THE ROLE OF SCRIPTURE IN THE THEOLOGY OF JÜRGEN MOLTMANN

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Abstract

The sum total of dissertations engaging Jürgen Moltmann’s work—numbering over 400—is testament to both his widespread appeal and the controversy of his claims. But while Moltmann’s interlocutors provide significant comment on key issues in his theology, the role that Scripture plays in his project is often only given limited attention, or even overlooked completely. This dissertation thus seeks to shed light on this frequently neglected aspect of Moltmann’s theology.

In attending to the “role” of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology, this dissertation’s aim is twofold. First, it will investigate the nature of Scripture according to Moltmann—its relationship to God, the church, and wider humanity. Second, it will address the function of Scripture in his theology—how it informs other areas of theological construction, such as eschatology, the theology of the cross, and the doctrine of the Trinity. Taking up this definition, the dissertation proceeds through six chapters to explore the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s early theology; Theology of Hope; the eschatology and political theology of the mid- to late-sixties; The Crucified God; the doctrine of the Trinity leading up to and in The Trinity and the Kingdom; and later theology—particularly Experiences in Theology.

In addition to various insights arising from studies of these different periods, this dissertation concludes with three key claims. First, Scripture plays a central and non-negotiable role in the construction of Moltmann’s theology. He cannot be properly understood apart from his this commitment. Second, Moltmann invokes a contrastive paradigm throughout his career, identifying allegedly non-biblical features in traditional and contemporary theology, and answering these with his own proposals derived from the biblical text. Third, Moltmann can be profitably understood as a “speculative” theologian—in the best sense of the term. He is not bound to a particular hermeneutic but reads Scripture creatively in order to open up new directions in theology.
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Preface

Not yet satisfied with the year I spent reading and reflecting on Moltmann’s work for my master’s, I decided to dedicate another three years of my life to the task in writing a doctoral dissertation. My reasoning was that reading one of the most acclaimed contemporary theologians for such a length of time would serve as a kind of intensive introduction to all things theological. The study in theology that I had completed up until that time had not yet made me confident to speak as a theologian. Looking back on the last three years, however, I am still somewhat reticent in claiming the title! But it is not necessary to be an expert in everything in order to reflect on God and on the world in light of God. What I have learnt from Moltmann is that it is at least necessary to engage and not retreat to the churchly and otherworldly—insofar as these bear little to no connection to everyday matters. Theology is a public discipline, and in this time of xenophobia and climate change denial, white supremacy and new nationalisms, anti-science and populism—not least in the church!—Christians must heed the call to creative action in the public sphere. Due to the nature of this project, and perhaps the nature of academia in general, this public-theological aspect will not be a major feature of this dissertation. I mention it here though as it is perhaps the most significant gift I have received in reading Moltmann’s theology.

There are a number of other people involved in my life over the last three years whom I also owe my thanks to. After supervising my honours and master’s theses, Christopher Holmes graciously agreed to supervise a dissertation on Moltmann—all the more gracious considering his Websterian and Thomist inclinations. I thank him not only for enduring my enthusiasm for some of Moltmann’s more radical proposals, but most of all for his pastoral approach to supervision and his feedback provided throughout the process. I also thank David Tombs, my secondary supervisor, for feedback on earlier drafts of some of my chapters. In our conversations I’ve found myself consistently more interested in his line of research than my own! Outside of my department, the library staff have been a huge help. I thank those working in interloans for their detective work in tracking down some of the more obscure items
in Moltmann’s corpus and in the secondary literature, working off my prior guesswork. I thank those working in collections who assented to significantly expanding the library’s Moltmann collection at my bequest, and found a workaround for an electronic book supplied with pagination.

The postgraduate community in theology during my time at Otago University has been a particular highlight, making the journey all the more memorable. There are too many to name whose friendship and stamina through almost daily etymological trivia on my part are much to be admired. Here, though, I thank Joel Banman especially for his close reading of and feedback on my final draft. His ever-readiness to respond to my ongoing typographical disquiet, always insisting that I am not disrupting him, has led me to conclude that Canadian politeness is the tenth fruit of the Spirit. I also thank another friend Caleb Day, who gave some of his time on short notice to offer an intensive review of a couple of my chapters. Through it all, my wife Chloe has been my biggest supporter. Meeting for the first time just six months out of starting my doctorate and then marrying with still over two years to go, this project has been a large part of our relationship. She has never stopped being encouraging, patient, and loving. Finally, I thank my heavenly Father for the call to the vocation of theology and the power of the Spirit to engage with my subject matter in a very direct way. May he become greater and I become less.

In the dissertation ahead I have employed gender-neutral language, but I have not made any effort to point out or remedy gendered language in quotations.

German translations of Moltmann’s work are abundant and generally reliable. Where I have adjusted translations or drawn attention to German words, I have indicated the parallel passage in the German original. Unless as part of a phrase, German adjectives and verbs are given in their lexical rather than inflected forms, for ease of reference. In any case, when referring to the German text, page numbers for the original appear immediately after the abbreviation, Ger., appended to the English citation. Bibliographical details for Moltmann’s major works in German can be found under the English counterparts in the list of works cited, whereas other
German texts receive their own entries because I do not always cite them in conjunction with the English. In a few places, for the sake of clarity, I have added or removed punctuation, adjusted capitalisation, or standardised the spelling of proper nouns. I make no mention of the German text at these points and include only the note: “slightly adjusted.”

Where no ET is available I work directly with German texts. Here, all translations into English are mine, unless otherwise stated. In order to give a clearer picture of the development of Moltmann’s theology, I have frequently referred to the original German publication date of his various writings in parentheses, following abbreviations for his works. For essay collections, the date refers to the original publication of the specific essay. Some works will thus have different dates, depending on which part is being cited at the time. Original publication data can most often be found in the front matter of translated works. This is not always the case for individual essays, however. I have thus also referred to James Wakefield’s bibliography in order to determine the earliest appearance of a text, largely omitting reference to Wakefield for sake of succinctness.

Almost all quotations of the Christian Bible are taken from the 1989 New Revised Standard Version (NRSV), and I have explicitly noted the exceptions. I have also made no distinction throughout this dissertation between the Holy Bible and Holy Scripture. While I can see how such a distinction might be helpful in some studies, I have not detected a difference in Moltmann’s own use of the terms and thus proceed to employ them interchangeably.

The image on the title page is a close-up of the angel in Simon Martini’s and Lippo Memmi’s Annunciation with St. Margaret and St. Ansanus altarpiece. It is in the public domain, and I use it here with thanks to The Yorck Project and Wikimedia. Moltmann writes about the work in The Coming of God: “Earlier, when I was writing on other subjects, I had a picture before me on my writing desk. And during my work on this eschatology of ‘the coming of God’ I have again had a picture in front of me: It is the Angel of the Annunciation, by Simone Martini, painted in 1315 and now in Galleria Uffizi in Florence. The angel is not looking back to the wreckage of
history, as does Paul Klee’s ‘Angelus Novus’, which Walter Benjamin called the Angel of History. This angel of the future is gazing with great eyes towards the messianic Child of the coming God, and with the green branches in his hair and in Mary’s hand proclaims the Child’s birth. The tempest of the divine Spirit is blowing in the angel’s garments and wings, as if it had blown him into history. And its meaning is the birth of the future from the Spirit of promise.”

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## Abbreviations

**Works by Moltmann**

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<th>Abbrev</th>
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<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td>A Broad Place.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>The Crucified God.</td>
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<td>CoG</td>
<td>The Coming of God.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPS</td>
<td>The Church in the Power of the Spirit.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EH</td>
<td>The Experiment Hope.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ExpTh</td>
<td>Experiences in Theology.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FC</td>
<td>The Future of Creation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>God in Creation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HP</td>
<td>Hope and Planning.</td>
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<td>HTG</td>
<td>History and the Triune God.</td>
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<td>PTh</td>
<td>Perspektiven in Theologie.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRF</td>
<td>Religion, Revolution and the Future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SL</td>
<td>The Spirit of Life.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TH</td>
<td>Theology of Hope.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TKG</td>
<td>The Trinity and the Kingdom.</td>
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<tr>
<td>WJC</td>
<td>The Way of Jesus Christ.</td>
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**Other Abbreviations**

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<tr>
<th>Abbrev</th>
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<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Barth, <em>Church Dogmatics</em>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGG</td>
<td>Welker, ed., <em>Diskussion über Jürgen Moltmanns Buch, “Der gekreuzigte Gott”</em>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ET</td>
<td>English translation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ger.</td>
<td>Original German</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWBAA</td>
<td>Bauckham, ed., <em>God Will Be All in All</em>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JM</td>
<td>Lapide and Moltmann, <em>Jewish Monotheism</em>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRSV</td>
<td>New Revised Standard Version</td>
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*For more complete bibliographical details, see my works cited at the end of this dissertation.*
1. Jürgen Moltmann: Theologian of the Bible

