P R O T E C T I O N  O F  A U T H O R ’ S  C O P Y R I G H T

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BEYOND THE PALE OF HUMAN RECOGNITION:

The Image of the Enemy as Portrayed in the Otago/Southland Press during WWI:

Attitudes towards British Propaganda and Censorship.

Natalie J. Wright

Presented in Fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of M.A in History at the University of Otago 1996
Acknowledgements

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<td>ANZAC</td>
<td>Australia New Zealand Army Corps</td>
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<td>C-in-C</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
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<td>CL</td>
<td>Clutha Leader</td>
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<td>DT</td>
<td>Dunstan Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
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<td>Lt-Col</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
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<td>MW</td>
<td>MaoriLand Worker</td>
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<td>NZ</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>NZEF</td>
<td>New Zealand Expeditionary Force</td>
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<td>NZT</td>
<td>New Zealand Tablet</td>
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<td>ODT</td>
<td>Otago Daily Times</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Propaganda and censorship were used with greater success during the First World War than at any other time in history. The early part of the Twentieth Century conspired to produce the perfect conditions for propaganda. It was a period of progressive idealism as it appeared that the world was progressing rapidly towards "civilization", where humanity ruled the hearts and lives of men and women.1 The beast within had been conquered and inventions were multiplying rapidly. There had been no wars in Europe for fifty years and everywhere peace was being preached. Competition may have been fierce in commercial and colonial development but it was mostly peaceful. Wars were confined mainly to Africa and Asia. In these continents the Great Powers worked together to exploit their resources to the detriment of the indigenous people. Politics and politicians were looked upon with respect and trust. The newly literate world believed what they read in the press.2 Political and economic freedoms were now matters of right, not privilege. Pacifism seemed a popular and viable option. Certainly, there had been a few scares that threatened to swallow up this peaceful idyll but all the close calls had been averted by compromise and appeasement.

The Great War thrust itself upon this confident and peaceful time to wreck mayhem and horror. And with this great scourge came its twins, propaganda and censorship. Together they were destined to lay waste to this innocent landscape, both physical and metaphorical. Innocence and trust were not much longer for this world, though this was not immediately apparent. It took time for doubts to set in and destroy the fragile innocence of the modern world.3 The Great War was the first


3 P. Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory, p.16
total war and it demanded all of a nation's resources. Public morale became as important as the men and machines in the field. It was in this sphere that propaganda came into its own.

A mixture of innocence, trust and ignorance was vital for Otago/Southland's acceptance of Germany as inherently evil villains. These ingredients combined to create a vacuum of real knowledge about the enemy into which was hungrily sucked the "facts" of war after they had been distorted by propaganda and censorship. There seemed to be little in the way of first hand knowledge of Germany in Otago/Southland. It was writings by and about Germans and Germany that provided the main window into the reality that was the "German enemy". The distance of Otago/Southland from the Front accentuated this ignorance of real facts, facts that would have intruded upon the fantasy world of the imagined enemy. Trust in the integrity of the British Government further hampered Otago/Southland.

According to accepted historical orthodoxy New Zealand swallowed propaganda whole with only the left wing questioning the Imperial line. Supposedly, there were also some more broadbased doubts after Gallipoli and the Easter Rebellion. The most English of the British Dominions placed all of its resources at the disposal of Britain as a matter of course and without debate. Most of New Zealand was apparently content to accept the British version of events with little public dissent and no new mature voices emerged to criticize the British Empire. New Zealand wholeheartedly believed that Germany was unrepentantly evil and the Allies gloriously virtuous and brave, as skilful British propaganda intended.

But how far was this really true in Otago/Southland? Did the southern portion of New Zealand slavishly follow the guide-lines set down by British propaganda for the duration? Was there any mainstream resistance to the overnight transformation of Germany from the leader of civilization into its scourge? Was the dishonesty of British propaganda discerned? What was the result of this resistance, if indeed it existed?

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Originally, I was looking for linkages between the major battles and the "image of the enemy" but as my research progressed the focus of this thesis changed. Linkages between battles and the "image of the enemy" mostly failed to materialize except for the initial contact period between New Zealand troops and the various enemy armies. This was because reporting of the major battles was exceptionally inadequate as a result of censorship and British concealment of disasters. The names of the great battles of Passchendaele, Somme and Ypres did not become truly famous until after the War in Otago/Southland.

Unintentional though it was on my part, the "image of the enemy" proved a useful tool in gauging public discontent with British War management. It provided evidence that challenges the prevailing orthodoxy of New Zealand history that dissent only came from the left and later the Irish Catholics. It also challenges the notion that grew up out of post War Germany that British propaganda was a wonder to behold and extremely successful. British propaganda was the most highly organized and impressive of all the belligerents, but it was not omniscient as events in Otago/Southland proved.

For the most part this thesis is sourced from the various newspapers of Otago/Southland with the exception of the national Maoriland Worker which represented the left and was published in Wellington. The remainder of the political spectrum was represented by the conservative urban dailies, the Otago Daily Times and Southland Times, the rural conservative Clutha Leader, the Catholic New Zealand Tablet and the oscillating Dunstan Times. These newspapers make up the bulk of this thesis's source material as they were the most readily available, representative and because almost all of the "image of the enemy" was projected through the press. The Otago/Southland newspapers recorded the opinions of community leaders through the reporting of public events and speeches. The comments of the various religious leaders were also sometimes published. The CL and the weekly ODT summary, The Otago Witness, contained cartoons and/or photographs. There was, however, a disappointing lack of letters to the editor. Soldier's letters were an alternative source but they tended to be

7 M. Sanders & P.M. Taylor, British Propaganda, p.1
either self-censored or officially censored, and were no match for the constant bombardment of propaganda.

In Britain the press was the most important disseminator of propaganda because it used Reuters' network and played upon its reputation for impartiality and freedom from official control.\(^8\) The British Government also had the most influential and powerful newspaper owners working with it. The propagandic "image of the enemy" then was not challenged by any major British newspapers.

There are, of course, some reservations in relying so heavily upon newspapers, especially as to their representativeness of public opinion; Otago/Southland is no exception in this respect. Editorial policy had a large influence on what was and what was not published. In noting this reservation I am only warning against ruling out the existence of other public opinions, not denying the usefulness of newspapers as recorders and formulators of opinion. It is probably best to regard the newspapers as leaders of opinion, influential but not wholly representative of the public. It is worth recalling here that New Zealand was a highly literate society and read newspapers more than other nations, so increasing the potency of Otago/Southland's newspapers.\(^9\) Newspapers are limited and must be read with caution but are still the best source available.

Over recent years interest in First World War activity on the homefronts, propaganda and the function of war correspondents has increased with the publication of several books. The focus has moved from the actual war and those directly involved to the more complex responses of the homefronts. The literature that has evolved, unfortunately from my point of view, seldom, or never deals with anti-German propaganda aimed at the British Dominions. These studies concentrate on Britain, neutrals like the United States of America, and the enemy nations of Germany and Austria-Hungary, as if New Zealand and Australia did not exist. They are useful in revealing the sources of the "image of the enemy" that reached Otago/Southland and the reasons behind the propaganda, but offer no specifics about Oceania. It seems that the world has just assumed that New Zealand trustingly followed the British model without deviation or creativity, if it thought of New

\(^{8}\) ibid., p.2

\(^{9}\) R. Arnold, New Zealand's Burning, The Settler's World in the Mid 1880s, Wellington, 1994, pp.232-234
Zealand at all. New Zealand was apparently like the mother in a James
M. Barrie short story from Echoes of War.

I wouldn't have had one of you stay at home, though I had a dozen
sons. That is, if it is the noble war they all say it is. I'm not
clever, Robie, I have to take it on trust. Surely they wouldn't
deceive mothers!10

The best recent studies of the operations and purposes of the
British propaganda effort include; British Propaganda During the First
World War 1914-18 by M. Sanders and P.M Taylor, Keep the Home Fires
Burning, Propaganda in the First World War by C. Haste, and War and the
Image of Germany, British Academics 1914-1918 by S. Wallace. These were
useful in outlining British propaganda in action at home before it was
broadcast to New Zealand. Propaganda activities in Britain were vital
to the operation of propaganda in Otago/Southland because Britain was
the wellspring and inspiration of the "image of the enemy" in
Otago/Southland's newspapers. The "monstrous Prussian" and the "evil
Kaiser" of the London Daily papers became the "monstrous Prussian" and
the "evil Kaiser" of Otago/Southland. If a cunning German peace plot
was revealed in Britain, it was revealed in Otago/Southland. The
atrocity stories of Britain and Otago/Southland were mirror images.
This was especially true during the early years of the War. The Allied
populations had to be made aware of the terrifying consequences of
defeat and of German war guilt.11

The close association between leaders of opinion, authors,
newspapers and the British Government in the moulding of the "image of
the enemy" and censorship meant that there were very few alternative
sources of information. All British newspapers operated under tight
censorship and many editors saw it as their civic duty to suppress any
unpleasantness and attack the enemy.12 The United States of America
was of minimal use because of subtle British methods of propaganda that
targeted prominent individuals rather than mass bombardment of the press
which would have filtered through to New Zealand.13 Strict American
censorship, once it entered the War, further restricted information,

10 P. Buitenhuis, Great War of Words, p.112
11 M. Sanders & P.M. Taylor, British Propaganda, p.137 & C.Haste, Keep
the Home Fires Burning, p.3
12 M. Sanders & P.M. Taylor, British Propaganda, p.162
13 ibid., pp.167-207
this was unfortunate because it coincided with the period of greatest discontent in Otago/Southland.

From the above accounts it was unsurprising that Otago/Southland followed the British model closely because there was no alternative. Any discrepancies between the British and Otago/Southland experience must therefore indicate that an independent line of thought existed in Otago/Southland.

First Casualty, The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker From the Crimea to Vietnam by P. Knightley is useful as an overview of the development of propaganda and the difficulties faced by the war correspondent in pursuit of any war story. The British Army did not want the press involved and attempted to completely ban them from reporting. Under pressure from Britain and German war reporting the military had to give way, but even then it was only a partial concession. Approved war correspondents only were allowed and they were kept under strict censorship.

Even if correspondents did get any inkling of what conditions for the fighting soldier really were like, they were not necessarily encouraged to send them home; indeed such knowledge as was theirs inspired silence.14

Little of the true nature of the War was reported so the "image of the enemy" had no challenge from this quarter.

In place of realistic war reports the British press had to make do with atrocity stories and the writings of famous British authors who became deeply involved in writing propaganda. H.G Wells performed best of all, using emotive phrases like "Frankenstein Germany". Atrocity stories were encouraged, be they true or false, as the British Government tried to keep up the momentum of the War. By late 1917 a backlash to the atrocities set in as the soldier compared what they had seen with the press stories. They became disillusioned with Britain's honesty.15

Knightley shows how difficult it was to obtain any true picture of the German enemy and how propaganda in the form of the "image of the monstrous German enemy" came to take the place of realistic war reporting. If the close proximity of Britain to the Western Front did not guarantee it realistic war reporting, then how was Otago/Southland going to effectively resist the "image of the monstrous German enemy"?

14 P. Knightley, First Casualty, p.110
15 Ibid., pp.104-5
Knightley points out that British war propaganda was subjected to a post-War propaganda effort by Germany that made it look more powerful than it was. Germany in an attempt to lessen the hurt of defeat successfully developed the idea that it had not been defeated in the field, but rather stabbed in the back by British propaganda. While British war propaganda was good it was not that good. A myth of invincibility now surrounded the British war propaganda. This myth may have coloured how later New Zealand historians looked at British WWI propaganda in relation to New Zealand. This thesis will try to deconstruct this later myth of an all pervasive British propaganda.

The Great War of Words - Literature as Propaganda 1914-18 and After by P. Buitenhuis, War and the Image of Germany, British Academics 1914-1918 by S. Wallace and The First World War by D. Hibberd reveal the specific sources of the main themes and images of British anti-German propaganda, most of which reached Otago/Southland. They reveal who developed certain ideas and explain why Britain's most famous and respected authors threw away their customary detachment to become propagandists. Until August 1914 many British authors, with the notable exception of Wells, Doyle and Kipling, believed in a stable and progressive world and were shocked by war and joined in the wave of hysterical patriotism that swept Europe. These authors used pre-War German military writings and the invasion of Belgium as their basis. Other authors like Sir Conan Doyle, Kipling, and Wells used the above source as well and created colourful fantasies in novels, articles and short stories. Between them British authors created a propaganda myth that prevailed inspite of evidence to the contrary until the end of the War. The secrecy surrounding the connection of these authors to the British Government meant that the world failed to recognize them as propagandists and believed that they were writing independently. Bernard Shaw was the only notable exception, but his strong attacks on British hypocrisy were swamped by the mass of propaganda. By the second half of the War many of the early propaganda authors were becoming disillusioned and felt that the reading public no longer

16 ibid., pp.130-145


18 P. Buitenhuiss, The Great War of Words, p.34
SOMETHING ON THE WESTERN FRONT: "THE CAVES ARE THROUGH."

The General, up in the forward-lookout tent, had marked the point where the lead was to go through and started the officers' line in the rear of the British line (as on the left). His officers were to remain just in front of the battery until the battery of the rear. The situation was ready for the advance, with the battery at心得 and the guns in position.
trusted their integrity. But by then it was too late, the German was forever branded the "evil Hun" and all aspects of German society had been examined and damned.\textsuperscript{19} As the British authors dropped the mantle, it was picked up by Lord Northcliffe and his papers as they pushed propaganda for total victory.

The employment of famous British authors in secret propaganda, veiled as independent thought, further strengthened British propaganda and undermined the ability of Otago/Southland to distinguish between what was true of Germany and what was not. The early Twentieth century was when famous authors were influential opinion makers and Otago/Southland was no exception.

P. Fussell in \textit{The Great War and Modern Memory} suggests further reasons as to why the particular "image of the monstrous German enemy" was developed and why heroic-romantic language was used as the vehicle for the image of the War in general. Fussell writes that the First World War was the most ironical war ever because it reversed the prevailing meliorist myth which had dominated the public consciousness for a century. It reversed the idea of progress.\textsuperscript{21} This reversal partially explains why the backlash against Germany was so severely unforgiving and why Germany became the Brute that threatened civilization.

The beginnings of the War were more innocent than most wars because, as A.J.P Taylor wrote, "there had been no war between the Great Powers since 1871. No man in the prime of his life knew what war was like. All imagined it would be an affair of great marches and great battles quickly decided".\textsuperscript{21} This innocence of the realities of war made the task of converting the German enemy into a monster that much simpler because it was able to mostly remain within the framework of heroic language. For example, the enemy easily became the Prussian Ogre and the German Army was easily portrayed as a dehumanized killing machine.

Fussell notes that ambiguity, like truth, is a main casualty of war. In World War One the modern "versus" habit developed, that is, one

\begin{footnotes}
\item[19] \textit{ibid.}, pp.xvii-xviii
\item[20] P. Fussell, \textit{The Great War and Modern Memory}, p.8
\item[21] \textit{ibid.}, p.21
\end{footnotes}
thing is totally opposed to the other with no hope of synthesis. For example, the "image of the monstrous German enemy" held that a negotiated peace was an anathema, an option so wicked and perverted that total submission becomes the only option. Because of the "versus" habit, total victory became essential.

The "versus" habit strongly influenced the "image of the enemy" in both Britain and Otago/Southland where the enemy became a mere collective entity while the Allies remained individuals, "we" are normal, "he" is grotesque. Everything the enemy used and was, was foreign, bizarre, animal-like and monstrous.

The "image of the monstrous German enemy" in Otago/Southland and Britain used this "versus" habit superbly in the manipulation of public opinion. But its hold on public opinion was not everlasting. Some began to question the intriugity of such a notion from as early as 1915.

A number of general political propaganda books that are also useful include Propaganda by L. Fraser, Propaganda by R. Lambert and Propaganda, Persuasion and Polemic, edited by J. Hawthorn. They provide interesting insights as to why propaganda and censorship are essential to the modern democracy, in both war and peacetime. Opinion management is essential to the stability of the modern democratic state so that the majority of the population wants to follow one course. In the words of F.C Bartlett, "divided counsels keep intelligence awake". The manipulation of the "image of the enemy" by the British is a fine example of the moulding of opinion into one common desire.

According to authors in Propaganda, Persuasion and Polemic, persuaders of all times have recognized that action is triggered more quickly and completely by emotional pressure than by rational argument, for example German atrocities. Stereotypes are of special value as they encourage people to categorize others in a certain way, as vile Hun monsters for instance. Persuasion often involves convincing people that their beliefs are inconsistent and therefore wrong. The actions and atrocities of the German Army in Belgium accomplished this for the Allies and overturned the prior belief of many Britons that Germany was

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22 ibid., pp.79-81
23 ibid., pp.75-78
24 R.C. Bartlett, Propaganda., Cambridge, 1940, pp.133-139
25 Propaganda, Persuasion and Polemic, ed. J. Hawthorn, p.ix
an admirable and civilized nation. The essays in *Propaganda, Persuasion and Polemic* go on to examine the power struggle within society that often underlies the use of propaganda. Propaganda is symptomatic of inequalities in society because it is used by those in power and as such is mistrusted as a tool to maintain a power structure. Otago/Southland although part of the weakest partner in the British Empire came to recognize and resent their feelings of helplessness in the face of propaganda.

Fraser, Bartlett and others explore why false propaganda can be very effective. They also consider the problems associated with using false propaganda over an extended war period. In World War One the conditions were perfect for false propaganda for three reasons. First, its target audience could not question or verify the propaganda claims. Second, the propaganda appealed to a really urgent hope and was accepted uncritically because of that hope, in this case hope for victory. Finally, the target audience had learned to trust the propaganda as having been truthful in the past and did not suspect it as being misleading. Otago/Southland fitted the bill in all these respects yet disbelief developed in the long term as Fraser warns may happen.

M. Andrews in *The ANZAC Illusion - Anglo-Australian Relations during World War One* mentions, in passing, the Australian reaction to British propaganda. Andrews notes that Australia, like the rest of the Empire, was subjected to a "constant barrage of indoctrination", most of which was British in origin. Many schools became more patriotic as a result, except for the more questioning Catholics. Heroic-romantic language of the British press masked the reality of war and Australians' lack of experience meant they did not recognize the genre and accepted it at face value. A comment that rather underestimates the intelligence of the Australian press and their ability to recognize something new, and is similar in this respect to orthodox New Zealand historiography.

Finally, there is P. Baker's study of the introduction of conscription in New Zealand, *King and Country Call*, one of the only books dealing indepth with a matter of opinion in New Zealand in the

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26 *ibid.*, pp.xii-xiii

27 L. Fraser, *Propaganda*, pp.204-7

First World War. It is of little use, however, in relation to this thesis because it does not touch upon the effect of British propaganda in New Zealand. It does, however, add to the impression that New Zealand wanted to do as much as possible for Britain and seldom questioned Britain's greater wisdom in matters of war.

All of these books are of limited direct use to the construction of the "image of the enemy" in the particular case of Otago/Southland. But they do provide an excellent foundation to show the differences and similarities between the great imperial power Britain and its colony, New Zealand. They also explain the intricacies of propaganda in action which helps to set Otago/Southland's reaction to the construction of the enemy in a broader international context.
FOR STIRRING TIMES

By Jessie Pope in the Daily Mail

Who hugged us to his martial breast,
And on our cheeks false kisses pressed.
And said that Brotherhood was best?
The Kaiser

When wiser patriots raised the cry
That Prussia plotted on the sly.
Who said it was a cruel lie?
The Kaiser

Who manufactured mammoth guns,
And served out fire 'sticks' to his Huns,
And made swashbucklers of his son?
The Kaiser

Who ultimately showed his cards,
And, buttered by Teutonic bards,
Dropped air-bombs in suburban yards?
The Kaiser

Who swore to grind us into dust
But found our land of rot and rust
Quite unexpectedly robust?
The Kaiser

Who's got to learn a thing or two
Before we've done with him, and who
Has bitten off more than he can chew?
The Kaiser

Source CL, 4-5-1915, p.1
Chapter One
THE VILLAIN IS UNMASKED

"War is Statecraft par excellence" von Treitschke (German Historian)\(^1\)

On 4 August 1914 the unimaginable happened; Europe plunged into general war for the first time in two generations. The world went into shock, paused to draw breath and began laying the blame for this catastrophe at the feet of Kaiser Wilhelm and Germany. The case to blacken the name of Germany was a carefully constructed mixture of truth, exaggeration and falsehood that proved conclusively that the guilt was wholly Germany's. The civilized world had been pulled reluctantly into a barbaric war by the arch-villain - Germany!

The charge to brand Germany the immediate peril to the civilized world became a stampede. All doubt had to be erased as to the responsibility of Germany for the War and the purity of the Allies' reasons for joining the War, especially Britain's. Images of the brutal ravaging of poor little brave Belgium were played up to the maximum and given as the noble reason for Britain's entry. That Britain really got involved because of secret international obligations and for reasons of national interest were mentioned only in passing, if at all. Before long most in Otago/Southland believed that Germany was solely responsible for the War and had used Austria-Hungary as its "cat's-paw" or pawn to launch its conquest of Europe. The day of the German Navy's toast, "To The Day", had arrived and Germany was determined to gain its rightful "place in the sun". Criticism of the hypocrisy of Britain's stated motives was left to papers on the radical fringe like the left-wing \( NW \).

The first order of business for Allied propaganda was to prove that it was Germany and Germany alone that had wilfully started a preventable war. To this end the events of the months leading up to 4 August 1914 were gone over with a fine-toothed comb and presented in a light that was unflattering to Germany. This endeavour was complicated because prior to the outbreak of War an anti-Russian rather than anti-German

\(^1\) ODT, 18-7-1916, p.4
slant was cast upon the same events. The finger of war-guilt was initially pointed at Russia. The ST on 31 July 1914 wrote that no-one wanted war except for Russia. It was Russia's preparation and desire for war that had forced the hand of Germany. Russia had recovered from the Russo-Japanese War and wanted to further its power in the Slavic Balkans. This ambition brought Russia into conflict with Austria. Germany could not allow its ally Austria-Hungary to be defeated, so it had to respond to Russian aggression. The article went on to suggest that Germany would do everything possible to avoid entanglement as it did not want to pit the strength of the Triple Alliance against the Triple Entente. The Balkan crisis would not be localized if Russia felt financially able to intervene for Serbia. The actions of Russia would be crucial.  

The ODT reinforced this interpretation by running German Press disclaimers of responsibility for the War. Germany blamed the mobilization of the Russian troops. The Berliner Tageblatt wrote, "It is clear Russia is playing a mendacious double game". The NZT agreed and outlined the hostile actions taken by Russia in the recent past against Austria-Hungary, actions which had deliberately provoked Austria. Recent revelations had shown that Russia had been intriguing against Austria, using Serbia as its "cat's-paw". For example, Russia set up the Balkan Confederacy to secretly serve Russian interests. 

Alternately, the War had resulted from a legitimate grievance between Serbia and Austria. This conflict, said the broad-minded, was deeply rooted in racial antipathies and ancient rivalries. Mr Carlyle of Dunedin, a journalist and "expert" on the Balkans, wrote in the ST that Serbia had been provoking Austria-Hungary ever since "King Peter waded through the blood of assassination to take the Servian throne". The Balkan wars had increased this bitterness. For Carlyle the assassination of Franz Ferdinand was the spark to gunpowder. The

2 ST, 31-7-1914, pp.3-4
3 ODT, 4-8-1914, p.5
4 NZT, 6-8-1914, p.21
5 ST, 31-7-1914, p.3
summary of the situation by Mr Booth Tarkington

Austria [to Serbia] You scoundrel, get down on your knees and eat ten mouthfuls of dirt! Do it in one minute, or I'll shoot.

Russia [to Austria] I'll shoot if you do.
[to Serbia] Eat all the dirt you possibly can; do your best to keep him from shooting. I don't want to have to shoot.

England/Italy/France
[to Austria] Please wait a minute.
[to Germany] Austria is your brother; he does exactly what you tell him to do. Ask him to wait just a minute longer before he shoots. We can arrange to satisfy Austria if you'll get him not to shoot.

Germany: No.

Serbia [on his knees and swallowing]: There! I've eaten 9 mouthfuls, and I will eat the 10th if you'll give me just a few seconds for digestion.

Austria: No, your minute is up and I shoot.

England/France [imploring Germany]: Please stop him! You are the only one who can. Won't you say a word to stop him?

Germany: No.

Russia [beginning to load his old-fashioned shotgun]: I hope you'll stop him. See here, Austria, can we talk things over and see if there isn't a better way out?

Austria: Perhaps we could if-

Germany [interrupting]: Russia, quit loading that gun!

Russia: I can't while things are in this shape, but I will quit loading at once if Austria will promise not to shoot Serbia.

Germany [interrupting]: I love peace and I have done more than any mortal to preserve it. The sword is forced into my hand, evidently by God, and I defend myself. [Draws two well-oiled and loaded pump-guns of a magnificent new model and begins to shoot, while France and Britain run home to get their guns]

A recital! True in fact and spirit.

Source ODT, 1-4-1915, p.4
instability of Austria-Hungary meant that it could not ignore Serbia's gathering strength, especially with Serbia's strong racial ties to an ambitious Russia. The HW correspondingly felt that Austria was to blame because it wanted to keep the Balkans weak and dependent. Germany had tried and failed to restrain Austria before Russia mobilized. From that moment on escalation into war was inevitable. Russia, Serbia or Austria-Hungary were portrayed as the culprits in these interpretations of events. Germany was more a victim of events beyond its control and its obligations to Austria rather than the active instigator of war. Germany did not really want war. As 4 August 1914 approached it was still very possible to believe Germany was giving the peace process its full co-operation. The ST did, however, add the disclaimer, "that is the situation unless the whole tenor of the last few days cables are misleading".

It was after 4 August 1914 that the interpretation of the chain of events altered to cast Germany as the villain. Essentially, the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo escalated tensions between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. The upshot of this crisis was that Austria-Hungary demanded satisfaction from Serbia, satisfaction that Serbia was mostly willing to give and Austria willing to receive, until Germany intervened. British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey suggested a conference of Powers as a forum to settle the dispute peacefully. All parties were willing except Germany, which was considered odd because Germany was not one of the injured parties. The ODT reported ambiguously that Germany had refused the plan because it thought it had no chance of succeeding. Meanwhile, Russia had been slowly mobilizing in support of Serbia. According to the generally accepted version, Germany then demanded to know why Russia was mobilizing. Germany did not receive a satisfactory reply and in order to gain the tactical advantage attacked Russia and its ally France.

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6 CL, 8-9-1914, p.6, MW, 2-9-1914, p.6, NZT, 6-8-1914, pp.26-7, ODT, 29-7-1914, p.4

7 HW, 2-9-1914, p.6, ST, 3-8-1914, p.4 & 31-7-1914, p.4

8 ST, 3-8-1914, p.4

9 ODT, 30-7-1914, p.6
GERMANY BADLY HIT ON THE SOLAR PLEXUS.
The main problem for Germany in protesting its innocence at this point was that Belgium's neutrality was protected by the neutrality treaty of 1839, which Germany had signed along with the other European Powers. Invasion of Belgium was a risk that cost Germany dearly in the propaganda and moral war. The violation of Belgian neutrality made it much easier for Britain to justify its entry as a matter of honour and moral obligation to a doubtful civilian population. Belgium overcame any reluctance Britain had in fighting a country to which it had strong ties, both racially and culturally, and had provided Britain's royal family.

It is interesting to note here the rapid change in image of the Russian Bear. While Germany's name was blackened, Russia's halo was polished. No longer was Russia the great Slavic threat to Europe, whose inhabitants would in time sweep over Western Europe by sheer force of numbers. Suddenly, with Germany as the common Enemy, the Russian 'hordes' were a vital ally because they would crush the greater evil of the Teuton.

This was the general drift of the case against Germany as received over the wire. But what were the specifics of press opinion in Otago/Southland? How far did they and their readers accept or question the official views as communicated to New Zealand by cable? How long before Otago/Southland viewed Germany as the "Enemy" that had deliberately started a preventable European war?

After very little struggle the newspapers of Otago/Southland soon subscribed to the view that German aggression was solely responsible for the terrible War. The DT supported this view when it noted Italy would not honour its commitments to Germany under the defensive Triple Alliance because Germany was waging an offensive war. The ODT typically was unquestioningly pro-British and anti-German. It saw the War as a just war for Britain, a war Britain was forced to undertake to maintain its honour. The outbreak of the War occurred

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11 L. Fraser, Propaganda, p.34

12 DT, 3-8-1914, p.3
"NOTICE TO QUIT."

Source OW, 4-11-1914, p. 42
according to the ODT because Austria-Hungary called upon Serbia to accede demands to which no self-respecting nation could agree. Germany then responded to the call of its colleague and forced Britain into the War by violating Belgian neutrality.13 This was the standard superficial explanation for the outbreak of the War. Later this bare statement was expanded into a conspiracy whereby the whole German nation had been covertly planning the War for at least thirty years.

Traits that had been regarded as typical of pre-1914 Germany were used to support the idea that Germany had long been planning this War. The widely accepted notion that Germans were an efficient and thorough people was used against them. The CL suggested that with its customary care Germany had long been preparing for this War and was satisfied it could conduct its part successfully.14 Germany did have the opportunity to keep the peace, but chose not to. According to the ST, Germany did not keep the peace because it saw a near perfect opportunity to settle Slavic-Teuton tensions once and for all.15 All speculation was ended for the ODT when on 7 August 1914 it received the following telegram from London,

As the result of disclosures in diplomatic circles, it is believed to be proved that Germany has deliberately worked for war for weeks past.

This telegram was run under the headline of "German Perfidy Disclosed" which neatly disposed of all prior images of a peaceful Germany.16

The floodgates of anti-German articles now opened. As proof that Germany could never be trusted the CL ran a review of Stanley Shaw's, William of Germany which concluded that under Bismarck the German bureaucracy had not worked for peace. It had served Bismarck well when he had wanted war with France and Denmark. Shaw characterized German bureaucracy as irresponsible and unpredictable and argued that countries always ran the risk that it would fasten a quarrel upon them.17 Thus a

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13 ODT, 7-8-1914, p.8
14 CL, 7-8-1914, p.6
15 ST, 12-9-1914, p.5
16 ODT, 8-8-1914, p.9
17 CL, 11-8-1914, p.6
Before the Storm.

My interpretation of the "Before/After the Storm" maps.

KEY:
- Britain/France and possessions
- Russia and possessions
- Triple Alliance and possessions
- China/Japan and possessions
- USA and possessions
precedent was established for covert German action. Germany's guilt was thereby more understandable.

The ST waited a full two weeks before condemning Germany. Such caution was fairly standard for the ST which wanted to be sure of its facts before committing them to print. The ST looked back to the Franco-German War of 1871 to provide a precedent for current German behaviour. The ST argued that Bismarck tricked the French into appearing to be the aggressors when it was really Germany that wanted war. Similarly, in 1914, the Germans were attempting to appear the reluctant and injured side forced into a war it did not really want. But Sir Edward Grey and Mr Asquith had given the world the true facts and Germany could not escape the responsibility for the war so easily.18

The ODT published an article from the Sydney Morning Herald to further support the idea that Germany deliberately started the War. It described two maps; one titled "Before the Storm" showed the world as it was in 1914. The other, "After the Storm" showed that Britain and France had lost all of their colonies to the Triple Alliance, Australia was lost to the "Yellow Peril", the Triple Alliance held all of Africa except Cape Colony and the Transvaal which were independent. The United States of America had taken over Canada, while Ireland was independent. Russia took India and the land between the Caspian Sea and the Indo-Chinese peninsula. These rather fanciful maps were printed as evidence of Germany's envisaged new world order.19

To remove any lingering doubts that a few strong minded individual may still have harboured, Britain in September 1914 issued a White Paper on events leading up to the War. This paper completely exonerated the British from any responsibility and revealed that Germany had attempted to buy British neutrality.20 The ST's earlier suspicions that Germany had deliberately provoked Russia were now proven. Germany was apparently acting on a pre-determined policy of aggression aimed at crushing France.

Prussian militarists did not help Germany's attempt to place the blame elsewhere when they proclaimed, "that no treaty whatever is

18 ST, 14-8-1914, p.4
19 ODT, 25-8-1914, p.4
20 ST, 23-9-1914, p.4
binding on a belligerent who thinks to find military advantage in breaking it". The ODT commented that, "they [Germany] imprudently call [Belgium] a necessity which knows no law". This was a reference to an often quoted speech by German Chancellor von Bethman-Hollweg to the Reichstag on 4 August 1914, "Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity and necessity knows no law". It concluded in a later article that German statesmen took the cynical view of Frederick the Great that, "all guarantees are like filigree work, made rather to please the eye than to be of use". Germany was conveniently damned by its own words.

As time went on certain rather paranoid theories were published in the press, written by respected writers. One example was the "Great Conspiracy" of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. Doyle said that prior to reading General von Bernhardi's book, Germany and the Next War he had believed the Germans to be basically harmless and the focus of envy from hostile eyes. But Bernhardi convinced him of a great conspiracy hatched in Germany to create world war. Doyle believed Bernhardi as he was one of the foremost German officers, moved in the highest circles and wrote the standard books on tactics. The fact that Bernhardi wrote his book because nobody took his ideas seriously and was removed from his position, was not disclosed. As events unfolded in the manner generally described in Germany and the Next War, it was taken as the blue print of Germany strategy and proof Germany had planned the War. Because the "Next War" had proved accurate the rest of Bernhardi's ideas were taken more seriously.

The conspiracy theory suggested by the MW was similar to the ideas of Rosa Luxemburg and other left-wing writers. German Capitalists were portrayed as supporting the War. To secure increased arms sales, German Capital brought up German papers to manufacture hate against France.

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21 ODT, 5-10-1914, p.3
22 ODT, 2-1-1915, p.6
23 DT, 30-11-1914, p.7
24 P. Buitenhuis, The Great War of Words, pp.31-2
A remarkable photograph of the Kaiser caught showing in a manner more familiar to his Ministers than to the general public. A similar expression was doubtless seen on the Kaiser's face as he looked upon the army (of whose head he hoped to enter Paris) being driven back by the Allies.

Source: GW, 14-10-1914, p.46
bought French papers to create hate against Germany, and English papers to fan anti-German feelings etc.25

A discussion between Kaiser Wilhelm and King Albert of Belgium in November 1913 was offered in the French Yellow Book as further damning testimony. The Kaiser said that war between France and Germany was inevitable and that the German Army was invincible. These words were interpreted by the ST as an attempt by the Kaiser to intimidate the Belgians into giving Germany free passage. The Yellow Book suggested that the Germans had deliberately kept diplomatic relations unsettled so the German people would welcome war as an end to uncertainty. The Yellow Book was convinced that the Prussian doctrine of "might is right" had saturated official German circles.26

Articles from German papers were occasionally reproduced to further indict the Germans. One was written by shipping magnate Herr Harden in the Die Zukunft. Harden urged Germany to acknowledge frankly that it willed the War and deliberately planned it, saying, "Our object is to hoist the storm flag of the Empire on the narrow channel that opens and closes the way to the Atlantic".27

Against this background of damning evidence a few brave souls attempted to come up with alternative explanations for the War that did not totally condemn Germany. Some German explanations were also reproduced and examined.

The HW saw the War as one big plot by the Capitalists of the world. The Capitalists in Britain and elsewhere wanted to use the military resources of their countries to expand their markets. War was more or less inevitable because all countries wanted their "place in the sun". The War was the product of the modern capitalist economy.28

The ST reproduced an article from the Hamburger Fremdenblatt. It used Germany's pre-war reputation as leaders of civilization to cast doubt upon the conviction of German guilt. It asked,

Can your clear brains really believe that a nation that has done the work of civilization and culture for forty years with untiring
industry would voluntarily tear down its own work, destroy its commerce, prostrate its arts and sciences and send the entire flower of its youth into death?

The Fremdenblatt then tried to pin the blame for the War on Britain. The following was a prime example:

the blood that is being shed in this terrible war cries to Heaven - civilization covers her face, but Clio stands silent and severe and her pencil records in the eternal accounts book of history one single name, the name of the guilty nation: England.  

One slightly bizarre attempt to twist the "facts" to Germany's advantage is worth mentioning. German sources suggested that the British Empire had become senile and its people degenerate. This weakness had produced a power vacuum and caused the War. Thus it was Britain's fault for allowing Germany to be tempted rather than Germany's fault for succumbing to the temptation.  

For Admiral von Tirpitz the War was engineered by England which wanted to destroy Germany because it had dared to cross England's path and threaten its commerce. He added French desire for revenge to England's ruthlessness. He felt that France was too weak to attack Germany but was keen to be England's partner. Germany was, therefore, essentially a blameless victim.  

Professor von Leydon in the Frankfurter Gazette, in an outburst that was remarkably similar to some Allied writings except for the identification of different villains, wrote:

They, England, have placed themselves beyond the pale of human recognition [because England started the War]. They are utter barbarians and as such are unfitted to be admitted to the circle of civilized Germany when peace is restored. 

Any attempts to justify the brutal occupation of Belgium were not given consideration. Germany suggested Belgium had forfeited its neutrality by fighting back thereby removing Germany's obligation. But Germany was damned before it started because of the extensively quoted speech of von Bethman-Hollweg which continued,

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29 ST, 1-2-1915, p.4
30 ODT, 18-12-1914, p.6
31 CL, 16-2-1915, p.2
32 ODT, 30-3-1915, p.4
necessity knows no laws. Our troops have occupied Luxembourg and have perhaps entered Belgium. This is contrary to the dictates of international law... compelled to ride rough-shod over the legitimate protests of the governments of Luxembourg and Belgium. For the wrong we are thus doing, we will make reparation as soon as our military object is attained.\textsuperscript{33}

But these efforts to avoid being forever branded guilty were too little, too late, for by now Otago/Southland was convinced. Germany was unassailably established as the criminal by January 1915.

