issues. In England young Kenyan born Peter Hain had just led STST in successful protest movement which CARE and HART watched closely. Later in June, STST assisted the New Zealand campaign and organised pickets outside New Zealand house in London.

The last of the major international contacts were the African organisations. The African National Congress (ANC), the South African Rugby Federation (non racial SARF), The South African non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC), the South African National Olympic Committee (SANOC) and lastly the United Nations from which came the Universal Declaration of Human Rights used by CARE as a basis for their protest. The International support strengthened CARE's domestic argument. It revealed to the public the controversy of race, sport and politics was not unique to New Zealand. Organised opposition toward South Africa's Apartheid sports policies had become worldwide.

In New Zealand, CARE attempted to obtain support from the controversies major players. With the Prime Minister, Sir Keith Holyoake they maintained a reciprocal dialogue. CARE secretary, Newnham consistently wrote to Holyoake questioning him on the tour issues. It was alleged Holyoake replied personally, remaining "scrupulously attentive" to what CARE was saying. His answers however circumvented the issues and he preserved his non-committal stance. CARE and HART never again had this same close correspondence with future Prime Ministers.

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23 Hain, p.11
24 Newnham Apartheid is not a Game p.49
25 Newnham Oral Interview and (CR)
26 Thompson, Retreat from Apartheid p.54
27 Newnham, Oral Interview
Discourse with the NZRFU remained virtually nil. Despite attempts to seek information CARE found themselves unliked and unwanted. The union clammed up immediately when CARE began to pry and those at the top normally refused to comment. 28 The university students on the other hand, were very co-operative and helped CARE in organisational matters, protesting equipment and bolstered crowd numbers on all occasions.

The students in fact, bring the second pressure group into focus. In May 1969 Trevor Richards, a political studies student and International Affairs Officer of Auckland University Students Association formed an umbrella organisation specifically concerned with the question of Apartheid sports tours. 29 At the meeting the name HART (Halt All Racist Tours) was decided, this being their solitary aim. Although HART looked for support from CARE, the trade unions, churches, Maori groups, and internationally based associations the majority of the support in these early years came directly from student sources. 30 By late 1969, HART had branch offices in all the University towns with Richards being the National Co-ordinator. 31 Besides this HART had little formal organisation on membership. Richards took the attitude 'If 2,000 people turn up for a demonstration in Auckland then those 2,000 are members of HART. 32

In the beginning HART took its cues from the violent but successful British 'Stop the Seventy Tour Campaign'. Needless to say HART was considered the more extreme of the two pressure groups in New Zealand. 33 Apart from a demonstration on United Nations Day 1969, when 2,000 people marched through Auckland. 34 HART, during the 1970 campaign was ostensibly, finding its feet, and as a protesting force did not develop till later, reaching its zenith in 1981.

To assess how successful the pressure groups were, remains difficult. Opinion polls as a device for taking the public temperature on issues were not in use and people's reckoning is all that is offered. Newnham believes
public opinion may have started at less than 25% and by June, 1970 although grown considerable, would not have approached 50%. CARE and HART as pressure groups were new ideas. Indeed demonstrating on this scale and frequency was new, thus their acceptance varied. CARE appealed to a broad middle ground. HART was a more militant student driven group. Both worked closely together throughout the campaign, functioning as societies conscience - a nagging reminder of its moral obligations. This was the aim they drove at, fully committed despite facing overtly stubborn resistance.

On the opposite side of the fence was the New Zealand Rugby Football Union. The Union saw itself as a responsible and private body. It was elected by and answerable to the affiliate provincial unions. It was an administrative body and saw this as its prime function. From the first constitution its stated object was 'to foster and control Rugby Football. To promote, encourage and administer rugby in the way it believed best. Those who elected the Council expected this. The Union on receiving the invitation from South Africa, duly accepted it. Union officials, as previously stated withdrew from public discussion adopting a 'no comment' attitude. If pressed the NZRFU through its Chairman, Jack Sullivan would pedantically reiterate the tour procedure.

I will remind everyone that the NZRFU accepted an invitation from the South African Rugby Board to tour this year. The position is very clear. The itinerary is accepted and made public. Trials were being arranged for May the venues being decided.

Of course there was no compulsion to enter the debate, the NZRFU knew this, stating, it went beyond its jurisdiction to do so. Anyway the battery of rugby supporters surrounding the NZRFU willingly offered any necessary comment.

In response to the pressure groups CARE and HART rose a right wing anti-demonstrator backlash movement. Organisations like the Friends of

35 Newnham. Oral Interview
36 Redpath, p.23
37 Swan A.C. The New Zealand Rugby Football Union 1892 - 1967 p.19
38 Redpath, p.23
39 The Listener, March 20, 1970 vol. 53 p.7
40 Newnham, Oral Interview
South Africa, the Association Defending South African Tours (ADSAT). The South African Friends Association and most sinister of all, War Against Recreational Disruption (WARD) aimed to encourage sporting contacts between New Zealand and South Africa and disrupt any demonstrations that might threaten these contacts. 41

The Friends of South Africa was considered the mildest of these groups. The leader Barry Delamore claimed "en masse the blacks have not yet reached the genetic level of the European". It had the widest support claiming one former Cabinet Minister and various opposition MP's.42 ADSAT looked to confrontational measures in achieving their aims. Bruce Thompson the Associations prime mover "believed rigidly in Apartheid the threat of world communism, the jewish conspiracy and the evils of black emerging nations." The organisation planned to meet demonstrating with counter demonstration disruption preventing any insults hurled at the visitors by a noisy minority of agitators, and having night watchmen at sports grounds.43 The Southern Africa Friends Association which claimed a 4,000 - 5,000 membership believed that 70% of the population favoured the tour. The Chairman Lieutenant-Colonel A.C.R. Elderton also supported Apartheid but was not, he maintained, a racist. He believed HART and CARE invented a racial situation that 'does not exist'.44 The most extreme group, with an openly belligerent policy was WARD. Advocating direct action and "no mucking about with demonstrators" WARD was the self-appointed guardian for the rights of spectators. In offering white-coated stewards to assist the police and Rugby Unions with protesters, New Zealand came perilously close to experiencing the brutal "rugby vigilante" witnessed in Britain.45

The majority of pro-tour supporters though did not align themselves to these extremist groups yet had no difficulty in expressing their views. Demonstrators were tagged as 'creeps' 'rubble rousers', 'agitators' even likened to "inverted Klu Klux Klanners". 46 Threats were not beyond some as this letter to Newnham suggests.

41 Laidlaw, p. 195
42 The Listener, May 22, 1972 Vol. 70 p.2
43 Ibid
44 Ibid, p.8
45 Laidlaw, P.196
46 The Dominion, 10 June, 1970 p.3 col 5-6 and Feb 12, 1970 p.8 col 2-4 (letter)
Observation of your actions makes it clear you have a problem. The symptoms are classic but it is possible that a competent psychologist may be able to do something for you - I hope so ......... I will continue to deal with people as I wish and you interfere with me at your peril.47

Clearly rugby was their major concern not moral issues, and any one who threatened this was met with frustrated abuse.