Jürgen Moltmann remains one of the most important theologians to read today. With an active career spanning from the late 1950s to the present, he has made invaluable contributions to the theological conversation over a broad range of different subject areas. His 1964 *Theology of Hope* compelled his contemporaries to reconsider Christian theology as thoroughly and fundamentally eschatological. His 1972 *The Crucified God* initiated passionate debates over the relationship between God and suffering, and spurred on criticisms of traditional concepts of God. And his 1980 *The Trinity and the Kingdom* inspired a generation of social trinitarians to rethink the meaning of the core Christian witness to the three-personed God. But the breadth of Moltmann’s career is only matched by his vigour. At the age of ninety-three, although retired from teaching, he continues to publish, present at conferences, and is even supervising a doctoral student.1

In view of this, Moltmann’s readers have called him “one of the world’s foremost theologians,”2 and “the most important German-speaking Protestant theologian since the Second World War.”3 Indeed, “Jürgen Moltmann has probably had more influence worldwide than any other Protestant dogmatic theologian alive today.”4 But others have been less enthusiastic about the value of his work. This lack

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1 Moltmann’s most recent book is *Christliche Erneuerungen in schwierigen Zeiten* (Munich: Claudius, 2019). The title translates as *Christian Renewals in Difficult Times*. In June 2019 he presented a paper at the “Reconciliation, Divine and Human” conference at St. Andrews in Scotland. For information on Moltmann’s latest work in doctoral supervision, see “Jürgen Moltmann Will Co-Advise LSTC Student Brach Jennings’s Doctoral Studies,” Lutheran School of Theology at Chicago (website), published 3 January, 2019, https://www.lstc.edu/about/news/article-515. Jennings informs me that he has since transferred from LSTC and is working under Moltmann as his primary supervisor at Tübingen.


of enthusiasm is apparent above all in the evaluation offered by Randall Otto: “Moltmann has through his sinful reason and idolatrous imagination formulated a theology that appeals to the rebellious desires of man to be as God, to create a world of his own, a world better than God himself did create.” But while I cannot agree with Otto’s assessment, such a response is understandable in light of the biting polemics that Moltmann himself advances throughout his career. Taking a less combative position, a theology lecturer I once met relayed to me that there is no value in teaching Moltmann at the undergraduate level. I had to disagree, seeing as I do not think twentieth century theology can be rightly understood without Moltmann, but the sentiment is of note, nonetheless, as another significant example of the range of responses that this polarising theologian has been met with.

It is not my concern in this dissertation to either exonerate or condemn Moltmann. I seek first to understand him. Although it cannot be said of all works that depart from Moltmann’s conclusions, I think Richard Bauckham’s observation is still applicable to much of the secondary literature today: “Too many criticisms of Moltmann are based on careless reading and misunderstanding of his work.” Certainly, individual theologians can be read too much and placed in the context of their times and concerns a little bit too generously, their defenders a priori shutting down any meaningful dissent. It is my hope that this dissertation will not reach such false heights, and instead provide a sympathetic exposition of Moltmann’s thoughts on

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7 Bauckham, *The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann*, x.
his own terms, ready to be heard and wrestled with, rejuvenated or rejected, amended or received as a source of new theological life for future readers. Indeed, such a purpose is in accordance with Moltmann’s own aims: “My whole concern has been, and still is, to stimulate other people to discover theology for themselves—to have their own theological ideas, and to set out along their paths.”

1.1. The Purpose of This Dissertation and the State of the Conversation

One important part of Moltmann’s theology that is often overlooked or misunderstood is the role that Scripture plays in his work. The reader does not have to look far to find criticisms of his use of Scripture. As J. Matthew Bonzo writes, “Moltmann’s references to scripture are used more as proof-texts for his particular philosophical position than in sustained exegetical analysis.” Similarly, Stephen Williams summarises, “Moltmann confidently derives theological conclusions from a cross and resurrection-centered christological vantage-point, showing few qualms about brushing aside or riding roughshod over both biblical and theological considerations which challenge his construction.” And, in the same volume, Lanier Burns ponders, “Is he not speaking to himself, when he argues, ‘It always causes misunderstanding when biblical texts are torn out of their proper contexts in the biblical tradition, and

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8 ExpTh, xv (2000).
9 J. Matthew Bonzo, Indwelling the Forsaken Other: The Trinitarian Ethics of Jürgen Moltmann (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2009), 10. Nonetheless, Bonzo writes a few pages earlier, “Whatever criticism I may bring against his thought in this thesis, it is important to confess that it is far outweighed by my indebtedness to the creativity and energy he has personified in his writing over the years.” Ibid., 5.
are used to legitimate other concerns’”

At best, then, “his use of the Bible is uneven.”

At worst, however, Moltmann’s theology “cannot be acknowledged to be a legitimate expression of the biblical view of God and his world.”

But others have praised Moltmann’s use of Scripture. As Joy McDougall writes, “Ever since his first major publication, Theology of Hope, Moltmann has unwaveringly turned to the biblical witness as the chief source and norma normans for his theology.” Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz, a personal friend of Moltmann’s, claims, “All his life, as he once said to me, he has remained a ‘Bible boy’, who allows himself to be addressed by Holy Scripture ever more directly.”

Kurt Richardson, observing the same patterns as Moltmann’s critics, can offer a much more positive assessment in regard to The Trinity and the Kingdom: “Throughout the work, Moltmann develops his reflection on the overall contours of Scripture. His is not a highly exegetical method but his total shaping in the revelatory narratives of Scripture along with its didactic rigor is not lacking. Hardly can one imagine a more engaged Scriptural reasoning.”

Even the critics themselves have allowed similar statements: Moltmann “trains our eyes in the direction in which the biblical witness trains our eyes and biblical and dogmatic theology are thus prepared for felicitous fusion. This is a

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12 Burns, “Moltmann’s Theological Anthropology,” 96.
13 Otto, God of Hope, 11. Nonetheless, “far from admitting the impotence of the biblical narratives, Moltmann intends his social interpretation of the traditional language of the Bible and church to bear witness to a God who provokes men to practical hope in the historical transformation of the world.” Ibid., 62. For other criticisms, see e.g., Beck’s comment that Moltmann “relies on Scripture to lay out the territory and basic parameters of the subject. Within these parameters, he then exercises a great deal of freedom in rendering an interpretation of Scripture.... Sometimes his conclusions are consistent with a historical-critical exegesis of the relevant biblical texts. However, at other times he strays into conclusions that are defined more by theological speculation and/or political and social rhetoric than the scriptural witness.” Beck, The Holy Spirit, 105
15 Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 12.
16 Kurt Anders Richardson, “Moltmann’s Communitarian Trinity,” in Jürgen Moltmann and Evangelical Theology, ed. Chung, 17-39, at 35. But while certainly generous, it is perhaps too much to say, “He is clearly not dominated by any extra-biblical model, even while very well-versed in the Christian metaphysical tradition.” Ibid., 38.
strength in all of his works.”17 Moltmann can thus be praised for the centrality of Scripture to his work, even if his reading is not always governed by conventional hermeneutical principles: “His theology is, for the most part, grounded in the biblical text, but he is no simple biblicist.”18

In view of this brief catalogue of somewhat conflicting claims, in this dissertation I seek to clarify the role that the Bible plays in Moltmann’s theology. I have deliberately chosen the general term, “role” to guide my investigation, as it covers both his theology of the Bible—that is, what he understands it to be in its relationship to God, the church, and wider humanity—and how it functions in connection to other areas of theological construction, such as eschatology, the theology of the cross, and the doctrine of the Trinity. But I will outline my project in greater detail towards the end of this introductory chapter. Before doing so, a brief survey of how this theme has previously been approached in the literature will help to identify areas requiring further attention.

Out of over four hundred master’s theses and doctoral dissertations on Moltmann’s work, not one provides a comprehensive survey of the role of Scripture in his theology.19 This represents, in my view, a basic understatement of the importance of Scripture for Moltmann’s project. Nonetheless, various features of the role of

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Scripture in Moltmann’s theology have not been completely neglected in the literature. Indeed, a few readers have still provided detailed comment on some of these.

