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The views of the New Zealand clergy of 1860 on race relations

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THE VIEWS OF THE NEW ZEALAND

CLERGY OF 1860 ON RACE RELATIONS.

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INTRODUCTION

Both as participants in the events of 1860 and as commentators on them, the missionaries and clergy who were active in New Zealand at that time demand our attention. This essay is concerned with their actions only insofar as they help us to understand their views. After a brief sketch of the background to 1860, it will deal first with their reactions to the Waitara dispute and the King Movement, and will finally attempt to draw a comprehensive picture of their views of race relations.

It is impossible to read the newspapers and Parliamentary debates of this year without realising that the problems posed by Waitara and by the King Movement were leading to a re-examination of this whole question of race relations. Old attitudes were being reassessed, new ones becoming crystallized. In the debate which ensued the clergy of the time took a distinctive place. They were, it is true, divided between the 'peace party' and the supporters of the Government, the former being drawn from the clergy of the Episcopal Church, most of the latter from those of the Wesleyan Society. The differences between the two groups, however, and the closeness of the alliance between the Wesleyans and the settler-orientated Government have been overemphasised. (1) The views of the leaders of the two parties, Bishop Selwyn and the Rev. Thomas Buddle, often bear a closer resemblance to each other than to the views of the settlers or the Maoris concerned.

To trace the evolution of these views, to show the
grounds on which they were held, and to explain the dilemma of their protagonists - that, as passions rose throughout the year, the more just and politic they were, the less chance there was of their adoption - will be the aim of this essay.

From the point of view of race relations the main trend in the years immediately preceding 1860 was the polarisation of the interests and views of pakeha and Maori. The problem of the integration of the two economic systems became increasingly acute. With his extensive system of land holding, the Maori often could not afford to sell more of his land. How long, asked the land-hungry settlers, was this barbarous system to prevent progress? Under heavy pressure, the Land Purchase Department began to adopt very questionable methods, still further alarming the Maoris, who came to see more and more clearly that only unity would give them the strength to resist this "new system." Hence the so-called land-leagues and the popularity of the King Movement.

Thus a crisis was rapidly approaching. The Maoris saw that the time for a successful resistance was running out. Their population was decreasing, that of the Europeans was growing by leaps and bounds, and the British Government, which had protected them in the past, was handing over all the powers of government to the settlers. To the Europeans, too, the time for temporising seemed past. The growing determination of the
Maoris to combine to resist further alienation provoked them to fury. So the incompatibility of the aims of the two races became ever clearer. Neither was willing to tolerate the status quo indefinitely. Sooner or later an issue would arise in which the status quo would be challenged, and a choice would have to be made between the wishes of the two parties. Waitara posed that choice. The result was war.

War, however, was not inevitable. People and peoples with the most disparate interests can, given enough goodwill and tolerance, live together amicably. There still remained at the beginning of 1860 the strong natural desire to avoid war, if possible. The influence of Christianity, too, was a factor making for peace. There is abundant evidence of the part played by Christian teaching in limiting the spread of the war in 1860, and it is at least arguable that, had the influence of the missionaries and clergy on Maori and Pakeha alike not been so weak and divided, war might have been avoided, or at least prevented from reaching serious proportions.

Among the Maoris, Christianity had lost its novelty. Its appeal had not been enhanced by the behaviour of some of its white devotees. It was increasingly felt to be an instrument of white domination. The dissensions between the Churches, finally, had lessened the force of its claim to possess absolute truth.

As for the settlers, many of them were pious enough, but the Evangelical fervour of the forties had died down and the widespread conviction that the British were the "chosen
people", meant that any attempt to advocate, on Christian
grounds, a course of action detrimental to settler interests
was rather unlikely to meet with enthusiastic approval.

As the decline of British power after 1854 implied a
parallel decline in the Churches' power to influence native
policy, this failure of the clergy to influence the settlers
gains added significance. Moreover, what little power and
prestige they did have was greatly weakened by their disunity.
If the list of 'Officiating Ministers' given by the Registrar-
General in January 1860 is reasonably comprehensive, there were
157 ministers in New Zealand at the time, of whom eighty be-
longed to the Church of England and about twenty each to the
Roman Catholic Church, the Free Church of Scotland, and the
Wesleyan Church.(2) About a quarter of the ministers of the
Church of England and about a third of those of the Wesleyan
Methodist Society took a more or less prominent part in the
events of 1860. Their views on the war, however, differed
widely. Divided among themselves, the Churches could hardly
expect to convince others. The settlers either ignored them
or adopted the viewpoint of the Church which was most favourable
to them. Thus a correspondent to the Southern Cross commented
bitterly on the meteoric rise in popularity of the Wesleyans
among the settlers(3). Their consciences, evidently, were
considerably relieved to find that God was on their side after
all - in the eyes of one denomination at least.
FOOTNOTES.

ABBREVIATIONS.

AJHR New Zealand. Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives.

GBPP Great Britain. Parliamentary Papers Relative to New Zealand.

NZPD New Zealand Parliamentary Debates.

1. INTRODUCTION.

2. *New Zealander* 23 January 1860 (Advertisement)
WAR.

War burst out at Waitara with dramatic suddenness. (1) The attack on Wiremu Kingi took the whole colony by surprise, wrote Archdeacon Hadfield and Bishop Abraham in a joint letter to the Duke of Newcastle which stated succinctly the position taken by most of the Anglican clergy. "It is unjust to the Natives", they declared, "to deny them equal rights, and to have had immediate recourse to arms, instead of applying to the Supreme Court, or of appointing a special commission composed of English Magistrates and Native Assessors, to decide the case on sworn evidence; and it is unjust that the decision of a native title to land, which the English government wanted to buy, should have been left to one or two subordinate officers of the native department, being English residents on the spot, while even the head of the Department was not sent to investigate the title till hostilities had commenced." It was a breach of the Treaty of Waitangi. (2)