Once the press of Otago/Southland was convinced that Germany alone had started the War they moved onto asking why? Why did the acknowledged leaders of the civilized world take such a disastrous and ruinous path? This question as far as Otago/Southland papers were concerned had very diverse answers, answers whose popularity waxed and waned as further information and ideas came to light.

One theory was that Germany was obsessed with power and determined to carve out an empire. The phrase "world domination" was bandied about frequently. The German military toast "To The Day" was taken to mean the "Day" Germany was overlord of the world and mistress of the seas.\textsuperscript{34}

The Kaiser directed the quest for Power, power both for himself personally and for Germany. Dr E.J. Dillion in the London Daily Telegraph in 1911 had written,

"... the Kaiser's dream of a Germanized continent presided over by the chief of the house of Hohenzollern. This ambitious scheme has to my knowledge been cherished and brooded over by Wilhelm II for at least 14 years... moved every lever to set aside the hindrances to its execution."\textsuperscript{35}

In Dillion's opinion war would have arrived eventually in Europe because of the long held ambitions of Germany and the Kaiser, it was just a question of when.\textsuperscript{36}

Kaiser Wilhelm came in for much criticism and blame as the absolute ruler of Germany. His ambitions, powers and character were all put under the microscope and for the most part found wanting.

\textsuperscript{33} ODT, 28-1-1915, p.4
\textsuperscript{34} CL, 14-8-1914, p.6
\textsuperscript{35} NZT, 3-9-1914, p.22
\textsuperscript{36} NZT, 26-11-1914, p.6
Looking at his political powers first the ODT and ST noted that the Kaiser had to give final approval for any war declaration. The Kaiser had massive influence and authoritarian powers in Germany and was afforded the title of "All-Highest Person" because he had final say in all decisions. Others might suggest alternatives but the Kaiser made the final decision. 37

The Crown Prince was not an innocent bystander as he had lashed military feeling to the point where it was difficult for the Kaiser to resist. T.P. O'Connor in the ODT wrote that the Crown Prince had deliberately created a situation to force the Kaiser to declare war. O'Connor went on to say that the Kaiser was really the weak puppet of the military wire-pullers. Jealously of his son's popularity may have added to the Kaiser's desire to conquer to re-establish himself in the nation's eyes. 38

The ODT strongly felt that ambition, both personal and national, motivated the Kaiser's aggression. Personally, the Kaiser wanted to prove that he was mightier in battle than Frederick the Great and to display to the world another aspect of his many-sided greatness. The Kaiser wanted an empire that reflected the true power and glory of Germany. 39

Many felt that the Kaiser's character and mental health were contributing factors to the War. The chief family traits of the Hohenzollerns were believed to include rapacity, faithlessness and trickery. "... In all history ... no record of any other family so addicted to chicanery, so fond of accomplishing its object by the exercise of the most contemptible cunning". It would be unrealistic, wrote the ODT, to expect honour from a country that worshiped Frederick the Great and his descendants. 40 It was conveniently forgotten that the German and English royal families were the same.

The Kaiser was variously described as eccentric, a megalomaniac, or obsessed with an exaggerated view of his own powers and place in

37 ODT, 11-12-1914, p.8, ST, 17-10-1914, p.4
38 ODT, 12-4-1914, p.8
39 ODT, 19-12-1914, p.6, 2-12-1914, p.5 & 8-4-1915, p.6
40 ODT, 17-9-1914, p.4
A SCRAP OF PAPER

A scrap of paper: just a ragged scrap
Of yellow parchment, fly-blown, musty, rotten!
Who but an Englishman would care a rap
For an old treaty — obsolete, forgotten?
Shall we be bound by a Prussian king
In a weak moment did a foolish thing?

`Ein Mann ein Wort' the German proverb ran,
A German word was as good as English credit;
That was before the battle of Sedan;
We needs must lie; our Chancellor has said it.
If Belgium we plunder, ravage, sack,
With English gold we mean to pay her back.

We still are pious, still the God of Hosts
Beside the Kaiser stands in our dispatches
And in His cause the righteous Uhlans roast
Housewives and sets to church and minister matches.
Our Nietzsche preached the gospel of the fist,
And Eucken is our new evangelist.

Our God is still the Hebrew God of Might,
The righteous end the means unrighteous hallows
For big battalions Providence will fight,
'Tis writ in heaven, 'Deutschland uber alles.'
So let us pray each day 'Thy kingdom come,'
Till dawns the German-made millennium.

Source ODT, 3-6-1915 p.11
creation. His actions in starting the War were thought to suggest that he had lost the higher mental control that constituted sanity. On this matter the ST quoted the Medical Press and Circular:

The picture of this one man engaging half of Europe in mortal combat suggests the grandiose delusions and conduct of a man who in private life would probably be called upon to undergo a careful scrutiny of his mental condition.\(^{42}\)

The Kaiser's mental attributes were not made to look any more stable by his conviction that God was on Germany's side and was providing direct divine guidance. One of the more colourful quotes attributed to the Kaiser was the following to his Eastern Army,

Remember you are the chosen people. The spirit of the Lord has descended upon me because I am the Emperor of the Germans. I am his sword and his representative therefore death and destruction be to all resisting my will or doubting my mission. So perish all enemies of the German people. God demands their destruction - God, Who by my mouth commands you to carry out His will.\(^{43}\)

The belief that God had willed the Kaiser to start a war that was killing and maiming millions was the worst possible blasphemy.

Ambition also motivated Prussian militarists who had been characterized as the "road-hogs of Europe" because they claimed absolute right of way through any country. As Lloyd George put it, "with cynical contempt Prussia had declared that no nation need carry out a treaty unless it suits her". To Prussia treaties were mere "scraps of paper" which made Prussia very dangerous.\(^{44}\)

Prussia, in the ODT's opinion, was the focus of German agitation for war because for Prussia "it [war] is much more than the national industry, it is the national religion and the national life".\(^{45}\) If this belief was widely held it was hardly surprising that Prussia was seen as the powerhouse of German aggression with the Prussian King, Kaiser Wilhelm at its malignant head. The insistence that, "it is necessary for Europe to burn out the Prussian cancer with red-hot irons"

\(^{41}\) ST, 17-10-1914, p.4, ODT, 4-11-1914, p.8
\(^{42}\) ST, 8-10-1914, p.4
\(^{43}\) ODT, 13-10-1914, p.5
\(^{44}\) ODT, 22-9-1914, p.4
\(^{45}\) ODT, 17-11-1914, p.4
suggested that Prussian militarism was held at least partially responsible for the War.\textsuperscript{46}

Tangléd with the quest for power was the desire for territory. Germany felt trapped in the centre of Europe with nowhere to expand to accommodate its growing population. War seemed to provide the answer. The success of Bismarck’s policy of territorial expansion in the 1870’s deceived Germany into thinking they would have success once again in reaching for their “place in the sun”.\textsuperscript{47}

Alternatively, Germany was fighting a defensive war against hostile neighbours, jealous of Germany’s growing wealth and commerce. Prince von Bulow in *Imperial Germany* maintained that Germany was a peace-loving nation that had been forced to draw its sword to defend itself.\textsuperscript{48} Bethman-Hollweg felt thus and said, “Anybody who is threatened as we are threatened and is only fighting for his highest possessions can have only one thought – how is he to hack his way through”.\textsuperscript{49} From here it was only a short step to the notion that the German offensive was a pre-emptive strike.

Tensions between Germany and its neighbours were also on the increase as a result of the Balkan Wars. The balance of power in Europe had shifted to disadvantage Germany. Germany which had been in a strong position in Europe after Russia lost to Japan felt its superiority slipping away. Bethman-Hollweg said, “It can be summed up in the words: Germanism versus Slavdom”.\textsuperscript{50} Germany felt that late 1914 was its best chance of defeating the Slav threat. August 1914 was also an opportune time to strike because Britain was preoccupied in Ireland, Russia disrupted by strikes and the French forts had not yet been upgraded.\textsuperscript{51}

Prevailing fears about the falling birth rates of Western Europe as compared to Eastern Europe were also discussed. The *NZT* suggested that only the Slavs had time on their side and that, “the women who fill the

\textsuperscript{46} ODT, 29-9-1914, p.4
\textsuperscript{47} DT, 7-9-1914, p.7, ST, 29-9-1914, p.4
\textsuperscript{48} DT, 3-8-1914, p.6, CL, 14-8-1914, p.6
\textsuperscript{49} NZT, 6-10-1914, p.34
\textsuperscript{50} NZT, 6-8-1914, p.33
\textsuperscript{51} CL, 14-8-1914, p.6, NZT, 6-8-1914, p.33, ODT, 28-9-1914, p.4
cradle are more potent in the end than all the warriors of all the Kings". There was a slight suggestion that Germany was justified in fearing and then attacking Russia while they had the chance.\(^{52}\)

One progressive reason offered was the desire of Germany to spread its superior "kultur" to the rest of Europe. The German press and public reportedly felt that German world domination would be better than English world dominance.\(^{53}\) Bernhardi in 1911 felt that German success in the next European war was vital for the general progress of humankind. He wrote, "the next war will be fought for the highest interest of our country and mankind". War was necessary to advance the human race to the next level of civilization because only during war did humans reach their full potential.\(^{54}\) Later the theories of other German Intellectuals, like Nietzsche, were examined as further explanations for the perversion of German society.

Others felt that war was inevitable because of the escalating arms race, possibly started by Germany. The Magazine of War repeated the well-known jingo principle, "if we want peace we must be prepared for war". The German nation took this maxim to heart but preparation proved not to be enough.\(^{55}\) Germany went mad and forced the Russians and the French to follow suit. Count Witte, ex-Chief Minister to the Czar, was of the opinion the only possible outcome of this obsession with building superior methods of destroying people would be war. This obsession would take the white man who personified humanity closer to the abyss,\(^{56}\) an abyss he did indeed fall into.

In a few short months the world view of Otago/Southland had undergone dramatic alteration. The Russian Bear was now fighting for higher civilization and the German Eagle had been branded almost a traitor to humanity and certainly a traitor to civilization. Germany had wilfully and deliberately started a preventable war that had swallowed up all of Europe. The words War-Guilt were engraved upon Germany for

\(^{52}\) NZT, 3-9-1914, p.13
\(^{53}\) NZT, 1-10-1914, p.22, DT, 22-2-1915, ST, 16-1-1915, p.5
\(^{54}\) NZT, 1-10-1914, p.22
\(^{55}\) MW, 19-8-1914, p.6
\(^{56}\) NZT, 10-9-1914, p.4
THE BLACKEST LIE

by Jessie Pope

Big bully Belgium
  Breathing blood and flame,
Crafty as a serpent
  In a cunning game,
Sent a note to England,
  Sent a note to France,
"Let us crush the Fatherland
  While we have the chance!"

Poor little Germany
  Gentle land of peace,
Seeking the Millennium
  When armaments shall cease;
Rather grieved than angry,
  Called her sons to fight,
To protect the Fatherland,
  As was only right.

Hurry with the whitewash,
  Pour it out in sheams!
Bleach the ravaged country,
  Louvain, Antwerp, Rheims!
Belgium concocted the war,
  Thus deserves her fate!
That's the blackest Teuton lie
  Published up to date.

Source CL, 5-1-1915, p.6
all to see. In this respect the position of the Otago/Southland press differed little from the official British position, which was unsurprising because most information came from Britain.

The ideas that condemned Germany were a complex tangle of political ambition, racial fears and royal instability. The only common bond was their anti-German theme. This confusion did not weaken the case against Germany because it had become the target of one of the most vicious, emotional and comprehensive hate campaigns that the world had ever seen. German excuses while acknowledged were never considered legitimate reasons for war. Only the MW managed to hold itself mostly aloof from the scramble to blame Germany, for it the world Capitalist system was at fault. But branding Germany the villain was only the beginning of what grew into the "image of the monstrous German enemy" that condemned all Germans, every man, woman and child.

The attitude of most Otago/Southland newspapers, which was little challenged by letters to the editor, towards German motives and responsibility for the War, can be summed up in the words of Dr E.J. Dillion, in the ODT.

War broke out as Germany believed there was not a more auspicious moment for the realization of Prussian [and the Kaiser's] ambitions than the assassination in Sarajevo. Attempts by Germany to justify the war have failed. She deliberately brought about a crude, naked might-struggle; in which war-lust and brute-force are pitted against the most sacred and imprestible rights that lie at the very roots of organized society.57

57 ODT, 26-11-1914, p. 6
"QUIT CALLING ME GOD I DETEST THE E"

—From New York "Life"

Source: OW, 12-5-1915, p.36
"Left Behind!" The tragedy of an old woman and her grandchild for whom there was no room.
Chapter Two
THE MONSTER IS CREATED
August 1914 to March 1915

Lord Curzon was
certain the name of the Kaiser will go down in history as that of
Wilhelm the Bloodstained, Wilhelm the Assassin. The whole German
people are drunk with the poison poured into their veins by
Bernhardi, Bulow and others.¹

How evil could a nation become? The world was about to discover
through the nefarious actions of Germany. Atrocity was heaped upon
atrocities until any true picture of Germany sank from sight beneath the
carnage. All thoughts of kindly civilized Germany washed away in a
matter of moments. That Germany was a nation operating outside the
"pale of humanity" and civilization, beyond redemption, was agreed upon
by all the Otago/Southland newspapers. Only the nationally oriented MW
disputed such claims. The conformity of local opinion in condemning
German in this period was remarkable but understandable considering the
lack of information from outside of official British war news.
Unfortunately, conformity in the desire to condemn Germany was not
realised in a rational and straightforward argument. There was little
to link many of the ideas except for a general anti-German tone and
little enough that was rational in some of the ideas. Emotions and
fears were running wild. All wanted to believe that Germany was
degenerate because this would guarantee an Allied victory. It was also
possibly easier to accept British news and propaganda at face value
because New Zealand did not as yet have a direct stake in the War.

Atrocity stories were the justification and proof of any theory
that Germany had forgotten all principles of civilization and was
drowning in war-lust. There were three stages in the evolution of the
"image of the monstrous German enemy" during this period: first the
making of the monster though the atrocity stories; second, the
explanation of the monster by examination of German society,
intellectual background, and leaders; third, the relating of the monster
to the actual performance of the German nation in the battlefield.
Reports of atrocity began coming over the wire in early August 1914. At
first these reports were greeted with disbelief. The ODT remarked that

¹ ODT, 20-11-1914, p.10
The wreckage of one of the Cathedral doorways. The door itself has been blown off its massive hinges.

Source: CI, 15-1-1915, p.6
Germany was an advanced, enlightened and civilized nation and, "it is amazing if in warfare they [Germans] are relapsing intomediaeval methods" and were "guilty of atrocities of a kind that would ordinarily be more readily described to primitive races than to a country that has made claim to be regarded a home of refinement and culture." The ST, NZT and MW were the most resistant to accepting all news as accurate and constantly warned its readers to beware. The atrocity stories usually took one of three forms: the wanton destruction of national and historical treasures and buildings; unsavoury activities during the heat of battle and the cold-blooded murder and mutilation of innocent civilians. Only the CL and the ODT in the Otago Witness printed photographs of the devastation wrought by the advancing German Army.

German activities in Belgium were the initial focus of attention. The writer of the ODT's "Passing Notes" column compared Germany to Naboth of the vineyard fable. Germany, the sworn protector of Belgium, incited by the Devil had turned upon Belgium as "thief and robber, burglar, ruffian, bully, torturer, bandit, incendiary and murderer".

Alexander M. Dairymple in a letter to the ODT expressed common sentiment on the fall of Antwerp.

It illustrated and commemorated the treaty breaking perfidy of the Prussian military and the brutality of both its designs and methods. In it, as on a lurid page, will read the story of insatiable greed, the treacherous preparations, the wholesale espionage of that 'nouveau riche' nation which has proved itself the deadly foe of human freedom, trampler of the weak, and the despiser of very consideration, divine or human, which stood in the way of self-aggrandizement.

The burning and sacking of Louvain was regarded by all as butchery and murder, not war at all.

Interestingly, it took the destruction of towns, cities and historic landmarks before the ST would accept that Germany was guilty of brutalities against civilians. The policy behind these outrages was

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1 ODT, 27-8-1914, p.6
2 ODT, 10-9-1914, p.4
3 ODT, 17-9-1914, p.4 & 11-9-1914, p.4, NZT, 19-11-1914, p.21, MW, 31-3-1915, p.5
4 ODT, 17-10-1914, p.6
5 ODT, 13-10-1914, p.6
labelled senseless by the ST editor who could not understand why Germany was deliberately alienating public opinion.7

Public opinion was further alienated in December 1914 when several German raiders bombed unfortified towns on the east coast of Yorkshire, directly in violation of the Hague Convention. The bombing of unfortified English towns was described as "mere wanton malicious blows struck by an enemy in full knowledge of their ineffectiveness".8 A phrase coined by the ever quotable Winston Churchill, "the baby-killers of Scarborough", stuck thereafter to the hapless German Navy.9

In the early months one event stood out as the ultimate example of German cruelty and barbarism, the sinking of the passenger liner "Falaba". A German submarine cornered the "Falaba" and gave its captain ten minutes to evacuate before it would be torpedoed. Ten minutes was far too little time. The crew of the German submarine had, "plumbed the deepest depths of barbarity and infamy when, with ghoulish glee, they witnessed the death struggles of the drowning victims".10 Worse this travesty of humanity was presented to the Germany people as a great victory.11

Looting of national treasures by the Crown Prince and other officers was another German crime. Germans were systematically stealing treasures then destroying the buildings to cover their black deeds. In this respect the ODT felt that the Kaiser and his pickpocket son were worse than Frederick the Great who had at least respected the valuable art galleries of Saxony.12

Newspaper stories and photographs were not the only source of images depicting German atrocities. Several films were shown at the time including "German Occupation of Louvain" and "Antwerp Under Shot and Shell". The first showed the aftermath of German invasion in which many of Louvain's noble architectural edifices were wrecked.13

7 ST, 5-9-1914, p.4 & 24-9-1914, p.4
8 ODT, 4-2-1914, p.4
9 ST, 19-12-1914, p.5, ODT, 22-12-1914, p.4
10 ODT, 1-4-1915, p.4, ST, 1-4-1915, p.4
11 ODT, 3-4-1915, p.10
12 ODT, 12-5-1915, p.8
13 ODT, 24-11-1914, p.6
One London Times correspondent, quoted in the ST, professed that s/he was not surprised that Germany was using terrorism because they had done the same in 1871. This Times correspondent wrote in 1871:

It is not a war, but a series of massacres ... the Germans are becoming fiercer from day to day ... they are growing a little wild. The severity of their trials, the constant slaughter, try the feelings of an army to an extent which renders it difficult to keep up the high moral tone which characterized them when they first entered France ... International reputation notwithstanding, the Teuton at war is a fine exponent of the law of vengeance. 

Germany's claim to be the leader of enlightened civilization made its actions worse. Donald Reid said at a public meeting in Dunedin, "they call their present state one of civilization, but if it is civilized to cause what has happened in Belgium, and of which you all know, then civilization has proved a failure".15

Carl Von Clausewitz's theories were used to condemn German terrorism as uncivilized. He discerned the difference between warfare of the savage and of civilized nations to be that, civilized nations do not put their prisoners to death, do not devastate towns and countries, this is because their intellect exercises greater influence on their mode of carrying on war and has taught them more effective means of applying force than the rude acts of mere instinct.16

As time went by German atrocities came to be viewed as a deliberate sanctioned policy of terror and vandalism called "Frightfulness". This view meant that the atrocities could not be even partially excused as the brutal explosion of an army infuriated by the resistance of their foe. The deliberate nature of the German policy was proved in Tirlemont, where the German troops arrived with all the necessary implements, and at Senlis where certain streets were methodically fired and looted.17

The blessing of such atrocities by the German High Command was supposedly proved by a printed notice found in the possession of a dead German soldier. It read:

Remember the Blood which flowed in 1870 and annihilate your hereditary foe, France, who has now driven forward the Russian Colossus to annihilate us. No quarter! Kill them all, these

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14 *ST*, 10-9-1914, p.3
15 *ODT*, 22-10-1914, p.4
16 *ODT*, 4-2-1915, p.4
17 *NZT*, 26-11-1914, pp.11-12
barbarians, these accursed - so that in a new day the peace of Europe may be solidly established. 18

Official Allied reports adjudged the Germans guilty as charged. The French Commissioner's report on violations of international law read,

Never has war amongst civilized nations or born savage had the ferocity of character as that waged by the German. Pillage, robbery, incendiarism and murder are the enemy's practice, denoting an astonishing retrogression in German mentality since the Franco-German War of 1870. The outrages on women and girls is unprecedented; soldiers and officers finish off the wounded mercilessly and kill inoffensive inhabitants irrespective of age or sex. 19

German justifications of its policy of deliberate outrages on the innocent were judged woefully insufficient. The main excuse given was that it was,

our only means of preventing surprise attacks from the civil population has been to intervene with unrelenting severity and to create examples which, by their frightfulness, would be a warning to the whole country. 20

The "treachery" of Belgium in resisting was surely not worthy of such harsh retaliation, commented the CL. 21

Amongst the hysterical condemnation of German atrocities there were one or two more rational voices. The NZT at times was one such voice and narrated the story of a Catholic priest in France. This priest said he had come across many cases of Germans treating wounded British soldiers. The editor in light of this story wrote that,

We cannot shut our eyes to Louvain, Rheims and Belgium but neither do we desire to be blind to any facts on the other side. Nothing is to be gained from tarring Germans everywhere with the one brush; and it is very much pleasanter to be able to think of your foe as a soldier and a man rather than as a ghost and a wild beast. 22

A review of E.A. Powell's book Fighting in Flanders in the MW began with the reviewer denouncing the false atrocity stories of British papers aimed at stimulating recruiting. The Daily Citizen's story of miners sealed in coal pits and stories of nuns having their breasts cut off and children their hands, were cited as examples. These stories were dismissed as clumsy patriotic attempts by unimaginative souls. Powell

18 ODT, 21-10-1914, p.6
19 ST, 9-1-1915, p.6
20 ODT, 21-10-1914, p.6
21 CL, 27-10-1914, p.2
22 NZT, 19-11-1914, p.21
A French military hospital at Senlis, bombarded by the Germans.

FRENCH RED CROSS TRAIN DISASTER AT MARY SUB MAENE.

This bridge was blown up by the Germans just as the entrained French wounded were crossing.
did, however, accept that true German atrocities were carried out systematically and found it terrifying, "that a (by all accounts) kindly and humane peasantry from Germany can be converted into a howling mob of barbarian brutes".\textsuperscript{23} MW attempts to discredit British propaganda and censorship seem to have been mainly part of its attack on the "most loathsome Political thing in Europe", that is, Russia,\textsuperscript{24} rather than an attack aimed specifically at Britain.

The ST in an admirable attempt to remain impartial wrote it was not inclined to accept at face value the Commissioner of Belgium's report because it was not a disinterested party. The ST felt that the United States of America would have been a suitable convener and if an independent tribunal judged the Germans guilty then Germany deserved to be treated as an outlaw nation.\textsuperscript{25}

Under the weight of the reports of German atrocity even the ST and MW succumbed along with all Otago/Southland papers and gave up its resistance temporarily. The German name had been blackened beyond redemption by the atrocities attributed to the brutal German soldier; excesses that were considered unforgivable in the modern civilized world where the intellect was supposed to rule supreme.\textsuperscript{26} The atrocities contravened the idealized image of war as an honourable game between professional soldiers who accorded each other the highest courtesy and did not involve civilians or neutrals. German conduct shattered the hope embodied in the Geneva Convention. International law apparently meant little to these outlaws.

The arrival of the atrocity stories demanded answers. Answers to questions like what had failed so badly in German culture to produce a nation capable of such horrors? Answers were needed to prove to Allied populations that such terrors were true and exclusive to Germany. The flaws of German culture had to be exposed both as a warning and a reassurance; a warning about what to avoid and a reassurance that the degeneration of Germany had taken many years and was the result of peculiarly German traits. There was no longer any suggestion that anything or anybody non-German was even partially culpable.

\textsuperscript{23} MW, 31-3-1915, p.5
\textsuperscript{24} MW, 24-2-1915, p.6, 13-1-1915, p.1 & 18-11-1914, p.6
\textsuperscript{25} ST, 17-9-1914, p.4
\textsuperscript{26} NZT, 17-9-1914, pp.33-4
Other explanations were thereafter rejected. The blood-madness, or seeing red, said to effect all men was dismissed because the French were not experiencing it. Atavism was also not an excuse as only the Germans were exhibiting symptoms. Alcohol was present everywhere and could not be blamed. 27

Running along side and intertwined with the quest to discover why the German people had become so brutal was the need for the Allies to reassure themselves that no matter how bleak things became the Allies would win. All aspects of German society were, therefore, examined from the twin perspectives of German guilt and the inevitability of Allied victory.

The search began with the ideas underpinning German society and "kultur". It was presumed there was a dominant ideology that appealed to a sector of German society influential enough to direct German development. Extensive discussion concluded that the ideology was "might is right" and the influential sector was the Prussian Junker class headed by Kaiser Wilhelm. These general conclusions were accepted by all the Otago/Southland newspapers, each of whom ran a version of the following scenario.

The past 30 years of intellectual development Germany had expanded and refined the doctrine that the supreme prerogative lay in the human sphere of material forces. The ODT in November 1914 voiced common sentiment when it wrote:

"Germany maybe materially strong but along the way has lost her soul ... it [culture] is tragically faulty when it is the animal in man that is alone strengthened and there is deliberate suppression of all in man that is most unto God." 28

This preoccupation with the temporal world created a vacuum of ideas opening the door to Prussian militarism. German philosophy and history was examined and interpreted in a manner compatible with the growth of Prussian militarism and the "might is right" ideology. The main protagonists identified by the Otago/Southland press were Nietzsche, Frederick the Great, Bernhardi, Bismarck, and Treitschke.

Mixed with the search for answers to Germany's outlawish behavior was a sense of bitter betrayal. Otago/Southland felt it had been deceived by German intellectuals; suckered into believing Germany was leading the world towards higher civilization. This sense of outrage

27 CL, 27-10-1914, p.2
28 ODT, 25-11-1914, p.6
HATE, GERMANY!

O, thou, Germany, hate now!

With a sound of iron, at the throats of millions of the men of that devil's race, [Britain]. Until higher than the mountain

Will be heaped with smoking flesh and bones of Germany, now hate!

Clad in bronze, take no prisoners, to each enemy

a bayonet thrust through the heart!

Silence all. Make a desert of the surrounding countries.

Source 0BT, 1902-1915, p.4
was expressed as a backlash against nineteenth century German thinkers. The "Our Public Schools Column" in the ODT wrote contemptuously, "the myth of [German] intellectual superiority has been accepted not only by the foreigner, but by the bulk of the German academic world itself".  

One cartoon described, but not reproduced in the ODT, showed the Kaiser being white-washed by four German servants, while exhorting them, "Lay it on my worthy professors, lay it on thick. I want every drop of it". This was supposed to illustrate the belief that the Kaiser and the German intellectual community were attempting to deceive the world.

The rationale was that German intellectuals had long been getting the German nation into the correct frame of mind for an aggressive war. As the ODT put it "this war did not spring up suddenly because a Serbian fanatic threw a bomb." The German climate of opinion had long departed from the idealism of Kant, Goethe, Marx, and Hegel and arrived at the philosophical cant that "might is right". Basically German philosophers had conceived the most fiendish and brutal doctrines. Its statesmen had then sown at very opportunity the seeds of hate, prostituted its learning, spent its wealth and become a murdering machine worked by a few arrogant warlords.

Germany's drift towards its abhorrent stand on self-seeking self-aggrandizement was traced back to Frederick the Great. He supposedly taught that:

if possible, the Powers of Europe should be made envious of one another in order to give occasion of a coup when the opportunity arises ... do not make the foolish mistake of not breaking them [treaties] when you believe your interests require it ... above all uphold the following maxim: - to deprive your neighbours is to deprive them of the means of injuring you.

As if to prove that Christianity was only skin-deep amongst the Junker caste he voiced the principle, "when he is about to conclude with a foreign Power, if a sovereign remembers he is a Christian he is lost". Significantly, Frederick was much admired by Kaiser Wilhelm.

Carl von Clausewitz was deemed the intellectual parent of German militarism. A Colonel Maude wrote of Clausewitz's principle work.
it reveals war stripped of all its accessories, as the exercise of force for the attainment of a political object, unrestrained by any law save that of expediency and this gives the key to the interpretation of German political aims, past, present and future, which is unconditionally necessary for every student of the modern condition of Europe.

For Clausewitz the object of war was the annihilation of the adversary using both physical and moral force. He, reported the ODT, advocated the use of terrorism as a legitimate tool of war. 34

Following Clausewitz in corrupting the German mind were the actions of Bismarck in unifying Germany using a mixture of force and diplomacy. A article by the Hon. Edward Lyttelton, Head of Eton, reproduced in the ODT argued that, the present horror in Europe is due directly not to Bismarck's policy but to his legacy of low cunning and his dazzling success. The Prussian conscience was debauched by him and has never recovered. The three underlying principles of Bismarck were supposedly "brute force, lying and caution". 35

Bismarck's greatest crime was the imposition of Prussian autocracy, with its reactionary and military discipline upon the whole of the German people. Prussia provided the lead and the rest of Germany followed, duped into believing that the answer to all the great questions would come only through "blood and iron". Bismarck helped Germany along the path of directing all its energies into the world-wide domination of German "kulture" through the means of absolute dominance by German arms. Germany was seduced into believing that the world would be better off if its "kulture" spread far and wide. 36

Heinrich von Treitschke as Germany's foremost jingoist historian was judged most responsible for influencing young Germany. His work, History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century, was a veritable "bible" for those who dreamed of a glorious German future. He interpreted history to support his ideas that the "State is might". 37 Treitschke taught that the State was an all-powerful entity and its highest moral duty was to care for its power. 38 "Of all political weakness that of

34 ODT, 26-10-1914, p.6
35 ODT, 11-1-1915, p.4
36 ODT, 11-1-1915, p.4
37 ODT, 24-10-1914, p.8 & 13-3-1915, p.4
38 NZT, 3-12-1914, p.24, ODT, 5-12-1914, p.3 & 24-10-1914, p.8
feebleness is the most abominable; it is the sin against the Holy Spirit of Politics". War for Treitschke was the "strong medicine, the teacher of heroism, the force that spreads the finest culture, is to be con-

sidered the law of humanity".39

Treitschke fostered the belief that Britain did not deserve its preminence. He thought that Britain was the great robber State and that Germany had stronger claim to such a large portion of the earth. Many Germans felt, he argued:

English supremacy is an unreality, her power is as hollow as her moral virtues - the one an arrogance and pretence, the other hypocrisy. She cannot long maintain that baseless supremacy ... Who is to succeed her? It may not be Germany; some power it must be. But if Germany were to inherit the sceptre which is falling from her nerveless hand ...

Britain was the Venice or Rome of modern days - doomed.40 His solution was an echo from Germany's past when Germany had united to destroy the Roman Empire, Charlemagne and the Ottonides. In Germany's past was the promise and potency of a world empire surpassing the highest glory of Rome.41

For Germans, a chosen people, elect of all the nations of the earth, fulfilling its destiny by the might of the sword, will hold among the nations the position she has made herself strong enough to take and that hers by a special divine appointment.

The triumph of arms would be a triumph of culture, ideas and German world vision; the end justified the means.42

Treitschke preached that peace was an evil that crippled human nature. No true liberty could exist without an armed force ready to sacrifice itself for the sake of freedom. A State that cultivated its mental powers at the expense of its physical prowess would inevitably go to ruin. War revealed the true worth of a nation. Arbitration and international law was the refuge of cowards.43

Finally, Treitschke declared, "the world is governed by Valour and the Will to Power". The "Will to Power" was the belief that if all

39 ODT, 24-10-1915, p.5
40 ODT, 5-12-1914, p.3, NZT, 3-12-1914, p.24
41 NZT, 3-12-1914, p.24
42 ST, 23-1-1915, pp.5-6, ODT, 5-12-1914, p.3, NZT, 3-12-1914, p.24
43 ST, 11-1-1914, p.4 & 23-1-1915, pp.5-6
Germany exercised this "Will" it could overcome anything.\textsuperscript{44} It was believed that Treitschke's works had power and he had succeeded in projected his vision for Germany's future onto a whole nation's psyche.\textsuperscript{45}

Another German intellectual who was the target of much censure was Frederick Nietzsche. The main charges against Nietzsche were that he was violently anti-Christian and anti-democratic.

Professor Cramb's writings on the subject of Nietzsche's anti-Christian teachings were printed in the ODT.

What is religion which, on the whole, may be characterized as the religion of the most earnest and passionate minds of young Germany ... It is the wrestle of the intellect, not only against Rome, but against Christianity itself ... Nietzsche clears away the 'accumulated rubbish' of 1200 years; he attempts to set the German imagination back where it was with Alaric and Theodoric, fortified by the experience of twelve centuries to confront the darkness unaided, unpalled, triumphant, great and free!\textsuperscript{46}

For Nietzsche Christianity was a crutch for the degenerate, the wretch and the weakling. God was a creation coming out of human weakness and despair, a mirage that would vanish as soon as humankind discovered the energy hidden within. "It [Christianity] is a terrible virus, which if its effects became universal, would turn the world into a Lazaretto [plague ship or hospital]."\textsuperscript{47}

Other heresies of Nietzsche included his ideas on "Supermen" or "Overmen" who were destined to rule their fellow humans or "herd". Nietzsche through his Superman preached the gospel of strength and the trampling down of the weak and degenerate. Many interpreted Nietzsche to be saying that the Supermen were German and it was their destiny to subdue the world by force. Strength was a law unto itself and the German atrocities were no more than a manifestation of this strength and therefore justified.\textsuperscript{48}

The NZT believed that Nietzsche's ideas undermined German leaders' sincerity because he said that morals stood in the way of humankind's attainment of the highest might and splendour. Under Nietzsche's new

\textsuperscript{44} ODT, 20-2-1915, p.6
\textsuperscript{45} ODT, 13-3-1915, p.4
\textsuperscript{46} ODT, 11-1-1915, p.4
\textsuperscript{47} NZT, 19-11-1914, p.34
\textsuperscript{48} ST, 23-10-1914, p.4
morality "nothing is true, all is permissible". Wickedness, wrote Neitzsche, is humankinds' greatest strength.\textsuperscript{49}

To further illustrate the rule of the Superman the NZT reported that he wrote,

the essential thing in a good and healthy aristocracy is, that it should feel itself to be not the function, but the end and justification, be it loyalty or of the commonwealth - that it should, therefore, with a good conscience, suffer to sacrifice of a countless number of men who, for its sake, must be humbled and reduced to imperfect beings, to slaves, to instruments.\textsuperscript{50}

These words were viewed as hardly encouraging the growth of the finer feelings.

One central tenet of Neitzsche's works was his hatred of democracy. Democracy was "organized mediocrity", set up by the timid for the timid and hostile to initiative, daring and genius. His government was to be a strong, exultant Overman aristocracy to whom the vast masses of people would remain obedient. The masses were slaves, necessary only for day-to-day duties, as a backdrop for the dazzling exploits of the Supermen and as subjects of Superman ruthlessness. The slaves could keep their morality and religion, but they were not binding on the Overman.\textsuperscript{51}

Neitzsche's ideas reputedly flourished amongst the fertile soil of the Prussian Junker caste. They fully accepted his idea that force was justifiable simply because it was a form of strength. According to commentators in the press Neitzsche's theories on force could only be put into practice in Prussia. The events of 1870-1 fired the German imagination, combined with fear of the British Royal Navy and Russia convinced Germany that it had to uphold German culture at all costs, by force if necessary. Circumstances played into the Prussian's hands and all was inspired by Neitzsche. "World Power or Downfall!" became the cry.\textsuperscript{52}

The teachings of Neitzsche were usually interpreted in a hostile and distasteful manner. A telling example appeared in the NZT, "it ever remains a disgrace to the German intellectual life of the present age,

\textsuperscript{49} NZT, 19-11-1914, p.34
\textsuperscript{50} NZT, 19-11-1914, p.34
\textsuperscript{51} ST, 2-3-1915, p.4
\textsuperscript{52} ST, 23-10-1914, p.4
that in Germany a pronounced maniac should have been regarded as a philosopher and have founded a school. 53

But not all commentators took this view. They looked for and found positive elements in Nietzsche's work and felt his influence was not as important as some believed. While they accepted that Nietzsche probably did encourage the growth of belief in force, he was not a favourite of the current regime. The DT remarked that Nietzsche had long poked fun at the clumsiness and stupidity of his fellow German and "repudiated the Prussian lock, stock and barrel". Of 1870 he wrote, 

the victories of 1870-71 had given the German an inflated conception of their own importance in the world and the material wealth that accrued to them during the next two decades ruined completely the old German philosophy and culture which had been the pride and hope of such men as Goethe, Schiller, Beethoven and Schopenhauer. 54

Nietzsche had no part in the special parochial patriotism of modern Germany. He railed against the Germans' lack of the essential adventurous characteristics of the Superman. 55

One ST writer felt Nietzsche's direct contribution to the War to be at about the same level as the indirect influence of Darwin's evolutionary theory. S/He pointed out that the whole scheme of Nietzsche's destructive and constructive criticism could be regarded as an application of the principle of "survival of the fittest". 56 Unlike Treitschke, Nietzsche had a large following outside of Germany which he would not have gathered if he wrote from an exclusively German viewpoint. He had to be taken seriously as a philosopher because he used evolutionary ideas in his approach to the metaphysical problem of truth. But all praise was tempered by his doctrine of force, his hatred of Christianity and dislike of democracy. 57 Those with a more balanced view felt Nietzsche was far less responsible than Treitschke for the modern German obsession of pride and arrogance.

