Authoritarian Politics and the Outcome of Nonviolent Uprisings

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Abstract

This thesis examines how the internal dynamics of authoritarian regimes influence the outcome of mass nonviolent uprisings. Although research on civil resistance has identified several factors explaining why campaigns succeed or fail in overthrowing autocratic rulers, to date these accounts have largely neglected the characteristics of the regimes themselves, thus limiting our ability to understand why some break down while others remain cohesive in the face of nonviolent protests.

This thesis sets out to address this gap by exploring how power struggles between autocrats and their elite allies influence regime cohesion in the face of civil resistance. I argue that the degeneration of power-sharing at the elite level into personal autocracy, where the autocrat has consolidated individual control over the regime, increases the likelihood that the regime will break down in response to civil resistance, as dissatisfied members of the ruling elite become willing to support an alternative to the status quo. In contrast, under conditions of power-sharing, elites are better able to guarantee their interests, thus giving them a greater stake in regime survival and increasing regime cohesion in response to civil resistance.

Due to the methodological challenges involved in studying authoritarian regimes, this thesis uses a mixed methods approach, drawing on both quantitative and qualitative data and methods to maximise the breadth of evidence that can be used, balance the weaknesses of using either approach in isolation, and gain a more complete understanding of the connection between authoritarian politics and nonviolent uprisings. Analysis of a global sample of civil resistance campaigns supports the argument, revealing a significant association between measures of personalisation and campaign success. I then explore these results in more detail with two case studies of civil resistance in Southeast Asia. The Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos shows how the personalisation of power generated grievances amongst members of the ruling coalition, leading to the rebellion by some of Marcos's core supporters which directly contributed to the success of the 1986 People Power revolution. The failed 2013 democracy campaign in Cambodia is then analysed as a deviant case. I conclude that, contrary to previous interpretations, prime minister Hun Sen was still constrained by a power-sharing agreement in 2013, and that this played an important role in maintaining regime cohesion against the uprising. Taken together, the results of quantitative analysis and in-depth case studies demonstrate that the internal power dynamics of authoritarian regimes have an important role to play in explaining the outcomes of civil resistance.

Keywords: authoritarianism, personalism, civil resistance, Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Cambodia, mixed methods.
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### Abbreviations

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Alliance of Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>Akaike Information Criterion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>Area under the curve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>Bayesian Information Criterion</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLDP</td>
<td>Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNRP</td>
<td>Cambodian National Rescue Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMELEC</td>
<td>Commission on Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Cambodian People's Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDSA</td>
<td>Epifanio de los Santos Avenue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNCINPEC</td>
<td>National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Grassroots Democracy Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF</td>
<td>Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRP</td>
<td>Human Rights Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBL</td>
<td>Kilusan Bagong Lipunan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPNLF</td>
<td>Khmer People's National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-L</td>
<td>Kullback-Liebler Divergence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPRP</td>
<td>Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCM</td>
<td>Magaloni, Chu, and Min (2013) dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METROCOM</td>
<td>Metropolitan Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMFREL</td>
<td>National Citizen's Movement for Free Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVCO</td>
<td>Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes dataset (Chenoweth &amp; Lewis, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>New People's Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP-Laban</td>
<td>Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRK</td>
<td>People's Republic of Kampuchea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAM</td>
<td>Reform the Armed Forces Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Receiver operating characteristic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNC</td>
<td>Supreme National Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRP</td>
<td>Sam Rainsy Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Democratic Nationalist Organization (prev. United Democratic Organization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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1. Introduction

There are people who have asked me about the [rumoured] list of 100 or 200 to be executed. Let me make it clear here. Whoever does not take part in destroying peace, you are not the target. Whoever intends to destroy peace of this country, you will get what is coming to you. If you keep saying that you will fight for power through colour revolution, then you are on the list.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, 21 June 2017.

1.1. Authoritarian rule and civil resistance

Civil resistance against authoritarian rule is now recognised as a major political force. Uprisings using nonviolent civil resistance tactics over the last century have successfully toppled entrenched dictatorships from the nationwide strike that overthrew El Salvadoran president General Hernández Martínez in 1944 to the sudden, massive protests that led to the downfall of Tunisia’s Ben Ali in 2011. Other nonviolent revolutions in the Philippines, Chile, East Germany, Nepal, South Africa, and Serbia, to name a few, have proven this to be a global phenomenon.

Furthermore, empirical research has shown definitively that nonviolence can be successful in achieving radical goals of regime change and secession, and indeed has been on average more successful than violence (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Nonviolent uprisings are more likely than armed uprisings to lead to democratisation rather than renewed authoritarianism (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013), and the resulting governments are more likely to remain democratic over the medium to long term (Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005; Shin & Tusalem, 2007; Johnstad, 2010). Yet the success of civil resistance is not guaranteed. This fact was brought to the fore during the Arab Spring, where the majority of the uprisings led not to democratic change but to violent crackdowns, political instability, or civil war. Other major campaigns have failed to achieve their objectives in countries such as Pakistan, China, Belarus, Myanmar, Iran, Guinea, and Togo. Indeed, over the last decade major civil resistance campaigns have failed more often than they have succeeded.

A substantial and growing body of research has examined this topic. For much of the 20th century, scholarship on regime change and democratisation dismissed the role of popular

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2 Chenoweth, Erica and Maria J. Stephan, Washington Post, January 18, 2016. "How the world is proving Martin Luther King right about nonviolence." See also Chapter 4 of this thesis.
protest as ephemeral and unimportant (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013). Early studies of civil resistance worked to counter this perception and show that effective nonviolence is possible by describing exemplary, standout cases, often motivated by a normative commitment to nonviolence as a better alternative to violent struggle (McCarthy & Kruegler, 1993; Martin, Varney & Vickers, 2001). More recently, the field has moved towards comparative theory building and quantitative analysis of empirical data to understand the onset, trajectories, and outcomes of civil resistance campaigns (e.g., Schock, 2005; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008; Nepstad, 2011; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017).

Perhaps the most important advance in this area has been the release of the Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO) data project, the most comprehensive examination of the outcomes of nonviolent uprisings to date (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argue that the reason that nonviolent resistance is more effective than violent insurgency is that nonviolent campaigns have lower barriers to participation, and so can gain a substantial advantage in mobilising supporters. Indeed, they find that the number of participants in protest campaigns is the strongest overall determinant of success, while other factors—including regime characteristics—are unable to fully explain civil resistance outcomes.

Aside from protest size, other success factors that have been proposed or tested include the opposition’s strategy, organisational structure, ability to employ multiple tactics, and resilience to repression (e.g., Ackerman & DuVall, 2000; Schock, 2005); the goals of the campaign (e.g., Svensson & Lindgren, 2011a); and nonviolent discipline by protestors (e.g., Nepstad, 2011). Notably, explanations of reasons for success and failure have to date primarily centred on the actions of protestors; indeed, inquiry across the civil research literature has been firmly focused on opposition movements and participants, while less weight has been given to the characteristics of the regimes that are being opposed. This is largely a response to the historical predominance of state-centric views in political science that denied or downplayed the existence of popular agency, as well as earlier claims that nonviolent methods could only be effective against ‘soft’ democratic targets; civil resistance researchers have responded to this by emphasising that popular agency exists and is capable of challenging all kinds of opponents (e.g., Ackerman & DuVall, 2000; Schock, 2003; Martin, 2015). Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) work, for example, explicitly counters this dismissal of nonviolent action by showing, using quantitative data, that civil resistance is capable of working against all kinds of regimes.

At the same time that the possibilities of democratic change through nonviolent action have become increasingly well-known, and civil resistance has become the “modal category” of contentious politics worldwide,³ there has also been a global resurgence of

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³ Chenoweth, Erica and Maria J. Stephan, Washington Post, January 18, 2016. “How the world is proving Martin Luther King right about nonviolence.”
authoritarianism, and with it a growing perception that democracy is under threat. This perception is supported by empirical data: Freedom House (2017), for example, has marked an average decline in political freedoms and civil liberties worldwide since 2006. The Varieties of Democracy data project likewise shows that, at the very least, the global level of democracy has stagnated over the last decade, with 2013 marking the first time since 1978 that more countries worldwide experienced setbacks to democracy than made gains (Lührmann et al., 2017).

Unlike popular stereotypes of totalitarian states or tinpot third-world dictatorships, modern autocracies are becoming increasingly advanced and diverse in their institutional makeup (Brooker, 2014). As Geddes (2003, 48-49) puts it,

Dictatorships can differ from each other as much as they differ from democracy [...] They draw on different groups to staff government offices and on different segments of society for support. They have different procedures for making decisions, different characteristic forms of intraelite factionalism and competition, different ways of choosing leaders and handling succession, and different ways of responding to societal interests and opposition.

Most now adopt at least some nominally democratic institutions, including elections, parliaments, or opposition political parties. Nearly half of all autocracies since the end of the Second World War have allowed multiple political parties to operate (Svolik, 2012, 34), for example, while ‘competitive authoritarianism’—to use Levitsky and Way’s (2002, 2010) term—is on the rise, with an increasing share of dictators now elected by simple majorities of less than 75% of the vote (Svolik, 2012, 37). Legislatures and executives vary widely in terms of how they are selected, whether unelected, selected by a small body, elected with a single party or candidate per seat, elected by a super-majority, or elected by a simple majority; indeed, in only a quarter of all autocratic country-years in Svolik's data were both the executive and the legislature entirely unelected (Svolik, 2012, 38). Even seemingly uncomplicated forms of authoritarian rule such as military governments range from outright military rule, to ‘civilianised’ regimes staffed by supposedly retired military personnel, to indirect rule from ‘behind the throne’ in which the military does not overtly rule but retains a veto over key policy decisions (Brooker, 2014). And beyond central government, an even wider variety of institutional forms can be seen at the local level, including experiments with relatively democratic consultative agencies as a way of channelling citizens’ frustrations without threatening the stability of the overall system (e.g., He & Thøgersen, 2010).

Authoritarian practices are also becoming more sophisticated. While violent repression of opponents is still a feature of many regimes, many also now make use of ‘lawfare’, the abuse of laws passed by rubber stamp legislatures and enforced by controlled judiciaries to eliminate political opponents in a way that is technically or superficially legal in order to provide a veneer of legitimacy to repression. Propaganda spread through traditional
media is also becoming more technically adept and convincing to target audiences (e.g., Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011). Warned by the role of newer communication technologies in previous uprisings (e.g., Shirky, 2011; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012), authoritarian rulers have moved into the online realm, using automated ‘bots’ and hired users to challenge or simply drown out online opposition on social media platforms (e.g., King, Pan & Roberts, 2017). The increasing prominence of civil resistance has not been lost on authoritarian rulers either, with some beginning to adapt and learn from previous successful campaigns against other regimes (e.g., Chen, 2010; Heydemann & Leenders, 2011). Even academics in authoritarian countries are being utilised: in September 2017, for example, China and Cambodia established a joint research group to investigate the causes of nonviolent uprisings and develop strategies for preventing them.4

Like civil resistance, authoritarianism has seen a substantial growth in interest from scholars. Although the most common form of government in history, until recently it has remained on the margins of political science research which was more concerned with understanding democratic systems (Gehlbach, Sonin & Svolik, 2016). Work on authoritarianism in the latter half of the 20th century focused on the creation of regime typologies, grouping different systems together based on essential characteristics, such as differentiating between the totalitarian regimes in Nazi Germany and the U.S.S.R. and the more ‘bureaucratic’ military-led regimes in Latin America (Brooker, 2014). Following the third wave of democratisation in the early 1990s, more attention has been paid to the ‘hybrid’ regime types—those which use nominally democratic institutions while remaining fundamentally non-democratic—that lie in the grey zone between highly repressive regimes and liberal democracies (Brooker, 2014).

There has also been a rapid expansion of research on authoritarianism using formal methods, drawing on work from economics and democratic politics to analyse strategic interaction between key regime actors in non-democratic regimes (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Myerson, 2008; Svolik, 2012). A key foundation in this field is the observation that authoritarian institutions cannot be taken at face value, as the underlying ‘rules of the game’ in autocracies are fundamentally different to those in democratic polities, thus adding a layer of complexity to analysis (Gehlbach, Sonin & Svolik, 2016). Formal models are by nature highly abstract and simplified, typically consisting of just a small number of ‘players’ who interact under extremely restricted conditions. Yet they show that there are similarities in incentives that cut across the huge variety of authoritarian regimes. In particular, formal modelling has highlighted the central role that information, coordination, and commitment problems play in determining what form authoritarian rule takes and how autocrats maintain their power (Gehlbach, Sonin & Svolik, 2016).

To date, however, this increasingly sophisticated and rigorous research on the internal dynamics of authoritarian politics has not been adequately reflected in studies of nonviolent civil resistance. While the focus on opposition actions has been a deliberate choice, intended to counter the aforementioned tendency of mainstream research to deny the agency of ordinary people in explaining political change, it neglects that fact that civil resistance campaigns are inherently dyadic, involving two sides in conflict with one another (see also Nepstad, 2015b). Indeed, much of the research on authoritarian politics is of direct relevance to understanding the outcomes of civil resistance, including (but not limited to) the role of institutions under dictatorship (e.g., Gandhi, 2008; Myerson, 2008; Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010; Frantz & Ezrow, 2011; Boix & Svolik, 2013), the function of non-competitive elections (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Morgenbesser, 2016), autocrats’ information problems regarding popular and elite preferences (e.g., Wintrobe, 1998; Shih, 2008; Frantz & Kendall-Taylor, 2014), how regimes anticipate and pre-empt mobilisation (Chen, 2010; Sullivan, 2016), and the effects of different regime origins on the cohesion of ruling parties (Smith, 2005; Levitsky & Way, 2012). As a result of this omission, we are currently left with an incomplete understanding of why nonviolent uprisings succeed or fail.

**Purpose of the thesis**

This thesis addresses this gap in civil resistance research by examining how the characteristics of authoritarian politics influence the outcome of nonviolent uprisings. Much recent research is part of the ‘new institutionalism’ or ‘institutional turn’ in comparative authoritarianism, focusing on the ways that formal government institutions—especially nominally-democratic institutions such as dominant political parties and elections—help to maintain authoritarian rule (Schedler, 2009; Pepinsky, 2014). In this thesis however, I am instead concerned with what might be termed authoritarian power politics, that is, struggles amongst members of the topmost political elite—which I refer to as the ruling coalition—for control over decision-making, resource allocation, and coercion within the government as a whole, regardless of institutional makeup. While power struggles can take place within the context of government institutions, they can equally operate through informal backchannels and even degenerate into outright violence; indeed the ever-present threat of noninstitutional violent resolution of conflict within the regime is a fundamental characteristic of authoritarian politics (Gehlbach, Sonin & Svolik, 2016).

Particularly important for this thesis is Svolik’s (2012) finding that the power politics dimension of authoritarian rule has a profound impact on regime stability. While a minority of authoritarian regimes operate through formal, well-institutionalised methods, including regular leader turnover, it is far more common that leaders are removed by disgruntled members of their ruling coalition. But Svolik shows that uncertainty and coordination problems caused by the conditions of information scarcity that exist in authoritarian regimes can allow some leaders to avoid this fate and establish absolute rule, in which they personally dominate the regime and are capable of effectively...
deterring threats from the ruling coalition. Under these conditions, which I refer to as *personal autocracy*, elites are vulnerable to the autocrat’s whims and incapable of protecting their interests, yet the balance of power makes challenging the status quo prohibitively difficult from within the regime. Notably, Svolik argues that elites’ inability to coordinate against a leader who has consolidated personal power leads to long periods of rule by a single autocrat, as other figures in the regime are incapable of challenging them for control.

Svolik’s (2012) argument assumes that the ruling coalition’s decision to rebel or remain loyal is determined solely by factors internal to the regime, most importantly the relative power balance at a given point in time. Yet I argue that a mass civil resistance campaign, which creates a crisis for the regime as a whole and requires a coordinated, cohesive response to suppress, acts as an exogenous shock to this calculus by providing an alternative claim to power and enabling elites to overcome their barriers to coordinated action. Hence, the same internal struggles in authoritarian regimes which influence the likelihood of coups d’état should also be related to the outcome of nonviolent uprisings. Thus, **the purpose of this thesis is to examine how the consolidation of personal rule by authoritarian leaders influences the success of nonviolent uprisings.** In doing so, it demonstrates that insights generated from the study of authoritarianism can improve our understanding of why some nonviolent campaigns are able to overthrow autocratic regimes, while others are unsuccessful in achieving political change.

The thesis begins by turning to previous work on civil resistance and authoritarianism to more clearly highlight the research gap and justify the focus on the internal power politics rather than the institutional characteristics of authoritarian regimes. The theoretical framework explains in more detail why power personalisation should impact elite incentives to remain loyal or support a nonviolent uprisings. The plausibility of this argument is then tested using quantitative cross-national data, while the processes involved are examined more closely through two in-depth qualitative case studies of power personalisation and its impact on civil resistance outcome. A more detailed outline follows at the end of this chapter; first, however, I define some of the key terms and concepts used in this thesis.

### 1.2. Key terms

In this thesis I use a number of key terms related to authoritarian politics and civil resistance campaigns with specific meanings which may differ somewhat from colloquial usage, and so brief descriptions and definitions are in order.

The object of inquiry is authoritarian regimes challenged by nonviolent uprisings. As is standard in research on authoritarianism, I use the terms ‘authoritarian regime’, ‘dictatorship’, and ‘autocracy’—and their various derivatives—interchangeably. Following, for example, Alvarez, et al. (1996), Przeworski et al. (2000), Schedler (2006), Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), and Svolik (2012), I adopt a minimal, either/or
definition of dictatorship and democracy. First, democracies are defined as “regimes in which government offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections” (Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland, 2010, 69). Three key elements of this definition are (Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland, 2010):

1. \textit{Ex ante} uncertainty: the winner of the election is not effectively known in advance,
2. \textit{Ex post} irreversibility: the winner of the election takes office in accordance with the rules governing the election, and
3. Repeatability: the winner of the election is then subject to the first two criteria at regular intervals.

Dictatorships are then all regimes that do not meet any or all of these criteria. In other words, they are a residual category of regimes in which the result of elections are not genuinely in doubt and/or the results of elections do not effectively constrain power-holders, or, having won a genuinely contested election, power-holders alter the playing field so that the either of the first two conditions no longer holds. This definition assumes that democracies and dictatorships are qualitatively different forms of government rather than lying along a scale: democracies are those in which governments give up power through regular, institutionalised means, while dictatorships are those in which the power-holders do not (Przeworski, 1991; Svolik, 2012). This means that in democracies civil resistance can affect decision-makers because they are constrained by the need to win elections (e.g., Meyer, 2003), whereas in dictatorships power-holders do not face the same constraints, as elections serve a different purpose (Schedler, 2006; Morgenbesser, 2016). The implication of this definition is that civil resistance campaigns under the two different forms of government are also qualitatively distinct political phenomena, with different mechanisms of action, success factors, and likely outcome. Hence, in this thesis I consider only civil resistance campaigns against authoritarian regimes, with the expectation that the findings presented here will not necessarily generalise to civil resistance against democratic governments.

I use the terms ‘civil resistance campaign’, ‘nonviolent uprising’, and associated variations synonymously. Following Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) and Schock (2013), I define civil resistance campaigns as nonviolent, mass campaigns of active non-cooperation that do not necessarily follow a particular philosophy or require a commitment to principles of nonviolence, and which typically seek maximalist aims such as regime change, secession, or major policy reform. Campaigns themselves are “a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective”, typically with a clear leadership and sometimes a defined organisational structure and name (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013, 416). While some campaigns may feature occasional acts that could be classed as violence, such as rock throwing or property damage, I follow previous studies in focusing on the primacy of nonviolent tactics in identifying civil resistance campaigns (e.g., Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). A range of terminology has been used in prior research to refer to civil resistance campaigns, such as unarmed insurrection (Zunes, 1994; Schock, 2005), unarmed uprisings (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011b),
nonviolent social movement (Zunes, Kurtz & Asher, 1999; Ackerman & DuVall, 2000), nonviolent resistance (Stephan, 2009), people power (Ackerman & DuVall, 2006; Carter, Clark & Randle 2006), and nonviolent revolution (Nepstad, 2011). These terms generally refer to broadly the same phenomenon, but may be distinguished in some aspects of their definition. In particular, most definitions do not explicitly exclude nonviolent challenges to democratic governments. However, in practice most studies are of campaigns against repressive or corrupt non-democratic governments, and this is the focus that I continue in this thesis.⁵

When referring to autocracies, the term ‘ruler’ or ‘autocrat’ refers to the individual leader of the regime. This is not always identical with the nominal leader of the regime, as in cases where a constitutional monarch reigns but does not hold real influence or where a powerful figure selects protégés to fill formal leadership positions (cf. Baturo & Elkink, 2017). For example, Vladimir Putin has been the effective leader in Russia since 2000, even though between 2008 and 2012 he appointed his lieutenant Dimitry Medvedev to the office of president to circumvent term limits on his position (Baturo & Elkink, 2016). As I am concerned in this thesis with the exercise of real political power, whether through formal or informal channels, when I use the term ‘ruler’ I am referring to the figure who has the most decision-making authority within the regime, although this authority may be more or less constrained by the ruling coalition. Effective regime leaders are identified using country-specific works and datasets on authoritarian politics such as Svolik (2012) and Magaloni, Chu, and Min (2013). The term ‘ruling coalition’ refers to the autocrat’s primary group of elite supporters; these can be civilian, military, or a combination of both, and vary widely in their background and the resources they can draw on to support the autocrat. I use the term ‘regime’ in a colloquial sense to be broadly synonymous with the term government—for example, the ‘Hun Sen regime’, as I use it here, refers to the government that has led Cambodia since Hun Sen was first appointed prime minister in 1985. In some sources that are drawn on in the quantitative component of the thesis ‘regime’ is used in a more technical sense, to refer to a specific system of formal and informal rules governing policy decisions and government appointments; this includes rule by a single party, such as the Chinese Communist Party following Mao, where leadership changes occur but the same basic ruling institution remains in place (Magaloni, Chu, & Min, 2013; Geddes, Wright, & Frantz, 2014). In order to avoid confusion between the two terms, I instead use Svolik’s (2012, 88) term ‘ruling coalition spell’ in place of this second usage. So, for example, North Korea since independence has had three regimes—under Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un, respectively—but one ruling coalition spell, the Kim dynasty.⁶ Similarly, as will become apparent in Chapter 5, Ferdinand

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⁵ Compare this with, for example, the social movement literature, which more typically examines the use of nonviolent action in democracies, particularly the United States (see Schock, 2013).

⁶ Although Svolik’s (2012, 88) definition of a ruling coalition spell as “a period of uninterrupted succession in office of politically affiliated leaders” differs slightly from that used by Magaloni, Chu, and Min (2013) and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), in practice it effectively identifies the same thing (Wright & Bak, 2016).
Marcos’s regime in the Philippines consisted of two ruling coalition spells, the first from 1965-1972 when he operated through the established national assembly and required the support of the wealthy landowning class, and the second from 1972 onwards where he marginalised many of the landowners and relied more heavily on the newly-politicised military.

The main theoretical argument in this thesis is focused on the power balance between the ruling coalition and the autocrat. In this context I take power to mean ‘power over’, that is, the ability to influence or direct the actions of others through the use or threat of coercion (Sharp, 1973, 1980; cf. Dahl, 1957; Lukes, 1974). In the context of authoritarian regimes, where the struggle over coercive power is a central problem and violence is always a possible solution for conflicts of interest, this realist view of power is more applicable than other, more structurally-oriented views (Sharp, 1973).

I develop a theoretical framework that classifies regimes as either power-sharing or personal autocracy. Power-sharing regimes, while diverse in their institutional makeup, are those where autocrats face internal constraints from the ruling coalition that limit their decision-making and implementing ability. As a result, they are obliged to balance their own personal interests with the interests of other centres of influence within the regime such as rival elite coalitions or autonomous institutions. Personal autocracies, on the other hand, are those where autocrats do not face these constraints, as—typically due to their progressive capture of power—autonomous institutions have been undermined, rival elite coalitions eliminated or co-opted, and other institutional limits such as term limits removed. Autocrats in personal autocracies are hence able to operate largely independently of the remainder of the political elite, making decisions purely as they see fit and able to take courses of action that may be inimical to institutionalised interests within the regime. These two forms of authoritarian government are central to the argument of the thesis, and so are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 below. While personal autocracy refers to a particular regime type, the term ‘personalisation’ refers to moves by autocrats to consolidate their power and remove limits on their position, such as through appointing loyalists to key posts or revising constitutional term limits. Hence, personalisation is the process of establishing personal autocracy, while personal autocracy itself is the end state of the successful personalisation of power.

1.3. Outline of the study

Chapter 2 reviews existing empirical nonviolence research in more detail to more clearly identify the research gap that I set out to fill. I also survey two main approaches to studying authoritarian politics, namely, the creation and analysis of regime typologies and the use of deductive, formal models. Building on this review, I then develop the theoretical framework that informs the remainder of the thesis. I outline the definitive features of power-sharing regimes and personal autocracy, and explain why autocrats may try to subvert power-sharing agreements to gain personal control over the regime. I then explain why the consolidation of personal control is a double-edged sword, decreasing...
the likelihood of challenges to the autocrat’s position from within the ruling coalition while at the same time making the regime vulnerable to mass protests, as elites who can no longer ensure that their interests are protected become willing to support an alternative to the status quo.

Chapter 3 sets out the mixed methods research design that I have used to test and explore this argument. It summarises the mixed methods approach, including explaining the motivation for combining both qualitative and quantitative analysis and outlining the explanatory sequential design that structures this thesis. It then addresses the quantitative and qualitative components in turn. Data sources, variables, and methods for analysis are set out for the quantitative component. Measures of concepts such as personal autocracy in authoritarian regimes are not yet settled in the field; one indirect indicator that I use, the time that the individual leader has been in power, is somewhat novel, so I pay particular attention to explaining and justifying this choice. I also devote space to explaining the methods that I have used, with the intention that they should be understandable by both quantitatively- and qualitatively-oriented readers. The final section describes the case study design for the qualitative component, including how the cases were selected and analysed and how field research was carried out.

Chapter 4 presents the results of quantitative analysis. It shows that there is a strong association between personalisation of power and civil resistance success in achieving regime change. I especially highlight the counter-intuitive finding that the vast majority of campaigns that challenged long-serving autocrats—those who had been in power for more than a decade or so at the time of the campaign—succeeded, while results for autocrats who had been in power for less time are more mixed. This relationship, I argue, is consistent with the argument that personalisation increases the vulnerability of autocratic regimes to civil resistance. I then show how the quantitative results were used to select the case studies for further exploration of this finding.

Chapters 5 and 6 present the findings of the qualitative component of the study, comprising two case studies of civil resistance in Southeast Asia. Chapter 5 illustrates how Ferdinand Marcos’s personalisation of power in the Philippines led core allies to defect in the face of the 1986 civil resistance campaign, ultimately leading to his overthrow. Chapter 6 analyses the failed 2013 civil resistance campaign in Cambodia as a deviant case. Although previous work has highlighted prime minister Hun Sen’s apparent consolidation of personal control, the evidence I present in this chapter indicates that, in fact, a power-sharing agreement remained in place at the time of the uprising. The chapter also highlights a number of factors related to the opposition which, in combination with the ongoing balance of power in the ruling coalition, led to the failure of the campaign.

Chapter 7 integrates the findings of the quantitative and qualitative components, drawing out conclusions regarding the research question. It also presents an evaluation of the research design and the limitations of the study. I conclude by describing several areas that this research opens up for further inquiry.
2. Literature review and theoretical framework

Authoritarian regimes are extraordinarily diverse in their institutional makeup, behaviour, and outcomes, yet to date have received little attention in civil resistance research. The chapter begins by surveying empirical research on civil resistance, highlighting the research gap and the consequences for our understanding of why anti-regime civil resistance campaigns succeed or fail. It then highlights two broad approaches to understanding authoritarian politics, namely, creating regime typologies and using deductive formal modelling, and summarises some key works in each that are relevant to this thesis.

Following this review, I present a theoretical framework connecting intra-regime power struggles to the outcome of civil resistance campaigns. This classifies regimes in a way that cuts across institutional diversity and instead considers the balance of power between autocrats and their ruling coalitions. I label power-sharing regimes as those where members of the ruling coalition are able to effectively constrain the autocrat and ensure that their interests are protected. Personal autocracies, on the other hand, are those where autocrats have overcome limits on their authority and decision-making power and are able to act autonomously of the ruling coalition. I argue that elites under personal autocracy have incentives to remove the autocrat and re-establish power-sharing, yet are prevented from doing so by the autocrat's ability to deter the initiation of internal challenges, thus preventing the kind of elite co-ordination required to alter the status quo distribution of power. When a civil resistance campaign emerges, however, personalisation of power becomes self-defeating, as the crisis caused by mass protests allows elites to overcome their coordination problems and withdraw support from the autocrat in favour of an alternative. As a result, I conclude that personalisation of power should make it more likely that anti-regime civil resistance will succeed in bringing about regime change.

2.1. Civil resistance

2.1.1. Background

Nonviolence has an extensive history in political thought in both Eastern and Western traditions, but empirical analysis is comparatively more recent. Case (1923) is one of the earliest examples, examining instances of both passive resistance as well as more active nonviolent coercion and non-cooperation. Other scholars, such as Gregg (1934) and Bondurant (1958), focused more on the principles and practice of Gandhian nonviolence after its success in ejecting the British from India, arguing that nonviolence functions through a combination of principled moral force and methods of direct action.

An important milestone in the study of nonviolence was Gene Sharp's (1973) development of the pragmatic approach, which emphasised the study of nonviolent action
as a kind of political action that is distinct from the philosophical or religious principles that had informed previous thought (Weber, 2003; see also Miller, 1966). Although initially a believer in the efficacy of Gandhian nonviolence in converting opponents and undermining systems of oppression, he later moved away from this towards conceiving of nonviolent action as what he called a method of combat (Weber, 2003). The fundamental principle of Sharp’s (1973) theory of nonviolent action is that authoritarian regimes rely on compliance and cooperation to carry out their rule; for example, tax must be collected, infrastructure maintained, orders carried out, and legislation complied with. As a result, an authoritarian regime’s power is mutable, shifting, and uncertain, capable of being reduced or eliminated through collective noncompliance. Of course, not all areas of society are equally important for maintaining authoritarian rule, and noncompliance in small numbers or by groups which are less important for regime survival is less likely to be effective, while noncompliance by key support groups can be critical in undermining regime strength. These core allies typically include individuals or groups which have control over major economic, communicative, mobilisational, or coercive resources (cf. Helvey, 2004).

Those who oppose authoritarian governments can challenge them by targeting these support groups. They do so using tactics of nonviolent action, of which Sharp (1973) lists 196 with historical examples. These are labelled ‘nonviolent’ because they use methods that do not physically harm opponents, and ‘action’ to differentiate them from passive acceptance of suffering. Types of action include symbolic protests, non-cooperation with expected or sanctioned modes of behaviour, and nonviolent intervention, i.e., direct action against the government’s authority (Sharp, 1973; Martin & Varney, 2003). In general, these actions influence the government’s supporters by persuading them to withdraw cooperation, such as through mass public displays of dissent, or coercing them into supporting change through imposing direct costs, such as by carrying out strikes or boycotts (Sharp, 1973). When a sufficient level of support for the regime has been lost, and the government can no longer have its will enforced by its agents, it can no longer govern effectively, and power has shifted to the opposition movement (Sharp, 1973; 2010). The clearest example of undermining a pillar of support can be seen in the form of security force defections in response to protests, a process which has been seen in several successful campaigns (Nepstad, 2011; cf. Lee, 2015). Effective nonviolent action therefore targets the autocrat’s sources of support, rather than directly confronting the regime itself.

Sharp’s model of nonviolent action opened up a much wider field of study for scholars interested in nonviolence (McCarthy & Kruegler, 1993), and has formed the basis for the majority of civil resistance research since it was developed (Martin, Varney & Vickers, 2001; Schock, 2013). Most empirical studies of nonviolence and civil resistance have followed Sharp’s framework by focusing on mostly nonviolent, mass campaigns of active non-cooperation that do not necessarily follow a philosophy or require a commitment to principles of nonviolence and typically seek maximalist aims such as regime change, secession, or major policy reform (Schock, 2013). Cases are defined and selected based on the primacy of nonviolent tactics rather than any other feature. Aside from the
commonly-cited civil rights movement in the United States, most campaigns that have been examined have been in non-democratic countries, although the definitions used in the literature generally do not exclude the possibility of nonviolent action campaigns occurring in democratic contexts.

In earlier research on nonviolent action, case studies were often used to prove that nonviolence can be effective, or to highlight the courage and commitment of the protestors, areas which had been neglected in mainstream research (McCarthy & Krueglar, 1993; Martin, 2015). As a consequence, many of these case studies are implicitly or explicitly normative: for example, Ackerman and DuVall (2000) deliberately emphasise the role of nonviolence and individual actions in their accounts of well-known revolutions in order to promote knowledge about nonviolent action and highlight its ability to challenge dictatorial rule. Notable works based on case studies that have a primarily descriptive or normative purpose include Carter, Clark, and Randle (2006), Stephan (2009), Roberts and Garton Ash (2009), and Clark (2009). Other works have used comparative analysis of case studies for theory building and testing (Schock, 2005; Nepstad, 2011).

A major advance for the field has come through the work of Erica Chenoweth and colleagues on the Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset, the most comprehensive and significant attempt to collect data on civil resistance campaigns to date (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). Although there have been other quantitative studies using medium- or large-n datasets to examine cases of nonviolent resistance (Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005; Shin & Tusalem, 2007; Johnstad, 2010), the NAVCO dataset is the first to have the outcome of civil resistance as the specific focus of enquiry. The central finding from the NAVCO data, which has been widely reported, is that nonviolent campaigns seeking maximalist goals of regime change or secession since the end of the Second World War have been nearly twice as successful as violent campaigns (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, 7).

The NAVCO dataset includes campaigns that pursue radical goals of regime change, independence from foreign rule, or separatism, as well as some campaigns pursuing major social change, such as the South African anti-apartheid movement. Campaigns are defined as movements with a name or discernible leadership that involve the active participation of 1,000 people or more (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, 12-14); they are labelled nonviolent “based on the primacy of resistance methods employed”, i.e., using tactics that do not “directly threaten or harm the physical well-being of the opponent” (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011 [Web appendix], 4-5). Data is sourced from a survey of the nonviolent action literature, supported by scholarly consensus (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011 [Web appendix]). More recent versions of the dataset have disaggregated campaigns into country-year (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013) and event-based data (Chenoweth, Pinckney & Lewis, 2017).

The NAVCO dataset has formed the basis of a number of quantitative studies, addressing areas such as the correlates of campaign success (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Svensson & Lindgren, 2011a), the effects of nonviolent as opposed to violent resistance on
subsequent levels of democracy (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Bayer, Bethke & Lambach, 2016), factors prompting campaign onset (Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017), the choice between violent and nonviolent tactics (Cunningham, 2013; White et al., 2015), diffusion and contagion effects (Braithwaite, Braithwaite & Kucik, 2015; Gleditsch & Rivera, 2017), and the effects of violent repression on mobilisation (Anisin, 2016). Additional data collection efforts on civil resistance have addressed questions relating to democratic transitions (Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005; Shin & Tusalem, 2007; Johnstad, 2010), the effects of violent repression (Sutton, Butcher & Svensson, 2014), and gendered dimensions of nonviolent protest (Asal et al., 2013; Murdie & Peksen, 2015).

Existing research has highlighted several factors that play a role in explaining the outcome of civil resistance campaigns. Schock (2005), for example, argues that the ability for opposition groups to alternate between tactics of concentration (e.g., demonstrations) and dispersion (e.g., boycotts) is essential for the success of nonviolent action, as it allows the opposition to survive repression. Furthermore, Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson (2014) find that when repression does occur, a pre-existing campaign infrastructure including parallel media institutions helps activists to spread information about the government’s violent response, encouraging wider backlash against the regime. Nepstad (2011) concludes that nonviolent movements achieve success primarily by attracting security force defections, and that this is more likely when protestors maintain nonviolent discipline and are able to make moral and shared identity claims on security force personnel. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) emphasise the role of participation in campaigns, arguing that protest size is the strongest determinant of campaign success. Svensson and Lindgren (2011a) focus on ethnic divisions between protestors and the regime and the degree of ethnic polarisation in society as a whole, finding both factors to be correlated with decreased chances of opposition success.

2.1.2. Authoritarian regimes in civil resistance research

Yet despite this progress in understanding why campaigns succeed or fail, civil resistance research has to date failed to fully address the role of regimes themselves in determining the outcome of nonviolent uprisings. The majority of research on the topic focuses on understanding the opposition movement and examining “techniques of nonviolent action, strategic choice, and mechanisms through which nonviolent action produces social change” (Schock, 2013, 281). It strongly emphasises the agency of ordinary people, rooted in Sharp’s (1973; 1980; 1990) argument—discussed further below—that political power is derived from cooperation rather than being inherent in a person or position. Existing social structures thus may be altered and reconstructed by ordinary citizens, who are “capable of wielding great power even against ruthless rulers and military regimes” (Sharp, 1990, 18). In this view, political institutions and characteristics of the opponent are seen as comparatively unimportant. For scholars who have a normative commitment to nonviolence and wish to highlight the possibilities of nonviolent action and civil resistance this ‘voluntarist’ approach is desirable, as it emphasises human agency and
insists that change is possible under even the most difficult and repressive circumstances (cf. Mahoney & Snyder, 1999). It also serves as an important corrective to mainstream scholarship, which had been largely dismissive of the role of protest and the possibility of real bottom-up political change (Martin, 2015).

Despite its advantages, however, the heavy emphasis on the nonviolent opposition has neglected the fact that nonviolent action is inherently dyadic, involving strategic actors on both sides of the conflict. As a result, there has been a lack of attention paid to the characteristics and actions of authoritarian regimes and how these might affect the onset, growth, and outcome of civil resistance campaigns. In particular, analysis which draws on research on the internal structures of authoritarian rule and how these vary across cases has as yet remained largely absent. Foundational works address the nature of authoritarian power, but have little to say about authoritarian regimes themselves (e.g., Sharp, 1973; Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994; Sharp, 2005). An indicative example is McCarthy and Sharp’s (1997) annotated bibliography of works on relating to nonviolent action and civil resistance campaigns, which contains more than 2,700 entries but only two that directly address authoritarianism or authoritarian politics. This gap remains in more recent theoretically-oriented works, which either neglect these areas or focus on only the repressive tactics used by regimes (e.g., Schock, 2015; Nepstad, 2015a; Hallward & Norman, 2015; Vinthagen, 2015).

Some characteristics of authoritarian regimes have received attention in comparative qualitative work. Schock (2005), for example, uses regime type as an organising device, specifically including case studies of campaigns against monarchies and military regimes, but does not give variation across regimes a causal role in explaining campaign outcome. Nepstad (2011) cites some works in the authoritarianism literature, including Geddes (1999) and Way (2008), and emphasises that elite divisions in all of the cases she analyses were essential for opening up political space. However, she concludes that this factor cannot adequately explain campaign outcome. Instead she primarily focuses on proximate factors, particularly frontline interactions between protestors and security forces. In a subsequent study, Nepstad (2015b) focuses more specifically on the gap in understanding created by the one-sided focus on opposition actions by examining the range of counter-strategies that are used by non-democratic regimes to avert or repress mass challenges.

On the quantitative side, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 67-68) test whether campaign onset or outcome is associated with regime strength—both democratic and authoritarian—using the Correlates of War dataset’s Composite Index of National Capabilities, which measures population size, urbanisation, iron and steel production, energy consumption, and military expenditure and size. However, they do not find a statistically significant relationship, which in some respects is not surprising given the wide range of potential causal factors captured by such an aggregate measure. They also use the Polity scale, which measures levels of democracy from -10 (most non-democratic) to +10 (most democratic), to test for selection effects in campaign onset. They conclude that the success of nonviolent civil resistance compared to armed rebellion is not merely
a result of campaigns being more likely to challenge ‘softer’ (i.e., more democratic) targets, finding that more campaigns occur toward non-democratic end of the scale; they further find that Polity score is not significantly correlated with campaign outcome. The Polity scale is also used in other quantitative studies of civil resistance as an independent variable, typically controlling for outcomes in democracies versus autocracies (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011a; Cunningham, 2013; Sutton, Butcher & Svensson, 2014; Murdie & Peksen, 2015; Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Gleditsch & Rivera, 2017). However, issues with the way the Polity scale is constructed—particularly relating to coding decisions and the aggregation of many correlated variables into a single measure—mean that while it may be appropriate as a rough measure of overall democracy versus autocracy, it is less well suited to comparing different authoritarian regimes or aspects of authoritarian rule (see, for example, Gleditsch & Ward, 1997; Munck & Verkuilen, 2002; Treier & Jackman, 2008).

Other aspects of authoritarian rule have also been touched on in some previous quantitative works. For example, Celestino and Gleditsch (2013) and Gleditsch and Rivera (2017) include regime duration in regression analysis to control for possible changes in regime stability over time, and Bayer, Bethke and Lambach (2016) include whether a regime was based on military rule prior to a democratic transition to test for lingering effects on post-transition democracy. These characteristics, however, are treated primarily as control variables rather than important independent variables in their own right, with relatively little reference made to authoritarianism research. More relevant for this project, Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) include the regime leader’s time in power in one of the models they test for accuracy in predicting civil resistance onset and find mixed evidence regarding a relationship, but also do not relate this finding to theories of authoritarian rule. Braithwaite, Braithwaite, and Kucik (2015), in their study of how prior histories of protest influence campaign onset, include regime type based on the prominent Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) typology. They find that single party and monarchical regimes are less likely to experience campaign onset in a given year, a correlation that is statistically significant and consistent across a range of model specifications. They also include the leader’s time in power as a control variable, but do not find a strong and consistent correlation.

Two quantitative studies that address similar topics to this thesis more directly are Ulfelder (2005) and Teorell (2010). Ulfelder (2005) examines how different kinds of contentious collective action affect different regime types. Using Geddes’s (1999) tripartite division of regime types, he finds that single party and military regimes are more likely to break down in response to peaceful protests than personalist regimes. Teorell (2010) finds that authoritarian regimes with multiple political parties are more likely to democratise in response to peaceful protest than those in which only one party exists, arguing that this is due to the presence of a pre-existing opposition which can mobilise dissent. Both of these works make important contributions by considering the role of peaceful protest in democratisation, previously largely absent from quantitative studies of democratic transitions. However, as well as problems that arise from relying solely on regime typologies, discussed further below, the data source that both authors use
somewhat constrains the conclusions that can be drawn from these studies (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013).

The most relevant previous study for this thesis is Lee (2015). Examining the reasons why soldiers sometimes refuse to carry out orders to repress protestors, he argues that personalist regimes, where the autocratic leader has a high degree of personal control over the government, are more likely to experience security force defections during nonviolent uprisings. Using a comparative case study method, Lee argues that personalisation involves politicisation of the military by the autocrat—using methods such as making personal decisions about promotions, budgets, deployments, and force structures while favouring loyalists and purging officers who voice their disagreement—creates zero-sum competition within the armed forces. This causes grievances amongst officers who are excluded from access to power or are concerned about the cohesion of the armed forces, and who consequently become willing to refuse orders to carry out repression if an opposition movement presents itself as a credible alternative to the status quo.

Aside from Lee’s (2015) study, which informs the theoretical argument developed in detail below, it can thus be seen that relatively little direct attention has been paid to regimes from the perspective of authoritarianism theory in existing civil resistance research. Yet by focusing exclusively on opposition movements, existing research has neglected the important ways that action and outcomes of nonviolent campaigns are shaped by the authoritarian regimes they oppose. Indeed, regimes are precisely the formal and informal institutions that shape political conflict in authoritarian societies, including both the strategies that opposition activists pursue in challenging the government and how regime elites respond to these challenges (Geddes, Wright & Frantz, 2014; cf. Mahoney & Snyder, 1999). In a related field, Fjelde (2010) has argued that failure to recognise the heterogeneity of authoritarian regimes has led to mistaken conclusions about the predictors of armed civil conflict. Lack of consideration to variation in the political institutions faced by civil resistance campaigns in existing research is similarly likely to limit our understanding of why some regimes remain cohesive in the face of mass protest while others break down. As a result, I now turn to research on authoritarian politics to examine ways that findings from this field can address these gaps in the civil resistance literature.

2.2. Authoritarian politics

In recent years political science has come to embrace the comparative study of authoritarianism (Goode & Ahram, 2016). This has been spurred not only by the mixed

7 Chenoweth (2015) likewise notes that in the social movement literature, which is primarily concerned with explaining the emergence and growth of protest movements, consideration of regimes is also generally limited to democracy versus autocracy.
results of many of the democratic transitions that took place during the 1990s and 2000s and the rise or re-emergence of non-democratic powers such as Russia and China on the world stage, but also by the publication of new datasets and conceptual tools that can be used to examine the logic and functioning of authoritarian politics (e.g., Geddes, 1999; Gandhi, 2008; Svolik, 2012; Geddes, Wright & Frantz, 2014). While some are still sceptical about the empirical roots of these works and our ability to make generalisations as a result (Goode & Ahram, 2016), they have enabled scholars to examine the wide variety of non-democratic forms of government more systematically than had been possible in the past.

Within this body of research there are two broad approaches. The first I label the typological approach, which consists of classifying regimes into a number of categories and then examining how behaviours and outcomes vary between different regime types (e.g., Geddes, 1999; Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Geddes, Wright & Frantz, 2014). The second is the deductive approach, which uses game theory and formal models to analyse the incentives and behaviours of actors within the regime under different conditions (Gehlbach, Sonin & Svolik, 2016). As I draw on both approaches in the remainder of this thesis, I discuss each in turn before turning to developing the theoretical argument linking authoritarian politics to the outcome of civil resistance campaigns below.

2.2.1. Typological approach

The most common method of developing theories of authoritarianism has been the creation of regime typologies, which group different regimes together based on what are perceived to be their essential features. One of the earliest examples on record is Aristotle’s classification of government types into rule by one, few, or many, and differentiation between correct and deviant types of these (Politics, II, 3.7-14, 4.4-10). Of these, monarchic and oligarchic rule—by the one or the few, respectively—has been by far the most common, and the most commonly examined, throughout history.

In the twentieth century, prompted by the rise of Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and fascist Italy, a new theoretical approach to classifying regimes emerged in the concept of totalitarianism (Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1966; Arendt, 1967). This approach cast these kinds of government as a distinct category, emphasising the presence of a universalist and dominating ideology which guided all aspects of policy-making, the use of psychological terror to maintain control, and mass mobilisation of the population in support of the regime (Brooker, 2014). Although popular, the concept was challenged by subsequent scholars as being too restrictive in scope, being ideological rather than empirical, and overstating many of the main characteristics of the so-called totalitarian regimes (e.g., Rigby, 1972; Przeworski, 1991; Corner, 2009), causing the term to fall out of favour (Brooker, 2014).

Emerging dictatorships in the developing world after the Second World War and the subsequent wave of decolonisation led to the introduction of a new category,
authoritarianism (Brooker, 2014). Linz (1970 [1964]; 1973) introduced the term in a narrow sense to describe new, often military dictatorships that relied on depoliticisation rather than mass mobilisation to maintain control and gave a greater role to bureaucrats and the military than the totalitarian regimes. A further development was the differentiation of military and single party regimes, which focused on the institutions rather than the ideology or methods of rule (e.g., Huntington & Moore, 1970; Nordlinger, 1977; Brooker, 1995). Subsequently there has been a further shift towards identifying and understanding the different forms of authoritarian regime that lie in the difficult hybrid space between ‘pure’ dictatorship and democracy (Brooker, 2014). Svolik (2012, 23) notes that there has been a proliferation of studies that seek to classify various forms of “authoritarianism with adjectives”, or increasingly-refined subcategories of different types of dictatorial rule. These include sultanism and neopatrimonialism (Snyder, 1998; Chehabi & Linz, 1998; Brownlee, 2002), competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2002), electoral authoritarianism (Schedler, 2006), strongman and military council rule (Geddes, Frantz & Wright, 2014), bureaucratic authoritarianism (O'Donnell, 1973), patronal presidentialism (Hale, 2005), dynastic, inherited, and presidential monarchies (Brooker, 2014), amongst others.