Two points were singled out for especial attention by the 'peace party' among the clergy. The first was that the Government had shown it intended to enforce the so-called 'new policy' which denied the seignorial and tribal right to land; unless himself a part-owner, the chief's right to interfere in the sale of land on behalf of the tribe was not to be recognised. This new system meant that Kingi's refusal to allow Teira to sell the land at Waitara could be branded as the dictatorial act of a 'land-leaguer'. The Church Missionaries were not
content to point out that, in fact, Kingi was a part-owner in this case. (3) They went on to condemn the whole system as an unwarranted attack on the chiefs' powers. As a consequence of it, every man with a spite against his chief or neighbour would "... revenge himself by offering land for sale, to which he has an undisputed right as an individual, but not as one of the tribe, or as one who respects his chief." (4) Since the land was communally, not individually owned, negotiations should proceed on that basis. Even on this vital question, however, there was not unanimity. The Rev. J. Hamlin, another Church Missionary, declared he could find no such thing as "Manorial Right, distinct from actual ownership, lodged in the chief." (5)

The importance of this question in race relations is clear. Given an agricultural economy, land was the country's chief asset, and farming its major industry. The race with the bulk of the best land would be supreme. This the Maoris knew. The wife of the Maori chief at Matiatia explained to John Wilson of the Church Missionary Society, that she opposed further sales lest her little son be "destitute, and without land, and breaking stones to mend the roads of the Pakeha!" (6) The settlers, on the other hand, knew that for their prosperity and progress this resistance to land sales must be broken, and that this would be infinitely easier if the chief's veto power could be removed as a first step to the complete individualization of Maori land tenure. Thus the concern of Hadfield, for example, with the minutiae of land purchase proceedings derived from his knowledge that it was through changes there that the
position of the Maori race in the new nation could be undermined. Bishop Selwyn and his clergy continually called for proper regulations to govern the purchase and sale of Maori lands, which would prevent the individual Maori, like Teira, from sacrificing the interests of the whole tribe for his own benefit. (7).

To Selwyn's mind, however, even more important than the Government's adoption of this 'new policy' was its folly in "rushing into a bloody quarrel without trying all other methods that of settling the dispute first; assuming the natives are rebels before they have done one single thing to prove themselves to be so, and denying them the ordinary privileges of British subjects, which the Treaty of Waitangi declares them to be."(8)

After all, the primary purpose of asserting British sovereignty, Selwyn declared, had been the protection of the Maoris(9). The Treaty of Waitangi was more than a symbol of this; with the transfer of power to the settlers, it was a legal guarantee of racial equality. By the resort to force, not law, at Waitara, that equality had been impugned. The matter should have been referred to a law court, Bishop Abraham protested to the Governor. "NO Englishman would have given up land to which he had a claim on the first demand of a hostile party, or would have allowed a Surveyor to enter upon it and mark it off for sale."(10) The Government had acted as the tool of the settlers, not as the protector of the natives. It had committed a "gross act of injustice", "an act of folly closely bordering on insanity", Hadfield informed Newcastle,(11)
and most of his colleagues would have echoed his sentiments, if not his language. (12)

Not all of them, however. The Very Rev. R.B. Paul, Archdeacon of Nelson, was in no two minds about the "treasonable proceedings of William Kingi at Taranaki". "That the right must eventually prevail, we cannot for a moment doubt..." he affirmed, but it was "fearful to contemplate the amount of suffering which has fallen on the inoffensive settlers. God grant that the signal chastisement which will sooner or later be inflicted on the stirrers-up of this unrighteous war, may have the effect of placing the European population of Taranaki on a more secure footing..." (13) The Archdeacon, however, was in a minority. Few of the Episcopalian clergy doubted the injustice of the Government's action, though many tended, like Henry Williams, to keep their views quiet, (14) and even Selwyn thought Hadfield rather extreme in his criticisms of the Government. (15)

The views of the Wesleyan clergy are strikingly different. When war broke out, they, like the bulk of the settlers, presumed that the Governor would not have used force unless there were good grounds for it, (16) and saw in the action of the natives a repudiation of the truths of the Christian Gospel. (17) The blame for the war should be laid at the feet of Kingi, and his actions were those of a land-leaguer. While Buddle, for example, could sympathise with the "barbaric pride" of the Maoris, and their belief that they could "maintain individually a degree of self-respect, importance
and independence" only if they kept their land, he could not believe, that Providence meant their lands to lie waste. Both races would benefit if the Maoris sold their surplus lands. (18) Unlike the Church of England clergy, the Wesleyans do not seem to have felt that the principles on which land sales were negotiated were defective enough to justify William Kingi in his resistance to the survey.

Thus, in the view of the Methodist leaders, the Treaty of Waitangi had not been broken. Teira's claim was quite valid, (19) and criticism of the allegedly provocative language of the Maori translation of the Proclamation of Martial Law was quite unjustified. (20) At a meeting of the Wesleyan Missionary Society Buddle held that the Maoris "...in pursuit of a phantom benefit" had "...taken up arms against a Government and people who have ever sought their prosperity..." Though some might hold the war to be unjust, it had, whatever its justice or injustice, had ill-effects on the religious and social welfare of the Maoris (21). This speech by Buddle shows the paramount concern of the Wesleyans to have been, not the rights or wrongs of the war, but rather its effect on the evangelization of the Maori. Since their concept of Christianity was so inextricably tied up with respect for British culture and law, it is hardly surprising that they supported the Government's suppression of what seemed to them a revolt against the new, civilised way of life.

What of the other denominations, the Roman Catholics, the Free Presbyterians and the other smaller groups? Most of the clergy from these Churches are notable only for their silence.
on the subject, though in far-off Otago the Rev. D.M. Stuart
delivered himself of the opinion that the "natives at Taranaki
have done very wrong, and God and the Europeans will punish
them..."(22)

On the whole we can safely leave the other denomin-
ations and go on to consider the attitudes of the Church of
England and Wesleyan clergy to the King Movement.