Inevitably the philosophies of Germany's leading military experts were investigated. General Friedrich von Bernhardt's ideas were the most easily accessible as he had written several books. Apparently for

53 NZT, 19-11-1914, p.34
54 DT, 11-1-1915
55 ST, 2-3-1915, p.4
56 ST, 2-3-1915, p.4
57 ST, 2-3-1915, p.4
Bernhardi "might was right". He was astonished that many felt a weak nation had the same right to exist as the powerful and wrote that "power [was] the vehicle of the highest culture". 58

Bernhardi, like many of his contemporaries felt that war itself was a blessing. He exulted the virtues of war over peace. War was described by Bernhardi as, "not only a necessary element in the life of the peoples, but also as an indispensable factor in civilization, nay, the highest expression of the force and life of truly civilized peoples". Peace was a poison which deserved "to be called positively immoral and to be branded as unworthy of the human race". The brutalities and casualties of war were dismissed as mere details that led to the overlooking of the idealism of war as a whole. 59

Morality had no place in a war zone. The sole reason a State existed was to gain power over other States and for a State to fulfil this it must throw all morality overboard. He pointed to the past and said this was the belief of all conscious empire builders including Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Bismarck and at times the British Empire. The Prussian system had much to recommend it as the model to secure for Germany its "place in the sun". 60

One MW observer, however, noted that Bernhardi bitterly complained that he only wrote because his countrymen did not share his views. He was cashiered from the German Army for his ideas. This writer argued the British public had been hypnotised into believing that Bernhardi's evil teachings had corrupted the pristine innocence of Germany. This was not true as every nation had men like Bernhardi. Britain had Cecil Rhodes who declared his life's dream, "was nothing less that the governance of the world by the British race". 61

The ST revealed the opinion of Karl Scheffler, a respected German publicist. He took Bernhardi's thoughts further and wrote it was dangerous to attempt to apply standards of ordinary morality to States.

The principle is false, because while practical civil morality is rendered possible by the authority of the State and of law, the State itself has no authority above it. It is, therefore, a misrepresentation of reality for a people in wartime to be morally indignant.

58 ODT, 24-10-1914, p.8
59 ODT, 5-9-1914, p.6
60 DT, 22-3-1915
61 MW, 7-4-1915, p.5
It logically followed on from this that all international agreements were null and void. Scheffler wrote, "a promise that cannot be enforced - however solemn the promise might be - is not a promise".

Scheffler after ruling out ordinary morality wrote that,

it must suffice us to know, that in our nations dealings we have a higher morality, namely, the ethics of force and of national expansion. An action shall be justified not morally but politically. More important is it to think politics than to give reciprocal assurances of behaving morally.\textsuperscript{62}

All of which led to the conclusion that the only thing the German State was amenable to was fear.

From reproduced German articles one got the idea that most German papers thought along similar lines to Scheffler. The Cologne Gazette wrote in 1911, "the secret of diplomacy success is ultimately military power ... success is reaped only by him who has the courage at the decisive moment to stake all the forces at his disposal without reserve".\textsuperscript{63}

Reverend Dean Burke in Invercargill in December 1914 summed up the destructive result of Nietzsche, Bernhardi and Treitschke. Their teachings had combined to produce the doctrines of bestial materialism and force that started Germany on its disastrous course. The German State was supreme and all individuals belonged to it. War, cruelty and fraud were means to all true progress for the German race, that is, "their place in the sun".\textsuperscript{64}

The arguments outlined above promoted the conclusion that the intellectual climate amongst the influential Junkers slowly developed the notion that the State was all-powerful. The individual belonged to the State, not the State to the people; the individuals' only worth being his/her value to the State. Germany's one-sided worship of national expansion and the superiority of its "kulture" led it to believe that morality was only for the weak. Machiavelli's ideas had come to life in German society where the State, "will go to work against faith and charity and humanity and religion" and march ruthlessly to war when necessary.\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{62} ST, 5-3-1915, p.4

\textsuperscript{63} NZT, 3-9-1914, p.22

\textsuperscript{64} NZT, 3-12-1914, p.25

\textsuperscript{65} ODT, 24-10-1914, p.8
Kaiser's vast ambition

Realm of the globe, submit! adore my power!
Mine the red globe; practised to devour!

Virtue, dark destruction's torch of irud light;
Mine, her keen scimitars resistless might!

Chief's! patriots! heroes! kneeling at my shrine.

Bend, ye proud isles! my dread behest obey!

Yield, prostrate nations! and confess my sway!

Loud the bright ensigns of supreme command;

Bend, ye hands, ye monarchs! bow the vassal knee!

My look, decision! and my spectre, fate!

The editor then remarked, such was the dream. The Marne is the waking reality and it may be the beginning of the end.
But how significant was the ideology of the Prussian Junker class in the German population at large? For the purposes of British War propaganda the German translation of theory into practice was almost perfect. Reality failed to force any compromise upon the ideology because censorship banned reality. Most Otago/Southland papers portrayed the majority of the German population as having been "brainwashed" by Prussian control of German institutions including the Government, administration and education. The German peoples had been primed for the occasion by its intellectuals and were performing brilliantly. Every German was a "rabid worshipper of a Frankenstein's monster of blood and iron".66

One writer "Ignotus" urged her/his readers to completely dismiss from their minds the preconception that the German people were gentle humanitarians. S/He wrote,

The Germany with which we have to deal resembles the France of Louis XIV much more closely than any contemporary regime ... the army is supreme and ready to trample civil rights and civil powers under foot at a word from its Lord.

A land where it was fine for Lt von Foerstner to offer ten shillings to any soldier who, "ran his sword through the body of any civilian who insulted him".67

War-lust was supposedly at the forefront of all Germans' minds. They believed that the Kaiser's war was fully justified because the "sword was forced into his hand". Even the German Social Democrats showed support by voting for war expenditure. Germany fully embraced the notion that it was fighting for its national life.68

Any suggestion that it was a war of the German military alone and not its civilian population was vehemently denied. One observer held that the heart of the German people is in the war and that heart is governed by two motives - the motive of self-defence against Russia and ... overbearing self-aggrandizement ... it is impossible that an autocracy, even a military autocracy, could exist unrooted in the people.

The power of the German Army was the reward offered Germans for all the suffering they endured under the autocracy.69

66 ODT, 24-12-1914, p.4
67 ODT, 1-10-1914, p.2
68 NZT, 8-10-1914, p.23
69 ODT, 22-10-1914, p.6
A manifesto issued by the "Young Germans" in October 1913 was examined to offer some insight into the youth of Germany.

War is the noblest and holiest expression of human activity. For us, too, the great, glad hour of battle will strike. Still and deep in the German heart must live the joy of battle and the longing for it. Let us ridicule to the utmost the old women in breeches, who fear war and deplore it as cruel and revolting. No, war is beautiful. Its august sublimity elevate that human heart beyond the earthly and the common.

One commentator regarded this a "bedlamite utterance especially choice" and "owes its inspiration to Treitschke whose lectures on the duty and the beauty of war would sometime end in tears and sobbing". In this instance it would seem the evil teachings of German intellectuals had a marked effect, but who the "Young Germans" were was not revealed.

Germany's lack of Christianity was partly to blame for its war-madness. The Reverend J. Gibson-Smith's classic speech in Wellington was reported in the ST. This tolerant Christian said,

Germany today is the Lucifer of the nations ... already she has sold her soul to the powers of darkness, sold her soul for treasures which the moment they are grasped in the hand turn forthwith into dust and ashes ... (Germany is now) flagrantly and avowedly pagan, her leaders professing to believe that none of the real problems of the world are to be settled according to the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount, but of war ... Germany calls her god today by the name of God, but that is not Germany's real God. The real God of Germany today is Mars or Odin or Boal.

This lack of Christianity was the natural outcome of Germany having been steeped for years in degrading and immoral philosophies.

Added to this was the dearth of German political talent. Germans supposedly had no sense of the general good. It was characteristic that the German employed his/her energies individually and subordinated the general good to his/her immediate needs. The NZT believed Goethe may have been thinking of this trait when he wrote, "that the German's are very capable individually and wretchedly inefficient in bulk". The fact that this trait conflicted with the commonly held notion that the Germans were an efficient and thorough race was ignored in the interests of proving something else "bad" in the Enemy.

The national characteristics of the Teuton were examined in detail by various "experts". One "expert" in the ST wrote that the German was

70 ODT, 17-4-1915, p.6
71 ST, 6-11-1914, p.3
72 NZT, 31-12-1914, p.21
intensely scientific in many ways, he has a weakness for the dramatic; sober in many ways, he rather enjoys a little theatrical display. The Kaiser had all arrangements made for a great kinematograph film depicting his entry into Paris.

An ex-Chancellor of Germany, Prince Von Bulow, offered the theory that the German had two sides to their personality - a sentimental desire to follow their hearts and a passion for logic amounting almost to fanaticism. Although they were not a cruel people, they were prepared to steel their hearts into inhumanity in order to follow the logical theory that terrorism would force people into surrender. The ODT remarked that most would refuse to accept the Germans had to really steel their hearts.

The DT felt similarly and printed an article from the English Review which held that Prussian principles had been preached for 15 years in the German military, universities, schools and by politicians. Its teachings had produced serious social disease. According to this paper brutal outrages on children had become rampant amongst the lower classes and sexual perversity was common in the upper levels. These brutal acts had become so common as to "constitute unmistakable scientific ground of speaking of the pathological state of Germany is the direct product of the imperial physical force doctrine".

The character of the Prussian was the focus of the strongest character assassination. On the surface the Prussian appeared tender-hearted but the reality was very different. He was a non-intellectual, conceited, quick-tempered, and savagely overbearing. His initially coarse feelings were further blunted by military training. The virtue of sportsmanship was non-existent. Moderation in victory was alien, no Prussian triumph was complete without the humiliation of the loser. When the Prussian lost their temper the wild beast within was released. The Prussian patriot motto instilled at school according to CL was "Germany always - not even Germany right or wrong because Germany can never be wrong".

73 ST, 16-10-1914, p.4
74 ODT, 10-11-1914, p.4
75 DT, 1-2-1915
76 ODT, 31-12-1914, p.6, CL, 12-1-1915, p.4
77 CL, 12-1-1914, p.4
OUTCLASSED

by the Exchange, I think, as a rule, I don't know what to do. I am not

The Devil sat by the Lake of Fire on

a pole of sulphur kegs,

His head was bowed upon his breast,

His tail between his legs;

A look of shame was on his face, the

spots dripped from his eyes.

He had sent his resignation to the

throne up in the skies

"I'm down and out, the Devil said

"He said it with a sob but he didn't mean it. He was issued regale

"There are others that outclass me,

and I want to quit the job.

Helf isn't in it with the land that lies

along the Rhine; I prefer to remain in England's midst.

I'm old and out of date; therefore I resign;

One Krupp-munition maker, with his

bloody shot and shells.

Knows more about damnation than all

the imp's of hell; one peremptory officer, horribleness, how.

But I feel that I'm not up to date in the

art of running Hell.

And the Devil spat a spurt of steam at

a brimstone bumble bee,

And muttered, "I'm outclassed by

Hohenzollern devilry."

Source DT, 10-4-1916
The German Kreuzzeitung was represented as summing up the uniqueness of German culture.

It is the peculiar property of the German culture that it, alone among all other forms of culture, possesses the secret of uniting the spirit of military stiffness and orderliness to the most profound, the most delicate conception of great works of art and science. It is this magnificent mental and spiritual capacity that no race on earth is able to imitate us ... the German Army ... is imbued with the scientific spirit.  

With a constitution that gave the Kaiser absolute control and a Germany predisposed to develop along military, materialistic and megalomaniac lines there was no stopping the Prussian militarist coup. As Ellis Barker put it, 'an evil spirit has taken possession of Germany and a quarter of a century of stirring imperial oratory, of jingoistic self - both the character and mind of the German nation". The whole national life of Germany became subservient to the Prussian obsession with building and then using the perfect war machine. H.G. Wells believed the obsession with destructive technology drained the life out of the infantry and cavalry, made German diplomacy brainless and tactless, had eaten up the philosophy, literature, the criticism and the emotions of a whole people.

As the War progressed it was increasingly stressed that the Germans were a tenacious race that would not lie down without a death struggle. The majority stressed that Germany was far from starvation and despair and that above all, unquestionably, is unity and determination unmistakable to wage the fight through to the finish - to carry it on to victory if possible, to destruction and doom if need be. Let no Englishman make any mistake about that. The Germans are going down fighting, there will be no whimpering surrender ... no peace that is not forced upon them by the iron arbitrament of defeated arms.  

German morale was bolstered by propaganda and carefully selected news items designed to keep up the esprit de corps of its troops and civilians. In addition to these well-springs of comfort and spiritual refreshment were devotion to their maxim "God Punish England"
and mediation on their moral mission to rule the world for its own good.83

Not every commentator damned all the German peoples. A few unusual observers felt the bulk of the German population were innocent of war crimes. They refused to see every German as a "evil monster". This was quite an accomplishment in the oppressive atmosphere whipped up by British propaganda. One letter to the ODT from "Another New Zealand Woman" wrote the blame should be attached to the arrogance and inhumanity of the German officers and rulers along with the irreligion and materialism caused by Germany's march towards scientific explanation. The editor of the ODT wrote that only part of the German population was war-mad and the rest were probably inarticulately ambivalent.84

Stephen Black's opinion in the Daily Mail was reprinted in the CL. He suggested that perhaps even Englishmen with their natural love of freedom would react similarly in the same circumstances. He pointed out that the French at certain times in their history had become blood-thirsty fiends when constricted by overrule. The only people the Germans could take out their frustrations on were the innocent inhabitants of Belgium, France and shipboard passengers. Black partially excused the ordinary German their deeds because of overdiscipline.85

Essentially, the teachings of the advance guard of Nietzsche, Bernhardi and Treitschke had striped Germany of its protective Christianity and made its population revolt against the visionary and intellectual tradition of Germany's past. All Germany under the leadership of Prussia had turned its energy to the cult of positive material aims. Past German leaders like Frederick and Bismarck helped set the scene for the Kaiser's ambitions and the transformation of the German Army under Junker leadership. Germany, however, was going the wrong way about it if it wanted world domination, the sword was not the answer.86

83 ODT, 3-4-1915, p.6
84 ODT, 14-9-1914, p.6
85 CL, 27-10-1914, p.2
86 ODT, 27-10-1914, p.4
ME. I, MYSELF - THE KAISER'S SOLILLOQUY

Written by John Kendrick Bangs thirteen years ago. In 1888.*

H.I.M. WILLIAM

Oh me! Oh my! And likewise!!!!

Sit still my curls, while I rose. Oh not to a usefulARDEN.

Me, I, Myself, the throne, the State,

I am the earth, the moon, the sun,

All rolled into one!

Both hemispheres am I, suburbs of my littleness heed not my yells.

Oh my! how did I come to call myself the white blue elephant

If there were three, the three

I'd be.

The constellations, blazing the constel, arranged in constellations

I am the Dipper, Night and Day,

The North and Southern Poles, the Milky Way,

I am they that walk or fly on wing,

Or swim of creep... I'm everything.

It makes me tremble, like the aspen tree to lightning showers.

To think, I'm Me!

And blink like stars up in the sky To think that I am Me!

And shrank in terror like a frightened elf

To realise that I'm Myself!

Ye blithering slaves beneath My iron heel,

What know ye of the things I feel?

Didst were wake a dead of night

And stand in awe of thine own might.

It took six days to make the land and sea,

But centuries were passed in making Me;

The Universe? An easy task; But I -

Oh, My!

Source: ST, 17-10-1914, p.5
There was still one important element missing from the equation providing the answer to why German forces were committing such atrocities. Prussian and then German absorption of the philosophy of "might is right" was not sufficient. The missing element was of course Kaiser Wilhelm himself; leader of the rotting moral corpse that was Germany. He was the ambitious and aggressive warlord of Germany; personally responsible for the warping of German society and a product of Germany's intellectual climate himself.

Germany is the direct product of the Imperial physical force doctrine... let us try and remember that the Germans are a misguided nation, suffering pathologically from a disease - a disease caught from their Kaiser, which may be described as 'intelligent brutality'.

The Kaiser had taken the "might is right" philosophy of his predecessors to heart and then to the world.

The Kaiser himself has declared more than once that war must be waged ruthlessly; and Treitschke, Bernhardi, Frederick the Great, Bismarck and Chamberlain unite in holding weakness up to ridicule and in emphasizing the necessity for brutality. "Frightfulness" was therefore sanctioned at the very highest level.

The speeches of the Kaiser were examined for clues as to when he became obsessed with "intelligent brutality". His delusion had gradually grown and was complete in 1900 when during the Boxer Rebellion the Kaiser uttered the following:

No quarter will be given, no prisoners will be taken. Let all who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Just as the Huns a 1000 years ago under the leadership of Attila, gained a reputation in virtue of which they still live in historical tradition, so may the name of Germany become known in such a manner in China that no Chinamen even dare to look in askance at a German.

Early in his reign he reputedly began to identify with God and develop traces of megalomania. By 1911 the Kaiser considered himself the "chosen instrument of Heaven". It was by right of "divine rule" he commanded because the crown of Prussia had been conferred upon Frederick the Great by the grace of God, not by any worldly power.

The Kaiser by 1914 had taken on the mantle of Hebrew prophet and claimed for his ravings divine inspiration. The Kaiser's patronage of

87 CL, 22-12-1914, p.6
88 CL, 22-12-1914, p.6
89 ST, 13-11-1914, p.4
90 ODT, 22-8-1914, p.13
TO WILLIAM THE MAD

By Herbert Kaufman

Some say that there's a Mongol strain in Prussian blood.

That when there burst from the far East that yellow flood
of flat-faced devils, sprung from hell's own womb.

And Attila, left Rome behind, a tomb:

The Hunnish tribesmen, raiding in the West,

Left behind many a Hunnish babe at Germany's breast,

This is sheer legend; yet, if the tale be true,

How proud today was Attila of you?

How proud today was Attila of you?

Source ODl., 3-12-1914, p.2

But may oldcredited or owed vibration ed spirit his of whom

Then filled him brave thought, and so in lock, he was

To thank and show He was a strong, and thank and show Kehlmann

In five pillars, was too swift to gloat or gloat's death

To thank and show he was a strong and thankful spirit, which did not bend in
God was supposedly a joke within his own family. The Crown Prince once said that "I think it must be a new decoration that my father has conferred on the Almighty".\textsuperscript{91} God was called "The Exalted" but the title of "The Most Exalted" was reserved for the German Emperor alone.\textsuperscript{92}

The Kaiser's racial ancestry was called into question regularly. Rumour of a Tartar taint in the Kaiser became rife especially after he reportedly offered a thousand pounds for the head of an armoured train commander. Supposedly this Tartar strain led him to admire Tamburlaine the Great who yoked the conquered kings of Asia to his chariot wheels.\textsuperscript{93}

The Kaiser was described by a German count, Erik Vanbergen, as a despot who gave himself military airs but saw soldiers only as so many tons of flesh to be exposed to the enemy cannon so as to shield his own path to victory. The Count went so far as to call the Kaiser a vampire who used the Angel of Honesty to cover his true nature.\textsuperscript{94}

Variously the Kaiser was described as having a withered arm, a running ear, a shrunken soul and a mind that reeked of egomania; a mastoid degenerate of a noble grandmother, Queen Victoria.\textsuperscript{95} His mental make up was a mix of bluff, coarse brutality, foolishness, a lack of real courage, and an intellect only capable of quick absorption of superficial facts. He had never been "quite the Gentleman".\textsuperscript{96}

The German people apparently followed Wilhelm because of his hypnotic spell of patriotism and the lure of the crowd combined with coercion. "We make a virtue of the things we are compelled to do", wrote one German. For the \textit{MW} the Kaiser symbolized a lust for power and a thirst for blood; a succubus that threatened "true" Germany's very existence.\textsuperscript{97}

One writer compared the Kaiser to Dryden's Buckingham:-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{91} \textit{ODT}, 2-1-1915, p.4
  \item \textsuperscript{92} \textit{ST}, 8-1-1915 p.7
  \item \textsuperscript{93} \textit{ODT}, 25-11-1914, p.6
  \item \textsuperscript{94} \textit{ODT}, 27-11-1914, p.6
  \item \textsuperscript{95} \textit{MW}, 16-12-1914, p.1
  \item \textsuperscript{96} \textit{ST}, 14-1-1914, p.7
  \item \textsuperscript{97} \textit{MW}, 16-12-1914, p.1
\end{itemize}
THE KAISER'S PRAYER

by QM of Invercargill

Gott, Gott, dear Gott, attention blesse!

Your partner Vilhelm's here,

And from my hour of birth to a very aged man I give you,

I quietly let you rule the Haffen,

Vile I ruled over the earth.

And when I told mein soldiers bold

Of bygone battle-days

And thought of my greatness was,

I gladly split the glory, Gott,

Und giff, You half the praise.

In every way I tried to prove

Mein heart to You was true,

Und only claimed mein honest share:

In great deeds that we did,

You could not have a better friendtv,

In sky or land or sea,

Dan Kaiser Vilhelm Number Two,

De lord of Shermeny

So vat I say dear Gott, is dis—

De WE should still be friends.

Und You should help to send me in foes

To meet their bitter end.

So four and twenty hours I gif

To make the Allies run,

And put me safe into my place—

De middle of de Sun.

Source 57, 28-10-1915, p. 7
A man so various that he seemed to be
Not one, but all mankind's epitome;
Stiff in opinions, always in the wrong,
Was everything by starts, but nothing long;
But in the course of one revolving moon,
Was chymist, fiddler, statesman and buffoon.98

The odd report on the Kaiser's personality allowed that he was a
three dimensional character, a strange and complex man rather than just
a fool. The ST found that while he most certainly was a megalomaniac he
did have some virtues. He lived a simple and industrious life, was
sincere in his religion and loved his country and people. It was
unfortunate for Germany that he was an example of perverted
greatness.99

By January 1915, however, the Kaiser's confidence in God was
beginning to wane. He ordered that his birthday not be celebrated. This
act revealed him to be in a chastened frame of mind or possibly a
practical one of not distracting Germany. His New Years speech of 1915
lacked his earlier fire and flamboyance. It was encouraging but devoid
of outrageous predictions of future victories.100 The Kaiser was
unexpectedly behaving like a responsible head of state, a warrior king
who looked as if the brain behind his eyes was busy with the mournful
thoughts not yet borne in other mens' minds.101 But no matter how well
the Kaiser behaved now he remained forever guilty of wilfully starting
the War.

The picture offered of his heir was never flattering. The Crown
Prince was damned for his atheism, suspected of anti-Semitic leanings
and reputed to believe in a paramount Teutonic Empire. Like his father
he was not a gentleman. He was also directly responsible for the
sacking of the Countess of Abbeye's house.102 He was, therefore, a fit
successor to his megalomaniac father.

The conversion of an entire nation and its leaders to an ideology
hell-bent on world rule would have not have been so serious had Germany

98 ODT, 2-1-1915, p.4
99 ST, 19-1-1915, p.4
100 ODT, 19-1-1915, p.4, ST, 4-3-1915, p.5
101 CL, 2-3-1915, p.7
102 ODT, 3-8-1914, p.5 & 10-12-1914, p.6
Just as in the western theatre of the war, the German legions had to turn about and retreat their steps when they were within sight of Paris, so in the east the Russians called them to a halt within thirty miles of the ancient capital of Poland. They began the hurried retreat of a million men through the mist and mud of Poland, leaving behind them thousands of war-wrack and dust. This was slowest of the different methods of war to give it the colour of desolation—plagues gray as ashes, overhung by rain-blurred distances, darkened, the air bitter with forebodings of winter, and then, the roads—winding channels of mud in which at places one could dip one's toes, black and slushy, the story of the retreat, its agony and cost, was plain to read, it was crowded in staring letters of wreckage all across those vast denuding miles.
not the material wealth and manpower to put its dreams into action. But as luck would have it, Germany had wealth, universal service, and a large well-equipped army and navy controlled by mostly Prussian officers. The German Army and Navy were constantly in the spotlight as the assault weapons of "kulture" and the perpetrators of atrocities. Soon after War was declared all Otago/Southland papers carried articles on the deficiencies of the German fighting machine.

The "image of the monstrous German enemy" had a problem with regard to the German Army as it was difficult to outright condemn the German Army as inferior because it had overrun large parts of Europe. The atrocity stories proved not to be enough and some admiration sneaked in. Yet, it must ultimately fail because of the morally rotten ideology and society it represented. The Navy was easier to deal with and tended to be used to personalize all that was rotten in Germany.

Prior to World War One the German Army billed itself as the greatest, best organized and most efficient fighting force in Europe. On paper the German Army was easily the best supplied and the strongest. But as "En Avant", a "military expert", in the London Magazine remarked it was not reams of statistics that won wars.103

In its last two outings the German Army crushed the French and the Austrians but this was forty years earlier. Perhaps the German Army was living on a glorious past and was unequal to its reputation. The German Army had stood still in a 1870 timewarp while the rest of the world had surpassed it.104 For example, "En Avant" wrote that he had never seen tactics with so little regard for the use by its enemies of modern ball cartridges. Grand sweeping cavalry charges and other nonsense were positively encouraged in training, it was perhaps, "magnificent, but it is not war". What would happen, he asked, then this army was asked to use such child's tricks against a real army? He suggested there would be massive casualties while the officers awaited new orders.105 Bernhardi and Sir Arthur Conan Doyle were of a similar opinion.106

103 NZT, 1-10-1914, p.13, ODT, 5-10-1914
104 ODT, 15-9-1914, p.4
105 NZT, 1-10-1914, p.13
106 ODT, 14-11-1914, p.6
THE MOVING DOWN OF THE WHEEL: PORTION OF THIRD GERMAN REGIMENTS FIGHTING, PRAGUALLY ANNIHILATED BY THE VALIANT BRITISH DURING THE ADVANCE ON LUBECK.
Doyle wrote the basic foundations of the German Army had been laid down 100 years ago and changed little since. 107

Another major deficiency was the stifling of initiative and spirit out of all members of the German war machine. German officers were forced to wait sixteen or seventeen years to get a company. By the time they rose to higher commands they were old and tired. 108

Several observers noted that it was the policy of the German Army for its officers to break the spirit of his troops through beatings to meld them into an efficient fighting machine. The German Army used a harsh and absolutist form of discipline that harked back to feudal times; a discipline totally unsuited to a modern army and contrary to elemental human rights. While discipline was essential to an army, absolute discipline worked only while the officer was present. 109

The greatest deciding factor in modern warfare was thought to be the ability of the individual soldier to endure hardship and their determination to win. German force of habit and discipline would not be enough. To illustrate this point the Balkan Wars were examined. Easily the best disciplined and organized soldier was the Prussian trained Bulgarian Army and the worst was the Greek. By all rules of war the Greeks should have been beaten off the field within seven days, but instead the Bulgars were thrown out of Macedonia in 30 days. This was simply because the Greek soldier was prepared to endure undreamt of hardships and his sense of national pride made him ignore danger. 110

An important thing to note about criticisms levied at the ordinary German soldier was that they stressed his inferiority to the Allied soldier on a man-to-man basis. This allowed some room for qualified admiration of the German soldier in the field and what he accomplished under such handicaps. A ST report was typical in that it acknowledged the Germans' tenacious courage, bravery, utter indifference to danger and death, their unquestionable fearlessness ... and inferiority. 111

107 ST, 15-12-1914, p.7
108 ODT, 15-8-1914, p.4
110 NZT, 1-10-1914, p.15
111 ST, 19-11-1914, p.4
German artillery was well respected as effective and accurate. The ST noted that the German gunners were venerated by all as magnificent, but not superior to the British. This skill was criticized by some that thought the brilliance of the artillery meant a trade off had occured to the detriment of other branches. A. Hilliard Atteridge in *The German Army in War* wrote that in some battles it seemed as if the infantry were being used merely as escorts for the artillery rather than as the main arm of attack. Atteridge felt this was probably an exaggeration but it echoed a point made by Bernhardi that the German Army placed too much reliance on its elaborate cannon.

The German officers came in for much censure because of their role in disciplining the soldiers and destroying men's spirits. One of the more extreme views was provided by the NZT where the officer was characterised as a moral delinquent vandal with a crude love of destruction.

The immense social gap between soldier and officer was dangerous both to German morale and to the officers themselves. Several reports came back of fed-up German soldiers shooting their officers. Philip Gibbs, British correspondent, wrote that "the German private now realises his officers' utter indifference to the lives of their men. He heard brutal orders to spill blood like water so long as those who might wade to the destined goal". The scandalous practice of officers standing back safely behind the lines further widened the gap. German High Command apparently saw its men as mere pawns in a great game of checkers and 50 percent losses were not excessive so long as the objective was taken. How this differed from similar British High Command attitudes and policies was difficult to see, especially when looking at Gallipoli or the Western Front.

General von Hindenburg, the German C-in-C, was described as 67 years old and in poor health, suffering from gout and rheumatism. A relative unknown but well respected in Germany. He had a reputation for

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112 ST, 15-12-1914, p.7 & 26-4-1915, p.5
113 NZT, 22-4-1915, p.34
114 NZT, 10-9-1914, p.21
115 ODT, 20-8-1914, p.3 & 2-10-1915, p.4
116 ODT, 2-10-1914, p.4, DT, 1-3-1915
117 ODT, 31-8-1914, p.4
Field-Marshal von Hindenburg may claim to be the central figure in the war at this moment. A Man of the Hour for Europe, he is, no other, has won the position of idol in Germany. The nation turns on his capacity to handle the situation which confronts his country on the Polish frontier. General-Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, to give him his full official title and rank, is in his sixty-eighth year, of a nobly Prussian family, and a native of Posen. He began military life in 1863, and won the Red Eagle decoration and the Iron Cross in the war against Austria and France in 1866. He was placed at the head of the Fourth Corps of the German Army. He retired as full General in 1911, receiving the Black Fleece Order; but was recalled to take part in the present war.

GENERAL VON KLUCK.

Whose army on the German right was defeated and demoralised by the British and French on the left of the Allies' line.

ADRIAL VON INGENOHL.

In command of the German High Seas Fleet.

(From Illustrated London News.)

Source: OW, 7-10-1914; p.38 & 17-2-1915, p.40
personal bravery as a front-line officer. Extensive knowledge of human nature meant that he was able to get the best out of his subordinates. General von Kluck was mentioned as a man who had made his way up through the ranks and was very popular with his troops. Von Kluck was recognised as a true leader of outstanding ability and an academic authority on military tactics. Exactly how the acknowledged worth of some German generals was reconciled with the brutality of the German officer and German High Command was of little concern.

Many asked how the German soldier could owe allegiance to such a callow, heartless and calculating system? How long could the wonderfully patient and brave German endure such punishment? Some argued that as long as the soldier was fed and clothed they would not impair the efficiency of the machine. Others like the ST were of the opinion that it took more than just food to keep a fighting man in good spirits and effective.

Many in Otago/Southland found the entire German system repugnant as the following quote showed,

The war is horrible, but there is nothing quite so horrible in it as the cold refusal of the German military to consider human life in their tactics ... They may conduct war on scientific principles, but they are principles which disgust and enrage every man and woman of normal sensibilities. Nevertheless we fear a long time will elapse before the mental revolt of the German soldier is translated into action.

Interestingly, the German Army was believed to have a traitor within its ranks. The fifth column was socialism which arose from resentment towards the iron discipline of the German Army and universal service. It was doubted that the "mailed fist" would rouse much enthusiasm from socialists to go and get killed at the bidding of a quasi-aristocratic clique of unsympathetic officers. This was probably the one and only time the conservative papers of Otago/Southland saw socialism as a good thing.

118 DT, 18-1-1915
119 DT, 15-2-1915
120 ST, 3-9-1914, p.4 & 6-10-1914, p.4
121 ST, 3-9-1914, p.4
122 NZT, 1-10-1914, p.15
Imagery of the machine was strong in peoples' perceptions of the German Army with its members being automatons, machines rather than human beings. The German soldiers were spiritless automatons performing to the orders of their officers without question, individuality or initiative. The German Army was a finely tuned machine, if one cog failed then the whole structure was likely to topple. \(^{123}\)

Animal imagery was used to portray the German Army as a mindless animal acting on instinct not intellect.

It [the German Army] is like a wild beast rushing about in a cage; wherever he may go there are bars, which may bend before the force of an exceptionally fierce onslaught, but always spring back into place and always hold. \(^{124}\)

The \textit{ST} ran another version of this quote from the London Times exchanging the words wild beast with something, suggesting the \textit{ST} preferred to compare the German Army to an inanimate object. \(^{125}\)

The German Navy on the other hand escaped all praise. It was the poor relative of the German Army and posed no threat to British naval supremacy. The reality that Britain was vulnerable to blockade counted for little. British propaganda did some of its most effective work in Otago/Southland on the German Navy.

The British Royal Navy was a major threat to Germany because it had total command of the sea. German propagandas held that the freedom of the seas was dependent upon the British love of freedom which could not be trusted. The \textit{NZT} thought it rude of Germany to suggest that the rest of Europe could, "feel it [British Royal Navy domination] as an incubus". \(^{126}\)

The German Navy's trainees served two years aboard ship before returning to civilian life. This was disadvantageous because the German Navy was essentially manned by amateurs. Added to this Germany had very few men born and raised to the sea life because of a lack of seaboard. As the German Navy was less prestigious than the army men of better quality tended to avoid it. On paper the German Navy looked good but if the quality of the men was inferior then so was the whole fleet. \(^{127}\)

\(^{123}\textit{ST}, 6-10-1914, p.4, \textit{DT}, 5-10-1914, p.7, \textit{NZT}, 1-10-1914, p.13\)

\(^{124}\textit{ODT}, 6-3-1915, p.6\)

\(^{125}\textit{ST}, 1-3-1914, p.4\)

\(^{126}\textit{NZT}, 20-8-1914, p.22\)

\(^{127}\textit{DT}, 5-10-1914, \textit{NZT}, 1-10-1914, p.17\)
H.M.S. Defender picking up German wounded while under the fire of the German fleet.
In Otago/Southland there was much speculation as to when the great battle between the fleets would eventuate and what form it would take. The German Navy was designed to engage in a short, sharp and decisive battle. The German sailors nerves were kept on the edge so the German Navy could be used as a "thunderbolt". The record of German naval training and evolution confirmed this conclusion.\textsuperscript{128}

The German Navy was not prepared to risk an all out sea battle as it would result in total victory or failure. The German Navy needed to harass the British Royal Navy and protect the "Fatherland" without risking defeat in a seabattle until after the British were weakened by submarines. The NZT saw these tactics as cowardly and unsporting.\textsuperscript{129}

With the bulk of the German Fleet languishing in port the only tactics available to the German Navy were ones most observers saw as dishonourable and therefore to be expected of Germany. These tactics were mine laying, blockade and submarine attacks on unsuspecting shipping, that is, atrocity. Mine laying was described by the ST as the action of a blackguard because mines posed a grave danger to merchant and neutral shipping. In German theory and practice the rights of neutrals had no place, international law or not. That these missions were carried out with acknowledged daring and skill did not make them at all admirable.\textsuperscript{130}

The enemy in using submarines were heeding the advice outlined by Bernhardi in \textit{How Germany Makes War} and \textit{On War of To-Day}. The submarine was to be used as an instrument of terror, to cause unexpected loses, and to target merchant shipping and non-combatants. The object was to spread terror thus immobilizing the merchant navy and starving out an import dependent Britain.\textsuperscript{131}

Germany's first step was to proclaim a blockade of Britain and declare it would not differentiate between neutral and Allied shipping. The German blockade was mockingly called a "paper blockade" in the Otago and Southland press. The sinking of all shipping in British waters regardless of nationality reduced the German blockade to a mere euphemism for piracy and murder. It was considered to be a bizarre

\textsuperscript{128} NZT, 12-11-1914, p.22
\textsuperscript{129} NZT, 1-4-1915, p.21
\textsuperscript{130} ST, 5-11-1914, p.4
\textsuperscript{131} NZT, 31-12-1914, pp.33-4
THE MOST WONDERFUL PHOTOGRAPH OF THE WAR: THE LAST OF THE GERMAN CRUISER BLUCHER.

This striking photograph shows the 18,000-ton German armoured cruiser Blucher at the moment of capitulation, after the terrible punishment she had received in the battle of the Dogger Bank. When this photograph was taken the crew had just received the order to save themselves. Some are clambering over the deck which is approaching the vertical, some are sliding down the sides, and some have already leaped for life in the water. Near them is a British warship—the cruiser from which the photo was taken—and they knew that although German airships, by some strange dropping bomb onto the cruiser, the business would still go on.
policy that led to the resentment of Germany by threatened neutrals. The ST said the German Navy could hardly have pursued a policy more calculated to force civilisation in sheer self-defence to combine against Germany than the one it followed automatically. "That whom the gods wish to destroy they first make mad" remarked the ST later. Interestingly, the British blockade was felt to be fully justified by the ODT and very different from the "sheer vandalism and wanton, merciless destruction of the worst kind" of the German blockade.