In a highly influential review, Geddes (1999) proposes a more general typology based on the primary institution of rule within authoritarian regimes. She divides regimes into military, personal, single-party, or hybrids of two or all three types. In military regimes, a group of officers rules, often in the form of a junta or consultative council, and no one individual has independent decision-making power. Single-party regimes are similar, but the ruling group comes from a civilian political party. Under personalist regimes, decisions depend to a much greater extent on the discretion of the individual leader, while access to power and influence over policy is derived from personal connections to the leader rather than formal or bureaucratic means.

Other works have made use of Geddes’s typology, although some have added monarchy as a separate regime type. Escribà-Folch and Wright (2010) find that monarchies and personalist regimes are more vulnerable to international economic sanctions than military or single-party regimes, as they rely more heavily on patronage to maintain control. Escribà-Folch (2013a) finds that leaders of military regimes are more likely to be driven out of office if they use violent repression than single-party or personalist regimes. He also finds that personalist leaders are more likely to be killed or driven into exile in the event of regime collapse, leaders of monarchies and single-party regimes are less likely to be jailed, and in general military and single-party leaders are much less likely to be punished after a democratic transition (Escribà-Folch, 2013b). Frantz and Ezrow (2011) highlight the importance of regime type for determining leader survival, finding that elites in military and single-party regimes can remove regime leaders more easily than in personalist regimes due to the coordinating functions of their respective organisations and their higher degree of control over the military.

Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) retain the same broad categories, but add monarchies as a fourth category. They also label regimes in more detail within each category,
including hybrid types and additional classifiers such as oligarchy (e.g., Bolivia, 1946-1951), indirect military (e.g., El Salvador, 1982-1994), and ‘Iran’ for the theocracy that has been ruling there since 1979. Magaloni (2008) similarly departs from Geddes’s (1999) original typology by using party-based, military, and monarchy as her primary categories. Magaloni argues that all dictatorships exhibit some degree of personalism, which therefore ought to be treated as a variable attribute of different regime types rather than a defining characteristic of one category.\(^8\) Magaloni (2008) further categorises regimes by the number of parties they allow in politics: none, one, or multiple parties, arguing that parties can stabilise regimes they enable elites to credibly threaten defection if the dictator reneges on promises of rents, positions, or access to policy-making decisions (see also Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010; Magaloni, Chu & Min, 2013).

Although these regime typologies have been highly influential in research on authoritarianism, quantifying regimes based on qualitative dimensions such as where genuine political power lies (with an individual or with a collective party leadership, for example) and classifying heterogeneous institutional arrangements into limited categories is a challenging task, both theoretically and practically. As an example of the complexity involved, Shih, Shan, and Liu’s (2010) comprehensive analysis of the balance of power within just a single regime—the Chinese Communist Party—required compiling data on the complete career biographies and social ties of some 1,600 party members over 86 years of rule, a project which took three years to complete. This complexity is compounded by the secretive, opaque nature of authoritarian regimes, which actively broadcast misinformation about their internal affairs and strongly resist external scrutiny (Barros, 2016).

As a result, although typologies are a useful tool for studying dictatorships, there are some issues with the ways they are commonly used. For example, data collection projects typically rely on the judgement of non-country experts—often graduate students—who make coding decisions about dozens of different regimes over decades of authoritarian rule based primarily on secondary sources, a fact which has been argued to have resulted in misclassification of even very clear examples of particular regime types (Morgenbesser, 2018). Svolik (2012, 21) further argues that most typologies conflate “multiple, distinct conceptual dimensions of authoritarian politics” into single categories. The personalist/single-party/military distinction, for example, fails to recognise that aspects of each of these categories may be present in one regime, and that these do not represent mutually exclusive empirical boundaries. Snyder (2006) makes a similar point, arguing that typologies conflate disparate forms of government. As an example, within military regimes there can be significant variation in how directly they maintain control, whether through direct rule by a junta, the installation of a puppet government under military tutelage, or taking a role as a veto player and supporter of a civilian government (see also Svolik, 2012; Geddes, Frantz & Wright, 2014). Military regimes can also ‘civilianise’ themselves, with officers retiring in order to take up government positions but

\(^8\) Hadenius and Teorell (2007) and Svolik (2012) make similar points.
maintaining strong ties with the military establishment (Brooker, 2014). Classifying these kinds of regimes as one of military, single-party, or a military-party hybrid is thus difficult and runs the risk of treating very different political arrangements as being substantively the same.

2.2.2. Deductive approach

Thus, although typologies are still a useful starting point for generating insights about authoritarian politics by illustrating broad differences amongst regimes, an increasingly prominent alternative approach is the development of deductive formal models of authoritarian politics, which can generate testable implications for regime behaviour and survival as well as generate insights about opaque or unobservable internal features of regimes (Gehlbach, Sonin & Svolik, 2016). This approach attempts to explain the extraordinarily wide variety of authoritarian governments as parsimoniously as possible, showing how relatively minor variations along a few key dimensions of interest can have extensive repercussions for a range of regime characteristics (Svolik, 2012). Early works that approach the study of authoritarianism in this way include Tullock (1987), Wintrobe (1998), and Geddes (1999). Tullock (1987) points out that, despite enormous variety, authoritarian regimes have displayed consistent patterns of behaviour throughout history due to two core problems of authoritarian rule: gaining information about the likelihood of revolutionary plots and maintaining control over the military. Wintrobe (1998) similarly emphasises the security problems faced by dictators, arguing that they need to make an uncertain trade-off between using repression and cultivating loyalty in order to prevent rebellion, compounded by the lack of information popular and elite preferences due to the absence of signalling mechanisms such as competitive elections.

Geddes (1999) not only contributes the influential typology discussed above, but also uses a game-theoretic approach to understand internal regime conflict. She argues that factions in different kinds of government face systematically different incentives to challenge each other for an increased share of power, and that this is the main factor explaining varying outcomes for personalist, single party, and military regimes. Military regimes “carry within them the seeds of their own destruction” (Geddes, 1999, 122), as divisions within the leadership threaten the integrity of the military as a unified whole, encouraging them to relinquish power when divisions emerge. On the other hand, factions in single-party and personalist regimes are argued to be more durable because cadres have fewer options outside of staying in power, and therefore have strong incentives to work together or risk losing everything.

Game theory models of authoritarian politics have become increasingly sophisticated, incorporating insights from economics and formal modelling of democratic politics (Gehlbach, Sonin & Svolik, 2016). A number of areas have been addressed, including how institutions can be used to distribute rents and co-opt potential opposition (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Gandhi, 2008) and economic performance and the consequences of economic policy for regime survival (Boix, 2003; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003;
Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005; Besley & Kudamatsu, 2007; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2009). Another relevant area examines determinants and effects of repression (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2010; Larcom, Sarr & Willems, 2014a, 2014b). Most important for this research project are the fundamentally important roles information, commitment, and coordination problems that have been highlighted by formal research on authoritarian politics (Myerson, 2008; Magaloni, 2008; Acemoglu, Egorov & Sonin, 2009; Svolik, 2009, 2012; Egorov & Sonin, 2011; Boix & Svolik, 2013; Edmond, 2014).

A major advantage of this approach is that it provides a solution, albeit an imperfect one, for pervasive information problems caused by the opacity of authoritarian politics. While acknowledging the limitations of deductive modelling, which is based on indirect evidence and implications rather than direct observation of internal processes (Goode & Ahram, 2016), the results can then provide a basis for theory-building and further analysis by highlighting how regimes should behave, given certain starting assumptions. Although the actual models themselves may prove to be based on evidence that is limited or equivocal, they can direct the researcher’s attention away from obvious but perhaps superficial or overly simplistic explanations for certain regime outcomes towards more productive areas of inquiry. Hence, while the typological approach provides the initial foundation for thinking about the connection between authoritarian politics and civil resistance, I base the theoretical argument in this thesis primarily on the deductive approach. In the next section I explore how problems of coordination, commitment, and information within the ruling coalition may affect the outcome of civil resistance campaigns. I then argue that conflict between elites and the autocrat that come about because of these problems can help to explain why some civil resistance succeed in causing authoritarian regimes to break down, while in other cases elites remain cohesive and movements are effectively repressed.

### 2.3. Theory: Personal autocracy and civil resistance outcome

The previous sections have argued that while civil resistance research has generated important insights about how nonviolent campaigns succeed or fail, it has largely been one-sided in its focus on opposition tactics and strategies at the expense of considering how the characteristics of authoritarian regimes influence campaign outcomes. In this section I develop a theoretical framework which addresses this gap by connecting internal power struggles between dictators and their allies within the regime to the outcome of civil resistance campaigns. I classify regimes as either power-sharing regimes, where autocrats are limited in their authority and discretion to act by the need to take competing interests within the ruling group into account, or personal autocracies, where the autocrat has largely superseded these constraints and gained individual control over the regime. In personal autocracies many political elites would prefer an alternative to the status quo that better protected their interests, but face severe coordination problems that make it difficult to act collectively against the autocrat. Under these conditions, I argue that the emergence of a civil resistance campaign creates an exogenous crisis which changes elites’ decision-making calculus, encouraging them to withdraw their support from the autocrat.
in favour of an alternative regime. In contrast, power-sharing regimes give political elites a stronger stake in the regime’s continued survival, encouraging them to remain cohesive in the face of an external challenge. Hence I conclude that, all else being equal, civil resistance campaigns which aim at regime change should be more likely to succeed against personal autocracies than power-sharing regimes, an argument which has important implications for how civil resistance is studied and understood.

The section begins by defining political power as it is conceptualised in this thesis and linking this to the basic structure of authoritarian regimes. I describe the power-sharing and personal forms of authoritarian rule, showing how the former can break down into the latter if the autocrat succeeds in personalising power as well as explaining why the autocrat should be motivated to do so. I then explain in more detail how this fundamental shift in the balance of power influences the outcome of civil resistance campaigns, particularly focusing on how mass nonviolent protests can help elites to overcome their coordination dilemma by creating a crisis that allows room for communication and manoeuvre.

2.3.1. Political power and authoritarian rule

Power is a contested concept in social and political theory, with discussions over its meaning often featuring “deep, widespread, and seemingly intractable disagreements” (Allen, 2016, §1). One of the key distinctions is whether power is seen as power-over, meaning the ability to control other people’s actions, or power-to, meaning the capacity to act or do something. Another is whether power is what Allen (2016) labels ‘action-theoretical’, that is, an actual action or disposition that is done or exercised instrumentally by individuals, or whether it is systemic, structuring possibilities for action or (more radically) playing a role in creating social reality. Yet while power-to and systemic understandings of power may be useful for other areas of inquiry, in this thesis I adopt an action-theoretical, power-over understanding, consistent with what might be called a broadly realist view of political power. That is, I conceive of power in authoritarian politics as the ability to influence or direct the actions of others through actual coercion, or the overt or implied threat of it, whether this occurs through institutional channels or otherwise. This echoes Sharp’s (1980, 27) view of political power as “the totality of means, influences, and pressures—including authority, rewards, and sanctions—available for use to achieve the objectives of the power-holder”, with these means typically including the ability to mobilise supporters, control over economic resources, and control over coercive resources such as security forces. In this ‘non-utopian’ view, power is seen as
real and inescapable, and the struggle over who wields power is the basic problem of politics (Sharp, 1973).9

Sharp’s (1973; 1980; 1990) theory of political power further differentiates between monolithic and pluralistic understandings. The monolithic view is that power emanates from the top of the government and is imposed on those who are ruled, who themselves are dependent on the good will and decisions of the rulers. In this view, which Sharp characterises as the traditional understanding of power and one shared by many violent revolutionaries, political power is solid, unchanging, and can only be defeated using destructive, violent means. Drawing on 16th century French philosopher Étienne de la Boétie (1942 [1576]), Sharp instead argues for a pluralistic view, in which power is understood to be not inherent in the person or position of the ruler but originates in the cooperation and quiescence of those who are ruled. This conceptualisation is derived from the observation that a single individual cannot enact or enforce decrees, carry out repression, or collect enough revenue to maintain the operation of government; these actions require the cooperation or compliance of agents of the ruler. Absent that cooperation, it cannot be said that the ruler has any meaningful power to enforce their will over the will of others at the societal level at all. Hence the removal of cooperation or compliance does not challenge the ruler’s power, but actually consists of removing that power itself. This understanding of power as pluralistic is common in work on civil resistance, and is the one I adopt in this thesis.10

When it comes to authoritarian regimes, the pluralist nature of power implies that no dictator is capable of governing alone. Instead, rulers must rely on the active support of a greater or lesser portion of society to have their will enforced. Within this broad network is the autocrat’s core group of supporters, the ruling coalition (Svolik, 2012, 57).11 The makeup of this coalition varies across cases: in the early part of Ferdinand Marcos’s rule of the Philippines, for example, he needed the support of landed aristocrats whose wealth and power came from agricultural production (Wurfel, 1988), while South Korea’s Chun Doo-Hwan seized power with the backing of his classmates from the Korea Military Academy (Moon & Rhyu, 2011), and monarchies in Persian Gulf states such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia rely on sprawling royal families which dominate government institutions (Herb, 1999). Likewise, the power of this elite group can be based in economic wealth, troops under command, an ability to gain the support of various social groups through ethnic, family, or other network ties, or other large networks of loyal followers who can

9 Although Sharp does not explicitly address only non-democracies, his theory of political power is obviously targeted at these forms of government, as implied by the title of his 2005 work From Dictatorship to Democracy.

10 As alluded to above, this model of political power is most suited for describing authoritarian forms of government where there is a clear ruler; Sharp’s theory is less appropriate for describing more systemic or structural kinds of domination, such as sexism, racism, or classism (Martin, 1989).

11 The term ruling coalition is analogous to the term winning coalition used in selectorate theory to refer to democracies as well as dictatorships (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).
be used to administer rule (Svolik, 2012). Regardless of their individual makeup, however, in all cases autocrats rely on their ruling coalition to manage government institutions, enact policy decisions, and coerce opponents; without this active support, the leader's survival in office is impossible.

Although autocrats need ruling coalitions in order to hold power, their relationship with their elite allies is undermined by the “distinctively dismal conditions” of authoritarian rule (Svolik, 2012, 20). In democracies, leaders are elected through free, competitive elections under institutions and rules that are clear, well-defined, and knowable to everyone who takes part (Alvarez et al., 1996). In dictatorships, however, institutions and the ‘rules of the game’ are typically unclear and contested, with much of political life taking place through non-institutional channels—and the use of violence to resolve disputes or gain personal advantage always a possibility (Gehlbach, Sonin & Svolik, 2016). Furthermore, by definition there are no institutions outside the ruling group that are independently powerful and capable of guaranteeing elite agreements with a credible threat to punish breaches (Myerson, 2008).

As a result of these conditions, intra-elite conflict always remains a possibility under authoritarian rule, and even in well-established regimes behind-the-scenes manoeuvring can threaten the status quo distribution of power. Chinese president Xi Jinping's recent moves to subvert limits on his position after decades of apparently stable collective rule by the Chinese Communist Party is a clear demonstration of the indeterminacy and unpredictability that underlies even apparently settled authoritarian systems (see, e.g., Shirik, 2018). Indeed, internal struggles for power pose the biggest threat to the survival of rulers in office: from 1946-2008, 68% of all autocrats who lost power in an irregular manner did so because they were forcibly removed by disgruntled regime insiders, including members of the inner circle, government, or security forces, far outnumbering those who lost office due to popular uprisings (11%), democratic transitions (10%), assassination (7%), or foreign intervention (5%) (Svolik, 2012, 5; see also Frantz & Ezrow, 2011).

### 2.3.2. Power-sharing and personal autocracy

The conflictual relationship between autocrats and their elite allies forms the basis of the theoretical framework that I develop in this thesis to explain how variation across authoritarian regimes influences the outcome of nonviolent uprisings. I divide authoritarian regimes into power-sharing regimes and personal autocracies. Unlike much recent work in comparative authoritarianism, which focuses on either classifying regimes into one of several ideal types or analysing the institutions of rule, I instead focus on elite-level power politics within the regime, irrespective of institutional variation—which, as Pepinsky (2014) points out, may be a cause of political outcomes in authoritarian states, but is also often itself an outcome of elite behaviour. I thus distinguish between the two regime types based on where the balance of power lies between the autocrat and the ruling coalition. An advantage of this approach is that it is based on a characteristic that is...
common to all authoritarian regimes, and hence not limited by institutional makeup, geographical location, or time period (cf. Geddes, 2003). Another advantage is that measuring a single dimension of authoritarian rule makes it easier to capture shifts in internal regime dynamics over time than approaches which rely on aggregating multiple measures across different, potentially incommensurable regime dimensions (Svolik, 2012; Baturo & Elkink, 2016), or which require substantive changes in institutional makeup to identify shifts between regime types (cf. Morgenbesser, 2018).

The following section defines the two regime types and describes the key indicators which I use to identify them. I explain how power-sharing regimes can transition to personal autocracies due to the ruler’s successful capture of power and avoidance of elite rebellion. I also explain the connection between time in power and the establishment of personal autocracy which I use as an indirect indicator in Chapter 4, the quantitative component of this study. I then link the variation between these two regime types to the outcome of civil resistance campaigns, particularly emphasising the effect of the establishment of personal autocracy on elites’ incentives to support the incumbent versus an alternative to the status quo. The causal pathway linking regime type to civil resistance outcome is summarised in Figure 2.1, with the definitions and indicators for each regime types summarised in Table 2.1 (next page).

Figure 2.1: Summary of causal argument

**Power-sharing**

| Elites prefer status quo | Campaign onset | Elites actively support ruler | Campaign failure |

**Personal autocracy**

| Elites prefer alternative | Rebellion prevented | Campaign onset | Elites do not support ruler | Campaign success |
### Table 2.1: Summary of theoretical framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power-sharing regime</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<td></td>
<td>The ruler is effectively constrained by competing centres of power within the ruling coalition</td>
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#### Indicators

**Direct**
- Rival elite coalitions present
- Autonomous decision-making institutions present
- Factional balance of control over high-level appointments
- Limits on leader tenure

**Indirect**
- Short leader tenure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal autocracy</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The ruler has successfully eliminated constraints from within the ruling coalition</td>
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#### Indicators

**Direct**
- Absence of rival elite coalitions
- Absence of autonomous decision-making institutions
- Leader has personal control over high-level appointments
- Limits on leader tenure extended, subverted, or eliminated

**Indirect**
- Long leader tenure
Power-sharing

I define power-sharing regimes as those in which autocrats are effectively constrained in their decision-making ability, coercive power, and direct control over the distribution of resources in authoritarian regimes by competing centres of power within the ruling coalition. The presence of these internal constraints means that autocrats are not able to act entirely as they see fit; while their power to implement decisions outside the regime may be extensive, within the regime they must listen to and take other interests into account. These centres of power can include individual rivals, autonomous institutions, or less formal groupings such as factions based on personal networks, ideological stance, shared history, or a range of other shared characteristics and interests (e.g., Treiwes, 2001). The exact picture is obviously highly context-specific, depending on the history and institutional makeup of the regime in question. But what power-sharing regimes have in common is that the autocrat must maintain a balance between their own interests and those of powerful rivals who retain influence over decision-making, thus limiting the autocrat’s individual authority and discretion to act (Svolik, 2012; cf. Jackson & Rosberg, 1982).

In order to maintain the support of competing centres of influence, autocrats in power-sharing regimes agree, willingly or not, to distribute the benefits of rule. These include not only opportunities for corruption, exploitation of natural resources, monopoly rights, or access to economic rents—all of which can be extremely lucrative—but also influence over decision-making and government policy, which can be used to encourage favourable legislation or prevent policies that would negatively impact individual or group interests within the regime (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Influential members of the ruling coalition could, for example, be given autonomy in operating ministries or governing regions, including in determining policy and making appointments, or retain veto powers over important executive decisions. Such agreements can involve an explicit contract, as in the case of the institutional arrangements hammered out by the Argentinian junta in the months before the 1976 coup (Fontana, 1987). Perhaps more commonly, though, the agreement is implicit, emerging as a pragmatic response to the status quo distribution of power and the autocrat’s inability or unwillingness to eliminate other influential elites (e.g., Barros, 2001).

Although direct observation of the power balance between autocrats and ruling coalitions is difficult due to the opaque nature of authoritarian politics (Svolik, 2012; Baturo & Elkink, 2016), there are a number of empirical indicators that signal that a regime is likely to be a power-sharing one. Autonomous decision-making institutions such as legislatures, ruling councils, juntas, or politburos—where they remain genuinely independent—constrain rulers’ ability to implement major policy changes by forcing them to work through formal rules or informal norms about collective decision-making processes, thus requiring the agreement of at least a substantial portion of the political elite for any initiatives (e.g., Slater, 2003; Gandhi, 2008). Regular face-to-face interaction amongst the elite in these institutions also aids monitoring the power-sharing bargain by facilitating intra-elitist communication and providing clear evidence that other elites are not being eliminated, for example (Svolik, 2012). Second, the presence of rival elite coalitions in the
regime similarly necessitates compromise in policy-making, as decisions running counter to their collective interests could otherwise provoke a challenge to the ruler’s authority (cf. Jackson & Rosberg, 1982).

A third indicator is shared control over appointments at the top levels of government. Autocrats that have extensive control over hiring and firing are able to grow their power base by appointing loyalists to key positions and stacking government ministries with their supporters while purging those of opponents (e.g., Slater, 2003; Baturo & Elkink, 2016; Morgenbesser, 2018). In contrast, where a balance of appointments is maintained, particularly with rival factions, rulers are limited in their ability to implement decisions without gaining the ruling coalition’s support or to undermine rivals’ bases of support.

The final key indicator of power-sharing is the presence of constitutional or other institutionalised term limits on the incumbent’s time in power, which can include limits on length of tenure and how many times a leader can be re-elected or appointed, as well as mandatory or informal retirement ages (e.g., Lee, 2015). Undermining power-sharing arrangements to consolidate individual power requires careful manoeuvring and building support, and hence is not usually quick process; arguably, several years in power would be a minimum timeframe for any ruler to fully establish their personal dominance over the ruling coalition (see, e.g., Svolik, 2012, 77). Hence, functioning term limits—which often consist of one or two terms of 4-7 years in duration (Baturo, 2014, 31)—limit the time that any individual leader has to become so powerful that they cannot be constrained by the ruling coalition. Attempts by the autocrat to make their position permanent would further send a strong signal that their primary goal is the consolidation of their personal power without regard for the interests of the political elite, making surreptitious personalisation of the regime more challenging (cf. Baturo & Elkink, 2016).

Note that in each case constraints need to actually function to be considered indicators of power-sharing; the mere existence of a legislature, for example, is not sufficient for a regime to be classified as power-sharing if it has been essentially gutted and so does not actually constrain the autocrat’s decision-making abilities. Indeed, many institutions found in power-sharing regimes can also be identified in personal autocracies, albeit in a reduced form, as they assist the autocrat in implementing policy and carrying out repression (Slater, 2003). Even ostensible compliance with term limits do not always mean that power-sharing remains in place: for instance, Vladmir Putin, who has substantially personalised power in Russia since the late 2000s, technically complied with term limits when he stepped down from the presidency in 2008, but worked around this by taking the office of prime minister instead and placing a compliant protégé in the presidency without meaningfully giving up power (Svolik, 2012; Baturo & Elkink, 2016). Neither are these indicators strictly necessary to classify a regime as power-sharing; in some cases, idiosyncratic institutions or channels such as the family decision-making processes of the dynastic monarchies in the Arab Gulf identified by Herb (1999) may operate as the main limitation on the autocrat’s authority. The most important criterion of a power-sharing regime is thus that the ruling coalition is actually able to constrain the
autocrat and hence force the autocrat to take their interests into account when exercising power.

**Personal autocracy**

In direct contrast to power-sharing regimes, I define personal autocracies as those in which autocrats have successfully eliminated constraints on their decision-making authority, control over coercive power, and control over the distribution of resources. As a result of the lack of internal constraints on their position, rulers in personal autocracies are not obliged to take competing interests within the regime into account; while they may still make decisions that are of benefit to major allies, these decisions are far more discretionary, not made as a result of a need to placate competing interests. Rulers are hence able to act autonomously of rules-based decision-making procedures, institutional constraints, or other kinds of limitations (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Chehabi and Linz, 1998). The career of Mao Zedong as described by Teiwes (2001, 79) illustrates the contrast between power-sharing and personal autocracy clearly:

The PRC under Mao can essentially be divided between the period before 1958 when the Chairman listened to interests within the system and sought results that took those interests into account [...] and the subsequent "later Mao" period when he simply overrode interests, or compromised with them because of the dire state of the nation and/or because he had no clear idea of what to do. [...] In the latter period, in both the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, Mao designed courses of action profoundly inimical to institutional interests.

Other paradigmatic examples of personal autocracies include the regimes led by Josef Stalin, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, Hafez al-Asad, Saddam Hussein, Mobutu Sese Seko, Nicolae Ceaușescu, Mohammed Reza Shah, and Suharto, amongst others; that many of these are household names attests to the dominance that they achieved over their respective countries. Under these conditions elites’ positions become threatened and tenuous, as even those who remain loyal to the autocrat must jockey for position; politics becomes a zero-sum competition for the autocrat’s favour, involving winners and losers, although the current ‘in group’ may change at any time (Lee, 2015).

Although I use the term personal autocracy, this concept is closely related to the concept of personalism—that is, the dominance of an individual ruler over a regime—which is widely used in research on comparative authoritarianism (e.g., Jackson & Rosberg, 1982; Geddes, 1999; Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Geddes, Wright, & Frantz, 2014; Lee, 2015). A number of empirical indicators that can be used to identify personalist regimes are commonly highlighted. First, while in non-personalist regimes autocrats are limited by the need to gain the support of rival elite coalitions and autonomous institutions, in personalist regimes these centres of power are either absent or ineffective (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982). Rival elite coalitions, for example, may have lost key members or been bypassed with the creation of new government institutions stacked with loyalists. Legislatures typically remain in place—the vast majority of modern authoritarian regimes
retain legislatures (Svolik, 2012)—but are reduced to ‘rubber stamps’, with no real authority or ability to block the ruler’s favoured legislation. Similarly, consolidating personal control over appointments allows autocrats to dominate government by sidelining major rivals and replacing them with obedient loyalists; this is often accompanied by expanding the autocrat’s own patronage network down through lower levels of government while marginalising the clients of rival elites (Baturo & Elkink, 2016; Morgenbesser, 2018). The final and perhaps most overt indicator of personalism is the extension or elimination of term limits on the leader’s tenure (Brooker, 2014). This signals that the regime has become less important than the individual ruler (e.g., Svolik, 2012; Baturo, 2014); indeed, constitutional amendments to extend or eliminate term limits are often accompanied with an implicit threat of chaos and disorder if the leader were to leave.

The dominance of an individual leader is particularly obvious when constitutions are amended to make the ruler ‘president for life’, or even a new monarch, such as ‘Emperor of Central Africa’ Jean-Bédel Bokassa of the Central African Republic. Likewise, the establishment of a personality cult, in which the autocrat’s image dominates public space and leaders claim superhuman, divine, or supernatural powers, signals the association of the regime with a single powerful individual. Both of these latter indicators, however, primarily occur at some point after the consolidation of personal rule, rather than constituting that consolidation itself, and so are of less usefulness in clearly distinguishing between personal autocracy and power-sharing (cf. Svolik, 2012).

As noted, however, I specifically use the term personal autocracy to distinguish the definition I develop here from the more common usage of personalism. As Svolik (2012) has pointed out, the commonly-used definition of personalism conflates two conceptually distinct aspects of authoritarian politics, namely (1) the ruler’s power relative to the ruling coalition and (2) the method by which power is exercised, particularly when this is through patron-client relationships rather than formal institutions. Because it relies on multiple regime measures, the concept of personalism as it is used in prominent typologies such as Geddes (1999) and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) also has difficulty capturing changes in key indicators over time, especially when the consolidation of power is gradual rather than sudden and overt (e.g., Baturo & Elkink, 2016; Morgenbesser, 2018). Hence, I use the term personal autocracy to refer specifically to cases where rulers have consolidated personal power relative to the ruling coalition, regardless of whether this power is primarily exercised through institutional or noninstitutional means.

Even under personal autocracy elites retain some power within the regime, as autocrats still need cooperation to have their will enforced, and governments need ministers to administer laws, repress opponents, and collect taxes. Indeed, autocrats may never be entirely free of constraint in a more general sense, as they remain limited by the capacity of the regime to actually implement legislation, lack of resources, powerful neighbours, or other practical considerations (cf. Slater, 2003). Influential rivals and their supporters may thus still be tolerated within the ruling coalition. For example, during Mao Zedong’s
period of rule as the absolute leader of China, the proportion of the all-important Central Committee made up of his supporters was in fact surprisingly limited, with his loyalists making up at most 60% of its membership, and the balance being supporters of other figures in the party leadership (Shih, Shan & Liu, 2010, 90). Nevertheless, he was clearly dominant, determining who was allowed to have influence and who was not, giving his blessing for key allies to stack the committee with supporters or vetoing proposals to alter the balance of power (Shih, Shan & Liu, 2010).

Personal autocracies are thus characterised by a fundamentally different relationship between the ruling coalition and the autocrat. Under power-sharing, members of the ruling coalition maintain independent bases of support and horizontal ties with one another which are facilitated by power-sharing institutions and allow them to monitor the agreement and coordinate to remove the autocrat in the event of power-grabs. Under personal autocracy, by contrast, these ties have been weakened to the point that the elite has become largely atomised; that is, individuals are still in place, and can still wield a substantial amount of power within their bailiwick, but are unable to coordinate it with others. Although as a group they retain influence, the overwhelming perception is that any individual is not necessary, and can be removed from the ruling coalition entirely at the autocrat’s whim (Svolik, 2012). As a result, elites face a severe collective action problem, as an attempt to build a strong enough coalition to challenge the autocrat is likely to be met with harsh reprisals.

### 2.3.3. Establishment of personal rule

How and why do rulers establish personal autocracy? It is assumed here that authoritarian regimes begin as power-sharing regimes when they are established or when a new leader takes power. As Geddes (2004) argues, taking power requires coordinated and costly action by the autocrat’s supporters, who must be convinced to provide this support with the promise of future benefits. And as Myerson (2008) points out, a would-be autocrat who could not at least partly commit to sharing the benefits of rule once successful would not be able to motivate allies to engage in the costly action involved, and so would fail in the bid to take power in the first place. This is obviously so for violent revolutions and coups d’état, where the personal costs of taking part are typically substantial. It is also the case when the autocrat takes power in the context of an existing regime, such as by achieving the nomination of a dominant party, as potential supporters must be convinced to support the autocrat and not an alternative challenger. Even in the case of inherited dynasties where power has passed from father to son, such as Syria under the al-Asads or North Korea under the Kims, succession involves factional struggles between those who support the designated heir and those who would prefer an alternative. The transfer of power from Hafiz al-Asad to his son Bashar, for example, required six and a half years of building support within the military and security apparatus (Leverett, 2005). Even with these efforts, Bashar had an “authority gap” and a “less hierarchical relationship” with the ruling coalition than his father, being limited by the need to maintain the support of entrenched members of the elite and fend off
challenges from opportunistic rivals for at least the first few years of his rule (Leverett, 2005, 30). The transfer of power from one leader to another, regardless of how it takes place, thus ‘resets the clock’, re-establishing power-sharing in some form as incoming leaders have to rely more heavily on the support of the ruling coalition than their predecessor.

Although power-sharing agreements are ubiquitous in the early stages of authoritarian regimes, underlying tensions between rulers and ruling coalitions mean that it is possible for them to break down (Geddes, 1999; Svolik, 2012). In particular, the lack of independent guarantees of elite agreements means that power-sharing is characterised by a commitment problem on the part of the autocrat, as it is in principle possible that they could subvert the agreement at their allies’ expense without being punished. Indeed, the possibility that the autocrat will opportunistically attempt to acquire more power in relation to the ruling coalition poses the biggest threat to power-sharing agreements (Svolik, 2012). Resolving this fundamental conflict of interest so that it does not lead to regime-destabilising internal conflict is a central problem of authoritarian rule (e.g., Myerson, 2008; Magaloni, 2008; Frantz & Ezrow, 2011; Svolik, 2012).

There are two main reasons why autocrats might try to subvert power-sharing agreements. The first is that because less active support is needed to maintain the status quo than to seize power, autocrats are able to increase the benefits of holding power for themselves by reneging on their promise to distribute resources with some members of the ruling coalition (cf. Geddes, 2004). This is the logic of minimum winning coalitions: the more supporters who need to be satisfied with resources, the less resources there are to go around. Conversely, if autocrats marginalise some members of the ruling coalition, they can retain a greater portion of the benefits for themselves and other remaining members, which can be used in pursuit of further consolidation of power or for private consumption (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; cf. Riker, 1962). This motivation applies just as much to influence over decision-making and policy as it does actual monetary resources, as reducing the number of powerful rivals who need to be contended with makes it easier for the autocrat to pursue their policy objectives without the need to take other interests into account.

A second reason is that delegating authority over social, political, military, and economic resources carries with it an inherent principal-agent problem. That is, although delegating authority is necessary for continued governance as well as obtaining elite support, that same authority could be used to build up an independent power base capable of challenging the autocrat’s position (Svolik, 2012). Compounding this problem is the ‘dictator’s dilemma’: ambitious lieutenants may be plotting to overthrow the autocrat, yet the heavy cost of being detected—at best, demotion or imprisonment, at worst, execution—means that they have strong incentives to keep this hidden (Wintrobe, 1998). This, together with the extremely large rewards that can go to the winners of intra-regime power struggles, means that autocrats under conditions of power-sharing can never be entirely sure that subordinates are not plotting rebellion (Wintrobe, 1998; Egorov & Sonin, 2010). Autocrats therefore have incentives to avert this possibility by decreasing
this delegated authority to prevent alternative power centres from forming within the regime.

Moves to acquire more power, or power grabs, can be sudden, violent, and overt, such as Ferdinand Marcos's declaration of martial law and ensuing crackdown on opponents in 1972 in the Philippines, or Saddam Hussein's dramatic purge of the Iraqi Baath party in 1979. In other cases, autocrats can capitalise on unexpected opportunities, such as Rafael Trujillo's use of emergency powers granted in response to a cyclone hitting Santo Domingo to later consolidate his position (Hartlyn, 1998). Overt power grabs may include tactics such as removing constitutional term limits or becoming 'president for life', gaining sweeping decree powers that override legislative institutions, or carrying out purges to remove political rivals. But just as often the consolidation of power is gradual and less likely to trigger resistance from the ruling coalition. Stalin's rise to power is a classic example of this, as he gradually defeated potential challengers for his position and brought government institutions under his control in the 1920s and early 1930s. Although some of his allies sounded warnings, his actions were not clear enough to prompt the rest to remove him, until the purges of the 1930s removed any possibility of elite resistance (Suny, 1998). These tactics often involve what Slater (2003) labels 'stacking, rigging, and circumventing'; that is, filling offices and core ministries with supporters, modifying internal rules to serve the autocrat's interests—without outright eliminating or overriding them—and creating alternative institutional channels to divert resources and decision-making authority away from institutions controlled by rivals towards loyalists.

Why are elites not able to prevent the establishment of personal rule and maintain the power-sharing agreement in the first place? After all, obviously it would be preferable to maintain shared control over sources of revenue and influence over decision-making. Even for loyalists, power-grabs bring risk as autocrats have a well-known tendency to turn on their former allies if the need arises. The primary method elites have to prevent personalisation is to rebel, withdrawing their support and making a coordinated attempt to remove the autocrat from power via a coup d'état or other relatively limited internal rebellion (Frantz & Ezrow, 2011; Svolik, 2012). Indeed, as mentioned earlier, this is the most common way that dictators are forced from office, with around two thirds of all non-constitutional exits from power of authoritarian leaders being due to coups.

Yet although common, rebellion is still a drastic response to perceived power grabs, particularly where the autocrat’s intentions are not entirely clear (Svolik, 2012). Even discussing a plan to carry out a coup may bring serious consequences for those involved if exposed, while a failed attempt can result in penalties ranging from imprisonment to death. In many regimes, too, an extremely high value is placed on maintaining the outward appearance of unity and cohesion, even if internal struggles are rife, a factor that may be particularly salient when they face potential existential threats from external forces (e.g., Treiwes, 2001). This 'hang together or hang separately' mentality may also act as an obstacle to elite rebellion, even if there is a high estimated chance of success, because of the possibility that exposing internal divisions will destabilise the regime as a whole.
Furthermore, while successive power-grabs send increasingly clear signals of an intent to subvert the power-sharing agreement, they also increase the autocrat’s ability to deter challenges from within the ruling coalition (Svolik, 2012). There are a number of mechanisms involved. For example, targeted purges remove influential elites who would otherwise have to be bargained with, but who would also be able to act as focal points for coordination; circumventing rival institutions reduces the resources that they could bring to bear against the autocrat; and stacking rival ministries with loyalists or rotating ministry heads who may show signs of independence makes it more difficult for those institutions to be used as independent spaces for coordination (e.g., Jackson & Rosberg, 1982; Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Slater, 2003). Control over appointments and resource distribution within the ruling coalition, and the threat of their withdrawal, also increases the potential cost of expressing dissent or criticism of the autocrat and makes it more difficult for elites to signal to each other that there is wide support for an alternative to the status quo, thus increasing the difficulty of initiating a challenge (cf. Kuran, 1995).

At the same time, autocrats also gain more control over ‘carrots’, using their increasing discretion over patronage flows to enrich those who support their rule.

Particularly important is that power grabs increase the autocrat’s ability to punish individual members of the elite. Autocrats frequently establish separate security and intelligence units, which report to them personally and are often headed by family members or very close allies, in order to increase the likelihood that plots are detected or defeated. Personal control over coercive agencies as well as the ability to overcome institutional constraints on draconian punishments dramatically increases the potential consequences of attempting to initiate or taking part in a failed rebellion. Once a certain level of personal power has been reached, the expected cost of a failed rebellion, together with the difficulties in initiating one and the probability that it will be defeated, then becomes greater than the benefit of remaining loyal, even taking into account the possibility that any individual may be marginalised within the ruling coalition in the future (Geddes, 1999; Svolik, 2012).

The situation resembles a multiperson stag hunt in game theory: the ruling coalition would be better off removing the autocrat and re-establishing a power-sharing regime, and because of the pluralistic nature of political power and the consequent reliance of the autocrat on cooperation to remain in office, it can be assumed that this would be possible were a sufficiently high proportion of the ruling coalition to rebel. Yet individual rebels face extremely high costs if others do not take part, while smaller—yet non-zero—benefits still accrue to individuals who remain loyal. As a result, because there is uncertainty about whether others will rebel, and because of the potentially extreme consequences if they do not, elites will prefer to make the safer choice of remaining loyal, leaving the regime in an equilibrium state where elites choose to tolerate the status quo distribution of power.

Finally, it should also be noted that personalisation of power is expected to be a one-way street. While personalisation is possible because elites are uncertain about the autocrat’s intentions (Svolik, 2012), once personal autocracy has been established, it is very clear to
the ruling coalition that the autocrat cannot be relied on to prioritise their interests. Following this point, the only way for the autocrat to credibly signal a return to power-sharing would be to give up a substantial degree of control over policy, coercion, and distribution of resources; however, this self-same power could be used by the ruling coalition—which is now very sure that the autocrat cannot be trusted—to initiate a rebellion. This obstacle to a return to power-sharing is similar to the dilemma faced by authoritarian leaders following democratisation, as highlighted by Sutter (1995): rulers who agree to hand over power in exchange for amnesty are then vulnerable to retaliation by the new power-holders, as they have lost the only means of guaranteeing their pact. While it is possible for outgoing leaders to overcome the dilemma of democratisation, particularly where they retain control over security forces (Suffer, 1995), whether it is possible for autocrats to negotiate the dilemma of a return to power-sharing once personal rule has been consolidated is less clear. Hence, it is assumed here that once personal autocracy is established, it remains in place until the leader dies of natural causes, is forced to retire or negotiate a succession due to ill health, or is removed from power by exogenous causes such as foreign intervention, assassination, or nonviolent uprising (cf. Svolik, 2012).

2.3.4. Leader tenure and personal autocracy

As mentioned above, I differentiate between the concept of personal autocracy and that of personalism as it is commonly used in comparative authoritarianism research due in part to the problems that arise from classifying regimes using multiple distinct and potentially incommensurable measures. An additional problem with using personalism as it is measured in existing typologies is that the information problems associated with authoritarian secrecy—typically ignored in work on comparative authoritarianism (Goode & Ahram, 2016)—mean that classifications of regime type based on outsiders’ judgments are prone to error. Barros (2001, 2002), for example, has demonstrated that the common classification of Augusto Pinochet’s Chile as a personalist regime misses the underlying power-sharing arrangement that moderated his rule, while Morgenbesser (2018) similarly highlights errors in the classification of the Hun Sen regime in Cambodia in the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) dataset. Morgenbesser notes that the problem of authoritarian opacity is exacerbated by the practice of using trained but non-specialist coders, often graduate students, to make judgement calls about governments, with which they have little familiarity, on the basis of limited secondary sources.12

Datasets with more disaggregated regime indicators also pose challenges. For example, the ‘constraints on the executive’ variable in the Polity IV dataset suffers from consistency problems (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2014, 7), while a similar index in the Varieties of Democracy dataset (Coppedge et al., 2017, 61) is not able to effectively distinguish between personal autocracies such as the Philippines under Marcos and Indonesia under Suharto and power-sharing regimes such as China under Deng Xiaoping (see Lee, 2015).

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I address this second problem in two ways. The first is that I follow Art’s (2016) suggestion and validate the quantitative findings of Chapter 4 with in-depth case studies in Chapters 5 and 6. The second is that I also use an additional, indirect indicator of personal autocracy that can be used for cross-national comparison: the leader’s time in power (see Svolik, 2009; 2012, 72-76; cf. Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). As mentioned in Section 2.1.2, this indicator has been used in previous quantitative work on civil resistance but to date has not been grounded in theories of authoritarian politics, nor has it been treated as more than a control variable. Yet while it is perhaps less intuitively obvious how time in office relates to the underlying distribution of power, it has the advantage of being more unambiguous and clearly observable than the direct indicators listed above. I explain why time in power serves as an indirect indicator of personal autocracy as follows.

As discussed above, it is assumed here that authoritarian regimes begin life as power-sharing regimes, as agreeing to share power is required in order for an autocrat to take office in the first place. It can also be assumed that virtually all autocrats are ambitious; indeed, this borders on tautology, as it is hard to imagine how one could become a ruler in the cut-and-thrust world of authoritarian politics without being highly ambitious. Given this assumption, it is therefore the case that if an opportunity arises to make power grabs and consolidate personal rule a proportion of autocrats will attempt to do so, in order to both increase their personal benefit from holding power and eliminate the possibility of being removed from office by internal rebellion, as described above (see also Svolik, 2012). Although in many instances this will be met with an elite rebellion, ambitious autocrats are motivated to take the gamble because if they get away with it, they are in a much stronger position vis-à-vis the ruling coalition than would otherwise be the case.

Given these conditions, rulers have two choices that they can make. First, they can cooperate with the power-sharing agreement and not attempt to consolidate power. As explained above, power-sharing regimes typically feature limits on individual leader tenure, so autocrats who are unwilling or unable to personalise power will comply with these measures and step down when they are supposed to. In some cases this leads to relatively stable power-sharing regimes with regular leader turnover and shorter individual tenures, as seen in countries like Mexico during the PRI era where leadership changed hands every six years. Even if term limits are generous or absent, because the autocrat remains weaker than the ruling coalition it is also possible that elites will rebel and remove the autocrat for some other reason, such as economic mismanagement or a foreign policy disaster. While it is possible that a complying autocrat could remain in power for an extended period of time, especially where there are no formal or informal limits on their tenure, the combination of needing to maintain a balance amongst competing centres of power, avoid the temptation to opportunistically subvert the power-

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13 Svolik (2012, 63-78) develops this argument more analytically, using formal modelling, to show that it is more likely that authoritarian leaders with long tenures have survived in power by establishing personal autocracy.
sharing agreement for significant personal gain, and fend off ambitious lieutenants without having consolidated a high level of personal control, all while effectively running a country, would be expected to be a major obstacle to this. Hence, the tenure of autocrats who comply with power-sharing agreements should, on average, be relatively limited by the constraints on their position.

Second, rulers can attempt to subvert the power-sharing agreement and establish a personal autocracy. In many cases, elites who feel threatened by personalisation will detect these moves and attempt to remove the autocrat by launching a coup. Indeed, as explained earlier, the consensus in research on comparative authoritarianism is that the biggest threat to the survival in power of authoritarian leaders comes from disgruntled ruling coalitions. Yet if autocrats are successful in avoiding detection, or survive a rebellion attempt, they increase their share of power relative to the ruling coalition, with enough successes leading to the establishment of personal autocracy. If an autocrat’s accumulation of personal power becomes so great that elites can no longer meaningfully constrain them, then the most serious threat to their continued survival in office has effectively been removed. This argument is illustrated by Svolik’s (2012, 77) finding that the likelihood of a ruler being removed by a coup decreases relative to the probability that they pass away naturally after the ruler has been in power for more than ten years, even with age-related increase in mortality risk taken into account.

Hence, autocrats who have established a personal autocracy would in general be expected to survive in office for longer than those who either comply with power-sharing agreements or attempt to consolidate power but are removed by elite rebellion. Note that this argument implies that successfully overcoming the ruling coalition to establish personal autocracy is a cause, not a consequence, of long survival in office, as it eliminates the biggest threat to the autocrat’s continued stay in power. Indeed, the establishment of personal autocracy leading to long tenure is consistent with the empirical record of noted leaders of this type of regime, including:

- Ferdinand Marcos (Philippines, 1965-1986) – 20 years
- Mao Zedong (China, 1949-1976) – 27 years
- Josef Stalin (U.S.S.R., 1923-1953) – 30 years
- Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire/D.R.C., 1965-1997) – 31 years
- Suharto (Indonesia, 1966-1998) – 32 years
- Kim Il-Sung (North Korea, 1948-1994) – 46 years
- Fidel Castro (Cuba, 1959-2008) – 49 years

In contrast, the overall average length of tenure for all authoritarian rulers who survived at least one year in office from 1946-2008 was approximately 10 years (Goemans, 2008; Svolik, 2012). Furthermore, as noted earlier, the PRI’s rule of Mexico—an exemplar of power-sharing—had an average leader tenure of 6 years, and Chinese leaders after Mao

\[14\] Data from Goemans (2008) and Svolik (2012), rounded to the nearest year.
Zedong and before Xi Jinping averaged approximately 8.5 years, although Deng Xiaoping did survive 16 years in office (Svolik, 2012). Overall, very few leaders actually achieve lasting power, with around 25% of leaders making it past the ten year point and only just over 10% surviving longer than 20 years in power, consistent with the argument that establishing personal autocracy is both highly risky and highly rewarding.\(^{15}\)

### 2.3.5. Effect on civil resistance outcome

The different incentives facing elites under power-sharing regimes compared to personal autocracies provide what I argue is a key link between authoritarian politics and the outcome of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns. Under personal autocracy, members of the ruling coalition would prefer to remove the autocrat and reinstall a power-sharing regime to ensure that their interests are protected, yet are prevented from doing so by the coordination problems they face as a result of the autocrat’s consolidation of power. I propose that the emergence of a civil resistance campaign allows the ruling coalition to overcome these problems by creating an exogenous crisis that alters elites’ decision-making calculus, encouraging them to withdraw support from the autocrat in favour of an alternative. As a result, regimes in which the autocrat has consolidated personal power vis-à-vis the ruling coalition should be paradoxically more likely to break down when challenged by a mass uprising than those in which elites’ interests remain protected by a power-sharing agreement.