II. \textit{WAP}.

1. For detailed description of the Waitara dispute, see Sinclair,
op. cit. p 136 ff.
2. \textit{New Zealand Spectator} and \textit{Cook's Strait Guardian} (Spectator)
   5 September 1860.
4. Kissling, C.A., Letter of 14 April 1860 p 14 in Hadfield, O.,
   Recent Outbreak at Taranaki, Otaki 31 March 1860.
5. GBPP HC/2798. Gore Browne/Newcastle 4 December 1860.
   Encl. 1 Appendix A No. VI p 201.
6. Wilson, J.A., \textit{Missionary Life and Work in New Zealand}
   p 81 (note).
8. \textit{Extracts of Letters from New Zealand on the War Question.}
   Mrs. Selwyn/Col.A.P. 30 August 1860. p 25.
9. GBPP HC/2798 Gore Browne/Newcastle 25 May 1860. Encl.2
   Selwyn/Colonial Secretary. 28 April 1860 p 48.
10. \textit{Extracts...} Abraham/Gore Browne. 11 March 1860 p 42
12. See e.g. Grace, T.S., \textit{A Pioneer Missionary Among the Maoris}
    Grace/Venn 23 October 1860. pp 93-94; Ashwell, E.,
    Recollections of a Waikato Missionary p 23.
    vol.II p.378.
15. \textit{Extracts...} Lady Martin/Miss Palmer 28 August 1860 p 16.
16. See e.g. \textit{Wellington Independent} 27 March 1860. (Buller in
    Letter to Editor)
17. Wellington Independent 27 March 1860 (Extract from the
    Sydney Morning Herald)
19. New Zealander 21 April 1860 (Buddle's letter quoted in /
22. Otago Colonist 19 October 1860.
THE KING MOVEMENT.

The most comprehensive exposition of the 'missionary' attitude to this movement is given in Buddle's pamphlet, "The Maori King Movement". It stemmed, according to Buddle, from the growing determination of the Maoris to resist the threat posed to their way of life by the spread of colonisation - the loss of their lands, their laws, their national characteristics. To avoid degradation and slavery, to prevent their young people from becoming debauched, unity under a King, who would give them law and order and prevent the progressive alienation of their remaining lands, was essential.

These aims, commented Buddle, could have some serious consequences. To try to retain vast areas of waste land would foster their "natural indolence and covetousness" and prevent their social and religious betterment. The endless discussions associated with such attempts at self-government would not only result in the neglect of industry and agriculture but would lead to a loss in interest in religious matters. Already runangas and political discussions had edged out "meetings for mutual religious improvement," (1) and spread demoralizing tendencies!

Although it professed Christianity, Buddle continued, the movement's first act, involving a breach of the Treaty of Waitangi, (i.e. proclaiming Te Wherewhero King) was inconsistent with the Christian religion, and as a result of the movement the Maoris were"... in danger of assuming to be teachers
when they should only be disciples."(2) They even interpreted the Bible to suit their own purposes! Thus the movement's attractive aspects covered a multitude of evils, and it disturbed the hitherto friendly relations between the races. Only a few extremists might want to reject British sovereignty and colonisation altogether, but undeniably it promoted "an undercurrent of ill-feeling in the native mind."(3).

To this Wesleyan viewpoint, the clergy of the Church of England had no major objections. There was, however, a difference of emphasis. They tended to dwell more on the failure of the Government to turn the positive features of the King Movement to its own advantage. Benjamin Ashwell, for example, a Waikato missionary, blamed Government neglect for the eagerness of most of the tribes "favourable to the tare" (the law) to join the movement, which was, he felt, part of the "... glorious struggle in the native mind for law and order."(4) Hadfield felt bound to call Newcastle's attention to the Governor's "culpable dereliction of duty in permitting the conspiracy to reach its present dimensions", (5) while Bishop Abraham too, in his milder manner, said that the desire for a better administration of the law and for a more civilized society evidenced by the Movement might have been used for the best purposes of law, morality and religion.(6)

The virtual unanimity of the Churches' opposition to the movement was due to the threat it posed to the principle of amalgamation. That the Anglicans attacked the Government while the Wesleyans did not should not be attributed to servility on the part of the latter. It has perhaps some significance that
when Buddle did lay some of the blame for the rise of the Kingites on the Europeans it was the moral laxity of the settlers, not the political ineptitude of the government, which he attacked. (7) While it would be as absurd to regard the puritanical, moralistic approach as characteristic of Wesleyanism alone, as it would be to claim for the Anglican clergy a monopoly of imaginative sympathy, there does appear to be an appreciable difference in outlook between the clergy of the Churches - a difference which helps us to understand their divergent views on race relations.

The Wesleyans tended to see their responsibilities to the Maoris as comprised within two headings - the salvation of their souls and the purification of their lives. The natural concomitant of these religious views was a strong political conservatism, a profound unwillingness to attack a Divinely-ordained status quo. Buddle's equation of an attack on British sovereignty with disobedience to Christian teachings referred to above is an example of this tendency to give conventional political ideas and systems an aura of sanctity which hindered clear thinking.

To over-emphasise the importance or the rigidity of such views, or to imagine that the attitudes of the Anglican clergy were not coloured by a very similar outlook, would be very unwise. All the clergy were to some degree creatures of their time. But because they were also able to achieve a certain degree of detachment they were able to play a distinctive part as intermediaries during the war proper. To this we can now turn.
III THE KING MOVEMENT

2. Ibid. p 66.
3. Ibid. p 65.
7. Buddle, pp 4-5.
THE CHURCH AS MEDIATOR.

Before the Wars the missionaries had often acted as agents for the Government in its dealings with the Maoris. Their understanding of, and influence on the native people was unrivalled, and their association with the Government, as in the assistance they rendered in persuading the Maoris to sign the Treaty of Waitangi, seemed to be of mutual benefit to both Church and nation.

But as the Government came more and more to appear to Maori eyes as the instrument by which they would be robbed of their lands, this association boded ill for missionary influence among the Maori. The missionaries, complained Wiremu Tamihana at a meeting of the Kingites at Ngaruawahia, had told them to direct their thoughts heavenwards while their land was being filched from them (1). In view of this increasing feeling that "...the ministers have led us astray...", the concern of the 'peace party' among the clergy to attack any infringement, in letter or spirit, of the Treaty of Waitangi, becomes understandable. They, the missionaries, had extolled to the Maoris the merits of British rule. Now every demonstration of its demerits, as far as the Maori was concerned, that is, was a blow to missionary prestige. After Waitara it was vitally necessary for the missionaries to reassure the Maoris that they had not used their influence over them in order to betray their most vital interests to the pakeha.