Steven Phillips investigates the role of Scripture in liberation theology. He has high praise for Moltmann. “Jürgen Moltmann laces his theology with countless biblical references. His thematic theological presentations have been fully substantiated by biblical corroborations.” Phillips proceeds to identify three major aspects of Moltmann’s hermeneutic. These are the assumption of the Bible’s eschatological orientation, reading with the eyes of the poor and oppressed, and trinitarian interpretation. Particularly notable is Phillips’s compilation of a Scripture index for six of Moltmann’s English works, namely, *Theology of Hope, Religion, Revolution and the Future, Hope and Planning, Theology of Play, The Crucified God*, and *Church in the Power of the Spirit*. He uses this data to identify preferences in Moltmann’s use of the Bible. Phillips focusses his attention on Moltmann’s reading of the four gospels, Romans, and 1 Corinthians, which together comprise 56.29% of the biblical references in these six works. He also notes a strong preference on Moltmann’s part for the NT, which accounts for 88.03% of the references. Phillips’s investigation sets an important precedent for future studies of the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology in that it is sympathetic and appreciative. Although there is certainly room for more critical comment, this dissertation is a happy contrast to those which seek to dismiss Moltmann’s claims ahead of giving him a fair hearing. Moreover, Phillips’s creative treatment of Moltmann’s biblical preferences provides an important angle on Moltmann’s work, one that has not yet been repeated in any noteworthy way. Following Phillips, I have decided to compile a somewhat lengthier index, accounting for those references overlooked by him, as well as those from Moltmann’s later works. I have included this as an appendix to this dissertation.

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In his research on Scripture in modern theology, Hendrik Marinus Vroom notes that theologians inevitably draw on other criteria, besides the content of Scripture alone, to inform their conclusions. In one chapter, he attends to Moltmann’s 1968 proposal that praxis be the criterion, alongside Scripture, for sound theology. While Vroom provides some critical comment, however, he acknowledges that the criterion of praxis does not control Moltmann’s theology at every turn.

Steven Johnson’s 1995 dissertation remains the most comprehensive account of the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology. He takes up the hermeneutical theory of the so-called Yale School, namely Hans Frei, George Lindbeck, and David Kelsey, to guide his investigation. Although in his interest in historical criticism Moltmann departs from the Yale theologians, he also shares much in common with them, such as in taking key biblical events like the exodus and the resurrection to be revelatory of God’s identity; reading Scripture as a coherent whole, particularly, for Moltmann, in regard to the theme of promise; and assuming that human beings are called to participate in the same story narrated by Scripture. Johnson’s work is especially illuminating in drawing on a particular, established hermeneutical theory to understand Moltmann’s project. Nonetheless, this also means that there is yet room for a more inductive approach to discerning the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology.

In his master’s thesis, Hyo-Dong Lee employs Moltmann’s political hermeneutics to respond to accusations that the Bible is complicit in the ecological crisis. For Lee, Moltmann’s hermeneutic is of particular interest, not only because he attends to ecological questions in some detail, but because such a hermeneutic “listens

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23 Steven D. Johnson, “Moltmann, Yale, and the Interpretation of Biblical Narrative,” Ph.D. diss. (Drew University, NJ, 1995). Interestingly, another dissertation completed in the same year also uses George Lindbeck’s work as a framework for interpreting Moltmann’s theology. Here, though, the emphasis is not so much on the role that Scripture plays in Moltmann’s project but the ways he draws on non-biblical sources to inform it. See Daniel L. Leister, “Experience, Language, and Dialogue in Postmodern Theology: A Study of Jürgen Moltmann’s Theological Method,” Ph.D. diss. (McMaster University, Canada, 1996).
first and foremost to the voice of the victims.”  

And these are not merely human victims but victims of humans in the modern age, namely nature. Significantly, Lee, too, notes “the relative paucity of literature on Moltmann’s biblical hermeneutic.”

A number of studies have also been conducted on Moltmann’s reading of particular biblical texts. Michael Gilbertson, for example, observing the keen interest given to the Book of Revelation in the theologies of both Wolfhart Pannenberg and Moltmann, develops his own reading of the biblical text and proceeds to evaluate the eschatological theology of Pannenberg and Moltmann in light of this. Gilbertson finds that Revelation supports some of their respective conclusions, whereas other times it departs from them, such as in its more deterministic view of God’s relationship to the world. Poul Guttesen also investigates Moltmann’s theology against the background of Revelation, centring the discussion on the concept of the kingdom of God. Guttesen’s reading, however, is more dialectical than Gilbertson’s, not only reading Moltmann critically against Revelation, but employing Moltmann’s proposals to illuminate Revelation for today. Other studies include that of T. David Beck, who, finding Moltmann’s eschatology to be insufficiently pneumatological, takes up the writings of Paul in order to offer a corrective. And Patricia Sharbaugh draws Moltmann into conversation with the OT theology of Walter Brueggemann, including a helpful and critical chapter on the role of the OT in Moltmann’s theology.

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of the cross. Most recently, Lidija Gunjević has taken a thematic approach, arguing that Moltmann’s theology of Sabbath and Jubilee helpfully illuminates the biblical texts dealing with these concepts. She also criticises him, however, for neglecting to develop this into a more concrete programme for the modern context.

Besides these longer treatments, various articles also provide comment on different aspects of the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology. I will attend to the most important of these in the main body of the dissertation. The above, however, shows that this theme has not yet received the attention due to it in research on Moltmann’s theology. Three observations in particular can be made. First, a general study on this topic has not yet been undertaken. The investigations above tend to treat Moltmann alongside other theologians or focus only on particular aspects of the role of Scripture in his theology. Johnson’s dissertation is perhaps the one exception here. Second, however, an inductive approach is also required. While comparisons with other theologians, such as those in the Yale School, are certainly necessary, inductive research that seeks its starting point in Moltmann himself is essential if Moltmann is to be understood on his own terms. Third, there is yet room for a diachronic account of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology, demonstrating early precedents and later developments. The tendency in the above studies is to read Moltmann’s theology thematically, which is in danger of obscuring the historical shape of his thought.

Obviously this study will have its own biases, so that attempts at generality can never be fully actualised—not least in view of the sheer extent of Moltmann’s literary output. Readers will note that the majority of my exposition is devoted to the first half of Moltmann’s career, up until 1980, by which time his basic concerns have been established and his later theology proceeds from these. I bring with me my own presuppositions, so that the inductive approach, too, represents the ideal rather than

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a perfect reality. And I have chosen in some places to organise the discussion around certain themes, so as not to lose my readers in the breadth of issues addressed in each period of Moltmann’s theology. Nonetheless, the methodological concerns of generality, inductivism, and diachrony will guide my investigation throughout.

1.2. Moltmann’s Contrastive Paradigm

From his theological beginnings to his most recent contributions, Moltmann has shown continued interest in the distinctness of biblical concerns over and against those found in Greek philosophy and thought in particular, and the Christian tradition in general. This was already perceived by Christopher Morse some decades ago, who wrote of Moltmann’s theology, “Accompanying each positive statement we find a polemic directed against some alternative position which is rejected as a prevailing misconception in Christian thinking.” The negative exemplar, along with its major faults, is typically presented first, opening up space for Moltmann to develop his own position. I have named this feature Moltmann’s “contrastive paradigm,” a term which I will use throughout this dissertation. Among other aspects of the role that Scripture plays in his theology, applications of this paradigm are to be found at key points in Moltmann’s career, lending support to his argumentation with the claim that his conclusions derive from biblical concerns, against other positions which circumvent Scripture with philosophical logic. As Moltmann writes as recently as 2014, he seeks “to understand what the Bible means by the ‘living God’ and

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31 Christopher Morse, *The Logic of Promise in Moltmann’s Theology* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), 27. Jerry Irish had earlier called this “Moltmann’s theology of contradiction,” though he did not differentiate between the two forms of contradiction he identified. The first is that between two theological commitments Moltmann wants to uphold, namely the crucifixion and resurrection. The second is that between Moltmann’s own position and the position he rejects—the form of contradiction that Morse also points out. Jerry A. Irish, “Moltmann’s Theology of Contradiction,” *Theology Today* 32:1 (1975): 21-31. Others have observed a slightly more sophisticated structure: “We frequently encounter in his [Moltmann’s] literature a form of argument along the lines of: ‘Neither A nor B’ (standard theological alternatives) ‘but C’ (which either negates both or incorporates elements of truth in them into a higher synthesis).” Williams, “Moltmann on Jesus Christ,” 112-13. While Williams does not provide a source, this same observation was made decades earlier by Dorothee Sölle in *DGG*, 112-13. Remarkably, the pagination is identical!
to free the God of Israel and Jesus Christ from the imprisonment of metaphysical definitions, which are due to Greek philosophy and the religious Enlightenment.”