A significant voice in the controversy came from the South African Consul-General P.H. Phillip. Not only did he provide an assurance to the Maori Council but actively championed the policy of Apartheid in New Zealand. He provided a rational framework for sports bodies within New Zealand to identify, when justifying a tour of South Africa.48 He was accused of setting up whispering campaigns against Dennis Brutus,49 and his voice was heard 'selling Apartheid' to the New Zealand public.50 When CARE wrote letters to Phillip demanding answers to the leading moral questions concerning the Apartheid system the Consul General remained conspicuously silent.51 In response to Phillips outspokenness came a threat to kidnap him. The caller said it 'was a means of compelling the New Zealand government to stop the All Black tour of South Africa this year'.52 This threat was one of many during the controversy. They tended to be aimed at those groups either determinedly for or against the tour but never came to anything.

For most protagonists, deep moral considerations were of no concern. Their interests were in rugby, and while openly discrediting the Apartheid system neither believed or wanted to believe a rugby tour would have wider implications. For the majority, rugby, in particular this tour, had no equal paramount - it was supreme. They were as absolute the tour would proceed as the protesters were to stop it - more so. There vested interest allowed for no other consideration. Many however saw the issues differently. Unobscured by a blind fervour for sport, many took time, and weighed the options before coming down on one side or the other, when

47 T.A. Stewart to Newnham, 30 May 1970 (CR)
48 Thompson, Retreat From Apartheid p.77
49 Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game p.39
50 Sorrenson, p.15
51 Newnham to P.H. Phillip, Wellington, 28 April 1969 (CR)
52 The Dominion, April 9, 1970 P.1 Col 2-3
they did, to their surprise or disappointment they opposed their workmates, Whanau or friends. The community it seemed had divided.

In 1960 when the All Blacks toured South Africa the church was considered the "vanguard of protest", having initiated the controversy over Maori exclusion from the rugby side to tour South Africa in 1960. Church support, it was said, helped to legitimize the protest movement. However, the appearance of unanimity amongst churches in opposing the exclusion of Maori players from New Zealand teams was to some extent an illusion, protected by the silence of those who were unconvinced or in favour of the tour under any conditions. 1970 differed because cracks covered over by silence then, were exposed now and the unanimous facade no longer stood.

The division of whether to tour or not came not from a neglect of their moral duty as they 'all abhor apartheid' and hence 'start from the same side'. But in how they attempted to show their opposition. Some believed the only way to exert influence on South Africa was to cut out all cultural relationships, while others saw sending a fully representative team as doing some small thing to breech the dreadful wall of separateness.

The major church groups had taken different sides. The Roman Catholic hierarchy and (predictably) the New Zealand Marist Rugby Council supported the tour despite the catholic press being strongly opposed to it. The Anglican and Presbyterian Churches were hopelessly divided on the issue. While the associated churches of Christ, the Society of Friends, and the Methodist Church remained totally opposed. Not surprisingly at the annual meeting of the National Council of Churches in August 1969, no statement by the NCC with regard to the situation as a whole was passed.

Both sides of church opinion was publicly visible. On the one side were those opposed, Anglican Bishop of Auckland, the RT Rev. E.A Gowing consistently opposed the racial restrictions in previous South African tours and

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53 Redpath, p.42
54 Thompson, Race Discrimination in Sport, p.10
55 Ibid
56 The Dominion, Oct 7, 1969 p.2 Col 3-5
57 Thompson, Retreat from Apartheid p.55
58 Document Summary of Church Opinions given to the Annual Meeting of the National Council of Churches by the General Secretary (CR)
59 Thompson, Race Discrimination in Sport, p.13
said so publicly. He gave his support to the opening of the National campaign to stop the 1970 tour in August, 1968. Invited by CARE and in conjunction with the president of the FOL, Mr Skinner, Bishop Gowing also led a deputation representing over 30 organisations to meet the Prime Minister urging the government to disassociate itself from the tour. Others to take a public stand were Rev. Ted Buckle, Executive Officer of the Diocese of Auckland, the Bishop of Dunedin, the Rt Rev. Walter Robinson and the New Zealand Student Christian Movement.

On the other side, the prominent Bishop of Aotearoa Rt Rev. M.A. Bennett supported the tour wholeheartedly. At a Rotary Club function Bishop Bennett expressed his hope that Maori players are chosen to tour and Maori people go as spectators. The Bishop believed the tour should go ahead because he "still held to the biblical assessment that the main element in human relations was goodwill. "Let us" he claimed "exercise this goodwill in places where goodwill is lacking." The failure of the NCC to make a comprehensive statement on the tour was not an oversight. Churches were divided on the issue and this division was unwelcome, serving to unsettle the unity of each congregation. Some churches refused any comment as they feared the depth of division which might become apparent.

From early on the Maori community was divided. These divisions created by the tour exposed a further split within Maoridom, one of young and old, or, correspondingly radical and conservative. The debate began in earnest when the New Zealand Maori Council announced its support for the tour.

The NZMC was set up by the 1962 Maori Welfare Act. It was the national body heading Maori Associations that were established in most Maori communities. The Council was dedicated to the purpose of 'bettering the conditions of New Zealand's Polynesian peoples and fostering

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60 Newnham, Oral Interview
61 Ibid.
62 The Dominion, Feb 7, 1970 p.1 Col 1-2
63 Letter R.T. Wildersin (Secretary of NZSCM) to Newnham Jan 1969, (CR)
64 The Dominion, April 18, 1970 p.59 Col 4-5
65 Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game p.38
66 Te Kaunihera Maori, Autumn Issue 1969 p.1
understanding and goodwill between all New Zealanders'. Henare Ngata, one of its most prominent members, claimed of the Council -

'by its very constitution the New Zealand Maori Council is rural orientated. It is conservative and is relatively free of the tensions which appear to be emerging in urban situations 'Race' and 'Colour' evoke no angry connotations, only the relatively mild emotions associated with the "Maori : Pakeha" relationship".

Later in the same article Ngata described the Council's attitude to rugby contacts with South Africa.

It need hardly be said that the New Zealand Maori Council opposes Apartheid, however, from the Maori viewpoint the primary issue involved in past, cancelled and proposed tours of South Africa, is not Apartheid in that country, but rather the removal of any hint of it here. Previous tours had always thrown into question the validity of the proposition that racial equality existed here, not so much because Maoris were excluded from such tours but because the Pakeha citizens of this country had acquiesced in that exclusion. The cancellation of the 1967 tour demonstrated at last that by and large, a great deal of goodwill towards the Maori people did exist among Pakehas.

Before the NZMC gave its consent to the tour, it required a firm assurance from the South African government that Maori supporters travelling with the All Blacks would be granted visas and treated no differently to other travelling New Zealanders. This assurance came through Consul-General, Mr P.H. Phillip in a letter claiming:

The individual members of any group of rugby supporters arriving in South Africa from New Zealand will enjoy exactly the same facilities that is to say that they will all be treated as New Zealanders without any discrimination.

In light of this 'clear and cordial statement' Sir Turi Carroll, the Council President announced the Council's support for the tour. The announcement had a double effect. It separated the old Maori from the new, and mobilized a full and determined campaign against the tour.