The German declaration of a blockade was the measure of its fear and desperation. Germany had been forced through hopelessness to negate the first rule of war: "It has hitherto been held that the object of war is not to destroy the civilian population of the enemy, but to subjugate that enemy by defeating the armed forces that are fighting under their flag". German Navy actions had no military value and could only be interpreted as a confession of weakness. Nobody in Otago/Southland feared the German Navy.

One justification offered for a blockade was by Dr Schramm in Secret Councillor of the Admiralty and First Councillor of the Imperial Naval Association 1913, Germany's highest authority on international law. Schramm submitted that naval and land wars were exactly the same and all means likely to led to victory were perfectly acceptable so long as unnecessary cruelty was avoided. At sea as on land non-combatants will suffer and it was justifiable to inflict such suffering upon whole populations to break resistance. The ODT noted that this meant that New Zealand had it on good German authority that Britain's blockade of Germany was perfectly acceptable.

On the influence of Prussian and militarist philosophy teachings in German society, leaders, Army and Navy, opinion was divided between complete saturation and mixed success limited to certain sections of the population. There was much said in the way of generalization with

132 ODT, 9-2-1915, p.4, ST, 12-2-1915, p.4
133 ST, 16-2-1915, p.4 & 3-4-1915, p.5
134 ODT, 17-3-1915, p.4 & 5-3-1915, p.4
135 ST, 20-2-1915, p.5
136 ODT, 16-2-1915, p.4, 17-2-1915, p.4 & 5-3-1915, p.4, NZT, 15-4-1915, p.34
137 ODT, 22-4-1915, p.6
The species, which had much to do with the popularization of the species, is now known as the Iron Range moth.

Adapted from an article by William H. Smith in the Minnesota Agricultural Journal, 1894.
little based upon in-depth studies of concrete evidence. Some seemed to believe that if a German wrote it then it must reflect the feelings of the whole population. The German people were denied the luxury of being individuals and became a collective being. This was an hysterical reaction to a threat and logically ridiculous, but believed for a time. Major contradictions were overlooked in the interests of proving yet another German flaw. Religion was an excellent example because the Germans were damned as Pagan and also for believing that God had singled them out to rule the world. Others approached the question in a more rational manner and gave some thought to their answers. Initially their voices were small and isolated but they grew in strength once people got over their first knee-jerk reaction.

The general drift underlying the confusion of ideas during this period was that the German intellectual climate of "might is right" had produced a distorted society. This monstrous society was immoral and materialistic and dominated by the Prussian Junker. The distortion of German society by the Junkers in conjunction with the Kaiser's absolutist rule and obsession with world domination, led to an explosion of aggression. The final outcome of this hideous ideology, society and leadership was a brutally inhuman army and navy whose actions and atrocities were justified by the belief "might is right". There was no escaping such reasoning for Germany as all theories on any aspect of Germany tended to reinforce negative attitudes towards all other aspects of German life. It was indeed a vicious circle.
Chapter Three
AND THE WAR WENT ON...
April 1915 - February 1916

Not in the legions
of horrid hell can come
a devil more damn'd
In evils to top MacBeth.¹

From Gallipoli to the Somme the "image of the monstrous German enemy" went into a holding pattern as fears of imminent Allied defeat faded. Prior attitudes were reiterated and deepened, seldom challenged or altered. The only sphere where the "image of the monstrous German enemy" expanded was German influence over its new allies but this merely reinforced ideas on German addiction to absolute authority. There were whispers of peace from Germany but these were dismissed as insincere attempts to gain some mysterious advantage that was impossible to pin down, but nevertheless real.

Part of the reason agitation over the German enemy died down was that New Zealand's troops were finally engaged in battle but not against the German enemy. Naturally enough the "image of the Turkish enemy" overtook the German somewhat in the collective mind of Otago/Southland. The "image of the Turkish enemy" revealed was a bit of a surprise and added a twist in the tale of the German enemy. New Zealand troops were dying at Gallipoli because Germany was pulling the strings of its Turkish puppet. The entry of Bulgaria also caused a momentary stir of interest and was viewed as further proof of dishonourable German manipulations. The freewill and initiative of Germany's allies was reduced to a minimum as the umbrella of German authority engulfed all.

The attitudes of the first year of the War continued into the second and were further entrenched by the violent sinking of the neutral Lusitania, the execution of Sister Edith Cavell and the publication of the damming Bryce Committee's report on German atrocity. The Kaiser underwent no miraculous recovery from his insanity, the German nation remained guilty and the German Army and Navy continued to be manned by brutal automatons. The Kaiser was despised for making positive and inspiring

¹ ODT, 15-5-1915, p.6
A Paraphrase of the Lord's Prayer from Hurrah and Hallelujah by Konsistorialrat Dietrich Vorwerk

Though the warrior's bread be scanty,
do Thou work daily death and tenfold woe into the enemy.
Forgive in merciful long-suffering each bullet and each blow that misses its mark!
Lead us not into the temptation of letting our wrath be too tame in carrying out Thy divine judgement!
Deliver us and our Ally from the infernal Enemy and his servants on Earth.
Thine is the kingdom, the Germans;
amidst we, by aid of Thy steel-clad hand,
achieve the power and the glory?

Source: ODT, 15-6-1917, p. 3
speeches to bolster his nations' morale, yet at the same time these speeches were welcomed as proof of weakening German resolve.2

To keep up interest in Germany during Gallipoli the Otago/Southland press searched for and found some interesting metaphors to illustrate current theories. A spider was used, for example, to convey Kitchener's theory that Germany had "shot its bolt"3 and was at the limits of its driving power. The German spider was characterized as a predatory creature that rushed upon any unfortunate victim that touched its web. The spider was becoming exhausted by these bitter struggles, so perhaps its intended victims could escape being sucked dry.4 The spider was a powerful image to use as many people have an irrational fear of spiders.

No matter how bizarre or irrelevant an opinion it was published so long as it showed Germany in an interesting and unflattering light. In contradiction of its earlier utterances on Germany's unchristian nature, the ODT partially blamed its insane war policy on a religious revival which had joined with patriotism in a "monstrous union".5

All possible challenges were absorbed into, and explained by, the existing "image of the monstrous German enemy". For example, rumours of a German desire for peace were dismissed as further evidence of German arrogance and dishonour.

They [Germany] have little sense of loyalty and honour, and they measure the moral sense of other people by their own low standards. Their arrogant self-sufficiency makes them blind to the viewpoints that exist outside their megalomaniac horizon. They have approached one ally after another ... to get the game declared a draw in order that they might be left with sufficient strength to strike Britain in the future ... proposals to Russia were a piece of pure effrontery.6 Alternatively German peace feelers were an admission of weakness or an obscure part of another German plot to fool and rule the world.7 Or maybe, just maybe, some suggested these peace feelers were a reflection of the mood of the German populace.8

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2 ODT, 3-8-1915, p.4
3 ODT, 27-9-1915, p.5
4 ODT, 4-11-1915, p.6
5 ODT, 1-9-1915, p.4
6 ODT, 10-8-1915, p.6
7 ODT, 10-8-1915, p.6 & 21-8-1915, p.10
8 ODT, 2-2-1916, p.3
The Chapel of the Hospital of St. Charles, at Amiens: one more monument to the eternal disgrace of the Huns.
By the time the first anniversary of the War arrived people's disgust at Germany had reached such heights that peace without the humiliation and punishment of Germany was unthinkable. As Sidney Dark in the Daily Express War Book put it bluntly, "the only way to treat a mad dog is to shoot it".9 Any German effort to end the conflict failed; in this respect the Allied propaganda succeeded too well and locked the War into a struggle unto death.

The only item the "image of the monstrous German enemy" was unable to contain was a sneaking admiration for Germany's management of its war effort. Germany had manifested a remarkable strength and unity of purpose in the waging of its aggressive war. Nowhere else in the world was there patriotism so complete and ingrained that it could create such an intense war effort. Because the whole nation was organized behind the German Army it could be kept in the field almost indefinitely.10

The inescapable conclusion that Germany was a powerful and organized nation meant that the "image of the monstrous German enemy" had to convince the world that a German victory would be the worst disaster to ever befall the world. "No peace without victory" had to become the only possible objective and the war of attrition began without hope of compromise. In this respect the "image of the monstrous Germany enemy" succeeded admirably in the Otago/Southland press, the CL and ST providing the best examples.

The CL believed that at the core of German consciousness lay the determination to fight to the last man. If pushed to the wall, all the bitterness and fear that have crept into the nation will be directed towards a gigantic effort to blow up the world. Germany no longer cares who she hurts - like an unloved child at bay, she means to smash and kill. The pity of it! Never was there a more generous, soft-hearted, kindly people ... but each individual is merely a cog firmly fixed in the national machine and will go obediently as long as the ruling power turns the crank".11

Victory would come but only after a hard fought slog against a powerful and committed, but morally bankrupt, enemy.

The ST also felt that Germany would fight to the last and was very powerful. According to the ST Germany's belief that

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9 ODT, 4-5-1915, p.4
10 CL, 7-9-1915, p.1, ST, 7-6-1915, pp.4-5 & 28-6-1915, p.4
11 CL, 7-9-1915, p.1
WAR VERSE - Tribute to a fellow nurse

by H.M.E (an extract only)

They killed her! 'Twas an act so base
The nates start, and look aghast!
The country which her birth had graced
With deep regret is overcast

With heads bowed low to funeral march
The noblest of the land attend
And honor give, with loves respect
To her who faced such tragic end

They killed her, did those nameless Huns;
Her, whose life work was life to save!
The sick and wounded were her care
Her pity for their pain she gave ....

....They killed her, oh! but theirs the sin, sin,
The blackness of an awful shame,
The stirs the world to anger hot!
Her death no honest heart will blame

Source CL, 23-11-1915, p.1
the Twentieth century is to be Germany's is a curious example of national egotism but it vastly increases Germany's ability to suffer and endure. Therefore we are not fighting merely the German Army, but the whole nation. Fighting the women as well as the men because women are taking men's positions at work ... no waste of effort.12

The ODT, however, continued to underestimate grossly German strength and determination while it enthusiastically carrying out its task of proving that Germany was "beyond the pale of humanity". April 1915 to February 1916 was the period when "image of the monstrous German enemy" entrenched itself further.

12 ST, 28-6-1915, p. 4
EFFECTS OF THE ENEMY'S BOMBARDMENT ON AN HISTORIC TOWN ON THE WESTERN BATTLE FRONT: PANORAMIC VIEW OF YPRES AS IT IS TO-DAY.

[Panoramic view of Ypres, showing the destruction caused by the enemy's bombardment.]
Chapter Four
"NO PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY"
February 1916 - December 1917
"Hell is empty and all the Devils are here"

By 1916 shades of grey were beginning to blur and complicate the "image of the monstrous German enemy" and the War itself. Superficially the "image of the monstrous German enemy" survived pretty much intact, Germany was still the brutal enemy, but a number of subtle ideas began to surface; ideas challenging the theory that all Germans were followers of the evil "kultur" of their rapacious power-crazed leaders. Continuity and change were intermingled during this period in a muddled tangle that somehow knitted together to meet the challenges presented, through it was becoming a little ragged at the edges. Consensus of opinion began to break down.

As time went on, it proved impossible to keep up the same level of derision of Germany without reflecting badly upon the Allies, who had failed to achieve victory. The stalemate on the Western Front forced Allied propaganda to redefine the "image of the monstrous German enemy" to meet the changed situation. It became necessary to give the German Army more credit so the Allied homefronts realized the seriousness of the situation and felt pride and hope because their troops were holding back possibly the most powerful army in the world. There was a delicate balance between the need to get across the true gravity of the situation and not to crush peoples' belief in Allied victory.

The older themes of monstrous Germany continued but they underwent modification to update them to better cope with the stalemate of the Western Front. Even so German officer cruelty, atrocity, morale problems, High Command stupidity and monstrous German leaders still permeated the newspapers of Otago/Southland.

Late 1915 and early 1916 ushered in the rise of bitter resentment towards the British handling of censorship and propaganda, lead mainly by the ST. The ST felt, with some justification, that New Zealand was being left in the dark. While the need for some secrecy was acknowledged, much of the censorship was regarded as pointless and stupid. Spoon-feed news was not to the taste of the ST editor, who wanted the facts so he could make up his own mind. Censorship was a

1 ODT, 4-1-1916, p.4
Source: OW, 30-9-1914, p.37
dangerous beast, he argued, as it could and did, seriously mislead the homefronts as to the "real" situation.2

The "image of the monstrous German enemy", as circulated at the beginning of the War, was proving inadequate and lacking in answers to important questions. Questions like, why was the War still dragging on when Otago/Southland had been assured that the Germans, despite years of preparation, were poor fighters clinging to outdated modes of warfare? Furthermore, a deluded people led by an unstable, if not actually insane king, should have crumbled by now under the economic pressure of blockade. These questions needed addressing if the Otago/Southland homefront was not going to lose confidence in their leaders' respect for the truth and insight into the "enemy".

Presentation of the "image of the monstrous German enemy" altered in a couple of fairly subtle ways. The "image of the monstrous German enemy" needed to strike the correct balance, not too pessimistic, not too optimistic. As a result the German Army was upgraded from a weak, degenerate army to an efficient force capable of holding out the Allied forces for years.3 The ideology remained corrupt but its tools, the German nation and Army, were recognized as powerful. This upgrading had twin purposes.

First, it explained the failure of the Allies not in terms of Allied weakness but in terms of enemy strength. Increasingly, the German Army's strength and tenacity was recognized. The view of the *Morning Post* reported in the *ODT* was typical of this period.

*It is undeniable that the Germans are fighting with desperate tenacity and valour ... the majority of the Germans will fight to till the last ... Teutonic resourcefulness is displayed by the care for the machine guns, which are the most devilish weapons against our advance ... the German machine gunner dies, but does not surrender; he is content to remain at his post after all his comrades have left, pouring deadly bullets into the enemy; he never throws up his hands.*

This upgrading had two effects that have not been remarked upon. It made the Allies initial effort in holding back the entire German Army at the Marne very heroic and splendid; making what was essentially an Allied defeat into a victory against overwhelming odds. And it showed how powerful the German Army really was in that it could conquer so much

2 ST, 4-6-1915, p.4 & 25-6-1915, p.4
3 ODT, 5-7-1916, p.5 & 17-10-1916, p.4, DT, 3-4-1916, ST, 15-7-1916, p.4
4 ODT, 5-7-1916, p.5
THE NATURE OF THE VIOLENT FIGHTING NEAR THE MEUSE: THE ENEMY DUG GAS BOMBS AND POURING LIQUID.

The official correspondence says: "On the heights of the Meuse, at the trenches de Cézanne, the Germans delivered a very violent attack against our whole front. During the engagement they hurled phosphor bombs, and threw burning liquid near our men."
Allied territory in a few short weeks. The opening weeks of the War, when so interpreted, thereby provided hope and a sense of gravity.

To offset the upgrading of the German Army, Otago/Southland was told that, the Allies had the advantage of time as they were gradually building strength, while Germany already had its entire force in the field and did not have the necessary reserves.\(^5\) It is important to note that while the German Army was viewed more favourably it was still portrayed as inferior to the Allied forces.\(^6\) Thus civilian populations were reassured.

The second objective in reevaluating the German soldier upward, was that it reflected glory upon the New Zealand and Allied troops fighting him. If the enemy was a worthy foe then any New Zealand victory was all the more impressive.\(^7\) If the German was a worthless degenerate, then the Allied failure to chase such a useless being from the face of the earth looked so much worse.\(^8\) Thus to measure the true worth of the New Zealand trooper the enemy soldier had to be given due credit and portrayed more realistically.

The atrocity stories persisted with a couple of new twists because one could only read about so many massacres of defenceless babies and other foreign non-combatants before becoming desensitized. Something fresh needed to happen to 'our sons' to keep up peoples' interest and maintain hatred otherwise they may have lost the ability to resist the tedium of a monotonous War.

The quite horrific POW stories circulating in this period provided this interest in very graphic fashion. Torture with a medieval favour was a popular favourite. So too were monstrous German guards and medical experimentation. The best example of this was the tuberculosis story where Allied POW's were injected with tuberculosis and sent home.\(^9\) This was story was especially effective, with even the generally level-headed ST editor going off into an uncharacteristic flight of hatred.

\(^{5}\) ODT, 6-7-1916, p.4 & 15-2-1917, p.4, ST, 30-7-1916, p.4, NZT, 19-4-1917, p.21

\(^{6}\) ST, 6-7-1916, p.4

\(^{7}\) NZT, 17-5-1917, p.19, ST, 30-7-1917, p.4 & 6-7-1916, p.4

\(^{8}\) NZT, 17-5-1917, p.19 & 6-7-1916, p.18, ST, 1-7-1916, p.4

\(^{9}\) ODT, 28-10-1916, p.5 & 12-4-1916, p.4
The Huns' Methodical Destruction of Rheims: The Latest Aspect of the Church of St. Andrew.

Rheims will all through the ages remain historic, if only from the fact that the Huns appear to be determined to leave it a heap of ruins.

Source: OW, 15-5-1918, p.31
amateur and no punishment was too harsh for Germany. This story put Germany further "beyond the pale".\textsuperscript{10} Most of the Otago/Southland papers echoed the \textit{ST} on this matter.

These stories did, however, have one outcome that was unworthy of how British propaganda portrayed the sporting, moral and virtuous Briton; a model designed to provide an antithesis to the German. People in Otago/Southland were becoming impatient with the "gentlemanly" conduct of the War by the Allies and increasingly called for reprisals.\textsuperscript{11} A desire more in tune with the "monstrous" Prussian than with the "gentlemanly" Briton, dryly remarked the \textit{CL}.\textsuperscript{12}

For a man so addicted to the limelight, these months must have been harsh on the Kaiser as he was displaced from centre stage by his own generals. The Kaiser had completed his primary act of starting the War and by virtue of his lack of talent as a Field Marshal, was no longer so important in the winning of the War.\textsuperscript{13} The denigration of the Kaiser continued but not as often, nor as violently. Increasingly, the Kaiser was drawn as a rapidly aging man bowed down by the fatigue of war, ill-health and guilt.\textsuperscript{14} No commentators were sympathetic, however, the ODT's "Passing Notes" columnist wrote. "Cheer up Willie; you'll soon be dead".\textsuperscript{15}

The ability and character of Germany's military leaders assumed greater importance. Von Hindenburg was of particular interest, as he was the C-in-C and a very popular "honest" hero because he defeated the Russians.\textsuperscript{16} It was generally accepted that Hindenburg was an excellent soldier and planner; his strategic abilities were admired by friend and foe alike.\textsuperscript{17} Hindenburg was believed to hold the status of demi-God because he personified German belief in victory by being ferocious,

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{10} \textit{ST}, 28-10-1916, p.5 & 30-10-1916, p.4
\item\textsuperscript{11} ODT, 28-3-1916, p.6, \textit{ST}, 30-10-1916, p.4
\item\textsuperscript{12} ODT, 23-5-1916, p.5
\item\textsuperscript{13} \textit{ODT}, 28-10-1916, p.6, \textit{ST}, 30-10-1916, p.4
\item\textsuperscript{14} ODT, 28-10-1916, p.6, \textit{ST}, 18-3-1916, p.5
\item\textsuperscript{15} ODT, 5-8-1916, p.4
\item\textsuperscript{16} ODT, 4-11-1916, p.4
\item\textsuperscript{17} ODT, 27-11-1916
\end{itemize}
Source: OW, 20-11-1918, p.30
courageous, brutal and cruel. Brute force and atrocity were his tools. In Prussia, he drove the helpless Russians into the swamps to drown and restrained his troops from saving them saying, "Let the swine drown, it will teach these Russians what it means to defile the soil of Prussia with their presence." This was another example of the differentiation between ordinary soldier and officer that was to become common.

The Crown Prince came in for attention because his military leadership was lacking in imagination and talent. His efforts at Verdun were called the "death march" and severely criticized. The Pall Mall Gazette described him as a looter, braggart and debauchee. To the Crown Prince, war was glorious fun so long as he had the advantage of overwhelming odds and could butcher to his heart's content.

The case of Admiral von Tirpitz was unusual and worth special mention. As the mastermind behind the "sink on sight" policy and blockade, he should have been a prime target for character assassination. But he was never accused of being a mad man who delighted in cruelty. When rumour came of his possible resignation in March 1916, it was said that it was because his efforts were not barbarous enough. The ODT rather peculiarly said that, "Admiral von Tirpitz was the victim of his position, and if he was mad, his madness was imposed on him and he was the least mad of the whole nation." Exactly why von Tirpitz escaped the fate of the other German leaders is unclear except that there was a vague belief that he, unlike the other military leaders, did not want war in 1914.

Much was made of the German Army's massive loss of men at Verdun; a logical purpose could not be discerned. Its strategic advantages were not worth the blood expended. On Verdun, the ODT's military expert "Shrapnel", wrote that the German High Command mind was in a state of "utter confusion" and "chronic imbecility". This "utter confusion" would have a debilitating effect on morale because it would cause the

18 ODT, 27-11-1916, GL, 17-11-1916, p.6, ODT, 20-7-1916, p.4
19 ODT, 29-1-1917
20 ODT, 20-7-1916, p.5
21 ODT, 22-10-1916, p.4
22 ODT, 21-3-1916, p.6
23 ODT, 17-7-1916, p.6
troops to lose faith in their officers which would, in turn, destroy the German Army. While many accepted that German morale was crumbling, some cautioned against believing this would lead to an early peace until more substantial evidence came to light. Implicit belief in the "image of the monstrous German enemy" as presented by British propaganda was beginning, ever so slightly, to wane.

While there had been some upgrading in the image of the ordinary German soldier, it did not extend to the acknowledgement of any German victory being the result of German brilliance. For example, the surrender of General Townsend at Kut-el-Amara, for which Germany claimed victory, was not presented as the result of German effort. Townsend's defeat was blamed upon the especially difficult environmental conditions of the Mesopotamia Valley and the British War Office for not giving Townsend adequate troops, equipment or support. And it was to Turkish forces that Townsend surrendered. It was preferable to blame the defeat upon the inadequacies of the British War Office, than give Germany High Command any credit whatsoever.

During 1917 the newspapers of Otago/Southland were in two minds over what the Somme offensives had achieved and how to interpret German retirement. The ST used an angry bully metaphor for the situation, angry because s/he found themselves facing an enemy with bigger fists and biceps, who was capable of giving them a thrashing. Germany was whining because Britain had displaced Germany from its perch of military ascendency in Europe. It is interesting to note that Britain was considered to have displaced Germany, when France held most of the Western Front and the Russians held all of the Eastern Front.

Surprisingly, the usually conformist NZT took a different and more pragmatic view on the German retirement in 1917. It was a planned military operation that had solid tactical objectives. Germany was

24 ST, 27-5-1916, p.5 & 29-9-1916, p.5
25 ODT, 18-1-1917, p.4 & 23-6-1917, p.9. CL, 13-7-1917, p.6
26 CL, 10-10-1916, p.5, ST, 30-7-1917, p.4
27 ODT, 2-5-1916, p.4, ST, 22-3-1916, p.4
28 ST, 9-9-1916, p.4
shortening and strengthening its lines, making the Allies task of breaking the deadlock all the more difficult.  

The sea was looked to as a possible way out of the long entrenched stalemate on land. The German Navy came back into prominence in the public consciousness of Otago/Southland with the Battle of Jutland in June 1916. First reports were that the battle was inconclusive but then it was stressed that the British losses were less relatively and absolutely. Did this mean a British victory? The German Navy had fought well and hard but it was still bottled up in the Kiel canal. The Kaiser's claims of a great German victory were treated with a grain of salt and dismissed. The only other German Navy exploit of note was when one of its u-boats ran the blockade all the way to New York and back. This feat was admittedly an example of the infinite resource and courage of the German Navy but in the greater scheme of things it meant little. Remaining dominant was the image of the German Navy as inferior and cowardly hiding in harbour.

With the stalemate on the Western Front and the inconclusiveness of the naval skirmishes, the importance of the respective blockades became magnified. Von Tirpitz, apparently, felt Germany's main chance to salvage anything from the wreckage of German war plans was to knock Britain out. This was because Britain was the most vulnerable to a naval blockade and the nation holding the Allies together. Britain's use of propaganda to stir up support strong enough to withstand the blockade and its overly optimistic reports on Allied shipping losses showed Britain's fear.

The need to reassure New Zealand that all was well for Britain and all was ill for Germany, led to an interesting double standard with regard to the two blockades. The German blockade or "piracy" supposedly had little chance of success simply because of its morally vile nature, especially in comparison with the virtuous nature of the defending British Royal Navy. German use of submarines was universally condemned,

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29 NZT, 29-3-1917, p.21 & 19-4-1917, p.21  
30 ODT, 6-6-1916, p.5, ST, 9-6-1916, p.4  
31 ODT, 10-6-1916, p.4  
32 ST, 15-7-1916, p.4, ODT, 26-8-1916, p.6  
33 ST, 12-10-1916, p.4, ODT, 1-8-1916, p.4  
34 NZT, 30-11-1916, p.21
yet at the same time, British use of submarines was applauded.\textsuperscript{35} It was never recognized that Britain was using exactly the same means, as Germany, to achieve exactly the same ends. Apparently, the motto of the time was as the \textit{MW} wrote, "All's fair in love and war except when the enemy does it".\textsuperscript{36}

Any German justification of its "sink on sight" blockade policy was rejected as window dressing, while British justification was accepted without question.\textsuperscript{37} German suggestions that Britain was breaking international law were ridiculed on the basis that Germany started the War by breaking international law and so had no right to complain now things were looking bad.\textsuperscript{38} Likewise, the attempt to shift the blame for escalating "Frightfulness" onto Britain, and for failing to accept German peace terms, was dismissed without serious consideration.\textsuperscript{39}

The German blockade was portrayed as the desperate thrashings of a beast that knew it was on the brink of defeat. This conveniently allowed the successes of the German blockade to be dismissed, almost lightly, as the death throes of a morality wounded leviathan, death throes that, while surprisingly strong, always proved fatal.\textsuperscript{40} It was an appropriately watery metaphor.

German intentions towards the United States of America were the object of much speculation in Otago/Southland; speculation that was influenced by the existing "image of the monstrous German enemy". What could Germany possibly have to gain by provoking America? All possible motivations behind German relations with the United States were examined. In this aspect of War, as in all others, Germany proved its untrustworthiness. Germany's true nature was aptly demonstrated when it, in response to American pressure, promised to restrain from sinking American merchant shipping only to go back on its word several months later.\textsuperscript{41} Apparently, Germany felt it could provoke America with

\textsuperscript{35} ST, 1-3-1917, p.5, ODT, 28-3-1916, p.4
\textsuperscript{36} MW, 11-8-1915, p.1
\textsuperscript{37} ODT, 1-3-1917, p.5 & 7-3-1916, p.4, ST, 6-2-1917, p.4, MW, 14-2-1917, p.2, CL, 3-8-1916, p.1
\textsuperscript{38} ST, 1-3-1917, p.5, ODT, 8-5-1916, p.4
\textsuperscript{39} ODT, 12-5-1916, p.5 & 16-12-1916, p.6 & 8-2-1917, p.4, DT, 8-5-1916
\textsuperscript{40} ODT, 3-1-1917, p.8
\textsuperscript{41} ODT, 11-11-1916, p.6
TO KAISER WILLIAM OF GERMANY

By W.R.P of Bannockburn

Oh, Kaiser William Prussian Fiend
What is it we see?
A perfect Devil Demon dyed,
And "Made in Germany"

Look over Belgium's blasted fields
Behold thy handiwork
Murder, Rapine, Arson, Crimes
Out heroding the Turk

The babe in arms, the mother mild,
Were ruthless slain by Thee,
Is this an offering to Thy Gott
That's made in Germany

Thou saintly bully preaching prig,
Thou sepulchre of sin,
Thou praying, canting hypocrite,
Let Satan take Thee in

Unleashed on France's flowering plains,
The serfs that follow Thee
Wolves and badger, retile hordes
New Made in Germany

That holy edifice at Rheims
Destroyed by shot and steel,
With worshippers of God at prayer
Will ban Thy soul to hell

And while that soul is gorged with blood,
And rapine full and free,
Thou it offer prayer to heaven above,
Prayers made in Germany

See loved Louvain, sweet learnings shrine
A ruined blackened heap,
Devastate by Thy swarming hordes,
Will make the Angel's weep

And cons't Thou hope for escape
The awful penalty
For this - the blackest of all crimes
Conceived in Germany

But take Thou warning Kaiser Bill
The time is drawing nigh,
When Thee, and Thy infamous crew
Will all be doomed to die
Then retribution Thou must make,
The Judge that thou wilt see
Will be a just and righteous judge
Not made in Germany

Source DT, 4-1-1915, p.5
impunity because President Wilson would refuse to be drawn from his isolationist policy. More than once in the Otago/Southland press, the question was asked if Germany was not correct in its assessment of Wilson. Based upon the President's inaction, despite his endless utterances in favour of peace, this was an understandable question.

The MW put forward a couple of alternative suggestions as to why Germany wanted to involve America. America's entry would stop the supply of war materials to the Allies as America would need all of its materials. It would enable the German Navy to lawfully sink any American ship, so improving Germany's public image. Opportunity would also be given to ex-patriot Germans within America to cause internal mayhem and chaos.

Attempts to prove that Germany was deliberately manoeuvring the Americans into the War to serve some obscure German purpose, fitted neatly into one of the underlying themes of the "image of the monstrous Germany enemy". The idea that Germany was in total control of its destiny and purposefully plotted everything, had been powerful since the beginning. As the ST put it, 'the Germans never do anything without a purpose'. This idea evolved from the pre-War stereotype of Germany as a thorough, purposeful and efficient nation. In some respects, the very success of pre-War Germany became a problem for it. Its pre-War success provided a solid base from which to exaggerate German abilities and gave credibility to Germany being responsible for every little accident of war. The German secret service was portrayed as the most thorough and extensive in the world and the power behind the Russian Revolutions, South Africa's rebellion, and the Irish Easter Rebellion. The label "Made in Germany" was attached to every event whose causes seemed even faintly suspicious; no evidence was needed.

The internal condition of Germany was the object of intense speculation with opinion swaying between extremes of optimism and pessimism. The optimists said Germany was on the brink of collapse with major problems due to rioting, strikes, anti-war demonstrations, failure

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42 ST, 12-10-1916, p.4
43 CL, 12-1-1917, p.5
44 MW, 14-2-1917, p.2
45 ST, 17-11-1916, p.4
of war loans, food shortages, material shortages and poor morale. German failure at Verdun could only open the eyes of its populace to the impossibility of the Kaiser's dream of conquest. This realization must dampen enthusiasm and bring on the beginning of the "spirit of despair", which would suck the German war effort dry. Some took this further by translating the "spirit of despair" into a national rage against the Hohenzollern dynasty, which would lead to revolution.\(^{47}\) The whole scenario was helped along by talk of possible separatist feelings in Saxony and Bavaria and the failure of parts of Germany to co-operate in food distribution.\(^{48}\)

The optimists also claimed Germany's situation was analogous to Carthage's before its fate was sealed in the Third Punic Wars. Rome (read Britain) commanded the seas, Carthage's treasury was empty, its allies deserting, its trade destroyed and its citizens starving, yet the Carthagians gave a great show of calmness and power. Carthage/Germany was a painted lady, fair without, corrupt within.\(^{49}\) The optimists seemed to prefer to believe that the strength demonstrated by Germany was a clever facade to cover weakness.

The pessimists were much more cautious in accepting reports of German weakness, fearing that the Germans were plotting to undermine the Allied effort by creating a false sense of security.\(^{50}\) Mixed with the fears of the pessimists there was grudging admiration. Several articles were openly admiring of German efforts to find substitutes and make the best of a tough situation. The DT, for example, applauded Cologne's feeding of its population of 300,000 with an efficiently organized soup-kitchen, thereby making optimum and ingenious use of every food item.\(^{51}\)

The ST was very reluctant to accept as true reports of imminent collapse because there was no reliable evidence. It ran an article stating it was wrong to believe that Germany was near collapse. Hopes that Germany would be starved out in 1917 were wholly unjustified according to this paper. "We cannot be distracted by food shortage

\(^{47}\) ODT, 14-3-1916, p.6, DT, 16-10-1916, CL, 4-5-1917, p.5
\(^{48}\) ODT, 16-3-1916, p.6 & 24-7-1916, p.4
\(^{49}\) ODT, 15-4-1916, p.8
\(^{50}\) ST, 5-1-1917, p.4, MW, 9-5-1917, p.1, CL, 28-8-1917, p.5
\(^{51}\) DT, 19-3-1917
stories" and hopes of an enemy collapse, commented the editor. To back itself up, the ST pointed to Austria-Hungary which, according to the cables, had been on the brink of collapse for two years. The truth was that nobody could accurately say what the situation in Germany was and the way it was waging the War suggested things were not as bad as some made out. The CL and the DT agreed with the ST on this point. If anything, the discussion over Germany's internal well-being said more about the "image of the monstrous German enemy" British propaganda wanted to present, than about how Germany was actually faring.

The prospects of peace were on everybody's lips in 1917 as the War dragged on into its third grim year. The desire for peace was strong but so was the desire to crush Germany so far into the dirt that it could never again threaten world harmony. There was to be no rising of the German Eagle from the ashes of its defeat. The "image of the monstrous German enemy" had done its work here so extremely well that it was impossible to accept anything less than unconditional and abject surrender from Germany. For Otago/Southland there could be no "peace without victory", victory could only come when Germany's hateful ideology was destroyed.

The proposal that Europe should go back to the status quo of 1914, was rejected in the Otago/Southland press on the grounds that it would be a German victory and would turn Europe into an armed camp. It would mean that "the dream that this is the war that will end war is destined, we are afraid, to prove only a dream".

The existing "image of the monstrous German enemy" determined how German peace overtures were viewed until mid-1917. Any German proposal was received with deep suspicion and closely examined for a diabolically cunning plot to gain peace while Germany held large areas of Allied land. Or peace overtures were portrayed as some kind of conspiracy to make the neutrals hostile to the Allies, by suggesting they were turning down Germany's generous peace offers and forcing the War's

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52 ST, 5-1-1917, p.4 & 11-5-1917, p.4, CL, 28-6-1917, p.5, DT, 3-4-1916
53 ODT, 3-4-1917, p.4
54 ODT, 14-12-1916, p.4, ST, 13-10-1916, p.4
55 NZT, 10-8-1916, p.17
56 ST, 13-10-1916, p.4 & 15-12-1916, p.4, CL, 30-5-1916, p.4, ODT, 12-5-1916, p.5
UNDER THE GERMAN RULE: A PARTY OF CHAINED NATIVES UNDER GUARD IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA.

—Central News, photo.

(From a captured photograph by a German officer.)
Others felt the offer of peace was merely a way of testing the waters to prove to the German people that the Allies meant to destroy them and that Germany was fighting for its very existence. This would have had the effect of stiffening the backbone of German resistance.

The philosophy and atrocities of Germany in the early War period were thrown back in its face as justification for dismissing German proposals. According to German philosophy, "a settled peace means disintegration, degeneracy, the sacrifice of the heroic qualities in the human character ... it means arresting the development of mankind along the lines of culture and humanity". Thus, Germany must see some advantage to gaining peace now and risking degeneration rather than fighting on. It had become impossible to trust Germany to hold to a negotiated peace because it regarded treaties as mere "scrap of paper"; therefore Germany must be destroyed.

Genuine humanitarian desire for peace, as expressed by Bethman-Hollweg was discarded as a transparent effort by Germany to swindle its way out of its own mess. The domination of the "Image of the monstrous German enemy" denied Germany the luxury of having any form of the higher human feeling that raised humanity above animals.

The increasing frequency of peace offers was taken as a positive indication that Germany was becoming ever more desperate as no nation would offer peace terms if it thought it could still win. Yet, while the increasing desperation of the Germans for peace was agreed upon, it was also accepted that Germany would fight to the last gasp, never giving up until total defeat. This was especially true now that the Allies seemed determined to annihilate Germany. The German cry "Everything for the Fatherland" was regarded as absolute reality with everything and everyone given a value depending upon its/their usefulness to the State. This duality of the "Image of the monstrous German enemy" meant that German defeat was certain but also made sure it

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57 ODT, 14-12-1916, p.4 & 16-12-1916, p.6, 8, ST, 2-10-1916, p.4 & 14-12-1916, p.4
58 ODT, 1-8-1916, p.4 & 4-1-1917, p.5, ST, 19-12-1916, p.4 & 20-12-1916, p.4, CL, 8-6-1916, p.5, DT, 5-3-1917, NZT, 1-6-1916, p.18
59 ODT, 14-12-1916, p.4
60 ODT, 16-12-1916, p.6, ST, 14-12-1916, p.4
61 ODT, 17-10-1916, p.4 & 15-1-1917, p.4, ST, 19-12-1916, p.4
was understood that this defeat, while inevitable, still needed maximum effort by the Allies.

The "image of the monstrous German enemy" had triumphed in committing Otago/Southland into a "no peace without victory" mentality but its supremacy was beginning to be challenged in a limited manner. For example, the practice of lumping all Germans into one collective hideous personality was beginning to weaken by late 1916 with the emergence of the "Two Germanys" theory in the Otago/Southland Press. The "Two Germanys" theory had initially appeared in late 1914/early 1915 in Britain as an explanation of why a highly civilized nation such as Germany had started a barbarous war. It soon disappeared under pressure from the atrocity stories. It was, however, resurrected. It was becoming difficult to believe that all Germans, from the highest to the lowest, were beasts capable of the greatest cruelties.