In the sharp contrast he draws between Greek and Christian thought, Moltmann is not alone in Christian history. Indeed, the contrast seems to go back to the NT itself. As Paul writes, “Jews demand signs and Greeks desire wisdom, but we proclaim Christ crucified, a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles [Hellēnes], but to those who are the called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God” (1 Cor 1:22-24). In another place, Luke contrasts the philosophical curiosity and scepticism of the Athenians with the call of the gospel (Acts 17:19-21, 32). And while some patristic authors tended to adopt a more generous view of certain insights explicitly derived from Greek philosophy, others made plain their antagonism. For example, Tertullian famously proclaimed, “What has Jerusalem to do with Athens, the Church with the Academy, the Christian with the heretic? Our principles come from the Porch of Solomon, who had himself taught that the Lord is to be sought in simplicity of heart.... After Jesus Christ we have no need of speculation, after the Gospel no need of research.”

It is not difficult to find similar sentiments expressed in the Reformation era. In his 1518 Heidelberg Disputation, Luther warns against the undisciplined use of Greek philosophy in theology, echoing Paul’s terminology in 1 Corinthians. “He who wishes to philosophize by using Aristotle without danger to his soul must first become thoroughly foolish in Christ. Just as a person does not use the evil of passion well unless he is a married man, so no person philosophizes well unless he is a fool,

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33 Or “Greeks.”
34 Tertullian, The Prescriptions against the Heretics, 7.9-10, 12, in Early Latin Theology: Selections from Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrose and Jerome, ed. and trans. by S. L. Greenslade, full work on pp. 25-77 (London: SCM, 1956). Tertullian’s famous statement does not, however, entail a rejection of reason altogether, but only the type of reason that Athens represents in opposition to Jerusalem. E.g., “‘Athens’ and ‘Jerusalem’ stand here as symbols... of the opposition between a mode of thought which believes that fact conforms to reason, and another which believes that reason must conform to fact.” Justo L. González, “Athens and Jerusalem Revisited: Reason and Authority in Tertullian,” Church History 43:1 (1974): 17-25, at 22.
that is, a Christian.” Melanchthon, too, takes up a similar position in the first edition of his *Loci Communes*, making the distinction between Scripture and Aristotelian thought a central feature of the work. “In this book the principal topics of Christian teaching are pointed out so that youth may arrive at a twofold understanding: 1. What one must chiefly look for in Scripture. 2. How corrupt are all the theological hallucinations of those who have offered us the subtleties of Aristotle instead of the teachings of Christ.”

It is in later German liberal theology, however, that this theme finds full and programmatic expression. Adolf von Harnack is its most famous exponent. In the beginning of his *History of Dogma*, Harnack claims, “Dogma in its conception and development is a work of the Greek spirit on the soil of the Gospel.” That is, the logical formulation of Christian doctrine “for scientific and apologetic purposes,” is a fundamentally Greek—and therefore unwelcome—invention in church history. For Harnack, while the historical development of dogma may be admirable, faith and now historical criticism require that dogma no longer have the exalted place it once held in the church. Wherever it stands opposed to faith or the fruits of historical investigation, it must be set aside. Thus, “the Gospel since the Reformation... is

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working itself out of the forms which it was once compelled to assume.”  

Harnack, the chief problem with dogma is that the church has taken up doctrines developed in particular historical circumstances and understood them to be eternal truths, making them binding for future generations. But “specifically Hellenic ideas form the presuppositions neither for the Gospel itself, nor for the most important New Testament writings.” Nonetheless, here I can only provide snapshots of Harnack’s Hellenisation thesis, which is certainly much more nuanced than this brief treatment will allow.

It is difficult to situate Moltmann in this tradition—or perhaps even claim that there is a tradition in the first place, as each of these authors wrote for different purposes in vastly divergent historical contexts. Moltmann himself draws attention to a similar issue, that of too closely identifying Reformation theology and historical criticism: “It becomes very questionable whether there is a historical relationship between the Reformation and [the] positivistic historical-critical method; … whether Luther’s struggle to free theology from (scholastic) metaphysics can in any way be said to be analogous to the historical and positivistic ‘overcoming of metaphysics’…. In any case, however, the distance of the Reformation faith from the autonomy and subjectivity of the individual which has been set free by the historical method and the abstract unhistoricity of society must be preserved at all costs.”

But this should not be a question of choosing between the broad strokes of a tradition, on the one hand, and a historical context that makes Moltmann irreducible to any tradition, on the other hand. Considering the amount of attention I will give

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41 This “tradition” has taken on new forms in modern and contemporary theology. Paul Gavrilyuk’s term, “the theory of theology’s fall into Hellenistic philosophy,” has gained some prominence. See Paul L. Gavrilyuk, *The Suffering of the Impassible God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1. Gavrilyuk defines this trend narrowly so that it concerns only divine impassibility, though it is surely broader than that—as I will show in the following chapters. He briefly explores some examples, including Moltmann, in an appendix. See ibid., 176-79.
42 *HP*, 59-60 (1962).
to the distinctive nature of Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm throughout this dissertation, I clearly favour reading his theology on its own terms, ahead of hastily situating him in a particular tradition. I have provided above a few examples of others who have in their own ways maintained explicit distinctions between Greek philosophical claims or approaches and the content of the gospel, however, for two reasons. First, Moltmann is not working in a historical vacuum, so it is important to point out some significant historical precedents to his contrastive paradigm. And, second, if Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm is to be engaged critically—a task that remains necessary, albeit one that I can only contribute to by way of brief comments scattered throughout my exposition—it would be unfair to dismiss it conclusively without also attending to its potential antecedents in Scripture and the tradition. Although the precedents I have identified are anything but exhaustive, I hope that in future they will nonetheless provide some preliminary pointers for critics of Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm.

When reading through Moltmann’s corpus, three applications of his contrastive paradigm can be identified that hold a central place in his theological construction. Interestingly, all three concern the nature of God and the Trinity. The first of these is the traditional theological approach to the divine eternity and to its relationship to created temporality. In his early writings, Moltmann becomes increasingly aware of the fundamental significance of history and eschatology to the biblical witness. This culminates in one of the central theses of Theology of Hope—that the future of creation is not already realised in God’s eternity, a claim implicit, according to Moltmann, in the theologies of both Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Barth, but that creation awaits a real future that does not yet correspond to anything in God. The consequence, though only hinted at in TH, is that God’s being, like the world’s being, remains unfinished—certainly a departure from the tradition against which Moltmann polemises. In subsequent writings, he contends for a notion of divine being that is located in the future. In place of what Moltmann identifies as the eternal present of God, then, comes the historical and futurist nature of God’s being.
The second key aspect of this tradition that Moltmann rejects is its doctrines of divine impassibility and immutability. In impassibility the tradition claimed that God does not suffer, and in immutability it claimed that God does not change. Indeed, Moltmann had already begun to dismantle the latter in proposing a historical God. If this was not enough, however, the doctrine all but topples in his audacious theological proposals concerning the suffering of the Father and the Son in the crucifixion. Beginning development in the late sixties, this idea found full expression in Moltmann’s *The Crucified God*, where Moltmann treats divine suffering in the context of the doctrine of the Trinity. In place of the impassibility and immutability of God, then, comes the trinitarian suffering of God.

Finally, Moltmann turns his attention to conventional theological constructions of divine unity, focussing in particular on their modern articulation in the theologies of Barth and Karl Rahner. While his alternative can be seen in development from at least the late sixties, it is worked out extensively in *The Trinity and the Kingdom*, where Moltmann contends that the shared community of the divine persons forms the basis for their unity, rather than a shared substance. This coincides with the contention that the three persons constitute three active subjects, against Barth’s and Rahner’s claims that God is a single subject. In place of the substantial and subjective unity of God, then, comes the social unity of God.

These three applications of Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm showcase his critical retrieval of what he perceives to be a biblical doctrine of God and the Trinity against undue, external influence in the Christian tradition—Greek or otherwise. They are intertwined with other assumptions about the nature of Scripture and its function in theological construction. I have drawn attention to them here so that the overall shape of Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm can be understood before attending to these various applications in detail in the following chapters. In my estimation, this paradigm constitutes the central logic of the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology. The value of the paradigm itself is difficult to determine, however. I refer to it here in general terms for the sake of analysis, but Moltmann himself never does so.
His readers will need to take into consideration how the paradigm is applied in connection to other hermeneutical and theological commitments. Throughout this dissertation, then, I explore this paradigm in conversation with these various commitments. Of course, this also stems from a more basic decision, noted in the previous section, to present a general account of the role that Scripture plays in Moltmann’s theology—not one that focusses exclusively on his contrastive paradigm.