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67 Ibid  
68 H.K. Ngata 'The South African Rugby Tour' Te Kaunihera Maori, Autumn Issue 1969, p.3  
69 Ibid, p.3  
70 Thompson, Retreat From Apartheid p.53  
71 P.H. Phillip 'The South African Tour Pro & Con' Te Kaunihera Maori, Autumn 1969, p.9  
72 Ibid, p.9
The Council when accused of supporting the Apartheid regime offered two further justifications for their stance. Firstly, by supporting the tour it would encourage coloured South Africans to work for improved conditions. Secondly it believed that the tour would make a crack in the walls of Apartheid and may bring a little more 'Aroha' to the grim situation in South Africa. In a predictable result the Maori Advisory Board of the NZRFU voted emphatically in support of the tour. It stated.

The view was unanimously held by all Maori people in all areas represented by the 10 Maori members of the board.

In addition to these council approvals came support from famous Maori individuals who had travelled to South Africa. In 1964 Maori rugby players, Ralph Love and Pat Walsh returned from South Africa singing its praises, claiming the South African's had been 'overwhelmingly generous'. Maori operatic bass Inia Te Wiata who had visited the Republic on three occasions said of his treatment 'I was received like a European and I went into their homes and was everywhere treated magnificently. This hospitality and pointed politeness shown to these and other New Zealanders however served to momentarily accommodate these guest for if South African law was strictly applied the Maori visitors would be segregated altogether. It was a one-off exception. In order not to lose Maori support and threatened further tours the South African's laid out a red carpet.

The first Maori organisation to express opposition to the tour was the New Zealand Federation of Maori Students. Syd Jackson having passed a motion that Maoris should not tour South Africa at all, then opened the 1970 campaign in Auckland. From the start Jackson had a clear understanding of the central issues. He understood that,

Maoris would travel in a New Zealand team in that country for the entertainment and also the ego satisfaction of the white minority......Maori players will be given only artificial and hypocritical equality... Our country should assert its capacity to make moral decisions. It should not, for the sake of

73 The Dominion, April 1, 1970 p.11, Col 5-7
74 Thompson, Retreat From Apartheid p.84
75 The Dominion, April 30, 1970 p.1 Col 1-4
76 Laidlaw, p.194
77 Thompson, Retreat from Apartheid, p.84
78 Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game p.36
expediency, deny the tradition of harmonious race relations
that we have built up. What is morally wrong cannot be
politically right. 79

Soon after the Maori Council decision Jackson, his wife and a
busload of University of Auckland Maori club members including Peter
Sharples and Toby Curtis (both of whom are now prominent in Maori
leadership today), set out for the Bay of Plenty and East Coast regions in a
bid to discuss on Maraes, the rationality of the Council's decision. The idea
was a brave one - the young Maori students saw for themselves the
problems they face.

"we were kids and who were we to think we knew better than
the adults."80

Their acid test came at Gisborne where the young contingent were against
the big guns of Maori leadership on the East Coast. Leaders like Henare
Ngata, Arnold Reedy and George Marsden, all members of Maori Council
were skilled in the art of Maori debating and very compelling orators.81 After
the student deputation had spoken with convincing rhetoric, the elders
replied. One by one they stood and spoke, but not on the topic to which
this young deputation had addressed as they could not refute what had
been said, but on unrelated topics. They mesmerized the whole issue so it
would not require a vote and they succeeded. It was a victory in the art of
Maori politics.82

Although the deputation failed to reverse the elders decision it did
leave an impact on the community. Many on hearing these fresh insights
began to question their own rationale. In terms of the key issues - a start had
been made. It also exemplifies the different attitudes between old and
young Maori. The students spoke briefly, on the key issues, and in English the
elders replied on unrelated topics for longer and in Maori - and won. The
Maori students living in the cities and having access to knowledgeable
sources lacked the ability to impart their enlightened ideas upon their elders.

Maori opposition to the Council decision went further than the students.
From early on Maori Women opposed the tour. The Maori Women's

79 S. Jackson,'Should we Go" Te Kaunihera Maori, Autumn 1969, p.17-19
80 T. Curtis, Oral Interview, 24 May 1990 at Auckland Teachers College Epsom Ave 12
p.m.
81 Ibid
82 Ibid
Welfare League had very powerful speakers in Mira Szaszy, Meremere Penfold and Shalima Vimbau of Auckland and Elizabeth Murchie, the president of the League from Dunedin. They immediately rose to the theme of basic human rights for all and featured prominently in numerous demonstrations. They also belonged to CARE.83

Notable in the Maori Women opposition was Carol Fleet who returned from overseas to take up the fight. Shortly before the All Blacks left Fleet donated $1,000.00 to organise a last-minute Maori rally at Te Unga Waka Marae in Auckland. Three hundred representatives showed from various Maori organisations and called for an urgent meeting of the New Zealand Maori Council to reconsider its decision.84 Despite failing in its objective, this powerful gathering organised at short notice by the League highlighted Maori women's commitment against the tour.

The four Maori MP's came out strongly in opposition. The most vocal opponent was Southern Maori representative Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan. She led demonstrations to the Prime Minister, openly endorsed CARE and HART, and staged her own protest by boycotting an official government function in honour of a visiting South Africa delegation, for which she received a minor reprimand from the Prime Minister. 85 Matiu Rata, Koru Wetere and Paraone Reweti all stated their opposition without committing themselves to the same extent.

The Maori Organisation on Human Rights (MOOHR) became very active in anti-tour demonstrations. Largely through the efforts of secretary Tom Poata, MOOHR was itself seen to repetitively question the wisdom of the tour keeping itself prominent in the public eye. As the name suggests MOOHR was equally involved in other pertinent issues. 86 Finally, Maori intellectuals expressed disapproval. Bruce Biggs professor of Maori studies at Auckland University condemned the "I'm All Right" attitude taken by the New Zealand Maori Council. 87 Other Maori organisations to oppose the tour were The Maori Graduates Association. The Ratena Youth organisation

83 Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game p.40 and Oral Interview
84 The Dominion, June 8, 1970 p.1 col.1 and Newnham, Oral Interview
85 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates. Vol 358 pp.3017-3021
86 Te Maori June July issue p.25-27 (letter)
87 Te Kaunihera Maori, Autumn Issue, 1969, p.19 (letter)
Inc. and many Maori committees over which the Maori Council resides. 88 Division touched everyone, with the trade unions being no different. Throughout the tour debate the unions official stance remained unchanged. Union leadership maintained their opposition as stated at their Annual Conference in April, 1969.