There are a number of reasons why civil resistance campaigns may allow elites to overcome barriers to collective action. By creating an external crisis which must be resolved, mass protests and non-cooperation create a dilemma for the regime: whether to make concessions to protestors, potentially signalling weakness and encouraging further mobilisation, or to use violent repression, which brings the risk of further escalation or international condemnation (cf. Sørensen & Martin, 2014). Indeed, repression of nonviolent mass protests by civilians is a risky strategy, as it often backfires on regimes, leading to increased mobilisation, international sanctions, or internal rebellion—a dynamic also known as political jiu-jitsu (see, e.g., Martin, 2007; Davenport, 2007; Sutton, Butcher & Svensson, 2014). In particular, military units are often deeply reluctant to use violence against their own people, and orders to do so can result in defections or retaliatory coup attempts (McLauchlin, 2010; Geddes, Frantz & Wright, 2014; Koren, 2014). Civil resistance thus forces difficult choices by autocrats and their allies, with the need to choose a course of action creating room for the kind of debate over decision-making which is otherwise suppressed by personalisation; this period of opening allows elites to consider alternatives to the status quo and obtain signals of how widely such alternatives might be supported in the ruling coalition, while framing these discussions as a response to the crisis rather than a signal of rebellion (cf. O’Donnell &

\(^{15}\) My calculations from Svolik (2012).
Schmitter, 1986). This instability is also likely to decrease elites’ time horizons by creating the perception that the autocrat may not remain in power for much longer, increasing the relative attractiveness of withdrawing support compared to remaining loyal (cf. Hale, 2005). The existence of a crisis which must be responded to, one way or another, thus removes or reduces some of the barriers to intra-elite coordination that otherwise make collective action challenging under personal autocracy.

Civil resistance campaigns further encourage elite coordination by providing a partner that can be overtly or tacitly allied with, reducing the need for elites to initiate a collective withdrawal of support themselves. Campaigns often have a clear leadership, including opposition figures and/or civil society, religious, or labour leaders, which can be negotiated with over guarantees that unrest will not escalate into violence and that elites will have their interests protected if they support the opposition in the event that the regime collapses (e.g., Karl, 1990; Cook, 2006). High levels of public participation in protests also give added legitimacy to alternative claims to power, as they signal that there is a large segment of society which dissatisfied with the current regime and provide a clear political resource that opportunist elites can draw on to their benefit under a new regime (Lee, 2015).

All else being equal, therefore, civil resistance in pursuit of regime change should be more likely to succeed against an authoritarian regime in which personal autocracy has become established than one in which the autocrat is still constrained by the power-sharing agreement, as it is able to encourage disgruntled members of the ruling coalition to withdraw their support from the regime. In particular, it allows elites to overcome their collective action problem imposed by the autocrat’s monopolisation of power to act on their incentive for regime change to re-establish some form of guarantee of their interests.

Note that it is assumed here that this connection between the transition to personal autocracy and regime breakdown in response to an external challenge is specific to a nonviolent campaign. In comparison to nonviolent uprisings, armed challenges such as insurgencies pose a much greater existential threat to the regime as a whole as well as to its individual members. Armed revolutions are also often followed by violent purges of members of the ancien régime, aside from the obvious physical damage to infrastructure and property and the heavy toll on the population that these forms of conflict always entail. In contrast, although individual autocrats and core allies may be prosecuted following a change of regime, this outcome is far from certain, and other members of the regime generally avoid serious sanctions. Indeed, a peaceful transition from personal autocracy to a more competitive form of authoritarianism, if not actual democracy, often allows large portions of the former elite to protect their interests and retain political and/or economic influence, an observation that has frequently been made of post-transition governments following major civil resistance successes (e.g., Fukuoka, 2016). Hence this argument only applies to uprisings that are primarily nonviolent; armed insurgencies or foreign invasion are instead more likely to result in regime consolidation and cohesion (e.g., Slater, 2010).
2.4. Summary

This chapter has shown that, despite having clear implications for understanding how civil resistance campaigns challenge non-democratic regimes, the characteristics of authoritarian politics have remained largely absent from existing research on the topic. In this section I have taken a step towards filling this gap by developing a theoretical framework which explains how power struggles between the autocrat and political elites within a regime can affect the likelihood that a nonviolent civil resistance campaign aiming at regime change will succeed.

I have argued that power-sharing regimes feature limits on the autocrat’s authority and decision-making power, and that this obliges the autocrat to share access to decision-making and resources in order to obtain continued support from the political elite. In contrast, the establishment of personal autocracy means that the ruling coalition can no longer credibly constrain the autocrat, and hence the political elite are no longer able to fully ensure that their interests will be taken into account and protected within the current system. Yet while elites have incentives to remove the autocrat and re-establish a power-sharing regime, the autocrat’s consolidation of personal control imposes coordination barriers that make collective action within the ruling coalition prohibitively difficult. Under these conditions, a civil resistance campaign creates an exogenous crisis which improves elites’ ability to withdraw support from the regime in favour of an alternative. By creating a crisis which forces a regime response, civil resistance opens up space for debate and dissent within the ruling coalition. It also acts as a focal point for negotiation and coordination and a source of legitimacy for alternative claims to power. Thus, it is expected that the establishment of personal autocracy should, perhaps somewhat ironically, increase the vulnerability of the regime to nonviolent external challenges even while it diminishes the threat to the ruler’s position from inside the ruling coalition. The remainder of the thesis puts this argument to the test, using both quantitative and qualitative methods, to examine whether the establishment of personal rule is indeed linked to the success of nonviolent uprisings.
3. Methodology

This thesis uses a mixed methods approach to inquiry, one which integrates both quantitative and qualitative methods to answer research questions. Although combinations of methods have been used throughout the history of social science, mixed methods as such has been developed more recently, as a distinct alternative to existing post-positivist or constructivist paradigms (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007; Onwuegbuzie, 2012; Maxwell, 2015). It was developed during and in response to the so-called paradigm wars between quantitatively- and qualitatively-oriented purists who implicitly or explicitly accepted the incompatibility thesis, i.e., the argument that it is inappropriate to mix quantitative and qualitative methods due to their fundamentally incompatible assumptions about the world (cf. Lincoln & Guba, 1986). Mixed methods researchers instead contend that quantitative and qualitative methods are inherently compatible and appropriate for many different research questions (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009).

While mixed methods is becoming more common in some areas of research, particularly in the education and health science fields (Ivankova & Kawamura, 2010), ongoing methodological developments have remained largely absent from studies of politics and political conflict (Thaler, 2017). Methodological works in political science, in particular, have largely failed to engage with mixed methods, either neglecting it entirely (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier, Brady & Collier, 2008; Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013; Johnson, Reynolds & Mycoff, 2015) or overlooking developments from outside political science (e.g., Leiberman, 2005; Rohlfing, 2008; Ahram, 2011; Goerres & Prinzin, 2012; Toshkov, 2016). Hence in order to justify the approach taken in this thesis, this chapter begins with a description of the mixed methods approach as a distinctive research paradigm and sets out the rationale for collecting both quantitative and qualitative data. It then describes the overall explanatory sequential quan → qual design, as well as setting out the specific techniques that have been used in the quantitative and qualitative components of the study.

3.1. Mixed methods approach

There is as yet no single widely agreed-upon definition of what mixed methods is, as the field is still developing (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010a; Mertens et al., 2016; Fetters & Molina-Azorin, 2017). Nevertheless, there are three core principles that define mixed methods studies as distinct from other forms of inquiry. The first, as mentioned above, is

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16 I have deliberately omitted the terms ‘positivist’ and ‘positivism’ here, as they are largely inappropriate for describing most modern quantitative research (see, e.g., Yu, 2003).
17 This is not confined to political science; indeed, as Small (2011) points out, there has been a notable lack of interdisciplinary communication in the development of mixed methods in general.
rejection of the incompatibility thesis in favour of seeing quantitative and qualitative methods as compatible (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2012). The second is an emphasis on the integration of methods, including in the research design, data collection, and interpretation of results. Integration is highlighted by mixed methodologists as a key characteristic separating truly ‘mixed’ research from ‘multi-method’ research, which uses multiple methods but does not combine them (Johnson et al., 2007; Mertens et al., 2016). A third principle is an instrumental approach to methods (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010b; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2012). Mixed methods researchers treat techniques as tools to be used when most appropriate for each particular topic; there is an emphasis on learning new techniques in order to more effectively answer existing research questions and open up new avenues of inquiry (Onwuegbuzie, 2012; Mertens et al., 2016).

While mixed methods may be just one possible approach to research, no better or worse than quantitative or qualitative-only approaches (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009), it is being increasingly argued that it in fact has inherent advantages over both (Mertens et al., 2016). At a general level, it attempts to move beyond the either/or thinking that has characterised methodological debates in social science over the last three decades, towards both/and thinking, recognising that both quantitative and qualitative methods are important and useful (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). In opposition to the “paradigm-deficit” approach, which emphasises points of difference, incompatibility, and disagreement, mixed methods seeks to emphasise points of commonality, and allow scholars from a range of backgrounds to engage in meaningful communication (Onwuegbuzie, 2012, 197).

In terms of research projects themselves, Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner (2007) highlight two primary advantages to mixing quantitative and qualitative methods. The first is increased breadth, in that triangulating multiple approaches can lead to better understanding, greater detail, and enhanced descriptions of the phenomena under investigation. The second is corroboration, i.e., validating and explicating findings, ensuring internal consistency and validity, and increasing confidence in findings. These advantages can be particularly applicable where the topic of investigation is highly complex and involves multiple layers of action and analysis, as is the case in most areas of political conflict (Thaler, 2017).

The reason for integrating both kinds of data in this particular project is twofold. First, both quantitative and qualitative approaches in isolation have weaknesses for studying the internal characteristics of authoritarian regimes. Qualitative studies of authoritarianism are made difficult by the fact that authoritarian regimes are secretive and often resist external scrutiny, although the methodological problems this entails have been recognised more often by area specialists than by scholars of authoritarianism (e.g., Heimer & Thøgersen, 2006; Barros, 2016). Yet quantitative studies are also hampered by the fact that the observable features of regimes are likely to be “equivocal indicators” of actually extant power relations (Barros, 2016, 954). As a result, quantitative datasets are likely to feature large amounts of ‘noise’ and relatively limited information, arising from high levels of aggregation in how variables are coded and mistaken judgements by
outsiders (e.g., Morgenbesser, 2018). Using both approaches in combination therefore maximises the breadth of data that can be drawn on to answer the research question, balancing the weaknesses that arise from using each approach in isolation and gaining a more complete understanding of the connection between authoritarian politics and civil resistance (Greene, Caracelli & Graham, 1989).

Qualitative case studies are particularly useful for validating quantitative studies of authoritarianism which rely on aggregated data, use uncertain operationalisation of indicators, or produce mixed results (Art, 2016). This is relevant in this study, as the indirect indicator for personalisation that I use in the quantitative component, the autocrat’s time in power, is derived primarily from theoretical arguments, and as yet has relatively limited direct evidence in its favour. Hence, the qualitative component is able to evaluate whether it is indeed suitable, or whether and alternative needs to be developed. Qualitative case studies are also particularly useful for explaining outlier or deviant cases (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007). They are able to examine whether an outlier is indeed an idiosyncratic case, and so can safely be ignored without challenging the overall validity of the theory or quantitative results, or whether these need to be revisited in light of new information that is revealed.

Mixed methods is thus an ideal approach for studying authoritarian politics, as combining quantitative and qualitative methods can make up for weaknesses of a single-method approach, test the validity of existing measures, and potentially gain new information that can be used for theory development and testing.

3.2. Research design overview

By its nature, mixed methods features a wide variety of research designs. Design typologies are likewise complex and numerous, classifying types on the basis of simple features like the number of research phases or using complex distinctions such as the researcher’s position on synergy of multiple approaches (Nastasi, Hitchcock & Brown, 2010). However, a simple distinction can be made between complex or advanced designs and basic designs (Creswell, 2016). Complex designs typically involve multiple stages or an iterative research design, and are more appropriate for large projects involving longer timeframes and multiple researchers. Basic designs instead consist of two stages, one qualitative and one quantitative, and are best suited for smaller-scale, individual projects (Creswell, 2016). Plano Clark and Ivankova (2016) identify three main variants, as shown in Table 3.1 (next page).

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18 Cf. Colaresi & Mahmood (2017), who emphasise the importance of detailed case knowledge for explaining outliers and highlighting likely omitted variables in order to iteratively improve quantitative models in the machine learning field.
Table 3.1: Basic mixed methods research designs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sequential quan → qual</td>
<td>Qualitative data is used to explain or confirm initial quantitative results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequential qual → quan</td>
<td>Quantitative data is used to test or evaluate the generalisability of qualitative results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concurrent quan/qual</td>
<td>Quantitative and qualitative phases are implemented interactively or in parallel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Plano Clark & Ivankova (2016)

Basic designs are most appropriate for projects by graduate students, who must work individually and have more limited time, experience, and skills than established researchers. This project therefore uses a basic sequential quan → qual model, also referred to as an ‘explanatory’ design (Creswell, 2016). In many mixed methods projects one of the components is ‘weighted’, that is, given more of an emphasis than the other (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). Reasons to attribute greater weight to one component include the methodological background or inclinations of the researcher, a feature of the research questions itself, or a desire to reduce the total time spent on a project (Creswell, Plano Clark & Garrett, 2008). In this thesis, however, I have attempted to balance both the quantitative and qualitative components as much as possible.

The research design thus consists of two components that each have distinct but complementary purposes. The initial quantitative component is a large-n analysis carried out on a global sample of civil resistance campaigns. It asks the question: is there a consistent and statistically significant correlation between personalisation of power and civil resistance success? Although, as is well known, correlation does not imply causation, establishing an association is essential as correlation is a necessary condition of causation. If no correlation were found, this would count as strong evidence against the theory of personalism increasing the vulnerability of regimes to civil resistance. The quantitative component also establishes the generalisability of the findings, as the use of a global sample shows that the connection between personal autocracy and campaign outcome is not restricted to a particular geographic area.

Large-n quantitative analysis can establish the existence of a statistically significant correlation, but is more limited in its ability to provide evidence for the underlying processes connecting the independent and dependent variables (George & Bennett, 2006). The qualitative component thus builds on the quantitative findings by filling in these gaps in the story, making ‘causal process observations’ (Mahoney, 2010) that establish the existence of the proposed mechanisms connecting personalisation to civil resistance success. It is thus intended to show that the correlation identified in the quantitative component is actually explained by the theory, and not the result of some other related or unrelated factors. Using two case studies, the qualitative component does this by first, looking for positive evidence that the independent variable (i.e.,
personalisation) actually existed as predicted by the theory and quantitative analysis, and second, examining whether the processes leading from personalisation to campaign outcome closely match those that would be expected from the theory, or whether an alternative does a better job of explaining the outcome. The qualitative component also explores the relationship between personalisation and civil resistance in more detail to look for important features that have been missed in the theory building and quantitative testing stages or may lead to new avenues of inquiry.

The two components are not carried out in isolation; as noted above, integration is a key feature of mixed methods studies (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007). The first point at which integration occurs is in the connection of the quantitative and qualitative components: the cases for qualitative analysis are sampled on the basis of the quantitative results. This point is returned to in more detail below. The second point of integration is at the conclusion stage, where both sets of findings are combined to draw overall ‘meta-inferences’ regarding the research question; a meta-inference is “an overall conclusion, explanation or understanding developed through and integration of the inferences obtained from the qualitative and quantitative strands of a mixed method study” (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2008, 101).

The conclusion not only uses the findings to answer the research question, but also evaluates how well the two components ‘fit’, that is, the coherence of the quantitative and qualitative findings (Fetters, Curry & Creswell, 2013). There are three general outcomes: confirmation, where the results from both components confirm each other; expansion, where the findings diverge and address different—ideally, complementary—aspects of the focus of investigation; and discordance, where qualitative and quantitative findings are inconsistent or in conflict with each other (Fetters, Curry & Creswell, 2013). Although discordant findings may be difficult to explain, they do not necessarily undermine the conclusions of the study. Indeed, as Moffat et al., (2006, 28), point out, “the investigation of such differences may be as illuminating as their points of similarity”, by identifying new areas for investigation and thus offering an opportunity for more in-depth analysis of the phenomenon. Responses to discordant findings include gathering additional data to conduct further analysis, or explicitly discussing reasons for the contradictory results and identifying potential theoretical explanations that can be followed up in future research (Moffat et al., 2006; Fetters, Curry & Creswell, 2013).

The overall research design for this study is summarised in Figure 3.1 (next page).
Figure 3.1: Visual model of research design

Quantitative component
Chapter 4

- Quantitative data analysis
- Integration of research components – case selection

Qualitative component
Chapters 5-6

- Qualitative data analysis
- Integration and interpretation of results

Integration and conclusions
Chapter 7
3.3. Quantitative component

The purpose of the quantitative component of the study is to test whether there is a plausible connection between personalisation of power and the outcome of civil resistance campaigns, as proposed in the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2. This section gives an explanation of the principles and techniques that are used in the quantitative component of the study, the results of which are presented in Chapter 4. It includes a definition of the relevant universe of cases for analysis; model specification, including issues related to uncertainty over the correct model specification due to the lack of existing theoretical guidance; and an explanation and justification of the specific focus on testing the predictive ability of the models that are presented.

3.3.1. Approach to quantitative analysis

Most quantitative research in political science is what Shmueli (2010, 291) labels explanatory modelling, the “application of statistical models to data for testing causal hypotheses about theoretical constructs”. In other words, explanatory modelling uses statistical analysis—typically regression models carried out on observational data—in order to test theoretical explanations of why phenomena occur. In this approach, statistical analysis follows theory building and operationalisation, and is primarily used to obtain estimates of the direction, size, and statistical significance of the effects of variables that are intended to capture underlying processes. Successful explanation is achieved when modelled values fit the observed data as accurately as possible.

Explanation is not the only possibility, however, and prediction is becoming increasingly advocated as an alternative approach (e.g., Ward, Greenhill & Bakke, 2010; Schrodt, 2014; Muchlinski et al., 2015; Hegre et al., 2017; Colaresi & Mahmood, 2017). Predictive modelling is “the process of applying a statistical model or data mining algorithm to data for the purpose of predicting new or future observations” (Shmueli, 2010, 291). Predictive modelling is conceptually distinguishable from explanatory modelling, as although high explanatory power is often assumed to entail or be a necessary condition for high predictive power, the two are not necessarily connected (Shmueli, 2010). This has been clearly illustrated by Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke’s (2010) evaluation of Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) well-known study of the conditions which favour civil war, which shows that although the covariates that Fearon and Laitin identify have high statistical significance and explanatory power, they predict conflict onset poorly. Indeed, prediction using tools such as data mining and machine learning can be completely atheoretical (Shmueli, 2010), although in political science it is typically used as an alternative method of testing causal explanations as well as a goal in its own right (e.g., Cranmer & Desmarais, 2017). As a means of testing causal explanations, in particular, predictive modelling is argued to avoid some of the problems that have been repeatedly highlighted with the more traditional use of null-hypothesis significance testing on observational data using p-values as the primary criterion of significance (see, e.g., Achen, 2002; Ward, Greenhill & Bakke, 2010; Schrodt, 2014).
Although some remain sceptical about the utility of prediction (see Shmueli, 2010), prediction is held by its proponents to be an integral part of the scientific process, and as Schrodt (2014, 289) points out, in other areas of scientific inquiry accurate prediction is considered to be “the epitome of validation of a theory.” This is because prediction can be strongly confirmed in a way that regression cannot—outcomes are either predicted accurately or they are not. Predictive testing thus provides a ‘reality check’ for causal explanations, as well as offering the potential to provide meaningful policy guidance (Singer, 1973; Shmueli, 2010; Hegre et al., 2017). Even a finding that events cannot be predicted easily can be useful, as it can help to target researchers’ efforts into more productive areas and give practical notice that some events are always likely to be a surprise (Shmueli, 2010); Chenoweth and Ulfelder’s (2017) finding that civil resistance campaign onset cannot be predicted accurately using existing models is an example of this latter point in practice. Predictive testing is also useful for improving statistical models. ‘Garbage can’ or ‘kitchen sink’ regressions which contain large numbers of variables are vulnerable to overfit, as adding additional variables nearly always improves model fit by capturing noise in the data without meaningfully identifying underlying processes (Achen, 2002; Ward, Greenhill & Bakke, 2010; Muchlinski et al., 2015). Both overfit models and underfit models—those which have left out important variables—will suffer a drop in predictive accuracy when exposed to new data caused by the same underlying processes (Beger, Dorf & Ward, 2014). Hence, predictive modelling can help researchers “steer between the rock of collinearity and the hard place of omitted variable bias” (Schrodt, 2014, 288; see also Cranmer & Desmarais, 2017; Colaresi & Mahmood, 2017).

In this thesis I follow, for example, Cranmer and Desmarais (2017) in treating prediction as complementary to explanation, that is, as an additional test of the causal explanations that I have offered in Chapter 2 rather than an end in itself. Although the data I use and the findings that are generated could be used in forecasting the outcome of future nonviolent uprisings, this is less of a priority for the current research goal. The quantitative component thus consists of two parts. First, I use explanatory modelling to test the theoretical association between the establishment of personal autocracy and the success of nonviolent uprisings, using two measures of personal autocracy as explained below. In this portion of the analysis I am concerned with statistical significance and fit; I also use multi-model selection methods to improve the models that I have developed on the basis of theory. Second, I use predictive modelling to complement regression analysis by testing whether the models also perform well at predicting civil resistance outcomes on both in-sample and pseudo-out-of-sample data, as a test of whether they are capturing underlying causal mechanisms.

3.3.2. Defining the sample

The focus of this study is authoritarian regimes that have been challenged by mass campaigns using primarily nonviolent tactics. In studying dictatorships specifically I make the assumption that democracies and dictatorships are fundamentally different political systems, rather than two ends of a sliding scale. This is because in democracies popular
pressure can influence policy choices because regular, institutional mechanisms for communicating public preferences and removing policy-makers exist in the form of competitive elections, while in dictatorships these mechanisms serve different functions, as even when elections are held those in power have no intention of stepping down (Schedler, 2006; Morgenbesser, 2016). As a result, the causal pathways by which campaigns affect powerholders are likely to be different under the two forms of government, as public pressure which would signal voter intentions to a democratic government is unlikely to have the same effect on a dictatorship. As stated in the introduction, I therefore follow, for example, Alvarez, et al. (1996), Przeworski et al. (2000), Schedler (2006), Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), and Svolik (2012) in adopting a minimal, either/or definition of dictatorship and democracy, identifying authoritarian regimes as those in which the government has not been elected in free and competitive elections. Governments are designated as authoritarian based on Svolik (2012) and Magaloni, Chu, and Min (2013).

The focus is also restricted to campaigns that aim at regime change. Other major nonviolent campaigns may have secessionist, anti-colonial, or anti-occupation goals, all of which challenge the structure of the state as a coherent entity. These campaigns are generally less effective than challenges to a particular government because they face significant barriers to attracting support from within the government and society more generally (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Svensson & Lindgren, 2011a). Territorial campaigns cannot usually rely on attracting support from regime elites, and do not necessarily require the breakdown of the ruling coalition to be successful (e.g., Cunningham, 2014). Like civil resistance in democracies, these campaigns are therefore likely to have different expected trajectories and underlying causal processes and are therefore excluded from this study.

Data on campaigns is derived from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes 2.0 (NAVCO) dataset, an update of the first large-scale data project directly addressing nonviolent conflict (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013). Although the quantitative component of the study does not address campaign tactics and strategies in detail, selecting campaigns based on criteria for inclusion in NAVCO inherently includes a substantial amount of information about them: campaigns are “a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective” and typically have a name, a defined organisational structure, and a clear leadership; campaigns that involve a limited amount of violence, such as rock throwing or sporadic looting, are also included (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013, 416).

Campaigns are selected for the current analysis if their demands would effectively result in regime change. Hence, a call for free elections in a regime which relies on fraud, patronage, and intimidation to win, for example, is treated as a demand for regime change,

19 There are minor differences between the two datasets; designation as authoritarian by one is deemed sufficient for inclusion as such. See the appendix for details.
as meeting these requirements would necessarily result in the breakdown of the existing authoritarian regime (see Schedler, 2006). In order to avoid analysing so-called non-starters, campaigns in NAVCO must involve at least 1,000 participants. NAVCO includes information on campaigns, both violent and nonviolent, from 1946 to 2006; in order to expand the sample and include important recent campaigns, such as those of the Arab Spring, additional campaigns from 2006 to 2013 were coded. Information sources including newswires from Factiva and secondary sources were used to identify events of anti-regime civil resistance meeting the definition used in NAVCO. A small number of cases recorded in NAVCO are excluded from the sample; explanations are provided in the appendix. In total, the dataset includes 84 cases, although three cases where outcomes could not unambiguously be coded were excluded from further analysis.

One issue related to the coverage of the sample is that relatively few autocratic leaders survived World War II. On the other hand, there was a substantial increase in the number of autocrats who gained power in the years following, particularly following the establishment of new communist regimes during the early stages of the Cold War and new autocratic regimes resulting from decolonisation movements. As I discuss below in more detail, personalisation is associated with time in power, so ‘young’ regimes are unlikely to have experienced a high degree of personalisation. As a result, the unusually high proportion of young regimes during the initial decades following World War II is likely to create bias, as it is more unlikely than usual to observe personalised regimes during this period. In addition, it has been pointed out that there may be selection effects creating inconsistencies in the earlier part of the NAVCO data (e.g., Lehoucq, 2016). Hence, as well as carrying out analysis on the full sample from 1946 onwards, I also re-estimate models on a restricted sample from 1970-2013. Admittedly, the 1970 cut-off is somewhat arbitrary, but it has been chosen in an attempt to balance the importance of ensuring even sample coverage with the undesirable exclusion of important cases of civil resistance such as the Iranian revolution in 1978-79.

### 3.3.3. Models

**Dependent variable**

The dependent variable is campaign outcome. This is classified as either success or failure in a limited sense: campaigns are labelled as successful if they result in the breakdown of the regime, which I operationalise as the autocrat either stepping down or initiating a transition away from the incumbent regime directly in response to the civil resistance campaign. Failures are defined as campaigns which do not meet these conditions, regardless of what other reforms or mid- to long-term benefits they may have achieved.

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20 Thanks to participants at a seminar presenting this research project at the Department of Sociology and Political Science (Norwegian University of Science and Technology) for raising this point.
The model developed here attempts to explain only the process by which mass protests can lead to the breakdown of an authoritarian ruling coalition, and does not speak to longer-term effects of campaigns, particularly post-transition outcomes. Hence democratization or other normatively-desirable goals are not included as part of the measure of campaign outcome.

**Independent variables**

Two measures of the autocrat’s consolidation of personal power are included as independent variables. The first is the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) (GWF) typology, the most prominent in the comparative authoritarianism field. This identifies personalist regimes as those in which “control over policy, leadership selection, and the security apparatus is in the hands of a [...] narrower group centered around an individual dictator”, contrasting this with rule through a monarchical ruling family, dominant party, or military hierarchy (Geddes, Wright & Frantz, 2014, 318). Although the authors do not explicitly set out their rules for classifying hybrids, I operate here under the assumption that regimes classified as personalist or personalist hybrid have experienced a substantial degree of consolidation of power by the ruler, with hybrid regimes—such as personal-party or personal-military—indicating that the ruler has consolidated power but maintains either a party structure or military hierarchy as the main institution of rule (see, e.g., Morgenbesser, 2018). Hence, I use classification as a personal or personal-hybrid regime type in the GWF typology as an indicator of personal autocracy, with classification as another type an indicator of a power-sharing regime.

The second measure is the autocrat’s time in office at the beginning of the peak campaign year, as explained in Chapter 2. I define the peak year as the highest level of observable, public civil resistance activity and code based on campaign descriptions from NAVCO and secondary sources, cross-referenced with newswires from Factiva. Autocrat entry and exit dates are taken from Svolik (2012), cross-referenced with dates available at http://rulers.org, and rounded to the nearest year.

One alternative explanation for any association between time in power and civil resistance outcome is that time in office is in fact capturing the ruler’s advancing age. Aging autocrats may decrease elites’ time horizons for obtaining a return on their investment of support, as the spectre of ill health or succession looms. Thus, any positive association may instead be due to the inherent connection between time in office and advancing age, rather than personalisation of power.

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21 As the relationship between personal-hybrid regimes and personalisation as described in this thesis is not entirely clear from the available documentation, I have also conducted robustness tests using only the ‘personal’ regime type; see the appendix for details.

A second competing explanation is that the relationship between time in office and campaign outcome is related to the length of the ruling coalition spell rather than the tenure of the individual autocrat. The ruling coalition spell is a period of rule where the same basic system of formal and informal rules governing policy decisions and government appointments remains in place; this is independent of the tenure of individual leaders. That is, there can be multiple leaders within a single ruling coalition spell; the ruling coalition spell can correspond with the rule of a single leader; or, as is shown to be the case in the Philippines under Marcos in Chapter 5, the leader can alter the makeup of the ruling coalition to such an extent that their tenure can cover multiple ruling coalition spells.\(^{23}\) If a relationship between ruling coalition spell duration and campaign outcome exists, it would substantially undermine the argument presented here, which focuses on the individual rather than system level.

In order to rule out these competing explanations, I therefore include the leader’s age and the length of the ruling coalition’s time in power at the beginning of the campaign's peak year to test whether these alternative time-related factors are also associated with campaign outcome. Leader age is taken from http://rulers.org, while length of ruling coalition spell is taken from Magaloni, Chu, and Min (2013).\(^{24}\)

Several independent variables plausibly associated with both civil resistance campaign outcome and the autocrat’s time in office are included. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) find that civil resistance campaigns are becoming more successful over time. This may be due to a learning or emulation effect, as participants in successful campaigns pass on knowledge of tactics and strategy to other campaigners (see, e.g., Beissinger, 2007; Gleditsch & Rivera, 2017). For example, student leaders of the Otpor! civil resistance movement in Serbia such as Srdja Popovic have actively been involved in disseminating civil resistance knowledge to activists in other authoritarian regimes.\(^{25}\) Conversely, Cuaresma, Oberhofer, and Raschky (2011) find that from 1980 to 2004 dictators on average stayed in power longer than their predecessors. This may also be in part due to an authoritarian learning effect, as there is evidence to suggest that authoritarian leaders are adapting to the threat of nonviolent uprisings (e.g., Chen, 2010; Heydemann & Leenders, 2011) as well as becoming more sophisticated at handling dissent and retaining control in general (e.g., Morgenbesser, forthcoming). While the direction of the effect of the passage of time is therefore unclear at this stage, campaign peak year is included as an independent variable to account for the effect.

In general, research on the ‘resource curse’ has found that oil production is strongly associated with authoritarian durability (Ross, 2015). In fact, while natural resources

\(^{23}\) As noted in Section 1.3, Magaloni, Chu, and Min (2013) and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) use the term ‘regime’ here, while I instead adopt the term ‘ruling coalition spell’ to avoid ambiguity.

\(^{24}\) Geddes, Wright and Frantz’s (2014) coding of ruling coalition spell duration is also used, but the substantive findings do not change; see the online appendix for details.

\(^{25}\) See https://canvasopedia.org.
such as timber, minerals, or precious gemstones have been argued to have an impact on specific authoritarian regimes, oil is the only resource that is consistently found to be associated with authoritarian strength across regimes, and is typically the key variable in studies of the link between natural resources and authoritarianism (Ross, 2015). Cuaresma, Oberhofer, and Raschky (2011) find that oil production has a positive effect on leader tenure by providing an easily-exploitable source of economic rents that can be distributed to supporters and used to finance repression (see also Wright, Frantz, and Geddes, 2015). Hence oil production is included to control for this effect; the unit is thousands of barrels of crude oil and natural gas produced per day, with figures obtained from Etemad, Luciani, Bairoch, and Toutain (1991) and the United States Energy Information Administration.

Legislatures may impact campaign outcome by making autocracies more stable regardless of whether they are power-sharing regimes or personal autocracies. For example, Svolik (2012, 111-112) finds that legislatures both increase the durability of ruling coalition spells and decrease the probability of leadership change due to all domestic causes, including coups d’état, popular uprisings, and assassination. This is likely to be because legislatures moderate intra-elite conflict by acting as a venue for negotiation, as well as allow elites to monitor the power-sharing agreement and thus decrease the likelihood of a transition to personal autocracy (Gandhi, 2008; Svolik, 2012). The presence of legislatures is coded based on Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), the CIA World Factbook, and country reports from Freedom House, and lagged one year to account for possible institutional change as a result of a nonviolent uprising.

Military regimes have been found to break down more readily than other forms of governments in general, and military dictators have a shorter average tenure than other leaders (Geddes, 1999; Svolik, 2012; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014). This is argued to be because military leaders value the cohesion of the military as an organisation over holding power, preferring to withdraw from power rather than risk intra-elite conflict leading to the breakdown of the military hierarchy (Geddes, 1999). It may also be due to the military’s strong pre-existing organisational structure making it easier for the ruling coalition to coordinate to remove a leader who threatens the power-sharing agreement (e.g., Frantz & Ezrow, 2011), thus reducing the likelihood that military rulers will be able to establish a personal autocracy. For regression based on autocrat tenure, military regimes are coded based on Magalonı, Chu, and Min’s (2013) (MCM) classification of regime type, as unlike Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) this typology does not include a personalist type.

Svensson and Lindgren (2011a) find that ethnic divisions between opposition and regime supporters decrease the likelihood of campaign success. Although this factor has yet to be addressed explicitly in cross-national studies of authoritarian durability, anecdotal evidence from regimes such as Syria under Bashar al-Assad and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq suggest that leaders are more resilient if their ruling coalition and core supporters are drawn from a particular ethnic group while others are excluded, as this increases the costs associated with defection (see also Nepstad, 2011). I conceive of ethnic divisions here as
meaning that the campaign and the regime draw on different ethnic groups as their primary support base, without considering more complex factors such as levels of ethnic fragmentation, polarisation, or otherwise. Ethnic divisions between protestors and the regime are coded based on Svensson and Lindgren's (2011a) data and updated to include additional cases in this dataset with reference to existing case studies and other secondary sources.

GDP per capita functions as a proxy measure for state administrative and coercive capacity across regime types (Fearon and Laitin, 2003), and so is included, logged and lagged one year. Although economic crises often precipitate mass protests, and might be assumed to play a role in explaining whether they lead to regime collapse or not, previous work has found that there is no consistent relationship between GDP per capita downturns and authoritarian regime breakdown, both in general and specifically in response to nonviolent uprisings (Teorell, 2010; Svolik, 2012); hence, change in GDP per capita is not included.

An additional macro-social factor that is included is population size, as this has been found to be negatively associated with both campaign outcome (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011) and leader tenure (Boix and Svolik, 2013). The underlying causal mechanisms explaining this connection are not well elucidated in existing work, although it may be related to the influence of the need to have stronger institutions in order to manage larger populations on regime stability (cf. Slater and Fenner, 2011). Nevertheless, to control for any systematic variation in either regime stability or the likelihood of civil resistance success between smaller and larger states, logged population size is recorded for the campaign peak year.

International factors are often attributed a major role in influencing the outcome of civil resistance campaigns, particularly the support or opposition of the United States and other Western governments (e.g., Levitsky & Way, 2005). However, in this thesis I am primarily interested in domestic factors that influence regime survival or breakdown, especially power struggles amongst regime elites; while these may be influenced by international considerations, my assumption here is that they are not in themselves completely determined by international factors. Hence, in building the quantitative models I have largely excluded international factors such as cold war rivalries, the relationship of the government to global or regional powers, international sanctions, or otherwise from analysis.

The independent variables, expected effect on campaign outcome, and data sources are summarised in Table 3.2 (next page).
Table 3.2: Summary of independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Expected effect on campaign success</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autocrat time in power</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Svolik (2012); <a href="http://rulers.org">http://rulers.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist regime type</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Geddes, Wright &amp; Frantz (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocrat age</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td><a href="http://rulers.org">http://rulers.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of ruling coalition spell</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Magaloni, Chu &amp; Min (2013); Geddes, Wright &amp; Frantz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign peak year</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Chenoweth &amp; Stephan (2011); my coding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest size</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Chenoweth &amp; Stephan (2011); my coding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military regime type</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Magaloni, Chu &amp; Min (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log population size</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Gleditsch (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP per capita</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Gleditsch (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic divisions between protestors and regime</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Svensson &amp; Lindgren (2011a); my coding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil production</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Etemad, Luciani, Bairoch, and Toutain (1991); U.S. EIA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature present</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Cheibub, Gandhi &amp; Vreeland (2010); Freedom House; CIA World Factbook</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3.4. Analysis

Separate explanatory and predictive tests are carried out, including measures of overall model accuracy as well as goodness-of-fit and validation tests. All of the tests were carried out in R (64 bit) version 3.4.1 in Windows 10.

Explanatory tests

Correlational tests are carried out to examine whether the establishment of personal autocracy explains the outcome of civil resistance campaigns well. Mean and median testing is taken as a starting point; Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U and t-tests are used to examine whether there is a statistically significant difference in the distribution of leader tenure for successful versus unsuccessful civil resistance campaigns. As Schrodt (2014) points out, these tests are simple yet robust and require few ancillary assumptions.

Regression analysis is then used to control for the effect of potential confounding variables. Because the outcome is coded as binary—either success or failure—logistic regression is appropriate. Typical ordinary least squares (OLS) regression measures the correlation between an independent variable X and a dependent variable Y using the equation,

$$ Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X $$

where $\beta_1$ indicates the effect on Y of a one-unit increase in X and $\beta_0$ is the intercept, i.e., the value of Y when X is 0. This equation can return an infinite range of values for Y, which would be difficult to translate to an outcome where there are only two possibilities. To deal with these kinds of categorical outcomes, logistic regression instead uses a mathematical function to constrain the possible output of the regression equation to between 0 and 1. The equation for logistic regression is,

$$ Y = f(x) = f(\beta_0 + \beta_1 X) $$

where

$$ f(x) = \frac{e^x}{1 + e^x} = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-x}} $$

The result of the equation can be interpreted as the estimated probability of Y occurring, given the value(s) of X (Freedman, 2005, 123). The term $x$ is the sum of the variables $X_1$ through $X_K$ (for $K$ independent variables) multiplied by their estimated coefficients $\beta_1$ through $\beta_K$, so can also be written,

$$ Y = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \cdots + \beta_K X_K)}} $$

As with OLS, the coefficient $\beta_i$ is the estimated effect of a one-unit increase in variable $X_i$ on Y. These figures are calculated using maximum likelihood estimation; because of the
relatively small sample size \((n \leq 200)\), these estimates are likely to be biased away from zero, so a correction based on Firth’s (1993) penalty is used.\(^{26}\)

While the direction and statistical significance of individual coefficients can be understood as per OLS regression, the value is less easy to interpret, so I also present these as odds ratios. The odds ratio is the probability of an outcome occurring relative to the probability of it not occurring; hence for example, if the probability of success is \(p = 0.6\) and the probability of failure is \(1-p = 0.4\), then the odds ratio is \(0.6 / 0.4 = 1.5\). In other words, the odds ratio is how much more likely an event is to occur than to not occur (Kleinbaum & Klein, 2010). It is calculated by taking the exponent of the coefficient given by logistic regression,

\[
OR = e^{\beta_i}
\]

An odds ratio above 1 indicates that a one-unit increase in a variable increases the likelihood of success relative to failure, while an odds ratio below 1 indicates that a one-unit increase in a variable decreases the likelihood of success relative to failure. Although it does not give a direct indication of the actual probability itself, the odds ratio can thus easily be interpreted as a measure of the relative size of the impact of a given variable on the outcome.

In addition to individual coefficient estimates, a number of diagnostic tests are carried out. To check for multicollinearity, or close association between any of the independent variables—which can result in biased coefficient estimates and resulting distorted values for statistics such as \(p\)-values—I examine the correlation matrix, which gives pairwise correlations for the independent variables I have identified. Lower values indicate that multicollinearity is less likely to be an issue. I also report the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each variable in the models I develop, which indicates the degree to which an independent variable increases the variance of coefficient estimates. Values closer to 1 indicate that multicollinearity is not a problem, while values above 10—sometimes lower—are generally taken to indicate that it is an issue (see, e.g., O’Brien, 2007). To aid readability and interpretation of Chapter 4, these tests are presented in the appendix.

I also check model fit, or how well values predicted by the model match the actual values observed in the data. There are a number of possible statistics that can be used for this. In OLS regression, a commonly-reported measure is the \(R^2\) value, which ranges from 0 to 1 and gives an overall indication of what proportion of the variance in the data is accounted for by the model. For logistic regression, however, calculating this statistic is not possible, and so it is more common to report pseudo-\(R^2\) values (Hilbe, 2009). However, there are a number of issues with this statistic. For instance, there are at least seven different pseudo-\(R^2\) statistics, most of which measure different things, and there is little guidance as to which should be used for a given purpose (Hoetker, 2007). In addition, pseudo-\(R^2\) does not have the same meaning as \(R^2\) for OLS regression—indeed, pseudo-\(R^2\) statistics

\(^{26}\) This was carried out using the ‘brglm’ package in R (Kosmidis, 2017).
generally have no inherent meaning in themselves—yet the similar name can easily cause confusion for readers, who may see it as a direct indicator of model fit (Hoetker, 2007). As a result, some statisticians (e.g., Long, 1997; Hoetker, 2007) are sceptical about its use. For these reasons, I have opted to not report pseudo-$R^2$ values. Instead, I report the area under the curve (AUC) score as an indicator of model fit; as this is based on predictive accuracy, I explain this in measure in the following section.

Likelihood-ratio (LR) tests can be used to test whether different model specifications can significantly improve model fit. As with pseudo-$R^2$ values, some are sceptical of the usefulness of LR tests, (e.g., Hilbe, 2009), yet they remain a commonly-reported statistic. Hence, I report LR test values for the models versus more restricted models consisting of only the intercept, indicating whether the specified models significantly improve fit. The related Wald test is also often used for this purpose; however, for smaller datasets (such as this one) the two tests can return different results, and the LR may be more appropriate (Long, 1997).

An additional goodness-of-fit test that may be a better measure for logistic regression is the Hosmer-Lemeshow test (Hilbe, 2009). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test identifies groups of observations in the dataset where discrepancies between predicted and actual outcomes are occurring. It does this by dividing the dataset by predicted Y values—in this case, campaign outcome—and measures the distribution of expected outcomes against observed outcomes to compute a test statistic; non-significant $p$-values ($p > 0.05$) are considered evidence of good model fit (Hilbe, 2009). These values are therefore also reported.

Whether model fit can be improved using a competing model or by adding or dropping individual variables is then measured using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, [1973] 1998; Burnham & Anderson, 2002, 2004). Less common in political science, AIC-based model selection is an approach to dealing with modelling uncertainty which has been widely adopted in fields such as ecology, where researchers are often faced with similar challenges of many plausible independent variables, relatively few observations, and limited theoretical guidance for building models (e.g., Burnham & Anderson, 2002; Arnold, 2010). AIC is based on Kullback-Leibler Divergence (K-L), a measure of the amount of information that is lost when we approximate an underlying process (in this case, 'reality') with a model (Burnham & Anderson, 2004). If full reality was known, this could be measured directly. As it is not, however, K-L can only be estimated. AIC does this using the following equation:

\[
AIC = -2 \log(\hat{L}) + 2K
\]

---

27 The default number of divisions is 10, which can cause problems when there are too few observations in each division; I thus also test a number of divisions for each model, with $p$-values consistently being above 0.05 considered equivalent evidence of good fit, although the specific figures may vary (Hilbe, 2009).
where $\hat{L}$ is the maximum likelihood value of the model and $K$ is the number of estimated parameters in the model (i.e. for $y = a + bx, K = 2$).\textsuperscript{28} For small samples (where $n/K \lesssim 40$) a bias correction is included which imposes an extra penalty for additional parameters:

$$AIC_c = -2 \log(\hat{L}) + 2K + \frac{2K(K+1)}{n-K-1}$$

AIC thus selects models that are more parsimonious, based on how much of the variation in the data they describe (model fit) balanced against their complexity (number of parameters). The AIC value itself has no intrinsic meaning, but is instead used to compare models that describe the data.

In this thesis I use AIC in two ways. First, I use it to measure the relative importance of individual variables using the $w^+(j)$ statistic (Burnham & Anderson, 2002). This gives an estimate of how sure we can be that a given variable should be included in a model describing the data. It is obtained by summing the Akaike weight $w_i$—that is, the evidence in favour of a given model on the basis of AIC—for all models which include the variable $x_j$. This gives the figure $0 \leq w^+(j) \leq 1$; the closer $w^+(j)$ is to 1, the more evidence there is that variable $j$ should be used to describe the data. As a general guideline, values of 0.9 or higher indicate strong evidence in favour of the variable, values from 0.6-0.9 moderate evidence, values from 0.5-0.6 only very weak evidence and anything below 0.5 essentially negligible (Burnham & Anderson, 2002, 75-77).

Second, I use AIC to select the model or models that describe the data the most parsimoniously, that is, with the best model fit balanced against the risk of overfit. In order to do this, I first create a complete model consisting of all of the plausible independent variables listed above. This provides the set of nested ‘candidate models’, consisting of each unique combination of variables from the complete model.\textsuperscript{29} The AIC value for each candidate model is then calculated and the models ranked. Lower AIC values indicate comparatively stronger evidence in favour of a given model compared to other candidates (Burnham & Anderson, 2004). The resulting model(s) are then assessed in the same way as the original models.

**Predictive tests**

Predictive tests are then used to examine how well the models I develop here predict the outcome of civil resistance campaigns. The basis for evaluating predictive accuracy is the

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\textsuperscript{28} The likelihood of a model is the probability of observing the actual data given a set of parameter values. Maximum likelihood estimation produces parameters for the model that maximises this value, and is the standard method of obtaining model parameters in quantitative political science. For an overview of the link between maximum likelihood estimation and K-L see Burnham and Anderson (2002, 60-61).

\textsuperscript{29} For a given global model with $k$ variables there are $2^k$ possible models, hence there are $2^{12} = 4096$ candidate models for this study (see 3.3.3.c).
2x2 confusion matrix (also known as a contingency table), which measures predicted outcomes versus actual outcomes, shown in Table 3.3:

Table 3.3: Confusion matrix for evaluating predictive accuracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual outcome</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predicted outcome</td>
<td>True positive</td>
<td>False positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>False negative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>True negative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fawcett (2006)

‘Positive’ means that an outcome occurred; hence a true positive in this study is a nonviolent revolution which is correctly predicted by the model(s), a false positive is a failed campaign that is predicted as a success, and likewise for the remaining categories. From the confusion matrix, a number of measures of accuracy can be calculated. Of particular relevance are:

- True positive rate (also called recall or sensitivity), the proportion of all positives cases correctly predicted as such.
- False positive rate, the proportion of all negative cases incorrectly predicted as such.
- Specificity (also called true negative rate), the proportion of all negative cases correctly predicted as such.
- Precision, the proportion of positive predictions that are actually positive cases.

An ideal model would have both its true positive rate and true negative rate close to 1, meaning that it classifies all of the observed cases into the correct category. In practice, however, models virtually always make at least some incorrect classifications. Thus, there is a need to make a trade-off between making the making models ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’; liberal models make positive classifications with weak evidence, thus capturing many true positives but also allowing in false positives, while conservative models have high thresholds for positive classifications, thus having few errors but also missing genuine positive cases (Fawcett, 2006).

The trade-off between true and false positive rates can be visualised using a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) graph, as shown in Figure 3.2:
The false positive rate is on the x axis, while the true positive rate is on the y axis. The top-left point of the graph indicates perfect prediction, i.e., correct classification of every positive case with no incorrect positives. The bottom-right point is the inverse, i.e., where every prediction made by the model is incorrect. The dashed diagonal line represents points where the models is 50% accurate, or in other words, where the models’ predictions are equivalent to randomly guessing or flipping a coin. Thus, any points above the diagonal represent predictions that are better than random, while any points below it indicate predictions that are actively worse than guessing (Fawcett, 2006).

Individual points on the ROC graph represent accuracy when a predicted value is binary (either positive or negative). Yet many predicted outcomes will take on continuous values, and thus for decision making a threshold value needs to be imposed to classify the result (Fawcett, 2006). In most cases, however, this threshold is necessarily arbitrary. Instead, an ROC curve can be plotted, showing the true positive versus false positive rate for all possible threshold values, indicating a model’s ability to differentiate between positive and negative instances without relying on an arbitrary threshold value, as shown in Figure 3.3 (next page).
To compare the predictive accuracy of different curves, ROC performance can be reduced to the area under the curve or AUC, i.e., the area between a curve and the x axis (Fawcett, 2006). Hence, even though curve B has a better true positive rate at some points, the higher AUC of curve A means that it is overall a better predictor. The AUC value is equivalent to the probability that the model in question will rank a randomly chosen positive case higher than a randomly chosen negative case (Fawcett, 2006). AUC values are between 0 and 1, with a score of 1 indicating that the model has a perfect ability to distinguish between positive and negative cases, with 0.5 equivalent to randomly guessing and figures below 0.5 worse than guessing (Fawcett, 2006). In studies of political conflict values above 0.7 can be considered good, values over 0.8 very good, and values over 0.9 excellent. The AUC thus provides a single, easy-to-interpret indicator of a models’ predictive ability which can be used to compare it to other candidates.