1.3. Dissertation Outline

In the following study I have divided the material into six chapters, loosely corresponding to different developments in Moltmann’s career over time, though with some necessary back-tracking in places for context and ease of understanding. My exposition proper begins in CHAPTER TWO with an investigation into Moltmann’s early theology. A remarkable level of interest in questions concerning Scripture is already discernible at this stage in his career. Moreover, the significance of reading these initial proposals becomes particularly clear in view of the relative paucity of attention given to them in the secondary literature. In CHAPTER THREE I proceed to the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s first major work, Theology of Hope. My main focus in this chapter is on the application of his contrastive paradigm, distinguishing between an ahistorical concept of divine being and the biblical witness to God’s historical being. I also explore other features of Moltmann’s use of Scripture, such as the place of the biblical canon in TH, and the relationship between the OT and NT.

I continue to trace the development of Moltmann’s theology in CHAPTER FOUR, with a discussion of his work after TH into the latter half of the sixties. Here the constructive side of his contrastive paradigm is apparent in his close alignment of the being of God with the future. Besides this, I address the important role that Scripture plays in Moltmann’s burgeoning political theology. The second part of the chapter provides an account of the transition from a theology of hope to a theology of the cross in The Crucified God. So follows CHAPTER FIVE, in which I explore the relationship between this focus on the cross and Moltmann’s theology of Scripture. This is
also the place in which I explore the second major application of his contrastive paradigm in his distinction between traditional accounts of the God who does not suffer apart from the body of Christ and the biblical witness to the cross, which Moltmann argues requires quite a different interpretation of the crucifixion. Other matters such as Jesus’ relationship to the OT, and the historicity of biblical texts are also addressed in this chapter.

In CHAPTER SIX, I turn to Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity in *The Trinity and the Kingdom*. Here I discuss the third major application of his contrastive paradigm, which concerns the distinction between traditional notions of divine unity and one that is derived from the biblical witness to the three persons of the Trinity. While I dedicate most of the chapter to this subject, I also comment on other methodological commitments in *TKG*, producing a picture of how the Bible functions in Moltmann’s theological construction in this work. My final expository chapter, CHAPTER SEVEN, is included to provide an account of the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s later theology. This is particularly important in regard to the hermeneutical programme that Moltmann forwards in his final major work, *Experiences in Theology*, though I also attend to developments elsewhere in his corpus.

In my CONCLUSION I offer a summary of major themes addressed in each chapter. Alongside each of these, it becomes clear that Scripture plays a central and non-negotiable role in the construction of Moltmann’s theology. He cannot be properly understood apart from this commitment. I then draw attention to two fundamental features of Moltmann’s use of Scripture. The first is his contrastive paradigm, which challenges readers to measure their theology against Scripture, as well as inspiring them to reimagine their theology in light of Scripture. The second is Moltmann’s commendably speculative approach to reading the Bible, which, like that of a novelist or artist, engages not just the mind but the heart as well.
2. Text, History, and Promise: Beginnings

A reading of Moltmann’s first essays, prior to the publication of *Theology of Hope*, demonstrates the central significance that Scripture held in his early thought.¹ Already at this point, Moltmann seeks to move critically beyond the Barthian, Bultmannian, and historicist orthodoxies of his day, grasping after the eschatological horizon of Scripture that will shape the rest of his theological career. I have divided the material into three sections, proceeding chronologically through key essays where Moltmann comments on Scripture, or where his argumentation reveals important presuppositions and conclusions pertaining to Scripture. In the first section, I explore Moltmann’s discussion of fundamental questions such as the inspiration of Scripture and the relationship between Scripture and tradition. In the second, the theme of an eschatological horizon begins to emerge—particularly significant for Moltmann at this stage in determining the universal scope of preaching and the persistence of the church despite the torrents of history. Finally, I attend to this concept of the horizon in two later essays, where Moltmann tests it in dialogue with Barth, Bultmann, and proponents of historical criticism. In these more sophisticated discussions, an important link is forged between the promises of Scripture and the work of the present, both in relation to their common horizon.

One essay from this period treating the theme of Scripture directly, namely, “Scripture, Tradition, and Traditions,” has been excluded.² This is because the essay is simply a summary of the discussions at an ecumenical conference and demonstrates little of Moltmann’s own concerns.

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2.1. Some Fundamental Questions: The Earliest Essays

In two of his earliest essays, Moltmann attends to some fundamental questions around the nature and role of Scripture in the church. In his first essay he takes up the theme directly, inquiring into issues like inspiration and the scientific validity of biblical claims. In his second essay on what it means to be Reformed today, Moltmann reminds the church of the ongoing need to read and reform tradition in light of Scripture.

2.1.1. 1959: “The Bible as the Word of God and the Word of Human Beings”

In this essay, Moltmann advances constructive proposals for a doctrine of Scripture, beginning with Paul’s theology in 2 Cor 4. Notably, I have not been able to find any treatments of Moltmann’s theology that address this piece in any significant way, if at all. This is somewhat surprising, since the essay is unique in Moltmann’s theology. It will not be for another forty years, in his 2000 Experiences in Theology, that he will again give sustained attention to the doctrine of Scripture.4

Moltmann begins with two claims made of the Bible that make it questionable today. First, the Bible is God’s word.5 Such a claim is met with offence on the part of non-believers, as it cannot be justified on the basis of human reason, nor with regard to the Bible’s practical relevance for those outside the church. Rather, believers quickly find themselves invoking absolutes, which by nature are neither demonstrable nor falsifiable. The second claim that brings the Bible into question is that God

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4 See section 7.5. of this dissertation.
5 Due to the overlap of divine word and human word in the context of this essay, I have chosen to consistently translate Wort as the lowercase “word.” Because nouns are capitalised in German, Moltmann does not make the same orthographical distinction between God’s Word and human word that is typical in much English-language theology.
speaks in the Bible through human words. There is nothing inherently divine about the human words themselves. It is only that God has chosen to speak through this medium.

Interestingly, Moltmann suggests, Paul faced similar questions. His defence in 2 Cor implies a number of allegations that were made against him. For example, not only does Paul “lack the captivating, ecstatic power of speech,” but his ministry has not been certified by the church in Jerusalem. It is thus indistinguishable from that of “swindlers, fools, and charlatans.” For Paul, however, it is Christ himself who guarantees the authenticity of the ministry. The commission to preach God’s reconciliation to human beings is given by Christ. For the apostle, questioning his ministry is thus questioning Christ himself. Moreover, Paul does not require any certification from Jerusalem. In doubting Paul’s apostleship, “since the fact that the Corinthians are Christians has arisen from his apostolic service, they would, after all, have to renounce being Christian.” That is, Paul does not here appeal to Scripture, the other apostles, the words of Jesus, or reason. Rather, for him, Christ himself establishes the truth of the word through faith in the hearts of those to whom the word is proclaimed.

Nonetheless, Paul also appeals to conscience (συνείδησις) in 2 Cor 4:2, “an apparently objective and neutral authority.” But, Moltmann wonders, following the polemics of dialectical theology, “Does this not contradict that which was said earlier of the unprovable nature of the word in the things of this world, of the unique self-evidence of the divine word?—Is then the conscience nevertheless the religious authority that is always available within human beings, to which the word of revelation must correspond, and to which it is attached, that proves them right?” The truth of

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the word would be made dependent, if only in part, on human beings. In response, Moltmann contends that such fears overlook the eschatological location of the conscience in Paul’s theology.\(^{11}\) For Paul, the conscience is not a “divine spark” in human beings that enables them to confirm the truth of the word. Rather, it consists in the confession given at the last judgement—which is on the cusp of taking place.\(^{12}\) “Paul feels that in this legal dispute with his opponents he is placed before the gates of God’s last judgement. In this situation... he calls upon everybody’s common knowledge of his apostolic message to be a witness for his word.”\(^{13}\)

Paul lastly appeals to the Holy Spirit. For him, neither history nor tradition could make comprehensible the presence of God in the crucified Christ. The apostle knew it was only the Holy Spirit that could bring about faith through the word. As such, Paul compares this act to the act of creation (2 Cor 4:6). It is through the Holy Spirit that mere human words become God’s own word.

Throughout his exegesis, Moltmann is determined to demonstrate that it is not Paul’s words themselves but that to which they witness that ensures their truth. But neither should this result in complete disregard for the words. As Moltmann puts it, “So little the human, apostolic word matters—for us the Bible—before the Lord Jesus Christ; so much it matters in service to the church for Jesus’ sake.”\(^{14}\) The meaning of these words become clearer as Moltmann proceeds to evaluate the doctrine of “verbal inspiration,” where the Holy Spirit inspires every single word of the biblical text.\(^{15}\)

In his discussion of verbal inspiration, Moltmann begins with the rejection of two extremes. On the one hand, the inspiration of Scripture is not simply located

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\(^{11}\) Moltmann cites Rom 2:15 and 9:1, and 2 Cor 1:12 and 5:11 in this connection.