The FOL cannot support the sending of an All Black rugby union football team to South Africa when black workers are prevented by law from organising with other workers. 89 A year later at the 1970 annual conference the president of the FOL, Mr Tom Skinner reiterated the FOL strong opposition and added that as an industrial movement the FOL should 'do as much as it could to embarrass the whole situation regarding the All Black tour of South Africa' 90 and

We must stand by our principles and do as much as we can to show that we will not tolerate discrimination. 91

The FOL asked of its trades councils and affiliated unions to initiate and actively support opposition to the tour. 92 It also pressed the government and particularly the Prime Minister to intervene and stop the tour. The time had passed when the government could continue to shelter behind the fallacious argument, that action on its part would be interference with sport. 93 If, claimed the FOL, an All Black tour proceeded the ramifications on New Zealand would be very great. New Zealand would bring on itself international pressures and boycotts and "our reputation for believing in human rights is completely discredited." 94

With little over a month before the All Blacks departure, Tom Skinner, supported by the Engineers and the Wellington Drivers Unions 95 proposed the FOL take direct action in the form of strikes and boycotts of anything involved with the tour. However pressure from delegates who claimed

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88 Principle submission of Te Rangitahi to NZ Maori Council, 6 Dec, 1969 Wellington (CR)
89 NZFOL 32nd Annual Report 1968, P.9 (CR)
90 The Dominion, April 29, 1970 p.2 col 3-7
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid, Sept. 25, 1969 p.5 col 3-4
93 Ibid, and May 25, 1970, p.5 col 5
these measures to be impractical, saw Skinner withdraw this idea. The leading delegates of the FOL and especially president, Tom Skinner and secretary W.J. Knox remained emphatically opposed despite open challenges. These challenges came from both inside and outside the unions.

In September 1969, Ron Don the Chairman of the Auckland Rugby Union openly questioned the validity of the official FOL claim. Don believed if a secret referendum was taken among members of all affiliated Unions it would ‘tellingly show that a great many people not directly involved in rugby are in favour of the tour’. Skinner replied in saying he was prepared to organise a postal ballot among all workers under his federations jurisdiction to determine their feelings about a proposed tour. However Skinner required an assurance that the Rugby Union would call off the tour if the workers decided the All Blacks should not go. At this point Don claimed these were only his views and not representative of the Rugby Unions at which point both parties drew back. Don’s suspicious that the FOL was not unanimous in its approach were borne out in the affiliated unions. The Wellington branch of the Railway Tradesmen Association openly disassociated itself from the FOL’s oppositionist view. Their reasoning was based upon the FOL’s inconsistent attitude.

As the FOL’s policy on Vietnam was that New Zealand should not be involved in the internal policies of another nation this view should also apply to South Africa. Inconsistencies were also noted by trade unionists in the FOL’s failure to oppose the tours of South Africa by the New Zealand bowlers and athletics teams. Shortly before the All Blacks left, the National Drivers Union also distanced themselves from the FOL as they deplored the FOL’s intervention in matters of any international sport.

Further evidence of union division on the tour issue came from the pressure groups. CARE attempted to appeal to workers at lunchtimes on

96 Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game p.47
97 The Dominion Sept 27, 1969 p.4 col 4-5
the job yet they discovered most workers were in favour of the tour. Division within the trade unions was deep. While the leadership resoundingly echoed their opposition the rumblings of disagreement could be heard from beneath.

In a formal capacity the Universities chose to oppose the tour. At the New Zealand University Students Association (NZUSA) Easter Council meeting a remit was moved to 'cut off sporting contacts with South Africa and Rhodesia'. All associations present voted in favour, save Lincoln. There was very little discussion on the matter. A second motion proposed "that NZUSA do contact CARE and other organisations and people concerned with the sport and South Africa issue, with a view to establishing an 'ad hoc' body whose sole raison d'etre is the cessation of the 1970 All Black Tour". This second remit was important as it suggested some "worth while action to implement NZUSA's attitude." The resolution was passed with the only dissension again being Lincoln.

This reluctant, semi-committal approach by NZUSA can be explained by its suspicion that the 30,000 students it represented were not united in their stand. Evidence of a split opinion was difficult to find for 1970 but the same issue caused massive rifts within universities in 1973 and 1981. And, with the dissension of Lincoln on each remit and a conspicuous lack of discussion overall, the prospect of division beneath the surface seems likely.

Students could however express their disapproval of the tour individually or through other organisations (HART, CARE, Student Christian Movement) and contributed enthusiastically in protest action, their youth and enlightenment overcoming inhibitions.

The African Students Association in New Zealand took a firm stand. President Henderson Tapela stating,

if the New Zealand teams play sport with countries that flaunt to the world their repugnant racist policies, then we must accept that we are on enemy territory and we must keep alert.

Tapela's strength of opinion was supported by his student body. One

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101 Newnham, Oral Interview
102 Critic, April 15, 1969 p.3 col 1-2
103 Ibid, April 15, 1969 col 1-2
104 S. Elworthy, Ritual Song of Defiance, p.125 and 132-133
105 Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game p.49
student felt supporting contacts with the racist republic...

"indicates that the New Zealand government is condoning the white supremacist regimes of Southern Africa".106

Another, sick of the 'groundless debates which dehumanize the coloured man' would opt for communism if it meant personal freedom.107 President Tapela was thoroughly committed to the protest effort.

At the center of the debate were those it concerned, the sports players and officials. Most who supported the tour believed they were 'unbiased sports loving, big hearted, New Zealanders. 108 However this appraisal is misleading and like other community groups, the sporting community was divided on the issue.

Of the All Blacks in contention for the tour, not all were unanimous. Certainly the majority of players supported the tour, with their reasoning as diverse as their position. Colin Meads the most senior of the selected All Blacks based his support on rugby issues, and his belief for continued rivalry between South Africa and New Zealand. To Meads, South Africa presented the greatest challenge to the rugby tourist.109 Flanker, Ian Kirkpatrick took the familiar "no politics in sport" line 110 while Fergie McCormick would play the game against any country including South Africa, 'or even Uganda if Idi Amin invited me.'111 Bryan Williams and Sid Going two of the four coloured players to tour with the All Blacks (the other two being Henare Milner and Blair Furlong) believed in the efficacy of a multi racial team playing and touring together, a line halfback and Rhodes Scholar Chris Laidlaw also took. 112 All Black and Maori winger George Skudder claimed if selected he would go to South Africa not as an honorary white but as a Maori. He was not selected.113 Significantly though were the players that declined to tour.

The most dramatic and unexpected refusal came from test veteran Ken Gray. Having previously played South Africa in 1965 Gray experienced a change in opinion and refused to tour because of his personal dislike of

106 The Dominion, May 19, 1970 p.9 col 1-4
107 Ibid, April 1, 1970 p.12 col 6 (letter)
109 Veysey, A. Colin Meads, p.151-153
110 Knight, L. Kirky p.49-52
111 Veysey, A. Fergie p.115-117
112 Howitt B. Super Sid, p.96-101; Howitt B Beegee, p.50
113 The Dominion, Oct 16, 1969 p.47 col 2-3
Apartheid. Bob Burgess, later to become an All Black also withdrew because of his views on the... 'South African Government's policy of Apartheid and the way sport is run there' Oppositionist views were also held in the rugby world at large. National representatives to come out in protest included; Andy McMillian (Ireland), John Taylor (Wales), Bert Toft (England), and six Australians who announced their repugnance for Apartheid sport simultaneously. Although small this voice was conspicuous in light of its rebellious nature.