Thus the outbreak of hostilities placed them in an extraordinarily difficult position. To prevent the continued
erosion of their influence over the Maoris, they must defend Kingi, for on the justice of his actions Maori opinion was almost unanimous. ("I have never before witnessed anything like the indignation expressed by the Maoris universally at the Government's Act," said Hadfield(2)). Yet Kingi was a rebel—a rebel against the authority of the Queen's government, a rebel in arms against the Queen's troops, a rebel who was gaining support from all those Maoris who wished to have their own King, or even to eject Europeans altogether. Could a missionary support a native chief against his own countrymen? If so, would not the Church completely lose its influence over the settlers, for whom it was also responsible?

But the problem was not simply one of expediency. There was the moral problem. War, it was generally agreed, could be justified on Christian grounds in certain circumstances. But here were two races—both of which the missionary knew intimately and loved deeply—locked in bitter conflict with each other, their interests apparently diametrically opposed. What could a minister of the Gospel of Peace do in such a situation? Both sides shared the faith he proclaimed and sought for his ministrations. He could not invoke the blessing of God on both armies, and yet to act as chaplain to one of the parties only would be an unmistakable sign of commitment. It was indeed a tragic dilemma. What could he do?

On some questions at least all the missionaries could agree. Suffering had to be limited as much as possible. Men like the Rev. J. Wilson hazarded their lives (and their reputation among the settlers (3)) by visiting the Maori pahs and
begging the Maoris to agree to treat the wounded humanely, to exchange prisoners, to honour the slain, to respect the flag of truce. Going out to negotiate a truce at Matarikoriko, Wilson was struck by the Maoris' bravery and conducted a service for them. Sympathising with both sides, he succeeded in reducing to some degree the barbarity of the fighting. Similarly, Bishop Abraham, though convinced the war was unjust, moved at a public meeting in Wellington, "That this meeting, deeply sympathising with our fellow-settlers in Taranaki, and with the soldiers, sailors, and volunteers engaged in, or suffering from, the effects of the present war, feels it to be a duty incumbent on all the inhabitants of the Province of Wellington to contribute towards the relief of those enduring privation..."(5)

Allied with such activity was a unanimous desire to prevent the spread of the war and to calm the passions it aroused. The statement of the Wesleyan missionary, James Wallis, about reports of disaffection among the natives of the Raglan district, is characteristic of many such utterances by ministers of all denominations. He declared that "...if there exists any disaffection..., it is only towards Europeans who take pleasure in circulating slanderous and mischievous reports respecting them."(6) The jingoistic talk of the settlers about exterminating the natives came in for some very bitter criticism.(7)

The missionaries were equally active in dissuading hitherto peaceful natives from joining in the fighting. Hadfield's great dread was that a "war of races" would develop,(8) and he was not alone in his fear. It was probably through his
influence that Tamihana Te Rauparaha went (successfully) to persuade the Wairarapa natives to stay at peace. (9) Selwyn's influence was often used to prevent the war spreading. In November, for example, he succeeded in pacifying a war-party of some two or three hundred Waikato Maoris who were threatening Auckland after the mysterious death of a Maori, thought to be murdered by a European. (10)

This unanimity about the need to restrict both fighting and suffering did not extend to the terms on which peace should be concluded. The Rev. Richard Davis, Church Missionary at Waimate, who had used all his influence to reassure the natives that the Government was not trying to dispossess them, felt that unless it came to terms with Kingi speedily, the Maoris would regard the war as one of extermination and act accordingly. (11) But the very idea of coming to terms with rebels stuck in the throats of those missionaries who thought the war just. John Morgan, another Church Missionary, felt that the Taranaki and Ngati Manu tribes should first be humbled and then be forced to pay compensation for the damage they had caused. (12) John Whiteley, a Wesleyan, urged unilateral surrender on Kingi on Scriptural grounds, (13) and most of the Wesleyan missionaries, praised by J.C. Richmond for acting "like good citizens and loyal subjects," (14) agreed that unconditional submission by Kingi must precede any talk of peace.

Both the Governor and the Southern Cross had urged Hadfield to use his influence on Kingi to urge him to yield. (15) He refused. He was "wholly unable to understand why he (Kingi)
had been forcibly expelled from his land." The Governor, not
Kingi, had violated the law. The precondition for peace was
therefore the dismissal of Gore Browne, not the defeat of Kingi.
Selwyn, and most of his clergy, agreed that the weakness, if not
the wickedness, of the Governor was a hindrance to peace, (16)
and that to demand unconditional surrender was both impolitic
and wrong. The main thing, Benjamin Ashwell thought, was not
the victory or defeat of the British troops but the establish-
ment of peace and the inception of a new native policy.(17)
Selwyn, Abraham and Hadfield all agreed that the Governor should
treat Kingi as a British subject ought to be treated and refer
the whole question to a proper court.(18)

To sum up, then, the natural corollary of a belief that
the war was unjust was the desire to see it terminated on con-
ditions which would go some way at least to satisfy the complaints
of Kingi and prevent the recurrence of a similar conflict. A
permanent peace could not be established without a relaxation
of the pressure for land, and a restoration of the Maoris' rights.(19) Harmonious race relations could not be built on
the basis of a peace which catered for the interests of the
Europeans alone.

The activities of the missionaries in connection with
the related question of the King Movement further illustrate
the difficulties of their intermediary position. The Waikato
missionaries, Buddle, Ashwell and Archdeacon Maunsell especially,
were in close touch with the movement throughout, attending
its meetings, informing the government of its intentions, and
trying to channel its activities along peaceful lines.