\(^{13}\) Moltmann, “Die Bibel,” 40.


externally in the heart of every individual to whom the Holy Spirit has imparted faith. On the other hand, however, neither is Scripture’s inspiration simply located within the words themselves, apart from their being heard. Following 2 Tim 3:16-17, Moltmann writes, “The Holy Scripture with which we deal is always the Scripture of this practical application. It is not simply there. It wants something from us.”16 Simply put, claiming that “the Bible possesses a tangible, heavenly quality that is demonstrable to everyone and automatically given with its origin,” and treating it as such, is to “engage in idolatry.”17 Such a claim would overlook the nature of Scripture as a human witness and seek security for faith in something other than God. The Bible is much rather like a sacrament, the sign under which God’s word comes to human beings. And sacraments are yet more than signs. “They not only signify what they testify, but they administer what they testify. In this way the Bible is the sign and administration of the one word in which God has determined the salvation of this world: the sign and administration of Jesus Christ.”18 To say anything more would be to open “a gate and a door to corrosive Enlightenment criticism of the Bible.”19

But this is not all there is to the doctrine of inspiration. Indeed, while he rejects some of the excesses of the doctrine of verbal inspiration, Moltmann can still affirm its basic insight. The doctrine “is intended as a guide, saying, ‘This is what you should listen to!’ It is intended to ensure that precisely in hearing the words of this and no other text we really hear the words of the eternal God’s own address to us human beings.”20 Taking this into account, Moltmann turns to Calvin to address

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17 Moltmann, “Die Bibel,” 44. This sentence closely resembles the words of Weber: “The concept of inspiration (4) serves the effort to ascribe to the Bible a tangible quality, inherently present in it, automatically given by its origin and means of development.” Weber, Foundations in Dogmatics, 1:233.
20 Moltmann, “Die Bibel,” 43. Similar sentiments are expressed by Barth. E.g., “The Reformers took over unquestioningly and unreservedly the statement on the inspiration, and indeed the verbal inspiration, of the Bible, as it is explicitly and implicitly contained in those Pauline passages which we have taken as our basis, even including the formula that God is the author of the Bible, and occasionally making use of the idea of a dictation through the biblical writers. How could it be otherwise? Not with less but with greater and more
the witness of the Spirit in the hearts of those who hear the word of God. While with
the coming of the end the judgements of God and Christ will finally be justified be-
fore all creation, in the present it is the Spirit who champions these from within hu-
man beings, ensuring that they hold to the truth of the word ahead of its eschatolog-
ical vindication. Again, then, the words themselves are not inspired apart from their
being taken up into the divine economy and made effective by the Holy Spirit.

Finally, Moltmann returns to the questions with which he began. First, Chris-
tians need to take reason’s doubts of the Bible seriously. “As Christians we cannot
raise our heads from the earth like moles and cry, ‘We have it!’ —and then, when the
inquiries come, crawl into the sand and keep our eyes shut.” 21 Rather, the doubts of
others need to be taken seriously, not dismissed from the outset. These doubts may
even be valid insofar as the central claims of the Bible do not depend on accordance
with science, history, or even morality. They are valid rather in the way that they are
taken up by the Holy Spirit as witness to Christ. Second, then, “we are not the advoc-
cates for the Bible and should not lose ourselves in any ingenious argumentation that
remains so tentative.” 22 The word is proclaimed in the presence of God. It is the Spirit
and not human beings that will advocate for it in the hearts of others.

This essay richly demonstrates the extent to which the early Moltmann had
thought through the doctrine of the Scripture. Throughout, the Bible cannot be ab-
stracted from its witness to Christ, nor from its missiological purpose, effected by the
Holy Spirit. This is the case with Paul’s words, which find their rationale in bearing
witness to Christ and, eschatologically, in having been the medium through which
the Corinthians came to Christ. Particularly noteworthy here is Moltmann’s distinc-
tion between words falling from heaven, which would erase the human quality of
Scripture, and human words that serve as a sign to point to Christ. Although he does
not go into detail, for him, affirming the Bible’s human character means that the
claims made by the ancient authors that present problems for the modern reader can
yet be appreciated for their role in administrating Christ. And it is only the true Advocate for biblical claims, the Holy Spirit, who can ultimately confirm their validity in this regard.

2.1.2. 1959: “What Does ‘Reformed’ Mean?”

In this short piece on the meaning of “Reformed,” Moltmann also includes some important comments that reflect his theology of Scripture. He begins with some observations on dialogue between the different generations in Germany’s Reformed churches. This not only involves appreciation for what the Spirit has done in the history of these churches, “but it also occurs in the freedom to criticise, which a person who is called out into their own responsibility and obedience receives, and can therefore no longer hide behind the answers of their Reformed grandfathers.” To be Reformed, then, is to ask after “the reforming impact of the word today.”

This central feature of the Reformed churches in Germany finds further support in their diverse history. Whereas some scholars have characterised the churches after their apparent connection to the famous Reformer, John Calvin, Moltmann draws on the work of Heinrich Heppe and Ernst Friedrich Karl Müller to argue otherwise. First, up until 1577 even the Lutheran churches “called themselves ‘reformed’ churches and at no time was this meant as a confessional or ideological self-designation.” It was from around 1560 that “Reformed” began to be used in certain areas in the more specific sense — referring to a movement within Protestantism. And yet, Moltmann contends, Calvin was still not a major figure in this movement. Rather, “we find among the contributors… a colourful and rather pluriform society of spirits: students from Wittenberg who are faithful to Melanchthon, such as [Zacharias] Ursinus and [Christoph] Pezel; Zwinglians like [Thomas] Erastus and [Albert]

Hardenberg; French and Dutch Calvinists like [Caspar] Olevian and [Peter] Datheen; and, finally, many humanists, who cannot be classified according to any confession, such as [Andreas] Hyperius.” These Reformed churches, especially following persecution at the hands of Lutheran churches in Germany, could boast a generous orthodoxy, albeit not one that was centred around the figure of Calvin. “They venerated Luther as the pioneer and originator of the Reformation in Germany, perceived its continuation in Melanchthon, and welcomed the French and Dutch Calvinist church system as a help and guidance for the realisation of their own goals of reform.”

In light of this history, Moltmann proceeds to address the place of Scripture and tradition in the Reformed churches today. He quotes the Italian Reformer, Hieronymus Zanchius, who contended that Calvin, Zwingli, and Luther should not simply be pitted against one another but be read in light of Scripture. Where Calvin’s words better represent Scripture, Luther must be set aside. But the converse is also true. Unfortunately, the town council discharged Zanchius from Strasbourg in 1563, following the response of the Lutheran Johann Marbach to this principle. Marbach had argued that Zanchius’s principle endangered the “religious consensus.” That is, Moltmann explains, for Marbach and others the truth of Luther’s theology was no longer seen primarily in relation to its agreement with Scripture but in relation to the time, insofar as the events surrounding Luther in the Reformation were seen as apocalyptic events, the ushering in of the end. Accordingly, Luther’s truth was found instead in his being the eschatological Elijah who preceded Christ’s coming. Rather than invoke Calvin as a counter-authority, though, the Reformed commended Scripture against “this apocalyptic absolutisation of Luther and his doctrine.”

For the Reformed churches in Germany at the time of Moltmann giving this paper, this last point is of particular importance. It must not primarily be specific confessions that dictate the theological work of these churches but Scripture itself.