Sports persons in the wider field were also divided on the All Black tour issue. Giving support for the tour was former Wimbledon tennis champion, Ann Jones, claiming Maori players, would be welcome in South Africa, as was local tennis ace Richard Hawkes, having just returned from the republic. Gary Player the world class professional golfer continually reiterated his full support and Graham Smith the National Welterweight boxing champion showed his, by travelling to South Africa himself.

The New Zealand Amateur Athletic Association (NZAAA) opposed the tour and moved to cancel a tour by South African athletes in January 1970. Chairman Ces Blazey stated the association would not want to put in jeopardy the participation of other New Zealand sports representatives in the Commonwealth Games. The NZAAA's moral garden was not all roses however and vested interests motivated the decision. If the South African's had toured, the NZAAA stood to lose their invitation to the Munich Olympics in 1972 and endanger New

114 Ibid, June 5
115 Ibid, May 5, 1970 p.11 col 4-6
116 Printed notice titled 'International Sportsmen Speak Out'. Leaflet stating six Australian wallabies who oppose the tour to Australia by South Africa. They include Tony Abrahams, Jim Boyce, Paul Darveniza, Terry Forman, Barry MacDonald, and Jim Roxburgh. No date (CR)
117 The Dominion, Jan 28, 1970 p.36 col 1-2
120 Ibid, Nov 7, 1969 p.1 col 1
121 Ibid, Dec 10, 1969 p.1 col 5-6
122 Ibid, Dec 10, 1969 p.1 col 5-6
Zealand's opportunity for hosting the 1974 Commonwealth event. There were however other New Zealand representatives who refused South African tours on principle, including; Susan Vaughan (hockey) John Lowes (Softball) and Rod Dixon (Athletics).

Most sports persons though plumped for 'the no politics in sport' theory and, if pressed generally supported the tour. This reflects to a degree the revered position sport maintains in New Zealand, where moral considerations, intrinsic to everyone, are overlooked for the sake of a game.

One person who became unintentionally involved was Chief Justice, Sir Richard Wild. At a rugby club function Justice Wild told the attentive audience he was 'certain the All Blacks will fly to South Africa' and 'the vast majority of New Zealanders have admired the way the NZRFU has carried the whole business through'. He brought a cheering crowd to their feet. It became an unfortunate slight for Justice Wild and attracted widespread criticism most notably from Sir Leslie Munro in parliament.

"I regard it as unfortunate that the Chief Justice should have expressed his views on what is a highly controversial matter. We can guide our own consciences on this problem and I am sure the Chief Justice will recall the observation of the later lord Atkin that justice is not a cloistered virtue." Editor of The Listener, Alexandra McLeod continued the point. Justice Wild had spoken in a public place on a contentious issue which divided his countrymen. "Inevitably name and office coalesced in the public mind. And taking a side was 'not the way to preserve a reputation for objectivity and impartiality'. CARE took no time in exploiting Wild's predicament. In letters to the paper, Newnham criticised the Chief Justice of New Zealand for giving aid and comfort to the Queens enemies, (Rhodesia). The accusation caused Justice Wild considerable anguish and he ceased further public comment.

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123 Ibid., Nov 22, 1969 p.72 col 3-7; and Dec 10, 1969 p. 1 col 5-6
124 Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game p.33
125 The Listener, April 17, 1970 vol. 63 p.5 (editorial)
126 The Dominion, March 30, 1970 p.1 col 4-5
127 L. Munro, NZ Parliamentary Debates vol 365 pp268-270, 1970
128 The Listener, April 17, 1970 vol. 63 p.5 (editorial)
129 Newnham, Oral Interview
Examining who was involved in the debate would be incomplete without looking at the media. The way it reported the events, its strengths and limitations. The key source for this study was the daily newspaper The Dominion which will thus be the medium examined.

The media, claimed Newnham, was very influential in bringing the publics attention to problem areas and issues. For a pressure group, being so small, any publicity was good publicity. Too often however it was 'any' publicity, as newspapers frequently ran impressive stories about a demonstration. They featured dramatic accounts of protesters' exploits, supported by revealing photographs but little on what the protest was about. It was, in short, sensationalising and not informing. While recognising this CARE still looked to gain useful exposure. 130

The Dominion was guilty of unbalanced reporting on two counts. First by deliberately not printing material holding contrary views to its own. In 1969 CARE commissioned a full page appeal to the NZAAA to stop the tour of New Zealand by South African athletes. The Dominion, after initially accepting the appeal at the eleventh hour refused it thus being too late to place the advertisement elsewhere. 131 In a similar incident T. Poata, Secretary for the Maori Organisation on Human Rights wrote a letter expressing concern at the non-publication of their letters. Of four letters sent to The Dominion only two were published with one having been abridged. Poata accused The Dominion of failing to report democratically.132 On learning of this misreporting a deputation of Wellington citizens approached The Dominion who then agreed to accept such advertisements in future.133 The Auckland Star was also found guilty of misreporting. 134

The second count concerned subtle slants The Dominion showed in its reporting. Through constantly featuring articles on the success of Apartheid, life in South Africa, sporting and political scene in the Republic and featuring large advertisements of South African companies, The Dominion worked on the public subconscious in the way it chose.135 For example on page four

130 Ibid
131 Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game, p.45
132 Poata to Holyoake, 7 May 1970 (CR)
133 Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game p.45
134 Sayers (Editor Auckland Star) to Newnham Sept 10, 1969
135 The Dominion, Sept 30, 1969 p.5 col 3-6
of an issue, in bold black letters read 'SOUTH AFRICAN BLACKS PREFER APARTHEID' following this in small lighter letters read 'NZ tourist says'. The story concerned an 80 year old New Zealand tourist just returned from the Republic. He is quoted: 'the blacks are very happy and would rather live this way under white rule.' 136 The frequency of these reports was constantly maintained. 137

To gauge how much the public was influenced by biased reporting is beyond the scope of this study. What can be said however is the intention was there to influence. For those who knew little about the controversy it undoubtedly had the educative effect desired. The media then, was persuasively involved.

The issue left few untouched cutting across established lines and boundaries within society. Those that followed rugby had an opinion, those that defended morality had an opinion, the churches and trade unions were asked for an opinion. If you watched television or read the newspaper, you had an opinion. As the central issues had expanded so did the impact on New Zealand. With the controversy growing in intensity and heat, attitudes hardened on both sides causing conflict. To consider who had a majority remains difficult but what can be said is - the All Blacks left a divided nation.

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136 Ibid, April 2, 1970 p.4 col 5-6
137 Ibid, Dec 5, 1969 p.9 col 3-4 and June 3, 1970 p.21 col1
Chapter Five
STOP THE TOUR: AN OUTLINE OF THE PROTEST

Protesting in New Zealand was not new. Reaction against Vietnam helped by United States unrest, saw the emergence of marching and banner-waving previous to 1970. In response to the "No Maori No Tour" controversy pressure groups were inaugurated and traditional methods in petitions and persuasive letters were expanded. 1970 saw a consolidation of these techniques.