A new model had to be created, one that allowed the incorporation of these doubts without overturning the whole carefully constructed "image" of the barbarous German. The already mentioned practice of giving the ordinary German soldier credit for being a worthy foe, while excluding the officers, fitted neatly into this new model. The "image of the monstrous German enemy" as a barbarous, cruel war-mad people narrowed its focus, and excluded large parts of the German population.

To add to the general chaos of the changing face of the German enemy there were two "Two Germanys" theories; the Socialist and the Liberal. Both divided Germany into two distinct groups; those responsible for the War and the hapless victims of the ruthless German war mongers.

The existence of the Socialist "Two Germanys" was first implied in the MW, which suggested that most German people were not responsible for the War, rather they had been tricked into it. The MW, looking at the War from a Socialist stand-point, believed the German people were the powerless captives of international armament manufacturers and the German Junker caste. It was imperialism and capitalism that were behind the War, so it was vastly unfair to blame the great majority of the German population.\footnote{S. Wallace, War and the Image of Germany, British Academics 1914–1918, Edinburgh, 1988, pp.31-2} \footnote{MW, 7-7-1915, p.5}
The MW separated Germany into the Germany of the working man, who raised the red-flag of humanity under the guidance of Schiller, Goethe, science, arts and Marx; and the Germany of Kings, Emperors, Junkers, jingoists, despots and militarists, that is, the ruling class responsible for the War. According to Marxist theory, the workers were powerless creatures and as such could not be responsible for the War; especially not in Germany where the German Government was beholden to the Kaiser, not Parliament.\textsuperscript{64} Marxist doctrine lent itself well to the establishment of a "Two Germanys" theory but this interpretation was not especially influential because it was tainted red.

It was a speech by Asquith that sparked the debate in the Otago/Southland press on the Liberal segregation of the German population; that is, the idea that the ordinary German people were different from the dynasty and Junker caste that ruled them.\textsuperscript{65} As in the Socialist version, only the Junker caste was responsible for the War and its cruelties. Asquith's statements implied that the earlier acknowledged unity of the Germans and their war-lust were either fading or had always been imaginary rather than real.

The Liberal division was taken further by the silver tongue of President Wilson; he distinguished between the German Government and its people as an incentive for peace. He wanted to encourage rebellion by promising equality with the rest of the world for the people of Germany if they promised not to seek to dominate. He stressed that the Allies only wanted to make Germany give up its unjust gains, to reassure Germany that the Allies had no designs upon the integrity of a democratic Germany proper.\textsuperscript{66}

The Liberal theory, that only part of the German population needed to be defeated to cut the cancer from Germany's heart, opened the way for an earlier peace. The blanket hatred of the earlier "image of the monstrous Germany enemy" was not conducive to the possibility of anything less than the total grinding of the whole German population into the ground.\textsuperscript{67} "Two Germanys" made a compromise peace easier and

\textsuperscript{64} MW, 12-1-1916, p.2 & 2-1-1918, p.4
\textsuperscript{65} NZT, 13-7-1916, p.18
\textsuperscript{66} CL, 7-9-1917, p.5
\textsuperscript{67} CL, 16-9-1917, p.5
incorporated eye-witness accounts that contradicted the earlier image of the German monster.

The idea of there being "Two Germanys" was not readily accepted in Otago/Southland. Some feared that separating Germany into two could lead to the optimistic misconception that Germany was nearly finished and led, in turn, to a slackening of effort. 68 Once again there was friction between those with an optimistic and pessimistic outlook in Otago/Southland. The NZT noted that leading Berlin newspapers had been completely outraged that Asquith had even suggested such blasphemy. One wrote that "We, Germans owe what we have won, our special position to the Hohenzollern dynasty" and claimed that the spirit of loyalty was deeply rooted in the Fatherland. 69

In a letter to the ODT, Paton Dunlop, strongly disagreed with the disassociation of the German people from their Government. Dunlop felt that the German people must have willingly gone to War and committed its outrages. As Lloyd George once said, "Germany is no longer a State; it is an army." 70 The ODT editor agreed and felt there was little justification to suppose that the German Government launched Germany into the War without the full support of its population. 71 Eventually it did, however, sink slowly into the general consciousness of the Otago/Southland populace and they became more comfortable with the notion.

Just as the Otago/Southland population was being coaxed into acceptance of a peace that did not completely destroy Germany, the German Chancellor seemed to be preparing Germany for a similar compromise. It would have been political suicide to state this explicitly but the implication in some of Bethman-Hollweg's speeches was picked up by the ODT. The disapproving ghost of Bismarck was conjured up by Bethman-Hollweg to add his weight behind the withdrawal of German annexation claims in Belgium and France. The ODT doubted whether this lessening of German expectations was preached for internal consumption. It felt that the German Government wanted to project different images to different audiences. For the world audience, Germany was supposedly

68 ODT, 19-8-1917, ODT, 7-9-1917, p.5, CL, 30-1-1917, p.5
69 NZT, 13-7-1916, pp.18-19
70 ODT, 7-9-1917, p.5
71 ODT, 6-10-1917, p.6
HYMN OF HATE

By Ernst Lissauer

We love have no title (26-2-1914), British, American

French and Russian they matter not,
A blow for a blow and a shot for a shot,
We love them not, we hate them not,
We hold the Waichsel and Vosges gate,
We have but one and only hate,
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe and one alone.

He is known to you all, he is known to you all,
He crouches behind the dark grey flood,
Full of envy, of rage, of craft, of gall.
Cry out of fury, wave that are thicker than blood.
Come, let us stand on the Judgement place,
An oath to swear to, Face to face.
An oath of bronze no wind can shake,
An oath for our sons and their sons to take.

Come, hear the word, repeat the word.
Throughout the Fatherland make it heard.
We will never forgo our hate,
We have but a single hate,
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe, and one alone -
ENGLAND!


NO TITLE (Alternative version of the Hymn of Hate)

What is Germany's Christmas carolling but hatred?
- France and Russia, they matter not;
- A blow for a blow, a shot for a shot;
- We fight the battle with bronze and steel,
- And the time that is coming Peace will seal.

You will we will hate with a lasting hate;
We will never forgo our hate,
Hate by water and hate by land,
Hate of the head, and hate of the hand,
Hate of the hammer, and hate of the crown,
Hate of seventy million, choking down;
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have ONE foe, and one alone -
ENGLAND!

Source: GDT, 26-12-1914, p.4
fighting a purely defensive war and may be prepared to, magnanimously, give up its demand for indemnities and annexations if its other demands were met.72 Bethman-Hollwege, again, was not given the benefit of the doubt - it was obviously more German hypocrisy. In reality the German Government was probably attempting to placate the advancing Allies.

Internally, Germany wanted to keep up the enthusiasm of its citizens by continuing to promise victory and wealth. German churches became instruments of State propaganda with Germany spoken of as a nation specially chosen by God for a unique and vital mission; the salvation of humanity. The Kaiser appeared to have taken a leaf from Queen Elizabeth I who preferred to "tune the pulpit rather than silence it".73 Internal German propaganda was recognized as such and condemned. It was interpreted as a sign of weakness, pointing to the inability of German civilians to bear the heavy weight of "truth". It was also evidence that German rulers doubted the staying power of its population if the "truth" was released.74 Interestingly, Otago/Southland quickly recognized the purpose of internal German propaganda, yet failed to realise for a long time that internal British propaganda had the same purpose.

The vitriolic fulminations of some German newspapers, that formed part of internal propaganda against Allied troops appalled the Otago/Southland press. The Vossishe Zeitung's attitude towards the Australians was depicted as typical. It wrote,

They are the riff-raff of humanity, descendants of murderers and thieves who despise the very thought of discipline and decency ... filthy human refuse ... against whom it is a shame that the German heroes should have to fight.75

The most violent denunciations were reserved for the British as it was they who held the Allies together, and who had betrayed Germany by fighting. Popular remarks from German papers reported in the Otago/Southland press included "England would fight to the last - French soldier" and "Gott strafe England".76 Ernst Lissauer's "Hymn of Hate" against Britain was widely publicized and deplored.

72 ODT, 14-7-1916, p.4 & 8-6-1917, p.4
73 ODT, 4-3-1916, p.4
74 ODT, 19-9-1916, p.4, ST, 10-4-1916, p.4
75 ODT, 10-3-1916, p.4
76 DT, 12-2-1917, ODT, 8-4-1918, p.4
The "image of the monstrous German enemy" ensured it was taken as read that the German Government routinely distorted the facts of War for its population by exaggerating enemy losses and German victories. The object of this was obvious to General Alexieff, Chief of the Russian Staff, who observed that "the German Government is daily increasing its output of lies in the vain hope that the German people, reading them, will forget their privations".\textsuperscript{17}

1917 was a testing time for the "image of the monstrous Germany enemy" because little was happening on the Western Front and war-wariness was taking hold. The "image of the monstrous German enemy" had to provide hope for future peace as well as impetuous for continued effort. In this period the "image of the monstrous German enemy" exhibited both powerful continuities and capacity for minor change. A mixture of old and new concepts were used with reasonable results. The slackening of interest was headed off by the highly effective tuberculosis atrocity that supposedly threatened New Zealand troops. The heightening of the ability of the German troops provided the answer to why the War was still dragging on and reflected glory upon our troops. It had been acknowledged by some in Otago/Southland, that Germany was a rich and prosperous nation which had mobilized its entire population behind its army and would be very difficult to defeat. Yet, reassurance was provided that victory was inevitable because of the inherent flaws in the ideology, leaders and society behind the German troops. Failure was the only possible outcome of such moral degeneration. The multi-faceted character of the "image of the monstrous German enemy" managed, simultaneously, to treat German peace offers with extreme suspicion and set up the Otago/Southland population to accept a peace that need not totally destroy Germany.

Late 1917 contained whispers of dissent in some of the Otago/Southland papers about the "image of the monstrous German enemy", but these whispers were not to gain pre-eminence until the last year of war. The press of Otago/Southland in 1916 and 1917 continued to look at enemy activity through glasses heavily tinted by the "image of the monstrous German enemy". The power of the "image" was, nevertheless, fading a little from the strain of a never-ending war.

\textsuperscript{17} ODT, 19-9-1916, p.4
A BATCH OF GERMAN PRISONERS CAPTURED BY THE CANADIANS ON THEIR WAY BACK TO THE COMPOUND.
Chapter Five

THE DEATH OF THE "MONSTER"

January 1918 - November 1918

"Germany will not collapse. She will have to be beaten."

The passing of the control British propaganda into the hands of London newspaper magnate, Lord Northcliffe, led to a resurgence of propaganda based on hate in Britain. The atrocity story mutated into an even more malignant form, all in the name of keeping up the fighting spirit of the British homefront. The London dailies of Northcliffe resounded with demands that no quarter given to Germany. This was in reaction to the knowledge that Germany would be very difficult to defeat in the field because the defender held the advantage now that Russia was out of the War. British resolve would not be allowed to crumble into accepting a compromise peace.

Up until the end of 1917 the "image of the monstrous German enemy" in Otago/Southland had closely mirrored its British counterpart, but this was not the case in 1918. The resurgence of anti-German hate propaganda was rejected as counterproductive by much of the Otago/Southland press. Many editors and journalists were insulted that the kind of feelings generated by anti-German hate propaganda were considered necessary to the continuation of the War. Otago/Southland had long been convinced of the need to defeat Germany for the good of humanity.

Thus 1918 was the year in which the "image of the monstrous German enemy" became confused in the Otago/Southland press. Much of the "image of the monstrous German enemy" relating to peace prospects, the German forces and internal conditions was discarded because the duration of the War had proven it false. It was obvious to all by 1918 that Germany was a strong foe and not a weak degenerate nation. A degenerate German society led by a deluded king would have collapsed long ago. Otago/Southland still generally accepted the assumption that the Central Powers were the weaker side, both materially and morally but rejected peace predictions based on German collapse. Most editorials argued that Germany would have to be defeated in the field.

1 CL, 13-8-1918, p.7
ON THE WESTERN FRONT: THE RIBS OF A GERMAN PILL-BOX WHICH THE ENEMY HAD NOT TIME TO COMPLETE.
The "image of the monstrous German enemy" lost its potency during 1918 in Otago/Southland. Few believed that the Allies really knew what was happening in Germany because they had been proven wrong so often in the past. Only concrete facts about Germany were accepted as the "truth". In the meantime the Otago/Southland press contented itself with striking out at British anti-German hate propaganda and dealing with the void of information left behind. Even the ODT's prodigious enthusiasm began to wane. Photographs in the OW now mainly focused on German atrocities committed during their retreat. Disillusionment with the reliability of the war news had brought the "image of the monstrous German enemy" into serious question in Otago/Southland.

This questioning did not significantly improve the situation for Otago/Southland readers because they were still blind to the reality of the German enemy. Only now they recognized this blindness and the root cause of it. Allied censorship and propaganda. Perhaps the change in Otago/Southland's knowledge should be regarded as a belated loss of innocence.

Each Otago/Southland paper dealt with the pressures of 1918 in its own way. The ODT continued its blind faith in British propaganda. The ST, the MW, the DT and the CL reacted with varying tones of disapproval, or plain disbelief, towards the War news. The NZT's response was the most extreme and unusual in its condemnation of the British Government, society and newspaper press.

Very little new was added to the "image of the monstrous German enemy" in 1918. This was because it was extremely difficult to write authoritatively about Germany as so much had been said in the past that had proved inaccurate or false.

Atrocity stories as part of the new British hate campaign came over the wires but they were likely to be dismissed as unproven, rebutted or disbelieved entirely. The charge that Germany was boiling dead humans for the sake of the fat in their bodies was at first believed, then rejected as malicious fabrication. The NZT wrote that this story was based upon a sentence in a German article, a sentence that could be translated in both a harmless or sinister manner, the harmless way being more common. The scurrilous manner in which the "evidence" had been manufactured was condemned as totally irresponsible. The NZT went further and stated that the atrocity stories about Belgian children

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2 DT, 13-8-1917
THE VILLAGE OF AUBVILLERS IN FRANCE, FIRST DESTROYED, AND THEN SET ON FIRE BY ORDER OF THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND.

IN THE LINE OF THE MINE RETREAT: VIEW OF THE VILLAGE OF AUBVILLERS IN FRANCE, FIRST DESTROYED, AND THEN SET ON FIRE BY ORDER OF THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND.
having their hands lopped off were also unproven and probably untrue.\textsuperscript{3} Even the "evil genius" Nietzsche was at times defended, with it being pointed out that his ideas had been distorted and grossly misused during the War.\textsuperscript{4} It was really only the ODT that continued to print atrocity stories and even its rhetoric was muted.\textsuperscript{5}

The initial success of the German Spring Offensive did put a small dent in the general confidence of Allied victory. But these fears, like the Offensive itself, were only fleeting. The DT was an example of how these fears were manifested. It changed its tune from one praising German food substitution to criticism during the Offensive.\textsuperscript{6} The CL began to call Germans "Huns" again.\textsuperscript{7}

The attitude expressed was usually that this Offensive was Germany's last chance to win the War before the Americans arrived.\textsuperscript{8} The arrival of the Americans would not mean the immediate end of the War, however, because the German Army was far from finished, especially now the Eastern Front had closed. As General Maurice said they [German soldiers] are still well-fed and formidable. We have not yet the superiority of force necessary to crush the Huns, but if we play our cards properly the German decline will become a collapse.\textsuperscript{9}

Allied confidence was such that it allowed praise for the German Army as a whole, rather than just the lower ranks. Lloyd George was quoted in April 1918 as saying, "We are fighting a very powerful foe whose successes have been mainly due to the superior unity of his strategic plans".\textsuperscript{10} The Allies would win because of its build up of strength and their superior moral fibre and conviction.\textsuperscript{11} Germany simply could not win because the Allies had held onto the moral high ground throughout the War. As late as July 1917, it was still viable

\textsuperscript{3} NZT, 12-7-1917, p.18
\textsuperscript{4} NZT, 7-2-1917, p.27
\textsuperscript{5} ODT, 25-10-1918, p.4, 10-8-1918, p.4 & 5-7-1918, p.4
\textsuperscript{6} DT, 7-1-1918
\textsuperscript{7} CL, 19-2-1918, p.6
\textsuperscript{8} ODT, 27-3-1918, p.6 & 6-6-1918, p.5
\textsuperscript{9} ODT, 30-8-1918, p.4
\textsuperscript{10} ODT, 12-4-1918, p.4
\textsuperscript{11} ODT, 1-6-1918, p.6
A PULVERISED HUN BATTERY, SHOWING THE EFFECT OF CONCENTRATED GUN FIRE

This was the position of one of the Hun’s heaviest gun batteries in Flanders until the French commenced their attack, preceded by artillery preparation. It serves to show how completely the allies are knocking the German war machines into scrap heaps.
for the DT to write that this War was the nearest history had come to a fight between good and evil.

With the prospects of peace seemingly so far away, utterances on the German attitudes towards peace were rather confused. The ODT and DT divided the German population into several camps and speculated on which faction held the upper hand. Most journalists suspected that ruling class and Government opinion was divided between those still consumed by the lust for conquest and those who wanted to end the War now so they could prepare for the next attempt. Those wanting territory in the East or West, supposedly, further divided the ruling class.12 The ODT believed that the remainder of the German civilian population and a sizable portion of the Reichstag wanted peace but lacked the necessary power to implement their desire.13

The other Otago/Southland papers refrained from such speculation; claiming it was pointless because speculation on peace in the past had proved only a pipe dream. But in the final analysis, what Germany wanted with regard to peace was immaterial because peace would only come on Allied terms.14

With victory assured, thoughts turned to what would happen once peace did arrive. Neither of the main Allied leaders, Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson, had anything definite to say on the subject, much to the frustration of the local papers. Vague statements of intent abounded, full of noble sentiment and not much else. High-minded gestures were popular like "don't punish Germany", which were designed more to induce German surrender than establish the groundwork for peace terms.

The Otago/Southland press's negative reaction to the "don't punish Germany" notion showed, that while they accepted the theory of "Two Germans", they believed that the German population should be punished. After all, it was established fact that at the beginning the German citizenry had whole-heartedly supported the War.15 The ODT summed the dominant Otago/Southland view when it wrote it was an individual who decided to go to war, it was the Prussian system that allowed him to make that decision but it cannot be

12 DT, 21-8-1918, 13-5-1918, & 20-5-1918, ODT, 10-1-1918, p.4 & 19-7-1917, p.4
13 ODT, 24-1-1918, p.5 & 19-7-1918, p.4
14 ST, 28-2-1918, p.4, ODT, 18-7-1917, p.4
15 ODT, 1-2-1918, p.5
doubted that the German people did not have a positive will to war if no actual say in the decision. The German people saw it as a great opportunity to enhance Germany and to contribute to the well-being ... in 1914 the German people rallied around their leaders and only very feeble protests against the war were heard.16

It was ironic that the year that finally saw peace, was also the year that abounded in cautionary articles, warning that peace would not come for years because the whole German nation was behind its Kaiser.17 Otago/Southland opinion had completed a u-turn. Germany was portrayed as far from finished and a sudden collapse seemed extremely unlikely, so long as Germany believed its sacrifices were to keep the "Fatherland" from being shattered by greedy and envious enemies.18 No longer was it written that the strikes and unrest in Germany were anything the German Government could not handle.19

The increasingly pragmatic attitude of the Otago/Southland papers meant that when news came of a small German naval mutiny, they did not proclaim that this heralded peace as they would have two years earlier.20 Past experience had convinced even the ODT that such minor events did not indicate German collapse.21 Even it occasionally ran articles under the disclaimer that the information contained was open to doubt because it was second or third-hand material.22 As far as the Otago/Southland papers were concerned the German Government was still firmly in control and the chances of popular revolt was nil while the Hohenzollern dynasty remained in control.23

Increasingly, it was acknowledged that it was impossible to say anything for sure because of the German and Allied censors, both of whom routinely distorted war news for their own ends. The loss of innocence had struck so deeply that any report suggesting that Germany was finished was greeted with suspicion rather than joy. Such reports were

16 ODT, 11-11-1918, p.4
17 CL, 16-4-1918, p.3
18 CL, 16-4-1918, p.3, ODT, 23-8-1918, p.5
19 ODT, 1-2-1918, p.5
20 ST, 13-10-1917, p.4
21 ODT, 12-10-1917, p.6 & 15-10-1917, p.4
22 ODT, 12-7-1917, p.4
23 ODT, 2-2-1918, p.4 & 2-2-1918, p.6
considered to have been manufactured in the lie factory of either the Germans or the Allies. The merest suggestion that Germany was on the verge of collapse was enough for another ST outburst on the dangers of encouraging false hopes.

The attempts by most Otago/Southland papers to dampen down false hope of an early peace did not mean that they had given up hope of peace, merely that they were very critical of false hopes. When news of Bulgaria's surrender came in October 1918 they immediately grasped its significance. The inherent value of this surrender was that it was concrete fact from which the Otago/Southland newspapers could draw their own conclusions, without relying on outside opinion. The CL was prepared to draw conclusions from Bulgaria's surrender mainly because Sofia, as Germany's ally, would know better than the Allies the real state of affairs in Germany. Clearly the fact that the Otago/Southland press found it more appropriate to believe the actions of a German ally than depend upon the knowledge of the Allies, says much about how they regarded Allied reliability.

The conclusion reached, however, did not escape the influence of the 'image of the monstrous German enemy" as established by 1916. Bulgaria's surrender was seen as great news both because of Bulgaria's reputation as an ally of "the monstrous German enemy" and from a military stand-point. The 'image of the monstrous German enemy" had given Bulgaria the unenviable role of an opportunist nation, hoping for quick rewards. Bulgaria's surrender could only sound Germany's death knoll, though the War might not end for some time yet. It was also suggested that the withdrawal of Bulgaria would strategically weaken the Central Powers in the Balkans and Turkey. For once the facts and the "image of the monstrous German enemy" were in collusion.

From here, it was a downhill coast to peace, with one enemy nation after another surrendering until Germany had no choice but to surrender. These rapid events took Otago/Southland completely by surprise because

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24 CL, 13-8-1918, p.7 & 27-9-1918, p.2
25 ST, 12-9-1917, p.4
26 CL, 4-10-1918, p.5
27 CL, 4-10-1918, p.5
28 CL, 4-10-1918, p.5, ODT, 4-10-1918, p.4
many thought an Allied tour de force would be necessary. Sudden collapse occurred just after all such hope had been abandoned in Otago/Southland.

Interestingly, on declaration of peace, the monster that was Germany was instantly transformed from a Prussian militarist dominated nation into one where democracy was flourishing. The democratic longings of the civilian population were credited with finally bringing about peace rather than the crushing defeat of the German forces. This notion fitted in well with the more recent image of "Two Germanys", as a nation of ordinary good people; victims forcibly held under the thumb of its twisted, ruling caste of militarists.

Anti-censorship feelings in Otago/Southland in 1918 helped undermine the "image of the monstrous German enemy". The "image of the monstrous German enemy" had been a very useful tool in the beginning but by 1918 it had lost its purpose, direction and its audience. Its audience mistrusted or disbelieved it. It had outlived its original purpose because Otago/Southland had long been convinced of the need to defeat Germany. The "image of the monstrous German enemy" was looking ridiculous; Otago/Southland knew it and particularly resented the continued use of this propaganda device by Mother Britain. Otago/Southland felt itself worthy of a trust and a faith that Britain never gave.

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29 ODT, 5-1-1918, p.6
30 NZT, 14-11-1918, p.14
A forecast of the proceeds of the universally expressed desire of Turkey's neutralists.

In life we are as thick as thieves.

As soon they will eat at dinner.

Source: CW, 23-12-1914, p.36
Chapter Six
OTHER ENEMIES

"THE UNSPEAKABLE TURK"?
August 1914 - November 1918

"The talons and beak of the German Eagle have sunk deep into Turkey"1

Ottoman power had long been crumbling, the greater part of its European Empire was already a fading dream by the outbreak of the First World War. A number of disastrous wars had recently been fought in an attempt to regain its position in the Balkans, but without success. The early twentieth century had not been kind to the Khalifat’s empire and now a war surpassing all others in history was being fought on its doorstep. For Turkey this war could either be a time of opportunity or further disaster. Which side would it support? Would it get involved at all? After much speculation in the press of Otago/Southland Turkey's decision to join Germany sealed its fate as far as Otago/Southland was concerned.

Turkey had an intriguing role to play with regard to the "image of the monstrous Germany enemy" and its own "image" was distorted by the glare reflected from the German model. Turkey's involvement would probably have been viewed very differently in Otago/Southland had without the "image of the monstrous German enemy", and if New Zealand troops had not been fighting at Gallipoli. The resulting "image of the Turkish enemy" was almost the opposite of the "image of the monstrous German enemy".

Turkey began the War with the unenviable reputation as the "Unspeakable Turk", capable of atrocity and cruelty at the drop of a hat. Surprisingly, the War improved Turkey's reputation. As a nation they were excused of any part in causing the War because they did not enter until November 1914. Otago/Southland newspapers generally portrayed them rather patronizingly as a backward people who had been tricked into the War by "evil" Germany. They were, therefore, not responsible for their actions. Even though it was on the wrong side of the conflict Turkey gained some sympathy in Otago/Southland because it had been pulled reluctantly in the War.

1 ODT, 27-1-1915, p.5
Prince Hussein Kamel Pasha:
Recently proclaimed Sultan of Egypt, which has been constituted a British Protectorate.

Source: OW, 13-1-1915, p. 40
Overall, the entry of Turkey caused little alarm in the Otago/Southland press. "Turkey", wrote the ODT editor, "has sounded ... her own death-knell as a European Power". The DT and ST agreed, with the ST remarking that Turkey's entry would, "merely spread its horrors, increase its difficulties and perhaps prolong its duration", truly a trivial outcome.

The lack of Turkish war-guilt and its existing reputation meant that its society and culture were not closely examined. Unlike Germany there was no need to root out the sources of corruption, everybody was aware of the faults of the "Indolent" Muslim Turk.

From the very beginning the Turkish Army was separated from the Turkish Porte; the former was a respected adversary and the latter a corrupt and devious administration. Asquith declared,

> It is not the Turkish people, it is the Ottoman Government which has drawn the sword, and which ... will perish by the sword ... the Turkish Empire has committed suicide and dug with its own hands, its grave.\(^4\)

The similar separation of the enemy population into "good" and "bad" elements did not occur with regard to Germany until much later.

So why did Turkey decide to enter the War if it was digging its own grave? What tempted it or drove it into war?

The Sultan's official version of why Turkey went to war was given little credence in Otago/Southland. The Sultan said he entered the War of his own volition to defend his country and champion the rights of the Muslim world. He tried to make it clear he was not a German puppet.\(^5\) Interestingly, the Sultan also declared that Turkey was compelled to go to war because of Allied policy.\(^6\) Otago/Southland newspapers dismissed this as nonsense because the Allies had treated the Turkish with the utmost patience and no doubt paternal condescension. The Allies had kindly promised that all Turkish rights in Egypt would be preserved and that Turkish independence and integrity against any enemy would be upheld if it remained neutral.\(^7\)

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\(^2\) ODT, 2-11-1914, p.4, DT, 5-4-1915

\(^3\) ST, 2-11-1914, p.4

\(^4\) ODT, 25-1-1915, p.4

\(^5\) DT, 12-4-1915

\(^6\) ODT, 17-12-1914, p.4

\(^7\) ODT, 25-1-1915, p.4
Many in Otago/Southland believed Turkey joined Germany as it saw the War as an opportunity for gain and were bribed into joining by the Germans.\(^8\) The \textit{ODT} quoted 10 000 000 pounds as the figure.\(^9\) If this figure was correct Turkish help did not come cheaply. According to the \textit{ODT}, \textit{ST} and the \textit{DT} German bribery was aided and abetted by the Turkish War Minister, Enver Pasha, and his party of pro-German "Young Turks", who were greedy for both military glory and German gold. They were supposedly prepared to trade Turkish autonomy for these baubles.\(^10\)

Otago/Southland newspapers argued that Germany was prepared to go to any lengths to embroil Turkey, even to stir up its legendary religious fanaticism and blood-thirstiness. The \textit{ODT} reported that Germany was prepared to use "Jihad" and held out Turkey's old European territory as bait. The preparedness of Germany to do such deals was a "crime against the white races and against civilization".\(^11\) The Turks were no angels, described as a "barbarous and fanatical people whose awful work in Armenia and the Soudan has at times horrified the world", but German dealings with such a nation was even worse.\(^12\) The bottom line of most reporting on the War continued to be to make Germany look bad, even if it meant casting Germany's allies in a more flattering light.

The theory was that German agents were attempting to persuade Turkey that Teutonic European rule would mean the restoration of Turkey's former glory as the great Mohammedan power of the world. Germany wanted the influence that the Turkish Sultan had over the Muslims as their Khalifat. Through the Khalifat Germany would gain control of India, Egypt, and the Suez Canal, and thereby undermine British relations with Persia and Afghanistan.\(^13\) This was a truly ridiculous notion as the Khalifat's influence had mattered little in these nations in the past.

Mohammedans as a whole were not considered stupid and the German attempt to use Jihad failed because it was realized that this War was

\(^{8}\textit{ODT}, 3-11-1914, p.4, \textit{ST}, 3-11-1914, p.4\)

\(^{9}\textit{ODT}, 4-11-1914, p.2\)


\(^{11}\textit{ODT}, 12-10-1914, p.6\)

\(^{12}\textit{ODT}, 2-11-1914, p.6\)

\(^{13}\textit{ST}, 31-10-1914, p.5\)
not anti-Christian. India was disinterested as it saw, "that Germany is using Turkey for her own designs and that the Sultan is a tool in the hands of the Kaiser's agents".14

The failure of Jihad was explained in terms of German guile. Turkish priests were purportedly employed to find supportive Koran texts. In some of its more fantastic imaginings the ODT reported that German professors were going out in Dervish dress and applying all their perverted intellect to convince the ignorant tribes of Asia and Africa that the one and only prophet, Allah, had been reincarnated in the evil genius of the War, that is, the Kaiser.15

The DT agreed that German influence was strong, though it overstated its case when it wrote that since 1898 Turkey had been little more than a suburb of Berlin because Germany had long been sending large numbers of officials to Turkey to reorganize the Turkish Army. These German officers, it argued had produced a disastrous effect in Turkish military policy ever since.16

According to the papers of Otago/Southland the Turks did not learn from past mistakes, even though their last forays into European affairs during the Balkan Wars had been disastrous. The reason suggested for this lack of caution was a complacency resulting from the mental atrophy, that came with Kismet. The Turk could excuse all of their short-comings by blaming it on Allah. And the Turk was naturally indolent.17

Added to this, their system of government was totally unsuited to their character and historical background. In 1898, Abdul Hamid had been toppled and his reign replaced by a democratic constitution. Ordinarily this development would have been positive, but in Turkey's case democracy was totally unsuited to a people unused to self-government. The constitution proved unworkable and was replaced by a very corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy.18

Individual Turks were not considered bad fellows and under a good government that paid attention to education, they could become a

14 ST, 26-11-1915, p.4
15 ODT, 17-11-1915, p.6
16 DT, 21-12-1914
17 ODT, 7-11-1915, p.7, DT, 21-12-1914
18 ODT, 7-11-1915, p.7
contented nation not prone to bloodshed. The problem was the Turkish mode of government. It supposedly fostered Turkish craftiness, sloth and degradation that had earned them the name "The Unspeakable Turk". The Turks were characterized as politically irresponsible children who blundered from one disaster to another. "Shrapnel", the military expert of the ODT, summed up when he wrote, "A foolish boy standing near a steam hammer with his pockets full of gunpowder seems to be the picture of Turkey". Turkish leaders commanded scant respect from the West. The Khalifat/Sultan was described as a weak and irresolute personage, lacking backbone.

The other main leader of Turkey, War Minister Enver Pasha, was characterized as gaining notoriety and power that did not accurately reflect his lack of talent. Since he had become leader of Turkey in 1909, through a revolution aimed at establishing "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity", the Ottoman Empire had plunged into two disastrous wars and now it was embroiled in a third. When a Daily News correspondent first met Pasha he could not help feeling that, "his natural vocation in life was not politics but philandering in a London boarding-house". Nevertheless, Pasha had proved himself adept at political intrigue. Dr E.J. Dillion, an Eastern expert, described him as of Polish extraction, a Prussian by training and sympathy, a Turk by language and by marriage to the Sultan's daughter; in other words, a splendid tool for Germany. Military glory was Enver Pasha's obsession. This character analysis like most of the articles published on Turkey, showed that Germany was pulling the strings behind the scenes.

The Turkish Army was not thought to pose much of a serious threat to anybody, except maybe to themselves. One writer asked her/his readers to, "Imagine a poor fellow with a big pack on this back, wearing a pair of heelless slippers". The Turkish Army's last outing did not inspire confidence in its abilities as it had been crushed by the Russian Army in Trans-Caucasia. The Balkan Wars had sapped the Turkish Army's strength and left it too exhausted and divided to re-equip.

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19 ODT, 26-11-1914, p.3
20 ODT, 19-12-1914, p.7
21 ODT, 8-1-1915, p.3
22 ST, 15-2-1915, p.4
23 ODT, 11-11-1914, p.6
Like the rest of Turkey, the Turkish Army was thought to be honeycombed with intrigue and corruption. The ST warned that it was unlikely to mutiny, however, as it would always follow its officers, its German officers. And there was little chance of a popular revolt because Germany controlled the Turkish Army.24

The paper strength of the Turkish Army was not seen as a true indication of the quality of its actual resources. The Turks were notoriously lethargic and inept and it was doubted that the German officers had managed to bring the Turkish troops up to the desired level.25 Once the Turkish Army was engaged in battle, this opinion was slightly modified with it being acknowledged that the Germans had moulded the Turkish Army into a homogeneous, if not an exactly united whole. But it was still believed that the Germans had not had enough time to turn the Turkish Army into a truly effective war machine.26

While the Turkish Army as a whole was usually dismissed as a negligible force the individual Turkish soldier was regarded more highly. This pre-dated a similar attitude towards the individual German soldier. "Shrapnel!" described the Turks as splendid soldiers; brave, hardy and capable of great self-sacrifice. They had proved themselves magnificent soldiers in the Crimean War. The Turks, for all their faults, were not regarded as cowards, especially if well led.27 Reports of initial skirmishes held that the Turks fought bravely though their retreat was a little disorganized.28 Captain C.E.W Bean, official Australian Press Representative, had a slightly different impression from the first skirmishes between New Zealand and Turkish troops at the Suez Canal. He branded the Turkish method of firing from their trenches pathetically simple and ineffective.29

As the War progressed there came increasing reports that the Turkish people were beginning to see through German lies and trickery. There were apparently anti-German and anti-war posters in Constantinople, one appealed to Turks to "punish the Germans who have

24 ST, 9-1-1915, p.5, ODT, 6-3-1915, p.8
25 ST, 6-3-1915, p.5
26 ODT, 7-4-1915, p.8
27 ODT, 13-1-1915, p.5, 20-3-1915, p.8
28 ODT, 6-4-1915, p.6
29 ODT, 22-4-1915, p.8
pushed Turkey into ruin". German arrogance and bullying produced isolated mutinies. There was a report of a serious clash between Arab, Turkish and German officers, in which revolvers were used and 27 Arabs were thrown in jail. The awakening of the Turkish people to their danger, however, had come too late.

The situation in Turkey was painted as desperate on all fronts, both military and civilian. Germany's main agent in Turkey, General von de Goltz, was credited with frankly confessing that it was a major blunder for Turkey to enter the War. He condemned German intrigues as acts of unmitigated idiocy. Ammunition and guns were said to be running very low and the Turkish Army position was apparently desperate. The Young Turks were divided amongst themselves and had antagonized the civilian population. Promised German help had failed to materialise.

The press of Otago/Southland argued that the Great War was not a national war for Turkey, but one manufactured by German gold and the "Young Turks". Germany's usurping of Turkish sovereignty had become too blatant for even the lethargic Turks to ignore. Unless Germany was defeated, Turkey would forever remain in Germany's thrall. Dr E.J. Dillon wrote that the one place that German plans were not upset was in Turkey where Germany skillfully manoeuvred the Young Turks into setting Turkey on the path to ruin. Germany was aided by the complete lack of moral restraint and an "invincible stupidity" that allowed Germany to turn Turkey into a Prussian province. It was Prussian/German influence that turned Enver Pasha from democracy to military autocracy. The general consensus in Otago/Southland was that Germany had forced Turkey into the War and that Turkey itself had very little say in it.

30 ODT, 4-1-1915, p.6, ST, 4-1-1915, p.4
31 ODT, 2-2-1915, p.6
32 ODT, 29-3-1915, p.3
33 ODT, 29-3-1915, p.5
34 ODT, 16-4-1915, p.4
35 ST, 4-1-1915, p.4, ODT, 25-1-1915, p.6
36 ST, 15-2-1915, p.4
37 ST, 29-3-1915, p.5
A DUEL TO THE DEATH: HEROISM OF AN AUSTRALIAN OFFICER

A stirring tale is told of a certain Lieutenant Sutton, of the Australians, who volunteered to go out with a small party one night to blow up a Turkish trench. Before, however, the little band were able to accomplish their mission, the Turks made a sudden attack, and Sutton and six men had to beat a hasty retreat. The lieutenant took refuge in a Turkish trench, and amused himself for some time in returning hand grenades to the enemy. One, however, exploded as he picked it up and blew off his right hand. He received a first-aid dressing, and was sitting in the trench, nursing the stump, when the Turks made a rush, and he suddenly perceived a huge Turk looming over him with a bayonet. Quick as lightning he drew a kukri from the head of a dead Gurkha lying by him and slashed the Turk, wounding him in the neck. The Turk fell over him, and Sutton grappling the man with his left arm, embedded his bayonet in the ear of his assailant, and thus held him for ten minutes till assistance arrived.