Unlike explanatory modelling, diagnostic tests for predictive modelling are primarily concerned with detecting overfit (Shmueli, 2010). The first step is in-sample testing, or testing the model’s ability to predict the outcome of the same observations that were originally used to generate the model. A harder test is the ability to predict the outcome of new, unseen cases. As Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke (2010) argue, a model that really

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captures the underlying relationship between independent variables and outcome should perform almost as well when faced with new data of the same type, while the predictive ability of a model that merely describes the data will be comparatively lower.

Genuine out-of-sample testing is less than ideal for this project given the limited size of the sample available. However, it is possible to perform pseudo out-of-sample tests using cross-validation techniques. This involves dividing the dataset into two groups: the model is re-estimated on the first group (the training set) and then used to predict the outcomes of the second group (the test set). This can then be repeated for different specifications of the training and testing sets. The simplest technique is the holdout method, in which (typically) two-thirds of the data is randomly designated as the training set and the remaining third is the test set. The results of repeated tests are then averaged to obtain an estimate of the model’s accuracy. However, this tends to generate inaccurate results, and a better approach is to use k-fold cross-validation (Kohavi, 1995). The observations are randomly assigned to one of k mutually-exclusive segments (the ‘folds’). The model is re-estimated on k-1 segments, with the remaining segment used as the test set. This is repeated so that each segment is used as a test set exactly once. Repeating the entire process with observations re-categorised at random into new folds acts as a Monte-Carlo simulation to improve the accuracy of estimates (Kohavi, 1995). More complete validation methods are possible, such as leave-p-out tests using every possible combination of variables, but are more complex and may not offer an increase in accuracy (Kohavi, 1995).

The final step in predictive modelling is model criticism (Colaresi & Mahmood, 2017). Like residual analysis in regression, it involves examining the difference between predicted and observed values—the residuals—to identify any systematic discrepancies, which would indicate that an important variable has been omitted from the model or that the model has otherwise been misspecified. This is most commonly done using residual plots or other visualisations of the errors, which allow patterns to readily be identified. I therefore conclude the quantitative component by assessing the predicted outcomes of the nonviolent campaigns in the dataset against the actual outcomes, looking for similarities between incorrectly-predicted cases; identifying clear patterns would then require returning to the specification stage to try and improve model performance (Colaresi & Mahmood, 2017).

### 3.4. Qualitative component

As outlined in section one, the qualitative component of the study consists of two case studies which corroborate and expand on the findings of the quantitative component. The primary method of analysis is process tracing of the individual cases to examine the dynamics of personalisation and civil resistance campaign; comparative analysis of both cases is conducted in the integration section of the thesis. There are three main areas that I discuss in relation to how these studies have been carried out. The first is the overall design, including the specific objective of each case study and the process tracing method that I have employed. The second is the principles that guide case selection, including the
sampling scheme and how the qualitative cases relate to the quantitative data. The third is how data collection was carried out, particularly regarding the field research component. This part of the study involved a number of additional challenges, relating not only to how field research was positioned in the context of the overall thesis, but also the politically sensitive nature of the research topic. These factors resulted in some potential issues for information quality and participant safety, so how these were dealt with is addressed specifically below.

3.4.1. Case study design

The primary goal of the qualitative component is to evaluate and expand on the quantitative findings. Within it, the case studies each serve an individual purpose, in terms of their relation to the theoretical argument and quantitative results, their scope and limitations, and how they are carried out. George and Bennett (2005, 75-76) identify six possible types of case study, as shown in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4: Example case study objectives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atheoretical/configurative</td>
<td>In-depth description that can be used in subsequent studies but does not contribute to theory building itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>idiographic</td>
<td>Disciplined configurative Use of existing theory to explain a case, and highlighting areas where theory is insufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heuristic</td>
<td>Identification of new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, or causal pathways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory testing</td>
<td>Assesses the validity or scope conditions of single or competing theories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plausibility probe</td>
<td>Preliminary study to examine whether further analysis is warranted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building block</td>
<td>Examination of types or subtypes of a phenomenon for the purpose of building typologies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: George & Bennett (2005)

Within this framework, the purpose of the first case study is theory testing, that is, assessing the validity of the competitive weakness argument in regard to the specific case. Theory testing cases can either strengthen the evidence for a proposed theory by showing that it explains the outcomes well in a particular case, or weaken it by showing either that
hypothesised causes are in fact absent or that an alternative theory more accurately describes the process of events (George & Bennett, 2005). Cases for theory testing can be most likely, least likely, or crucial cases. For this study, I have used the People Power revolution against Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines as a most likely case, where the statistical results strongly predict that the theory should explain the outcome well. It asks whether Marcos indeed personalised power, as predicted by his long term in office, by removing constraints on his position and excluding other members of the political elite from control over decision-making and access to revenue. It also asks how this personalisation affected elites’ choices when the regime faced an external challenge, and what effect this had on the outcome of the campaign.

Despite the theory testing label, the case study does not follow strict falsificationist principles: existing qualitative work has already argued that personalisation resulted in Marcos’s downfall (Thompson, 1995; Lee, 2015) and so pretending ignorance prior to analysis is not appropriate. Rather, the benefit of using a most likely case is that it would cast strong doubt on the theory if it does not fit the case well (Eckstein, [1975] 2009). The intention is therefore to illustrate the dynamics involved by examining the processes involved in more detail, as well as to look for any discrepancies with the theoretical account and quantitative results that would challenge the theoretical account of personalisation and its effect on elite cohesion.

The purpose of the second case study is both theory testing and heuristic. It analyses a deviant or outlier case, where the predicted outcome differs greatly from the observed outcome, to examine whether the theory should explain this case well, or needs to be revised or rejected. If it is concluded that the theory ought to explain the outcome well, yet does not, then this is considered strong evidence against the theory. The purpose of a heuristic case study is also to inductively identify new variables or factors, with a particular focus on searching for anomalies, factors that cannot be explained by the existing theory, in order to challenge previous hypotheses and open up new avenues for investigation (George & Bennett, 2005). Because of this, heuristic case studies are particularly suited to analysing deviant cases (George & Bennett, 2005). In this study, Cambodia is identified as a particularly prominent outlier, where previous analysis (Strangio, 2014; Morgenbesser, 2018) and quantitative results presented in Chapter 4 strongly imply that there was a high level of personalisation prior to the 2013 civil resistance campaign, but the campaign was unsuccessful in bringing about regime change.

Both case studies are carried out using process tracing. This consists of making causal process observations, that is, identifying and analysing the intervening steps that connect personalisation with campaign success (George & Bennett, 2005, Mahoney, 2010). The

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31 George and Bennett (2005) point out that these labels are slightly misleading, as they imply that only a single case can be ‘most likely’ or ‘least likely’; instead, cases fall on a continuum between most and least likely, and are selected for their relative proximity to either ideal end.

32 Cf. Lijphart’s (1975) perhaps somewhat unrealistic criterion that researchers should know only the value of the single variable in question before embarking on a theory testing case study.
The purpose of process tracing is to see whether the theory actually worked in practice in the manner it is hypothesised to, and thus not only identifies intervening variables but shows that they causally connected in particular ways that are consistent with theoretical expectations (George & Bennett, 2005). As large-\( n \) statistical analysis is unable to do this, process tracing is essential to show that the hypothesised connection between independent variable and outcome in fact exists.

As with the quantitative component, while I acknowledge the impact of international factors—such as the withdrawal of support for the Marcos regime by the United States in 1986, and the continued support of the Chinese government for the Hun Sen regime in 2013—I have largely chosen to focus on domestic factors, as I am primarily interested in the effect of intra-regime power struggles on the campaign outcome. Hence, while I do not pretend that international factors play no part in influencing regime survival in response to civil resistance, I would turn to these factors only if internal factors prove to be insufficient to explain why the regimes collapsed or remained cohesive, respectively.

In presenting qualitative case studies, a balance needs to be struck between rich detail that remains faithful to source material and accurately reflects the nuances of the case, and a more abstract analytic structure that relates clearly to the theory guiding the study (George & Bennett, 2005). I have attempted to do so by first presenting summaries of the civil resistance campaigns to give the required context, then providing narratives of the process of personalisation in each instance. For the sake of clarity I have had to leave out a large amount of circumstantial detail, particularly in regard to the historical events that allowed the respective dictators in each case to rise to power in the first place; secondary sources cited in the text may be consulted for additional information.

### 3.4.2. Case selection principles

Case selection is an area that requires care, particularly in sequential or nested designs (Rohlfing, 2008). At its simplest, case selection can be probabilistic, where cases are selected using some form of random sampling, or purposive, where individual cases are deliberately chosen for a specific purpose (Collins, 2010). Beyond this, there are a number of possibilities; Collins (2010), for example, lists five random sampling schemes and 19 purposive schemes that can be used in mixed methods research, any of which may be most appropriate for a given study. For the second component specifically, I have used purposive sampling to select the two case studies for analysis. In line with the objectives of the case studies outlined above, I have used a confirming/disconfirming sampling scheme, in Collins’s (2010) formulation, which selects cases on their ability to validate or contradict the initial results of the quantitative component.\(^{33}\)

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\(^{33}\) ‘Confirming’ in this instance should be interpreted in the general sense of ‘providing evidence in favour of’, rather than decisively proving the theory.
There are two related points that need to be addressed before moving on. The first is the relationship between the case studies and the quantitative results. In Lieberman’s (2005, 437) nested analysis model, for example, comparison of on-the-line and deviant cases is only warranted when the initial statistical results are not deemed to be “robust and satisfactory.” Yet, as Lieberman acknowledges, this advice hinges on the researcher’s evaluation of what robust and satisfactory means. In practice, Toshkov (2016, 320) argues instead that testing and extending theory is better accomplished by comparing on-the-line and deviant cases even when the statistical model does a reasonably good job, as there will often be notable outliers even in models that otherwise fit the data very well, whereas if it performs very poorly there is no point in selecting on-the-line cases as none really exist. Following this advice, this study uses both an on-the-line and a deviant case for analysis.

The second point is whether the qualitative component should be nested or not – that is, whether the case studies should be cases that have already been examined in the quantitative component, or whether new cases should be used. Small (2011) notes that nesting is primarily useful where more detail is required on cases that have been used in the quantitative component, while non-nested designs are useful where flexibility is required. In this project, the Philippines case study is nested, as the purpose is to analyse the dynamics of a case from the quantitative component in more detail.

In contrast, the Cambodia case study is non-nested, meaning that it is not included in the quantitative dataset and was not used to obtain the results presented in Chapter 4.34 The motivation for using a non-nested case comes from the emphasis on prediction outlined earlier: a good theory should do well at predicting outcomes when exposed to new data or cases, as this shows that it is capturing an element of the underlying causal process(es) and has not simply been fit to ‘noise’ in the data. Cambodia is ideal as an out-of-sample case, as the only reason it is not included in the quantitative analysis is because the campaign had not concluded one way or the other before the end of 2013, instead ending in January 2014. Otherwise in all respects it is clearly a case of civil resistance that is compatible with the definition set out in the NAVCO project, as it consisted of a sustained, public series of primarily nonviolent actions in pursuit of an overtly political goal, and had a clear leadership and organisational structure. In comparison, out-of-sample cases that occurred before the beginning of the sample (i.e., 1946) could be more challenging to study due to the difficulty of gaining detailed data. Similarly, cases which have been missed from NAVCO (see, e.g., Lehoucq, 2016) or other sources which have been used to compile the dataset would also be problematic, as it would be difficult to disentangle the reasons they have been missed from the reasons why the outcomes deviate from theoretical and quantitative predictions, hence raising questions of comparability with other cases in the data.

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34 The Cambodia case is displayed in a visualisation of the data in section 4.1.6, but this is for comparative purposes only – data from Cambodia was not used to make the original calculations.
Note that only the principles guiding case selection are discussed here. The actual process of case selection, including assessment of how well the cases fit the quantitative results, discussion of potential alternatives, and explanation for why these particular cases were chosen, is set out in section 4.2 below, following presentation of the quantitative results.

### 3.4.3. Data collection

Data for the case studies has been drawn from secondary academic sources, particularly from area studies scholars focusing on the politics of the respective countries, as well as newspaper accounts and ‘grey literature’, i.e., government and NGO reports. For the Cambodia case study, I have also drawn on interview data and personal communications carried out during a field visit to the country from May-June 2017.

Much of the fieldwork methods literature in political science is intended for advanced liberal democracies, and has little to say about the unique challenges of doing this kind of work in authoritarian contexts (Rivera, Kozyreva & Saravoskii, 2002; Reny, 2016). These can include limited access to official data on both sensitive and non-sensitive topics, information control and censorship, surveillance of foreign researchers, difficulties accessing government officials, risk to participants and consequent reluctance to participate in research, potential insecurity of internet communication with research participants, and more (Reny, 2016). As a result, as pointed out by a number of scholars who have done fieldwork in authoritarian countries, prospective designs are likely to break down when researchers actually get to the field (e.g., Malekzadeh, 2016). Therefore I discuss not only what was planned, but what actually happened, both to document the exercise and to provide more perspective on the information that has been obtained.

**Purpose of field research**

Qualitative fieldwork plays a “critical role” in studying authoritarian regimes, through providing new insights, corroborating theoretical assumptions, and acting as a foundation for more abstract deductive and quantitative work (Goode & Ahram, 2016, 827). For this thesis, in addition, there was a more specific rationale for carrying out field research in Cambodia, namely, the lack of empirical data that is available on both the campaign and the political dynamics of the regime in secondary sources.

The lack of data is partly due to the fact that the campaign happened relatively recently, and so there has been little time for detailed research to be carried out and published.\(^{35}\) Indeed, in some ways the events of 2013 and their aftermath are still playing out in

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\(^{35}\) A successful campaign, of course, would likely have resulted in much more prompt and widespread analysis; as it is, unsuccessful or more peripheral campaigns typically receive less attention than successful or more dramatic cases from academics and non-academics alike (cf. Martin, Varney & Vickers, 2001).
Cambodia, with the consequences still unclear. On top of that, as Strangio (2014) points out, there is a notable lack of detailed analysis of Cambodian politics from the 2000s onwards, following the decline of Western interest in the country at the end of the 1990s. Academic research that is available is often either excellent but focused on aspects of Cambodian politics that are less relevant for this study (e.g., Hughes, 2003, 2006; Springer, 2010), or based on distressingly essentialist cultural explanations for political trends (e.g., Jacobsen & Stuart-Fox, 2013; see Springer, 2010, for a critique). Similarly, non-academic sources, especially NGO reports, are often extremely detailed and well-researched, but are focused on other issues such as corruption or human rights (e.g., Global Witness, 2009; CCHR, 2010).

A further problem, which became clear during field research, is the quality of information that is available. Access to the regime for outsiders, especially foreigners, is now virtually non-existent; only those very few Westerners who were able to build strong relationships with government officials in the 1990s and remain in the country retain any kind of access, and even that is becoming more restricted. I was told by several journalists, for example, that no journalists currently operating in the country have contacts within the ruling party, and that news reports are instead based on a combination of official pronouncements, rumours, and guesswork. While poor information quality is likely to be an unavoidable problem in studying any authoritarian regime, it makes disentangling claims based on solid evidence from those based on speculation extremely challenging; this is especially the case if things that ‘everybody knows’ but are in fact specious are repeated in academic or credible non-academic sources.

Given this situation, in-depth interviews serve two main purposes. First, they provide new information, especially regarding ‘unknown unknowns’, i.e., factors that the researcher is not even aware might exist or be important. Second, they can corroborate or challenge existing information, both directly and through offering additional perspectives on the reliability of the sources of that information. On top of this, time spent in Cambodia offered an opportunity to access the insider perspective, allowing me to refine my initial ideas and conclusions through conversation with those who have far more in-depth knowledge of the country, including its politics, history, and culture, than I could gain from the outside. Through this I was able to discard a number of avenues of inquiry that had initially appeared to be promising, but ultimately proved to have little

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36 This thesis was finalised in the months leading up to the 2018 general election, and shortly after the dissolution of the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) by the Supreme Court, a move effectively ordered by prime minister Hun Sen.

37 The shock result of the 2013 general election and the subsequent civil resistance campaign appear, thankfully, to have put descriptions of the inherently ‘passive’ or ‘subservient’ nature of ‘the Khmer’ to rest.

38 Phnom Penh-based journalist, personal communication, June 2017. Markowitz (2016, 898) describes a similar process in Uzbekistan, where informal barriers to access increased in the early 2000s before escalating to full closure after a crackdown on protests in 2005; access since then has reduced to a “trickle.”

39 Phnom Penh-based journalist, personal communication, June 2017.
explanatory leverage. As the conclusion that I reach regarding the power balance within Cambodia’s ruling party in some ways goes against the ‘received wisdom’ regarding prime minister Hun Sen's personalisation of power, this was also important for increasing my confidence in the overall findings of the case study that I present in Chapter 6.

**Design**

Research participants were selected using a purposive rather than probabilistic sampling scheme. Probability sampling was not appropriate because I was not carrying out a survey of Cambodian political elites or otherwise interested in generalising from interview data to a population (Tansey, 2007). Instead, I was interested in finding out specific information about events that have occurred in Cambodia’s recent history. Thanks to a grant from the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, I was also able to hire a research coordinator for the project. In the lead up to arriving in Cambodia my research coordinator was able to arrange a number of initial interviews with specific individuals who met the criterion of being well-informed about Cambodian politics. Additional participants were identified by asking interviewees, journalists, and other researchers I met for recommendations, as well as drawing on names mentioned in various news articles as important figures in Cambodian politics.

Interviews were planned to be open-ended rather than structured or semi-structured, beginning with an initial, extremely broad description of the topic but otherwise left to evolve as the interview continued. This was an attempt to address the heuristic purpose of the case study and to not shape interviewees’ responses in advance. It was also an attempt to keep the topic of the interviews ‘boring’, i.e., minimising the political sensitivity around the topic (Art, 2016). But although participants in these early interviews gave me extremely important pieces of information of their own accord, I felt that this occurred in spite of rather than because of the open-ended structure, and this information could also have been gained through more structured interviews that did not run the same risk of missing key points through failing to ask targeted questions. In addition, I found that I had to demonstrate clearly to participants that I was well-informed about the details of Cambodian politics in order to avoid overly general or uninformative answers. Hence, the structure of later interviews was altered to include both elements of undirected ‘chit-chat’ that could allow ‘unknown unknowns’ to emerge, as well as targeted questions about specific information that I needed.

In general, my prior lack of experience with interview methods meant that some early interviews were less successful than hoped for, as I missed openings for possible expansion on areas that later turned out to be of great interest or tried to cover too many topics in too short a time. But as Sæther (2006) points out, these initial difficulties are a common feature of fieldwork for graduate students, which typically involves a lot of trial and error. To facilitate the self-learning process, I kept a research diary that included notes on how the interviews went, as well as the content, and set aside specific time for critical reflection on what went well, what did not, and what I could do better next time.
Through this process I felt that my interviewing skills had significantly improved towards the end of the fieldwork period, and much of the more important material in the case study resulted from these later interviews.

An additional complication was the quan → qual structure of the study: selecting cases for qualitative analysis on the basis of quantitative results leaves little room for incorporating factors such as availability, practicality, or personal familiarity into the selection process, particularly when there are few options to choose from, as was the case here. This issue has yet to receive attention in the mixed methods literature, but meant beginning the case study with little background knowledge, no language skills, and no established contacts in the country.\(^{40}\)

In practice, though, carrying out fieldwork as part of a mixed design did not end up posing major difficulties. While prior experience in Cambodia would have been helpful in many areas, I was still able to collect what I consider to be adequate data. To make up for lack of prior familiarity with the context, I read intensively on Cambodia’s history and politics in the several months prior to the visit, with immersion in the literature made easier by the flexibility of a graduate timetable. Language did not present a serious barrier: because of extensive Western intervention in Cambodia, most educated and politically-engaged Cambodians can speak English well, and the majority of interviews were carried out comfortably in English. My research coordinator was also able to interpret for non-English speaking interviewees. In fact, probably the most important factor that made field research possible was being able to work with an excellent research coordinator who had extensive networks in the country; this was an invaluable part of the project, and is a key recommendation I would make to other researchers carrying out fieldwork under similar circumstances.

**Data reliability**

Getting access to government officials in authoritarian contexts is challenging even when the topic of research is not sensitive. Government officials may be suspicious of the researcher’s motives, or worry about the consequences of divulging information that they later find out was not permitted. Even when interviews can be secured, officials may prefer to toe the party line, making it difficult to get direct answers to important questions even for experienced researchers (Markowitz, 2016). Indeed, I found this to be the case in my fieldwork, and I succeeded in interviewing only three government-aligned figures.\(^{41}\)

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\(^{40}\) Köker (2014) provides a descriptive case study of elite interviewing as part of a nested framework in a graduate research project. However, the range of countries to be selected from was much more restricted than for this project, and the author was able to draw on existing language skills, experience, and contacts in several of the countries. This may be a helpful way of approaching the issue of integrating field research into mixed methods studies.

\(^{41}\) A further complication with pushing for information was that these interviews were secured through my coordinator’s personal contacts; while very direct questions may have achieved a
As a result, it is often easier for researchers—especially those who have had limited engagement with the country—to speak to opposition-aligned figures, as they are more likely to be interested in their claims being heard. Yet this raises the potential for bias in the data that is collected. While opposition figures are often doing a remarkable job under extremely trying circumstances, they still have an agenda, and an interest in painting the government in as negative a light as possible. As Goode and Ahram (2016) point out, this means that their claims need to be treated critically and with reflexivity, so that the researcher does not simply repeat one-sided accounts that may not be entirely accurate.

While it may not be possible to eliminate these potential sources of bias completely, I endeavoured to minimise them as much as possible using a number of strategies. The first is that, although I was not able to access large numbers of government officials, I tried to still talk to as wide a range of participants as possible, including not only opposition activists but also independent analysts, civil society members who at least claimed political neutrality, and figures critical of the opposition itself. A second strategy was to cross-reference any key or controversial claims with other sources, including asking subsequent interviewees who were not affiliated with the initial source of the claim. I also asked interviewees about their source for the information, such as whether they had gained this directly from speaking to members of the ruling party (as was sometimes the case) or whether it was something that ‘everybody knows’. Where uncertainty remains, in the case study presented in Chapter 6 I have noted this and qualified my claims accordingly.

Safety considerations

A final important consideration was the safety of participants in the project. Despite a relatively long period where overt repression had been quite uncommon, Cambodia is still an authoritarian state, and hence there was a non-negligible risk to anyone who elected to speak with me about such a politically sensitive topic. The crackdown that began some weeks after the end of the field visit and is ongoing at the time of writing (detailed in the postscript at the end of the thesis) proves that this is not just an abstract idea, but that real consequences for criticising the government were and are possible. Indeed, following the field visit, one person who I had interviewed was charged with a serious crime as a result of a phone conversation that had been intercepted by the government, and has had to go into exile to avoid imprisonment as a result.42 Data from the interview had to be withdrawn from the thesis in response, out of concerns for further consequences for the participant’s safety. A second participant had their email and social media accounts response, as Markowitz (2016) suggests, I was concerned about possible ramifications for my coordinator following my departure from the field.

42 Any more details need to be omitted for the sake of anonymity; I do wish to emphasise, however, that the government’s accusations were unrelated to this research project, and I have no reason to think that any breach of security took place regarding my field recordings or notes.
hacked at around the same time, although they were subsequently happy to confirm quotes which have been included in the case study. Hence, I will describe the ethics and security arrangements I had planned, as well as what happened in the field.

The field research project underwent ethics approval through the University of Otago’s human research ethics committee. Participants were given copies of the project description and explanation of the ethics and security considerations in English or Khmer, as appropriate. This gave information about the general purpose of the project, although this description was slightly sanitised to make the project sound more politically neutral if it received any official attention. I had intended to bring up the more sensitive aspects of the research only if participants gave an indication that they would be willing to talk about these; in practice, however, I was surprised at how willing most participants were to address these topics directly.

Participants were invited to choose a location for the interview that suited them, and usually this was either cafes or their offices. Because of concerns about possible reluctance to sign paperwork, consent was obtained verbally, as well as specific details about whether and how participants were willing to be quoted. With participants’ permission interviews were recorded for later transcription; in a few cases, permission was withheld, so I took notes by hand, or on one or two occasions when that was also unacceptable, noted down key points as soon as possible after the interview had ended. Participants were invited to turn off the recorder if they wished to talk about particularly sensitive or identifying points and I also encouraged my coordinator to bring this option up as appropriate during the interview; this occurred several times during the project. Participants were also invited to cut the interview short as required, although in the end this was not a problem.

Following interviews, I transcribed the recording as soon as possible during downtime. Transcriptions were given an individual code and personally identifying information was removed; the list of codes was kept on a secure university server located in New Zealand. Both transcription and recording were then uploaded to the same server using the Syncplicity program, which was set up on my device in consultation with the university’s information security team. Files uploaded in this way are encrypted, so that insecure WiFi or 3G/4G connections are not a security risk. Locally stored copies were then deleted; recordings were stored on the audio recorder in a micro-SD card which also transferred to my device, so no separate copies were stored on the recorder. As a basic security precaution the device was kept on me at all times when away from my hotel room. In the event of unwelcome official attention it would have been possible to wipe the device quickly, and I also prepared its remote wiping function in case it was stolen, although luckily neither was required.

Explicit permission was obtained for all direct quotations, and these were confirmed in context via email following the field visit. Although many of those interviewed gave permission for their name to be used with quotations, and even requested it at the time, because of the ongoing crackdown referred to earlier and described at the end of the thesis, I have chosen to make all quotations anonymous. Participants are instead referred
to using a very general, non-identifying title only, such as ‘independent political analyst’ or ‘former government minister’.
4. Quantitative analysis

This chapter presents the results of the quantitative component of the study. As described in Chapter 3, the purpose of this component is to systematically examine whether the establishment of personal autocracy is associated with the outcome of nonviolent uprisings, consistent with the theoretical argument developed in Chapter 2. The chapter itself is broken into two major sections. In the first section I give the main quantitative results. I first give basic descriptions of the data, highlighting the correlation between the two measures of personal autocracy—the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) personal or personal-hybrid category and the ruler’s time in power—and the outcome of civil resistance campaigns. I then present the results of explanatory regression analysis, including coefficient estimates, statistical significance, and measures of model fit. Following this, I report the results of predictive analysis, with both in-sample and pseudo-out-of-sample measures of predictive accuracy, and carry out model criticism by examining the residuals of the predictive models for any systematic discrepancies.

The second section integrates the quantitative and qualitative components of the thesis by using these findings to select cases for qualitative analysis. Candidate cases are those where the quantitative results indicate that the regime is likely to be an established personal autocracy. I then identify the specific cases for analysis by comparing predicted with actual campaign outcomes, with on-the-line cases being those where these outcomes match and deviant cases being those where they diverge. Given the resulting lists of possible case studies, I then explain why I have chosen the Philippines 1986 and Cambodia 2013 cases for the qualitative component.

4.1. Results

4.1.1. Descriptive results

84 cases of civil resistance campaigns seeking the overthrow of authoritarian regimes between 1946 and 2013 are identified, including 47 successes, 34 failures, and three cases which could not be unambiguously classified into either category. Figure 4.1 (next page) shows the distribution of cases over time, revealing two clear peaks in campaign activity. The first consists primarily of the movements that led to and followed the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the second consists of the events of the Arab Spring beginning in 2011. Successes peaked during the decade from 1985, but have declined since then. There has been an especially noticeable drop since the mid-2000s, with approximately 75% of campaigns between 2005 and 2013 failing to succeed in ousting the incumbent autocrat.
Figure 4.1: Frequency of campaigns over time by outcome, 1946-2013

![Bar chart showing frequency of campaigns over time by outcome from 1950 to 2015. The x-axis represents peak campaign year in 5-year increments, ranging from 1950 to 2015. The y-axis represents the number of campaigns. The chart is segmented by outcome, with bars for failure, unable to be coded, and success. The note indicates that 5-yearly increments are used and that no campaigns are recorded for the periods 1946-1950 and 1961-1965.]

Note: 5-yearly increments. No campaigns are recorded for the periods 1946-1950 and 1961-1965

Figure 4.2: Campaign outcome by GWF regime type

![Bar chart showing campaign outcome by GWF regime type, with categories for non-personalist and personalist. The x-axis represents GWF regime classification, with bars for success and failure. The note indicates that campaigns which cannot be unambiguously classified are excluded.]

Note: campaigns which cannot be unambiguously classified are excluded
Figure 4.2 (previous page) illustrates the relationship between campaign outcome and personal autocracy based on the GWF typology. Regimes in the GWF typology that have experienced a substantial degree of consolidation of power by the autocrat—those labelled ‘personal’ or ‘personal-hybrid’ types—are combined into the category ‘personalist’, while others are designated ‘non-personalist’. Consistent with the theoretical argument, the chart shows that civil resistance has been more successful against personalist regimes, with more than twice as many campaigns succeeding as failing, while outcomes against non-personalist regimes are much more evenly balanced. Pearson’s chi-squared test indicates that the observed difference would be unlikely if campaign outcome and the GWF measure of personal autocracy were in fact unrelated ($p = 0.076$).

Figure 4.3 (next page) presents a visualisation of the relationship between the ruler’s time in power and campaign outcome. Campaigns are divided into ‘high’ and ‘low’ participation campaigns for illustrative purposes; as would be expected given the central importance of participation in campaign success highlighted by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), none of the successful cases were ‘low participation’ campaigns involving fewer than 10,000 participants. In terms of failed campaigns, a group of cases are clustered around the sample mean of 11.25 years, including Belarus in 2006, Poland in 1968, and the Arab Spring cases of Bahrain, Morocco, and Syria in 2011. The Saffron revolution in Myanmar in 2007 stands out slightly, with the ruler, General Than Shwe, having been in office at the time for 15 years. Three small campaigns failed to overthrow long-tenure incumbents in Egypt in 2004, Yugoslavia in 1968, and Sudan in 2011; due to their low participation, however, these would not be expected to succeed regardless of the regime’s internal power dynamics. Campaigns also failed to unseat Iranian leader Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei in 2009 and Guinea’s Lansana Conte in 2007, who had been in power for 20 and 23 years prior to the onset of the campaigns, respectively. As these were relatively large campaigns (at least 10,000 participants) but were unsuccessful against leaders who, based on the theoretical argument, would be expected to have consolidated personal power, these cases stand out as notable outliers. Otherwise, the remainder of the failed cases were against leaders who had been in power for less than around a decade or so, where power-sharing agreements within the respective regimes are more likely to have remained in place.

43 A small number of cases in the dataset are not included because the country falls under the 1,000,000 population threshold for inclusion in the GWF data, such as the campaign against the Hoyte regime in Guyana from 1990-1991.

44 Substantively the same relationship is obtained if regimes labelled solely as ‘personal’ are compared with all other regime types; see the appendix for more details.
Figure 4.3: Autocrat tenure by campaign outcome, 1946-2013

Note: High participation ≥10,000 and low participation <10,000 active participants in a single or closely-related series of protest events

Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics, autocrat’s time in power at campaign peak year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign outcome</th>
<th>Time in power (years)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Min</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Success (n=47)</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure (n=34)</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: campaigns which cannot be unambiguously classified excluded

In contrast, there have been far more successes against long-serving autocrats: 21 campaigns succeeded against autocrats who had been in power longer than the sample mean, with autocrat tenure in eight cases exceeding the maximum for the failed cases. Examples include prominent instances of successful civil resistance, such as campaigns against Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Tunisia’s Ben Ali in 2011, Indonesia’s Suharto in 1999, Iran’s Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1979, and Haiti’s Jean-Claude Duvalier and the Philippines’ Ferdinand Marcos in 1986.45 Notably, a number of these long-tenure cases have been highlighted in previous work as examples of highly personalised regimes (e.g., Thompson, 1995; Chehabi & Linz, 1998; Lee, 2015). While there are also successful cases

45 Refer to the appendix for a full case list.
against regimes with shorter leader tenure—I do not argue that civil resistance can only succeed against personal autocracies—the average leader tenure in cases where civil resistance succeeded is approximately 4.5 years longer than for those where it failed. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U and t-tests both indicate that the observed difference would be highly unlikely if there were in fact no relationship between tenure and campaign outcome ($p = 0.028$ and $0.022$, respectively).

### 4.1.2. Explanatory results

Table 4.2 (next page) gives the result of logistic regression on the full sample of cases from 1946-2013 with campaign outcome as the dependent variable. Model 1 is the main model developed in Section 3.3.3, including both measures of personal autocracy as well as the control variables. As expected, GWF personalist regime type and leader tenure are both statistically significant and positively associated with campaign success. Each additional year that a leader is in power is found to increase the odds of campaign success by approximately 9%, which I have argued to be caused by the increasing likelihood that the regime has become an established personal autocracy. Similarly, the odds of success versus failure for campaigns against regimes classified as personal or personal-hybrid are more than three times higher than those against non-personalist regimes. Campaign size is statistically significant and positively associated with success, mirroring Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) central finding about the role of participation in civil resistance success. Population size also is found to be statistically significant but negatively associated with campaign success, while the effect of the other independent variables cannot confidently be distinguished from zero.

Model 1a is re-estimated with leader age and ruling coalition spell duration included as independent variables in order to test whether time in power is actually capturing leaders’ increasing age and the corresponding decrease in elites’ time horizons or structural declines in autocratic stability, respectively. Although the $p$-values for leader tenure and personalist regime type both increase—which is not surprising, given the increased ratio of variables to observations and the relatively small sample size—age and ruling coalition spell duration are both statistically insignificant. Furthermore, the likelihood-ratio test against the more restricted Model 1 indicates that adding the two additional variables does not significantly improve model fit ($p = 0.886$), and so they should not be included in a model describing the data.

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46 In addition to the standard use of asterisks to indicate $p$-values below typical alpha levels, I have also opted to report the full $p$-values for each variable to aid in accurate interpretation of the variables’ statistical significance (see, e.g., Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016).
### Table 4.2: Regression results, full sample (1946-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1a</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \beta )</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>( p )</td>
<td></td>
<td>( \beta )</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>( p )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader tenure</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>1.091</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>1.091</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.046</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWF personalist</td>
<td>1.174</td>
<td>3.236</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1.081</td>
<td>2.948</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.693</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.738</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader age</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.995</td>
<td>0.886</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.033</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruling coalition spell duration</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>0.973</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.020</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>1.229</td>
<td>0.774</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>1.235</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.721</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.734</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Peak year</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>0.980</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>0.982</td>
<td>0.349</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.019</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.020</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legislature</td>
<td>-0.659</td>
<td>0.517</td>
<td>0.491</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.614</td>
<td>0.541</td>
<td>0.530</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.958</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic divide</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>0.971</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>0.951</td>
<td>0.955</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.894</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil production</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>1.074</td>
<td>0.848</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>1.075</td>
<td>0.844</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.368</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-0.510</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>-0.485</td>
<td>0.616</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.252</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.262</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign size</td>
<td>0.949</td>
<td>2.584</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.915</td>
<td>2.497</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>n</th>
<th>74</th>
<th>74</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>0.857</td>
<td>0.855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosmer-Lemeshow ( X^2 )</td>
<td>4.764</td>
<td>4.797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood-ratio</td>
<td>-34.298***</td>
<td>-34.419</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Logit regression using penalised MLE, standard errors in italics, intercept not reported. * \( p < 0.1 \), ** \( p < 0.05 \), *** \( p < 0.01 \). Likelihood-ratio test for Model 1 against intercept-only model; for Model 1a against Model 1.*

Table 4.3 (p. 84) gives the results for the same models re-estimated on the restricted sample from 1970-2013, intended to account for possible selection bias in the earlier part of the NAVCO data as explained in Chapter 3. Model 2 shows that leader tenure remains statistically significant and positive. In the restricted sample peak year is also significant and negative, matching the observation that success rates have been declining since around the 1980s, as indicated in Figure 4.1. Oil production is similarly significant and
negative, while campaign participation remains significant and positive. Unlike Model 1, population size in the restricted sample does not reach typical thresholds for statistical significance. Interestingly, personalist regime type loses statistical significance, with a likelihood-ratio test indicating that its addition does not significantly improve fit for Model 2 ($p = 0.405$). This suggests that there is indeed some inconsistency in the data, although it may also be due to the fact that both measures of personal autocracy capture aspects of the same underlying concept. Indeed, tests for collinearity indicate that tenure and GWF personalist regime type are correlated, although the association is not strong enough to cause problems for regression (see the appendix for details). Furthermore, when tenure is dropped from the model, the $p$-value for personalist regime type decreases substantially, suggesting that the connection between time in power and probability that personal autocracy has been established may be accounting for the discrepancy. I return to this point below with the AIC-based model selection results.

As before, Model 2a includes leader age and ruling coalition spell duration to rule out competing explanations for the connection between the leader’s time in office and campaign outcome. Again, the $p$-value of leader tenure rises (but remains low), but neither variable is found to be statistically significant. Also as before, the addition of the two variables is not found to improve model fit. Hence, I conclude that the leader’s age and the length of time the particular ruling coalition has held power do not adequately explain the relationship between leader tenure and campaign outcome identified in either the full or the restricted sample.
Table 4.3: Regression results, temporally-restricted sample (1970-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Model 2</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Model 2a</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>$p$</td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader tenure</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>1.123</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td><strong>0.102</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF personalist</td>
<td>0.621</td>
<td>1.860</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>0.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.795</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruling coalition spell duration</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>-0.464</td>
<td>0.629</td>
<td>0.570</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.817</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peak year</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>0.925</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td><strong>-0.075</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature</td>
<td>-0.513</td>
<td>0.599</td>
<td>0.608</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic divide</td>
<td>0.866</td>
<td>2.377</td>
<td>0.489</td>
<td>1.419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.252</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil production</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td><strong>-0.001</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>1.131</td>
<td>0.760</td>
<td>0.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-0.339</td>
<td>0.713</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>-0.472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign size</td>
<td>0.868</td>
<td>2.383</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td><strong>0.773</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.323</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| $n$                  | 64          |          | 64           |          |
| AUC                  | 0.902       |          | 0.905        |          |
| Hosmer-Lemeshow $X^2$| 4.594       |          | 9.297        |          |
| Likelihood-ratio     | -24.680***  |          | -23.977      |          |

Note: Logit regression using penalised MLE, standard errors in italics, intercept not reported. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Likelihood-ratio test for Model 1a against intercept-only model; for Model 1 against Model 1.

Given the relatively limited theoretical and empirical guidance for model specification in this area, together with the changing standard error on the personalist regime type variable on the two different samples, I also carry out post-analysis model selection using AIC as described in Chapter 3. This is intended both to assess the evidence in favour of inclusion for the independent variables I have identified and to select the best model(s) for describing the data, balancing model fit against the likelihood of overfit. Given the evidence that there may indeed be selection biases in the earlier part of the sample, I limit
this to the restricted sample from 1970-2013. Results are presented in Table 4.4 (next page).

Exhaustive screening of every possible combination of independent variables gives the relative importance \( w_{+1} \) of each; as mentioned earlier, values closer to 1 indicate stronger evidence for inclusion in a model describing the data, with values above 0.9 considered strong evidence, values from 0.6-0.9 moderate evidence, values from 0.5-0.6 only weak evidence and anything below 0.5 essentially negligible (Burnham & Anderson, 2002, 75-77). Participation (0.983), personalist regime type (0.952), peak year (0.939), and leader tenure (0.918) all have strong evidence in favour of inclusion, while oil production (0.807) and population size (0.694) have moderate evidence in favour. There is no evidence on the basis of AIC for using the remaining independent variables.

AIC values indicates that there are two ‘best’ models for describing the data, shown in Table 4.4 as Model 3 and 4. Both include campaign size, leader tenure, peak year, and oil production, while Model 3 also include population size. Although personalist regime type is given high variable importance on the basis of AIC, its addition to either model increases AIC by ~2, indicating that it does not provide meaningful additional explanatory value (see Arnold, 2010). Likelihood-ratio tests for the models with and without the regime type variable also indicate that its addition does not significantly improve model fit, while AUC values indicate that predictive accuracy actually decreases slightly when it is added. As a result, I drop the GWF personalist regime type variable from these models.

With the exception of population size, all variables in Models 3 and 4 are highly statistically significant, with the coefficients in the expected direction. Higher participation in campaigns increases the probability of success, while civil resistance in larger or oil-producing countries is less likely to succeed. In general, civil resistance is becoming less successful as time goes on, possibly due to the authoritarian learning effect discussed in Chapter 3. Most importantly for the purposes of this thesis, however, civil resistance is more likely to succeed the longer an individual ruler is in power, which I argue indicates the underlying probability of personal autocracy having been established. This variable is not only statistically but also substantively significant: with other variables held at their means, the predicted probability of campaign success from 1970-2013, averaged across the two models, rises from 27% in the ruler’s first year in power to 97.7% at the sample maximum of 35 years in office.

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47 Results regarding the measures of personal autocracy are substantively the same when AIC model selection is performed on the full sample, although in-sample predictive performance is poorer, likely due to the aforementioned inconsistencies in the data (see the appendix).
48 See the appendix for a list of the top models with AIC values.
Table 4.4: AIC-based model selection results for restricted sample (1970-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$w_{(0)}$</td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Campaign size</strong></td>
<td>0.983</td>
<td>0.883</td>
<td>2.418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peak year</strong></td>
<td>0.939</td>
<td>-0.087</td>
<td>0.917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leader tenure</strong></td>
<td>0.918</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>1.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oil production</strong></td>
<td>0.807</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td>0.694</td>
<td>-0.330</td>
<td>0.719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GWF personalist</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.952</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ruling coalition spell duration</strong></td>
<td>0.409</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic divide</strong></td>
<td>0.335</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP</strong></td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leader age</strong></td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legislature</strong></td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military</strong></td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n$</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>0.898</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosmer-Lemeshow $X^2$</td>
<td>2.154</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood-ratio</td>
<td>-27.684***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Logit regression using penalised MLE, standard errors in italics, intercept not reported. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Likelihood-ratio tests against intercept-only models.

The possible presence of a selection effect on these results needs to be considered. It could be the case that activists become more discriminating in their choice to initiate civil resistance the longer a given leader is in power, choosing to launch an uprising against only those autocrats who are weakest. Yet I find that there is little evidence for this. Figure 4.4 (next page) shows that the proportion of authoritarian regimes experiencing campaign onset does not substantially vary with leader tenure. Although a slight positive trend is observed, the 95% confidence intervals are broad and the relationship is not found to be statistically significant ($p = 0.241$). There is therefore insufficient evidence to
conclude that the observed relationship between autocrat tenure and campaign outcome is due to a selection effect.49

Figure 4.4: Autocratic regimes experiencing campaign onset by tenure, 1946-2008

![Graph showing proportion of autocratic regimes over autocrat's time in office]

**Note:** Black line is a locally-weighted estimate of the average proportion with shaded 95% confidence intervals

### 4.1.3. Predictive results

I next assess the predictive accuracy of the models developed above. The measure for this is AUC, which as explained earlier is a single-figure evaluation of the models’ overall ability to discriminate between successful and failed campaigns. An AUC value of 0.5 is equivalent to randomly guessing—hence this is the baseline, rather than 0—with figures above 0.7 considered good, above 0.8 very good, and above 0.9 excellent in comparative political science.50 Table 4.5 shows that Model 1, estimated on the full sample, performs very well at 0.857, while Model 2, estimated on the restricted sample, achieves an

49 Similarly, as mentioned earlier, Braithwaite, Braithwaite, and Kucik (2015) and Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) find that leader tenure is not related to campaign onset, further evidence against the results being driven by a selection effect.

excellent 0.902. Models 3 and 4 also achieve very good AUC scores, which is particularly notable given the small number of predictors they contain and the general unpredictability of other areas of civil resistance (cf. Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017).

Table 4.5: AUC results from in-sample and pseudo-out-of-sample tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In-sample AUC</th>
<th>Cross-validated AUC</th>
<th>Loss of accuracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>0.857</td>
<td>0.725</td>
<td>-0.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>0.902</td>
<td>0.778</td>
<td>-0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 3</td>
<td>0.898</td>
<td>0.863</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 4</td>
<td>0.890</td>
<td>0.861</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I then repeat this test on pseudo-out-of-sample data to check whether the models may suffer from overfit. This is done using a 4-fold cross-validation. Cases are randomly assigned to one of four subsets (the ‘folds’), the relevant model is re-estimated on three of these, and its performance then scored on how well it predicts the outcome of the remaining subset (Kohavi, 1995). This is repeated once for each remaining subset, then the entire process repeated 10 times and the results averaged. The predictive metric is the AUC; as mentioned earlier, models that are overfit to the data are likely to suffer from a notable drop in AUC when cross-validated (Ward, Greenhill, & Bakke, 2010).

The larger models 1 and 2 both suffer a fairly sizeable drop in predictive accuracy when cross-validated, decreasing by 13.2 and 12.4 percentage points respectively. This suggests that overfit may be a problem; indeed, the inclusion of several extra variables in these models that are not statistically significant makes this unsurprising, as adding parameters to regression models nearly always improves accuracy on in-sample data even if they are not actually relevant. The AIC-selected models perform much better, with AUC decreasing by only 3.5 and 2.9 percentage points respectively. As Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke (2010) have argued, small decreases in predictive ability on out-of-sample data compared to in-sample data constitute stronger evidence that a model captures some element of a real causal process (Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke, 2010). These two models thus perform very well at predicting campaign outcomes while having a minimal risk of overfit. As a result, the findings about the direction, size, and significance of leader tenure, campaign size, oil production, campaign peak year, and to a lesser extent population can be treated with a high degree of confidence.
4.1.4. Model criticism

The final part of this analysis involves carrying out model criticism by evaluating the results of prediction to look for systematic discrepancies that might indicate that important factors have been missed in the model development process (Colaresi & Mahmood, 2017). An average predicted outcome for each case is calculated using the coefficients of the three models (2, 3, and 4) that are estimated on the restricted sample from 1970-2013; simple averaging of multiple models has been shown to improve accuracy in predictions, while more complex averaging methods may not offer a substantial improvement in accuracy (Graefe et al., 2015; cf. Montgomery, Hollenbach & Ward, 2012).

Figure 4.5 (p. 91) gives a visual representation of the accuracy of these predictions. The y axis is the absolute difference between the predicted outcome and the observed outcome for each case; higher values mean more inaccurate predictions, while lower values mean that the predicted outcome was close to the actual outcome. Given the issues highlighted earlier with the use of authoritarian regime typologies, and the mixed results I have found in this chapter for the GWF typology, I use leader tenure as the measure of personal autocracy along the x axis. Thus as well as allowing for the identification of patterns in all mispredicted cases, Figure 4.5 also highlights cases where the expected relationship between personal autocracy and campaign outcome has broken down.

To aid interpretation, I have added visual guides to the chart. The horizontal line at y = 0.5 represents a basic classification threshold between ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ predictions; in other words, points below the line are closer to being right than they are wrong (‘correct’), while points above the line are closer to being wrong than they are right (‘incorrect’). The vertical line at x = 10 is an approximate boundary between those cases that are unlikely to feature high levels of personalisation and those where the leader’s long tenure would be expected to have resulted from personalisation of power. This point is derived from Svolik’s (2012) finding that the proportion of autocrats suffering coups d’état declines after the first decade in power as a result of the successfully consolidation of personal autocracy, but is intended primarily for visual reference and should not be taken too literally.

The chart can therefore be approximately divided into four quadrants. The lower-left quadrant contains cases where the models have predicted the outcome accurately, but factors other than the establishment of personal autocracy are likely to have played a more important role, as the autocrat’s short time in office is suggestive of a power-sharing regime being in place. Examples include Greece in 1974, Uruguay in 1984, and Mongolia in 1990. The top-left quadrant similarly contains cases where personal autocracy is not expected to have played a major role, but where the predicted outcome is inaccurate.