After the 1967 proposed tour was cancelled the issue of South African sporting contacts faded, discussion almost ceased.¹ CARE had to remotivate and energize a society whose concerns with race and sport had lulled. The opportunity arose when Dennis Brutus wrote to Jackson acknowledging his stand against the tour, which precipitated the opening of the campaign.² Of even more significance in mobilizing a disinterested public was the D'Oliveira affair. On September 24th 1968 the MCC decided against a tour of South Africa because it refused to comply to South Africa demands and exclude D'Oliveira from the English cricket team.³

The news instantly hit the headlines. Observers in New Zealand saw ominously close parallels to the possible inclusion of Maoris in the All Blacks. The tour looked doomed, but most importantly for CARE, South Africa was back in the headlines.

CARE recognised early that the central issues of 1970 were not domestic but involved the policies within South Africa, which the majority of New Zealanders knew little about. There was a need for information. So CARE, in conjunction with Australian pressure groups, invited Dennis Brutus to New Zealand on a speaking tour on Apartheid and sport in 1969.⁴ CARE had chosen its speaker well. Brutus was highly articulate and through his works with SAN-ROC had become well informed on South African affairs. For two weeks in February and March, Brutus travelled the country handling up to

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¹ Newnham, Oral Interview
² Brutus to Jackson May 6, 1968 (CR)
³ Hain, p.82
⁴ Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game p.37
five engagements a day. He addressed meetings throughout the country speaking to church and Maori groups, parliamentarians, trade unionists, university and school students. Thousands more heard Brutus on radio and television and most daily newspapers ran extensive feature profiles and published his addresses.

Brutus had a profound effect on those who listened. He opened peoples eyes to South Africa's racial problems making many re-evaluate their opinions. Some, so inspired by his rhetoric, determined to actively do something and questioned the Government who, on the one hand allowed continued sporting contacts with South Africa, yet on the other preached platitudes about racial equality. Even The Dominion who criticised Brutus for attempting to use rugby as 'a weapon with which to beat the South African Government' conceded he was an 'eloquent reasoning opponent of Apartheid' and applauded his motives stating 'his mission will not be quickly forgotten.'

The Brutus message drew close parallels between the tyrannous system of apartheid and the rise of Hitler. He states

No one can read the history of the rise of Hitler without recognising the clever exploitation of prejudice for what were in part at least, economic and political reasons. In South Africa racism is quite clearly used in order to keep people at low levels of earning power. So the crude concept of economic exploitation has got something to do with it.

Brutus was not optimistic about a peaceful resolution

'What we are left with in the last resort is the black people abandoning their fifty years of passive resistance and non-violent struggle and turning to arms. This they have begun to do.'

The impact Brutus had on the protest movement was dramatic. He rekindled old fires and lit many new ones. CARE offices opened in Wellington, Christchurch and Nelson while the Auckland office was inundated

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5 The Listener, March 14, 1969 vol 60 p. 13
6 Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game p.38
7 Ibid
8 The Dominion, March 4, 1969 p.10 col 1
9 The Listener, March 14, 1969 Vol 60 p. 13
10 Ibid
"I’m against 1970 tour"
I'M AGAINST THE TOUR
with requests for speaking engagements and interviews. 11 The Brutus tour had satisfactorily achieved CARE's aim of education.

In March of 1969, the New Zealand Maori Council announced its support for the tour, prompting Syd Jackson to lead a deputation of students through the East Coast - Gisborne area in a bid to reverse the decision. As previously explained they failed in their objective but did enlighten people on the contentious nature of the topic.

In the meantime Trevor Richards emerged with the concept of an umbrella organisation devoted primarily to stopping the tour. HART began at Easter 1969 yet by September was still floundering through lack of support. The opportunity to expand HART came with the arrival of Judith Todd and a second speaking tour. 12

Todd was the daughter of Garfield Todd the New Zealand born former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia. 13 Although quietly spoken she had an acute grasp of international affairs and was highly articulate. Todd spoke largely on the evils of the unconstitutional Smith Regime in Rhodesia and its oppressive racial policies which paralleled South Africa's Apartheid system. The tour lasted five weeks travelling to major and minor centers around the country. 14 Before every address Trevor Richards informed the large audiences of his new organisation HART. Both speaking tours were highly successful and equipped the public with a well informed appraisal of the issues at hand.

Over the next few months protest action against the rugby tour fell quiet but the issue of apartheid sport and South Africa remained. Every day reports appeared in the newspaper of disruptions and violence in England where the Springboks were touring. 15 Back in New Zealand, South African golfer Gary Player experienced similar difficulties. On November 6th, several busloads of demonstrators mounted a vocal protest at a tournament in which Player was involved. Urged on by their peers, protesters invaded the golf course requiring the police to remove them by

11 Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game p.38
12 Sorrenson, p.11
13 The Dominion, Sept 23, 1969 p.5 col 2-4
14 Sorrenson, p.11
15 The Dominion, Nov 7, 1969 p.1 col 2-4
force. 16 CARE who disassociated themselves from this protest, later discussed with Player Apartheid sport. From the ensuring interview Player admitted for the first time that non-white golfers who reach the required standard should be allowed to compete in the South African Open Golf Championship. His declaration made headlines in New Zealand and South Africa.17

The NZAAA was still jostling with the option of inviting South Africa to New Zealand. In the face of mounting opposition from within the NZAAA and public alike the NZAAA withdrew the invitation. 18 Up till now protest action had remained persuasive, however from the early months of 1970 a distinct change in protest action occurred. It became more intense and grew in militancy.

The first demonstration of note occurred on the 19 March. Students and young workers demonstrated outside the South African Consulate as a prelude to a larger protest held a week later in commemoration of the Sharpeville-Langa Massacres; where 83 peaceful protesters were killed. 19 Two weeks later a demonstration, of greater significance to the tour, was held outside the NZRFU offices. Among the hundreds of Victoria University students were community heavyweights, Jim Knox Secretary of the FOL, Whetu Tirakatene-Sullivan MP for Southern Maori, Paul Grocott President of NZUSA, Trevor Richards, President of HART, and Tom Poata Secretary of the Maori Organisation of Human Rights.

Protest pressure was applied to the NZRFU and Government but also included those self-acclaimed supporters of the tour. After the indiscretion by Justice Wild in support of the tour, protesting began outside his house. 20 The next day Victoria University Students, having marched to the Wellington Town Hall where the NZRFU was holding its AGM turned their attention to The Dominion offices shouting “racist rag” due to The Dominion’s stance on the tour.21 On the 7th May, Bishop Gowing and Tom Skinner led a deputation representing over 30 organisations to meet the Prime Minister urging the

16 Ibid
17 Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game p.44
18 Ibid, p.45
19 The Dominion, March 19, 1970 p.21 col 1
20 Ibid, April 30, 1970, p.1 col 1-4
21 Ibid, May 1, 1970 p.3 col 2-6
STUDENTS with painted faces arrive at the Wellington Town Hall yesterday to protest against the proposed All Black tour of South Africa.
government to disassociate itself from the tour and refrain from giving the All Blacks any official farewell. Newnham, who presented the Prime Minister with an official statement concluded it. 22

When the United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid feels it necessary as it did on April 14th last, to specifically name New Zealand in a Special Communique to remind this country of its responsibilities in this matter there can be no doubt that in the eyes of the world our attitude to Apartheid is equivocal and suspect. In the circumstances, we submit that there is an urgent need for you to make a clear statement of condemnation of Apartheid sport and to disallow those New Zealanders who participate in it. 23

It fell on deaf ears. The following day Holyoake announced, the government will not become officially involved in the All Black tour and affirmed government plans to arrange the customary farewell reception for the All Blacks at Parliament Buildings. 24 Clearly, the message was not getting through. Words had become ineffective and action was needed.