Acting as a link between the Kingites and the settlers, their influence had a moderating effect. They reassured the panic-stricken, and attacked extremists on both sides. In view of the state of alarm and tension among the Europeans at the time, caused often by quite groundless rumours, (20) this function of the missionaries was a very valuable one. Potatau, the Maori King, could, for example, assure the settlers at Raglan, Waikato and Waiuka, of his peaceful intentions through the medium of Ashwell, while the ability of men like James Wallis and the Rev. Seth Tarawhite to give information in advance if trouble was pending helped to restore a measure of stability to the situation. (21)

Extremists among the settlers came under fire, and many of the clergy expressed concern at the malign influence which the formation of militia companies had on the native mind, acutely suspicious as it was of any apparently hostile actions. (22)

There was, however, nothing equivocal about the missionaries' attitude to the King Movement. There seems to be no evidence that any missionary or clergyman supported it in word or action, and there is a mass of evidence to show that, from Hadfield on one extreme to Turton (23) on the other, all of them exerted their influence to stop the spread of the movement, or, where it was firmly established, to restrain its anti-European tendencies. (24) Faith in the arguments of the missionaries and in the religion they taught undoubtedly influenced many natives to turn their backs on the movement, in the
hope that both Europeans and Maoris would "cleave together in the love of their Lord Jesus Christ," as Tamihana Te Rauparaha put it (25).

The lot of the intermediary, however, was not a happy one. Maunsell might tell the Waiuku natives that the King should not prevent a man selling his land as the Treaty of Waitangi secured this for him, (26) but they were likely, looking at Waitara, to doubt both the value of the Treaty and – which is more important here – the sincerity of the man who advocated their reliance on it. The Maoris came to regard the missionaries "more as the friends of the Governor than of themselves" (27). At the great gathering of the Kingites at Ngaruawahia, where many missionaries were present, Te Heuheu violently criticized John Morgan whose active part in the opening of the road to Ahuriri through the Taupo district had dis pleased the Kingites. "Let Mr. Morgan go away and become a soldier", he thundered."If he persevere we shall be scratching each other" (28). With such sentiments being aired, it is no surprise to read the sober comment of the Southern Cross correspondent that the meeting confirmed his belief in the "serious diminution" of missionary influence and the reversion of the Maoris to their old ways. (29) It might be true that the Maoris knew of the opposition of the Bishops and the Church Missionaries to the war (30) but to the Maori nationalist, the missionary tended to appear more and more as the representative of an alien race; he was a chaplain to the men who were killing his compatriots, he refused to stay with the Maoris when they took up arms against the Government (31); he spied on their activities and sent reports to the Governor on them; he tried to induce them to make peace before they had
redressed their wrongs. Already native missionaries were becoming popular. Soon native religions were to appear.

The success of the missionaries, then, in limiting the extent and the barbarity of the war and in reducing tension between the two races was won at the expense of a very considerable loss of influence among the Maoris. Even more pronounced was their loss of influence among the settlers if and when they criticized the war. Most of the clergy, even of the Church of England, do not appear to have criticized the war, not publicly at least. Even among those who strongly denounced the war, few were willing to agitate against the Government as Hadfield did. The Editor of the *Wellington Independent* could declare that only a few of the missionaries had spoken strongly against the war and that all but one or two were in favour of "a sharp and decisive termination to the present war," without provoking a denial from any of the clergy. (32) And yet the missionaries were universally condemned by the settlers as 'Exeter Hall sentimentalists', and wild rumours flew around that Selwyn and the 'ultra-missionary' party had persuaded the Governor to end hostilities. (33) By many indeed, Selwyn was regarded as a traitor," a turbulent priest intermeddling with the affairs of state, denouncing the Governor and countenancing the Natives in their rebellion." (34) As for Hadfield, the settlers ran out of expletives. His views, the *Taranaki Herald* declared, were nothing but "the passionate feelings of a man who combines womanly weakness with priestly presumption," (35) The smear campaign against Hadfield over the question of the Otaki Maoris' petition, which he was accused of fabricating, and of Wiremu
Kingi's letters, which he was accused of concealing, degenerated into complete absurdity when he was charged by Turton ("a wretched Wesleyan missionary", spluttered the indignant Hadfield) with encouraging the natives to reject European jurisdiction on the grounds that he had advised a Maori to settle a dispute about a cow out of court! (36)

On the whole, the clerical critics of the Government were either branded as criminals or dismissed contemptuously as impractical idealists. They lacked power, prestige and unity of purpose. They expected the settlers to display a degree of altruism towards the Maoris unparalleled in the history of British colonisation. The settlers, very understandably, were unwilling to "go the second mile".

The 'peace party' did, however, win one major victory when they managed to persuade Parliament not to proceed with the 'Native Offenders' Bill', and it is significant that both in this and in their success in convincing the Waikato Committee of the House of the need for a radically changed native policy they had the support of the Wesleyans.

The Native Offenders Bill gave the Governor power to declare a native area 'hostile' and to prevent any one from having any communications or dealings with the Maoris in it. In a closely reasoned protest, Bishop Selwyn, Archdeacons Kissing, Maunsell and Hadfield and other clergymen inveighed against this proposed bill, as an infringement of the Treaty of Waitangi, an obstacle to the work of the missionaries, an unwarranted concentration of power in the hands of the Govern-
or, and a denial of the right of the Maori to freedom from any penalties unless "brought to answer by due process of law" (37). They stormed in vain until - and this is the interesting point - they were joined in their protests by James Wallis and Thomas Buddle, both Wesleyans. Though it was hardly to be expected that the remonstrances of the Bishop and some of his clergy would have much effect at the present stage of the bill, said Mr. Dillon Bell in the course of a debate in the House, "... when ... Mr. Buddle unexpectedly comes forward and joins his own appeal to those of the clergy of the Church of England, Ministers must surely see that there must be real grounds for asking that the Bill be now withdrawn." (38) Had the two denominations presented a united front more often their opinions would have carried much greater weight in the community.

In summing up, we may fairly claim that the influence of the missionaries and clergy throughout the war was limited, and decreased as the year went on. Such as it was, it generally had a moderating effect, doing much to prevent the spread of hostilities, and to keep the two races in touch with each other. As Sinclair points out, the fact that the Europeans as well as the Maoris were disunited helped to restrain racial hatred. (39) Their arguments gained some support in the newspapers, though it was not until Parliament had opened, and the Opposition had attacked the Government, that the "Southern Cross", the "New Zealand Spectator" and later the "Wellington Independent" denounced the Governor's actions in initiating the war. Perhaps this was because the relevant evidence was not released until then; or perhaps because the papers were more concerned to discomfit the
Government than to champion the Maoris.