51 For visual clarity, not all of the points in Figure 4.5 are labelled; a complete list of all cases with the difference between predicted and actual outcome is provided in the appendix.
indicating that the models have not captured the factors explaining the outcome. These include Panama in 1989, where General Manuel Noriega was removed from power by a United States invasion of the country in the context of an ongoing campaign, and Nepal in 2006, where a civil resistance campaign opposed the constitutional monarch King Gyanendra’s establishment of a new monarchical regime.
Figure 4.5: Error in predicted outcome by leader tenure
Note to Figure 4.5 (previous page): Point size indicates outlier status with regard to theoretical relationship between tenure and outcome. ‘Cambodia 2013’ case is not in the original data used to generate predicted outcomes, but is included for visual comparison.

More relevant in terms of the causal explanation advanced in this thesis are the right-hand quadrants. The lower-right quadrant indicates cases that match the theory well, in other words, where autocrat tenure implies a high level of personalisation and the predicted campaign outcomes (mostly successes) closely fit the actual outcomes. These cases include the campaign against Suharto in Indonesia in 1998, the 2005 campaign in the Maldives against Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, and the 1986 overthrow of Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier in Haiti. The upper-right quadrant includes cases that are outliers in regards to the relationship between autocrat tenure and outcome. Most notable is the failed campaign against Guinea’s Lansana Conté in 2007 (the out-of-sample Cambodia case from 2013 is included as a reference point). Other cases such as the Saffron Revolution in Myanmar in 2007 and the campaign in Belarus in 2006 are also outliers, but to a lesser extent than Guinea 2007.

In total 12 cases are predicted ‘inaccurately’, with the estimated probability of success more than 0.5 away from the actual outcome. These cases do not appear to show any obvious geographical or temporal grouping. The coding scheme used to classify outcomes as successes or failures appear to be responsible for a portion of these; a dichotomous classification is difficult to apply in cases where campaigns ended after obtaining concessions, such as Poland 1976, and Guinea 2007, or where the effects of the campaign were substantially delayed, such as (perhaps) Myanmar 2007. In other cases, a conjunction of multiple events makes it difficult to clearly classify outcomes. For example, the Panama 1989 campaign is predicted to have had a high chance of success (0.86) but the outcome is coded as a ‘failure’ because the leader, Manuel Noriega, was removed from power by a United States invasion of the country rather than due to the direct effect of protests. Syria 2011 is a similar example, where the nonviolent uprising was replaced by armed insurgency and the breakdown of central government control over large portions of the country. Otherwise, it is not obvious that there are any other variables that would explain the discrepancy between predicted and actual outcomes for a significant number of these cases that could be included in the regression models. Hence, I conclude that there are no systematic features of the cases themselves that explain why they succeeded or failed that should be included as independent variables in the models that have been developed.

4.1.5. Summary

The purpose of this component of the thesis has been to test statistically whether personal autocracies are more likely to collapse in response to civil resistance than power-sharing regimes. Overall, I find strong support for the argument. Basic description of the data shows that campaigns against regimes classified as personal or personal hybrid by
Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) are more than twice as likely to succeed as to fail. Similarly, campaigns against leaders who have been in power for more than around a decade—and, as I have argued, are likely to have done so by establishing a personal autocracy to minimise the main threat to their survival in power, elite rebellion—show much higher rates of success than failure. Indeed, only three major civil resistance campaigns failed to unseat an autocrat who had been in office for longer than the sample mean of 11.25 years, while 21 succeeded, an extraordinary relationship given that these cases cut across markedly different countries in terms of time, culture, geography, and international context.

Regression analysis shows that these relationships largely hold when other factors are taken into account. Results for the GWF regime typology are somewhat mixed, but given the more general issues surrounding regime typologies discussed earlier in Chapters 2 and 3, this was not entirely unexpected. More importantly, the alternative measure of personal autocracy that I develop in this thesis, the autocrat’s time in power, is significantly and consistently associated with campaign outcome. I am further able to dismiss alternative explanations for this relationship by showing that age and more general factors related to the wider structure of the regime do not adequately account for the observed outcomes. As a result, I conclude that the increasing likelihood that a ruler has survived in office by establishing a personal autocracy the longer they are in power is the best explanation for this relationship.

Further support for the relationship between time in power and campaign outcome is provided using AIC-based model selection and predictive analysis. AIC values indicate that leader tenure, as well as campaign size and peak year, oil production, and to a lesser extent population size, are strong explanatory variables for campaign outcome. Parsimonious models consisting of only these variables indicate that the association is statistically significant and that the models have high levels of predictive accuracy. Leader tenure in particular is also substantively significant, with the estimated probability of success rising from 27% in the ruler’s first year to 97.7% at the sample maximum of 35 years in power, with other factors held at their means.

Pseudo-out-of-sample testing shows that the initial larger models may suffer from a degree of overfit, but the AIC-selected models perform well when faced with new data, strongly implying that they are in fact capturing an element of the underlying causal processes. Indeed, using 0.5 as a basic decision-making threshold, the models I have developed are able to correctly predict the outcome of 84% of civil resistance campaigns that occurred between 1970 and 2013. This degree of accuracy is particularly notable given both the small number of predictors involved and the apparent unpredictability of campaign onset (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). Analysis of the errors suggests that these are mostly due to either the difficulty of forcing complex political phenomena into restrictive coding schemes or idiosyncratic features of individual cases, rather than the omission of important independent variables.

One final point to note from these findings is that, while the importance of campaign participation and changing success rates over time has been highlighted in previous work
(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011), the importance of the autocrat’s time in office—and its implications for the likelihood of personalisation—has not been identified in civil resistance research to date. Indeed, I argue that the strong and consistent association between tenure and campaign outcome only makes sense in the light of theories of authoritarian politics which relate time in office to intra-regime power struggles. These results therefore highlight the benefits of incorporating insights from both the civil resistance and authoritarianism literatures when studying the outcome of nonviolent uprisings.

4.2. Case selection

Evaluation of the quantitative results forms the basis for case selection in the qualitative component of this study. As explained in Chapter 3, two cases are selected: one on-the-line, i.e., one that fits the theoretical expectations closely, and one deviant, where the predicted outcome and actual outcome differ markedly.

4.2.1. On-the-line case

The on-the-line case should be one in which, with other factors controlled for, the expected establishment of personal autocracy is associated with a successful civil resistance campaign outcome. As can be seen from the lower right-hand quadrant of Figure 4.5, there is a substantial number of cases that fit this description. Specific values for the cases with the lowest difference between predicted and actual outcome are given in Table 4.6.

Table 4.6: On-the-line cases by accuracy of predicted outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>Leader time in power</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Predicted outcome (averaged)</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar 1988</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.993</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria 1989</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.991</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philippines 1986</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.989</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.011</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia 1991</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.985</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany 1989</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.984</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali 1991</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.945</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi 1993</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.940</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt 2011</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.931</td>
<td>0.069</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Given these options, I have used a purposive sampling scheme to select the Philippines 1986 campaign for further analysis, based on its expected ability to provide evidence in favour of the theoretical model. There are several reasons why this case is appropriate. First, the nonviolent uprising that overthrew Ferdinand Marcos is well known and is seen as an exemplary case of civil resistance, so has received a substantial amount of scholarly attention (Sutton, 2012). As a result, there is a large quantity of material that can be drawn on to carry out the case study. Some other cases on the list, in comparison, have less secondary information available, whether because they are less prominent, have occurred more recently, or because much of the information available would require specific language skills to access, something that is a particular challenge for mixed methods research in comparative politics. Furthermore, existing work already suggests that Marcos’s concentration of personal power contributed to his downfall (Thompson, 1995; Lee, 2015), making this a very likely case to show the dynamics expected on the basis of the theoretical model developed here. Chapter 5 thus describes the personalisation of power in the Philippines, and analyses the effect this had on the outcome of the 1986 civil resistance campaign.

4.2.2. Deviant case

Inversely, the deviant case should be one in which personal autocracy is expected to have been established, yet the civil resistance campaign was not successful. Only the cases where the autocrat was in power longer than about a decade, and where other factors identified in the regression models did not outweigh the influence of this, would be expected to show the kind of personalisation dynamics that are of interest. Specific values for these cases are given in Table 4.7 (next page).
Table 4.7: Deviant cases for qualitative analysis by accuracy of predicted outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>Leader time in power</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Predicted outcome (averaged)</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia 2013*</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.837</td>
<td>0.837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea 2007</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.722</td>
<td>0.722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar 2007</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.550</td>
<td>0.550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain 2011</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td>0.546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not in the original sample

The clearest deviant case in the sample is the campaign in Guinea in 2007, when long-term autocrat Lansana Conté was challenged by strikes and protests involving hundreds of thousands of people. However this case is somewhat problematic to use for further analysis. Although Conté refused to resign as president, the opposition agreed to a negotiated solution whereby he would appoint a new, independent prime minister, and make a number of other concessions. Following this agreement, the campaign ended, seemingly considered a success by its participants.\(^\text{52}\) The inaccuracy of the predicted outcome may therefore be a result of the coding criteria used in the quantitative study being too strict about what constitutes ‘success’. Further complicating the picture, the nature of the agreement—whether it amounted to real moves towards regime change or whether it was simply a sop to opponents—was contested at the time (ICG, 2007; Engeler, 2008). Conté’s death in December 2008 means that this ambiguity may be irresolvable even in retrospect, as his true intentions were never revealed. Thus, although the Guinea case is an outlier, the difficulty in clearly assessing the outcome compounded by the natural death of the leader during what may or may not have turned out to be the political opening of the regime makes it less suitable for the purposes of this study.

Two other in-sample deviant cases are Myanmar 2007 and Bahrain 2011. Like Guinea, the Myanmar case is somewhat problematic for qualitative analysis. The lack of predictive accuracy is likely to be due to coding difficulties. The campaign is coded as ‘failed’ because it did not result in leader overthrow or lead to the initiation of a transition away from authoritarian rule. Yet it does appear to have had a substantial impact on the subsequent liberalisation of the regime, including the dissolution of the ruling junta in 2011, which paved the way for the election of the opposition National League for Democracy party in

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\(^{52}\) *BBC News*, 27 February 2007, “Guineans back to work after deal.”
Furthermore, Lee (2015) has already argued that in 2007 a power-sharing agreement remained in place at the top of the military regime. Based on this analysis, it is not well suited for the purposes of the deviant case study.

Bahrain would potentially be a better case for analysis, as it represents a clearer example of a failed civil resistance campaign when the Arab Spring protests in the country—which had high levels of participation, involving more than 100,000 at their peak—were violently crushed in February 2011. Sheikh Hamad ibn `Isa Al Khalifah, who remains in power, has ruled since 1999, putting his tenure at 12 years in 2011. While in principle this is consistent with personalisation having taken place, it is close enough to the decade mark at which I assume the establishment of personal autocracy becomes more likely that it is hard to be confident that this case should be very likely to show the dynamics that I am trying to capture in the case study. In addition, other factors may have accounted for failure: although it is in the Persian Gulf, Bahrain produces only limited amounts of oil, and its population is small at approximately 1.3 million in 2011. Further, Herb (1999) identifies Bahrain as one of the ‘dynastic monarchies’ in the MENA region, in which large and influential royal families act as stable power-sharing institutions, maintaining a significant degree of power over the monarch and limiting any attempts to personalise the regime. Although Herb’s analysis concerns the regime of the current king’s father, the Al Khalifa ruling family remains influential in Bahrain, and an initial plausibility probe of secondary literature on the regime did not find any evidence that the power-sharing arrangement has changed since the accession of the current Sheikh. Hence, while there are several characteristics of this case that would make it suitable for further analysis—perhaps in future research—for this thesis it is less than ideal as a deviant case study.

The alternative, as highlighted in Table 4.7, is to use an out of sample case, in this instance Cambodia 2013. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are theoretical benefits to carrying out analysis on cases that have not been used to derive the original model(s). More practically, it is also suitable as a disconfirming case. Both the results of the quantitative study and other qualitative research (e.g., Un, 2005; Strangio, 2014; Morgenbesser, 2018) has highlighted leader Hun Sen’s apparently consolidation of personal control since he first took power in 1985. With the consequent very high predicted probability of success, the 2013 campaign’s failure to overthrow the regime or force a transition away from authoritarianism thus represents a significant challenge to the theoretical model developed here. As a result, Cambodia is selected as the deviant case for further analysis, the results of which are presented below in Chapter 6.

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53 Whether Myanmar has really transitioned to democracy is an open question, however, as the military still controls 25% of parliamentary seats and retains substantial constitutional powers, including an effective veto over constitutional amendments (see, e.g., Economist, 29 October 2015, “Still the generals’ election”).

54 Al Jazeera, 17 February 2011, “Clashes rock Bahraini capital.”
5. The Philippines

5.1. Introduction

5.1.1. 1986 People Power revolution

At the beginning of 1986, the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos, leader of the Philippines since 1965, was in crisis. The economy was struggling: since 1984 GDP had decreased by 9.25%—a “catastrophic” per capita decline of about 15% in two years—and inflation had peaked at more than 50%, while in 1985 unemployment reached 12.5% (Hill, 1986, 240; Sanchez, 1987). Hundreds of businesses had gone bankrupt, tens or hundreds of thousands of manufacturing workers had lost their jobs, and major export industries such as sugar and coconut had been crippled by international conditions and government interventions (Hill, 1986). Ongoing insurgencies were also creating difficulties for the military, particularly the rapidly-growing communist New People’s Army (NPA) and various Muslim separatist forces in Mindanao (Youngblood, 1986).

Politically, the government was being challenged on a number of fronts. A broad range of ‘moderate’ opposition parties and organisations supported by the elite and middle class, including the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO) alliance and the PDP-Laban (Partido Demokratiko Pilipino–Lakas ng Bayan) party, were becoming more unified. This was thanks in large part to the assassination of influential opposition leader Benigno Aquino Jr. at Manila Airport on August 21, 1983, an act which had shocked the country and resulted in mobilisation of influential sectors of Filipino society (Aquino, 1984; Youngblood, 1986; Celoza, 1997). Further nonviolent opposition came from the more left-leaning ‘cause-oriented’ civil society organisations and the leadership of the Catholic church, particularly from Archbishop of Manila Jaime Cardinal Sin.

In an attempt to delay further calls from the United States for reform and to reinforce the appearance of legitimacy to external observers, Marcos called a snap election for February 1986 (Thompson, 1995). Despite the widespread challenges, the KBL at this stage controlled two-thirds of the legislature and the overwhelming majority of local offices (Timberman, 1987; Thompson, 1995). The KBL mobilised its electoral machine, distributing bribes to voters and patronage to its own members, coordinating with the military to violently intimidate oppositionists, manipulating voter lists, and changing the location of polling booths and electoral boundaries in areas which could not be relied on to vote for Marcos (Thompson, 1995). Confident that his domination of the government structure together with a seemingly-divided opposition would give him an overwhelming victory, Marcos gave independent election watchdog NAMFREL (National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections) permission to field an army of 400,000 volunteer monitors across 90% of the country to conduct an independent count of the vote (Laxalt, 1986; Timberman, 1987).

On election day NAMFREL estimated that the KBL’s manipulation of the election had resulted in approximately 3.3 million people, an eighth of the total 26.1 million registered.
voters, being unable to vote, mostly in areas expected to support the opposition (Timberman, 1987). Despite these efforts, after polls closed NAMFREL reported that Marcos had still lost, receiving only 47.3% of the vote (Timberman, 1987). The government’s COMELEC (Commission on Elections) responded by padding vote counts in areas where NAMFREL observers had not been permitted to operate, declaring Marcos the winner with 53.8% of the final vote (Timberman, 1987; Thompson, 1995). Yet the election had already been thoroughly discredited. A decisive blow was the walk-out staged by a group of COMELEC computer programmers in protest at its role in the fraudulent count, covered by live television.

In the days that followed it became clear that Marcos’s rival, Corazon ‘Cory’ Aquino, had won the moral victory. Aquino called for a nationwide boycott of ‘crony establishments’ and further civil resistance in front of a crowd of up to 2 million people at Rizal Park in Manila. Yet Marcos refused to step down, bringing things to a deadlock. At the same time, the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), a right-wing group of junior officers which had been trying to build support for a coup since the early 1980s, began mobilising (Davide et al., 1990). On the morning of February 22nd RAM, led by Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile launched a coup attempt. Marcos loyalists had gained advance warning due to the rebels’ widespread recruitment efforts, however, and the putsch was repulsed (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005).

Amidst rumours that Marcos was about to reimpose martial law, the rebels, joined by armed forces Vice Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos, retreated to two large military camps on the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA), surrounded and protected by more than a million opposition supporters. A cascade of defections in the military ensued, including almost all of the Metropolitan Police Force and large segments of the air force, as military units ordered to clear EDSA refused to fire on unarmed civilians who were offering them prayers, cigarettes, food, drink, and flowers (Davide et al., 1990).

Clinging to power, Marcos tried to reassert control from his residence at Malacañang Palace, announcing a curfew on February 24 and urging supporters to fight against the rebel forces (Timberman, 1987). In reaction to the rebellion and the mass display of public dissatisfaction with Marcos’s rule, however, the United States government—which had pressured Marcos to carry out reforms but continued to support his position until the last moment—finally withdrew its support, unwilling to sanction a civil war to protect its interests in the Philippines (Laxalt, 1986). Informally, United States president Ronald Regan signalled to Marcos that he should step down peacefully and accept the transfer of power (Laxalt, 1986); with few supporters left, Marcos finally decided to flee Manila, and on the evening of 25 February he boarded a United States Air Force transport for exile in Hawaii (Timberman, 1987).
5.1.2. Summary: Personal autocracy and civil resistance success

Based on the argument that lengthy leader tenure is likely to be driven by the successful establishment of personal autocracy, Chapter 4 identifies the Marcos regime as a 'most likely' case for personalisation of power leading to the success of civil resistance, with Marcos having been in office for 20 years at the time of the People Power revolution—also known, especially in the Philippines, as the EDSA revolution. And indeed, I argue that Marcos established personal autocracy around the mid-1970s. First, he closed the national legislature after declaring martial law in 1972, thus removing the most important autonomous decision-making institution in the regime and eliminating his need to gain the support of influential elites and work through entrenched patronage networks to pass legislation. Even once the assembly was re-opened in 1976 it was only as a temporary, 'rubber-stamp' body with no real independence. Second, Marcos undercut the economic and coercive strength of the wealthy landowning families which had dominated Filipino politics, particularly targeting those that opposed his personalisation of power, thus severely weakening his main elite rivals in the regime. Third, he took personal control over appointments in all areas of the government, replacing supporters of rivals with his own clients and undercutting or eliminating areas of the bureaucracy that he did not have direct control over. Finally, he overrode constitutional term limits that would have forced him to step down at the end of his second term in 1973, subsequently gaining the ability to directly amend the constitution in order to continue to extend his stay in power in 1976. With these measures, which I detail below, Marcos effectively removed the ruling coalition’s ability to limit his decision-making authority and control over government, thus successfully establishing his personal autocracy. Following this point, he was able to act largely unconstrained by the need to balance entrenched interests or preferences of influential rivals, aside from what was necessary to maintain support from the United States and deal with ongoing challenges in the country.

Marcos’s consolidation of personal control over the regime in the Philippines therefore closely matches the concept of personal autocracy developed in the theoretical framework. I argue that this led to regime breakdown in the face of civil resistance by generating opposition amongst members of the ruling coalition who could no longer protect their interests against his virtually unlimited power. In the absence of a mass civil resistance campaign, however, these figures were unable to coordinate to seriously threaten the regime. Instead, those who were marginalised either remained loyal and hoped for the best or left the ruling coalition altogether to join an elite-led opposition movement, although this struggled to unite and mount a serious challenge through the early 1980s. The central conclusion that I draw is that the emergence of a more unified opposition to challenge the 1986 snap election enabled disgruntled members of the ruling coalition to overcome their barriers to action against Marcos, prompting an elite rebellion—particularly, as will be seen below, by Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and the second in command of the armed forces, General Fidel Ramos—that led directly to Marcos’s loss of power. Hence I conclude that Marcos’s establishment of personal autocracy and the effect that this had on the incentives of the political elite played an important role in determining the outcome of the 1986 nonviolent uprising.
In order to show how I have reached this conclusion, the next section traces the history of the political elite in the Philippines up to Marcos’s ascent to power in order to highlight the power-sharing agreement that was in place during his first two terms in office. I then examine key power grabs, including the declaration of martial law in 1972, to show how Marcos personalised power during his tenure and the effect this had on the ruling coalition. I then examine how the establishment of personal autocracy led to the creation of a subversive coalition in the regime, as figures who had had their interests threatened by Marcos’s consolidation of personal rule began to look for alternatives to the status quo distribution of power. I conclude with a summary of the case and a brief discussion of how it relates to the quantitative component, before moving on to the second case study in Chapter 6.

5.2. Authoritarian politics in the Philippines

5.2.1. Background

The Philippines were first conquered by Spain in 1521. Without the resources to control the entire archipelago directly, the Spanish relied on indigenous leaders, the principalia, to govern in exchange for tax exemptions and land titles (Larkin, 1972). In the mid-18th century the economy, which had remained largely undeveloped, became oriented towards agricultural production for export (Hawes, 1987). This shift was accompanied by the rise of a new social class, the mestizos, the offspring of Chinese entrepreneurs and local Filipinos. Acting as intermediaries in the booming export trade, they accumulated wealth and land holdings, gradually supplanting the earlier principalia class (Larkin, 1972).

The invasion and capture of the Philippines from Spain by the United States in 1898 first allowed the mestizos to become a genuinely national elite (Anderson, 1988). The Americans brutally subjugated opposition to their rule, eliminating the independent areas that the Spanish had been unable to bring under their control and centralising force and authority in Manila (Wolff, 1961; Anderson, 1988). The most important factor in establishing the political elite was the importation of American government institutions, including municipal and provincial elections in 1901 and 1902, the election of a national assembly in 1907, and the creation of a presidency with the writing of the 1935 constitution. Despite their democratic origins, these institutions were co-opted to act as vehicles for intra-elite contestation over control of the state apparatus, which effectively became subordinated to elite interests (Wolff, 1961; Anderson, 1988; Sidel, 1999). It was the wealthy mestizo elite who had the economic resources to spend on public works projects and outright bribery who were able to mobilise enough support to be elected (Wurfel, 1988). Once elected, further extensive control over the institutions of government enabled officials to reinforce their support networks and shut out competition (Anderson, 1988; Sidel, 1999).

Following World War II and official recognition of its independence by the United States, the Philippine government suffered a severe balance of payments and foreign exchange
crisis (Doronila, 1992). In response, it embarked on an *ad hoc* import-substitution industrialisation process, creating substantial windfall profits for entrepreneurs who were capable of capitalising on the opportunity (Payer, 1973; Doronila, 1992). This created a newer elite group, those who had gained most of their wealth through industrial production and had limited or no land holdings in the countryside. These industrial entrepreneurs originated overwhelmingly from Manila and its immediate environs, and were highly educated and often upwardly mobile (Payer, 1973). Yet they also largely had strong ties to the older landed elite. A 1961 survey provides evidence for this point: while the post-war period did show a higher degree of social mobility than had existed in the past, the old land-owning families were still tremendously over-represented amongst the new economic elite, with 35% of the new entrepreneurs coming from families with extensive land holdings, a group making up an estimated 0.1% of the total Philippine population (Carroll, 1962).

By the 1960s, manufacturing came to be a major source of both wealth and influence for the elite. Wurfel (1979) notes that at this point families which had only land holdings had largely disappeared from the political scene, while those which had both land and industrial investments had become the primary political elite (see also Makil, 1975). Although there was some conflict between elites who had the political connections to benefit the most from industrialisation and those who did not (Payer, 1973), these divisions were largely muted, often because they existed within single families with interests in both areas of the economy (Hawes, 1987). As a whole the elite remained, as Fast (1973, 9) puts it, “remarkable in its homogeneity.”

### 5.2.2. Leader-elite relations prior to Marcos

Politics in the Philippines in the pre-Marcos period from independence to the declaration of martial law has been labelled as the “heyday of cacique democracy” (Anderson, 1988, 16): despite the challenge posed by the peasant-led Hukbalahap guerrilla movement, the elite’s hold on power was firm, private militias were endemic and unable to be contained by the central government, policy was manipulated to elites’ advantage, government revenues were routinely plundered to pay for election campaigns, and electoral success was based on a combination of patronage and coercion. Despite strict rules regarding electioneering, electoral monitors were essentially toothless (Kiunisala, 1969); at a time when 95% of families in the Philippines earned less than P5,000 a year—and the average family in a rural village earned P500-P750 a year—it is estimated that a senatorial seat would require spending on average P250,000, while the office of the president would cost from P5 to P10 million in vote buying, patronage, and distribution of pork barrel (Abueva, 1969; CDD/USOM/AID, 1969; Kiunisala, 1969). The clear advantage this gave to independently-wealthy candidates highlights the interconnection of money and political power in the Philippines during this period. The two major political parties, the Liberals and the Nacionalistas, were based solely on a desire to gain access to power, and did not have any clear ideological programme (Lande, 1965). Indeed, intra-party solidarity was largely non-existent and defection to one side or the other commonplace. Politics itself
was restricted to intra-elite competition, with the two parties arguably best conceived of as two factions of the same elite group, which continued to maintain high barriers to non-elite interests (Lande, 1965; Sidel, 1999).

The 1935 constitution institutionalised a powerful presidency. The president had direct personal authority over all executive departments, bureaus, or offices, including extensive powers of appointment in the civil service and the military. He was also the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and given the authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and place the Philippines under martial law if deemed necessary (Philippines Const. [1935], art. VII, § 10). Even before Marcos, the president’s influence was spread throughout government and he was seen as the central figure of government; personal ties to the president were the best method of obtaining desired political outcomes for anyone in the country (Sison, 1969). Presidents dominated the legislative process, with Wurfel (1988) noting that legislative bills almost always contained the exact wording of the original draft written by Malacañang. The president had extensive veto powers over bills introduced by members of the legislature. The president also had a very large ‘public works’ fund, amounting to P500 million by 1969, which in reality was a discretionary pork barrel fund (Wurfel, 1988). Because distributing pork amongst the local constituency was so important for politicians to succeed at the polls, they were then reliant on the president to release funds in a timely manner, giving him substantial leverage (Wurfel, 1988).

Yet, as is intended in any constitutional presidential system, the president’s powers were not absolute. The constitution limited tenure to two consecutive four-year terms, although additional terms after a rotation in the presidency were not explicitly forbidden (Philippines Const. [1935], art. VII, § 5). Likewise, despite the influence of the executive over policy and government funds, the legislature was still able to constrain the president’s power in several ways. Pork or patronage was required for legislators to pass bills that the president favoured. Where insufficient incentives were provided for voting the right way—or indeed even showing up to vote at all—the legislature was able to thwart executive initiatives through rejection, in some cases, or forcing the watering-down of key provisions (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). Committee chairs were powerful figures, able to block initiatives that they did not wish to see discussed and exercising influence over the shape of final pieces of legislation (Wurfel, 1988). A particularly strong bargaining chip was the necessity for appropriations by executive branch agencies to be approved by the House speaker; given that appropriations were the sole source of funding for government agencies, threats to withhold approval were serious indeed. Similar reliance on the release of appropriations in exchange for personal favours—particularly the appointment of relatives and friends to comfortable jobs—rendered the civil service completely subordinate to the legislature (Wurfel, 1988). While constraints on the president in this period were perhaps more often informal than institutional, they thus provided a measure of balance against the powerful executive.
5.3. The Marcos regime

As the previous section shows, when Marcos first took power, he did so in the context of established interests and powerful rivals that imposed considerable constraints on his authority. I describe in this section how he worked to overcome these limits by politicising and gaining the support of the military, which allowed him to reduce his dependence on these entrenched political figures, as well as pushing for reform of the constitutional term limits that would have forced him to step down in 1972. Yet, warned by his initial moves to consolidate power, many members of the elite refused to support revisions to the constitution, forcing Marcos to declare martial law instead. During the martial law period in the mid to late 1970s the power-sharing agreement degenerated fully into personal autocracy, as Marcos eliminated or cowed major political rivals, undermined economic interest groups, and took complete personal control over decision-making authority within the regime.

5.3.1. Power-sharing, 1965-1971

Under the previous president, Diosdado Macapagal, economic growth from industrialisation had slowed, prices for food staples were increasing, and wages were depressed as rural unemployed increasingly flocked to the cities looking for work (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). Marcos campaigned against Macapagal on a promise of making the country ‘great’ again, assuring voters that he would root out corruption and inefficiency. In keeping with previous patterns of turncoatism, he switched from Macapagal’s Liberal party to the Nacionalistas, attracting the support of politicians currently locked out of the president’s patronage network, and gained popular support with nationalist slogans while still maintaining a close relationship with the United States government, and subsequently won the 1965 election.

Marcos took power with the support of a large portion of the elite, including extremely powerful land-owning families such as the Lopezes of Iloilo (Wurfel, 1988). Although the presidency was powerful in many areas, decision-making was substantially constrained by the need to satisfy their interests. As Canoy (1980, 121) describes,

Rich landowners, sugar barons and the millionaire land speculators...these ‘villains’ of land reform delighted in fancying themselves as the kingmakers of the country –

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55 A note on dates: the ‘Marcos dictatorship’ is often identified as the period following the declaration of martial law in 1972 (e.g., Geddes, Wright & Frantz, 2014). However, the sources I use for defining governments as authoritarian in this thesis, Svolik (2012) and Magaloni, Chu, and Min (2013), both put the start of Marcos’s authoritarian rule at 1965, as following this point he was no longer effectively constrained by genuinely competitive elections. This date is supported by, for example, Anderson (1988), who notes that Marcos began entrenching his regime before declaring martial law, and Canoy (1980), who alleges that the plan to implement martial law was being developed as early as 1965.
as indeed they were. No politician of national stature, no President whether incumbent or aspiring, dared to antagonize this entrenched and privileged group unless he desired to commit political suicide.

He was also limited by the legislature, which Canoy (1980, 154) describes as an “unruly crowd” of “old political pros” who were experts at political blackmail and other noninstitutional forms of politics, and who could not easily be dominated. Compounding this, during Marcos’s first term the legislature was controlled by members of the Liberal party, which he had defected from to gain the presidential nomination (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). Thus, it is clear that the initial period of the Marcos regime began with a de facto power-sharing agreement, resulting from the pre-existing distribution of power within the system, firmly in place.

Yet Marcos was already making moves to undermine these constraints and increase his personal power. As soon as he took office he began hinting that he would revise constitutional term limits, and in 1968 his wife, Imelda, denounced major political families as oligarchs who controlled the country at the expense of the common people (Canoy, 1980). He also began working towards gaining the support of the military. Prior to the Marcos presidency the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) had had no political influence as a body and was effectively under civilian control. Appropriations for the military also depended on political approval, further cementing the dependent role of the military hierarchy on the political elite (Wurfel, 1988).

Marcos expanded the military’s sphere of responsibilities and began moving it towards taking an active role in politics. From 1965 onwards, he began appointing officers from his home region of Ilocos to key positions within the military (Canoy, 1980). Plans for the declaration of martial law were already in development during this period at high levels within the military, with the cooperation of the United States (Canoy, 1980; Wurfel, 1988). The military’s role was expanded to include economic development projects, particularly through the use of the AFP’s engineering capabilities (Hernandez, 1984). The military was also given an expanded internal security role. Marcos set up the Philippine Constabulary Metropolitan Command [METROCOM] in 1968. This was a rapid-response special forces unit based in central Manila and tasked with dealing with urban unrest, particularly the student and labour activism that was increasing around the time of Marcos’s second election campaign. In conjunction with the Presidential Security Command, METROCOM was also responsible for providing security for Marcos and his family from 1969 onwards (Hernandez, 1984).

Marcos’s first major power grab came in 1969 when he ran for re-election. Having already run severe budget deficits to pay for pork barrel projects during his first term (Thompson, 1995), he spent as much as US$50 million—most of it misappropriated from the public purse—on electioneering, which amounted to a substantial increase on previous campaigns and strained the government’s resources to such an extent that it led to an
economic crisis and rapidly rising inflation (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). This was accompanied by extensive corruption, fraud, and violence, seen by many as the worst since 1949, when Liberal candidate Elpidio Quirino’s campaign had held areas of the Philippines in a “virtual reign of terror” to ensure election (Hedman & Sidel, 2000, 20). Marcos’s 1969 campaign was seen by other elites as violating norms of political behaviour; as one commentator put it, he ignored “with impunity the ground rules of our kind of politics” (cited in Thompson, 1995, 37). His opponent, Sergio Osmeña Jr., famously complained that he had “won the election but lost in the counting”, having everywhere been “out-gunned, out-gooned and out-gold.” Yet the gamble paid off, and Marcos became the first Philippine president to win re-election for a full second term.

Marcos’s re-election proved to be the strongest challenge to the cohesion of the elite to date. In the aftermath of the election, those who had not benefited from his success began to mistrust his intentions and suspect that his accumulation of personal power—evidenced by his unprecedented re-election—indicated a lack of commitment to the interests of the elite as a whole (Wurfel, 1988; Thompson, 1995). Prominent figures, including the Lopez family, began to withdraw their support in favour of potential competitors (Wurfel, 1988). Attacks on Marcos from the elite-controlled Manila press began to increase, at the same time as student and labour protests grew in intensity.

5.3.2. Martial law and establishment of personal autocracy

Marcos’s second term began with the so-called First Quarter Storm, a period of protest from January to March of 1970. The late 1960s had seen the formation of a number of student groups, including leftists drawing from Marxist or Maoist ideologies as well as activist Catholic groups. Initially espousing a range of demands including land reform and an end to American neo-colonial involvement in the Philippines, after the 1969 demands escalated and became openly anti-Marcos, with many thousands taking part in protests at his re-election (Wurfel, 1988). A campaign of teach-ins, demonstrations, burning of effigies, and riots gained momentum after the initial rounds of protests, as student organisations began building networks with teachers, workers, and activist farmers. Clashes with police and the armed forces led to the deaths of nearly two dozen students between 1970 and 1972 (Wurfel, 1988; Celoza, 1997). At the same time, a new insurgency emerged out of a split within the previously-dormant Communist Party of the Philippines: the NPA was founded in March 1969 and quickly became active in a large number of provinces (Thompson, 1995). The NPA were blamed by the president for the Plaza

56 Estimates of election spending in this campaign by Marcos vary widely; Thompson (1995) cites figures of up to US$250 million.
Miranda bombing in August of 1971, when a grenade attack on a Liberal Party rally maimed several senior Liberal politicians and killed several other attendees.

The Plaza Miranda bombing, in the context of widespread unrest, was the reason given for the declaration of martial law. Yet this was only a pretext: Wurfel (1988) points out that the military command had reported only three days prior to martial law being announced that internal security conditions were only slightly worse than ‘normal’, indicating the degree to which Marcos was exaggerating the threat of student radicals and the NPA for political purposes. A more important factor was that Marcos was reaching the end of his constitutionally-mandate term in office. In order to extend his tenure, he strongly supported a shift to a parliamentary system in the national Constitutional Convention, which had begun in 1971 for the purpose of replacing the outdated 1935 constitution (Canoy, 1980). This would have allowed him to stay on as prime minister rather than president. The majority of the delegates approved the move to a parliamentary system. But more than half of the delegates had also signed a petition to include a provision blocking Marcos or any of his relatives from holding office in the future. Although the motion was not included in the subsequent constitution, and despite extensive behind-the-scenes manipulation, it became apparent to Marcos that he would not be able to override the constitutional constraints on his tenure in time to secure a further term (Celoza, 1997).

Forced to make a bolder and riskier move to retain power, on the September 23, 1972, Marcos announced Proclamation no. 1081 instituting martial law. The military immediately raided and closed schools, religious institutions, communications networks, and newspapers, and arrested opposition figures including student, labour, and peasant leaders and organisers, journalists, and businesspeople. The political elite were not exempt, and major figures such as Benigno Aquino Jr. and several members of the offending Constitutional Convention were arrested and imprisoned, while others fled the country in order to avoid imprisonment (Wurfel, 1988).

The military was used to disarm the private armies that had served to secure the position of powerful families in the countryside, with official figures announcing that 145 separate militias had been forcibly demobilised and half a million firearms seized. An additional move to undermine elites’ local power was the incorporation of local police—which had until then been largely under the control of local-level political leaders—into a national organisation under the command of the AFP (Hernandez, 1984). A land reform process was implemented, intended the break up some of the largest plantations belonging to the largest landed families which retained political influence (Sidel, 1989).

In conjunction with these measures, Marcos also acted against the elite by closing Congress in December 1972. This had been a bastion of support for elite families with

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agricultural interests, and there is a consensus that its closure was the most severe blow to their ability to prevent the president from acting against their interests (e.g., Hawes, 1987; Wurfel, 1988). During the early phases of the implementation of martial law Marcos especially moved against some of the largest families which were in opposition to his rule. Three major families were initially targeted: the Lopezes, the Osmeñas, and the Aquino-Cojuangcos, all of them large landholders with extensive business interests (Wurfel, 1979).

The Lopezes in particular were singled out for destruction. Both Fernando and Eugenio Lopez had been extremely influential in pre-martial law politics, with Fernando being a key ally of Marcos during his first term and the beginning of his second (Roces, 2000). Eugenio Lopez was out of the country when martial law was announced but dared not return; Marcos imprisoned his son, Eugenio Jr., for use as a bargaining chip instead. With a hostage Marcos was able to force the Lopez family to sell their 'crown jewel', their monopoly over electricity supply to Manila, for a pittance (Roces, 2000). Other firms were similarly 'sold' to the Marcos Foundation or seized outright by the military.

But such open moves against political families generated widespread fear amongst the elite that the Marcos regime threatened private fortunes more generally. To avoid provoking outright elite rebellion, after 1973 seizures of private firms were curtailed, and by 1978 it was announced that some businesses which had been seized would be returned (Wurfel, 1979). Yet the point had been made: Marcos had demonstrated publicly and effectually that he was capable of destroying even one of the most prominent families in the country if they went against him, thus simultaneously undermining the political clan most capable of opposing him and setting an example for those watching (Hawes, 1987).

Marcos challenged not only the industrial bases of families’ wealth and political influence but also moved against their agricultural wealth. His did this by centralising agricultural industries and then siphoning off the surplus that would have gone to the wealthy landowners (Hawes, 1987). While this undoubtedly made Marcos and his inner circle of cronies very rich, it also undermined the elites’ ability to mobilise local political support, given the importance of money and patronage networks outlined above.

An illustrative example is the sugar industry. Sugar production was characterised by extreme levels of income inequality and heavy concentration of wealth in the hands of landowners (Cherniguin, 1988), and a large proportion of the political elite came from sugar producing regions, including the Lopezes and the Cojuangcos. The sugar bloc had been important in electing Macapagal in 1961, and as their profits increased due to favourable trade conditions with the United States they became increasingly assertive on the political scene. In 1974, however, the United States re-imposed import duties on Philippine sugar, forcing the previously-protected producers to compete on the world market and denying them market protection and subsidies which had made up a large portion of their economic and political power.

Marcos took advantage of the opportunity and issued a decree giving the government monopoly control over sugar exports, including the setting of purchase prices, a decree
which Hawes (1987, 94) labels “every bit as important as the abolition of Congress two years earlier in President Marcos’s continuing effort to reshape the Philippine political economy.” Central control over the sugar trade left producers completely dependent on the state for their continued survival and removed the economic resources that had made them the most powerful political bloc in the country. By 1980 an estimated 95% of sugar growers had been unable to repay bank loans on time and only half were able to make a profit in the subsequent year, and the ability of the elites who relied on profits from sugar to unite in order to challenge Marcos had been severely constrained (Hawes, 1987).

The same pattern of centralisation and siphoning of profits was also seen in the coconut industry. In both cases, elites with substantial agricultural interests were attacked by having their wealth expropriated at the same time as Congress, their institutional access to the presidency, was closed. As Hawes (1987, 82) concludes,

> The losers were the landlord politicians. Ultimately their defeat was to prove important, because in the countryside these were the people who provided leadership in the elite opposition movement that developed after the assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino in 1983.

With regard to the industrial entrepreneurs, the majority of influential business leaders either lost political influence or were excluded from the ruling coalition entirely between 1969 and 1975 (Makil, 1975); observers noted that the influence of those who survived qualitatively changed, and was largely subordinated by Marcos. The core support group almost without exception owed their positions entirely to Marcos’s continued favour, making it impossible for them to constrain him. However, open moves against the powerful families declined after Marcos had neutralised the Lopezes, especially, as these were generating a lot of fear amongst the economic elite that the martial law regime was threatening the security of their private fortunes (Wurfel, 1979). As a result, government takeovers after 1973 slowed markedly, and after 1978 it was announced that some government-expropriated businesses would be returned to their former owners.

After 1972, Marcos took personal control of appointments in all areas of government (Lee, 2015). The military’s budget was greatly expanded, increasing tenfold in the five years from 1972 to 1977 (Wurfel, 1988) and the number of personnel grew from about 55,000 in 1972 to approximately 200,000 by 1984 (Hernandez, 1985). Much of this expansion was paid for with aid from the United States; in comparison with Indonesia, for example, Wurfel (1988) points out that relatively little of the military’s institutional funding came from areas outside the government budget such as military-owned corporations. Privately, however, officers benefited greatly from the martial law regime, and often came to supplant the role of patron that had previously been held by politicians and landowners; they could, for example, speed up applications and cut red tape for their friends and family. As well as material benefits, Marcos ensured the military’s loyalty by occasionally purging its leadership and encouraging factional rivalries (Wurfel, 1988).

After the declaration of martial law, the process of drafting a constitution was “speeded up” and a draft version was approved by November of 1972 (Celoza, 1997, 48). This draft gave Marcos an extended stay in power as head of the ‘interim’ National Assembly, with
no time limit for this body. It also retrospectively justified and legalised the declaration of martial law and the orders that Marcos had issued in the initial phases. In addition, the new constitution gave the president extensive legislative powers. The process of ratifying the constitution was manipulated by the executive branch, despite some public opposition; in particular, the consultation process involved an apparently clearly manipulated process of counting hands in barangay meetings without any oversight or independent monitoring (Wurfel, 1988).

Throughout the 1970s Marcos continued to expand his patronage network while removing anyone who did not have direct ties to him through patron-client relationships. A large part of this consisted of cutting out the intermediaries in the patronage game, especially members of Congress, and centralising both decision-making and the distribution of pork-barrel funds in the office of the President (Wurfel, 1988). For example, the Executive Secretary had been an extremely powerful position in the pre-martial law years, due to the office’s ability to control the flow of paperwork to and from Malacañang; whoever held the position was widely referred to as the ‘little president’. In December 1975 Marcos eliminated the position, effectively putting decision-making in the executive branch directly in his own hands (Celoza, 1997, 69). It was also accomplished by carrying out purges of the bureaucracy, ostensibly in the name of rooting out corruption. In actuality, of course, those who were purged were those without ties to the president; the same tactic was used with success again in the run-up to the 1980 election (Wurfel, 1988). Those who remained were kept on a tight reign: a 1975 referendum extended the term of local officials beyond what was constitutionally mandated, effectively tying their ongoing position and livelihood to Marcos’s continuation in power (Celoza, 1997).

Constitutional amendments in 1976 consolidated presidential power even further by, for example, enabling Marcos to personally nominate changes to the constitution. Previously, such suggestions would have had to have come from a constitutional convention or the National Assembly, making future amendments even easier to pass (Canoy, 1980). He also gained almost unlimited abilities to make legislation, including the ability to rule by decree even after martial law had been lifted when, “in the judgement of the President (Prime Minister)”, a state of emergency or threat thereof existed or whenever the National Assembly failed “to act adequately on any matter for any reason” (1973 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Amend. 5 & 6 [1976]).

By the mid-1970s Marcos had effectively succeeded in creating a personal autocracy, in which he no longer needed to balance his own goals against competing interests within the regime. Political influence, which had once involved give and take between clients who needed patronage and patrons who needed support, shifted to become much more unidirectional. A contemporary observer notes that “a person’s influence [in 1975] depended on how much he was listened to by the man on top, specifically, the President. The crucial direction is upward, and only upward” (Makil, 1975, 32-33, emphasis original). An anonymous panellist in Makil’s study puts it more bluntly:
Unlike in 1969-1970, when power was broadly based, there is only one power now. There is a polarization—no, not even that—a *monopoly* of power and influence by the President and his wife. The others have disappeared. (Makil, 1975, 33, emphasis original)

5.3.3. **Opposition to the Marcos regime**

Following his establishment of a personal autocracy, Marcos began easing restrictions on politics, allowing a degree of superficial competition. In September 1976 he instituted a temporary Legislative Advisory Council, the *Batasan Bayan*, dominated by his family and close allies, which was to be replaced by an elected interim National Assembly, the *Batasan Pambansa*, in April 1978 as an attempt to legitimise the regime in the eyes of the nation and of the international community (Wurfel, 1988). In order to coordinate his patronage networks and more efficiently manipulate the election to ensure victory, Marcos then established the New Society Movement (*Kilusan Bagong Lipunan, KBL*) party in February that year, while allowing a small opposition to campaign under heavy restrictions. Despite the KBL’s best efforts, the opposition—led by Benigno Aquino from jail—gained a higher degree of public support than anticipated, with public rallies and a widespread noise campaign in Manila demonstrating that the great majority of the city’s population opposed the regime. In response to this undesired show of opposition Marcos ensured his victory by transparently rigging the results, with the KBL sweeping to victory (Celoza, 1997). As expected, the interim National Assembly was a rubber-stamp legislature, referred to in the popular press as “an expensive Xerox copying machine” and acknowledged as a façade even by its own membership (cited in Celoza, 1997, 65).

By the end of the 1970s, nonviolent opposition to Marcos could be divided into three groups: students and labour, who were in loose alliance with one another, church and middle-class civic groups, and Marcos’s elite rivals for power, most notably former Nacionalista and Liberal party members who had been marginalised during the martial law period (Corsino, 1981). Despite an apparent level of support, the elite opposition was not able to seriously challenge Marcos for several reasons in addition to the ‘incumbency advantage’ exercised by the regime. Most of the political elite had joined the KBL party quickly in order to ensure their continued positions and access to patronage. At this early stage there were few incentives to defect from the party, as the opposition remained small and divided over the decision made by various factions to either boycott or participate in the 1978 sham elections (Wurfel, 1988). After the majority of politicians had already joined the KBL Marcos also made ‘turncoatism’ illegal through a combination of decrees, raising a substantial barrier to defection (Canoy, 1980). Perhaps most importantly, there was also a widespread belief at the elite level that the martial law situation would be only temporary, and that once it was lifted Marcos would not be able to retain control. The possibility of “anyone but Marcos” winning the presidency in a subsequent campaign thus prevented the most prominent elites from uniting behind a single opposition leader (Canoy, 1980, 56).
Against elites’ expectations, however, when Marcos did lift martial law in 1981 the balance of power remained unaffected, and he retained his personal control of the regime. In particular, constitutional amendments passed in 1976 meant that Marcos effectively retained a presidential veto over parliamentary legislation, an ability to make legislation himself, and the right to detain anyone he considered to be subversive, while all of the decrees made under martial law remained in place (Sodusta & Palongpalong, 1982). Although political space increased somewhat, with an uptick in student and labour protests in 1981-82, Marcos was able to win the presidential election of 1981 with 88% of the vote while keeping the opposition divided (Sodusta & Palongpalong, 1981; Wurfel, 1988). By the end of 1982 Marcos was judged by observers to be “fully in control of the situation”, and this period has since been cited as the height of his personal power (Solidum, 1983, 244; Celoza, 1997).

Perhaps compounded by the revelation that Marcos would not willingly stand down after all, elite opposition was growing, as figures who had been passed over for success in the KBL began to defect from the regime. Two of the most significant of these were the Laurel brothers, House Speaker Jose Jr. and former Senator Salvador. Although they had challenged Marcos from within the Nacionalista party prior to 1972—as has already been pointed out, a common occurrence in Filipino politics— they had cooperated with Marcos during the martial law period, with Salvador Laurel running for parliament as a member of KBL. The reason for their defection from Marcos was stated most clearly by Jose Jr.: “I am fighting Marcos because I have an investment in him. I was hoping to collect but I have waited long enough” (cited in Thompson, 1995, 103). The Laurel family had one of the best-maintained political machines outside the Marcos’s own regional bases, and their defection was a major blow to the regime. They revived the hitherto-defunct Nacionalista party, attracting other defectors and opportunists from the KBL, and were able to achieve a measure of success in the 1980 local elections (Wurfel, 1988; Thompson, 1995).