Most of the extreme measures taken were unrelated to the official pressure groups, CARE and HART. On May 8th six men were caught by police inside the NZRFU house attempting to take documentation relating to the All Black tour, 25 and a few days later the covered grandstand at Athletic park caught fire around 10 p.m. at night in suspicious circumstances. 26 The first incident was admitted as protest action while the second was strongly suspected to have been.

CARE and HART publicly announced their intentions to protest. The first major demonstration was at the All Black trials in Wellington. The police immediately called for reinforcements. 27 120 extra police were brought in for the first All Black trial in Palmerston North, to control 90 protesters who marched onto the ground. 28 But worse was to come. A day preceding the main All Black trial in Wellington the headlines across The Dominion read

| 22 | Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game p.47 |
| 23 | Ibid, p.27 |
| 24 | Ibid |
| 25 | The Dominion, May 9, 1970 p. 6 col 6-7 |
| 26 | Ibid, May 12, 1970 p.1 col 5-7 |
| 28 | Ibid, May 21, 1970 p.1 col.5-7 |
FIGURE 10

DESECRATION!
"Massive Security Plan for All Black Trials Tomorrow". Police numbers were double that in Palmerston North and Athletic Park was kept under surveillance overnight before the trial. In the morning newspapers the following day, HART president, Trevor Richards appealed to protesters to remain non-violent and bear in mind the long term goal before indulging in any illegal action. His plea was to no avail.

Police had to contend with a bomb hoax and, early in the second half 50 protesters leapt over the fence, raced onto the field and stopped the main trial for five minutes. Spectators were left in no doubt to the invaders intentions as the first man onto the field carried a banner proclaiming 'NO RACIST SPORT'. While removing protesters, the police made 17 arrests.

In a related incident a caller rang Athletic Park and said a man would burn himself in a nearby park if the game continued. Soon afterward a car pulled up at the park and a man began walking across the grass carrying a yellow gallon tin. As police closed in, he doused himself from head-to-foot with petrol. He was tackled by police, stripped of his clothes, wrapped in a blanket and taken to Wellington hospital where he received treatment for petrol burns.

The disobedience continued. During the night on May 25th the Headquarters of the Auckland Rugby Union was set on fire with a molotov cocktail causing $5,000 damage. Disapproving reactions came from all corners. Tom Newnham condemned the action as 'criminal and cowardly' however The Dominion stated while Newnhams comments may have been sincere,

in a controversy as heated as this one on how countries can most effectively react to South Africa's racial policy of Apartheid it is inevitable that an idiot fringe will resort to violence. The protest groups have to consider that their campaigns will appeal to extremists.

This was true to an extent. Leaders of minority pressure groups can use

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31 Ibid, May 23, 1970 p.1 col 1-5 and p.6 col 4-7
32 Ibid, May 25, 1970 p.1 col 1-4; Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game p.48
violence to bargain with formal authorities and all other members of society by saying:

"You must accept our just complaints and you must deal with us, otherwise, we will not be able to control our people".  

While playing this role, the group is not unhappy of a malicious act or two by a few psychotic teenagers. The irresponsible elements are, of course, disowned, but the bargaining power of the leader and cause is enhanced.

While this situation did not apply to CARE the same cannot be said for HART whose chairman admitted to militant activity.

On May 27 two petitions were heard in the Parliamentary Petitions Committee. The first was organised by Dr P.W. Hohepa and the second organised by Trevor Richards. Both petitions were...

"Praying that parliament states its support for the principle of racial equality in sport and urges the government to ask New Zealand sporting bodies to examine their overseas tour policies."

Dr Hohepa's petition which collected 7,400 signatures, claimed that despite the New Zealand Maori Council's decision the majority of Maoridom is against the tour. The concession that Maoris can be included is expensive as they go under an 'honorary white' premise. Richard's petition on behalf of HART collected 12,209 signatures, and their principle reason for opposing the tour was moral. He stated

"the only way to achieve anything was through sports boycotts. It was not before but after the MCC had said they would not be going to South Africa that South African sportsmen had sought changes."

Both petitions were referred to the government for consideration at which point they disappear.

While protest action continued along conventional lines there were a number of individual protests of a different character. In one example a Wellington dairy-owner fed up with the anti-tour movement took his own

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36 Ibid

37 The Dominion, May 28, 1970 p.5 col 1-7

38 Appendix to the Journals House of Representatives, 1970 Vol. IV H.31-I I.1 p.3

39 The Dominion, May 28, 1970 p.5 col 1-7

40 Ibid, May 28, 1970 p.5 col 1-7
public opinion poll of 310 people. Questioned he found 218 were pro, 48 anti and 34 undecided. Despite claiming his customers were 'a fair cross-section of the community' his dubious sampling techniques raise questions over the validity of the results. 41

In another, Wellington bookseller Mr Roy Parsons sought a writ of 'Ne exeat regno' (not leaving the realm) to restrain the All Black team from going to South Africa as it "would be gravely prejudicial to the interests of New Zealand". However the writ was not issued because it lacked a precedent case and was unsuitable in contemporary law. In his judgement Mr Justice Hardie-Boys said the writ of 'ne exact regno' was used for high political purposes in Elizabethan times and in the nineteenth century had become an instrument for restraining debtors.

But even so on matters of state this court would in my view be usurping the functions of the Queens ministers in New Zealand if on the application of a private citizen the court in the name of the Queen in a matter of this kind permitted its writ to issue. In the absence of clear authority or precedent I decline to do so. It is accordingly refused.42

The day after Parsons filed his writ, Ken Gray announced his shock retirement because of his personal beliefs on apartheid.43

As the tour departure drew nearer the civil disobedience continued. A goal post on Lancaster Park was sawn down with six slogans in large letters being painted on the front two grandstands. And on June 5th, protesters were ejected from the courtroom in Wellington for noise abuse as the Athletic Park demonstrators were facing charges. 44

Later at a farewell to Blair Furlong, one of the four coloured players to leave, Bishop of Aotearoa Manu Bennett, stated that sporting contacts with South Africa should end if the All Black tour did not ease Apartheid.45 This comment prompted CARE secretary Newnham to change his ground and support Bennett and the tour if the Rugby Union or the Government would in turn agree that this would be the last tour based on Apartheid rugby. Newnham was criticised widely for his change in position. The Rugby Union

41 Ibid, June 6, 1970 p.56 col. 5-6
42 Ibid, June 9, 1970 p.2 col 1-7 and June 10, 1970 p.9 col 1-5; Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game p.50
43 The Dominion, May 31, 1970, p.2 col. 1-4
44 Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game p.49
was a sports administrator and to expect it to consider the racial or political implications behind competing against opponents exceeds the job asked of them.\textsuperscript{46} The issue quickly died however, as neither, the Rugby Union nor the Government bothered to respond. \textsuperscript{47}