Source: CW, 18-8-1915, p.45
Overall, Turkey's entry was not regarded as a serious blow to the Allied cause. The ODT was moved to write that, "such a state of affairs leads to the assumption that the occupation of the entire Dardenelle and Gallipoli Peninsula will not be difficult nor a work of long duration". The case of Turkey exemplified the kind of unreal expectations Otago/Southland developed because of the one-sided nature of the war news; exactly the false expectations that the ST constantly warned against.

The Gallipoli landing marked the beginning of New Zealand's active involvement in The Great War. It also marked the beginning of a change in the "image of the Turkish enemy"; a change that paralleled later shifts in the "image of the monstrous German enemy" once New Zealand troops hit the Western Front. The physical involvement of "our boys" in the fighting changed how Otago/Southland thought of the enemy. No longer was the enemy an abstract being, now the Turkish enemy was real and facing Otago/Southland troops across a narrow no-man's land. Intriguingly, on the day of the landing at Gallipoli the CL ceased publishing photographs of war atrocities and bombed out cities. Coincidence or a conscious effort to spare its readers a visual representation of the War their sons, daughters, husbands and fathers were now entering?

Unsurprisingly, Otago/Southland newspapers now became very interested in the activities and worth of the Turkish Army. Most reports praised the ordinary Turkish soldiers' achievements under hardship. The Turks were regarded as magnificent defensive fighters, as good as any in Europe. As soldiers they were accorded the ultimate compliment of being "clean fighters that played the game". The Turkish sniper was highly respected as brave, almost brazen, and their machine gunners were described as wonderful. The Turks were regarded as very suited to the irregular warfare of the broken ground of the Gallipoli peninsula. Turkish humanity was remarked upon more than

38 ODT, 29-4-1915, p.6
39 ODT, 3-15-1915, p.3
40 ODT, 6-7-1915, p.5 & 20-8-1915, p.5, ST, 19-7-1915, p.3
41 ODT, 7-8-1915, p.8 & 22-9-1915, p.5
42 ODT, 26-8-1915, p.5
once as they carefully refrained from shelling hospitals and often helped the ANZAC wounded.\(^{43}\)

That the Turk proved to be a clean and fair fighter came as a surprise to many who had expected the Turk to deviate from every rule of civilized warfare. The Turks did not come close to touching the Germans for pure “Frightfulness” and did not use gas or flame throwers. The Australian journalist, Captain C.E.W Bean’s defence of the Turk was widely published. He wrote that the Turk was a rather maligned person and blamed any Turkish Army atrocities on the Kurds, Circassians and other wild men contained within the Turkish forces.\(^{44}\)

Another Australian correspondent’s article in the \textit{CL} did offer one explanation for this unexpected resistance. When the Turk had gained his reputation for cruelty he had been fighting while angry, now he was fighting with the courage of despair as he watched his country slip slowly from his grasp. The Turks were suffering from this “courage of despair” because of their belief in “Kef”. Supposedly, this produced a condition of extreme acquiescence and fatalism in the Turkish approach to life. All of life was entrusted to Allah and no reasoning could prevail against this all encompassing religion. As the Koran said, “Each nation has its turn. When the appointed time comes, men can neither retard or hasten it”. The one thing that could arouse the Turk from their habitual apathy was war, even through this was not a religious war.\(^{45}\) The British had many Muslims living happily under their rule and were prepared to guarantee Turkish integrity prior to Turkey’s entry into the War. Thus the Turks had no reason to hold a religious grudge against the enemy of Germany, the British.\(^{46}\)

A small number of reports of Turkish atrocity and cruelty, usually in letters or interviews arrived in Otago/Southland.\(^{47}\) Malcolm Ross, New Zealand’s official correspondent, assured New Zealand that most of these alleged cases proved groundless when investigated properly.\(^{48}\) The odd New Zealand soldier wrote home with hatred in his heart, but in

\(^{43}\) \textit{ODT}, 27-8-1915, p.10 & 28-8-1915, p.7
\(^{45}\) \textit{CL}, 25-6-1915, p.3
\(^{46}\) \textit{ODT}, 25-1-1915, p.4
\(^{47}\) \textit{ODT}, 8-6-1915, p.8, \textit{CL}, 17-8-1915, p.3
\(^{48}\) \textit{ODT}, 11-12-1915, p.3
general reports were very favourable. Certainly they played a few tricks on their foe, like impersonating Allied officers, but what army did not? Reports of Turkish atrocity on the battlefield were consistently denied.49

While the ordinary Turk soldier was respected their officers did not rate so highly, especially their German officers. In July 1915 there was an incident at the Constantinople barracks where ten Germans were killed and fourteen wounded. The German officers were obviously not popular with their troops.50 The Turkish officers were portrayed as little better. They were supposedly ordered to shoot any cowards who ran away, shoot them yourself.51

On the battlefield opposite the ANZAC's the Turks were a respected force, but the Turkish Porte remained beyond the pale. Ross described the Turkish administration as dirty, brutal and tyrannical, returning to the bad old days of the Sultan.52 Enver Pasha, the Turkish War Minister, was painted as a mere puppet of his German masters, without initiative. Only he and his German masters stood between a reluctant Turkey continuing the fight or calling a halt.53

Not all shared Ross's low opinion of Enver Pasha. Enver apparently believed that Turkey's day was not yet over and that this was a great opportunity to prove to the world that Turkey still had what it took to be a world power. Even so his belief in the dormant strength of Turkey, though admirable, did not give Turkey an adequate excuse for joining Germany and believing their promises.54

Like Austria-Hungary, Turkey had been relegated to the role of German "cat's-paw" and the bulk of its people more or less absolved of all responsibility. Germany was responsible for all Turkey's actions. Constantinople was a city completely under the heel of the German jackboot. The true situation in Turkey was summed up by one old Turk quoted in the CL. "We have given up every vestige of liberty just to waste our men and our money in a quarrel which doesn't concern us". Had

49 ST, 19-7-1915, p.3
50 ODT, 29-7-1915, p.5
51 ODT, 7-8-1915, p.8
52 ODT, 11-12-1915, p.3
53 ODT, 3-5-1915, p.8, DT, 5-7-1915
54 DT, 18-10-1915
it not been for the declaration of Jihad, the Turkish rank and file would not have picked up arms.

But the crime, if it could be called that, of Germany dragging an unwilling Turkey into war paled beside the much greater crimes that went under the name of the "Armenian Atrocities". These atrocities were distinguished from German atrocities in two ways. First, they were true and second, they were hardly surprising as Turkey had been killing off the Christian Armenians for hundreds of years. Unlike the German atrocities no journalist needed to exaggerate or stretch the truth to shock the world. This was terror and horror on a mass scale, with extermination as the objective. For weeks there were bodies floating down the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and hundreds of thousands of men, women and children were killed, deported (which amounted to death), or enslaved. Sadly, by the stage of the War these reports filtered through they made less impact than they deserved because the Otago/Southland papers had already been saturated with news of German atrocities.

These stories, unsurprisingly, reflected worst upon Germany who was the "master" of Turkey and so must, therefore, be either instigating or approving Turkish actions. The ST stated that Germany alone could stop these massacres. The "image of the monstrous Germany enemy" meant that Otago/Southland readers believed that Germany could have stopped these atrocities. Turkish actions must be part of German plans to extend its "kulture" into the nations under its control. The Armenian atrocities were a manifestation of kulture in all its glory, running parallel to "Frightfulness" in Europe. This was further backed up by a report that the Kaiser decorated a Turkish minister who had exterminated more Armenians in nine months than Abdul Hamid, the bloodiest of all sultans had in 25 years. The fact that Germany

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55 CL, 15-10-1915, p.4  
56 ST, 29-9-1915, p.4  
57 ST, 23-9-1915, p.5  
58 ODT, 20-11-1915, p.6  
59 NZT, 3-2-1916, p.34
desperately needed Turkey as an ally and could do little to stop the embarrassment caused by the Armenian atrocities was ignored.60

The fact that the Turks were fighting New Zealanders was important in colouring Otago/Southland perceptions of them as soldiers. It would not have been encouraging for Otago/Southland had its troops been fighting monsters from an Arabian nightmare. As the Turkish soldiers were considered worthy opponents then it reflected well upon the New Zealand troops and maybe removed some of the worst fears of those at home concerning atrocity on the battlefield. It also explained the ANZAC's failure to make headway, despite much bravery and gallantry. A similar change occurred once the New Zealand Division arrived on the Western Front. It became necessary to upgrade the enemy to explain the failure of the Allies to make any significant advance.

What was interesting about the clash with Turkey at Gallipoli was that the Turks themselves were given very little credit or condemnation for anything that they did - Germany was behind it all. This allowed more recrimination to be heaped upon Germany's head. It was because of this attitude the Turks escaped most of the condemnation they deserved for the Armenian atrocities. This notion of "monstrous Germany" also explained neatly why Turkey had decided to join Germany.

Otago/Southland's hatred of Germany tended to make them see the German bogeyman everywhere and blinded them to reality. It may have taken a little imagination to blame Germany for every horror and accident of war but the press of the time was remarkably successful in doing so.

Once it had been established that Germany was firmly in control of Turkey little remained to be said. The odd incident was remarked upon, like the chaos resulting from the murder of Prince Yussuf. The "Young Turks" apparently used this incident to purge Turkey's higher offices of "Moderates", including the Riza President of the Chamber, Halil Bey, Zeia, a high functionary of the Grand Vizierate, and thirty officers. They were supposedly confined to Asia Minor thereafter.61

Once Gallipoli was over and the New Zealand troops moved to the Western Front, the main focus of interest in Otago/Southland shifted to the prospects of a Turkish revolt. The debate centred on whether or not

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60 S. Wallace, War and the Image of Germany, British Academics 1914-1918, p.169

61 ODT. 2-3-1916, p.5
the Turks could overcome their habitual resignation to life's irritations. The ODT wrote in March 1916 that there was growing evidence that many Turks wanted to cry "Hold, enough", especially since the fall of Erzeroum. The ODT felt there was some truth in these reports because they were persistent and full of detail. Added to the cry for peace was the increasingly desperate situation of Constantinople. Its people were starving and being swept by typhus, cholera and the plague.

The "Young Turks" were being threatened by a population that was angry and desperate because their country had been sold to Germany. The Young Turks had swept all able-bodied men into the army where the German officers kept them in line by using vicious corporal punishment. The discontented Turkish population was rendered impotent by the iron discipline wielded by a German police force. There was little chance of revolt.

The ST warned against expecting a revolt to materialize in Turkey because the strongest governing forces were on the side of Germany as was the strongest personality, Enver Pasha. Furthermore, Germany's other allies, Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary, had not revolted and nor would Turkey.

In addition to German influence the NZT felt there was a religious element involved for Turkey that would compel it to fight on. Turkey was defending its sacred capital against the Infidel. Turkey may have been tricked into the War but now that it was in it, Turkey would fight to defend itself. And it would be next to impossible to take Constantinople, which was "a gate, like the bridge of Horatius; where a 1000 might be stopped by three".

There were also reports of growing discord between Turkey and Germany over operations against Russia in Armenia, especially over the fall of Erzeroum. Each blamed the other for the defeat. Turkey had

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62 ODT, 11-3-1916, p.6
63 ODT, 7-2-1917, p.5
64 ODT, 7-2-1917, p.5
65 ST, 16-3-1916, p.4
66 NZT, 20-4-1916, pp.29-30
WITH THE ALLIED FORCES AT THE DARDANELLES: DEFEAT OF THE PIRKS IN A MOONLIGHT BATTLE.

The Turks had offered a bellicose and noisy answer to the Allies. Our troops, concentrating on the heights and establishing the formidable trenches, overwhelmed the Turks in the supporting trenches and overran them with no serious loss of life. The victory was complete, and the Turks were driven back to their lines, where they awaited further developments.

The nature's storm on the sea resulted in 300 casualties to the Allies.
supposedly disobeyed orders and acted independently with disastrous results.67

With the arrival of the first anniversary of ANZAC day the Turk was, once again portrayed as a wonderful defensive fighter. Interestingly, Enver Pasha's opinion on Gallipoli expressed in the Spanish Journal Ibanez de Ibero was published by the DT. "The Dardanelles expedition was a bad blunder on the part of the Entente".68 Enver Pasha's argument that troops were needed more on the Western Front were later echoed by the official British inquiry into Gallipoli.

The Turkish authorities continued to be damned for their part in the Armenian Atrocities. In February 1917, Viscount Bryce presented to the British Parliament a book that outlined the vast amount of evidence that proved Turkish policy was aimed at the complete extermination of the Armenian people. This Turkish policy was apparently unchallenged by Germany.69

The contradiction between the "clean fighting" Turkish soldier and Turkey's slaughter of approximately one million Armenians did not go unnoted. The DT ran an article from The Times that pondered this paradox. It was explained thus:

The Turk as a ruler is a merciless oppressor; as a negotiator a cunning Byzantine; as a soldier a tough fighter; as a victor a remorseless bully. But when he is defeated he is a pathetic and distressed gentleman, when he feels he has met his match he is chivalrous.69

The War exemplified the perceived paradox of Turkish nature very nicely; the cruel versus the thoughtful. The "Young Turks" wanted a great and pure empire and were prepared to be ruthless beyond all measure, while doing every little kindness necessary to add to the Turks' reputation as "clean fighters".

His success we must acknowledge; he has massacred, pillaged, outraged; for two years and a half, he has broken every convention, maltreated our prisoners, killed our wounded, held our women hostages; yet he remains the "clean fighting Turk".71

67 DT, 14-8-1916
68 DT, 12-6-1916
69 ODT, 24-2-1917, p.13
70 DT, 21-5-1917
71 DT, 21-5-1917
The NZT with a newly born scepticism in March 1918 wrote that it felt these atrocities had been greatly exaggerated and some were made up by Turkey's political enemies, or for political ends within Allied countries. Otago/Southland had been told of many Gallipoli cruelties, stories that were as odds with what our returned servicemen revealed. The Armenian Atrocities was a similar case. The NZT felt that while some of the reports were true, many of the Turkish attacks were in reaction to violence perpetrated by others. The NZT believed strongly that past experience with the truth of the "War News" should cause Otago/Southland to question what they heard. In an attack of religious rivalry, "Odysseus" in the NZT wrote that there had been peace between the Turks and Armenians before the Protestant missionaries stirred up trouble.72 The scepticism demonstrated by the NZT towards the Armenian atrocities was only a small part of the war it was waging against unquestioning belief in the "War news" as received in New Zealand. Unfortunately, in this isolated case the War news was accurate.

Late in July 1918, Turkey severed relations with Germany and Enver Pasha's hold on Turkey was reputedly weakened severely. Reasons suggested for his decline included the failure of Enver Pasha to gain territorial concessions from Germany. Alternatively, Germany was no longer in a position to bolster Turkey financially or militarily and the Turkish people had been sorely tried and wanted a separate peace.73 It was predicted that Enver Pasha's rule would be replaced by Talat Bey, who was lukewarm towards Germany and felt that the sooner Turkey was out of the War, the better.74

On 2 November 1918 the War ended for Turkey with its unconditional surrender. Otago/Southland celebrated. For many the demise of Turkey marked the end of the road for Germany. As the Reverend W.A Hay remarked at the Dunedin celebrations, "Turkey's historical attitude had ever been that of the wily fox with its nose to the ground scenting trouble. She had apparently scented trouble, and now she had run home to root", (laughter). He added, "The Turkish Empire was splashed with blood, and every page of her history was drenched in blood and God would

72 NZT, 23-3-1918, p.14
73 ODT, 31-7-1918, p.4
74 ODT, 2-8-1918, p.5
now see that a peace-loving nation would inherit that land", 75 Peace was breaking out all over and the meek would inherit the earth.

In the final analysis, the development of the "image of the Turkish enemy" was an interesting one that was strongly entangled with that of the "image of the monstrous German enemy". The establishment of the "image of the monstrous German enemy" before the entry of Turkey had a definite impact upon the "image of the Turkish enemy" because all Turkish wrongdoing was attributed to Germany or German influence. The other major event that influenced the "image of the Turkish enemy" was Gallipoli. Gallipoli became a New Zealand legend and a worthy foe was needed. It also produced first-hand accounts for the citizens of Otago/Southland through its returning troops. The fact that the news of the Armenian atrocities reached Otago/Southland after the "horrors" of "German Frightfulness" was important because it meant that their impact was muted when they were greeted by a desensitized population. As the CL wrote with regard to the sinking of the "Arabian", atrocities no longer sent a thrill of horror through the world.  76

Despite the attention Turkey received it remained only a sidelight to the most important player, Germany. Had it not been for New Zealand's involvement at Gallipoli, Otago/Southland's interest in Turkey's would have remained minimal as Turkey was not considered to be of critical importance. It was a pawn of Germany and therein lay its importance within the framework of the "image of the monstrous German enemy".

75 ODT, 2-11-1918, p.10
76 CL, 27-8-1915, p.4
GENERAL HUTZENDORF, Austrian War Minister.

COUNT BERCHTOLD, Austria's Prime Minister.

Source: OW, 23-9-1914, p.38
Chapter Six
OTHER ENEMIES

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
August 1914 - November 1918
The corpse around Germany's neck?¹

The name Austria-Hungary was not one that struck terror into the hearts of Otago/Southland citizens. Austria-Hungary was more an object of derision, a foolish nation that had followed its stronger ally into an ill-conceived war that could not help but destroy it. Austria-Hungary had made the fatal mistake of falling into the claws of that most perverted nation - Germany and there could be no escape! For that they were to be pitied, but nothing could now stop its suicide as a political entity.

In the minds of the newspapers, editors and journalists of Otago/Southland, Austria-Hungary had sacrificed its independence to become a German satellite. Its greatest service to Germany and greatest impact in the War was considered to be the provision of the pretext to spark war. Aside from this Austria-Hungary had little worth as an enemy, or as an ally. Few, except perhaps the Magyars of Hungary,² believed that Austria-Hungary had actively started the War and was anything more than Germany's "cat's-paw".

Austria-Hungary's wartime image was strongly effected by the "image of the monstrous German enemy" and as such became a one dimensional creature that existed solely to help prove how evil and manipulative Germany was. The "image of the Austria-Hungarian enemy" as a pathetic and foolish ally of manipulative Germany thereby robbed Austria-Hungary of its independence, self-motivation and intelligence.

The general picture of the Dual Monarchy received in Otago/Southland, was of a crumbling Power on the brink of disintegration because of the stresses of war and internal pressures. As the months rolled by more and more flaws were uncovered until it became hard to believe that the Dual Monarchy could function, let alone fight on. Yet, fight on it did in defiance of the death sentence pronounced upon it by the negative "image of the Austria-Hungarian enemy".

¹ ODT, 4-1-1915, p.4
² ODT, 17-4-1915, p.13
Austria-Hungary was supposedly doomed as an empire because the many small States it contained were demanding independence and some would refuse to fight. The ODT reported that Prague seemed more like an Allied town, and that on several occasions Czech troops had laid down their arms without fighting.³ The slender thread that bound the Dual Monarchy states together, Catholicism, was reported as becoming ever more tenuous.⁴

The feebleness and age of its Emperor, Francis Joseph, made it all the more doubtful that the Dual Monarchy could hold together its diverse inhabitants under the strain of war.⁵ Added to this, the Hapsburg manner of ruling was unhelpful to inspiring national loyalty, and was summed up in three words by the ODT, "absolutism, selfishness and tyranny".⁶

The manner in which the Hapsburg Empire came into existence and its organization did not bode well either. Unlike most empires, the Hapsburg Empire was the product of gigantic matrimonial and land deals. No ideology or national feeling aside from Catholicism held any unifying influence over its disparate inhabitants. Ten languages were spoken within the Hapsburg Empire by many races. Little love was lost between the subject nations and their masters, nor between the rulers of Hungary and Austria and the Hapsburgs.⁷ The divisive force of a large Slavic population with Russian sympathies was added to the list of Austria-Hungary's woes.⁸

The ODT found some truth in the remark of Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador to Britain, that "Germany goes to war with a corpse hanging around her neck".⁹ Austria-Hungary was an artificial mass that could never hold under wartime conditions.¹⁰ Little was heard in Otago/Southland to counter these claims of imminent Austrian ruin.

³ ODT, 17-4-1915, p.13, DT, 16-11-1914, p.7
⁴ DT, 16-11-1914, p.7
⁵ ODT, 23-12-1914, p.4
⁶ ODT, 4-1-1915, p.4
⁷ ODT, 23-12-1914, p.4
⁸ ODT, 4-1-1915, p.4
⁹ ODT, 4-1-1915, p.4
¹⁰ DT, 29-3-1915
According to the model reported in Otago/Southland, Austria-Hungary should have collapsed within months, not years.

Unsurprisingly, after the treatment given to Austria-Hungary's political system the Austrian Army came under heavy attack. Most reports received in Otago/Southland on this army's battle worthiness and loyalty were disparaging in the extreme. One Vienna military journal, The Reichpost, was quoted in the ST as saying that, "The Austria-Hungarian Army has fallen on evil days" and that the the condition of the infantry was "melancholy". The infantry roll-call barely reached 80 per company as against 160 in France and Germany and 170 in Russia.\textsuperscript{11}

The Austrian Army C-in-C, General Conrad von Hoetzendorf, was described as devoid of all original military tactics and had a charming nickname - "The Genial Hangman". Apparently, he believed that armies existed only to make war and that if given too much rest they deteriorated. The Austrian Army was so hidebound by tradition that it detested and discouraged all original talent and so was destined to fail miserably.\textsuperscript{12}

The Austrian Army's military worthlessness was considered proven when it failed to effectively resist Serbian and Russian forces. The ODT billed its defeat at Lemberg as the greatest defeat in their history, with the loss of 70 000 prisoners and 200 guns in seven days. Otago/Southland newspapers predicted that the Austrian Army would be unable to stop the Russo-Serbian forces from overrunning Austria-Hungary and must, therefore, be ruled out as an important factor in the War.\textsuperscript{13} One Russian commentator was reported as writing grimly that: "Austria is faithful to Germany as the stone is faithful to the drowning man round whose neck it is tied".\textsuperscript{14}

Austria's worth as a German ally was generally adjudged to be close to nil by Otago/Southland newspapers and maybe a hindrance incapable of defending itself. The London Correspondent of the ODT concurred and implied that maybe the Germans realized this also because, "The Germans were treating them [Austria-Hungarian soldiers] with contempt and

\textsuperscript{11} ST, 3-8-1914, p.6
\textsuperscript{12} ST, 10-8-1914, p.3
\textsuperscript{13} ODT, 7-9-1914, p.4
\textsuperscript{14} ODT, 24-9-1914, p.4
THE AUSTRIAN AND GERMAN ADVANCE IN RUSSIA: A SCENE TO THE SOUTH OF WARSAW.

The Austrians are carefully crawling forward in their attack on the Chelm Lublin line. Men may be seen lying about in an absolutely exhausted state after the forced marching and constant fighting they have had to undergo.

(Photos by Newspaper Illustrations.)
arrogance. The CL suggested that Austria-Hungary only joined Germany because it was afraid of being plundered by Russia and Italy.

Morale within the Austrian Army was portrayed as very poor partly because "it is becoming rapidly obvious to many Austrians that their cause is hopelessly impaired and that they are now being used by the Germans as a buffer between themselves and the advancing Russians." Added to this morale sapping prospect there were internal racial tensions. The Slavs disliked their Austrian officers who did not speak their language, and the Croats were reported as resenting orders to slaughter kinsfolk from outside Austria-Hungarian. It did not help that the Croat-Serb civilians taunted the soldiers, "Huh! see these little fools; they are the pet lambs of the enemy; they disgrace their Slav blood."

Adding to the chaos, a plot was revealed in an Austrian newspaper which showed plans to Germanize Central Europe all the way to the Aegean Sea and the Dardanelles. If the German plan succeeded then Austria-Hungary would cease to exist. This was not a move designed to strengthen the bonds of trust between Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Only the NZT protested the impression that the Austria-Hungarian soldier was a worthless, inefficient fighter and a negligible force, despite their intense training. Fuller information in the American press revealed that the early Austrian reverses were due to their being hopelessly outnumbered. Later the Austrians had some noted success against the Russians at Cracow, pushing them back 80 miles. The German press believed that the Austrians were a useful ally, full of valour but hampered by lack of troop numbers. None of this appeared in the cables to New Zealand. Censorship obviously, kept much from Otago/Southland.

Against the backdrop of poor morale and military disaster there were persistent rumours that Austria might sue for an independent peace. Austria’s past was examined and a precedent found. During the

15 ODT, 9-1-1915, p.5
16 CL, 22-8-1916, p.5
17 ODT, 9-1-1915, p.5
18 DT, 25-1-1915
19 ODT, 27-1-1915, p.5
20 NZT, 15-3-1915, pp.21-22
MASSACRE OF THE SERBIAN EVACUEES. REFUGEES LEAVING BELGRADE ON THE APPROACH OF THE AUSTRO-GERMAN ARMY.

When the refugees were streaming out of Belgrade, German airmen appeared and dropped bombs on the gathering crowds of women and children.
Napoleonic Wars Austria made a separate peace with Russia. Peace would have had the advantage of allowing Austria to avoid invasion and maybe hold its Empire together. 21 The theory was that Austria might opt out of the War because it had very little to gain territorially from a German victory, except perhaps Serbia and Montenegro. If Germany did gain its "place in the sun", all Austria could hope for was to be a Germany vassal and appendage; not an appealing prospect for any nation. The ST hoped that Austria was beginning to ask why it was suffering battles within it borders for an essentially German cause. The ST then suggested the Austrians knew they were losing but Germany did not. 22 But it was accepted that even if Austria-Hungary did negotiate a peace agreement it would not be for some time. Austria was not yet beaten and would continue to fight for what it wanted. 23

Very little appeared in the Otago/Southland press that allowed for any alternative interpretation of the situation, strength and motivation of Austria-Hungary. Austria was incapable of thinking or acting independently of Germany and derived all its motivation from Germany. Only one article reproduced in the CL challenged this view. It was a reprint from the Daily Chronicle, which wanted it to be understood that one of the most deeply rooted convictions in Austria-Hungary was that Serbia had to be crushed. Only small elements in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slavonic Croatia did not want to humiliate Serbia. The most serious impediment to a favourable Serbian solution was Russia, the self-proclaimed "Protector of the Balkan Peninsula". This championing of Serbia when combined with contempt for races lower on the scale of civilization, had bred hatred for the Russian. Much of Austria-Hungary was united in its hatred of Russia and would gladly fight it. The article warned that at crucial moments in the past the various groups within the Hapsburg Empire had proved themselves loyal and would probably prove so again. "Neither racial differences nor defeat have yet managed to drive home the wedge of disunion and disruption". 24 Such historically founded judgement, however, was rare.

21 ST, 11-19-1914, p.4 & 13-4-1915, p.5, ODT, 13-4-1915, p.4
22 ST, 13-4-1915, p.5
23 ST, 10-4-1915, p.3
24 CL, 16-3-1915, p.7
As was the case with Germany several themes remained constant as the War entered its third year. Despite the continued ability of Austria-Hungary to fight on, its early demise was still expected and debated by the Otago/Southland press, especially the ODT. The cables continued to brand the Austrian Army a force of incompetent cowardly officers that was incapable of standing up to the invading Russians. The massive number of Austrian POW's taken by the Russian Army in early 1916 was considered proof that the Austrian Army was collapsing. The Austrian Army's recent record was dismal and it was reported as having to have been rescued by the German Army at Galicia. It was attacked by its enemies and held in contempt by its friends.

In the second half of the War the ODT's predictions of doom became more dire. According to reports in the ODT, Austria-Hungary was financially bankrupt, bankrupt in strategy and morale and short of horses. It was also lacking some foodstuff and experiencing hyper-inflation of 50 to 100 percent. Racial tensions were escalating within the Army, with various nationalities like the Bohemians, Slavs, Bosnians and Croats deserting to the Russians. Reportedly even the Magyars, rulers of Hungary, erstwhile admirers of Prussian autocracy, were being enlightened as to its very obvious flaws. In August 1916 the ODT went so far as to write that "Vienna is said to be as gay as ever. It is known that the moments preceding death are often a period of a sense of relief". But even the ODT had the grace to write on the following day that it should not prematurely predict Austria-Hungary's collapse as it had held together much longer than many expected.

In mid 1916 the ODT changed its tack and temporarily attacked the Magyars as the handmaiden of Germany, rather than the Hapsburg Emperor. Magyar rule was described as "the most illustrative example of racial
EMPEROR CARR PACE OF AUSTRALIA AND EMILY OF
SCOTLAND AND HIS WIFE, MRS.

Emperor Carr was born in 1892, married 1911, ascended to the throne 1922.

Source: OW, 20-11-1918, p.33
monopoly at its worst." The reason for the change in direction was because Count Burian was replaced as Austria-Hungary's Foreign Affairs Minister by Count Andrassy. Andrassy was a Magyar who was fully sympathetic to the Prussian philosophy of conquering all small nations, holding them as subjects and working them for the enrichment of the conquering class of overlords. The Magyars would go even further than the Prussians and give its subject peoples no representation. All subversive nationalist feeling would be crushed ruthlessly. The point of all this rhetoric was that the appointment of Andrassy was deemed the first major step by German agents to submerge Austrian sovereignty into Prussian. Austria-Hungary was apparently on its way to becoming a principality of Germany like Saxony. The ODT was able to be sympathetic towards Austria-Hungary because such was the distortion of logic caused by the influence of the all pervasive negative "image of the monstrous German enemy" that Germany's allies were judged to be free of most evil intent.

The death of the aged Emperor Francis Joseph caused barely a ripple in the Otago/Southland press as it was hardly unexpected. Charles VIII took the throne and made a guarded speech on wanting peace after the honour of Austria-Hungarian arms had been satisfied. These remarks led the ever optimistic ODT to suggest, yet again, that the Dual Monarchy might not last much longer. The DT commented on the Emperor's death some four months after the fact that his death would make little difference because the junta that desired war was still in control. The DT editor was very impressed by Charles and his wife. He described them as warmhearted and popular, liberal and progressive. Charles Francis had spent the past two or three years at the front under heavy fire and so deserved respect, unlike the Kaiser.

In the dawn of 1917 the ODT introduced yet another major threat to Austria-Hungary's stability. It ran this quote from the Petrograd correspondent of The Times, "Unless a miracle happens famine in its

31 ODT, 2-8-1916, p.4
32 ODT, 18-8-1916, p.5
33 ODT, 25-11-1916, p.6
34 DT, 19-3-1917
worst form is inevitable.\textsuperscript{35} Austria-Hungary could not last much longer.

It was not until in mid-1917, however, that news of a Czech revolt reached Otago/Southland. Finally, one of the discontented nationalities had lived up to the ODT's prediction of internal revolt. These Czechs issued a manifesto demanding the creation of a representative assembly based upon universal suffrage for the purpose of founding an independent Czech-Slav State. This was seen as the another "first" symptom of the inevitable break-up of the Austria-Hungarian Empire. This revolt was reputedly partly anti-German in nature.\textsuperscript{36} This revolt meant little, however, in the bigger picture of the War.

The ODT became increasingly adamant about the special case of Austria-Hungary in 1918. The other papers of Otago/Southland remained silent having learnt the lesson that the propaganda of the Allies and the Central Powers had distorted the facts so much that it was impossible to know anything for certain.

The ODT's opening salvo was to once again revisit the tired old theme of Austria-Hungary being a mere tool of a monstrous Germany. There was a slight change, nevertheless, in the ODT's attitude to the strength of bond between Germany and Austria-Hungary. This was due to the influence of an article in the journal, Nineteenth Century, by Dr Barry Cal Cenron and also because of the failure of the Italian forces. Austria-Hungary would almost certainly have come to terms long ago had it been fighting alone wrote the ODT. It was the domination of Germany that had put the backbone into Austria-Hungary's effort. Germany had managed to so buttress Austria-Hungary as to turn it from a wavering ally into a vigorous instrument of defense. Austria-Hungary was firmly bonded to Germany because it was the keystone in the arch of Pan-German domination and Germany had the force to hold Austria-Hungary together. For this reason Austria-Hungary and Prussia were in a partnership until the end.

It is her [Austria's] last marriage and nothing but death will dissolve it ... importance to it [Pan-German design] of the two headed Empire, not merely as an instrument, but its connecting and co-ordinating principle, its Achilles heel, mayhaps but also its iron shod and seven-leagued boot of travel.

\textsuperscript{35} ODT, 1-2-1917, p.6

\textsuperscript{36} ODT, 22-6-1917, p.4
AUSTRIA'S NEW BARRABOUS WEAPON.

These were found by the Italians by the hundred. It is said they were used to despatch the wounded, the spring handle enabling the wielder to fracture the skull with one blow.

Source: CW, 24-7-1918, p.29
The whole point of this article was to make it clear that the peace must break up Austria-Hungary to safeguard Europe against the Pan-German ideal and set free a whole ring of captive people. It was portrayed as practical and noble aim. Suddenly, after years of being a negligible force, Austria-Hungary in 1918 gained a new status in the eyes of the ODT. The ODT did, however, continue to cover all possibilities by publishing reports of rising internal discontent.

As spring came to Europe the thoughts of the Otago/Southland press moved once again to the chances of a separate peace. As always the ODT led the charge. It was suggested that the peace terms of Austria-Hungary and Germany were drifting apart. Statements by President Wilson and Count Czernin seemed to suggest that they may be able to compromise, whereas Germany and the Allies could not. Count Czernin was quoted as saying, "Austria and America practically agree on the great principles of a new world settlement after the War and our views on several concrete peace questions approach agreement". But the ODT doubted that Wilson's attempt to drive a wedge between Austria-Hungary and Germany would be successful.

The sincerity of Count Czernin's peace utterances was distrusted in a later ODT article. The ODT's habit of seeing conspiracy everywhere proved too great for it to resist. Czernin's resignation as the Austrian Foreign Affairs Minister was felt to have been hastened by his attempt to organize a unilateral peace with France, and by his dishonourable attempts to drive a wedge between France and Britain. This was another example of the double standards of the propaganda war. This interpretation of Czernin's resignation originated with the French Premier Clemenceau who stated that Czernin lied when he said that Clemenceau had approached him about a separate peace. This development was portrayed as Germany using Austria's voice to sound out France.

Added to the confusion over Austria's peace intentions was the publication of a leaked letter from Karl of Austria to France. In this letter he promised to side with France in the post-war negotiation over Alsace Lorraine. The implication was clear, Karl had gone behind the Kaiser's back in an attempt to gain peace. The authenticity of the letter was of course denied by Karl but the ST felt that the existence

37 ODT, 15-1-1917, p.4
38 ODT, 13-2-1918, p.4
39 ODT, 17-4-1918, p.4
of the letter was enough to suggest that things must be becoming very
bad in Austria-Hungary. This was a strong statement for the ST to make
as it had mostly kept out of speculation over Austria's motives and
internal condition. 40

The defeat of Austria-Hungarian forces by Italy was the signal for
another surge of ODT articles predicting doom, both militarily and
politically. Peace was becoming a necessity to Austria-Hungary rather
than an option. 41 The final dissolution of the polyglot Austrian Army
was beginning in earnest with Czech-Slovaks fighting against Austrian
and German soldiers. Thousands of Slovaks, Croats and Jugo-Slavs were
deserting. Austrian military authorities were too afraid of the
consequences to deal too harshly with the deserters. 42 Austria-
Hungary desperately needed peace, much more so than did Germany. The
ODT wrote on 28 October 1918 that the time must come when desperation
overcame Austria-Hungary's bond with Germany. 43 It did not have to
wait long.

In common with the other non-Germany enemy nations Austria-
Hungary's weaknesses were emphasized, especially by the ODT. Most of
the other Otago/Southland papers had the sense to stay away from what
they knew very little about. It was a fairly simple matter to paint
Austria-Hungary as a nation on the brink of collapse because of its
political and racial makeup. Little was said to contradict the negative
"image of the Austria-Hungarian enemy" promoted by the ODT because
nobody knew anything for certain, and also because Austria-Hungary was
regarded as unimportant to the outcome of the War.

The negative "image of the Austria-Hungarian enemy" changed little
over the whole War period. This was probably because the New Zealand
forces did not come up against the Austrian Army. There was no need to
revise upwards the enemy's status to make him a worthy foe for our
troops. Few reports of Austrian success made it to Otago/Southland so
the Austrian Army remained an underrated entity. And Austria-Hungary's
image as a collapsing Power meant that it was never taken as a serious

40 ST, 3-5-1918, p.4
41 ODT, 25-6-1918, p.4, 26-6-1918, p.4 & 3-7-1918, p.4
42 ODT, 30-7-1918, p.5
43 ODT, 28-10-1918, p.4
threat, it could be more or less ignored. The fact that it did not collapse until the very end was irrelevant. Perception was all.

As was the case with Turkey and Bulgaria the negative "image of the Austria-Hungarian enemy" was used mainly as a tool to cast more shame upon the real enemy - Germany. Germany was blamed for Austria-Hungary's behaviour and this fact could never be forgotten. Austria-Hungary as a nation was excused most wrong-doing and its population treated more as reluctant prisoners of an enemy nation than as enemies in their own right.
"EMPEROR OF THE ORIENT": KING FERDINAND OF BULGARIA.