A number of political parties formed a loose association called the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO) in August 1980. Weakened by personal feuds amongst its members, it was initially ineffective. In 1982 it was re-formed as a more cohesive alliance of 12 parties and renamed the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (Solidum, 1983). Notably, UNIDO included a “Who’s Who” of pre-martial law Liberal and Nacionalista politicians, representing a number of powerful factions from both parties, all of whom had lost political influence during the martial law period (Thompson, 1995, 104). Its leaders were a potent force, bringing political skills, financial resources, old patronage networks and organisational ability to the growing opposition movement (Wurfel, 1988). Another organisation outside the UNIDO umbrella was the PDP-Laban party, which had resulted from a merger of the Philippine Democracy Party, formed in 1982, and the Laban (“Fight”) Party, formed by popular former senator Benigno Aquino Jr. in 1978 (Kessler, 1984).

However, although the nonviolent opposition, broadly put, was attracting high-level defections, it remained heavily divided and had great difficulty coordinating against Marcos. Opposition politics was highly individualistic and polarised along ideological
lines (Solidum, 1983). For example, a conference in January 1984 gathered 2,400 anti-Marcos political figures under one roof, but the atmosphere was “heated” and unity at this point “extremely fragile”, as even the recognition of a common problem and a need to work together marked “major concessions” from all sides. Even by 1984 UNIDO remained a broad alliance rather than a cohesive opposition organisation. It also lacked local-level organisational reach and an ability to mobilise mass support (Wurfel, 1985).

5.3.4. The Aquino assassination

Perhaps the most serious threat to Marcos from the elite opposition was Benigno Aquino Jr., who was widely popular despite having been incarcerated since 1972 and possibly a figure capable of uniting the opposition (Aquino, 1984). Recognising this, Marcos allowed Aquino to travel to the United States for medical treatment in 1980; a military death sentence that had been passed on him in 1977 made it clear that he had been sent into exile (Wurfel, 1988).

Despite the threat to his life, by 1983 Aquino believed that he would be able to safely return to the Philippines (Aquino, 1984). He also apparently intended to negotiate the presidential succession with Marcos, who was beginning to show signs of ill-health (Wurfel, 1988). But upon landing at Manila International Airport on August 21, 1983, he was shot dead by an assassin, an act which shocked the country and led immediately to the widespread politicisation of large sectors of the population, many of whom believed Marcos to be ultimately responsible (Aquino, 1984). Protests broke out across the country, involving well over one million participants, while United States president Ronald Reagan cancelled a scheduled trip to the Philippines (Aquino, 1984).

Aquino’s assassination prompted a marked increase in the diversity of the opposition. One of the most important consequences was the mobilisation of business groups from the Makati financial district against Marcos, many of which were led by figures associated with the ‘old wealth’ of the political elite (Wurfel, 1988). In frequent large protests over the following months, these formerly “sedate and conservative” groups began explicitly calling for Marcos’s resignation over his authoritarian rule and mismanagement of the economy (Aquino, 1984, 267). The Catholic church also lent its informal support to UNIDO, expanding the elite opposition’s ability to mobilise mass support through its extensive organisational and communication networks including Radio Veritas, which would play a key role in the events of the People Power revolution itself (Aquino, 1984). Wurfel argues that the support of these two groups for the elite opposition had profound consequences, particularly by making it “easier for United States policymakers to think about alternatives to Marcos” (1988, 278). The United States government, in response to Marcos’s public loss of legitimacy as well as the worsening economic situation,

increasingly began putting pressure on him to carry out at least some measure of reform (Wurfel, 1988).

Despite mounting protests against Marcos and the defection of supporters from his regime, it soon became clear that the president would not resign or offer meaningful reforms (Thompson, 1995). Bowing to calls from the United States government, however, he did agree to allow parliamentary elections in May 1984. Most of the opposition and external observers agreed that the only purpose of this was to offer a semblance of legitimacy to the regime; however, UNIDO and some other smaller political parties thought that it might be possible to bring about a change in leadership, and contested the election, although more radical leftist organisations boycotted (Wurfel, 1988). As expected, Marcos and the KBL resorted to outright fraud as well as ballot stuffing and bribery to ensure victory, including spending approximately 10% of all government tax revenue for the previous year on patronage (Wurfel, 1988). The KBL also had control over most of the mass media, while UNIDO had to rely on Radio Veritas and campaign rallies, particularly by Benigno’s widow Corazon Aquino, to spread their message. Mass outrage at the assassination of Aquino and frustration with years of dictatorship was not enough to unseat Marcos; the opposition, however, did secure a third of the seats in the National Assembly.

The 1984 to 1985 period saw intense negotiation amongst the leadership of UNIDO, as they tried to settle on a presidential candidate who would be capable of defeating Marcos. While Salvador Laurel—the younger of the two defectors from the KBL—was the leader of the coalition, he was deeply distrusted by much of the business and church community for his earlier cooperation with Marcos and his family’s historical connections to the Marcoses (Thompson, 1995). He also had an image as too much of a *trapo* (traditional politician) who was “too much like the guy we’re trying to get rid of”, one who would not bring about any real change if he were to be elected (cited in Thompson, 1995, 133).

An alternative was Corazon Aquino, Benigno Aquino Jr.’s widow. She had widespread popular appeal due to her moral stature in the aftermath of her husband’s assassination and her image as a “simple housewife” (Anderson, 1988, 4).\(^6^0\) Aquino had an apparently genuine preference not to be nominated, but was pressured to accept it by opposition politicians, friends, and family, and a 1 million-signature petition organised by Joaquin Roces, another member of the old elite (Roces, 2000). Initially she intended to run as the nominee of the PDP-Laban party, which had to this point remained stubbornly separate from UNIDO (Kessler, 1984). But in December 1985 Jaime Cardinal Sin negotiated an agreement whereby Aquino would run for president under the UNIDO banner, while Laurel would run as vice president instead (Timberman, 1987).

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\(^6^0\) Anderson points out that this image was rather disingenuous, as Aquino (née Cojuangco) was a member of one of the wealthiest and most powerful political clans in the Philippines and had herself served as treasurer of the Cojuangco family's corporation for thirteen years prior to her political career.
5.3.5. Civil resistance and regime breakdown

In the lead up to 1986, dissent began to surface within Marcos's ruling coalition. In 1983 the KBL was characterised by polarisation and competing factions which were "just waiting for Marcos to leave the scene before manoeuvring for power" (Aquino, 1984, 275). Minister of Defence Juan Ponce Enrile and another close ally, Eduardo Cojuangco, were noted as showing signs of ambition for Marcos's position, with both seen as possible challengers for the presidency.61 Divisions became more prominent in 1985 as Marcos's health problems led to jockeying for power at the top of the KBL. Minister of Labour Bias Ople, Enrile, and Marcos's wife Imelda were all seen as having presidential ambitions, and began trying to distance themselves from the regime by articulating independent positions on key issues (Youngblood, 1986). Arturo Tolentino, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, openly criticised Marcos's continued decree powers, while Enrile and Imelda Marcos clashed at a KBL leadership gathering in an open sign of disunity (Youngblood, 1986). By the end of 1985 divisions in the KBL were "barely concealed", with a presidential spokesman acknowledging that there were "fissures" in the party centred on the three main candidates for the presidency (Youngblood, 1986, 226). However, none of the three major potential rivals for Marcos's position within the ruling coalition were willing to sacrifice their own chances of taking the presidency in order to support one of the others. They preferred instead to stay loyal and wait it out rather than initiate a rebellion; this was demonstrated by Marcos's easy defeat of an impeachment bid from the National Assembly in August 1985, for example (Youngblood, 1986).

Although divisions in the civilian side of the KBL were primarily driven by opportunism over Marcos's apparent ill health, personalisation more directly contributed to divisions amongst the military members of the ruling coalition, as Lee (2015) has shown. During martial law the AFP had become heavily involved in politics, acting as a major part of Marcos's patronage network (Davide et al., 1990, II.C.1.h.). In order to increase his level of control over the military, Marcos took sole charge of promotions, with personal loyalty being the primary criterion for advancement (Davide et al., 1990, II.D). Organisational cohesion as a whole suffered from politicised jockeying for position, resulting in a substantial loss of professionalism and consequent inefficiency in the face of ongoing insurgencies (Aquino, 1984; Youngblood, 1986).

Marcos particularly favoured a faction of the military centred on General Fabian Ver, who had been made AFP Chief of Staff in 1981 over a non-loyalist alternative, General Fidel Ramos (Aquino, 1984). Ver, Ramos, and Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, amongst others, had all been part of a group of military officers who had been in consultation with Marcos over the implementation of martial law (Davide et al., 1990, II.C), but Ramos and Enrile had been marginalised within the ruling coalition relative to Ver following the

establishment of personal rule. Officers loyal to Ver had benefited substantially from martial law and were prominent in areas such as intelligence, police, special combat, home defence, and other units (Aquino, 1984). They were, however, often more familiar with civilian than military affairs, and as a result were seen as ‘civilians in uniform’ and resented by the career officers who had been blocked from promotion to higher ranks (Aquino, 1984; Davide et al., 1990, II.D).

As Ver expanded his influence within the military, a number of subversive organisations emerged, most notably RAM, which was formed around 1982 (Davide et al., 1990, II.C). At the time it cited discontent over corruption, favouritism, lack of professionalism in the military, and the scandal caused by the military’s alleged involvement in the Aquino assassination. Yet the Davide commission found that it was largely organised by Enrile due to persistent rumours that he was to be eliminated or that he wouldn’t have a chance at gaining the presidency if Marcos were to die or step down (Davide et al., 1990, IV.A). According to Enrile’s own account, while the movement tapped into genuinely-held grievances and did aim at reforming the military, it also existed to provide protection for his own personal safety and political interests against Ver and the Marcoses (Davide et al., 1990, IV.A).

RAM organising increased in 1985 as its members began actively preparing for a coup attempt (Davide et al., 1990, IV.A). Before initiating the attempt, however, its leaders needed to assess that there were the appropriate political and economic conditions for a coup to be successful, including widespread support for a change of government at both the popular and elite level. Military involvement in the 1986 election campaign—secretly funded by anti-Marcos businesspeople—gave RAM officers a clear signal that there was widespread public discontent with Marcos (Davide et al., 1990, IV.A). The organisation also met repeatedly with prominent opposition figures in 1985 and early 1986, including Corazon Aquino and Cardinal Jaime Sin as well as organisations representing business, media, and civil society (Davide et al., 1990, IV.A). The RAM was thus able to judge that there were favourable political conditions for coup success. The relationship between the effect that the establishment of personal autocracy had had on the ruling elite, the expression of popular discontent with the Marcos regime, and the decision to attempt a coup are summed up in the testimony of a senior RAM member given after the fact:

> The signal and encouragement from the different sectors of society to unite and move against the dictatorship of Mr. Marcos were too loud and strong to be ignored. Eventually, we were subtly encouraged, if not practically pushed, by the Opposition [sic] groups . . . to either stage a coup or start a revolution (Davide et al., 1990, IV.A, ¶13)

It is thus clear from the evidence gathered by the Davide Commission that the presence of an opposition movement with mass support enabled potentially rebellious elites within the ruling coalition, namely Enrile and Ramos, to overcome the barriers to action that had been imposed by Marcos’s personalisation of power. This involved an informal survey of public opinion through the military’s involvement in the 1986 election campaign as well as direct negotiation with leaders of the opposition movement, which allowed the plotters
to gain enough information to be confident that a coup attempt would receive popular support – as indeed turned out to be the case during the events of February 22-25. Although the coup itself was not successful, it was the direct proximate cause of both the mass protest along EDSA and the widespread defections within the regime’s security forces that ultimately forced Marcos to step down.

5.4. Case study conclusion

This first part of the qualitative component builds on the quantitative findings presented in Chapter 4 by examining Ferdinand Marcos’s rule of the Philippines from 1965 to 1986 as a ‘most likely’ case for the establishment of personal autocracy leading to civil resistance success. Indeed, the analysis presented here shows that the regime matches the concept of personal autocracy well from the mid-1970s onwards, with 1976 probably marking the latest point at which power-sharing can be said to have decisively broken down. As anticipated, Marcos took office under conditions of power-sharing, being limited by the need to work through existing patronage networks and an ‘unruly’ legislature. This obliged him to take into account the interests of competing centres of power within the regime, particularly those of wealthy political families with backgrounds in agricultural production and industrial manufacturing. Although Marcos began making moves to consolidate power almost immediately upon taking office, I conclude that the Philippines was certainly a power-sharing regime during his first two terms in office, from 1965 to 1972, and perhaps remained so—despite the closure of the legislature—for one or two years after the declaration of martial law, while the landowning families still retained some influence. After this point, however, Marcos thoroughly subverted power-sharing by undermining his rivals’ economic and coercive resources, stacking the ruling coalition with members of the military—whom he was able to more reliably control than the old political elite—and purging the bureaucracy of rivals’ supporters. Marcos’s personal authority was cemented in 1976 with revisions to the constitution granting him, amongst other powers, the authority to rule by decree and to personally make further changes to the constitution. His political dominance was clearly demonstrated when he created a new, compliant national assembly and political party and then lifted martial law without giving up his personal control of the regime.

The connection between the establishment of personal autocracy and the extension of leader tenure is also displayed in this case. Notably, the declaration of martial law not only allowed Marcos to remove one of the main constraints on his position—the need to work through the legislature—it also allowed him to overcome the constitutional eight year limit on his time in office. An outright refusal to step down at the end of his term could easily have been met with a strong challenge from the ruling coalition, as it would have clearly signalled an intention to consolidate personal power. Declaring martial law not only allowed Marcos to delay the formal requirement to step down, as well as giving him the opportunity to dominate the constitutional revision process that was initiated shortly afterwards, it also introduced an element of uncertainty regarding his intentions. This caused the political elite to mistakenly believe that the situation would be only temporary,
and that Marcos would surrender power after martial law was lifted, thus limiting their willingness to take risky actions to remove him once he began acting against their interests. This case is thus exemplifies why lengthy time in office is a suitable indirect indicator of personal autocracy, as Marcos’s 20 years in power would have been impossible to achieve without breaching the power-sharing agreement.

Once personal autocracy had been established, Marcos deterred rebellion from within the ruling coalition through discretionary distribution of patronage, carrying out periodic purges, undermining independent centres of power, and carrying out limited but high profile attacks on targeted rivals, as well as disguising his intentions to remain in office. This did generate grievances amongst members of the ruling coalition, particularly those who were passed over for promotion as a result of internal jockeying for position or were marginalised from patronage flows. In the absence of a strong, unified opposition movement with mass support, however, this did not lead those who had lost out in intra-regime struggles to launch a coordinated attempt to remove Marcos, with those losing out from personalisation either defecting individually or choosing to remain within the system to collect continued, if reduced, benefits from supporting Marcos.

With the onset of civil resistance, though, these grievances led to Marcos’s downfall. In particular, Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile created the RAM organisation within the armed forces to defend his personal safety and political interests from the Marcoses and his main rival, AFP Chief of Staff Fabian Ver. The process by which RAM decided to launch a coup attempt, which acted as the trigger for mass protests along EDSA and led directly to the cascade of defections in the regime’s security forces and Marcos’s decision to flee, illustrates how civil resistance can overcome barriers to elite coordination imposed by personal autocracy. The organisers themselves stated very clearly that it was the signal from the opposition that there was widespread support for an alternative to Marcos that prompted them to initiate the challenge, something that was facilitated by direct observation of the election campaign and close communication with the leadership of the movement. As mentioned earlier, while the loss of support from the United States played an important role in Marcos's final downfall—particularly influencing the manner in which it took place—it was this prior loss of support from within the ruling coalition that, I argue, crucially undermined his ability to survive in office through the mass protest campaign. This case study thus illustrates how the creation of a personal autocracy, while increasing the benefits of rule to the autocrat and deterring challenges from inside the regime, can backfire when a mass, nonviolent civil resistance campaign emerges.
6. Cambodia

6.1. Introduction

6.1.1. 2013 election protest campaign

In mid-July 2013 Cambodia’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), led by Hun Sen since 1985, allowed exiled opposition leader Sam Rainsy to return to the country to compete in the upcoming general election. Intended to deflect international criticism by granting a degree of legitimacy to the election while also improving Hun Sen’s image as a magnanimous leader, the move backfired, as Sam Rainsy was met by crowds numbering in the tens of thousands (Strangio, 2014, 259). Supported by Rainsy’s popularity, a shift in demographics towards a younger population, and increased access to information, the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) shocked the CPP by securing 44.5% of the vote against the CPP’s 48.8% (Strangio, 2014, 259-260).

The election itself was tainted by accusations of widespread electoral fraud, with the number of suspect ballots much greater than the margin of victory claimed by the CPP. Immediately, Sam Rainsy called for the creation of a special committee to investigate, and demanded either new polls in the worst-affected provinces or a complete rerun of the election. The first major rally took place on August 6, with at least 10,000 participants gathering at Phnom Penh’s so-called Freedom Park, a designated space for protest near the city centre; troops and tanks were deployed throughout the city in response. Initial protests involved training sessions emphasising nonviolent tactics and discipline, and attracted up to 20,000 participants in early September. After the national electoral commission confirmed the CPP’s victory, the CNRP boycotted parliament and called for further protests; during September the first major violence occurred, as one protestor was killed while trying to remove barricades erected by security forces around Freedom Park. As rolling protests continued, regularly attracting 20,000 participants or more, a

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62 A note on names: Cambodian names consist of a family name followed by a given name(s), so Hun Sen’s family name is ‘Hun’ and his given name ‘Sen’. However, usage is inconsistent in Western sources: while Hun Sen is universally referred to using his full name, others such as Sam Rainsy or Prince Norodom Ranariddh are often referred to by their given name only (‘Rainsy’, ‘Ranariddh’). For consistency, full names are used throughout. Cambodians working with foreigners will occasionally reverse the order of their name; in references here, the ordering occurring in the source material is used to avoid confusion.


64 Al Jazeera, 30 July 2013, “Cambodia opposition claims massive poll fraud.”

65 Reuters, 6 August 2013, “Thousands protest in Cambodia as opposition rejects poll result.”

66 Vong Sokheng & Kevin Ponniah, Phnom Penh Post, 5 September 2013, “A lesson in non-violence”; Xinhua News Agency, 7 September 2013, “Cambodia’s mass protest over poll results ends peacefully.”

67 Al Jazeera, 16 September 2013, “Clashes erupt at Cambodia opposition rally.”
petition calling for an impartial investigation into the election results gathered more than 2 million thumbprints and was delivered to the embassies of the United States and other foreign countries in October. The largest protest, on December 22, attracted at a minimum 100,000 participants, and possibly as many as 300,000 or more.

The campaign was centred on CNRP activists but also included a wide range of social groups, including young Buddhist monks, members of teachers’ and workers’ unions, and large numbers of ordinary Cambodians. Claims rapidly escalated from demands for an election inquiry to calls for broader political change, including the resignation of Hun Sen. In Phnom Penh many residents stockpiled food and stayed home, fearful of armed conflict breaking out. The CPP itself had been stunned by the election result and for several months was unable to coordinate an effective response to the campaign, as moderates and hard-liners within the ruling coalition debated the best course of action. Prompted by growing mobilisation and increasingly radical demands, it launched a crackdown in January 2014, using the army to disperse protestors and clear Freedom Park (with the use of live rounds by security forces also resulting in the deaths of several striking garment factory workers) and banning public demonstrations. In February the ban was lifted and sporadic protests occurred over the next few months. However, they failed to generate the same momentum seen prior to the January crackdown, and open civil resistance has since then largely subsided.

### 6.1.2. Summary: Power-sharing and civil resistance failure

Why did the 2013 civil resistance campaign fail to bring about regime change in Cambodia? As with the Marcos regime in the Philippines, Chapter 4 indicates that the civil resistance campaign in Cambodia had a high probability of success, in part due to Hun Sen’s long tenure at the time of the campaign indicating a high probability that the regime was a personal autocracy. Indeed, previous research has emphasised Hun Sen’s

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69 A government spokesperson put the largest demonstration at approximately 100,000 participants, while Sam Rainsy claimed 500,000, and independent analyst Kem Ley estimated 300,000 to 500,000 (Bennett Murray & Khouth Sophak Chakrya, *Phnom Penh Post*, 3 January 2014, “Size me up: Calculating crowds at Cambodia’s demonstrations”).
71 Interview, Cambodian academic, Phnom Penh, June 2017.
72 Personal communication, Phnom Penh resident, May 2017.
73 Interview, independent political analyst, Phnom Penh, May 2017; Interview, CPP official, Svay Rieng province, May 2017.
74 *Reuters*, 11 June 2014, “Cambodia’s strongman affirms pre-eminence as opposition challenge falters.”
75 *Reuters*, 11 June 2014, “Cambodia’s strongman affirms pre-eminence as opposition challenge falters.”
dominance of Cambodian politics, characterising his rule as personalist for years prior to
the 2013 uprising (e.g., Un, 2005; Strangio, 2014; Morgenbesser, 2018). This position was
expressed clearly by one research participant in Cambodia:

There’s no political system. It’s rule according to the will of the one man, according
to which way he wakes up. [...] He’s basically the centre of all things.\textsuperscript{76}

Some of the empirical indicators of personal autocracy developed in Chapter 2 point
towards Hun Sen’s high levels of personal power at the time. First, he was not constrained
by autonomous institutions outside the CPP, as there have been few other figures or
institutions within Cambodia that have been able to meaningfully check Hun Sen’s power.
The monarchy under King Norodom Sihanouk played a major role in the regime,
particularly during the 1990s, but following his abdication in 2004 lost all political
influence, with his successor, Norodom Sihamoni, widely seen as apolitical.\textsuperscript{77} The
leadership of the Buddhist \textit{sangha}, or monastic community, is dominated by the CPP and
does not overtly interfere in politics, while other institutions such as the judiciary have
virtually no independence.\textsuperscript{78} Second, Hun Sen is not constrained by limits on his stay in
office, formal or informal; for example, there is no evidence to suggest that there have ever
been measures to ensure leadership rotation within the CPP, while the 1993 Cambodian
constitution does not include formal term limits on the prime minister’s position
(Cambodia Const. [1993], ch. X).

Yet in the face of sustained civil resistance involving hundreds of thousands of
Cambodians, the ruling party remained cohesive, supporting the repression of protests
and—at least on the surface—remaining loyal to Hun Sen. Hence this case poses a puzzle:
Why, given the apparent establishment of personal autocracy by Hun Sen, was the
nonviolent uprising not successful? The conclusion I reach regarding this question is that,
despite Hun Sen’s public prominence in Cambodian politics, he had in fact not established
personal autocracy at the time of the 2013 campaign. Most importantly, he was
constrained by the need to balance his personal interests with the interests of a competing
elite coalition, in the form of the rival faction within the CPP centred on Senate president
Chea Sim. This internal competition obliged Hun Sen to work through established
decision-making processes in the party and to maintain a balance of factional interests in
state, party, and military appointments, limiting his ability to consolidate personal
rule. Therefore, despite some increases in his personal power during his nearly 30 years in
office prior to 2013, the Hun Sen regime more closely reflected the concept of power-
sharing developed in the theoretical framework of this thesis, with the power balance
primarily being a pragmatic response to the conflictual factional divide within the CPP.

\textsuperscript{76} Interview, independent political analyst, Phnom Penh, May 2017.
\textsuperscript{77} Indeed, his selection as heir may have been supported by the CPP for precisely this reason
(interviews with political analysts, former government officials, and members of civil society,
Phnom Penh, June 2017).
\textsuperscript{78} Interviews, political analysts, Phnom Penh, June 2017. On relationship between the \textit{sangha} and
Cambodian politics see also Harris (2001) and Soeung and Lee (2017).
Following the passing of Chea Sim in 2015, and the consequent breakup of the rival coalition, however, I argue that the regime has now fully transitioned to personal autocracy.

When the civil resistance campaign emerged, the CPP remained cohesive, and although the response to the uprising was debated, eventually supported a repressive response and the co-optation of the opposition leadership. I conclude that this cohesion was encouraged by the continued power-sharing arrangement at the top level, which helped the political elite to insure that their interests would be protected under the status quo. I therefore find that the 2013 uprising in Cambodia is a deviant case with respect to the quantitative findings in Chapter 4 not because it is inconsistent with the theoretical framework, but because of the unexpectedly long duration of the power-sharing agreement at the elite level.

In line with the secondary heuristic purpose of the case study, I also highlight aspects of the campaign itself as additional explanation for its failure. Although the protest movement fits the criteria used in this study to identify civil resistance campaigns, it had a number of weaknesses that decreased its ability to effectively challenge the regime, including specific strategic and tactical failures of the campaign itself as well as characteristics of the CNRP leadership. In combination with the cohesive effect of the power-sharing agreement, these issues meant that the campaign was unable to sufficiently alter elites’ decision-making calculus to encourage them to support an alternative to the status quo distribution of power.

To explain how I have reached these conclusions, which challenge the common view that Hun Sen had become a personalist dictator prior to 2013, I first trace the history of Cambodia’s current ruling elite. I then analyse the evidence for and against interpretations of several key episodes as power grabs by Hun Sen in order to determine whether the Cambodian regime in 2013 was a personal autocracy. I also describe a number of additional factors that weakened the campaign’s ability to undermine Hun Sen’s support base and bring about regime change.

### 6.2. Authoritarian politics in Cambodia

#### 6.2.1. The People’s Republic of Kampuchea

On January 7, 1979, Vietnamese troops drove Khmer Rouge forces out of Phnom Penh. The next day the formation of a Vietnamese-style communist government was announced, consisting of the state, named the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), and the communist party, the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP). Members of the government included both revolutionaries who had left Cambodia for Vietnam in 1954 and defectors from the Khmer Rouge who had fled in response to purges carried out by Pol Pot’s leadership from 1977 onwards (Vickery, 1994; Gottesman, 2004). Amongst the latter group were Chea Sim, the most influential of the former Khmer Rouge cadres at the time, Heng Samrin, who was selected by the Vietnamese to be president for his
ideological reliability, and a young Hun Sen, who stood out for his ambition and intelligence (Gottesman, 2004). Despite its Cambodian face, however, the Vietnamese kept tight control over the new government. General Le Duc Tho, who had led the invading force, dictated all of the initial policy and internal decisions (Duc, 2012, 380-381). So-called advisors were stationed in almost every ministry; a contemporary United States intelligence report notes that “virtually no significant action or major policy decisions can be taken […] without Vietnamese agreement”, and that Vietnamese ‘advice’ “has the impact of a direct order” (CIA, 1982, 1).

The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia was complicated by the fact that the Khmer Rouge had not been decisively defeated. From bases on the Thai border, along with two other armed groups, the royalist National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and the anti-communist Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF), their forces launched a guerrilla civil war against the PRK government. Supported by foreign powers including China, the United States, Thailand, ASEAN and others, the armed groups were able to sustain insurgency throughout the 1980s, inflicting heavy losses on the Vietnamese and PRK armies (Brown & Zasloff, 1998; Duc, 2012).

On top of this challenge, the PRK had to rebuild party and government organisations from the ground up, as the Khmer Rouge had completely destroyed the pre-existing state structure during its time in power (Gottesman, 2004). In particular, the persecution of Cambodians who were educated or in any way associated with the previous Lon Nol or Norodom Sihanouk regimes had left the country with a severe shortage of potential recruits for government positions. Communists who had fled to Vietnam from repression by the earlier Norodom Sihanouk regime and had been trained in Hanoi formed the basis of the central government in Phnom Penh, as they were ideologically compliant, trustworthy, and capable of running an administration (Vickery, 1994; Gottesman, 2004, 53). The regime’s first prime minister, Pen Sovan, for example, was drawn from this group, although he was soon removed from office for showing too much independence from the Vietnamese and abusing his position for personal gain (Duc, 2012, 382). Outside Phnom Penh the PRK was made up primarily of Khmer Rouge defectors, as these were seen to be the only figures with both the communist credentials and local support required to run the state (Gottesman, 2004, 75). By the mid-1980s as the Vietnamese began looking seriously for ways to extricate themselves from Cambodia the communist party came to be dominated by former Khmer Rouge cadres, centred on Hun Sen, Chea Sim, and Heng Samrin (Gottesman, 2004, 215; Duc, 2012, 394). Pen Sovan’s successor, Chan Sy, passed away in 1984, and Hun Sen was appointed in his place in January 1985.

6.2.2. End of the civil war and international involvement

Diplomatic efforts to end the armed conflict began to bear fruit in the late 1980s, leading to the official withdrawal of Vietnamese troops in 1989 and the signing of the
comprehensive Paris Peace Agreements on 23 October 1991. The agreement involved a UN-supervised interim administration followed by multi-party elections (Strangio, 2014). It also established the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and a 13-member Supreme National Council (SNC), consisting of delegates from each of the four armed factions plus Norodom Sihanouk, to hold sovereign authority.

The Cambodian government was not passive during this period, and from 1989 onwards began to assert its independence from Vietnam. In April 1989 it rebranded itself the “State of Cambodia” (SOC) and adopted policies opposed to the Vietnamese brand of communism, including reinstating Buddhism as the national religion and officially reintroducing private property rights (Gottesman, 2004, 271-276; Strangio, 2014, 40). The communist party was renamed the Cambodian People's Party (CPP). References to Marxism-Leninism were scrubbed from official documents, and those referring to the government's relationship with Vietnam were destroyed. Ambassadors from communist countries were quietly ejected from Phnom Penh, and diplomatic channels with Vietnam reduced (Duc, 2012, 396, 396n605).

At the same time, the CPP, which still dominated the state structure, was using foot-dragging and ‘devious consent’ to resist international pressure to create an even playing field for the elections that would end the UNTAC administration (Lee, 2011). UNTAC administrators—most of whom did not speak Khmer and had no experience of the country—were denied control of key areas of government, including defence, finance, foreign affairs, information, and internal security (Shawcross, 1994; Strangio, 2014). Orders from UNTAC were ignored, UNTAC contingents were attacked, and necessary facilities were refused to the authority (Lee, 2011, 188-189), while failure to secure cooperation from the remainder of the Khmer Rouge was used as a pretext for refusing to demobilise CPP forces (Strangio, 2014, 53-54). The SNC became a “nominal consultative council” with no real power to enforce its policies (Lee, 2011, 280).

Having failed to carry out much of its mandate, the UNTAC leadership made its top priority the holding of elections in May 1993 (Strangio, 2014). The three largest parties registering for the election were the CPP, FUNCINPEC, and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP), the political successor to the KPNLF. The continuation of its pre-existing party structure gave the CPP a huge advantage over its rivals. Its competitors had little time to build mass support, while the CPP coerced enrolment and votes and assassinated political opponents (Ledgerwood, 1996; Frieson, 1996; Hughes, 2003). Yet in the end the CPP’s tactics proved ineffective against the popularity that the association with Norodom Sihanouk brought to FUNCINPEC: with voter turnout at nearly 90%, FUNCINPEC won

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79 Although Vietnamese forces are claimed by both governments to have been withdrawn completely, substantial numbers of former Vietnamese soldiers demobilized on the spot, and remain in Cambodia to this day (Vietnamese government official, personal communication, June 2017).
45.5% of the vote, followed by the CPP at 38.2% and BLDP at 3.8% (Widyono, 2008, 124, 127).

The result was unacceptable to the CPP, which had no intention of relinquishing power. It immediately began protesting claimed irregularities in the election, announcing that the results would not be accepted unless new elections were held in at least four major provinces. Chea Sim and Hun Sen petitioned Norodom Sihanouk to assume full power and demanded an equal power-sharing arrangement with FUNCINPEC in the new government (Widyono, 2008, 124). A short stand-off ensued, during which time a number of senior CPP members announced the secession of several eastern provinces. After Hun Sen negotiated the end of the attempt—although he was widely believed to be behind it—Norodom Sihanouk was reinstalled as head of state and agreed to the CPP’s power-sharing proposal. The office of ‘first prime minister’ went to the head of FUNCINPEC, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, and that of ‘second prime minister’ was given to the CPP, while ministries were divided between the two parties, with one also going to the BLDP.

During this time King Norodom Sihanouk was the nominal head of state, but under the newly drafted constitution did not have the right to govern, holding only constitutional powers. Neither did the so-called power-sharing arrangement represent a true division of power between the CPP and FUNCINPEC. While the CPP retained its organisational structure and control over the bureaucracy and security forces, FUNCINPEC’s authority existed “mostly on paper” (Strangio, 2014, 63). Norodom Ranariddh had little involvement in the actual running of government, while the first priority of FUNCINPEC ministers was personal gain from office. Sam Rainsy, FUNCINPEC’s finance minister, was one of the only government members to speak out on corruption, and in response lost his cabinet position in October 1994 before being stripped of his parliamentary seat and ejected from the party in May 1995.

Following the purge of Sam Rainsy, the National Assembly became a rubber stamp for CPP-tabled legislation, confirming where the true balance of power lay (Strangio, 2014, 71). FUNCINPEC ministers were left out of the policy-making process and the majority of government positions were reserved for distribution by CPP ministers. At a meeting in January 1996 the leadership responded by resolving to push for a larger share of political power and to build up a military wing capable of challenging the CPP (Widyono, 2008, 213-214). Tension built as the CPP and FUNCINPEC competed to attract the allegiance of defecting Khmer Rouge forces, and an alliance between FUNCINPEC, Sam Rainsy’s newly-created Khmer Nation Party (KNP), and remnants of the BLDP potentially capable of defeating the CPP in the upcoming 1998 elections was announced (Strangio, 2014, 76-77). On March 30, 1997, grenades were thrown at a KNP rally at which Sam Rainsy was speaking, killing 16 and injuring 100; a resulting United States government investigation

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80 Thayer, Nate. Phnom Penh Post, 18 June 1993, “Sihanouk back at the helm.”
81 Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia (1993), ch. II, art. 7.
implicated Hun Sen's bodyguard unit in the attack.\textsuperscript{82} Open fighting broke out in Phnom Penh on July 5, 1997, resulting in the swift defeat of FUNCINPEC and the destruction of its military forces.\textsuperscript{83} The party was severely weakened as scores of its members fled the country, and Norodom Ranariddh was replaced by a more compliant figure, Ung Huot, who would not challenge the CPP's dominance (ICG, 1998a).

### 6.2.3. Continued CPP control

After months of negotiation, a deal was struck whereby Norodom Ranariddh would be convicted \textit{in absentia} and then given a royal pardon, which, although a “charade of justice”, would allow him return to Cambodia in order to legitimise the July 1998 general election (ICG, 1998a, 8). In a pattern that has been repeated in subsequent elections, the short campaigning period and election day itself were relatively free and fair. Most of the CPP’s efforts instead focused on the period before official campaigning began, using a strategy of low-level but pervasive intimidation and distribution of “gifts” by local officials to secure votes (ICG, 1998b, 11; cf. Hughes, 2006). Opposition parties suffered from a lack of resources and facilities, and were barred from accessing broadcast media (ICG, 1998a). The CPP also manipulated vote-counting formulas to its advantage and resisted re-counts afterwards, while the national electoral commission refused to investigate virtually all of the complaints of electoral irregularities (ICG, 1998b; Peou, 2000).

In August 1998 opposition supporters, lead by Sam Rainsy, began a protest campaign in Phnom Penh, attracting in excess of 10,000 participants. Many activists in the renamed Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) who had been ejected from their home villages and fled to Phnom Penh in the aftermath of the election found themselves surrounded by like-minded figures and in the presence of politicians and international observers for the first time, making this a major moment for the opposition as a movement in Cambodia (Hughes, 2006). Protests continued for several weeks, challenging the CPP and proving to be resilient in the face of police repression (ICG, 1999, 4). Ongoing violence, however, prompted opposition leaders to scale back their demands and call for an end to protests by the end of September that year (ICG, 1999, 5). Talks between the political parties remained deadlocked until early November, when Norodom Sihanouk offered to host talks. After two days of negotiation the opposition was split by Norodom Ranariddh agreeing once again to join a coalition government with the CPP. Chea Sim, who had to give up his position as head of the National Assembly for Norodom Ranariddh, was placated with the

\textsuperscript{82} The FBI investigation, which was carried out because an American citizen was injured at the rally, was never completed (HRW, 2012).

creation of a Senate, which he would chair and could fill with his supporters, while Sam Rainsy was excluded from power (ICG, 1999; Strangio, 2014, 86).

Two more episodes need to be mentioned before the internal power dynamics of the CPP are examined. In the 2003 election FUNCINPEC, discredited by Norodom Ranariddh’s cooperation with Hun Sen in 1998, performed poorly, obtaining only 20.8% of the vote against the SRP’s 21.9% and the CPP’s 47.3%. Although the CPP dominated, Norodom Ranariddh and Sam Rainsy formed a coalition named the Alliance of Democrats (AD) and were able to deny the CPP the 2/3rds majority it needed to form a government by boycotting the National Assembly (Heder, 2005, 115-116). The CPP responded by exploiting rivalries and ambitions behind the AD’s façade of unity, as senior FUNCINPEC members suspected that Sam Rainsy wanted to take control away from Norodom Ranariddh. Many of them had also been funded in their electoral campaigns by government-affiliated businesspeople, and thus urgently needed to secure lucrative government positions to pay back their debts (Heder, 2005, 117-118). In the period after the election there were also a number of high profile killings of FUNCINPEC and other opposition figures, widely believed to have been ordered by Hun Sen (Heder, 2005, 117-118). Alongside pressure and threats were inducements: Hun Sen created more than 160 new cabinet positions and hundreds more positions at lower levels of government to provide FUNCINPEC members with jobs if they cooperated (Strangio, 2014, 101). In July 2004, Norodom Ranariddh once again folded and agreed to cooperate with the CPP, while Sam Rainsy was excluded. FUNCINPEC was assimilated into the CPP’s patronage network and effectively ceased to function as an opposition movement, its leadership accepting a relationship with the CPP that was “subordinate, subservient, and lucrative” (Heder, 2005, 121). Norodom Sihanouk, proclaiming himself disgusted with the whole affair, had withdrawn from negotiations in early 2004; shortly after the deal was made, he announced his abdication, marking the end of his role in Cambodian politics (Strangio, 2014, 103).

Threatened with a defamation charge, Sam Rainsy went into a short period of self-imposed exile in the wake of the CPP-FUNCINPEC deal. In February 2006 he was pardoned and allowed to return to the country. During Sam Rainsy and Hun Sen’s short rapprochement, the SRP sponsored a constitutional amendment which would reduce the necessary share of seats to form a government from 2/3rds to a simple majority; while this made electoral victory a more realistic target for the SRP, the amendment also suited Hun Sen, who would no longer need to keep FUNCINPEC in the government. Upon the amendment’s passage senior FUNCINPEC ministers were immediately purged, while the party itself devolved into in-fighting. Norodom Ranariddh was ousted as party leader, stripped of his parliamentary immunity, and sued by his former subordinates. Like Sam Rainsy, he chose to go into exile rather than be jailed (Strangio, 2014, 113-114). With FUNCINPEC rendered impotent, the CPP won 58.1% of the vote in the 2008 general election with no major challenges from opposition parties, and its dominance seemed assured.
6.3. The Hun Sen regime

Despite its attempts to project an image of unity, the CPP’s appearance of cohesion is an illusion which conceals deep divisions within the party. At the grassroots the party is strong and cohesive, due to its now well-established structure and possibly the shared military backgrounds of many of the party officials who work at the local level.\textsuperscript{84} At the top, however, there are extremely low levels of trust, with elite cohesion resulting from personal interest and a desire to stay in power rather than being a product of a unifying ideology or principle.\textsuperscript{85} Even the families of rival leaders are known to be unable to work together publicly.\textsuperscript{86} Hun Sen himself is unpopular in many parts of the CPP, and has been for much of his career, and both Hun Sen and Chea Sim have maintained bodyguards much larger than would be required simply for personal protection. A former government minister, when asked whether senior figures are loyal to Hun Sen, emphatically stated that they are not, but merely—using a Khmer expression—‘swallow the hard stone’, cooperating unhappily for the sake of their positions.\textsuperscript{87}

As alluded to earlier, conflicts within the CPP have often—although not always—run along factional lines. Hun Sen’s faction has included central figures such as Hok Lundy, the late head of national police, late deputy prime minister Sok An, and Pol Saroeun, the current head of the armed forces. The rival faction was centred on Chea Sim until his death in June 2015, and included figures such as Minister of the Interior Sar Kheng and senate president Say Chhum. The influence of the latter faction has substantially declined, as noted by Cambodia watchers.\textsuperscript{88} Yet much of this decline has occurred after the death of Chea Sim, 18 months after the civil resistance campaign ended. The central argument of this section is that prior to the civil resistance campaign, Chea Sim and his factional allies were still able to constrain Hun Sen, thus leading to the conclusion that Hun Sen had not, at that point, fully established a personal autocracy in Cambodia.

6.3.1. Origin of intra-party divisions

The factional divide in the current CPP originated in the PRK period. Khmer Rouge cadres who had defected to Vietnam in 1977 and who formed a major part of the new government took advantage of their positions to construct patron-client networks in the areas under their control. In doing so they supplanted the Hanoi-trained communists, who were ill-placed to compete due to their long absence from the country (Gottesman, 2004, 212-213). Chea Sim was particularly adept at building and promoting his patronage

\textsuperscript{84} Interviews, CPP officials, Svay Rieng, May-June 2017. Cf. Smith (2005).
\textsuperscript{85} Interviews, Phnom Penh, May-June 2017. See also Cock (2010), who notes that internal jockeying for position is endemic, although external threats are met with a united front.
\textsuperscript{86} Interview, Cambodian academic, Phnom Penh, May 2017.
\textsuperscript{87} Interview, former government minister, Phnom Penh, June 2017.
\textsuperscript{88} E.g., Ponniah, Kevin & Vong Sokheng, \textit{Phnom Penh Post}, 15 Nov 2014, “The slow demise of Hun Sen’s greatest CPP rival.”
network, and by 1981 had appointed hundreds of former Khmer Rouge cadres to government positions, effectively clearing them of any wrongdoing under the previous regime and building a loyal force of his “children and grandchildren”, as they were referred to (Gottesman, 2004, 122). Concerned by his accumulation of independent power, the Vietnamese removed him as Minister of the Interior in June 1981 and assigned him to the primarily ceremonial role of president of the National Assembly (Gottesman, 2004, 122). Despite this, however, he remained extremely powerful throughout the 1980s, exercising his influence through both formal and informal channels and being treated with substantial deference by the rest of the Cambodian leadership (Gottesman, 2004, 133, 333).

Hun Sen was likewise opportunistic and ambitious in building a personal power base in the Foreign Ministry, which he headed from 1979 to 1984. Although he accepted the tutelage of the Vietnamese, when it came to selecting ministry members and resolving internal disputes he always made his own decisions (Duc, 2012, 381n574). He was highly pragmatic in doing so, choosing those with talent above those with the right ideology; the two were usually mutually exclusive, as Cambodians with technical expertise and administrative experience were hardly ever communists, most having worked instead under Lon Nol or Norodom Sihanouk (Gottesman, 2004, 211).

By the end of the 1980s the two largest factions were headed by Chea Sim, with the support of Heng Samrin, and Hun Sen. Although factional boundaries are not always easy to define, even Vickery (1994, 104), who otherwise disparages such “Kremlinology”, acknowledges that most influential figures in the party could be credibly identified with either Chea Sim or Hun Sen. Yet a relatively even balance of power was maintained at first as both figures avoided challenging each other directly, and struggles within the regime focused more on ideology versus pragmatism in rebuilding the state and the economy (Gottesman, 2004).

### 6.3.2. Hun Sen dominant?

A number of key episodes from the 1990s onwards are cited by scholars and other Cambodia observers as evidence of Hun Sen’s personalisation of power. Most notable are Hun Sen’s use of a coup attempt in 1994 as a pretext to gain control of the national police; his armed conflict with FUNCINPEC over the objection of much of the ruling coalition in 1997; and the resolution of a political deadlock in 2003 and 2004 over the formation of a coalition government in his favour. Yet in all of these instances accounts of events are contested or lack adequate evidence, and questions still remain about the substantive impact they had on the power balance within the CPP.
Despite the initial balance of power, by the end of the UNTAC administration the Hun Sen faction was becoming more prominent, and Hun Sen himself had grown in influence within the party (Vickery, 1994). During the negotiations following the 1993 deadlock, for example, Chea Sim had initially proposed the power-sharing arrangement to Norodom Sihanouk with himself as prime minister, but in the final deal the position went to Hun Sen. This increase in personal power first provoked rebellion from within the ruling coalition in 1994. National Security Minister General Sin Song, supported by senior Interior Ministry official General Sin Sen and Prince Norodom Chakrapong, launched a poorly-organised coup attempt on July 2. It has subsequently been claimed that senior members of the Chea Sim faction were aware of and supported the coup attempt. Hun Sen at least seems to have believed this to be the case: he did not notify the Ministry of Interior, headed by Sar Kheng, about the attempt until several hours after he had begun moving against the ringleaders, and relied on FUNCINPEC instead of CPP forces to block Sin Song’s forces from entering Phnom Penh. More importantly, the coup is reported to have been used as a pretext for Hun Sen to make what has been labelled “a crucial power grab” to take control of the national police away from Sar Kheng and Chea Sim (Morgenbesser, 2018, 9). Aware of their likely complicity in the coup plot, Hun Sen allegedly pressured them to accept the appointment of a close ally, Hok Lundy, to head of the police in exchange for not pursuing the issue, thus gaining control over the most powerful coercive agency in the country at the time.

This interpretation, however, somewhat oversimplifies the circumstances and consequences of Hok Lundy’s appointment. The assertion that Hun Sen forced the appointment of Hok Lundy over the opposition of Chea Sim and Sar Kheng is made only in one article, which was written twenty years after the event and does not provide sources or further evidence to support the claim. In contrast, a former personal advisor to Hun Sen, for example, states instead that Chea Sim and Sar Kheng supported Hok Lundy’s appointment thinking that they could control him. The view of Hok Lundy’s appointment as a power grab is also challenged by subsequent problems that Hun Sen had in controlling Hok Lundy himself. Initially, Hok Lundy indeed worked to undermine Sar Kheng’s control of the National Police, one of three departments at the Ministry of Interior.

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89 Thayer, Nate. Phnom Penh Post, 18 June 1993, “Sihanouk back at the helm.”
95 So Naro, “Dr So Naro, why did General Hok Lundy die or is he still alive.” YouTube video, 18:23. Posted 16 July 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4pZIOJ-fTtg
Interior. However, he soon became powerful enough to pose a potential threat to Hun Sen himself, becoming defiant and refusing to listen to the prime minister.\textsuperscript{96} Hun Sen relied on rivals of Hok Lundy’s to constrain him, particularly Heng Pov, head of the Phnom Penh municipal police department, and Ke Kim Yan, head of the armed forces and a Chea Sim loyalist.\textsuperscript{97} While Hok Lundy was able to out-maneuver and arrest Heng Pov—despite advanced warnings from Hun Sen to Heng Pov himself—by 2008 he had become a liability for his alleged involvement in killings, corruption, and the drug trade, and was being seen as harbouring ambitions for Hun Sen’s position.\textsuperscript{98} He died in a helicopter crash on November 9 that year, with rumours of foul play believed to be credible by many in Cambodia, foreigners and Khmers alike. CPP members reportedly celebrated for days afterwards, as Hok Lundy was widely hated within the party.\textsuperscript{99}

Shortly after Hok Lundy’s death, Ke Kim Yan was replaced as head of the armed forces by a Hun-Sen aligned figure. Although it is only speculation, the implication appears to be that with Hok Lundy gone, Ke Kim Yan’s control of the armed forces was no longer needed to constrain him. The upshot of all of this is that the argument that Hun Sen was able to gain control over the national police by appointing an obedient loyalist mischaracterises the contested nature of that control.