On the 11th June, two days before the scheduled departure, Wellington witnessed the most spectacular protest of the campaign. CARE commissioned sky writer Mike Brannigan to write the words STOP THE TOUR in huge letters across the sky. The weather was perfect and a brilliant clear sky with no wind made for a dramatic effect. \textsuperscript{48}

That night at the parliamentary farewell to the All Blacks, seven people were arrested as they surged through Parliament grounds booing the departing team and throwing paint and flour bombs at guests. There were 40 police on hand to control the situation. \textsuperscript{49}

With only a day till the All Blacks left it was all or nothing for the protest movement. That night police and protesters clashed when demonstrators chanting slogans and carrying placards held up traffic in downtown Wellington for up to two hours. Police had to remove them forcibly and in doing so arrested 34 people. \textsuperscript{50} The next morning at 5 a.m. 250 protesters marched from Victoria University to Wellington airport. There they joined many others totalling close to 1,000 demonstrators. Added to this were hundreds of tour supporters and 300 police. Tension was high as the parties waited for the All Black bus to arrive. To everyone's surprise the bus went round the terminal on to the tarmac on straight to the waiting plane. While the protesters began their vocal chants protester Tim Shadbolt leapt over a fence and raced towards the aircraft, only to be brought down not by police, but a pro tour supporter. Shadbolt refused to pay his fine and served one month in jail.\textsuperscript{51} The All Blacks had left and the protest failed.

Why did it fail? There appears no definitive answer. Certainly the protest movement did not have the support in numbers that it needed. Without polls, determining public opinion remains speculative guesswork.

\textsuperscript{46} The Dominion, June 12, 1970. p.8 col. 1 (editorial)
\textsuperscript{47} Sorrenson p.14
\textsuperscript{48} The Dominion, June 12, 1970 p.1 col. 5
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid, June 12, 19780 p.1 col. 5
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, June 13, 1970 p.1 col. 1-5
\textsuperscript{51} Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game p.51
however in the final analysis anti tour sentiment seems well below fifty percent. Those that actively protested, significantly less again, leaving a small troop to fight a much larger army. It was, however a lively troop. Protests were more frequent and louder than before, civil disobedience and the disruption of sporting occasions became commonplace and over 70 arrests is testimony to a determined more militant struggle. The targets of protest were many and varied. Not specifically the NZRFU and Government but individuals, and companies, or anyone who openly or actively supported the tour. This wide target area may have reduced the potency of their message. Unlike Britain's STST campaign, the New Zealand protest did not have continuing game venues on which to focus a sustained protest. Organisers had only a handful of All Black trials, and a few days when the All Blacks were together before they left, in which to stage a protest while national attention was focused upon them. Further, if 'direct action' was the most effective tactic HART not CARE was capable of leading it. But CARE, the moderate citizens group, not HART, the youthful militant group, led the 1970 campaign. By world standards the protest was a moderate one not rising to the storms of violence seen elsewhere. By New Zealand's standards it was a most troublesome sport associated protest to date. Though behind the rest of the world, it was clear, in regard to South African sporting contacts, New Zealand was losing its patience.
Conclusion

Until 1970 protests in New Zealand against racial discrimination in sport were wholly domestic. For this All Black tour however the issue was not against racial discrimination here, but objection to its formal presence in South Africa. The dissent in New Zealand to Apartheid sport, and Apartheid in general was enhanced by growing world hostility against South Africa. The determined campaigning by the London based SAN-ROC organisation had woken the world conscience to South Africa’s inhumane sporting policies which were incongruous to the central sporting value of fair play. In response to this South Africa was expelled from the Olympic movement and later the Davis Cup. In England, Ireland and America, militant protests and violence occurred in opposition to visiting white South African sports teams. Each new development received substantial press coverage and educated the New Zealand public in the evils of Apartheid and the world abhorrence of it. Furthermore New Zealand pressure groups CARE and HART had become part of a loosely structured wider international movement against Apartheid sport. And by inviting Judith Todd and the president of SAN-ROC, Dennis Brutus to speak to the public at large, CARE had imported the international movement into New Zealand.

But this All Black tour differed somewhat. New Zealand had obtained a concession from South Africa never before allowed - to enter the republic with a multi-racial team. It introduced new possibilities on how best to achieve a breakdown in Apartheid. Some advocated no tour at all, hoping enforced isolation would bring about change. Others saw a multiracial team touring South Africa represented the thin end of the wedge and a basis from which further concessions could be won. With the implications of either option unclear, it became a question of tactics, to tour or not to tour, which would be better in achieving this aim? Opinion remained divided. Undoubtedly a large percentage of the sporting public aligned themselves for expedient reasons with touring as the thin end of the wedge. On the outside they claimed the All Blacks were moral crusaders, while on the inside gleefully rubbing their hands in anticipation of the rugby encounter. 1970 differed from the 1960 and 1967 protests where the sides were clearly divided. In this issue both pro and anti tour factors could have been morally correct. The existence of this split meant many pro-tour anti
FIGURE 14
-Apartheid supporters remained indoors and did not join the protest movement. This significantly weakened its effect and played the major part in the failure to stop the tour.

What successes then, did the tour achieve? Firstly the issue of Maori inclusion in the All Blacks ironically became the thin end of the wedge which split the South African National Party. The break by Hertzog's HNP extremist group ended full party unity, and separated those unwilling to compromise Apartheid dogma from those who were. That is not to say the National Party relaxed its Apartheid policy in fundamental areas and those laws remained as permanent as ever. Secondly the tour did become the thin end of the wedge regarding concessions in Apartheid sport. Due to near total sport isolation South Africa allowed gradual changes to take place within sport. In rugby for instance, the All Blacks played a coloured team in 1976 and by 1981 the first coloured player was selected to tour with the Springboks.

And lastly, the distinguished performances by the coloured All Blacks may have dispelled for white South African's the notion that skin colour is a determinant of athletic skill. Bryan Williams excelled especially and was frequently named the 'star' of the tour. African's and coloured identified closely with Williams from early on. After the All Blacks second match at Kimberley cheering African's invaded the field and surrounded Williams for autographs. These gestures however were not appreciated by drunken whites nor were they legal and soon a full scale riot eventuated. If the multi-racial All Blacks had delivered a message to South African's, the whites were determined not to let it flower. So while the tour recorded some gains they remained meagre and did not constitute the further concessions desired. It became clear South Africa's reforms in sport were not reforms so much but measures designed to placate world opinion and preserve its sporting contacts. How effective isolation would have been is difficult to tell, but the advantage of retrospect has shown that when internationally unanimous the isolation of South Africa has proven to be the best strategy in pressing for change.

For New Zealand however not playing rugby against South Africa was catastrophic. The "honorary white" issue exposed how central an All Black tour was to New Zealand when those in power could overlook this blatant injustice in order that we still see the All Blacks play the Springboks. Voluntarily isolating New Zealand's greatest rival in its favourite game was
inconceivable and moral issues were swept aside. Although the nations social conscience in regard to race issues was undoubtedly rising, New Zealand still placed too much importance on sport. It was after all - only a game.
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