28 Moltmann, “Was heißt ‘reformiert,’” 27.
29 Moltmann, “Was heißt ‘reformiert,’” 27.
Yet Moltmann does not stop there. He takes the opportunity to highlight the distinctly radical nature of this principle. “A theology conducted in this way and a church determined by it must be open to the truly ecumenical horizon of the word of God…. For this reason we should not so much say: ‘We are Reformed!’—but should ask what will reform the whole church of Christ.”30 Moltmann also draws attention to the situation that young ministers find themselves in. Whereas the previous generation witnessed the ousting of cultural Protestantism at the hands of dialectical theology and in the struggle for truth in the churches under the Third Reich, it is all too easy in this subsequent time of relative peace to “adopt corollaries, without taking the time to make new calculations,” or to “embrace an orthodoxy that accepts answers, without having done the questioning.”31 For this, however, it is not back to Scripture but forward to the horizon of Christ’s eschatological lordship to which Moltmann turns. Nonetheless, neither is this horizon a departure from Scripture. Indeed, the two necessarily presuppose one another. “There is no middle without the horizon, no centre without the perimeter, no Christ without his royal lordship in the worldly, incarnate life, no word of God that does not push to become flesh in the obedience of faith.”32

Here, Moltmann has reminded his Reformed companions of their duty to uphold the primacy of Scripture to confession. The task of the Reformation is not yet complete. The role of the Bible remains that of continually converting the church to the image of Christ. Strikingly, it is not simply Christ but Christ against the horizon of his eschatological lordship to whom the church is to be conformed. The church cannot only look back to Scripture but must look forward too. This eschatological orientation was hinted at in the essay I discussed above, in the previous subsection (2.1.1.), with Moltmann’s interpretation of the conscience. Moltmann begins to reflect more deeply on this theme of horizon from this point on, as the following expositions will demonstrate.

30 Moltmann, “Was heißt ‘reformiert’,” 27.
2.2. Looking to the Horizon

Another piece of Moltmann’s from 1959 is also of note, along with two others from the following years. At this point, the theme of the eschatological horizon that lies beyond the church takes an increasingly central place in his theology. In the first essay, Moltmann draws on Barth, Bonhoeffer, and others in order to demonstrate the scope of Christ’s coming lordship, often overlooked in preaching that is directed primarily to the individual and the domestic sphere. Next, in an essay from the following year, Moltmann argues that this horizon secures both continuity through history and the historical character of history. The horizon remains the same throughout history, while preaching must be faithful not only to this horizon but to the ever-changing circumstances of the present. Finally, in a third essay, Moltmann returns to ecclesiology in order to speak to the nature of the church in light of this horizon.

2.2.1. 1959: The Church Community against the Horizon of Christ’s Lordship

The eschatological horizon in Christ’s coming kingdom is the central theme of this essay, published in booklet form. Its contents are divided into four sections. First, Moltmann draws on the work of Karl Barth to demonstrate the close and inseparable relationship between Christ and his kingdom. This is significant because although preaching has become centred on Christ, this Christ is often abstracted from his kingdom. But Barth provides a reply here, in that Christ’s lordship denotes a universal state of affairs, namely his rule over all things. Thus, in accordance with Barth, “the expectation with which we attend church services suffers from our stupidity—that we dare not hope for anything more.” Preaching must look at Christ in the context...

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33 Moltmann, Die Gemeinde im Horizont der Herrschaft Christi (Neukirchen: Neukirchener, 1959), 13. Moltmann will write of this piece later, “When I read this again today, I can see that here all the themes of my later theology are really already sounded: the eschatological horizon of history in the kingdom of God; faithfulness to the earth; new partnerships for the church in the world; and ‘the narrow wideness of the cross of Christ.’” ExpTh, 91 (2000). For other expositions and comment, see BP, 78 (2006); van Prooijen, Limping but Blessed, 56-63; and Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power: The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, trans. by John Bowden (London: SCM, 2000), 26-39.
of his kingdom in order to recover the breadth of the biblical hope. Second, the Blumhardtts, Richard Rothe, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer each in their own ways testify to the comprehensive scope of God’s kingdom, one that does not only extend over every human being individually but over all the earth. Moltmann summarises their contributions, writing, “The kingdom of God has to do not only with human beings, but also with circumstances, things, and institutions—not only with personal connections, but also with connections to things, connections which link us in human society. The earth in its unabbreviated abundance will enter into the kingdom of God when the curse of the earth in Gen 3 is overcome, along with its conditions and its fate.”

Moltmann proceeds, in a third section, to draw out the ecclesiological implications of this position. Turning to the doctrine of the ordinances or “mandates” (Mandaten) he situates the calling of the church within the context of additional worldly ordinances instituted by God. These include the state, family, economy, and culture. In this context, the church is “an arrabōn of the kingdom.” That is, it is not the kingdom itself, nor will it become the kingdom, but it witnesses to that which is coming.

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35 Moltmann, Die Gemeinde, 22.

36 This is Bonhoeffer’s term. Moltmann explores the concept in “The Lordship of Christ and Human Society,” in Jürgen Moltmann and Jürgen Weissbach, Two Studies in the Theology of Bonhoeffer, trans. by Reginald H. Fuller and Ilse Fuller (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967), 21-94 (1959). In the booklet I am discussing presently, Moltmann uses “orders” (Ordnungen) and “mandates” almost interchangeably, perhaps because Bonhoeffer’s alternative does not appear to him to be substantially different—despite such a difference being Bonhoeffer’s intention in adopting the term. Indeed, just one year later, in HP, 115-18, Moltmann is critical of all approaches to the orders of creation—Bonhoeffer’s mandates included—because they inevitably obscure the historical character of reality. Alluding to Bonhoeffer’s innovation, Moltmann writes, “It is relatively unimportant whether a theology of ordinances develops from a doctrine of ordinances of creation or from a christological foundation.” HP, 112. I attend to this essay below, in the following subsection (2.2.2.).

37 Moltmann, Die Gemeinde, 25. The word arrabōn, NRSV “first installment” (2 Cor 1:22), “guarantee” (2 Cor 5:5), and “pledge” (Eph 1:14), is used exclusively of the Holy Spirit in the NT. Here Moltmann extends the meaning to that of the church. Just as the Spirit is given as a guarantee that the full payment will come in future, with the consummation of
Conversely, this means that the other ordinances have a positive role to play as “site[s] for the fulfilment of the commandments.”38 The church does not hold a monopoly over obedience to the commandments because God not only seeks to redeem the church but, with it, the whole of creation.

Finally, Moltmann turns to address “courage for worldly preaching,” which more directly relates to his doctrine of Scripture.39 Preaching is not only engaged with “meditation and concentration on the word of the Bible.” But, “with equal intensity, mediation on and exegesis of the hearer must be undertaken.”40 Without this connection to its hearers, preaching is simply an “orthodox and biblically correct speaking in tongues,” one which is at the same time a “mercilessness” and an “illusion.”41 Such a rigid focus on being biblically correct at the expense of addressing the hearers in their particular circumstances is thus a disservice to Christ and his kingdom. And while Moltmann does not name any theologians or preachers who advocate such a principle—information which might aid in comprehending his alternative more precisely—something of his doctrine of Scripture can nonetheless be discerned in his following comments.

In particular, Moltmann is concerned with “the form of communicating the gospel that is everywhere common to us today,” namely, that which is “oriented to the familial, domestic, and private sphere of human beings. This is a dangerous retreat.”42 Here, preaching addresses only one mandate, that of the family. It cannot grasp the breadth of Christ’s lordship over all the domains of human life. As such, the other ordinances are both excused from the responsibility of obedience to the commandments and lose out on the liberating power of the gospel. Significantly, domesticised, individualised preaching overlooks the historical character of the gosp-

38 Moltmann, Die Gemeinde, 30.
39 Moltmann, Die Gemeinde, 30.
40 Moltmann, Die Gemeinde, 31.
41 Moltmann, Die Gemeinde, 31.
42 Moltmann, Die Gemeinde, 31.
pel, insofar as it is directed to maintenance of the way things are and does not challenge them. But, for Moltmann, “the gospel has entered into history (John 1:14). It exists historically. This does not mean that it adapts itself to the respective fashions of different periods, but that it will mould the present period of time.” Preaching must seek ever and again to speak the word into history. The way in which the word was spoken yesterday will not suffice for today.

These probings into the universal significance and historical nature of the word will receive fuller expression in Moltmann’s subsequent theology. Above all, this reclamation of the future horizon of Scripture and preaching will become increasingly important for Moltmann as he develops a sturdier foundation for the historical character and eschatological orientation of theology. At this point, though, the building blocks are already beginning to appear. Theology concerns itself not only with Christ, but Christ in the context of his coming kingdom, a kingdom in which the whole world will be redeemed. In the light of this universal horizon, it is not only the church but the other mandates too that are to listen to the word and respond in obedience. And yet, this universal vision leads to a homiletics that is sorely deficient if focussed exclusively on the exegesis of Scripture and not that of the audience as well. Christ’s kingdom claims both Scripture and audience. Moreover, this means that preaching should endeavour to address human existence in its entirety, and not just in the domestic sphere. It needs to take into account the historical character of the word and seek to speak it in such a way as it will be heard and understood in the present.

2.2.2. 1960: “The Understanding of History in Christian Social Ethics”

Moltmann’s theology of Scripture continues to develop into the sixties, not least in this article attending to the relationship between theology and sociology. Notably, in the space of a year, he makes an about-turn on the ordinances and mandates, taking a stance that has important consequences for the role of Scripture in theology.