1997 conflict – reassertion of power-sharing

By far the most prominent apparent power grab was the 1997 armed conflict in Phnom Penh. Widely denounced as a coup by Hun Sen, in reality it represented the result of months of mutual antagonism and provocation between FUNCINPEC and the CPP (Strangio, 2014, 82).\textsuperscript{100} There was also, however, a factional element to the conflict. In response to the 1994 coup attempt and the build-up of FUNCINPEC military strength, Hun Sen had increased the size of his bodyguard unit to 1500 troops equipped with heavy weaponry in the lead-up to the conflict (Strangio, 2014, 82). Hun Sen had also been losing popularity within the CPP, with many party members wanting to replace him with

\textsuperscript{96} So Naro, “Dr So Naro, why did General Hok Lundy die or is he still alive.” YouTube video, 18:23. Posted 16 July 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4pZIOj-fTlg
\textsuperscript{97} So Naro, “Dr So Naro, why did General Hok Lundy die or is he still alive.” YouTube video, 18:23. Posted 16 July 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4pZIOj-fTlg. For more detail, see a cable from the United States Embassy discussing the struggles within the Ministry of Interior (United States Embassy in Cambodia, “Cambodia’s renegade police chief”, Wikileaks Cable: 06PHNOMPENH1509_a, dated 24 August 2006).
\textsuperscript{98} Khy Sovuthy, Phnom Penh Post, 2 Oct 2014, “Heng Pov tells court of police power struggles.”
\textsuperscript{99} Phnom Penh-based journalist, personal communication, June 2017.
\textsuperscript{100} Phnom Penh-based journalist, personal communication, June 2017.
someone more palatable to voters. When the possibility of military action against FUNCINPEC was raised it was opposed by Chea Sim and his allies, including Defence Minister Tea Banh and head of the armed forces General Ke Kim Yan. During the conflict itself they refused to mobilise the forces under their command in support, with Hun Sen relying instead on his own bodyguard unit and the forces of the few figures who supported military action, including General Pol Saroeun and Kandal Deputy Governor Kun Kim, both of whom have subsequently become prominent figures in the regime. After Hun Sen’s victory it is reported that the CPP officials who had not cooperated sandbagged their houses and put their personal bodyguards on alert, allegedly in the expectation that they might be attacked next.

This 1997 conflict is portrayed in most accounts as having been a major turning point in Hun Sen’s personalisation of power, after which he dominated the CPP and secured the position of powerful loyalists in prominent government positions. Yet subsequent intra-party negotiations, not mentioned in these sources, suggest that the conflict may have had a more limited effect on the power-sharing agreement. In October 1997 the CPP held its fifth party congress. In the lead-up there was widespread speculation that Hun Sen would use the congress to strengthen his position against Chea Sim or attempt to challenge him for control of the party. However, reported events strongly imply that the congress instead resulted in a reassertion of high-level power-sharing. While the CPP endorsed Hun Sen’s actions in July, his proposal to add several loyalists to the party’s standing committee was blocked by the objections of Chea Sim. He also had to withdraw proposed amendments to an electoral law, drafted by Sar Kheng, that would have altered it to strengthen his loyalist-dominated Council of Ministers against Sar Kheng’s stronghold in the Ministry of Interior. Most significantly, the plenum agreed to return to “the classical way of managing the party”, which was interpreted by observers as meaning collective decision-making by the standing committee. The re-assertion of collective decision-making and constraints exercised on moves by Hun Sen to strengthen his faction against Chea Sim hence strongly imply that the July 1997 conflict did not constitute a breakdown of the CPP’s power-sharing agreement.

2003-2004 deadlock

A third key episode mentioned by observers is when Hun Sen forced Chea Sim out of the country in order to pass legislation favourable to his own position in 2004 (Morgenbesser,

105 Barber, Jason, Phnom Penh Post, 10 October 1997, “CPP rumblings as congress nears.”
106 Barber, Jason & Samreth Sopha, Phnom Penh Post, 7 November 1997, “CPP endorses Hun Sen despite military doubts.”
2018). After the 2003 election, the AD, which had the overt or tacit support of Sihanouk, the Chea Sim faction, and civil society in Phnom Penh, posed a serious threat to Hun Sen’s position, demanding substantial concessions that would have amounted to a “political death warrant” if he had agreed (Heder, 2005, 116-117). Hun Sen instead proposed a deal to create new government positions for FUNCINPEC if they split the AD. The deal required a constitutional amendment, which needed the signature of Chea Sim as acting head of state while Norodom Sihanouk was out of the country. However, on the day he was due to sign the deal he was ‘escorted’ to the airport by police—led by Hok Lundy—and flown to Thailand. It was also reported that the night before members of Hun Sen’s bodyguard unit had been posted outside Chea Sim’s residence.107 FUNCINPEC minister Nhek Bun Chhay, next in line as acting head of state, signed the amendment instead, before Chea Sim returned to Cambodia the following week.

The event is considered to have been humiliating to Chea Sim (Strangio, 2014, 102), although several days later the CPP broadcast a clip of an informal and apparently friendly meeting between Hun Sen, Chea Sim, and other leading members of the party on state TV as a show of unity.108 Indeed, it stands out in retrospect as a remarkable rupture in the CPP’s façade of cohesion, with no comparable public conflicts occurring in the years since That Hun Sen was willing to make such an overt display of party disunity suggests that the move was a last-resort response to the severe threat that Chea Sim’s support for the opposition alliance posed to his political survival; from a more dominant position, it seems more plausible that Hun Sen would have simply forced Chea Sim to sign the amendment, avoiding the public spectacle.

The ensuing effect on the balance of power is less clear than some subsequent reports have suggested (e.g., Morgenbesser, 2018). Notably, Sar Kheng retained his post in the new government, although Hun Sen’s ‘crony’ Sok An was also promoted to deputy prime minister (Heder, 2005). Furthermore, there are only conflicting reports about whether appointments to the party’s standing committee in January 2005 were dominated by Hun Sen or whether they reflected a balance of interests.109 Indeed, despite Hun Sen’s attempts to stack the central committee with his core loyalists in subsequent years, Chea Sim was able to block him from doing so.110 Thus, although the episode was an unusually public display of disharmony within the CPP, and may indeed have been a blow to the Chea Sim faction, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that it resulted in Hun Sen being able to effectively remove constraints on his position in regard to high-level appointments or the passage of legislation within the regime. Similarly, other attacks on Chea Sim supporters,

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109 Phnom Penh Post, 11 February 2005, “CPP adds eight to top echelon.”
110 Interview, independent political analyst, Phnom Penh, May 2017.
such as the arrest and imprisonment of his bodyguard head in 2011, had a relatively limited effect on the fortunes of his faction.111

6.3.3. Indicators of power-sharing

Conflicting information and interpretations of episodes commonly highlighted as power grabs by Hun Sen thus throw into question the conclusion that they in fact represented substantive moves towards personal autocracy. In addition to the relatively limited effect of these episodes on the influence of the rival CPP faction, there are also a number of areas where Hun Sen was obliged to make concessions to competing interests within the regime shortly before 2013.

The first area is control over appointments in the military. After the numbers of senior officers had rapidly expanded in the 2000s, Hun Sen temporarily called a halt to promotions around 2010.112 When, in spite of this, he tried to promote his son Hun Manet—who had only received his first command in 2008—to the third-highest rank of Lieutenant General, other high-ranking officials objected, accusing him of favouritism and demanding that their children be promoted as well. Hun Sen was reportedly unhappy about this, but complied.113 For example, Sar Sokha, Sar Kheng's son, was promoted at the same time as Hun Manet.114 In a similar vein, Chea Sim and Heng Samrin were both promoted to 5-star generals at the same time as Hun Sen in 2009.115 Similarly, Chea Sim's ally Ke Kim Yan was widely popular within the armed forces. Although he was removed as head of the armed forces in 2009, several weeks after the death of Hok Lundy, he was shortly afterwards appointed to the post of deputy prime minister.116 This was possibly intended to deter the threat of rebellion from his supporters; indeed, when rumours had emerged that Ke Kim Yan was going to be removed, loyalist troops—who are alleged to still make up the bulk of the armed forces—deliberated whether to launch an armed rebellion in response.117

115 Vong Sokheng, Phnom Penh Post, 23 Dec 2009, “CPP leaders receive five-star promotion.”
117 Interview, former government minister, Phnom Penh, June 2017; personal communication, Phnom Penh-based journalist, June 2017.
A second area where Hun Sen faced constraints was in determining policy, where he had to operate through a consensus-based decision-making system that is reported to have existed between the ‘three *samdechs* [lords]’ Hun Sen, Chea Sim, and Heng Samrin:

In the old days, before his [Chea Sim’s] death, there was a triumvirate, as in Vietnam these days. Checks and balance. Each of the three can veto any big decisions. Then, one died, and the other [is weak] vis-à-vis Hun Sen. Hun Sen, Chea Sim, Heng Samrin. The same as in Vietnam. The communist party leadership, a triumvirate. Three. Any big decisions must have the consensus of the three. Each can veto. The Soviet system, following Stalin.\(^{118}\)

Such collective decision-making mechanisms are a common feature of power-sharing autocracies, although they may not be easily observable from the outside. As discussed in Chapter 2, tools like vetoes allow members of the ruling coalition to block unfavourable legislative or administrative decisions while providing clear signals of the autocrat’s intention to further consolidate power if they are breached or ignored. In contrast, in personal autocracies vetoes over the ruler’s decisions by definition do not exist.

Third, although Hun Sen has been the most influential single figure in the regime since the early 1990s, he was not able to gain outright control of the CPP until 2015, with Chea Sim retaining the role of president until his death. Chea Sim’s position prevented Hun Sen from being able to remove entrenched political elites, introduce reform policy that would impact their interests, or otherwise exercise discretionary control over the party.\(^{119}\) Indeed, there is little evidence to suggest that Hun Sen was able to achieve the kind of dominance over the CPP that would be expected of a personalist dictator prior to the 2013 campaign. For example, as pointed out above, he was prevented from stacking the party leadership with loyalists in 1997 and there is no solid evidence that he did so in 2005, with no further major changes occurring until 2016 as discussed below. Indeed, other Chea Sim allies retained—and continue to retain—key government posts, including Sar Kheng as head of the Ministry of Interior and deputy prime minister and Say Chhum in a number of prominent posts.

Further evidence for classifying Cambodia as a power-sharing regime at the time of the 2013 protests comes from Hun Sen’s much more clear consolidation of personal autocracy following the death of Chea Sim in 2015. His faction has now become significantly less influential, as no-one has been able to effectively take over as its leader, including Chea Sim’s children:\(^{120}\)

In our culture, in our history, there is a strong cult of personality, a rule of men. So without any leader it falls apart. And when one leader stays so long it’s very difficult

\(^{118}\) Interview, independent political analyst, Phnom Penh, May 2017.


\(^{120}\) Interview, Cambodian academic, Phnom Penh, June 2017.
to have a comparable leader, with comparable support and all that. So now, Hun Sen.\textsuperscript{121}

The main constraint on Hun Sen’s power, the continued presence of a strong rival elite coalition, has therefore been removed following this point:

We are starting to see some of the old guard, some of the top elites starting to leave the political scene. Chea Sim was definitely a big character, definitely left a big shadow, a big vacuum now. [...] In the old days there was a lot more balance within the ruling party. Before Chea Sim – I mean now basically Hun Sen has consolidated all of the power.\textsuperscript{122}

The Cambodian government has hence more closely resembled the concept of personal autocracy I have developed here since Chea Sim’s death in 2015, with Hun Sen now the only meaningful centre of power within the regime.

A symbolic example of this transition can be seen in the CPP’s election campaigns. In the past, campaign posters had always featured images of Hun Sen, Chea Sim and Heng Samrin together. During the 2013 campaign, Hun Sen pushed to have these posters show only himself, or to have his portrait placed more prominently than the other two, but was prevented from doing so.\textsuperscript{123} During the 2017 commune election campaign, however, Heng Samrin’s portrait was notably absent from CPP posters, with Hun Sen’s image shown alone.\textsuperscript{124} Another symbolic example is the hagiographic documentary “Marching Towards National Salvation”, released by the CPP in early 2018, which chronicles Hun Sen’s defection from the Khmer Rouge and involvement in Vietnam’s 1979 invasion of Cambodia.\textsuperscript{125} While Hun Sen is given the most prominence, influential defectors like Chea Sim and Heng Samrin are mentioned only in passing, and others who remain high-ranking members of the CPP, such as Men Sam On and Tea Banh, are not mentioned at all.\textsuperscript{126} This rewriting of history is suggestive of initial attempts at building the kind of personality cult seen in other personal autocracies such as North Korea or China under Mao, as it creates a narrative lionizing Hun Sen as the most important figure in the “rescue” of the Cambodian nation from the Khmer Rouge. Indeed, personality cults are endemic to personal autocracies, as they reinforce the leader’s paramount political standing and send a clear message to potential challengers in the ruling coalition—as well as broader

\textsuperscript{121} Interview, independent political analyst, Phnom Penh, May 2017.
\textsuperscript{122} Interview, independent political analyst, Phnom Penh, May 2017.
\textsuperscript{123} Interview, independent political analyst, Phnom Penh, May 2017.
\textsuperscript{124} Author’s observations, Phnom Penh, June 2017.
\textsuperscript{126} Vietnamese accounts ascribe Hun Sen a more modest role during this period, with the Hanoi-trained revolutionaries and figures such as Heng Samrin and Chea Sim being more prominent within the party and the new government (Duc, 2012).
society—that there is only one person who counts, and they are firmly in control (Svolik, 2012).

More concretely, after Chea Sim’s passing Hun Sen immediately took over as party president, which, in conjunction with his role as prime minister, gave him personal control over both government and party for the first time in his tenure. Observers at the time noted that gaining direct control of the party gave Hun Sen much greater leverage and more freedom to speed up the generational transition in the party by ‘easing out’ party veterans and introducing younger, ‘reform-minded’ figures into key institutions; in other words, eliminating entrenched elites and replacing them with younger, less independent, more easily controlled party members. In March 2016, a few months after Chea Sim’s passing, Hun Sen carried out a major reshuffle of the CPP cabinet, making a total of 24 changes to leadership and senior positions in a number of ministries. External observers have attributed the reshuffle to the CPP’s poor performance in the 2013 election, with some criticising it as being ‘cosmetic’ rather than reflective of genuine government reform because many figures were simply moved into different positions rather than removed altogether. But such ‘superficial’ rotation of senior officials serves a distinct purpose in personal autocracies, as it prevents government ministers building up independent bases of loyalists in their ministries which could be used to mount a challenge while simultaneously demonstrating the autocrat’s personal authority. Tellingly, the changes are alleged to have not gone through the normal CPP decision-making processes, but were instead pushed by Hun Sen himself.

Other recent moves similarly reflect the kinds of actions typically taken by personalist autocrats to consolidate their position. For example, Hun Sen has recently announced plans to establish a separate intelligence agency—with a training institute for its members run by his own son—that could be used not only to monitor potential opposition, but also to spy on Cambodia’s military and security forces to detect or deter potential subversive factions forming. He has also announced his intention to take personal discretionary control of appointments to the executive branch, reducing its excessive size (and consequent need for patronage) while also bypassing the National Assembly, which currently needs to approve appointments. These moves, and more, are ongoing at the time of writing.

128 Mech Dara, Phnom Penh Post, 18 March 2016, “Details of PM’s cabinet reshuffle announced.”
129 Khmer Times, 20 March 2016, “Cabinet reshuffle just cosmetic, critics say.”
130 Kavi Chongkittavorn, The Nation, 4 April 2016, “Hun Sen’s cabinet reshuffle sends a strong signal.”
131 Mech Dara, Phnom Penh Post, 13 December 2017, “New spy school announced.”
132 Mech Dara & Yesenia Amaro, Phnom Penh Post, 28 December 2017, “Hun Sen’s ‘vision’ would see him bypass National Assembly, shrink cabinet.”
6.3.4. Cambodia in 2013: A power-sharing regime

In 2016, CPP spokesman Sok Eysan, in response to speculation about the impact of the death of Chea Sim on the balance of power within the regime, stated:

The analysers could not know what is in the minds of both the samdechs. They've raised [the idea of CPP factions] since after the national election in 1993. You can see until now that the CPP has not split up. It's been 25 years already. Has it split up like they said? Since the past, people have said 'This is Samdech Hun Sen's bloc, this is Samdech Chea Sim's bloc, this is Samdech Heng Samrin's bloc.' But in fact, the samdechs often eat together.¹³³

Despite the obviously self-serving purpose of these comments, the evidence I have presented suggests that they may not be entirely inaccurate. Indeed, they are lent some plausibility by the fact that they echo a similar insider claim from the early 1990s that the three leaders were close comrades who often visited each other at home and drank cognac together (Mehta & Mehta, 2013, 152).¹³⁴ Whether this really meant, as the anonymous senior CPP official reported, that they were “the best of friends” is less important than the fact that this is the kind of collective, face-to-face interaction amongst influential elites that characterises power-sharing regimes. On the basis of the evidence that I have presented in this case study, I therefore conclude that one of the factors that kept the CPP cohesive in the face of mass demonstrations in 2013 was the ongoing power-sharing agreement. While the power balance at the time of the civil resistance campaign had been shifting towards personal autocracy, Chea Sim and his factional allies were still able to constrain Hun Sen’s decision-making power with regard to the ruling coalition. As anticipated by the theoretical framework, the maintenance of power-sharing helped to maintain regime cohesion. In particular, Chea Sim in his position as party president played a key role:

You have the communists, they appreciated and honoured those fellow revolutionaries, leaders of the revolution. [...] They were cooperating very well. It was up to Chea Sim as a sort of moderation, a moderating force.¹³⁵

As an influential party elder, Chea Sim was able to resolve intra-party disputes that arose as a result of personal conflicts or turf wars over private interests, preventing them from erupting into regime destabilising divisions and maintaining the appearance of unity.¹³⁶ But, as mentioned above, he also acted as a check on Hun Sen’s consolidation of personal

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¹³³ Quoted in Willemyns, Alex, Cambodia Daily, 6 June 2016, “CPP bigger than Hun Sen, dissent reminds.”
¹³⁴ It should be noted that Mehta and Mehta (2013) is not an unbiased source, being highly sympathetic to Hun Sen (Osborne, 2015). Yet, this information may still be useful to show that the ‘standard view’ of power dynamics within the CPP may be somewhat lacking in nuance, as I have argued in this chapter.
¹³⁵ Interview, independent political analyst, Phnom Penh, May 2017.
control by preventing the replacement of older party members with younger cadres, thus forcing Hun Sen to continue balancing these entrenched interests.

At the time of the campaign, then, the ruling coalition had not suffered the kind of loss of influence over the autocrat that in a personal autocracy would encourage them to support an alternative to the status quo, and instead chose to remain loyal and support a repressive response to the uprising. In contrast, I have argued that the post-Chea Sim regime is far more reflective of a personal autocracy as described in the theoretical framework of this research, in which Hun Sen’s rule is largely unconstrained by the political elite. The political balance of power is now one in which Hun Sen almost entirely dominates the CPP and faces far fewer constraints than he did even a few years ago.

6.4. Additional obstacles to success

This case study also has a secondary heuristic purpose, to identify additional factors or hypotheses that can challenge or improve the theoretical framework. Indeed, the ongoing power-sharing agreement at the top of the Cambodian regime was not the only factor influencing the outcome of the 2013 civil resistance campaign. Other analysis has highlighted the role of China in supporting the Hun Sen regime, together with the declining influence of Western governments (e.g., Croissant, 2018). As discussed in Chapter 3, however, I do not directly address international factors in this thesis, other than to note that China’s role as a diplomatic and economic backer of the regime likely had a positive influence on its chances of surviving the civil resistance campaign. Instead, I focus here on identifying factors relating to the opposition CNRP and the campaign itself, including how the protests from July 2013 to January 2014 were carried out, as well as some more general obstacles to a transition of power from the CPP to the CNRP. Together with the maintenance of power-sharing, I argue that these factors prevented the uprising from sufficiently appealing to potential elite allies from within the CPP who might otherwise have supported a shift in the status quo distribution of power. The implications of these additional factors for understanding the outcome of nonviolent uprisings against authoritarian regimes are explored further in the concluding chapter below.

6.4.1. Opposition characteristics

A major obstacle to the success of the civil resistance campaign, as well as democratisation in Cambodia more generally, is that members of the ruling coalition do not trust that the CNRP can guarantee their interests and ensure a peaceful transfer of power in the event of regime change. Only limited direct evidence for this point is available; CPP officials spoken to by the author were dismissive of the CNRP and preferred to discuss it as little as possible, likely because they did not want to give the impression that they see it as a
credible challenge. However, mistrust of the CNRP is also common amongst members of civil society, politicians who have defected from the CNRP or established rival parties, and foreigners in Cambodia, and their views can be read as likely indicators of the thoughts of the ruling coalition.

The first reason that Cambodian political elites may not trust the CNRP is to do with its structure and leadership. Although espousing democratic ideals, the CNRP has frequently been accused of being less principled in its own internal makeup, being described as highly centralised and focused on a tight inner circle with an “almost obsession with consensus [...] from the top down.” The party has a personalistic structure focused on “the leadership dimension” at the expense of well-articulated policy and party programme development (Croissant, 2016, 28). The nature of this is illustrated by one interviewee’s description of Sam Rainsy’s leadership style:

Sam Rainsy is a character that doesn’t listen to anybody, just has his own version of everything and that’s it, it’s his way or the highway. That’s how he operates. He doesn’t listen to anybody. I remember when the decisions were being made by the permanent committee or the steering committee, which is actually the highest body of the party, and Sam Rainsy would step in and say ‘I disagree’ and that’s it, that’s that, end of conversation. And we’re talking about the decision’s already been made, there’s meetings and votes are taking place - and Sam Rainsy doesn’t go to these kinds of votes, right - and then he’d just walk in and say ‘no I don’t want that’ and that’s it. I’ve asked some of the key people, including Mu Sochua, and said that can’t be right, that’s not democratic and she said “No, you’ve got to listen to the president.”

Sam Rainsy has, for much of his career, presented and seen himself as the only legitimate leader of the opposition, initially seeing Kem Sokha as a challenger to his position before opportunistically agreeing to a merger after the HRP’s unexpectedly strong performance in the 2008 election. Although the merger between the two parties is reported to have gone smoothly at the grassroots level, groups of loyalists centred on Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha at higher levels of the party in 2013 still maintained a degree of rivalry. The party has also been accused of nepotism, for example in the appointment of Kem Sokha at higher levels of the party in 2013 still maintained a degree of rivalry. The party has also been accused of nepotism, for example in the appointment of Kem Sokha’s daughter Kem Monovithya as the party’s deputy PR manager, although Sam Rainsy’s children are not much involved in party affairs. All of these factors are indicative of a personalistic, patron-client-type structure in the CNRP:

138 Hutt, David, Diplomat, 26 November 2016, “The trouble with Cambodia’s largest opposition party”, emphasis added.
139 Interview, independent political analyst, Phnom Penh, May 2017.
140 E.g., United States Embassy in Cambodia, “Rainsy convicted and sentenced to two years for border stunt”, Wikileaks Cable: 10PHNOMPENH75_a, dated 29 January 2010.
141 Interview, CNRP official, Svay Rieng, May 2017.
142 Interview, Cambodian former politician, Phnom Penh, May 2017.
143 Hutt, David, Diplomat, 26 November 2016, “The trouble with Cambodia’s largest opposition party”; Civil society participant, “Building and consolidating state institution reform in Southeast
When we look at the structure and the operation of the leadership of the opposition party, we see they are not different from the ruling party. [...] Kem Sokha is more considerate, he’s more consultative, but Sam Rainsy's personality... but then not only these two guys but the whole structure is top down, like the CPP. It's the leaders that appoint the guys down the line. Exactly the same. You need to be loyal to your boss, your leader, you need to please them, you need to give them more money and so on, you need to go with them everywhere as part of their entourage.144

At a strategic level, the structure of the CNRP may suggest to CPP members that government positions are more likely to go to Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha’s loyalists first. This kind of preferential treatment of loyal clients is common in Cambodian politics—and indeed Southeast Asia more generally—but decreases the likelihood that potential defectors will consider withdrawing support from the incumbent regime, as they consider their risk of being excluded from a future ruling coalition to be too high compared to the potential benefits and choose to remain loyal instead (cf. Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).

A second factor affecting CPP members’ trust in the CNRP to guarantee their safety and interests in the event of regime change is the CNRP’s campaigning style, particularly its strong reliance on demagogic rhetoric or “gutter politics” to challenge the legitimacy of the current regime.145 Several interviewees highlighted the lack of a clearly-articulated policy platform in the CNRP’s campaign messages, particularly in 2013:

They [the CNRP] need to focus more on the policy, what you're going to do on education, what you're going to do on health, on job creation business and all of those. Which an opposition party has never paid much attention to for the last, I think, 20 years. They have the policy written down there but they never talk about it. The only thing they say – Hun Sen is a yuon puppet, a Vietnamese puppet, Hun Sen is a criminal, we need to bring him to justice and whatever.146

Instead, as the above quote suggests, the party has primarily relied on anti-Vietnamese narratives to gain popular support (e.g., Future Forum, 2017). The CNRP, and the SRP before it, have drawn heavily on racist and nationalist rhetoric in opposing what they claim to be Vietnamese influence over the CPP, typically casting the CPP as a ‘yuon [Vietnamese] puppet’.147 Sam Rainsy was part of the CGDK delegation which opposed the
U.N.’s recognition of the (Vietnam-sponsored) PRK government, and has a long history of using xenophobic appeals in his speeches, with SRP rallies in the past occasionally leading to violence against ethnic Vietnamese (Hughes, 2001). Kem Sokha is not innocent of this either, having accused Vietnam of ‘staging’ the S-21 prison, where the Khmer Rouge interrogated and later executed thousands of prisoners, and blamed Vietnam for the Koh Pich bridge stampede in 2010 which killed 353 people (Future Forum, 2017). CNRP election monitoring is very heavily focused on preventing ‘illegal immigrants’ (codeword for ethnic Vietnamese) from registering or voting. During the 2013 campaign demonstrators abused security forces as yuon, even though they were definitely Khmer, prompting a violent response from the troops.

The focus on demonising the CPP regime as a Vietnamese puppet regime is one example of what many interviewees as ‘painting’ or ‘colouring’, which roughly means distorting or misrepresenting one’s opponents in order to delegitimise them. This tactic is common in Cambodian politics: other examples include the CNRP accusing new opposition parties like the Grassroots Democracy Party (GDP) of being creations of the CPP or the government labelling independent, non-partisan civil society organisations or labour unions as pro-opposition. Colouring was more prominent in the CNRP’s 2013 campaign than in previous elections, as they switched their focus from intellectuals and civil society towards broader mass appeals. Indeed, it has been suggested that the CNRP’s anti-Vietnamese stance is more strategic than heartfelt, as invoking nationalist sentiment is an effective way to mobilise popular support in Cambodia.

The consequences of relying on such negative attacks, however, is that a political transition is more likely to be seen as zero-sum, prompting potential defectors to remain loyal for fear of instability and conflict in the event of regime change. Given Cambodia’s history, in which a peaceful transfer of power has never occurred, such a fear may be more salient than in other contexts. Hence, an interviewed CPP official’s statement that the CNRP’s “not peaceful talk” in 2013 put Cambodia’s relative peace and security at risk may indeed represent genuinely-held concerns. As another interviewee put it,

If they feel scared, if they feel fearful, they will not hand over power and they will protect power more. And that’s why I was disappointed that Sam Rainsy did not

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Ley’s former colleagues I noted that, although they frequently criticised the CNRP for relying on anti-Vietnamese rhetoric, this point was never raised (Interviews, civil society figures, Phnom Penh, May-June 2017).

148 Hutt, David, Diplomat, 26 November 2016, “The trouble with Cambodia’s largest opposition party.”
149 Author’s observations and personal communications, Phnom Penh, May-June 2017.
151 Interviews, Phnom Penh, May-June 2017.
152 Interview, civil society member, Phnom Penh, June 2017.
154 Interview, CPP official, Svay Rieng, May 2017.
grasp that idea, you know? If you would like to lead a peaceful change there are already good examples. But the way of his message remains the same: this is the bad guy, this is the corrupt guy, this is the traitor, the Vietnamese puppet. So how can you earn the trust of this person to give over power? He just pushes him to protect more.155

6.4.2. Problems of the campaign

The 2013 campaign had several other features that civil resistance researchers have linked to success. These included training in nonviolent discipline,156 large numbers of participants, inclusion of social groups with substantial social and moral authority,157 sustained action, ethnic homogeneity between protestors and security forces, and clear, well-defined goals (e.g., Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994; Schock, 2005; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Nepstad, 2011, 2013). However, it fell short in several areas. The CNRP was either unable or unwilling to build a broad coalition of civil society and labour organisations to support the campaign. People from a range of backgrounds did take part in the demonstrations, a factor which is likely to contribute to the ability of protest movements to obtain concessions from governments (Denardo, 1985), but there was a notable lack of participation from social groups as such. For example, Buddhist monks began joining protests around the beginning of September, particularly younger monks.158 The involvement of monks in the 1998 protests had severely damaged the CPP’s legitimacy, particularly when they were beaten and shot at by security forces (Heng, 2008). Yet in 2013 the sangha hierarchy, which remains dominated by the CPP, did not officially condone the involvement of monks in protests or come out in support of the opposition, limiting the ability of the sangha’s great moral authority to be used against the regime.

Civil society organisations, even those critical of the government, remained on the sidelines, taking on support roles such as human rights monitoring and first aid, but asserting their independence.159 Organisations did allow their members to take part, but most did not actually engage in mobilising their networks in support of the CNRP,160 which could have potentially generated substantially more participation and legitimacy for the campaign. Those members who did participate in protests were maintained to be

156 Song Sokheng & Kevin Ponniah, Phnom Penh Post, 5 September 2013, “A lesson in non-violence.”
158 Cheang Sokha, Shane Worrell & May Titthara, Phnom Penh Post, 7 September 2013, “‘Mass demonstration’ a restrained affair.”
159 Interview, Cambodian academic, Phnom Penh, June 2017.
doing so as individuals and not representatives of their organisations, despite CPP attempts to ‘colour’ them as such.\textsuperscript{161}

Particularly important here was that the CNRP was unable to adequately take advantage of concurrent but separate labour strikes that were being carried out by Cambodia’s powerful garment worker unions during the civil resistance campaign. During December 2013, unions carried out strikes involving hundreds of thousands of participants that crippled the economy after negotiations over wage increases had failed to yield a result.\textsuperscript{162} Large numbers of individual garment workers had also voted for the CNRP during the general election because of their promise to raise minimum wages. During the civil resistance campaign, CNRP officials made informal efforts to get the support of workers by visiting protests and making political speeches, and individual workers also joined the protests in Freedom Park. However, the CNRP never approached the organisers of labour protests to seek an alliance or overt support, nor try to persuade them to connect their economic demands with the CNRP’s political goals.\textsuperscript{163} Thus the CNRP was unable to capitalise on widespread worker discontent and the unions’ size, economic power, or extensive networks and organisational structure to increase protest participation, breadth, and leverage against the regime.

Thus, while the campaign had the individual involvement of people from a wide variety of backgrounds, there was no broad coalition of the type seen in the Philippines. Virtually the only organisation which took place as such seems to have been the CNRP itself. The opposition was thus not able to effectively bring the moral authority of the sangha, the mobilisational ability of civil society, or the economic influence of the labour unions to bear in support of the campaign. Together with the rapid escalation of demands for Hun Sen to step down while the results were still being contested, the lack of a broad coalition of organisations opposing the CPP also encouraged international actors to view the campaign as the reaction of ‘sore losers’ complaining about the loss, rather than an expression of mass discontent against an authoritarian regime. As a result, the campaign also failed to attract overt international backing or pressure on the government either.\textsuperscript{164}

Related to this, the leadership of the CNRP did not have a strong strategy for the protests. Immediately after the election there was a strong upwelling of support for civil resistance, as described by one interviewee:

\begin{quote}
The number increased from day to day, day to day. I talked to a lot of people at the Freedom Park that day, or those who travelled to the city, some of them said ‘I sold
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{161} Interviews, civil society members, Phnom Penh, June 2017.

\textsuperscript{162} See, e.g., \textit{Radio Free Asia}, 30 December 2013, “Cambodian garment factories closed due to wage strikes.”

\textsuperscript{163} Interview, Cambodian labour leader, Phnom Penh, June 2017.

\textsuperscript{164} It should also be noted that, as has been typical in Cambodia’s modern history, international actors including New Zealand, Australia, Japan, and France were insufficiently critical of the election itself, recognizing the result without supporting an investigation into the widespread and plausible allegations of irregularities (HRW, 2013).
\end{footnotesize}
my cow, I sold my cow in order to get enough money to get here, we need change, we want change.’ I think the energy was very powerful, very influential.\textsuperscript{165} However, the leadership did not have clear strategic aims for the campaign, with disagreement taking place between the older generation and younger figures who came into politics through civil society involvement.\textsuperscript{166} Furthermore, after short periods of protest, Sam Rainsy called for breaks so that people could return home and rest. As a consequence, the campaign lost much of its momentum between protests:

I think that was the mistake that Sam Rainsy made, I would say, when he called for postponing the momentum. He said ‘go home, relax, we start again next week. During that time those who want to stay here can stay, but those who want to leave, you leave’. And you know like hundreds and thousands of people who were there, on the Freedom Park, left back home and left about 4 or 5 hundred people at Freedom Park. And after one attack by the government, the opposition party could not call for that number again, they lost the number, they lost the momentum.

The lack of strategy can also be seen in the over-reliance on tactics of concentration. A petition demanding an independent investigation into the election did attract the thumbprints of a reported 2 million people and was delivered to the United States embassy.\textsuperscript{167} Nevertheless, the campaign almost entirely consisted of the occupation of Freedom Park in Phnom Penh; once Freedom Park was forcibly cleared on 4 January 2014, the CNRP did not have alternative means of resistance to fall back on. While tactics of concentration are more damaging to regimes, they are also more vulnerable to repression as they provide a clear target, and an ability to cycle between tactics of concentration and tactics of dispersion—such as boycotts and stay-aways—is important for maintaining resilience to repression.

The campaign’s lack of resilience to repression was also brought up by a number of interviewees, who emphasised the perceived failings of the CNRP leadership in ‘chickening out’ once the CPP decided to crack down.\textsuperscript{168} While I wish to emphasise that I do not endorse such a view personally, it was repeatedly claimed that if the campaign leaders had been willing to put more lives on the line, including their own, it may have had a better chance of overthrowing the Hun Sen government. Sam Rainsy’s decision to enter into the so-called culture of dialogue with Hun Sen following the crackdown is also seen as a major let-down for those who supported change.\textsuperscript{169}

\textsuperscript{165} Interview, Cambodian academic, Phnom Penh, June 2017.
\textsuperscript{166} Mu Sochua. Interview with Liam Gammon, \textit{New Mandala}, 9 December 2017. http://www.newmandala.org/interview-mu-sochua/
\textsuperscript{167} Maresca, Thomas. \textit{USA Today}, 23 October 2013, “Cambodia opposition begins 3 days of protests.”
\textsuperscript{168} Interview, former government minister, Phnom Penh, June 2017. Additional quotes to similar effect by other interviewees are omitted as they are distinctly personal and even slanderous in nature, yet largely reinforce this perception.
\textsuperscript{169} Interviews and personal communications, Phnom Penh, May-June 2017.
6.4.3. Roadblocks to transition

Finally, contextual factors may have increased the perceived risks of regime change by making negotiating transitional arrangements more difficult. One is the fact that the 2013 election result was a complete surprise. The CPP failed to recognise the change in national feeling about reform and change, and so was unable to respond to popular preferences in their campaign, relying instead on propaganda.\textsuperscript{170} One consequence of this is that the CPP was unable to respond quickly and effectively to contain protests, and it took some months before hardliners like the head of the military police Sao Sokha could persuade the rest of the leadership to use force.\textsuperscript{171} Yet another consequence was that there was also no expectation of a serious challenge to Hun Sen's leadership. In the lead-up to the 2013 election, Cambodia was therefore lacking the kind of leadership crisis that would have prompted elites to begin considering alternative options, surveying the attitudes of other members of the ruling coalition, or building connections to possible rivals for the leadership of the country. The rapid and surprising onset of the civil resistance campaign thus provided less room for elite manoeuvring that could have encouraged divisions to lead to regime breakdown. The CPP is still very concerned about the destabilising effect of sudden political change, and there continues to be a reluctance to openly discuss succession or transition options:

> Nobody even dares ask “what happens if there’s no Hun Sen tomorrow?” What if he was no longer there to hold the factions in check? I would assume that’s never been entertained within the ruling party, because nobody wants to be seen as asking such a doom and gloom question.\textsuperscript{172}

A further obstacle to the campaign’s success may have been the difficulty of negotiating a transition. Even aside from making it easier for Hun Sen to step down, the extensive implication of the CPP in corruption at all levels would necessitate some form of amnesty arrangement simply so that the new government could function.\textsuperscript{173} Yet since the abdication of Norodom Sihanouk there are no independent institutions in Cambodia that would be capable of mediating or guaranteeing such an arrangement. The current king, Norodom Sihamoni, is apolitical and does not have the skill or power to manage negotiations.\textsuperscript{174} The sangha hierarchy, while dominated by the CPP, likewise sees itself as

\textsuperscript{170} Interview, CPP official, Svay Rieng, May 2017.
\textsuperscript{171} Interview, independent political analyst, Phnom Penh, May 2017.
\textsuperscript{172} Interview, independent political analyst, Phnom Penh, May 2017.
\textsuperscript{173} See, for example, Global Witness (2009, 2016). Transparency International’s 2016 Corruption Perceptions Index lists Cambodia as continuing to be the most corrupt country in Southeast Asia and one of the most corrupt countries in the world (https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016)
\textsuperscript{174} Indeed, his selection as heir may have been supported by the CPP for precisely this reason (interviews, Phnom Penh, June 2017).
too apolitical to play this role.\textsuperscript{175} NGOs played a role in encouraging the culture of dialogue negotiation between Sam Rainsy and Hun Sen,\textsuperscript{176} but are not influential enough to really shape political calculations regarding regime change.\textsuperscript{177} And international actors which would be able to apply pressure if required have so far refused to do more than provide statements of support for negotiation and compromise.

The CNRP itself did not and does not have any lines of communication with the CPP. Opposition members avoid talking to CPP members, even lower-ranking officials, for fear that they will be labelled ‘CPP puppets’; even figures like Kem Ley who engaged with the CPP were similarly painted as \textit{yuon} puppets.\textsuperscript{178} Previous research has highlighted the importance of communication with middle- and low-ranking government officials for building trust and providing guarantees of safety in the event of regime change (Binnendijk & Marovic, 2006), yet this appears to have been completely absent in the Cambodian case.

\textbf{6.5. Case study conclusion}

This second part of the qualitative component builds on the quantitative findings presented in Chapter 4 and the qualitative findings presented in Chapter 5 by examining Hun Sen’s rule of Cambodia from 1985 to the onset of civil resistance in 2013 as a ‘deviant’ case, where the expected establishment of personal autocracy was not associated with the success of a nonviolent uprising. Indeed, the expectation that Cambodia was a personal autocracy in 2013 on the basis of the quantitative findings is also supported by the widespread notion that Hun Sen had established personal rule at least several years prior to 2013, if not earlier.

Contrary to expectations, I have concluded that the Cambodian regime had not broken down from power-sharing to personal autocracy prior to 2013.\textsuperscript{179} While there have been a number of events that have been presented as significant power grabs by Hun Sen throughout his time in power, the evidence in favour of this interpretation is often too ambiguous to justify the conclusion that they represented substantive moves towards personal autocracy. I have also presented evidence that Hun Sen was still constrained in

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\textsuperscript{175} Interviews, Phnom Penh, June 2017
\textsuperscript{176} Interview, Cambodian academic, Phnom Penh, June 2017.
\textsuperscript{177} Personal communication, government official, June 2017.
\textsuperscript{178} Interview, Cambodian academic, Phnom Penh, June 2017.
\textsuperscript{179} Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) do not classify Cambodia as a personalist regime, instead labelling it party-based. However, their judgment for doing so is based, as Morgenbesser (2018) points out, on analysis of the regime during the 1980s; furthermore, their coding scheme does not allow for the evolution of the balance of power over time in the absence of sharp regime discontinuities, thus preventing it from capturing shifts from power-sharing to personal autocracy that do not result from outright regime change. Hence, while this chapter is consistent with Geddes, Wright and Frantz’s (2014) classification of the Cambodian regime, it is for different reasons and on the basis of different evidence.
his ability to act autonomously with regard to the ruling coalition prior to 2013 by the need to accommodate entrenched interests, particularly related to the rival faction in the CPP centred on Chea Sim. This assessment challenges existing perceptions of Hun Sen’s dominance within the Cambodian regime, indicating that the establishment of an absolute personal autocracy came at a much later date than previously suggested. The case study thus clearly illustrates the need to use caution when it comes to assessing underlying power dynamics on the basis of surface characteristics, as discussed in Chapter 3, and the potential pitfalls that can come from accepting existing accounts at face value.

Hence, although Cambodia is a deviant case with regards to the quantitative component, I find that it is consistent with the theoretical framework. While China’s support for the CPP and the declining influence of the West in Cambodia has played a role in keeping Hun Sen in power, I have also argued that power-sharing continued to limit the incentives for elites to support a change to the status quo distribution of power by protecting their interests from arbitrary rule, thus reducing the leverage that the opposition campaign could exert against the regime. In particular, Chea Sim’s position as president of the CPP maintained balance within the party by preventing Hun Sen from stacking the party leadership, removing party veterans, or initiating ‘reform’ policies that would affect their influence. He also helped to maintain elite cohesion by resolving intra-party conflicts, preventing personal disputes from escalating into major divisions. Power-sharing thus did not lead to the kind of internal division and marginalisation of sectors of the ruling coalition that could have led to regime breakdown when challenged by mass protests, as it did in the Philippines under Marcos.

The case study does, however, show that tenure may not always be a fully reliable indicator of personalisation. While the direction of the process is consistent with theoretical expectations, in that power-sharing was followed by the establishment of personal autocracy, the time to personal autocracy of approximately 30 years is well outside the expected range. Power-sharing in Cambodia lasted far longer under a single leader than the theoretical framework and quantitative results assume is generally possible. In this respect, therefore, Cambodia is indeed a deviant case. I explore potential explanations for this discrepancy further in section 0 of the conclusion, where I directly assess the coherence of the qualitative and quantitative components of this thesis.

The case study has also shown that the ongoing power-sharing agreement within the ruling coalition is not the only reason that the civil resistance campaign was unsuccessful. In line with the heuristic purpose of the case study, I have highlighted several additional factors that also contributed, particularly with regards to the opposition’s tactics and strategy. A particular issue that came out of interview data is that members of the CPP do not trust the CNRP to guarantee their interests and safety in the event of regime change, due the opposition party’s structure, campaign rhetoric, and refusal to communicate with the government. Other important issues include a failure to build a broad coalition capable of leveraging the political and economic power of other social groups in Cambodia, strategic weaknesses of the campaign itself, and contextual obstacles to ensuring a smooth transition. Counterfactually, it does seem possible that the campaign
could have been successful had some or all of these factors been addressed, as the campaign had widespread support and created a major crisis for the regime, a point that was emphasised by a number of interviewees. Yet, in combination with the ongoing power-sharing agreement, these weaknesses were insufficient to overcome elites’ preference for the survival of the status quo.
7. Integration and conclusions

7.1. Summary

In this thesis I set out to examine how variation in authoritarian regimes influences the outcome of nonviolent uprisings. I argued that one dimension of authoritarian rule in particular, the power balance between autocrats and their elite allies, should play a role in explaining why uprisings succeed or fail by affecting elite incentives to actively support the ruler. Based on this argument, I divided regimes into two types: power-sharing regimes, where the autocrat’s decision-making authority is constrained by competing centres of power within the regime, and personal autocracies, where these constraints have effectively been removed. I then argued that personal autocracies should be more vulnerable to mass civil resistance campaigns, while power-sharing regimes should remain more cohesive when challenged by mass protests.

To test this argument, I adopted a mixed methods sequential quan → qual design, involving both cross-national quantitative analysis and in-depth qualitative case studies selected on the basis of the quantitative results. The rationale for collecting both types of data was that either approach in isolation was unlikely to be sufficient to explore the topic in enough detail to adequately address the research question. The two components had distinct but complementary purposes: the quantitative component to establish a statistically significant association between measures of personal autocracy and civil resistance campaign outcome, and the qualitative component to unpack and explore these results in more detail by examining two cases, one most likely and one deviant. The second case study also had a heuristic purpose, to identify factors that could not be adequately explained by the existing theoretical framework.

The quantitative results are largely consistent with the theoretical argument. Although the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) indicator of personal autocracy had only an inconsistent association with campaign outcome, I somewhat discounted this finding due to the existing problems with the dataset that have already been highlighted by Morgenbesser (2018) and others. However, the alternative indicator that I developed in Chapter 2, the leader’s time in power—which I argue to be a more consistent, albeit indirect indicator of the establishment of personal rule—is consistently and significantly associated with campaign success.

I then carried out two in-depth case studies to examine this association in more detail. The overthrow of the Marcos regime (1965-1986) in the Philippines was identified as a most likely case for the purposes of theory testing, and I found that the case is indeed consistent with the theoretical argument. The establishment of personal autocracy threatened the interests of portions of the ruling coalitions, leading key figures who were marginalised from patronage flows and influence over decision-making to look for alternatives to the status quo to protect their personal safety and political interests.
Marcos’s consolidation of personal power thus ironically played a major role in his downfall by giving his elite allies incentives to support regime change.

The 2013 uprising against the Hun Sen regime (1985-present) in Cambodia was then analysed as a deviant case. Counter to existing analyses of Hun Sen’s rule, I argued that the case is also consistent with the theoretical argument, with power-sharing surviving to 2013 and playing a role in maintaining elite cohesion in the face of the pro-democracy protest campaign. I also highlighted a number of additional factors that made it difficult for the campaign to overcome the barrier of the continuing power-sharing agreement, including strategic and tactical weaknesses, characteristics of the opposition party, and other obstacles to a peaceful transition of power.

The final stage of this study involves integrating the quantitative and qualitative components in order to draw overall conclusions, as well as assessing the coherence of the two sets of findings. The next section thus combines the results of both components to present the conclusions that I have drawn. It then assesses the quantitative study in light of the qualitative findings, and identifies additional explanatory factors highlighted by the Cambodia case study. I also highlight the main contributions that this thesis makes, including to research on civil resistance and authoritarianism, Southeast Asian politics, and political science methodology. I finally identify several limitations, including those relating to the scope and to the amount and quality of evidence available, and discuss areas that are likely to be productive for future research.

### 7.2. Integration

An essential part of combining qualitative and quantitative analysis in a mixed methods study is assessing how well the components ‘fit’, i.e., whether they are coherent or whether they have areas of divergence or disagreement (Fetters, Curry & Creswell, 2013). As mentioned in Chapter 3, there are three general outcomes: confirmation, when the results from each component corroborate one another, reinforcing the overall conclusion; expansion, where results diverge and expand understanding by examining different or complementary aspects of the research focus; and discordance, where the results are inconsistent or contradictory (Fetters, Curry & Creswell, 2013).

In terms of the overall research focus, the quantitative component shows a strong and consistent correlation between measures of personalisation and the outcome of nonviolent uprisings, with plausible confounders taken into account and using a range of analytic techniques. The qualitative component is consistent with these findings. In the Philippines, I found that personalisation of power by Ferdinand Marcos was a factor in his downfall, as it generated divisions within the ruling coalition that emerged into open conflict following the 1986 election. In Cambodia, I found that the maintenance of power-sharing within the CPP was associated with elite cohesion in the face of the 2013 campaign, giving members of the ruling coalition a continued stake in the regime’s
survival. Hence, I conclude that the quantitative and qualitative components largely confirm one another.

There are two areas, however, where the results are not confirmatory. The first is the partial discordance over the use of time in office as an indicator for personalisation. Although it is consistent with Marcos’s consolidation of personal rule, it is challenged by the unexpectedly long duration of the power-sharing agreement in Cambodia under the Hun Sen government. The second is regarding characteristics of the opposition identified particularly in the Cambodia case study that are also likely to have played a role in influencing elite decision-making. The qualitative component here expands on the quantitative findings by showing that these aspects of nonviolent uprisings are also likely to be important in explaining outcomes. The following two sections address each of these areas in turn.