The Missionaries also had some support among the settlers. Most of the settlers who wrote to the "Southern Cross" were pro-Maori. The arguments of Selwyn and his clergy probably had something to do with the British Government's decision to recall Gore Browne. But generally the end of the year found them viewed with disfavour by both races. Not even Hadfield could prevent the King's flag from being raised at Otaki. The foundation of a new religion, more accommodating to Maori interests, was not far off. That the Angel Gabriel chose to reveal it to a convert of Whiteley, the most militaristic of the Wesleyans, is hardly likely to surprise us.

IV THE CHURCH AS MEDIATOR.
1. Southern Cross 5 June 1860
5. Spectator 11 August 1860.
6. New Zealand 16 May 1860 (Letter to Editor).
13. Wellington Independent 27 March (Extract from Sydney Morning Herald article written probably by Whiteley.)
15. Hadfield, Recent Outbreak at Taranaki 31 March 1860; Southern Cross 7 December 1860.
17. AJFR 1860 F-3 p 49.
IV THE CHURCH AS MEDIATOR Contd.

20. New Zealander 23 April 1860 (Wallis)
21. Ibid. 21 April 1860 (Letter to Editor); Southern Cross 8 May.
22. See e.g. Wellington Independent March 27 1860. (Buller);
   Spectator 23 May 1860 (Rev. W. Ronaldson).
23. Turton was a Wesleyan, an ex-missionary.
24. See e.g. GBPP HC/2798. Core Browne/Newcastle 26 May 1860
   Encl. 2. Morgan/Core Browne 8 May 1860 p 64; Ramsden, p 223
   (on Roman Catholic Bishop); AJHR 1860 F-3 pp 42-3 (Main-
   sell's 'neutral' attitude).
25. Wellington Independent 1 May 1860.
27. Wellington Independent 29 June 1860.
29. Southern Cross 12 June 1860 (Letter to Editor).
32. Wellington Independent 8 June 1860.
33. Spectator 23 April 1860 For attacks on Missionaries see e.g.
   editorial of Southern Cross 13 May 1860 (extract from Taranaki News;)
   Southern Cross 13 May 1860 (extract from Taranaki News;)
34. Wellington Independent 9 June 1860.
35. Taranaki Herald 24 November 1860.
36. Ramsden, p 221.
37. GBPP HC/2798; Core Browne/Newcastle 7 September 1860 Encl. 3
   pp 131-3.
38. NZPD 1860 p 578.
PACIFIC RELATIONS.

The views of the clergy on race relations, as we shall see, were defective in many ways. For their age, however, they were very advanced; the missionaries succeeded in rising above the spirit of their times. That, of course, is the aim of all the great religions - to find the eternal in the transient, the universal in the particular and, having found it, to make it the basis of life and thought. The Christian Gospel, that truth is love, had a considerable influence on its New Zealand ministers in 1860, especially in freeing them from nationalistic and racialistic bigotry. Witness, for example, both the championship of the Maoris' case by pakeha clergymen and the considerable restraining influence exerted by native ministers on their countrymen. (1)

There are at least two other factors, however, which militated towards the adoption of a relatively impartial stand by the clergy on this race relations question. First, the obvious one: their greater knowledge of the Maori language, the Maori way of life, and, still more important, of the Maoris themselves. They knew the Maoris as people who lived and loved and died, as human beings who knew joy and sorrow, hope and despair. As missionaries, they knew the best and the worst of these people, and thus it was almost impossible for them to be caught up in the war fever, with collective hate against the Maoris as one of its main characteristics.

They thought of the Maori, then, in human terms. Another factor, their economic independence from the struggle
for land, helped them to do this. They were, quite literally, not so directly concerned with "the things of this world" as their parishioners. Their stipends were not diminished by the amount of the land the Maoris refused to sell. Of course, this must be qualified. They would have their children to provide for, and that might necessitate the purchase of land. But, to a certain extent at least, they could afford to be objective. It might, perhaps, be mentioned in passing that some of the settlers considered those who opposed the war to be motivated directly by economic or authoritarian motives. Selwyn's proposed system of Native management, declared the *Taranaki News*, was directed to the aggrandizement of his Church. To this end the Maori was a mere stepping-stone, influence with the Maori being the best way to assure the supremacy of his order (2). It is true that the missionary had a vested interest in the continued existence of the Maori people. That this was an important factor in the formulation of his views on race relations is, however, more than doubtful.

If, as a group, the missionaries and clergy were thus enabled to be relatively objective, the clergy of the Church of England had a further advantage. The hierarchical nature of their Church polity gave them a certain detachment from the laity which had its advantages as far as authoritative statements of Christian principle were concerned. The Wesleyan ministers were less fortunate.

What, then, were the views of the clergy on race relations? What did they mean by the 'amalgamation' they favoured? How did they envisage this 'amalgamation' being
achieved on the cultural, political and economic levels? the

To a man, they assumed/superiority of the Christian religion, and of the European culture that went with it, to the indigenous religions and culture of the Maoris. After all, they were missionaries. It was axiomatic that if the natives were to adopt Christianity, they must renounce their native customs (3). The amalgamation of the cultural pattern of the Maori with that of the pakeha (and by amalgamation was meant submergence) was to be encouraged. With the two races living together in the one country, there were only two alternatives - one was amalgamation, the other some form of apartheid. The clergy, as evangelists, naturally chose amalgamation, and probably chose wisely. It is regrettable that they did not have more understanding of the upheaval such a policy would cause, not only in the Maori way of life, but in his way of thinking. We cannot, however, expect a nineteenth century missionary to think in the terms of a modern anthropologist.

As missionaries, they felt their task was to share the blessings of the Christian Gospel and of European civilisation with the Maoris with the hope that eventually Maori and pakeha would stand on an equal basis. At the ordination of these Maoris, as Deacons in the Church, Selwyn preached an illuminating sermon on this subject, pointing out the barbarous origins of the British civilisation and the great responsibilities attendant on the possession by the Europeans of such powers and privileges. "The Englishman might, by neglecting the cultivation of the
Christian graces", he warned "become lower than the New Zealander... and on the other hand the New Zealander... by embracing the Gospel invitation, might reach a standard of excellence higher than that of his more enlightened fellow-men"(4).