King Ferdinand of Bulgaria recently had his portrait taken as "Emperor of the Orient," and the picture hangs in the Royal Palace at Sofia. He is very like his friend the Kaiser, an ideal showman, whose charity will doubtless lead him to disaster.

Source: CW, 1-12-1915, p.49
Chapter Six
OTHER ENEMIES

BULGARIA
"PRUSSTIA OF THE BALKANS"
September 1915 - October 1918

Towards the end of September 1915 the press spotlight moved back
onto the complex situation in the Balkans. At the focal point of
interest was King Ferdinand of Bulgaria and the question was to which
side would he join? This was of interest as it was generally recognized
that the Allies were vulnerable in this area after the Dardanelles
fiasco. Speculation was rife in Otago/Southland. The past actions and
motives of Ferdinand were investigated for clues as to his current
thinking because his decision could prove to be crucial. Furthermore,
his close links to the Hohenzollern dynasty and Austria-Hungary made him
an important figure. He was, after all, a Saxe-Coburg (German) on his
father's side and an officer in the Austria-Hungarian Army.1

As always, underpinning interest in the Balkan situation was the
recognition that while other players may enter the field of battle,
Germany remained the focal point: the entity behind all major
developments. All that had gone before in the construction of the
"image of the monstrous German enemy" demanded that a German connection
or conspiracy be found that explained Bulgaria's unworthy actions.
Freewill and initiative on the part of Bulgaria, as was the case with
Turkey and Austria-Hungary, was reduced to a minimum; German authority
engulfed all.

It was a fairly simple matter to cast slurs upon Ferdinand's
character because of his past behaviour. Ferdinand's ascension to the
throne of Bulgaria was unusual in that he was elected to a throne that
nobody wanted because it was a dangerous position. This might have led
to admiration of his courage or ambition but upon ascension, Ferdinand
had his chief minister Stambuloff assassinated and so blotted his copy
book.2

In the thirty years before 1914 he had built Bulgaria into a much
more powerful state with the sage advice of his politically masterful

1 DT, 24-1-1916
2 ST, 5-10-1915, p.4
mother. It was generally conceded that it was she that kept Ferdinand from the excesses that were inherent in his nature. Unfortunately, she died in 1907 and since then Bulgaria had been involved in some unsuccessful wars. During the course of these wars, notably the 1912 and 1913 Balkan Wars, Ferdinand had proved himself an unreliable ally, liable to desert a friend if he saw any advantage, personal or national. This trait made him a suitable ally for the treaty breaking Germans. The ODT believed that Bulgaria was putting up its resources for auction to the highest bidder. According to its editorials, personal and national advantage, not philosophy, drove Ferdinand into war. 4

Added to his performance as a statesman he had a collection of undesirable personal character quirks. These included a desire for personal glory, recklessness, dandyism, strong personal ambition, and an extreme vanity that lay behind all his devious schemes to make Bulgaria stronger. 5 The NZT noted that he had proven unworthy of his Catholic faith and had been excommunicated. 6 He also lived in constant fear of assassination. 7 All in all, he did present not an attractive picture.

The ST believed that Bulgaria's past fickleness was best understood if one realized that Ferdinand was without scruple, held all principles in contempt and subordinated all to his own personal advancement. He did have some positive qualities but these were not enough to offset his overwhelming desire for recognition. He was considered a genius in military matters and statesmanship with a keen eye for the main advantage. But Bulgaria itself was merely a means to an end - his greatness. 8

The BT was gentler on the Bulgarian monarch than most. It portrayed him as a family man who had done much of practical value for his kingdom in the fields of education, communications, agriculture and defence. The story of how an assassination attempt was foiled was recounted. Supposedly, the unseen assassin was preparing to deliver the death-blow when he was overcome with compassion and could not complete

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3 CL, 26-11-1915, p.7, DT, 24-1-1916, ST, 14-12-1915, p.11
4 ODT, 24-9-1915, p.4 & 4-10-1915, p.4
5 ST, 28-10-1915, p.2
6 NZT, 2-12-1915, p.26
7 ST, 14-12-1915, p.11, ODT, 10-12-1915, p.4
8 ST, 5-10-1915, p.4 & 28-10-1915, p.2
the task when he saw how Ferdinand treated his many children.\(^9\)

Sometimes the ODT went off into bizarre realms of fantasy.

Ferdinand's loyalty to Germany was believed to be pre-existing because he was an officer in the Austria-Hungary Army.\(^10\) And he was reputed to be still smarting over the humiliating end of the Second Balkan War where Bulgaria was harshly treated by the Treaty of Bucharest. This meant that his ambitions were unfulfilled so he was especially susceptible to German wooing.\(^11\) Ferdinand would apparently feel no pangs of conscience if he joined "monstrous Germany" because he believed that the ends definitely justified the means.\(^12\)

As was the case with the Turks and some Austria-Hungary citizens, the Bulgars were usually excused the faults of their leader. Before Bulgaria actually entered the War, however, its people were occasionally pictured as possessing the unwelcome traits of hypocrisy and duplicity.\(^13\)

Once they entered the War on the "engineered" Incident of Serbia attacking Bulgaria the Otago/Southland press felt more sympathetic. The ODT commented that the Bulgar population was no more fooled by this pretext than the rest of the world.\(^14\) It felt sympathy for the poor Bulgar because they were being bullied into the War by Germany and their vain and foolish king.\(^15\)

Many Bulgarians were opposed to Bulgaria entering the War according to the Otago/Southland papers.\(^16\) The actions of the Bulgarian Government were not seen as a just reflection upon the brave and estimable nation it represented.\(^17\) The bulk of the Bulgarian population was Slavic and loathe to fight their kindred in Russia, especially since it had been Russia that freed Bulgaria from its Turkish

\(^9\) ODT, 3-1-1916
\(^10\) ODT, 4-10-1915, p.4
\(^11\) ODT, 13-10-1915, p.4
\(^12\) CL, 26-11-1915, p.7
\(^13\) ODT, 19-10-1915, p.6
\(^14\) ODT, 5-10-1915, p.4
\(^15\) ODT, 6-10-1915, p.4
\(^16\) ODT, 24-11-1915, p.5, NZT, 2-12-1915, p.26
\(^17\) NZT, 7-10-1915, pp.33-4
overlord.\textsuperscript{18} There was little chance of a rebellion, however, because Ferdinand controlled the Bulgarian Army and was reported to have purged it of any discontented officers with pro-Russian leanings.\textsuperscript{19}

Oddly, in mid-October 1915, the attitude of the ODT to the Bulgars changed yet again to less complimentary terms. This was mostly due to the publication of the opinion of Dr E.J Dillon, an acknowledged expert. He wrote that the Bulgarian was the 'Prussian of the Balkans'. Both the Prussian and the Bulgarian were incredibly thrifty, sober, capable of boundless sacrifice, and had little understanding of the graces of life. Obstinacy, distrust, secretiveness and abuse of force in war were the peculiar traits of the Bulgarian. The demands of the State were the ruling passion for Bulgaria, like Prussia, and so too was obedience to the law. It was this obedience that allowed them to keep a straight face when declaring their attack on an ally (in the Second Balkan War) a legitimate defence. Apparently, Bulgaria had been long been the handmaiden for German plans in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{20} A few atrocity stories were thrown in just to emphasize links of a more sinister nature than a mere military alliance between Germany and Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{21}

The ODT added to the variety of Otago/Southland press opinion in its own unique manner. In late 1915 the ODT wrote that the Bulgars were even worse than the Germans when it came to desiring war. The ODT declared that it was false to think that they were forced into the war because the Bulgars hated the Serbsians with a passion that amounted to genocide. This passionate hatred meant that the Bulgarians were not above atrocity and massacre and were prepared to go to any lengths to get their hands on Macedonia.\textsuperscript{22} Yet, the ODT contradicted this view some four months later, when it quoted a British officer on these same people in the effect that: "the Bulgar is a great fellow. He likes us and treats our wounded and prisoners well".\textsuperscript{23}

German success in pulling Bulgaria into the maelstrom merely reinforced Otago/Southland's perception of Germany as an arrogant,

\textsuperscript{18} ODT, 13-10-1915, p.4
\textsuperscript{19} ODT, 12-1-1916, p.5
\textsuperscript{20} ODT, 12-10-1915, p.3
\textsuperscript{21} ODT, 7-2-1916, p.5
\textsuperscript{22} ODT, 25-12-1916
\textsuperscript{23} ODT, 28-3-1917
self-absorbed nation intent upon using everyone and everything to fulfil
its goal of self-aggrandizement. It did not matter to Germany that its
allies may self-destroy as viable nations so long as Germany had
secured all possible advantage out of them first. The blindness of
these foolish nations meant that they were deceived by Germany’s
manipulations. They could not see that even if Germany did, by some
miracle, win the War, they would be little more than vessel states to
Germany’s dictatorship.24

To the ST Germany’s diplomatic success in the Balkans was just
another manifestation of German “kulture” where, “Bluff and bludgeon are
Germany’s favourite weapons”.25 Bribery could easily be added to the
list as it was rumoured that Germany had offered Bulgaria, Macedonia and
other territories in the East as a reward for their help, and they had
also offered Turkey. According to the papers of Otago/Southland it was
Germany’s and Ferdinand’s fault that Bulgaria got involved in the War
which it would probably have stayed out of otherwise.26 This was a
hypocritical attitude to take as the Allies were involved in as much
intriguing in Romania and Greece as Germany was in Bulgaria.

Further evidence of the Germany connection was detected in the
manner in which Bulgaria entered the war, that is, the fabrication that
Bulgaria had been innocently dragged into the War by its “felonious
neighbour”, Serbia. This seen was a typically German trick and as proof
that Germany was taking over as the real ruler of Bulgaria.27 Germany
could not just ally with a nation it had to cannibalize their
sovereignty and government for the good of Germany.

The success of Germany in the Balkans did not go unappreciated by
the ODT. The Kaiser and his diplomats had cleverly diagnosed the
situation in the Balkans and had played off one state against the other
to tempt them to join the Central Powers or remain neutral. For
example, it offered Greece, Southern Albania and Cyprus to protect it
from Italian plans for the Adriatic. If Greece wished to remain
friendly with Germany it had to accept German terms.28 For the most

24 ODT, 11-10-1915, p.4, ST, 13-10-1915, p.4
25 ST, 12-10-1915, p.4
26 ST, 13-10-1915, p.4
27 ODT, 13-10-1915, p.4 & 19-10-1915, p.6
28 ODT, 29-10-1915, p.5 & 9-10-1915, p.10
part Germany's plans in the Balkans appeared to be working, Greece was still neutral and Roumania was easily crushed. Bulgaria was its greatest success according to the Otago/Southland papers.

Once Germany's underhand influence had been established in the decision of Ferdinand to enter the War against the will of his citizens the interest of the Otago/Southland press in Bulgaria waned. The lessening of local papers' interest in Bulgaria mirrored a decrease in information that was received over the wires. The odd article still appeared, but on the whole the Otago/Southland press left Bulgaria alone until late in the War.

The main topic of the articles that did appear was the rising discontent of Bulgaria's population at being involved in a foreign war. The ODT reported in March 1916 that anti-War rallies were being held and that the police were powerless to stop them because the soldiers refused to help them. Some of these meetings demanded Ferdinand's abdication in favour of his son and the withdrawal of the Germans. Tensions between Bulgarian and German troops at Uskub were extremely high. Bulgarian sentinels had been ordered to fire on any Germans crossing the Vardev river. Added to these problems, economic conditions in Bulgaria were tightening.²⁹

The ODT also felt that tensions were getting worse between the Bulgarian Army and its German masters in 1917. The Bulgarian troops were demoralized and tired, they had lost their spirit because of German officer tyranny and the use of unfamiliar and disliked tactics.³⁰

It seemed that nobody in Bulgaria supported Ferdinand's entry into the War and all were actively agitating against the War. The Bulgarian Premier, Radoslavoff, was uncertain as to the advantage of joining the Central Powers. Apparently, he felt that the outcome of Verdun would prove "whether God is for us or against us". The ODT, in its usual optimistic manner, felt that this was the first unassailable evidence that Radoslavoff might lead Bulgaria to a separate peace. After all Bulgaria had abandoned allies before when it could see no advantage. Bulgarian philosophy was represented as a simple faith that Heaven was always on the side of the winner. According to this interpretation the actual fighting was only necessary to see what side God was on. Thus it

²⁹ ODT, 2-3-1916, p.5
³⁰ DT, 6-6-1917
would be perfectly legitimate to abandon Germany now that it was losing.  

Typically, the ST held a different opinion to the ODT as to the worth of the feelings of Bulgaria population towards peace. For the ST, the only man in the whole of Bulgaria that mattered was Ferdinand because over the years he had become an absolute ruler; it was he who held the nation's life in his hands. Bulgaria's ministers were merely his puppets. He kept them under control through the use of secret files. Bulgaria's ministers were, therefore, of little importance. The Bulgarian population would not rebel in favour of peace, no matter how much they desired it. This was because they were a Tartar race that had not yet managed to overcome the after-taste of years of Turkish rule, that is, they lived in an atmosphere of petty distrust of each other. Secret files and the aftermath of Turkish rule, according to the ST, meant that it was very easy for Ferdinand to use them as his personal tools.  

As 1917 wound to a close the case for Bulgaria's abandonment of the War seemed to be strengthening. The DT reported in September that Ferdinand was planning treachery to Germany because his main foe, Russia, had collapsed and Germany had not done what it had promised and won the War within a set time frame. Ferdinand hated the Kaiser and wanted to make peace at the expense of Russia and Turkey. Ferdinand wanted certain Russian and Turkish territories to form the basis of a Danubian Empire.  

Nothing further was written about Bulgaria until there were concrete indications that Bulgaria had making peace overtures in September 1918 after the Allies had invaded deeply into Bulgarian territory. Bulgaria had given up because its defenses had been compromised and it no longer believed that the Central Powers could win. It was showing its opportunist colours and wanted to depart the field of battle before it became the first enemy nation to be overwhelmingly defeated. Or so wrote the ODT on 1 October 1918.  

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31 ODT, 17-3-1916, p.4  
32 ST, 13-5-1916, p.5  
33 DT, 24-9-1917  
34 ODT, 1-10-1918, p.4
On 2 October 1918 the ODT revealed that Bulgaria had accepted Allied terms, citing war-weariness, demoralization and loss of a cause as the reasons. Bulgaria's surrender was important because it severed the direct link between Turkey and Germany and left all the Central Powers vulnerable.\(^{35}\) If the treacherous wobbler that was Bulgaria had decided to get out then the end could not be far off.\(^ {36}\)

The most important element in the "image of the Bulgarian enemy" was Ferdinand because he was Bulgaria's king and absolute ruler. It was he alone who decided whether to go to war or not; whether to sue for peace or not. He was not nicknamed the "Tsar of Bulgaria" for nothing.\(^ {37}\) His opportunist nature and existing links to the Kaiser (links that were never made entirely clear) were believed to have predisposed him to joining the Central Powers. Otago/Southland newspapers were disappointed but not surprised that Ferdinand opted for the Central Powers because German conspirators had been so successful in Turkey and Austria-Hungary.

Once Ferdinand entered the War the Otago/Southland press mainly concentrated on minimizing the danger of Bulgaria's action by emphasizing civilian and military discontent and Bulgaria's past fickleness. It became inconceivable that Bulgaria would have any significant impact in the War because its reasons for fighting were so tenuous. The rewards Germany could offer Bulgaria were not enough to excite any Bulgarian into action except for Ferdinand, who was German anyway.

Typically, the overall picture projected by the various Otago/Southland papers was not clear cut. The whole picture presented of Bulgaria was confusing and contradictory with the Bulgars being alternatively portrayed as a people oppressed by its own king and army, or a stubborn people who were the Balkan counterpart of the Prussian. All depended upon what point the writer was trying to convey. As time went on the idea of Bulgaria as the "Prussia of the Balkans" was usurped by the reassuring idea that a large proportion of its population was against the whole war and might demand a separate peace. The ST, however, pricked this bubble by suggesting that the Bulgarian population was powerless to resist the whim of Ferdinand. The variety of opinion

\(^{35}\) ODT, 2-10-1918, p.4

\(^{36}\) ODT, 5-10-1918, p.4

\(^{37}\) ST, 14-12-1915, p.11
between the Otago/Southland papers obscured what truth they may have contained because the evidence was so meagre and the rumour so prolific. Editorial policy had a definite impact on what "image" a papers' readers received.

The role of Bulgaria within the presentation of the "image of the monstrous German enemy" was similar to that of Austria-Hungary and Turkey, in that Bulgaria proved yet again the perfidy of Germany. Germany's allies had no real worth on their own because they were merely the tools of the true enemy – Germany. Bulgaria also demonstrated that one must remain vigilant to the dangers of listening to German lies because several nations had been taken in. The differences between the individual non-German enemy models could be explained by the fact that each German ally's "image" was tailored to the peculiarities of each nation's circumstances and characteristics. But underneath these differences was always the motivating force of Germany. In Bulgaria's case Ferdinand's opportunism was the thread that bound it to Germany, a thread that broke once Germany had nothing other than defeat to offer Bulgaria.
Chapter Seven
PROPAGANDA AND CENSORSHIP
The Enemy of the people.

"All's fair in love and war - except what the enemy does."  

Criticism of Allied propaganda and censorship, especially Britain's, were closely connected in the Otago/Southland press undermined the "image of the monstrous German enemy". Doubts about the motives behind British censorship led to doubts about how accurate a reflection the "image of the monstrous German enemy" was of German actions and ability. If Britain could hide its blunders behind censorship and propaganda then why should the "image of the monstrous German enemy" be any more honest? The duration of the War went a long way to disproving the alleged incompetence of the German Army and degeneracy of its society, which in turn led to questioning of the value of "war news" in general. Protests became more strident as the War progressed. During and after Gallipoli reaction towards the "image of the monstrous German enemy" and censorship became more personal and heartfelt. The War in Europe was no longer an abstract idea that could be discussed at length in a detached manner. The CL stopped publishing war photographs on 25 April 1915 for undisclosed reasons, probably because New Zealand troops were now fighting. The lack of detailed news was now a personal affront because New Zealand was denied knowledge of what their sons and daughters were doing. There was no discernable reason for such denial.

Late 1916 and 1917 was an interesting period as the backlash was no longer directed solely against the censor and censorship policy but towards British leadership and Parliament. Enough time had passed to fine tune the censor into an entity that was more acceptable to the general populace, yet nothing changed for the better. It was becoming obvious how far the War news received over the cables erred from the truth. It was evident that there was a deliberate policy of suppressing bad news, inventing good news and unjustifiable slander of the enemy. It looked increasingly likely that the British Government was using

1 MW, 11-8-1915, p.1
censorship to hide its larger blunders rather than for the legitimate purpose of suppressing information useful to the enemy.

Comment on Gallipoli and the submarine menace, exemplified the waning confidence of the Otago/Southland press in the honesty of British leaders and in the truth of information received from Europe in general. Implicit in this comment was a questioning of the validity of all War news and the "image of the monstrous German enemy" if the Allies were lying deliberately.

After three years of war it had become obvious that the Central Powers, contrary to the "war news", were still far from defeat. The bloody battles of the Somme and Passchendaele proved just how difficult it was going to be to dislodge the German Army. To invade Germany was going to be next to impossible without overwhelming forces. Time proved to be the greatest enemy of the "image of the monstrous German enemy".

The period from mid-1916 to December 1917 was the turning point for most Otago/Southland papers' attitude towards the positive uses of censorship and propaganda. Increasingly, censorship was seen as detrimental to the all important war effort.\(^2\) The policy makers who implemented censorship were attacked for refusing to listen to demands for useful and interesting news so the public could better understand how to help the war effort. And the Otago/Southland papers no longer felt that the high pitch of hatred that was justifiable.

Utterances on the disgrace that was the "war news" changed little in 1918. Most papers became more virulent and irritated as they settled in for the long wait till peace. If Britain was not going to send any useful and interesting information to New Zealand then most of the press of Otago/Southland were going to refuse to believe any news that did arrive. It could almost be said that in 1916 Germany was seen as less of a hindrance to the war effort than British censorship and propaganda.

This attitude can be seen as an example of the growth of nationalism in New Zealand during the War period. No longer was New Zealand prepared to sit back and passively accept whatever news the British condescended to give it. The Otago/Southland press felt that it deserved to know about the activity of its troops. It was no longer enough to just be a part of the armed forces of the British Empire; New Zealand now had a separate fighting identity of its own. Censorship was

not serving the interests of New Zealand and should, therefore, be altered. For the first time New Zealand's needs were placed before the needs of Empire.

By late 1918 the people of Otago/Southland were in the habit of thinking for themselves and had rejected much of the contrived "image of the monstrous German enemy". Little was believed if it could not be tested against the facts; the only reliable fact being that the War continued despite many predictions to the contrary. The boasting and sneers of the British Press had proved themselves to be empty lies whose purpose was to manipulate public opinion.³ There was still a problem though, while much of the British propaganda was disbelieved or questioned, censorship was still so effective that there was nothing with which to replace the "image of the monstrous German enemy".

While the need for some censorship was acknowledged, the general consensus by mid-1918 was that it had been grossly misused for the manipulation of public opinion, concealment of Allied blunders, and the suppression of important news. Indeed, it was beyond doubt that the Otago/Southland papers, with notable exception of the ODT, felt it was their right and duty to question the official version of events and "image of the monstrous German enemy".

What remains to be examined in this chapter was the negative reaction towards propaganda and censorship of the individual papers. What were the Otago/Southland newspapers reservations about propaganda concerning the enemy? How was censorship and propaganda regarded in general? When did the doubts set in and why? Was the "image of the monstrous German enemy" recognized as propaganda or accepted at face value? Was it fact or myth that New Zealand wholly and without question supported British policy? How did the different Otago/Southland newspapers deal with the realization that the "image of the monstrous Germany enemy" was an artificial construct?

There was some dissent in the ranks right from 4 August 1914. The NW with its socialist and pacifist leanings was by its very nature bound to be critical of the British Imperialist Government and its utterances. The dark horse of the Otago/Southland papers was the ST which from September 1914 was very critical of censorship. Its standpoint was that it was not censorship in itself that was evil but rather its irresponsible use. The other Otago/Southland papers were

³ NZT, 29-8-1918, p.15, NW, 13-3-1918, p.4
Sir J. Hutchison (1867-1946)

Otago Daily Times Editor

Source: G.H. Scholefield, Newspapers in New Zealand, Wellington, 1958, p.160
positioned between the two extreme standpoints as expressed by the ODT and the MW, with some movement over time.

The attitude of the ODT towards British use of propaganda and censorship could be described as ostrich-like; it buried its head in the sand and refused to acknowledge its use by Britain. It damned Germany’s use of these tools of war but failed to acknowledge that Britain was making just as much use of these same tools. The ODT editor, Sir James Hutchinson, never was prepared to ask uncomfortable and awkward questions about British use and misuse of propaganda. Throughout the War the ODT remained firmly on the side of the “image of the monstrous German enemy” and cast no doubt upon it. The only concession the ODT made to the increasingly obvious discrepancy between the “image of the monstrous German enemy” and reality, was that in the latter part of the War it published articles about “the monstrous German enemy” less often.

At the other extreme was the MW which steadfastly remained critical of the use of propaganda and censorship by Britain in the face of the mass of “evidence” to the contrary that poured over the cables. It did not suddenly forget the past and develop a blind hatred for Germany. The MW, unlike the other papers, was not hampered by a belief that Britain would never manufacture “evidence” on such a massive scale. The MW had no problem questioning the British version of events.

From the beginning the MW’s editor, Marxist Harry Holland, believed that both sides of the conflict would lie to manipulate public opinion. These lies would be believed until proven false, and by then it would be too late. James Thorn suggested that Britain should live up to its own image of doing battle as gentlemen and do away with all the unseemly lying about the enemy. He could not see why Britain should insinuate that all Germans were cowards and credit itself with all the world’s courage and humanity. The truth was that there was no difference in nature between the armies. The calls to men to fight for the “glory”, “honour” and the “flag” were merely sentimental froth to cover the actions of those shady ruffians who had started the War. For the MW the propaganda of war was a tool of oppression.

Heaven save us from liars who corrupt the earth so that the peoples murder with a light heart, ravage nations for glory and set up in Christendom the brute as as an example for all mankind.³

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⁴ MW, 19-8-1914, p.5
The refusal of the NW to believe many of the cables led it to question the motives behind the chain of events that led up to the outbreak of hostilities. It doubted that Britain got involved because of a moral necessity to protect Belgium from the "evil Hun". It asked if Britain would have been so quick to jump in to defend Belgium if it had been France that invaded Belgium to attack Germany? The reality was that Belgium was merely the excuse to gain the support of the British population for policies based on opportunistic imperialism and fear. Britain feared that in a war between the Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian combination the Triple Alliance would win, leaving Britain facing Germany over the Channel. This was an unacceptable situation.7

According to the NW it was the modus operandi of the British Government to hide its real reasons for going to war behind noble but nonsensical reasons. Its policy was to maintain widespread ignorance so its real motives for deciding to go to war without consultation would be obscured behind the Belgian smokescreen. According to the NW the British Government had done the same thing during the Boer War. The fictional reason was the voting rights of 60,000 Outlanders, which was ridiculous because many in Britain did not have the vote at the time. The reality was that the Boer War was fought to reduce the wages of the miners and to import cheap Chinese labour. The NW contended that the British Government needed censorship and propaganda because it knew that if the truth was revealed then its population would refuse to fight.8 For the NW the War was the outgrowth of Capitalism and imperialism that had been allowed to run amok under the propagandic guise of being a war to defeat the inhuman German. Even the NW had to agree, however, that it was Germany that started this war but not because it was "monstrous".9

The NW went further to question the assumption that war was a worthwhile enterprise at all. Would this War significantly change anything? Would the world be a better place after the destruction of German militarism by Allied military force? The editorial answer was an

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6 NW, 5-5-1915, p.7
7 NW, 9-6-1915, p.7
8 NW, 9-9-1915, p.4
9 NW, 2-9-1914, p.3
The Dachshund: "I thought you were only a contemptible little talking machine."

—from The Bystander.

Source: OW, 25-11-1915, p. 40
empathic no! The past one hundred years of European history was examined and found to be a mass of changing alliances and wars to fit the changing needs of Capitalists. War had essentially changed nothing for the better in the past, so why should it do so now? The only possible outcome of this War was a reshuffling of alliances and a lot of death. It was not a war between good and evil as propaganda would have the world believe, but an effective way of diverting attention away from the real problems of Northern Ireland, strikes in Russia and the absence of political freedom in Germany.10 War would not defeat German militarism, it could only be vanquished from within.11

Throughout the War the MW continually attacked the ever present double standard caused by propaganda. Patriotism was a fine case in point as it was a high virtue for all Britons to possess but the eighth deadly sin for Germans. To the MW the contradiction in this idea was immediately apparent and reprehensible. Patriotism as preached by the Allies, it wrote, ceased to be a virtue when it branded people traitors if they questioned the infallibility of a vacillating Cabinet Minister.12 It was ridiculous that the only horrors of war that were allowed unrestricted circulation were those perpetrated by the enemy, designed to engineer artificial anti-German sentiment.13

The MW marveled at the gull of those controlling public opinion and the short memory of the public that allowed the most extreme changes of image to be accepted.14 It firmly agreed with Bernard Shaw's dismissal of the notion that there was any difference between the aims of Germany and Britain, or between their militarists. He summed up his opinion on the manipulation of images with a typically crisp dismissal of propaganda:

Let us have no more nonsense about the Prussian wolf and the British lamb, the Prussian Machiaveli and the English Evangelist. We cannot shout for years that we were boys of the bulldog breed and then suddenly pose as gazelles.15

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10 MW, 26-8-1914, p.5 & 13-1-1915, p.1
11 MW, 13-1-1915, p.1
12 MW, 26-8-1914, p.4
13 MW, 19-5-1915, p.4
14 MW, 5-5-1915, p.7
15 MW, 24-2-1915, p.5
Overall, the MW was very disparaging of the use of the "image of the monstrous German enemy" because it did not serve the good of humanity, only the good of the capitalist and imperialist minority. This was the minority that through manipulation of the "image of the monstrous German enemy" sought to use the flesh and blood of the masses for their own ends. The "image of the monstrous German enemy" was a mostly false construct dedicated to the evil task of creating a high tide of hate towards Germany so the War continued to the satisfaction of the profit making Capitalists.\(^{16}\)

The MW had no doubt that Britain deliberately misused censorship and propaganda to hide its blunders from the world.\(^{17}\) Gallipoli was one of the best examples of this duplicity. The MW wrote of Gallipoli that it was the British Army's greatest defeat and could only compare in magnitude with the disastrous retreat of Napoleon from Russia in 1812.\(^{18}\) Another truth that censorship suppressed was the horrific Allied retreat from the Battle of Ctesiphon. The MW disclosed that medical treatment for the wounded had been completely inadequate. The officer in charge of the hospital ship said,

they [the wounded] were lying in a pool of dysentery about 30 feet square. They were covered with dysentery generally from head to foot ... One man had a fractured thigh and his thigh was perforated in 5 or 6 places. He had apparently been writhing about the deck of the ship. Many cases were just as bad.\(^{19}\)

The 1918 Spring Offensive illustrated for the MW one of the dangers of the false "image of the monstrous German enemy". After much boasting of Allied superiority and recklessly optimistic reading of the situation this disturbing setback carried with it more shame and weight than otherwise would have been the case. The public would have been better prepared if the truth had been told earlier.\(^{20}\)

The MW regarded as reprehensible the deliberate whipping up of hatred towards the enemy to boost enlistment. It's editorials argued that it made the non-combatant mind blind with intolerance and mad with hate. "We are the good white knight, but he is the seven-headed dragon

\(^{16}\) MW, 24-3-1915, p.2 & 19-5-1915, p.4  
\(^{17}\) MW, 4-7-1917, p.4  
\(^{18}\) MW, 6-6-1917, p.2  
\(^{19}\) MW, 12-9-1917, p.2  
\(^{20}\) MW, 10-7-1918, p.1
A GRIEVENCE

By Perplexed

To the editor,

Pray, how can we further economise?
We've suffered enough through this tiresome strife.
'Tis true we've more money that ever before,
But it came our way and we need it too.
War profits, you say and a goodly store.
Well, maybe your right, but its only our due,
Why should we not ride in our motor cars?
Why should we not guzzle our whisky and wine?
What matter to you tho' we lounge at bars,
Nor study the cost when we meet to dine?
You harrow our souls with Serbian woes,
With Belgian wrongs and such tales of war
That we needs must frequent the picture shows
To banish there fears and horrors afar.
We gave our old clothes to the Belgians too,
Turned out every garment our eyes could see,
And just got our tailor-mades smart and new
When the fashions changed - and so did we.
The latest in hats and shoes are so dear,
And petrol had reached a fabulous price.
The poor man you dare not get rid of his beer,
Tobacco? Impossible that sacrifice?
We go to the races excitement to seek
But once now and then all sportsmen go there;
We gave to the war funds our three pence a week,
And give to Red Cross what time we could spare;
While soldiers must wade knee-deep in the mud,
Face hunger and cold and the pains of Hell.
To live on the price of our brothers blood
In pleasure and peace, you say is not well.

Source ST, 26-1-1917, p.2
that God and Justice has called us to destroy”. The MW said that the need for raising a volunteer army had raised the abuse of the enemy to the level of a public duty. The reality was that “A foe is human too, with a faith of his own and a soul to save - and women sob for all alike!”21 For the MW hatred generated by the presentation of the German enemy as always monstrous had no place in this War. They rather sided with the martyr, Edith Cavell, when she said, “Standing, as I do, in view of God and eternity, I realize that patriotism is not enough. I must have no hatred or bitterness towards anyone”. Hatred must go if there was to be a lasting peace.22

The MW escalated its criticism of the British news services in 1918. The cable services exist to obscure the vision, pervert the judgement, inflame hatreds, widen schisms, confirm ignorance and prejudice and so entrench the world of Capitalism ... run by despots mentally warping millions who have little means of correcting the falsities forced upon them.23

Nothing happened in 1918 to suggest the situation was other than how the MW interpreted it.

The ST was the other most consistently critical Otago/Southland newspaper. It failed to completely believe in the “image of the monstrous German enemy” for long and was always critical of British censorship policy. Unlike the MW, the ST believed that the War had to be fought, it just objected to how it was being fought - under a veil of secrecy, distortion and untruth. Censorship stood in the way of a more efficient war effort because it created a false picture and kept the true gravity of the situation from the public. It was the lack of detailed and factual information that truly irritated, R.J Gilmour, the editor of the ST.

The ST launched its first attack on British censorship policy in mid-September 1914 when it complained that the censor had passed for publication many statements that had been proven false.24 The warning, first implied then made explicit, was that the cable reports were unreliable and that one should not believe all that one read. The necessity of some censorship was acknowledged as a part of war, but the

21 MW, 22-9-1915, p.3
22 MW, 21-9-1917, p.7
23 MW, 28-9-1918, p.1
24 ST, 12-9-1914, p.5 & 16-9-1914, p.4
R. J. GILMOUR

Southland Times Editor

Source: ST, 125th Jubilee Edition, p.5
ST felt that censor was being far too strict. The editor bitterly called the War the "Silent War" because the censors' knife was cutting far too deeply into unjustifiable territory. All the interesting and important news was suppressed along with those items that had to be cut for reasons of national security.

The ST editor wanted to know what was happening but all that he received were hopelessly inadequate battle reports. The ST noted that the Canadians lost 8000 to 10 000 men in one battle and all that was released about this tragic loss was, "It was a day of glory and mourning for Canada. The loyalty of the great dominion has indeed been sealed in blood". What kind of non-news was this? What was the point of suppressing details of a battle that had already been fought and about which the enemy knew all? Yet, the ST editor believed that for the time being the best course was to trust the British authority's judgement and assume it had good reasons for such harsh censorship.

The building frustration created by the lack of real news was expressed in the escalating attacks mounted by the ST on the censor. By June 1915 it was no longer enough to gently suggest that censorship was too strict and hope that the appropriate authorities would take heed. The office of censor was rapidly losing respect and becoming an object of bitter ridicule. The ST wrote that it was not difficult to show that censorship was often clumsy and unintelligent. The mistakes exposed created the impression that New Zealand could be told much more without prejudicing military operations; after all it was the public that was footing the bill.

The ludicrous side of censorship was exposed by the London Daily Mail. The censor cut a report from the Daily Mail which quoted General French, unaware that French's comments had already been published in full. Many articles were refused publication by the censor when they had already been published in other Allied countries, or when it was too late to attempt to conceal facts from the enemy. An example of the bizarre anomalies created by censorship was an article on the Dardanelles that was published in Italy but was refused publication in

\[25\] ST, 3-10-1914, p.5
\[26\] ST, 5-10-1914, p.4
\[27\] ST, 1-5-1915, p.5
\[28\] ST, 4-6-1915, p.4
Britain. The purpose of such an exercise was difficult to fathom, it could not be to conceal vital information from the enemy.\textsuperscript{29}

The ST used these examples, and others, as the basis for its scathing accusation that censorship was deliberately being used in the inappropriate concealment of ugly facts from Britons. Such concealment or "toning down", suggested that the poor-spirited Briton would have the fight scared out of them if they knew the facts.\textsuperscript{30} There was no legitimate reason why the news that Hill 60 had been retaken by the enemy was suppressed for two months. It certainly was not to keep it from the enemy as nobody knew better than the enemy that Turkey had retaken Hill 60! Perhaps it was thought that Britain would clamour for peace if the news got out that a hill Britain had not needed for eight months had been retaken.\textsuperscript{31}

The opinion of the ST was that concealment of the news from the public was wrong on every count. The ST fully agreed with the Morning Post that it would be wise for the Government to state frankly the state of affairs in the Dardanelles in a manner that did not give the enemy useful information. The censor was not serving the public interests by refusing to release the truth, be it good or bad. According to the ST "The people have nothing very much to thank the censor for". As far as the ST was concerned the publishing of the truth would solve a lot of the present problems like the lethargy and complacency that was pervading the civilian populations.\textsuperscript{32}

The suggestion of Lord Newton in the British Parliament in July 1915 that the press was demanding the lifting of censorship so they could increase circulation was treated with contempt and disbelief. This suggestion was bizarro as the newspaper magnates of Britain were staunch supporters of censorship. It was the public that were demanding the facts because not knowing was worse than bad news.\textsuperscript{33}

Burgeoning distrust of the news released in New Zealand made the ST wary of attempts by the British authorities to downplay the submarine menace. When more accurate news was finally released on this aspect of

\textsuperscript{29} ST, 4-6-1915, p.4
\textsuperscript{30} ST, 4-6-1915, p.4 & 25-6-1915, p.4
\textsuperscript{31} ST, 16-7-1915, p.4
\textsuperscript{32} ST, 4-6-1915, p.4 & 16-7-1915, p.4
\textsuperscript{33} ST, 16-7-1915, p.4
the War these suspicions were confirmed. The ST feared that there was much truth in Admiral von Tirpitz's claim that the submarine starvation of Britain was the route to German victory. Britain did not admit the scale of its problems to its Empire until April 1917. When these candid comments were followed by the announcement that the British Royal Navy had found a new method of overcoming the submarine menace the ST remained somewhat dubious as no details were given. This scepticism was not lessened by the continued heavy shipping losses.

The lies that constituted the "image of the monstrous German enemy", and the hiding of British incompetence behind censorship, meant that the ST's disbelief deepened. The mood of the ST in 1917 was accelerating towards the point where any opinion on the War, be it expert or not, was distrusted.