**Tenure as an indirect indicator of personalisation**

The results of the qualitative component are partly discordant with regard to the use of time in office as an indirect indicator of personal autocracy. In the Philippines, Marcos had established a personal autocracy by the mid-1970s, approximately ten years after taking office in 1965, while the height of his personal power is cited as being 1982. This timeframe is consistent with the approximate judgement that most regimes where a leader has been in power for much longer than a decade are likely to have become personal autocracies. In this case, therefore, the argument that time in office is correlated with personalisation of power largely holds. In the Cambodia case, though, I have concluded that the power-sharing agreement held for three decades after Hun Sen initially took power, from 1985 to 2015. While the general pattern of long tenure eventually leading to personal autocracy remains in place, the timeframe is sufficiently different from theoretical expectations to pose a challenge to the suitability of leader tenure as an indicator of personalisation.

As Fetters, Curry, and Creswell (2013) point out, there are a number of options when findings are discordant, including offering potential explanations for the discordance, gathering additional data, re-analysing existing datasets, or rejecting the theoretical framework altogether. Given the limitations of a graduate research project, I have chosen to highlight the discordance and discuss some potential reasons why Cambodia may be an outlier in terms of how long the power-sharing agreement remained in place.

One explanation that is immediately apparent is the continuing legacy of the Khmer Rouge and the Democratic Kampuchea regime from 1975-1979. The conflict of the 1980s and the enduring presence of a threatening armed insurgency until the final defeat of the Khmer Rouge’s remaining forces in 1998 may have had a cohesive effect on Cambodia’s political elite. Levitsky and Way (2012) argue that violent struggle in the early days of a regime’s existence tends to create enduring partisan identities, produces leaders with large amounts of legitimacy, and enhance the rulers’ capacity for repression, while Smith (2005) similarly argues that revolutionary origins tend to increase party cohesion.
Although it is not entirely clear whether these mechanisms apply in the Cambodian case, it is possible that they have played a role; some interview evidence from the case study suggests that the experience of CPP cadres in armed conflict during the 1980s, in particular, may have indeed contributed to party cohesion, at least at the grassroots level.\textsuperscript{180}

More relevant to the argument of this thesis is the fact that the 1993 Cambodian constitution did not place term limits of any kind on Hun Sen’s position (Cambodia Const. [1993]). As a result, the kinds of checks on the autocrat’s time in power that I argued underlie the relationship between power-sharing, personal autocracy, and length of tenure were not present in this case.\textsuperscript{181} As pointed out earlier, however, an autocrat needs to maintain a balance amongst competing centres of power, avoid the temptation to opportunistically subvert the power-sharing agreement, and prevent ambitious lieutenants from launching challenges to their position, all of which are likely to limit the average leader’s time in power even in the absence of term limits. Hence, while the lack of constitutional limits on Hun Sen’s tenure may have made it easier for him to remain in power without needing to make overt power grabs, more explanation is still needed.

A further and more idiosyncratic factor may be Hun Sen’s evident political skill, which has allowed him to survive major challenges to become one of the longest-enduring autocrats in the modern world, and which may have enabled him to effectively manage the threat from within the ruling coalition without having to create a personal autocracy. This would suggest that political skill by the autocrat has a role to play in maintaining a balance of power that minimises the risks of rebellion from within the ruling coalition while maintaining a broad enough support base to fend off external challenges. That said, Marcos is also noted to have been a masterful political player (e.g., Celoza, 1997); whether this factor can provide an adequate explanation is therefore not immediately obvious.

A third factor may be the ready availability of easily-exploitable natural resources in Cambodia. I included oil production as an independent variable in the quantitative study, but members of the Cambodian regime have benefited from other natural resources that are not included such as timber, gemstones, and sand (Global Witness, 2009; 2016). While

\textsuperscript{180} Interview, CPP official, Svay Rieng province, May 2017.

\textsuperscript{181} It is true that it is not unusual for parliamentary system to lack constitutional term limits, which are more commonly associated with presidential systems (cf. Baturo, 2014). However, in democratic parliamentary or similar non-presidential governments other functioning limits on the leader’s position exist. In constitutional monarchies such as Australia and New Zealand, for example, the Governor-General, who represents the monarch, holds ‘reserve powers’ that allow the dismissal of the prime minister, while exercising few powers otherwise. Typically, prime ministers in parliamentary systems can also be removed by a vote of no confidence from the parliament, which—in genuinely democratic contexts—is itself responsible to the electorate. Yet while the National Assembly is theoretically capable of passing such a vote in Cambodia, the inability of the UNTAC administration to implement genuine democratic accountability during its mandate meant that this and other democratic checks and balances did not seriously constrain Hun Sen’s position (Cambodia Const. [1993], art. 90).
oil is the only resource that has been found to be consistently associated with authoritarian durability (Ross, 2015), and hence is the most appropriate for cross-national regression analysis, in individual cases the particular resources that are used to fund patronage and repression may play more of a role. Indeed, the impact of natural resource extraction—including potential future oil reserves—on Cambodia’s political system has received some attention in previous work (e.g., Un, 2005). However, the impact of these revenue streams on power dynamics within the regime have yet to be explored, and warrant further attention in the future.

A related aspect that seems especially likely to be salient is the degree of Western intervention in Cambodia that has taken place during Hun Sen’s rule, not only through the unprecedented UNTAC administration but also through continuing aid flows to the country. Large quantities of this aid have been misappropriated by the Cambodian government in order to maintain the patronage system and enrich those at the top of the regime (e.g., Calavan, Briquets & O’Brien, 2004; Ear, 2013). A large proportion of this aid has been, at least in name, tied to the notion that Cambodia is progressing towards democracy, or at least ‘good governance’, although obviously the reality has been somewhat different (Ear, 2013). Overt personalisation of power may have threatened the continued flow of funds by removing the thin veneer of democracy and making it more difficult for Western donors to continue supporting the regime, thus giving Hun Sen a strong incentive to limit his attempts to create a personal autocracy. Additional evidence for this interpretation comes from the observation that Hun Sen's more recent open moves to consolidate personal rule have occurred at a time when Western influence in Cambodia has substantially declined and become increasingly supplanted by China as a source of economic and diplomatic support, with a corresponding decrease in pressure for democratic reform (see Croissant, 2018).

Overall, it is difficult to determine why the power-sharing agreement in Cambodia remained in place for so much longer than theorised. Potential explanations are related to the lingering effects of genocide and civil war, the lack of checks on Hun Sen's position in the 1993 constitution, individual characteristics of Hun Sen, or the presence of easily exploitable natural and aid resources. All of these factors may be fruitful areas for future enquiry. As a result, while evidence from the Philippines case supports the use of tenure as a proxy indicator of personalisation, the Cambodia case implies that it should be treated as only an imperfect measure and thus treated with some caution.

**Opposition factors not included in the quantitative component**

While less information about civil resistance campaigns themselves is included in the quantitative component, the qualitative studies expand on the quantitative findings to show that characteristics of the opposition are likely to interact with power personalisation to determine whether the regime breaks down or remains cohesive during a civil resistance campaign. In particular, my research on the Cambodian campaign indicates that issues including lack of trust in the opposition leadership, the
comparatively narrow social base of the campaign, and strategic weaknesses also posed obstacles to success.

A major factor preventing Cambodian political elites from considering alternatives to Hun Sen was identified by many interviewees as their lack of trust in the CNRP. There were a number of elements to this. Given the CNRP’s undemocratic internal structure and the authoritarian personal style of its leadership, the CPP is likely to have seen the CNRP as simply a competing patronage network, thus making political competition an all-or-nothing struggle for power. This view is likely to have been reinforced by the CNRP’s campaign methods of ‘colouring’ the entire CPP as illegitimate yuon puppets. Furthermore, there were no lines of communication open between the CPP and CNRP. All of these factors would have made it difficult for CPP members to gain assurances that a CNRP victory would not have led to their interests or safety being threatened and potential political instability for the entire system. In contrast, Corazon Aquino’s call for civil resistance focused primarily on removing Marcos and his ‘cronies’, rather than challenging the system as a whole. As a member of the elite class, she also had a stake in the stability of the Philippines’ political and economic system, a factor which is likely to have helped Marcos’s supporters view her as a relatively safe alternative.

An additional factor, which has been highlighted in Denardo’s (1986) formal work on protest but has received less attention in empirical civil resistance research, was the social breadth of participation in the campaigns. In the Philippines a wide range of social groups joined protests against Marcos in the lead-up to the EDSA revolution, including students, left-wing radicals, right-wing business groups, land-owning elites, and religious authority figures. Although the coalition subsequently broke down, the breadth of social groups taking part played a major role in Marcos’s overthrow, as it signalled both a widespread lack of support across society as well as providing signals for Marcos’s supporters that the movement was ‘moderate’ rather than ‘radical’ and hence could be supported without threatening dramatic political instability (Anderson, 1988). In contrast, the breadth of social participation in the Cambodian campaign was more limited. While representatives of different social groups took part, including Buddhist monks and NGOs, there was little official participation by the leadership of those groups, with individuals instead taking part as citizens only. The CNRP, which has been resistant to coalition building in the past in order to maintain its status as the primary opposition movement, was unable to link its political objectives to the interests of other important social groups, particularly organised labour. The preeminent status of the CNRP in the protest campaign is also likely to have contributed to it being viewed as a ‘sore loser’ by the international community, which was more reluctant to lend its overt support in comparison to the challenge to the more blatantly fraudulent result of the Philippines’ election in 1986.

Finally, the Cambodian campaign featured strategic weaknesses. The campaign relied solely on tactics of concentration, which are more vulnerable to repression than tactics of dispersion such as strikes or boycotts (Schock, 2005). Sam Rainsy’s calls for periodic breaks—even in the absence of overt repression—dissipated the momentum of the protests. And when Freedom Park was forcibly cleared in January 2014, the leadership
was unable to continue the campaign, choosing instead to negotiate with the regime from a position of weakness, a move much criticised by many in the aftermath. The Philippines campaign, in contrast, involved a wide range of groups protesting in different locations and at different times, thus making it more difficult for the regime to focus on one clear target for repression. Even when repression did occur, the opposition was able to continue maintaining pressure on the regime.

There are therefore a number of features of the Cambodian campaign that contributed to its failure to achieve regime change, in addition to characteristics of the regime itself. Especially interesting is the important role given by research participants to the campaign’s communication strategies and political message and the way that this is likely to have been perceived by members of the ruling party, something that has received little attention in civil resistance research to date. While work has examined the different effects of ‘maximalist’ versus reformist goals (e.g., Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011), also important may be the difference between ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ goals, in the sense of targeting just the regime leader and a few close allies versus attacking the legitimacy of the entire government or state system; the latter may, for example, make it more difficult for ruling elites to feel that their safety or interests would be assured in the event of regime change. Similarly, the effect of rhetoric that would generally be considered negative by Western advocates of the democratising potential of civil resistance, like the racist and xenophobic appeals used by the CNRP as well as other opposition parties in Cambodia, may play a role in explaining elite preferences for regime continuity versus change. Future work on civil resistance, both quantitative and qualitative, may benefit from addressing these issues.

Overall, I have identified some discordance between the quantitative and qualitative findings, with leader tenure shown to not be a perfectly consistent indicator of personal autocracy. However, I argue that this is not fatal to the overall suitability of tenure as an indicator of the establishment of personal autocracy. Cambodia features several idiosyncratic features that are plausibly responsible for the unusually long duration of power-sharing in this case in particular, although further comparative research into this subject would be needed to determine this conclusively. Furthermore, tenure is only a probabilistic indicator of power personalisation, and so a small percentage of extreme values would be expected; Svolik (2012, 77) similarly acknowledges that there are a small number of exceptions to the low likelihood of coups occurring in personal autocracies. The fact that Hun Sen’s tenure is likely to be an extreme value in this case is supported by Cambodia’s status as an outlier in relation to the quantitative findings, as indicated clearly in Figure 4.5.

In terms of opposition factors, I conclude that the qualitative analysis has not highlighted any thing that clearly ought to be considered in the quantitative component, the omission of which is likely to be causing omitted variable bias. This is supported by the fact that the cases which have been predicted inaccurately do not show any clear patterns, as would be expected if omitted variable bias were an issue; a large proportion of these were mispredicted mainly due to the difficulties of fitting complex political processes into
discrete categories. However, the case studies do suggest several areas for further inquiry. In particular, I have highlighted the possible importance of the social breadth of campaign participation, in addition to protest size, in influencing success. Measures of campaign goals could also be further refined beyond the current broad categories to capture the scope of movements’ ambitions. I also argue that specific attention should be paid to political communication in nonviolent uprisings and the way that campaign messages may influence elites’ decision-making processes.

7.3. Conclusions

The conclusion that I draw from this study is that civil resistance campaigns are more likely to succeed against personal autocracies than power-sharing regimes because of the distinctive difference in the relationship between the autocrat and the ruling coalition under these two forms of authoritarian rule. In power-sharing regimes, members of the ruling coalition are capable of coordinating to remove rulers if they attempt to subvert the agreement to share control over decision-making and access to resource, thus obliging rulers to balance their own interests against those of other centres of power in the regime. Because elites are able to protect their interests by threatening to rebel against a predatory autocrat, they have fewer incentives—all else being equal—to support far-reaching and unpredictable political change. Power-sharing thus increases the regime’s cohesion and ability to resist external challenges from anti-regime civil resistance campaigns by reducing the likelihood that elites will withdraw support from the ruler.

By contrast, in personal autocracies the ruler’s monopolisation of power undermines elites’ ability to ensure that their interests are protected within the existing system. Where autocrats have consolidated control over the legislative, executive, and coercive authority of the state, they can act largely autonomously of their ruling coalition, using tools such as purges, personnel rotations, separate coercive agencies, and discretionary distribution of patronage to deter internal challenges. Elites have incentives to remove the autocrat and re-establish power-sharing in order to prevent policies and actions that are counter to their interests; indeed, this is possible in principle because elites retain a degree of influence and power which is required to keep the regime running. Yet the autocrat’s ability to punish first movers effectively atomises the ruling coalition, imposing a prohibitively high risk to any individual if they were to initiate a rebellion, thus creating a collective action problem.

In this context, mass civil resistance acts as a coordinating mechanism, allowing regime elites to overcome their collective action problem and withdraw support from the autocrat. A nonviolent uprising creates an exogenous crisis which removes the need for elites to initiate a rebellion themselves, thus avoiding the first mover problem that otherwise prevents internal challenges. By forcing a regime response, it opens up space for debate, allowing elites to consider alternatives to the status quo and find out whether there is wider support for change within the ruling coalition. The opposition leadership provides a partner for negotiating a transition, while mass protests provide a political
resource that can be drawn on to legitimise alternative claims to power and may also affect the perceived likelihood of a withdrawal of support succeeding.

Therefore, I conclude that civil resistance is more likely to succeed under conditions of personal autocracy because elites are more likely to withdraw their support from the ruler than under conditions of power-sharing. The establishment of personal autocracy is thus a double-edged sword, protecting the ruler from challenges from within the ruling coalition yet at the same time rendering their position more vulnerable to a nonviolent mass uprising.

7.3.1. Contributions and implications

Civil resistance and authoritarianism research

The main contribution of this thesis to research on civil resistance is to show that explicit attention needs to be paid to the characteristics of authoritarian regimes. Focusing on opposition characteristics, strategies, and tactics is an important corrective to the dismissal of popular agency in large areas of research on politics (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Martin, 2015), and has highlighted the previously under-appreciated success of civil resistance (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Yet, to date, work on civil resistance has largely neglected the internal characteristics of authoritarian regimes, or has included only the field’s main typologies without fully engaging with comparative authoritarianism theory. This thesis shows that analysis of only the opposition movement is insufficient to fully understand why some regimes fall to civil resistance while others endure even very large and sustained protests. As has been pointed out before (e.g., Geddes, 1999; Fjelde, 2010), variation amongst regimes has direct consequences for the outcomes they experience. Taking this variation into account is likely to become even more urgent for scholars of civil resistance in years to come, as authoritarian regimes become increasingly sophisticated in their institutional makeup and methods of rule and the effects of these shifts on civil resistance and prospects for political change become more pronounced.

I have not only identified this gap in existing research, but also demonstrated how research from comparative authoritarianism can be applied to understand civil resistance outcomes. There are two main approaches that I have discussed: typological (e.g., Geddes, Wright & Frantz, 2014) and deductive (e.g., Gehlbach, Sonin & Svolik, 2016). Both have now generated substantial bodies of literature, and can be used as a source of insights for developing theory and producing new hypotheses. Each approach has its own advantages. While there are problems with regime typologies, they are relatively simple to apply and capture broad commonalities and differences across a wide range of regimes. Hence these are a good starting point for incorporating authoritarianism theory into studying civil resistance. Deductive models, on the other hand, rely on often complex formal models, but are able to at least partly deal with the problem of gathering evidence on political processes inside the authoritarian ‘black box’, as well as show the far-reaching consequences of simple variations in a few key dimensions of interest. Approaches based
on game theory can be particularly valuable for producing non-intuitive hypotheses about connections between regime characteristics and campaigns; the strong correlation between leader tenure and campaign outcome, for example, only makes sense once the competing incentives of autocrats and their ruling coalitions are taken into account. Furthermore, civil resistance research does not necessarily need to develop complex or technical models from scratch, but can make use of the findings of the increasing range of formal work that is being produced; the conceptual framework developed here, for example, draws a number of key insights from Svolik’s (2012) work, yet is itself quite simple. It is also consistent with Sharp’s (1973) foundational work in civil resistance, which argues that undermining support for the ruler from key areas of the regime is essential for civil resistance success.

Related to this last point, a further implication of this thesis for scholarship on civil resistance is that it needs to pay more specific attention to the central roles of autocrats’ elite allies in influencing the outcome of nonviolent uprisings. Although civil resistance work typically considers the autocrats various bases of support, most explicitly in the commonly-used ‘pillars of support’ model (e.g. Helvey, 2004), it has not emphasised enough the role of the ruling coalition, which, by definition, is absolutely central to maintaining authoritarian rule. Although I do not argue that regime change is an inherently elite-led process, as espoused by earlier scholars such as Pareto (1935), the findings of this thesis do point towards the importance of the decision by members of the ruling coalition to support either the status quo or an alternative regime in influencing the likelihood that civil resistance campaigns will succeed. The importance of elites is not only highlighted in the theoretical framework but also by some of the additional factors that I identified as contributing to the failure of the 2013 campaign in Cambodia. These include the CNRP's reliance on xenophobic rhetoric, its broad attacks on the entire CPP’s legitimacy rather than just the leadership of Hun Sen, its perception as a competing closed patronage network that would not seek a compromise solution, and signals that it did not have the full support of a broad social base. I concluded that all of these issues negatively impacted the campaign’s likelihood of success because of the way they impacted elite preferences for change versus the status quo.

This thesis also contributes to comparative authoritarianism by demonstrating the particular vulnerability of personal autocracies to nonviolent uprisings, something that has not been highlighted in previous research. I have concluded that this occurs because autocrats’ moves to protect themselves from the ruling coalition simultaneously increase their susceptibility to nonviolent external challenges. Thus the same process that Svolik (2012) identifies as accounting for the decreasing incidence of coups the longer autocrats remain in power is also a major factor increasing the likelihood that anti-regime civil resistance succeeds. It has been pointed out in the past that the greatest threat to autocrats’ positions comes from their elite allies (Frantz & Ezrow, 2011; Svolik, 2012). Yet this thesis shows that, for the minority of autocrats who succeed in overcoming constraints on their position and establishing a personal autocracy, the threat of a challenge from civilians outside the regime is a much more pressing concern.
As with civil resistance, this thesis thus shows that research on comparative authoritarianism would benefit from incorporating insights from the ‘other side’. Civil resistance research has been largely absent from typological work on comparative authoritarianism, which has tended to conflate conceptually distinct forms of resistance such as riots, coordinated protest campaigns, and spontaneous demonstrations under the umbrella of ‘mass protest’. This misses important variation across different instances of civilian-based resistance, including the type and range of tactics employed, the degree of underlying organisation and coordination (which is often greater than it appears on the surface), the degree of nonviolence and precise boundaries of what constitutes violence, and other factors that have been highlighted in research of civil resistance. Civil resistance research has also been markedly absent from formal, deductive work, which typically focuses on strategic interaction only amongst elite actors and ignores the role of popular pressure in influencing regime dynamics.

In general, the findings of this thesis highlight the fact that a one-sided approach in either field is inadequate for understanding complex political phenomena such as nonviolent uprisings. Contrary to Chenoweth and Stephan's (2011) central conclusion, I argue that regime characteristics cannot be left out of a complete explanation of why some campaigns succeed while others fail. Yet at the same time, the shortcomings of the Cambodian campaign demonstrate that the focus should not shift entirely to the regime at the expense of the opposition movement, as for example Way (2008) has argued, as civil resistance movements are not all alike. Rather, it necessary to examine the characteristics and strategies of both sides, and perhaps more importantly the interplay of these factors, if we wish to understand why civil resistance campaign succeed or fail.

**Southeast Asian politics**

The qualitative case studies also make a distinct contribution to the study of Southeast Asian politics, an area which is receiving more scholarly attention with the shift in comparative politics generally away from democratisation towards examining authoritarian survival.

In the Philippines study, I am able to revisit a much-studied case with a new analytical framework derived from deductive work concerning the strategic interaction of regime actors under authoritarianism. While many comparative works either focus on the differences and specific characteristics of individual cases, or restrict comparison to within the region, this framework allows me to show that the Marcos regime has commonalities—in particular, the consolidation of personal power and consequent effect on ruling coalition cohesion—with other authoritarian regimes, both within Southeast Asia and outside. In addition, while much previous work on the EDSA revolution has emphasised the role of civil society mobilisation in bringing down Marcos (e.g., Thompson, 1995), this case study contributes to the growing recognition that the loss of support from regime insiders played a key role in weakening the regime to the point where Marcos was forced to flee (Lee, 2015; Fukuoka, 2015). Thus, like Fukuoka (2015)
and in contrast to studies which emphasise the role of external forces (e.g., Slater, 2010), I argue for a need to look at what is happening inside the regime as well if we wish to understand how governments in Southeast Asia endure or collapse.

In the Cambodian case study, I provide a detailed analysis of the 2013 democracy campaign, which has not yet been addressed in academic work.\(^{182}\) I show that, although some observers have dismissed the campaign (e.g., McCargo, 2014), it in fact posed a major threat to the CPP’s hold on power, and had real potential to force political change. Indeed, subsequent and ongoing warnings by the CPP and military leadership against nonviolent protest show the extent to which they were threatened by the 2013 uprising, and that they continue to view the possibility of mass mobilisation as a serious risk. In a region where the number of large-scale anti-regime campaigns still remains limited, this case study can provide a foundation for future comparative analysis by both highlighting the importance of the 2013 campaign, which has otherwise been missed or downplayed in research on Cambodian politics, and providing detail about it and the political context in which it occurred.

In addition, the case study uses original data to generate new insights about the dynamics of Cambodian politics. I have highlighted ambiguity surrounding key regime events following the UNTAC administration, providing new interpretations that challenge existing interpretations. As a result, I have been able to present a more nuanced assessment of Hun Sen’s personalisation of power by highlighting the balance at the top of the regime provided by Chea Sim and his faction. While undoubtedly the turn to China has played a role in influencing the direction of the current regime, I point to the importance of internal factors in explaining developments in Cambodian politics. In particular, my analysis implies that the death of Chea Sim in 2015 marked a critical juncture for the Cambodian regime, with Hun Sen now facing much fewer restrictions on consolidating personal power from within the ruling coalition than he did at the time of the 2013 campaign. This is likely to have major consequences for Cambodia, as Hun Sen will now be more free to eliminate opposition and act without intra-regime constraint; indeed, it may help to explain the unusually overt and bold nature of the crackdown which is ongoing in the country at the time of writing (see the postscript below). Yet there is also room for cautious optimism; in the light of the results of this research, Hun Sen’s current personalisation of power also implies that if a major civil resistance campaign can emerge again in the future, it may have a greater chance of bringing about political change.

\(^{182}\) Although the campaign has received little attention thus far in academic research, detailed analysis has been carried out by the democracy and civil resistance promotion NGO CANVAS (2016).
Political science methodology

A further contribution of this thesis is that it utilises an innovative methodology that has to date received little attention in political science research. In doing so, it shows how developments in the mixed methodology field can be applied in political science. Currently, recommendations for carrying out mixed methods studies in political science remain limited, being either neglected from methodological works entirely or limited to narrow prescriptions of how projects should be carried out (e.g., Lieberman, 2005; Toshkov, 2016). In contrast, methodological work from education and health science, as well as the growing dedicated mixed methodology field, allows for a wide range of possible research designs, focusing on how the principles of mixed analysis are applied in a study rather than setting out rigid steps to be followed (e.g., Nastasi, Hitchcock & Brown, 2010). These principles include compatibility and communication across methodological approaches, an instrumental approach to methods, and careful evaluation of the consistency and coherence of quantitative and qualitative results. Especially important is the integration of quantitative and qualitative methods in order to generate a more complete understanding of the phenomenon under investigation and increase confidence in the research findings. Hence, this thesis contributes to political science methodology by paying specific attention to these principles, showing how they can be applied in practice, and demonstrating the utility of doing so.

One particular benefit of using mixed methods in this thesis is that it has been possible to compensate for the weaknesses of relying on either a quantitative or qualitative approach in isolation to study authoritarian politics. For instance, quantitative analysis can be rigorous and persuasive, and a useful solution to the ‘black box’ problem. But in isolation it is often limited by a lack of evidence that proposed causal processes actually exist, and also generally has to rely on only imperfect indicators of key theoretical concepts. I have been able to deal with this issue by using qualitative analysis to show that the theoretical argument of degeneration into personal autocracy leading to regime vulnerability provides a good explanation of individual cases, and to examine the validity of time in office as a measure of personalisation. The qualitative component has also provided a much more detailed and nuanced description of power-sharing, personalisation, and the impact of the establishment of personal autocracy on civil resistance than would be possible in a quantitative-only study.

At the same time, the use of global quantitative data has shown the generalisability of the theoretical framework, something which can be challenging for small-n comparative studies. I have also been able to generate new insights regarding the two case studies by applying an analytical framework that draws heavily on formal modelling of authoritarian politics, something which has largely been absent from qualitative studies of authoritarianism. By drawing on both quantitative and qualitative data I have been able to provide a more detailed description of the phenomenon of personalisation and how it relates to nonviolent uprisings than would otherwise be possible, while also making up for some of the more challenging problems of relying on either approach in isolation, thus demonstrating the utility of using a mixed methods approach.
7.3.2. Limitations and areas for future research

There are a number of limitations to this study. While I conclude that the case studies have provided qualified support for the use of autocrat tenure as a proxy indicator for personalisation, it is possible that other factors are driving the relationship between time in power and civil resistance outcome. While I have endeavoured to evaluate and dismiss what I consider to be plausible explanations, the absence of fully developed theoretical alternatives linking authoritarian rule to civil resistance outcomes makes it difficult to do so with complete confidence. Further research into the relationship between internal regime politics and the outcomes of civil resistance campaigns, and especially how the dynamics of these change over time, is therefore needed to explore this relationship in more detail.

One particular limitation is that the argument I develop is based on the incentives faced by regime elites and the decisions they make as a result. However, other than in the Philippines case study where post-transition documentary evidence exists, I am not able to draw on direct evidence that these incentives influenced elites in the way that I have argued. This is a problem faced by many studies which address elite decision-making, particularly in authoritarian regimes (e.g., Slater, 2010; cf. Art, 2016; Barros, 2016). In general, the secrecy that pervades authoritarian regimes still limits the availability and quality of direct evidence, regardless of research approach. Again, this is a problem for the vast majority of studies of authoritarian politics, especially when studying regimes that are still in existence (Art, 2016; Barros, 2016). As mentioned above, this is the case in Cambodia, where access to reliable information about the internal dynamics of the CPP remains limited. The lack of access thus qualifies my conclusions regarding the balance of power within the regime, as new information may come to light in the future that enable the re-evaluation of existing evidence. There are also limitations to the evidence that could be drawn on to reach the conclusions presented here. Due to the time and budget limitations of a graduate research project, I was not able to carry out fieldwork in the Philippines. As a consequence, there is less detail in the Philippines case study, particularly regarding the actions of other members of Marcos’s ruling coalition during the civil resistance campaign and the 1986 election.

In terms of scope, the empirical focus of the study is restricted to only large civil resistance campaigns aiming at regime change in authoritarian states. As stated earlier, it does not consider campaigns that occur in democracies. Nor does it consider campaigns with other goals, such as more restricted policy reform, group- or identity-based rights, radical social change or otherwise; indeed, as the theoretical argument here is based on contestation over control of government, it would be expected that these kinds of campaigns would exhibit different success/failure dynamics. One area where these findings may have implications, though, is civil resistance campaigns aiming at secession or other territorial goals. Cunningham (2014), for example, argues that the outcome of self-determination campaigns (in both democracies and autocracies) is influenced by the number of factions within the central government of the state that are capable of vetoing decisions. Given
that establishing personal autocracy involves removing constraints on the autocrat, including vetoes, the dynamics of collapse into personal autocracy seem likely to be pertinent in explaining variations in the outcome of self-determination campaigns. Taking into account the constraints of this project, I leave further investigation in this area to future research.

A final important limitation is that the study is based on a restricted definition of ‘success’, which I defined as the breakdown of the authoritarian regime in response to civil resistance, and operationalised as the autocrat either stepping down or initiating a transition away from the incumbent regime. The constraints of using a dichotomous success variable have been discussed already in Chapter 4. But this definition also means that the study does not consider the longer-term or normative outcomes of campaigns. Yet these areas are obviously of importance, not only to scholars but also those living in the countries involved. Indeed, although the democratising potential of civil resistance has been highlighted in previous research (Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005; Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013), others have seriously questioned whether the longer-term effects of successful campaigns have been positive or not (e.g., Rupnik, 2010; Chabot & Sharifi, 2013). More specifically to this project, the successful overthrow of personal autocracies in Southeast Asia has had mixed consequences. For example, the post-EDSA period in the Philippines featured multiple coup attempts by the military (see Davide et al., 1990) while the country's minimally-democratic government remains dominated by the oligarchic elite (Fukuoka, 2016). Similarly, although Indonesia remains one of the only democracies in the region, the fall of Suharto did not lead to a dramatic shift in underlying power relationships (Fukuoka, 2016). The election of Rodrigo Duterte in 2016 and his subsequent authoritarian-like style of leadership raises further questions about the quality of democracy in the Philippines. The relationship between personalisation, civil resistance, and longer-term outcomes—which may be related to the effect of personalisation on the strength of state institutions (cf. Snyder, 2000)—therefore warrants more attention in the future.

The results of this thesis point to two further areas that are likely to be productive for future research. One is the relationship between personalisation and campaign onset and growth. This study finds that when campaigns do emerge, they are more successful against more personalised regimes. But there are also autocracies where the ruler’s tenure is long enough to suggest personalisation, yet open civil resistance has not occurred. This includes a handful of cases where the autocrat survived in office longer than the maximum tenure in the sample used for this study, Bulgaria’s Todor Zhivkov at 35 years, including Cuba’s Fidel Castro (49 years), Jordan’s Hussein ibn Talal al-Hashimi (46 years), and Tonga’s Taufa‘ahau Tupou IV (41 years). Further examination of why civil resistance campaigns have emerged in some personal autocracies and not in others may shed additional light on the relationship between authoritarian politics and civil resistance.

The second is the role of international actors in supporting authoritarian regimes or civil resistance movements. Although I have for the most part excluded international factors
from the analysis presented in this thesis, instead focusing on internal and domestic factors, the influence of powerful third parties is often emphasised in both academic and non-academic accounts of nonviolent regime change, particularly from outside the field of civil resistance research. Especially of importance for the regional focus of the qualitative component is the growing influence of China in Southeast Asia, given its willingness to support non-democratic regimes (e.g., Denoon, 2017; Croissant, 2018). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the declining authority and influence of the United States, particularly since the election of their most recent president, may also be playing a role in affecting repression and dissent in the region. While the importance of external actors is often exaggerated at the expense of dismissing political pressure driven 'from below', changing dynamics between major international powers may be an important factor to consider in future research on the relationship between authoritarian rule and civil resistance.

As a final note, I wish to stress that the findings of this research should not be interpreted as being pessimistic about the chances of successfully challenging non-personalised authoritarian regimes. Nor should it be inferred that I am recommending delaying activism in pursuit of democracy for years until the leader of the regime has personalised power. The power balance within the regime is just one factor among many that contribute to the success of a civil resistance campaigns; as has been argued by others (Sharp, 1973; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011), a well planned, strategised, and executed campaign can be successful even against a very strong opponent. Far from the popular image of the all-powerful, entrenched dictator, this thesis shows that the longer one individual is in office, and the more personal power they amass, the more vulnerable they become to a mass campaign of nonviolent civil resistance. I therefore hope that these findings may offer a sense of optimism about the ongoing potential of civil resistance to bring democratic change, under even the most trying conditions.
Postscript

Research does not occur in a vacuum, and even as this thesis was being finalised events were unfolding in Cambodia. As I noted in Chapter 3, I was surprised at how willing interviewees were to talk about highly sensitive political topics. There was, however, an element of good fortune in achieving the level of openness that I did. In August, only a few weeks after my field visit, the Cambodian government initiated a widespread crackdown, beginning by shutting down the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia radio stations and ordered the closure of the National Democracy Institute, a pro-democracy NGO supported by the United States government. Shortly afterwards, CNRP leader Kem Sokha was arrested in a midnight raid on trumped-up charges, without a warrant and in violation of his parliamentary immunity. Several days later, the critical English-language newspaper The Cambodia Daily was forced to close over charges of tax evasion. Notably, this is the first time that the government has openly targeted Western organisations and the English-language press in Cambodia, which, until now, have been allowed to operate remarkably freely (CCHR, 2010; Strangio, 2014).

The crackdown culminated in the formal dissolution of the CNRP on the 16th of November, with the party’s National Assembly seats and commune council heads redistributed (mostly to the CPP) and its senior officials banned from taking part in politics for five years. Mu Sochua, who had taken over as party leader following the arrest of Kem Sokha, has been forced to flee the country along with a number of other senior party figures. Former leader Sam Rainsy is also set to be charged with treason alongside Kem Sokha, although he remains in exile. The move has been followed by a widespread campaign of intimidation against former CNRP members, with Hun Sen ordering officials to “break the legs” of the party at the local level; this has included coercing defections to

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184 Phnom Penh Post, 4 September 2017, “Sokha arrested for ‘treason’, is accused of colluding with US to topple the government.” The charges referred to a 2013 speech where Kem Sokha had said that he had consulted with figures from the United States about how to bring peaceful democratic change to Cambodia.
185 Wallace, Julia, The Nation, 21 September 2017, “Cambodia’s Crackdown: What Happens When an Autocrat Shutters a Newspaper.” While it appears that the charges of tax evasion may be true, the lack of due process involved in deciding on the amount (US$6.3 million) and the timing, immediately after the arrest of Kem Sokha, point towards political rather than legal motives.
186 Ben Sokhean, Phnom Penh Post, 16 November 2017, “Breaking: Supreme Court rules to dissolve CNRP.”
187 Ananth Baliga and Mech Dara, Phnom Penh Post, 3 October 2017, “Breaking: CNRP’s Mu Sochua flees country following ‘warning’ of arrest”; Andrew Nachemson, Ben Sokhean and Mech Dara, Phnom Penh Post, 9 October 2017, “Court to weigh CNRP’s fate, moving government closer towards killing off its largest political rival.”
188 Ben Sokhean and Erin Handley, Phnom Penh Post, 20 October 2017, “Rainsy targeted for ‘incitement’.”
the CPP, in an attempt to destroy the opposition’s morale and mobilisational ability in the lead-up to the 2018 election.189

The central findings of this thesis imply that Hun Sen’s personalisation of power ought to increase the likelihood that the regime would collapse if another mass uprising were to occur in Cambodia. That Hun Sen may be aware of this risk is attested to by the regime’s frequent and heavy-handed use of propaganda to deter ‘colour revolution’, a term which is misused by the regime to conflate nonviolent uprisings with violent revolution.190 The regime has also taken more concrete steps to proactively prevent an uprising. These have included posting pictures of soldiers and police drilling with heavy weaponry to put down nonviolent protests to social media,191 and ordering local cadres to arrest former CNRP members at the first sign of mobilisation.192 In the short term, mass protests may be unlikely, as the CNRP’s leadership is mostly in exile and has had difficulty maintaining lines of communication, while its grassroots structure has been disrupted by repression.193 Yet, as Hun Sen’s rule increasingly resembles that of Ferdinand Marcos and other personal autocrats, he may be increasing his future vulnerability to a nonviolent uprising.

189 Sun Narin & Julia Wallace, VOA Cambodia, 16 December 2017, “The reluctant defectors of Cambodia.”
190 Sokhean, Ben, Andrew Nachemson & Shaun Turton, Phnom Penh Post, 15 September 2017, “Government’s preoccupation with ‘colour revolution’ reveals misunderstandings.” Interestingly, Sar Kheng is noted as the only regime figure who has publicly recognised that the colour revolutions in Eastern Europe were prompted by the failings of the governments themselves; others have more typically attributed them to shadowy ‘external forces’.
191 Mech Dara, Twitter post, 29 October 2017, 2.45 PM, https://twitter.com/MechDara1/status/924452097369632768
References


Makil, Perla Q. 1975. Mobility by Decree: The rise and fall of Philippine influentials since martial law. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University (Institute of Philippine Culture).


Muchlinski, David, David Siroky, Jingrui He, and Matthew Kocher. 2015. “Comparing random forest with logistic regression for predicting class-imbalanced civil war onset data.” Political Analysis 24 (1): 87-103.


Appendix
Additional information to accompany the quantitative component of the thesis.

A.1. Case list

This list gives each case used in the quantitative component. Campaign outcome is coded as ‘1’ for success, ‘0’ for failure, and ‘-99’ where the outcome could not be unambiguously determined or insufficient information on the campaign could be found. I have classified campaigns as targeting authoritarian regimes if either Svolik (2012) or Magaloni, Chu & Min (2013) [MCM] designate the regime in the peak campaign year as such. There is substantial overlap between the two datasets for the campaigns under enquiry; in only three cases—Armenia in 2008, Nepal in 2006, and the Maldives in 2005—do judgements differ. The Maldives are excluded from MCM for failing to meet their 500,000 population size threshold, while the reasons for disagreement over the remaining cases are not clear.

Table A.1: Case list

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Peak year</th>
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1 This year is not inside the dataset, but the same leader is recorded as authoritarian for earlier years and no change of regime subsequently took place.

2 The 2013 regime was a continuation of the regime recorded for 2012.
Excluded NAVCO cases

Territorial, anti-colonial, or anti-occupation campaigns:

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<td>Palestinian Territories, 1987-1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea, 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139</td>
<td>Philippines, 1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Russia, 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>186</td>
<td>Rwanda, 1956-1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179</td>
<td>Slovakia, 1989-1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205</td>
<td>Slovenia, 1989-1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>Sri Lanka, 1972-1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>227</td>
<td>Tibet, 1987-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232</td>
<td>Tunisia, 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>242</td>
<td>West Papua, 2000-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243</td>
<td>Western Sahara, 1982-1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Yugoslavia, 1970-1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>Yugoslavia, 1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>Yugoslavia, 1989-1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Campaigns which appear to be primarily violent, or for which information on nonviolent aspects could not be identified:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAVCO ID</th>
<th>Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>Algeria, 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>Colombia, 1946-1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>Guatemala, 1963-1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>Guatemala, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>Indonesia, 1956-1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Romania, 1987-1988</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Campaigns against democratic regimes (using minimal definition only):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAVCO ID</th>
<th>Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Croatia, 1999-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Ghana, 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Greece, 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>Madagascar, 2002-2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mexico, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>194</td>
<td>Philippines, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Thailand, 2005-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159</td>
<td>Ukraine, 2001-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Zambia, 2001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other campaigns excluded from analysis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAVCO ID</th>
<th>Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Argentina, 1987 – campaign against an attempted coup, not a regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Nepal, 2006 – two campaigns are recorded in NAVCO 2.0; they do not appear to be separate, however, as they had the same target, and hence only one case is recorded here.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185</td>
<td>Russia, 1991 – campaign against an attempted coup, not a regime.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A.2. Robustness tests

A.2.1 Alternative measures

Regime type

In Chapter 4 one of the ways I identify regimes as personal autocracies is where they are coded by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) as personal or personal-hybrid regimes. However, what constitutes a ‘hybrid’ regime is not clearly defined by the authors, so it may be the case that personal-hybrid regimes feature only a partial consolidation of control by the ruler, or are identified by some other features. Hence, I re-estimate Models 1 and 2—the larger regression models on the full and restricted sample, respectively—excluding hybrid regimes, as shown in Table A.2 (next page). With personal-hybrid regimes not counted as personalist, the GWF variable loses significance in Model 1; otherwise, the results are substantively the same as in Chapter 4. Aside from small changes to coefficient estimates, the results for AIC-based model selection are also identical, with personal regime type selected but remaining insignificant and not adding to model fit or predictive accuracy.
Table A.2: Regression results for GWF personal regime type only, full and restricted samples.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Model 1(^*) Full sample 1946-2013</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Model 2(^*) Restricted sample, 1970-2013</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(\beta)</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>(p)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader tenure</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>1.092</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF personalist (excl. hybrids)</td>
<td>0.961</td>
<td>2.615</td>
<td>0.228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.798</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>0.804</td>
<td>2.234</td>
<td>0.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.698</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peak year</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>0.982</td>
<td>0.318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature</td>
<td>-0.478</td>
<td>0.620</td>
<td>0.613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic divide</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>1.033</td>
<td>0.970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.862</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil production</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>1.028</td>
<td>0.937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.353</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-0.455</td>
<td>0.634</td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign size</td>
<td>0.866</td>
<td>2.377</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>0.843</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosmer-Lemeshow (X^2)</td>
<td>8.861</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood-ratio</td>
<td>-35.433(***)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Logit regression using penalised MLE, standard errors in italics, intercept not reported. \(* p < 0.1, \( \text{** p < 0.05, } \text{*** p < 0.01. Likelihood-ratio tests against intercept-only models.}"

**Ruling coalition spell duration**

In Chapter 4 I use Magaloni, Chu, and Min’s (2013) coding of ruling coalition spell duration because its coverage goes to 2013. Geddes, Wright & Frantz (2014) [GWF] also have data on ruling coalition spells (labelled regimes in their analysis, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 3), although it only covers the period up to 2010. Re-running regression on Models 1a and 2a as shown in Table A.3 (next page) shows that the same substantive results are obtained, with age and ruling coalition spell duration remaining insignificant and likelihood-ratio tests indicating that their addition does not improve model fit.
compared to Models 1 and 2, respectively. AIC-based model selection continues to assign it a low relative variable importance (0.218).

Table A.3: Regression results for GWF ruling coalition spell duration, full and restricted samples.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1a*</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2a*</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>p</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>p</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader tenure</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>1.087</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>1.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF personalist</td>
<td>1.308</td>
<td>3.699</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.413</td>
<td>1.512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader age</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.993</td>
<td>0.821</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>1.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCS duration (GWF coding)</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>1.013</td>
<td>0.538</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>1.202</td>
<td>0.802</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.272</td>
<td>0.762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peak year</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>0.977</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.073</td>
<td>0.930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature</td>
<td>-0.889</td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.159</td>
<td>0.853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic divide</td>
<td>-0.216</td>
<td>0.805</td>
<td>0.818</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.246</td>
<td>3.476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil production</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>1.065</td>
<td>0.866</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>1.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-0.462</td>
<td>0.630</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>-0.426</td>
<td>0.653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign size</td>
<td>0.918</td>
<td>2.505</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.792</td>
<td>2.208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n | 74 | 64 |
AUC | 0.865 | 0.906 |
Hosmer-Lemeshow X² | 5.018 | 6.646 |
Likelihood-ratio | -34.082 | -24.632 |

Note: Logit regression using penalised maximum likelihood estimates. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, standard errors in parentheses, intercept not reported. Likelihood-ratio test against Model 1 and 2, respectively.

A.2.2 Collinearity checks

As leader tenure and the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) personalist regime type are both intended to measure aspects of the same underlying phenomenon, collinearity may be an issue. Indeed, tenure is associated with classification as a personal or personal-
hybrid regime type at \( p < 0.05 \) as shown below, although evidence regarding goodness of fit is not decisive.

Table A.4: Regression results for GWF personalist regime type on leader tenure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( \beta )</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>( p )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leader tenure</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>1.055</td>
<td>0.048**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( n )</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0.657</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosmer-Lemeshow ( X^2 )</td>
<td>13.867*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood-ratio</td>
<td>-48.908**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Logit regression using penalised MLE, standard error in italics, intercept not reported. * \( p < 0.1 \), ** \( p < 0.05 \), *** \( p < 0.01 \). Likelihood-ratio test against intercept-only model.

Association between independent variables is not necessarily a major problem in regression analysis, however, if it does not result in biased coefficient estimates. The following page thus gives a correlation matrix for the independent variables used in Chapter 4. The highest correlation is between military regime type and the existence of a legislature (0.35) and between legislature and personalist regime type (-0.23), but these are not high; otherwise, there is no significant correlation between the independent variables.

I also check variance inflation factors (VIF) for the variables in each of the main models used in Chapter 4; higher values (≥2.5 for logistic regression) indicate that multicollinearity may be a problem. However, none of the values exceed 2 for any of the models, further indicating that multicollinearity does not affect the results.
Table A.5: Full correlation matrix for all independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ten.</th>
<th>GWF</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>RCS</th>
<th>Mil.</th>
<th>Peak</th>
<th>Leg.</th>
<th>Eth.</th>
<th>Oil</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>Pop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tenure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF personalist</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader age</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCS duration</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peak year</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic divide</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil production</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign size</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A.6: Variance inflation factors for main models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VIF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader tenure</td>
<td>1.540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peak year</td>
<td>1.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil production</td>
<td>1.506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign size</td>
<td>1.523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>1.325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF personalist</td>
<td>1.476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>1.506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature</td>
<td>1.434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic divide</td>
<td>1.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>1.326</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A.2.3 Model selection

Table A.7 (next page) gives the results of AIC-based model selection. The ‘best’ models consist of leader tenure, peak year, oil production, campaign size, plus or minus population; as discussed in Chapter 4, GWF personalist regime type is selected by AIC but is not statistically significant and does not improve model fit or predictive accuracy, hence is left out. Other models are close in terms of the difference in AICc value, but have additional model parameters; for each additional parameter, the difference between the AICc value and the minimum AICc value (∆AICc) needs to increase by at least 2 before the extra variable can be considered informative (Arnold, 2010). K gives the number of parameters in each model (excluding intercept).
Table A.7: AIC-selected model list

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>AICc</th>
<th>ΔAICc</th>
<th>K</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1* Tenure + GWF personalist + Peak year + Oil production + Population + Campaign size</td>
<td>71.386</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Tenure + GWF personalist + RCS duration + Peak year + Oil production + Population + Campaign size</td>
<td>72.181</td>
<td>0.795</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3* Tenure + GWF personalist + Peak year + Oil production + Campaign size</td>
<td>72.523</td>
<td>1.137</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Tenure + GWF personalist + Peak year + Ethnic divide + Oil production + Population + Campaign size</td>
<td>72.863</td>
<td>1.477</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Tenure + GWF personalist + RCS duration + Peak year + Oil production + Campaign size</td>
<td>73.206</td>
<td>1.820</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Tenure + GWF personalist + RCS duration + Peak year + Ethnic divide + Oil production + Population + Campaign size</td>
<td>73.303</td>
<td>1.917</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Tenure + GWF personalist + Peak year + legislature + Oil production + Population + Campaign size</td>
<td>73.812</td>
<td>2.426</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Tenure + GWF personalist + Peak year + Oil production + GDP + Population + Campaign size</td>
<td>73.858</td>
<td>2.472</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Tenure + GWF personalist + Leader age + Peak year + Oil production + Population + Campaign size</td>
<td>74.023</td>
<td>2.637</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Tenure + GWF personalist + Military + Peak year + Oil production + Population + Campaign size</td>
<td>74.043</td>
<td>2.657</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
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A.3. Predicted campaign outcomes

Cases are sorted by discrepancy between predicted and actual outcome in ascending order, i.e., with most accurately predicted cases at the top.

Table A.8: Campaigns by actual versus predicted outcome

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