Thus the Gospel was seen as a bridge between the two races. If both Maori and pakeha had been redeemed by a common Saviour, race relations could only be conducted on terms of mutual respect. The Church Missionaries, especially, pay repeated tribute to the courage of the Maori, no less than to his growing capacity for spiritual understanding. (5) An interesting comment on the Maoris by Mrs. Selwyn is that they ".. would be loyal to the Queen, and amenable to law, if there were any for them. They will fight unto death if they think they are in the right, and give way readily when they know they are wrong; and it goes to our hearts to see a noble race of people stigmatized as rebels..."(6)

The Europeans were not set up as models of perfection. Archdeacon Mannsell, writing to the Maori paper 'Haeta' praised the liberality of the Maoris and would have them tell their fellow-Pakehas who hold the Maori Christians at a low estimation that "they are a church that bears no fruit, and are not advancing in good works."(7) Further the alleged 'deterioration' of the Maori character was often blamed on the Europeans bad example (8), or on their establishment of 'Grog Shops'. "We are desirous, as a people, " pointed out the Wesleyan missionary, Alexander Reid, "that the natives should adopt our laws, conform to our customs, and sell us their lands. One of the greatest obstacles to any of these ends being gained is Grog." (9)

It was generally agreed that the Maoris were an inferior race, but one already raised by God ".. far from the depths of
barbarism."(10) An address by the Wesleyan, James Buller, emphasised the transforming and civilising effect of Christianity on the natives, and claimed that this, combined with the elevating effect of education, was responsible for the present hospitality, kindness and orderliness of the Maoris (11). The Bishop of Wellington summed up admirably the aims of the Churches. "I trust", he said, "that we shall do our part in this Diocese towards furthering and encouraging the Native desire for a more Christian habit of life, for Education, and a more advanced civilisation." (12)

The views of the missionaries and clergy on the political amalgamation of the two races are closely connected with their desire to 'Europeanize' the Maoris. They wanted a union of the two races which would extend the Maoris' knowledge of the English way of life and would lead to the eventual abolition of all 'separate systems' and 'exceptional laws'. (13) Maunsell stressed the need to educate the Maori to accept European ways as well as granting him political rights, if he were to be enabled to adjust himself to the new conditions. "The great political want of the country" he said, "is some leavening principle that shall mould society into those thoughts and actions which, unless brought into operation before the white man has consolidated his power, and before England has withdrawn her protection, must issue in either debasement and contempt to the Natives, or in fierce struggle which will end in their extermination."(14) The establishment of a political system which would unite the two races, without leading to the exploitation of the Maori in the process, was the aim of the clergy, or at least of those of them who thought about the matter.
Most of the thought on this subject came from the Anglican clergy. Selwyn's view, for example, was that the Maori, by the Treaty of Waitangi, enjoyed the full rights of a British subject in return for his recognition of British sovereignty. From subordination to the Crown's authority he could have derived many benefits, but, unfortunately, a policy of neglect had been followed and peace and justice had not been enforced in native areas. (15) This lack of government was universally deplored by the clergy. Hadfield felt that "... nothing could be more calculated to alienate the feelings of the Natives, than the practical denial of Government protection." (16) Thomas Grace declared that the Government's refusal to intervene in disputes unless a European was involved was estranging the Maoris, while Bishop Abraham denounced the meagre expenditure on Native Affairs. If the Government had spent another £5,000 and maintained a hundred native-elected Mayors of Districts, no more would have been heard of the Maori King Movement, he maintained. (18)

The success of that movement, all were agreed, was partly due to the native desire for law and order; everywhere, on his pastoral visits, Selwyn found a desire for English Missionaries and Magistrates (19). The two often worked well together. Indeed, as the Waikato Committee reported, "... to persuade the native people to accept British law in lieu of their old customs is, in truth, a Missionary enterprise." (20) For it was never sufficient to provide simply an effective system - a "benevolent concern for their general welfare "was
necessary on the part of the administrators if they were to induce the Maoris to accept the authority of the law (21). 

But what type of system should be introduced, if sufficient funds and personnel were available? 'Fenton's system' was widely approved by the missionaries and clergy. The Maoris should be given representative self-government. Their runangas would elect their own Magistrates and Councillors, whose appointment and whose decisions would, however, have to be ratified by the Governor. The Maoris would be eager to support such a system, it was claimed. The European Magistrates would instruct the Natives in Maori law, leaving the execution of the law to the Maoris themselves, and their Maori counterparts would be on a footing of equality with them.

The basic unit of this system would be the runanga, and possibly a general council of all the tribes in the central part of the North Island, whose decisions would be binding on all, would develop later (22). By forming one or two Native Provinces, largely self-governing, the Maoris would become accustomed to democratic procedures and would be at least partly insulated from the pressures of the European population. This 'Indirect Rule', would also free the outsetters from their present danger, as the runangas would be responsible for keeping the peace. (23) These new 'civil institutions' with their 'Civilizing Magistrates' might be fairly expensive, but much less so, it was felt, than costly native wars. (24) Some opposition might be encountered, too, from the conservative forces in native society (25) but any progressive policy had to reckon with that.
Expensive and difficult it might be, but "it would be more safe and more just for England to retain to herself the care of this infant nation... until they have reached that degree of maturity in which they can join the superior race in administering the interests of their common country." (26)

It would, it will be noticed, be England which would determine the policy. The Maoris' submission to the Crown's authority would be gained by the grant of the rights and privileges of self-government. In this contract the settlers would have no part. The administrative officers, therefore, would be responsible directly to the Crown. Until the Maoris were mature enough to participate in the Representative System, neither the General Assembly nor the Provincial Councils could have any jurisdiction over them (27). These views of Selwyn on the relation between the proposed Native Provinces and the representative system would appear to have been restricted to the clergy of the Church of England. (28) Maunsell thought a properly qualified Officer in Auckland should have the general direction of the whole system (29) and Grace had a rather similar idea - an independent native council for Native Affairs, with a high official at its head, who would become a trusted adviser of the Maoris. (30) The general purpose was clear - to keep the government of the Maoris out of the hands of local interested ministers, who were responsible only to a body in which the Maoris were quite un-represented.