In March 1917 another problem with the suppression of the true worth of the German Army enemy became evident to the ST. The use of the term "strategic retirement", that is, the legitimate military move of withdrawing voluntarily from untenable positions, eventually worked against the British. Initially, it had been an effective method of denying any kind of enemy victory, but once Germany became involved in a similar retreat, the Allied public undervalued the full import of the German retreat.

The news that made it through the all conquering censorship machine was described in increasingly uncomplimentary terms. All that was received in New Zealand aside from the daily casualty lists, were cheap and flippant stories that were degrading to both the New Zealand troops and public. The impression conveyed was that the NZEF was having some sort of a spree, that the Germans were in terror of them, and that the New Zealand soldiers despised the enemy. One example was the story of a New Zealand soldier who bet that he could bring back a prisoner, which he duly did, supposedly his only regret was that he got such a sorry specimen. "Piffle" was the ST's and NZT's verdict in July 1916.

34 ST, 5-3-1917, p.4
35 ST, 14-4-1917, p.4
36 ST, 4-6-1917, p.4
37 ST, 25-6-1915, p.4 & 8-3-1917, p.4
38 ST, 1-7-1916, p.4
39 ST, 1-7-1916, p.4, NZT, 6-7-1916, p.18
These stories irritated the ST because it was no longer believed that the German was a poor cowardly soldier. The ST suggested that if such stories reached the New Zealand troops in the trenches they would think them ridiculous.\(^40\)

This "piffle" was especially annoying at a time when so many New Zealand troops were amongst the casualty lists. It was considered most unjust to keep from the people paying for the War, news of their kith and kin. Correspondents, the ST argued, should be allowed to observe the fighting and fully report the NZEF actions.\(^41\)

The rationale behind Britain's censorship policy was unfathomable to the ST unless it believed the British were using it to cover their blunders. The facts offered it little alternative. The ST wanted to trust the British, but was finding it increasingly difficult to do so. Censorship, while sound in theory, was being grossly misused as much accurate information that was useless to the enemy was being suppressed, and much misleading material was passed as accurate.\(^42\) In the words of Brigadier General Sir Robert Anderson the net result of censorship was "that roseate hues were published and leaden hues were missed".\(^43\)

The ST reported that pressure had been building in Britain over the lack of real war news and the apparent use of censorship to cover British blunders. Leading British politicians made speeches acknowledging that there was some truth to this rumour. The gravity of the situation with regard to the submarine menace and other matters were revealed by Sir Edward Carson and Lloyd George. Their frankness was warmly received by the ST because the "optimistic" feeling engendered by censorship was a dangerous and unhealthy stumbling block for the war effort. It was far better for Britain to treat its citizens as intelligent human beings than as weak fools who would crumble at the slightest pressure.\(^44\) It was ridiculous to follow a war in which it was impossible to discover that the Allies had been defeated, or that Germany had ever been victorious. The truth was needed to wake up the

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\(^{40}\) ST, 1-7-1916, p.4  
\(^{41}\) ST, 1-7-1916, p.4  
\(^{42}\) ST, 26-7-1916, p.4, MW, 4-7-1917, p.4  
\(^{43}\) ST, 27-8-1917, p.4  
\(^{44}\) ST, 16-3-1917, p.4, 16-11-1917, p.4 & 31-11-1917, p.4
"optimists" who were able to keep their heads in the sand because of the misguided censorship.\textsuperscript{45}

One of the larger contradictions in the early "image of the monstrous German enemy" identified by the \textit{ST} was that it held that all of Germany was extremely keen to go to war when this same Germany's army was supposedly extremely incompetent and reluctant to go into battle. More and more often the \textit{ST} wrote that the German was a foeman worthy of respect in all quarters, tenacious and dogged in defence; in short, courageous first class soldiers who would be very difficult to defeat. It was nonsense that the German was a coward or would not go into battle unless "doped".\textsuperscript{46} The rubbish produced by propaganda and censorship was a dangerous and useless distraction that made a mockery of the Allies self-image as honourable nations fighting a great evil.\textsuperscript{47}

The \textit{ST}'s bitter comment in January 1917 cut to the heart of the abuse of the news service and public opinion. It was, the editor argued impossible for the public to form any true conception of those actions from the news they read while the battle was in progress ... If one compares war histories of these battles and the cables received at the time one can see the huge differences between the accounts.\textsuperscript{48}

The protests of the \textit{ST} culminated in January 1918 when it called for the recall of Malcolm Ross, official New Zealand war correspondent. He was over in Europe at the expense of the tax-payer, yet all he sent back over the wire was news of secondary importance to the fighting that was producing so many local casualties. Given that New Zealand lost so many troops just before Christmas 1917, why did he not send back cables on this fighting? This was the information that New Zealand wanted and was entitled to. It was grossly unfair that Germany knew more about New Zealand's troops than New Zealanders did. In the interests of New Zealand better use should have been made of Ross.\textsuperscript{49} It was "grotesque that the only news cabled out by the official correspondent should be

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{45} \textit{ST}, 2-5-1917, p.4
\item \textsuperscript{46} \textit{ST}, 6-7-1916, p.4
\item \textsuperscript{47} \textit{ST}, 30-7-1917, p.4 & 6-7-1916, p.4, \textit{CL}, 10-10-1916, p.5
\item \textsuperscript{48} \textit{ST}, 8-1-1917, p.4
\item \textsuperscript{49} \textit{ST}, 15-1-1918, p.4
\end{itemize}
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that the Division in the month, subscribed 12,000 pounds to the War Loan. 50

The British press did not escape attack from the ST in 1918. It became apparent to the ST that parts of the British press was privy to a lot of classified information that was declining to pass on to the rest of the world. Britain seemed to be ruled by a combination of Cabinet Ministers and the newspaper editors. This criticism echoed the words of Winston Churchill who said:

one of the greatest evils from which the country had suffered during the war was the practical elimination of the platform and the abdication of Parliament had given an altogether disproportionate power to the Press ... newspaper editors given information which was withheld from the House of Commons ... an extraordinary thing that one government department after another should have relations with the Press which were more intimate than those held with the representatives of the people? 51

What had before been hints that the ST felt that overzealous censorship was a violation of the people's rights and undermined democracy were becoming more concrete. More often sinister motivations were attributed to be behind the suppression of useful news. But by the last months of the War the ST had fallen strangely silent, possibly seriously frustrated and discouraged by the lack of change for the better.

The ST did see fit, however, to publish an exact from Sir Ian Hamilton book on Gallipoli where he quoted Napier. It gave voice to some of the ST misgivings on censorship.

Napoleon's troops fought in bright fields, where every helmet caught some beams of glory; but the British soldier conquered under the cold shade of aristocracy; no honours awaited his daring, no despatches gave his name to the applause of his countrymen; his life of danger uncheered by hope, his death unnoticed ... [Hamilton commented] Should the same reproach be leveled against us by our sons? Was the colder, darker shade of the censor to replace that of the aristocrat? Never, if I could help it, and so I wrote as I have written. 52

Of all of the Otago/Southland newspapers, it was the dramatically changing stance of the NZT on British censorship and propaganda that was the most surprising, both for what it did and what it did not. The Irish Easter Rebellion did not have the expected result of making the NZT editor, Irishman Dr. Kelly, immediately anti-British. Instead it

50 ST, 16-1-1918, p.4
51 ST, 6-6-1917, p.4
52 ST, 4-3-1918, p.4
went to great pains to prove that it and all New Zealand Irish-Catholics were loyal and condemned Irish actions. The NZT believed a German conspiracy was mostly to blame for the whole mess.\textsuperscript{53} Not until mid-1917 did the NZT begin to react negatively to the "image of the monstrous German enemy" as constructed by British propaganda, then it made up for lost time with avengence.

The first indication that the NZT gave of its changing stance was in its reaction to British attempts to downplay the submarine menace. No longer was the NZT prepared to accept the British version without reservation. It revealed that the losses published were not complete as ships were only included when it was certain that they had been torpedoed. Taking its cue from the Brooklyn Eagle, it suggested that the British had been doctoring the figures upwards on how many German submarines had been destroyed and downwards for lost shipping.\textsuperscript{54}

The duration of the War discredited the early "image" of German military prowess for the NZT because had it been true the Central Powers would long ago have been prostrate at the Allies feet. The NZT quoted a Swedish paper which commented that the German offensive at Verdun was a model of its kind and that "The great art of German generalship consists in saving the men; the loss of our enemies in squandering their soldiers".\textsuperscript{55}

The NZT considered it insulting to their readers' intelligence to continue to publish the earlier rubbish concerning the "monstrous German enemy" and agreed with the opinion of Australian Correspondent Smiler Hales that three quarters of the cables were "utter rot".\textsuperscript{56} The NZT did not ask for unlimited truth but it did object to New Zealanders being treated as fools. The rubbish that was passing for news was giving Germany something to ridicule like the reports of the Crown Prince who kept dying, being buried, then leading men back into battle.\textsuperscript{57} It was beneath the dignity of the NZT to participate in such a sorry state of affairs.

\textsuperscript{53} NZT, 4-5-1916, pp.29-31
\textsuperscript{54} NZT, 13-9-1917, p.14
\textsuperscript{55} NZT, 6-7-1916, p.17
\textsuperscript{56} NZT, 17-5-1917, p.19
\textsuperscript{57} NZT, 6-7-1916, p.18
The NZT came to believe that censorship and the "image of the monstrous German enemy" probably lengthened the War. It kept the Allies from realising the full magnitude of their problems for three years and it hid blunders that may have led to the replacement of incompetent military leaders. Censorship had a lot to answer for as it meant that newspapers were worthless as an index of how the War was going, especially in Germany, France and Britain. That this kind of thing happened in democratic countries was shocking. Politicians were supposed to be the servants of the people, not the manipulators of opinion.

The NZT was part of an Otago/Southland press backlash against the resurgence of anti-German hate propaganda in Britain in 1918. The NZT blamed this rabid racial hatred on newspapers which had set themselves the task of inflaming the worst passions. These papers never stopped the misrepresentation and never had the grace to retract false statements. According to the NZT the generation of popular feeling in this manner made New Zealand's loyalty less than pure. The evil work of the statesmen and newspapers had produced a coarse, black and brutal hatred of Germany that wiped out all Christian feeling and hopes of peace.

Doubt had increased to the point where the NZT wrote in April 1918 that:

We cannot see things in their true light now; the press has taken care of that ... perhaps after the War, when our press was once again eloquent in the praise of all that was German, we may all be convinced that poor old Wilhelm had the misfortune to not be strong enough for the Junkers led by his son.

This statement was a total repudiation of the earlier "image" of a violently evil Kaiser. The "image of the monstrous German enemy" was sinking fast into an infamous sea of lies.

The inglorious British Press and Government remained firmly in the sights of the suddenly radically critical paper. British propaganda was of such a vile nature that everybody should be ashamed of the British Government. The reason the British Press was co-operating in

50 NZT, 25-10-1917, p.14, 57, 2-5-1917, p.4
51 NZT, 25-10-1917, p.14
52 NZT, 28-6-1917, p.4
61 NZT, 2-5-1917, pp.11-13
62 NZT, 4-1-1918, pp.26-7
such a docile manner was that an end to the War would end profiteering. The NZT felt that the great Capitalist, Lord Northcliffe, owner of the main newspapers of England, was the greatest enemy of democracy in Britain because he manipulated public opinion. For Capitalists peace was a dirty word, as were all those who preached it like Lord Lansdowne and the Pope. The British Press had fallen into the hands of capitalists, so swamping the voice of the people.63 The NZT stopped running its War Notes column for the bluntly stated reason that the British press could not be trusted to print the truth.64

According to the NZT, censorship and propaganda were subverting the course of democracy in Britain and its Empire because all independent thought or criticism was suppressed and much knowledge withheld from the public. The harsh suppression of the Irish Rebellion was finally reflected in the NZT attitude towards British authority in 1916. The NZT compared British actions in Ireland with German Prussianism and found that Britain was truly "Prussian". The NZT argued that just because Britain was strong and Ireland weak, Britain refused to act justly towards Ireland so long as it was useful.65 The "Prussian" element in Britain, according to the NZT, was dangerous because it criticized democracy as being unable to plot or fight and lacked consistency and resolution. It had the distasteful habit of believing that "We must fight Germany with her own weapons".66 The "image of the monstrous German enemy" and the "saintly Briton" was backfiring on Britain.

It was unclear why the NZT suddenly changed its stance but several reasons did suggest themselves. A belated negative reaction to the suppression of the Irish Rebellion, the duration of the War and a defensive reaction towards criticism of the Pope's stand on peace. Whatever the reason the results were spectacular.

Throughout the War the CL did not become very interested in British propaganda and censorship nor with the "image of the monstrous German enemy" itself. This was possibly because its editor/owner was Lt-Col Pennycook during the crucial pre-Gallipoli period. Being a military man

63 NZT, 30-5-1918, p.14 & 11-7-1918, pp.25-6
64 NZT, 29-8-1918, p.15
65 NZT, 25-4-1918, p.14 & 2-5-1918, p.31
66 NZT, 4-7-1918, p.13
he probably knew something about how War exaggerated the vileness of the enemy. D. Kirby replaced Pennycook after he left for the Front in March 1915. Kirby was replaced in February 1916 by the local Member for Parliament, A.S Malcolm until April 1916 when W.A Anderson took over, in July 1918 Kirby returned. The CL was embroiled in serious matters close to home that distracted it from the War in the latter stages, namely the disgraceful handling of the Clifton Soldier Settlement and South Otago's fight to separate from the Dunedin Hospital District.67

Whatever the reason, the various CL editors looked around the world's press for alternative views of Germany, like the New York Times. An interview of Admiral von Tirpitz was treated very fairly and not subjected to derision. The CL was admiring of the war effort of German women68 and failed to publish many articles predicting an early end to the War. Not all utterances of the Allied leaders were treated as worthy, especially not President Wilson's. The only topic that the CL really became passionate about was its dislike of the American President and his "weak" policies. In January 1917 it went so far as to suggest that Wilson's state of mind was one of "sheer moral imbecility" after he suggested that there was little to choose between the two sides.69 The CL was either more detached, or more locally focused, than most of the Otago/Southland papers.

The CL was one of the only two Otago/Southland papers that published the official investigation into the debacle that was Gallipoli. This report was damning of the whole expedition, right from its ill-conceived purpose of diverting enemy troops from the Eastern Front. The main problems of Gallipoli, and there were many, included the lack of consultation of expert knowledge by the War Council, lack of staff preparation, lack of detailed planning, serious underestimation of Turkish strength and continued vacillation within the War Council until it was too late. The main responsibility was laid at the feet of Kitchener, Asquith and Churchill. Churchill was seen as being far too optimistic and inexperienced to be entrusted with such a difficult task. To make matters worse there was some evidence that expert military and

67 N. Wright, Clutha at War! The Impact of the First World War on the district of Clutha, Unpublished, 1998, pp.113-4
68 CL, 14-6-1918, p.7
69 CL, 12-1-1917, p.5
naval opinion was pushed aside so Churchill and company could gain political advantage.\textsuperscript{70}

The CL did, however, comment that censorship was detrimental to the war effort and the war effort was all important.\textsuperscript{71} The CL felt that it was impossible to form a realistic opinion because of the German censors and the British censors.\textsuperscript{72} The CL never became as directly critical of propaganda and the "image of the monstrous German enemy" as some of the other Otago/Southland papers but then neither did it buy into it as strongly as they initially did.

The editorial policy of the DT owners, Harold and Sydney Stevens,\textsuperscript{73} was impossible to discern as they seemed to print any opinion, no matter how bizarre or contradictory. It seemed likely that the reason for this was that it had problems gaining enough copy as it was only a small weekly. Until the latter parts of the War the DT failed to admit to Allied propaganda while severely criticizing Germany's use of it. The propaganda efforts of Germany were examined and found to be the clumsy efforts of addle brained buffoons trying to keep up flagging public confidence.\textsuperscript{74} Or they were represented as the fiendishly clever manipulations of public opinion designed to deceive the German population into believing they would win.\textsuperscript{75} Either way the dishonesty of German propaganda was recognized as a weakness. All the while the DT continued to be blind towards the similar purpose, success and failings of the Allied propaganda machine. The DT even advocated the expansion of efforts to sway the American population and to ensure that Germany was denied the opportunity of doing so.\textsuperscript{76} Professional detached reporting of the news was alien to the DT.

While the DT tended to be blind to the use of Allied propaganda it did occasionally chide the British for problems caused by hiding blunders like Gallipoli. The DT felt that Churchill fooled the British

\textsuperscript{70} CL, 13-3-1917, p.7, MW, 6-6-1917, p.2

\textsuperscript{71} CL, 10-10-1915, p.5

\textsuperscript{72} CL, 13-8-1916, p.7

\textsuperscript{73} G.H. Scholefield, \textit{Newspapers in New Zealand}, Wellington, 1958, p.200

\textsuperscript{74} DT, 28-2-1916

\textsuperscript{75} DT, 12-7-1915, ODT, 16-7-1915, p.4

\textsuperscript{76} DT, 31-3-1916
Empire into believing that they were on the verge of a great victory, when Gallipoli was shaping up to be a terrible defeat. Gallipoli was an unmitigated disaster from day one to evacuation, a disaster that cost 40,000 lives because it was run by non-experts who vacillated over dinner and wine in Downing St. lacking the courage to make the tough decisions. The DT felt justified in printing the opinion of the Weekly Despatch that the men killed at Gallipoli were murdered.

In July 1917 the DT published an interesting article on the three stages of war correspondence by an American journalist, William G. Shepherd, that might explain its changing attitude in late 1917. The first stage was the "freelance days" when many lies and fakes were fed to the public by unscrupulous adventurers. The second was the "dark ages" where the public received no real news, only official reports, but there were less fakers. Third, was the "Twentieth Century correspondent".

The "freelance days" were almost unbelievable in 1917. During this time anything was pure gold for a news hungry public and much rubbish was published. Some fakery had serious results like the German atrocity stories. Shepherd debunked most of the German atrocities in Belgium as he never found a first hand account, nor saw a victim after spending much time with Belgian refugees. Journalists wrote about battles they had never seen, or had never happened at all. But on the positive side it was a good time to get reliable stories as the authorities had not yet organized to keep the journalist out. The "dark ages" were problematic for the journalist as they were suppressed as pests by the military. The third stage began when Germany began to use correspondents to glorify German deeds. Britain was forced to fight German propaganda with propaganda of its own. Correspondents then only wrote about what they had actually seen. While this did not reveal the whole truth, less lies were heard. Britain had managed to suppress news of the first battle of Ypres for four months.

The DT never directly challenged the use of propaganda by the British in the form of an editorial opinion but the above articles suggest that it recognized that Britain was suppressing news. On the
other hand the ODT editor did not seem to feel strongly that it was a bad thing. Recognition and resentment of British propaganda in Otago/Southland at least was more widespread and deeply felt than previously acknowledged by New Zealand historiography. While most supported the War, with the exception of the _MW_, its manner of reportage was not appreciated. The distortion that was the "image of the monstrous German enemy" was eventually seen through by all except the _ODT_, and resented as unnecessary and dangerous. The false "image of the enemy" led to unrealistically high expectations at Gallipoli, on the Western Front, and at sea. Otago/Southland had lived through a war that it knew very little about and had grown distrustful of the integrity of the British Government and Press with regard to the War news.
CONCLUSION

What does the interesting story of Otago/Southland's encounter with the "image of the enemy" mean in relation to the bigger picture of British/New Zealand wartime relations? Does it add to the literature on the New Zealand experience of the Great War in any significant manner? Did the growing sense of New Zealand identity in this period reflect itself in differences between the British source and its Otago/Southland target audience described in this thesis? Were there other factors that influenced or caused the differences between the "Home" and Otago/Southland version of the "image of the enemy"?

The British "image of the enemy" was very persuasive in the beginning, it seemed to have all the answers and there was little difference between its presentation and reception in Britain and Otago/Southland. The moral offensive against the "Prussian Ogre" ruled supreme in both places with a large slice of atrocity to reinforce the stereotype. Germany was guilty and had to be defeated; it was as simple as that. Propaganda reduced everything to simple black and white, no ambiguity was allowed. Repetition was the vital ingredient and wore down those who doubted. It was an emotional appeal that proved extremely difficult to resist.

Skilful and secret recruitment of famous and reputable British authors and intellectuals, like R. Kipling, H.G Wells, Sir A. Conan Doyle and A. Bennett, added further credence to the notion that the Allies were virtuous and the Germans the "Beast". These academics and authors were the source of some of the more enduring notions of the War like the German desire for world domination, its long secret preparation for "The Day", and the subordination of the Hapsburgs.

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Few, except the left in both places, mounted much opposition. The
"image of the enemy" was so powerful because British censorship ensured
that there no alternative sources of information. Literacy and belief
in the printed word proved to be the unwitting allies of the "image of
the enemy". The "truth" ceased to be important in the British
Government's desire to simulate recruitment, keep up morale, mislead the
enemy, disguise Allied disasters and prove Britain's righteous and
idealistic stance.  

The "image of the enemy" projected by British propaganda was as
successful in Otago/Southland during the early part of the War as it was
in Britain. Repetition, simplification and slander of the enemy had
done their work well along with the suppression or distortion of
information that did not fit the simplistic "image of the enemy".  

During 1917 and 1918 the tone of the "image of the enemy" changed
as war-weariness began to overtake the British civilian population. A
negotiated peace came to be an accepted way to end the slaughter. Lord
Lansdowne's public letter on the desirability of peace was an example of
growing dissent towards the War. Britain needed to be convinced that
the War had to be fought to victory and nothing less. Propaganda and
the suppression of the truth were essential because as Lloyd George
wrote in 1917, "If people really knew, the War would be stopped
tomorrow. But of course they don't know and can't know. The
 correspondents don't write the truth and the censorship would not pass
the truth!". The accuracy of Lloyd George's assessment is evident in
the comments of the NZT. It printed a detailed article from two
soldiers, detail so harrowing that at the end of the article the NZT
added, "the moral of all of which is the urgent necessity for a united
and supreme effort to bring the hellish business to a close".  

In 1917 the National War Aims Committee was established mainly to
counter British pacifist propaganda. The British Government then

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4 M. Sanders & P.M. Taylor, British Propaganda During the First World War
Literature as Propaganda 1914-1918 and After, London, 1988, p.xv

5 C. Haste, Keep the Home Fires Burning, p.82

6 M. Sanders & P.M. Taylor, British Propaganda, p.149, C. Haste, Keep the
Home Fires Burning, pp.4,46, 107-8 & P. Buitenhuis, Great War of Words, p.144

7 P. Knightley, First Casualty, p.109

8 NZT, 20-5-1915, pp.21-2
centralized and reorganized its propaganda agencies in 1918 into the Ministry of Information, headed by newspaper mogul Lord Northcliffe. The anti-German press campaign was stepped up through the newspapers of Britain, especially Northcliffe’s London dailies. Until the Treaty of Versailles was signed in June 1919 hatred became the essential ingredient of British press propaganda. The corpse factory atrocity story was a prime example of the period. Hatred was the best option available to Northcliffe because the Allied Governments refused to define their peace terms and talked instead in lofty principles that did little to reassure discontented nations. It became essential “to make the English hate the Germans as they had never hated anyone before!”. This hatred was to have unfortunate post-War ramifications, most noticeably at Versailles.

The British press was loyal to its Government during the War because they felt its was their duty to support rather than question. The Times completely approved of its role as propagandist and censor: they felt their task was to sustain the morale of a nation in mortal combat; therefore they praised victories no less highly than they deserved; in stalemates they found elements for advantage; and defeats they minimized, excused or ignored.

All information services including Reuters conspired to suppress, distort and manipulate the news to achieve their own and the British Government’s ends. Accurate reporting of the news fell foul of Northcliffe and Lloyd George’s hidden agendas. The alliance between the British Government and press was the basis of a great conspiracy that told more deliberate lies than at any other time in history.

It is interesting, however, as P. Buitenhuis notes in The Great War of Words that there was a noticeable difference between the London dailies of Northcliffe and Britain’s provincial papers. One example, was the reaction towards the Lansdowne letter. The London papers

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10 L. Fraser, Propaganda, p.45

11 P Knightley, First Casualty, p.104

12 ibid., p.97

13 ibid., p.80
reacted very negatively and viciously, the provincial papers did not. The provincial papers were probably more independent of Government influence and this was reflected in their reaction to the "image of the monstrous German enemy". But they were severely restricted by the lack of accurate news because of censorship and propaganda.

Some of the authors recruited at the outbreak of War became disillusioned as time passed by. Unfortunately, this disillusionment mattered little because after Asquith's fall the press had mostly taken over all propaganda. Many British authors felt that they had betrayed their tradition of objective detachment and integrity of the writer to write false propaganda. Many in Otago/Southland would have been inclined to agree with them had they known of the authors' role as propagandists.

As the major papers of Britain became more firmly entrenched in anti-German hatred and in British Government goals of "no peace without victory", the Otago/Southland press began to cut a separate path. Anti-German hatred was not to the taste of the Otago/Southland press in late 1917 and 1918 and they either pointedly rejected it, or did not indulge. The NZT, ST and the MW refused to deepen anti-German feeling. The NZT and ST felt that it was necessary to fight on to victory but that hatred would sour any peace that arrived. The MW believed the War was pointless and that hatred could only make it worse. Even the ODT, CL and the DT failed to participate in the intensified anti-German campaign, though they did not state why they made this decision. Their inaction, nevertheless, does suggest tacit disapproval. The gap between the few facts Otago/Southland had and the "image of the monstrous German enemy" was too large to be bridged by an intensified hate campaign. The required depth of trust in the British Government to maintain belief in the "image of the monstrous German enemy" did not exist after 1917. The British Government had lied and the newspapers of Otago/Southland for the most part knew it.

The experiences and reaction of the Otago/Southland press to the "image of the monstrous German enemy" adds an extra layer to a rather neglected period in New Zealand history. While this case study came up with some expected conclusions like the dissent of the left and later

14 P. Buitenhuis, The Great War of Words, p.145
15 ibid., pp.xvii-xviii
WHERE OUR BOYS ARE DISTINGUISHING THEMSELVES.
the Catholics, it also illuminated mainstream criticism that had gone unnoticed.

It is important that mainstream criticism of British war management, propaganda and attitude towards New Zealand is noted because otherwise there is a tendency to marginalize criticism as the opinion only of minorities on the extremes of New Zealand society. When this happens the story of New Zealand in World War One is perceived as a simple case of mainstream New Zealand blindly following Mother Britain with little deviation except on the fringes. Exploration of New Zealand's part in the Great War needs to go further so the real story is unravelled and adds to the greater understanding of the complexities of New Zealand's development as an independent dominion.

Why then, did the Otago/Southland newspapers respond differently to the British press? A growing self-confidence in New Zealand, created partly by the successes of its soldiers, led to resentment that Britain was not more sensitive to the need for news of New Zealand's troops. Britain's lack of trust in New Zealand's ability to weather the toughtimes, also became resented as casualties escalated. The use of British propaganda implied to the people of Otago/Southland that they were not considered worthy of Britain's trust. The press of Otago/Southland felt that they were worthy and resented Britain treating them as fools or half-witted children. This resentment was manifested in varying degrees of non-cooperation with the contrived "image of the monstrous German enemy".

Otago/Southland's reaction in the later part of the War was influenced by a number of other factors. The NZT was belatedly effected by the Easter Rebellion and peace proposals of the neutral Pope. The MW was strongly influenced by its political ideology. The other Otago/Southland papers were like the British provincial press in not being under the direct control of the British propaganda agencies and so reflected their war-weariness in a way the Northcliffe controlled press could not. Otago/Southland was able to achieve some degree of autonomous thought as it became apparent that the "image of the monstrous German enemy" was largely false. Furthermore, the smallness of the communities that the Otago/Southland press serviced probably had an impact because the editors were closer to the community. These papers would have reacted in a more personal manner to its concerns than the large British papers.
The negative reaction of Otago/Southland in 1918 has two other possible explanations that are worth considering. First, maybe the "image of the monstrous German enemy" simply failed to sustain a mostly false propaganda image over an extended war period. British false propaganda was well protected by the inability of its audience to verify or disprove the "facts" because of censorship, stereotyping and the emotional pressure of the constantly repeated atrocities. British propaganda's Otago/Southland audience also believed in the trustworthiness of the British Government which made its lies more acceptable. These advantages were not enough, however, in the long-term to protect the "image of the monstrous German enemy", time itself defeated it. Disbelief in the long-term is the price that false wartime propaganda in general must pay.  

Second, Otago/Southland's resentment of British propaganda could have been partially the result of resentment of propaganda in general rather than the result of the specific Empire/national related reasons outlined above. According to J. Hawthorn in Propaganda, Persuasion and Polemic most people proclaim to disapprove of propaganda because they equate being duped with being treated like children. We resent the attentions of a professional persuader because they appear to be the henchmen of the ruling class. We rebel against the use of language to establish or maintain a power structure. Once power enters into the equation persuasion becomes less effective. So we tend to resist words that have "a palpable design upon us". Perhaps most of the Otago/Southland press rejected or questioned the "image of the monstrous German enemy" because they unconsciously realized that Britain was using its position to control New Zealand and its attitude to the War ... and that Otago/Southland was powerless to resist.

With the exception of the ODT, the Otago/Southland press showed remarkable resilience in the face of overwhelming indoctrination by British propaganda. Retaining the ability to think independently came to be seen as a duty to the Empire. The "image of the monstrous German enemy" was a masterly construct that delivered to the British cause a

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16 L. Fraser, Propaganda, pp.204-205 & C. Haste, Keep the Home Fires Burning, p.4

17 L. Fraser, Propaganda, p.207

PEACE. Source: Ov, 2-7-1919, p.31
moral and idealist reason for getting involved in what became the bloodiest War in history. It then justified the need to continue fighting until victory by generating a fierce hatred of Germany. Ironically, New Zealand probably did not need the "image of the monstrous German enemy" as justification for following Britain because New Zealand wanted to prove to Mother Britain just how loyal and useful a Dominion it was. New Zealand, however, was saturated by a vicious anti-German propaganda campaign that in the long term probably did more harm than good to its relationship with Britain. Otago/Southland recognized the need for some censorship to prevent useful information reaching the enemy, but most of the press strongly objected to its obvious and continued abuse.

For all the skill of those in the British Government controlling propaganda and censorship, most of the Otago/Southland newspapers began to realize that the British were peddling lies and distortions as the truth. By the end of the War most of the Otago/Southland press managed to overcome handicaps of distance and subjection to intense world-wide propaganda and strict censorship, to form their own opinion about the "image of the monstrous German enemy" and the destructive nature of British propaganda.

Reaction towards the signing of the Treaty of Versailles proved to be a useful test of how deeply disillusionment with the "image of the monstrous German enemy" had bitten into the various newspapers. For most Otago/Southland newspapers the disillusionment proved only partial, they may have bitterly resented propaganda but Germany was wholly and solely responsible. All papers except the NZT showed a distinct desire to punish Germany harshly for unleashing the horrors of modern warfare on the world all in the name of "might is right".

The ODT was delighted by the "impressively drastic" terms of Versailles because it showed the determination of the Allies to finish the job. Versailles rendered Germany forever impotent, reduced to a mere shadow of its former self. A strong echo of past rhetoric was heard in the ODT's declaration that the "ordeal of fire [war] might have brought purification ... and generations to come will reap the benefit". Versailles had dramatically "set the rising star of the German nation". A just and necessary peace was the ODT's final verdict.

19 ODT, 27-3-1919, p.4
20 ODT, 25-6-1919, p.6
SOME ROYALTIES WHO ARE GOING OUT OF THE BUSINESS.


Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, born 1869.

Ex-emperor Carl Franz of Austria and ex-king of Hesse and his wife, Zita.

Emperor Carl was born in 1847, married 1891, succeeded his great uncle, 1916.
Considering the bitterness of some of the ST criticisms its reaction to the Treaty of Versailles was disappointing. The ST editor believed that the treaty was a hard peace, but just. When the magnitude of Germany's crimes were looked at the peace terms erred on the side of leniency rather than severity. It is still the same nation that waged the War and should be punished accordingly. It dismissed claims by some prominent Allied citizens that it was better to base a lasting peace on a willing surrender than on one forced by starvation or occupation. Germany may have been somewhat misrepresented by the "image of the monstrous German enemy" but it deserved to be punished because it alone was responsible for the War.

The CL was generally approving of Versailles as it was the destruction of all Germany's vanity, arrogance, bombast and the "death before dishonour" code of the German Warlords. It sounded a word of warning, however, and called for never-ceasing vigilance. According to their argument if the Allies were not prepared the military power of Germany would be restored stronger than ever because it would have the force of hatred and revenge behind it. The CL did not believe that the world was any nearer to realising the prophet's vision of "beating swords into ploughshares and spears into pruning hooks". Peace had not come to the world and if the Allies were not careful 'The Day' of Germany might yet come.

The editorial of the MW celebrated the Treaty of Versailles because it believed that force as a civilizing agent had received its deathblow. The Prussian ideal of State had been slain and put to rest forever as a philosophy. The Great War had conclusively proven that brute force was incapable of subduing the human soul.

Henceforth, the struggle for existence is on the intellectual plane, between the apostles of States built on and maintained by force and the free communities of the future where State action has for its

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21 CDT, 27-3-1919, p.4  
22 ST, 25-3-1919, p.4  
23 ST, 18-6-1919, p.4  
24 ST, 19-6-1919, p.4  
25 ST, 18-6-1919, p.4  
26 CL, 27-6-1919, p.5
THE KAISER'S SONS AND THEIR WIVES.

Left to right: Princess August Wilhelm, Prince Eitel, Princess Eitel, the Crown Prince.
object the entire elimination of the struggle for animal existence, which had served its natural purpose long ago. The end of the Great War, for the MW, heralded a new era of hope for humankind. The MW may not have placed much faith in the "image of the monstrous German enemy" but it did seem to believe that Germany and its philosophy of State was responsible for the War.

The DT's response was typically non-committal but its attitude was reflected in its choice of articles. In the lead up to the signing of the Treaty it ran articles demanding that Germany be punished so its could not come back for revenge, that the Kaiser and heir were wholly responsible, and that some German's felt that those Germans responsible should be strongly punished.

The NZT was the only newspaper that rejected the Treaty of Versailles as a fitting end to the War, it was an ending only and not true peace. Under the terms of Versailles force and might had taken the place of true justice. This peace would not last because "no nation can be kept in peace by force" and the greedy expansion of boundaries in the name of self-protection will become festering sores in the future. Father Coffey declared that:

we shall never have peace until nations are content with what they have got ... peace terms accepted under threat of starvation and accepted as the less bitter choice will never be other than "scraps of paper" to be torn up at the first hopeful opportunity.

Peace had not brought what Lloyd George and the Allies had said we were fighting for; an end to warfare, an end to self-aggrandizement, and the freedom of oppressed nationalities. The League of Nations was a tool for the aggrandizement of the five Great Powers, democracy in Europe was more unstable than ever and Wilson's Fourteen points of justice and clemancy had been rejected for a policy of conquest. The NZT quoted the London Catholic Times that "the ambition of the strongest is to make their will the law of right and suppress whatever was opposed to their interests ... but of democratic progress we have heard nothing".

"Might is right" had succeeded but not in the form that propaganda about the "monstrous German enemy" had suggested.

27 MW, 2-7-1919, p.4
28 DT, 15-6-1919, 3-3-1919 & 24-2-1919
29 NZT, 3-7-1919, p.28
30 NZT, 3-7-1919, p.14
THE GERMAN CONCEPTION OF A PEACE CONFERENCE.

The above is a reproduction of a popular picture in Germany by a German painter. It represents Bismarck, the soul of Europe, arranging the "terms of peace" in 1919 for Munich Turkey, the Western representatives being Abu, Tress and John Nerva. The attitude of Bismarck is emblematic of the kind of treatment the Allies would have received had Germany been victorious. The puns, innuendo, and social snare rest of themselves.

(Photo taken by Mr. Horda.)

Source: 07, 2-7-1919, p. 37
Only the NZT continued its attack on the negative effects of British propaganda into the peace. The other Otago/Southland papers preferred to celebrate the Allied victory and forget their bitterness towards British propaganda and censorship. The stress of War had temporarily shown up deficiencies in New Zealand's relationship with Britain but victory smoothed them over once again. The papers reactions to the Treaty of Versailles showed that while they had rejected the excesses of the British "image of the monstrous German enemy" they did believe that Germany alone was responsible and deserved to be punished.

When all was said and done all the Otago/Southland papers felt that victory was the most important thing, the greater "evil" that was German aggression had been defeated. Maybe they believed like the Norwegian Aftenposten editor during the Gulf War.

[The critics] seem to have forgotten that the most important thing in a war is not to send reports home but to win. Thus the truth will always be subordinated to victory. And that is how it should be... this means that in war there are greater tasks than news reporting and you have to know which side you are on.4

With victory the Otago/Southland papers were firmly on the side of the victors of World War One: Germany deserved no sympathy and received none.

Post-War revelations that many of the World War One atrocity stories were without foundation vindicated Otago/Southland's newspapers wartime disbelief in the "image of the monstrous German enemy". But by the 1920's it was too late, however, because the "image of the monstrous German enemy" had created ripples outside the narrow focus of the Great War itself. A desire for revenge created mostly by the "image of the monstrous German enemy" was reflected in the extremely harsh peace of Versailles, that in turn contributed to the Second World War. Unfortunately, these post-War revelations led to suspicion in Britain, and probably New Zealand, of the true horror that was the later Jewish Holocaust.32 The propaganda distortions of 1914-1919 obscured not only the harsh realities of the First World War but also the Second.

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