The main reason for this reluctance to trust the settler-dominated government with the direction of native affairs
The continual pressure on the Maori people to sell more and more of their land, surplus or not, was, however, strongly denounced. Moreover, Selwyn felt, the Native Land Title must be fully recognised. With stability of tenure assured, sales, preferably by direct purchase but strictly regulated, would be easier. In the Provinces of Hawke's Bay and Wellington, the Maoris could take out Crown Grants with power to sell or lease unless the tribe should demand its prior consent. In the Province of Auckland, however, the right to sell should be restricted to those Maoris living on the margin of the settled lands. In the unsettled areas the Maoris would have a considerable degree of self-government and there they should only be allowed, as tribes or as individuals with tribal consent, to lease the land. Thus European settlement and legislative sovereignty would be coterminous. The individualization of tenure would proceed only outside Native Areas, until at least some time for adjustment had elapsed. (33)

This ingenious scheme seems peculiar to Selwyn, but most of the clergy, and certainly all of the 'peace party' agreed on the need to define what constituted a native title if the
insecurity felt by the Maoris was to come to an end. (34) On the question of individualization of Maori land tenure, advocated by the settlers as a means of breaking down Maori resistance to sales, there is little explicit said. What was insisted on was that any such process must be preceded by a satisfaction of the claims of all the parties concerned and that it must not be used as a pretext by which the settlers' need for land could be satisfied, regardless of the rights of chief, tribe or individual. Above all, policy should be guided by the spirit of the Treaty of Waitangi.

To turn, finally, to the relation between the religious beliefs of the clergy and their views on race relations. The prominence of the clergymen in the attack on the war against Kingi, in the demand for a positive policy towards the King Movement, in the attempts at reconciliation during the war, as in the various controversies of 1860 should be sufficient proof that such a relation exists. Most of the settlers it is true, were also Christians, and their approach often differed radically from that of their ministers. But there are Christians ... and Christians. The differences of opinion between laity and clergy (especially in the case of the Anglican Church) reflect on the failure of the latter to communicate the Christian approach, or, at least, the approach which they believed to be the Christian one.

The first main characteristic of their approach was the tendency to approach questions from the moral view-point. It was the conviction that the Government's action had been unjust that stirred the 'peace party' into violent protest, not their belief in its impolicy. This moral sense, where it did not
degenerate into a mere code (as it often did) was often accompanied by a consciousness of sin - of one's own sin. We should remember our own shortcomings and be more humble, said the Wesleyans' leader, criticizing settlers who had glibly talked of exterminating the Maoris (35). Humility and racial bigotry could not go together.

This humility did not prevent the clergy from believing in the superiority of their race. But, together with their paternal attitude, it did modify the arrogance with which that belief was entertained by many of the settlers. This paternalism was partly an occupational disease, but it also stemmed from a quite profound sense of trusteeship, of the responsibility of the strong to use their strength for the benefit of the weaker.

In terms of race relations, this meant that, as far as their economic interests were concerned, the settlers should act sacrificially, should, that is, be prepared to allow an antiquated and wasteful system of land tenure to thwart their economic development, in order to give the Maoris time to adjust themselves to the new way of life. Progress, obviously, could not be conceived in purely economic terms.

The really important things are often those one takes most for granted. In studying the views of these missionaries, their self-abnegation, their absorption in the lives of others and in the service of their God, are apt to be overlooked simply because they are always so evident. Occasionally, however, they shine through. Many of his natives had taken to drinking again, wrote Richard Davis, but recently he had heard one or two of them
"express themselves on religious subjects, in a way and manner which is quite new... it is the best encouragement we had had for many years" (36) It is not hard - or rather, it is quite extraordinarily hard - to imagine how much labour, most of it unrewarded, must have lain behind the writing of these words. Such a complete identification with the interests of others clearly had a bearing on the attitude of these men to race relations, which, after all, are essentially a human problem. Love, tolerance, charity - call it what you will - is the essential lubricant of any harmonious society, and if Maori and pakeha were to come together to form one society then that would have to be present. Thus the constant emphasis placed by the Churches' leaders on the importance of trust and goodwill between the races was not just a rather wearisome reiteration of the obvious. To most of the settlers at the time the importance of pursuing their own legitimate interests was much more obvious, and since this involved intolerance of the equally legitimate interests of the Maoris confidence between the two races was impossible. And yet, as Archdeacon Kissling knew, to unite both races, the confidence of the native race, who were in possession of the soil, was absolutely necessary. (37).

V RACE RELATIONS.
1. New Zealander 21 November 1860 (William Barton at Wesleyan Missionary Meeting)
2. Southern Cross 18 May 1860 (Extract from Taranaki News.)
3. Buddle, p 50 (Speech by Buddle).
6. Extracts... Mrs. Selwyn/M.A.P. August 30 1860 p 25.
7. Southern Cross 17 April 1860.
8. Ibid. 10 January 1860 (Editorial).
10. Southern Cross 3 July 1860.
13. AJHR 1860, E-I Encl. 1 in No. 4, Selwyn/ Core Browne 8 May 1860 p 27.
15. Ibid E-I Encl. No. 1 in No. 4, Selwyn/ Core Browne 12 May 1860 p 23.
18. Extracts... Bishop of Wellington/? 29 June 1860 p 10.
19. AJHR 1860 E-I p 63.
22. Ibid E-I pp 61-3. Buddle thought native interests should be represented in the 'councils of the country' either by chiefs or by Europeans, but did not elaborate on this (Buddle, p 59).
27. Ibid E-I Encl. I in No. 4, Selwyn/ Core Browne 8 May 1860 p 23.
29. Grace, p 91.
32. AJHR 1860 E-I Encl I in No. 4 p 27.
33. Ibid E-I p 11.
34. New Zealander 23 April 1860.
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