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43 Moltmann, Die Gemeinde, 32.
Key to this change of direction is Moltmann’s engagement with the sociology of his day, something which he thought could not be justifiably ignored by theology. Thus, “theology will always have to start from the fact that it speaks about the very reality of man that also confronts sociology. Were this not the case, the statements of theology would only be the arbitrary and non-binding agreements of a religious group.”

This is not to say that theology need uncritically accept all sociological conclusions on the nature of being human. But it is to say that there should be some degree of continuity between the sociological and theological, seeing as they do not inhabit absolutely distinct spheres in terms of subject matter. “If theology speaks at all about ‘the true man’, destiny, justification, the demands made on man and his destiny, then its statements ought to be valid apart from faith.”

Moltmann also discovers a connection between theology and sociology in their common search for a horizon. Sociology has sought to rid itself of ideological presuppositions in order to approach history as history, which begins to fade when observers attempt to fit it into a static conceptual framework. Conversely, however, endeavouring to view history simply as history prevents any meaningful interpretation of the facts. Theology and sociology alike seek a horizon against which to interpret historical facts, though one that would not interfere with the historical character of these facts.

Moltmann proceeds to address this theological interest in history in more detail. He advances the programmatic statement: “For a biblical, Israelite Christian theology, the reality of man is understood through an eschatological disclosure to be ‘history’. The course of history is determined and directed by a once-for-all, radical, unique, unrepeatable event [Geschehen].”

That is not to say, however, that the whole of history derives from just one event. Indeed, Moltmann refers to “event” in the plural a few sentences later. History is propelled through multiple events, such as:

44 HP, 101.
45 HP, 101.
46 HP, 103-4; PTh, 151-52.
47 Israel “recognized and expected the coming of God with the incalculable events [Geschehnissen] themselves.” HP, 104; PTh, 152. Moreover, unlike the English “event,” which tends to designate a single, discrete incident—perhaps more akin to the German Ereignis—
the exodus, the giving of the law, the resurrection, and Pentecost. Anthropologically, this means that “man does not have a nature but a history.” Nonetheless, neither does this result in a loss of constancy. Such constancy is afforded through God’s faithfulness to the promise, despite the changing circumstances of history.

Importantly, the seeds for the sharp contrast that Moltmann later sets up between Greek and biblical thought, essential to his argument throughout TH, appear here already at this earlier point in his career. Christian faith does not only hold a unique, historicist outlook. It must also reclaim this in light of the pervasive Hellenisation of the Christian tradition. If theology follows Scripture, Moltmann here contends, then “God’s action is not seen in that which is repeatable or which remains the same, or in that which is taken from time and history, as for example in the eternal laws and regularity of nature. Rather, it is seen in the unique and unrepeatable quality of temporal contingency.” Theology would be thinking in Greek terms if it understood the revelation of God in Scripture not as a new event on the way to an as of yet unrealised goal but as the appearance in time of that which is always already eternally realised. Thus, “the Greek man stands in ‘the epiphany of the eternal present’; the Israelite-Christian man stands in the ‘apocalypse of that which is coming.’” The Greek man awaits the disclosure of that which has already taken place in eternity, whereas a biblical view of reality “expects truth to come out of the future

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48 “Der Mensch hat keine Natur, sondern Geschichte.” HP, 105; PTh, 153. Moltmann sets this phrase in quotation marks but does not provide a source. It comes from José Ortega y Gasset, whom he attributes another phrase to on p.107. See José Ortega y Gasset, History as a System: And Other Essays toward a Philosophy of History, trans. by Helene Weyl (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1941), 217, where this ET reads, “Man, in a word, has no nature; what he has is … history” (ellipsis original).


50 HP, 104.

51 HP, 104, adopting Georg Picht’s phrase, “the epiphany of the eternal present.” See below, 3.1.3.
of God.” Such statements seem to require a robust ontology—something which Moltmann does not develop at this point. The concern is evident in later texts, which I address in the following chapter. Here, his concern is primarily with the historical character of experienced reality. An unchanging eternity veiled in the present precludes the possibility of changing this present in view of an alternative future. Instead, the status quo remains. The present is to always return to the same point in seeking correspondence to the eternal.

Significantly, this key biblical insight has not been completely buried in the text until now. Moltmann points to Luther, for example, who, commenting on Rom 8:19, wrote, “The philosophers so direct their gaze at the present state of things that they speculate only about what things are and what quality they have, but the apostle... directs us to their future state.” Yet the beginning of theology’s turn to the historical only starts to materialise with “Hegel and the philosophical school which followed him in the nineteenth century.” What is more, however, “only now has knowledge of the biblical disclosure of reality as history... established a new direction in Protestant theology.” Moltmann is likely referring to the work of Wolfhart

52 HP, 104.
53 See 3.3.2.
54 Martin Luther, Luther’s Works, vol. 25, Lectures on Romans: Glosses and Scholia, ed. Hilton C. Oswald (Saint Louis, MO: Concordia, 1972), 360. Latin cited in HP, 104; cf. 127 nn. 12-13. Moltmann cites this passage twice again in TH, 35, 290 (1964). Note however, that this “was not realized either by himself [Luther] or by Protestant philosophy.” TH, 35. And, “it would surely be an abstraction that would not do justice to the Old Testament hope, if we were to describe this hope as spes purissima in Deum purissimum. Hope, where it holds to the promises, hopes that the coming God will bring it also ‘this and that’—namely, his redeeming and restoring lordship in all things.” TH, 119. The Latin comes from Luther, which Moltmann’s translator, Leitch, renders as “purely hope purely in God.” For Luther’s influence on Moltmann see 5.1.1.
55 HP, 105. Moltmann does not provide any citations at this point though. He attends to the modern development of historicism and historical criticism in greater detail in HP, 56-60 (1962); and TH, 230-72 (1964).
56 HP, 105.
Pannenberg, Mircea Eliade, and Georg Picht, which he cites earlier in the article.\textsuperscript{57} I will attend to these influences in the following chapter.\textsuperscript{58}

In the second section of this essay, Moltmann draws connections between sociological analysis and the theology of the ordinances. According to the first, society is increasingly historicised in the “rapid transition from an agricultural to an industrial society.”\textsuperscript{59} The communities that previously provided people with stability and a sense of permanence give way as the world in which they exist brings accelerated change. “All ordinances become unstable and lack both certainty and driving force.”\textsuperscript{60} With these observations in mind, alongside his earlier claims in regard to the historicist character of Christian faith, Moltmann advances to the theology of the ordinances—the “mandates” in Bonhoeffer’s adapted concept—derived from Luther. These might include, for example, the ordinances of church, state, economy, and marriage. Moltmann proceeds to conduct a short survey of the doctrine in the theologies of Paul Althaus, Emil Brunner, Walter Künneth, Helmut Thielicke, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and in the 1956 theses from the Commission for Church Law. He is immediately critical. “One can always stumble upon a timeless foundation under the quicksand of history which is to give a foundation to the house of human society. The question of stable orders in an unstable world can never be answered by denying their historicity in small points.”\textsuperscript{61} For Moltmann, sociological and theological historicism precludes the possibility of the doctrine of the ordinances holding a central


\textsuperscript{58} See 3.1.

\textsuperscript{59} HP, 109.

\textsuperscript{60} HP, 109.

\textsuperscript{61} HP, 117-18.
place in modern theology. Negatively, this also means taking into account the alleged influence of Greek thought on the doctrine. Moltmann argues, “The concept of order which is both presupposed and sought for is, as such, rooted in the Greek structure of thought and logically always leads to unhistorical, naturalistic conceptions.” In contrast, “the New Testament offers no metaphysical doctrine of ordinances.”

Finally, having rejected the doctrine of the ordinances, Moltmann proceeds to address the converse side of the problem of history for sociology and theology. In his first section, he had pointed to sociology’s difficulty with interpreting historical facts without inadvertently dehistoricising them by attempting to fit them into a fixed conceptual framework. A similar problem arises in theology. With the rejection of ahistorical ordinances, faith’s relationship to God’s commandments is also called into question. Moltmann summarises one position, in which God’s commandments are no longer to be read as “expressions of timelessly valid norms for all men… but rather as the historical will of God at particular points in history.” Because “all commandments and instructions in the Bible are determined by the particular situation,” the Bible “abandons” the theologian “at that point where a ‘translation into our situation’ is demanded.” There is no “constancy of divine spheres in history” but only the utter particularity of every historical moment, so that no connection can be drawn between the commandment of the biblical text and any contemporary situation. Today must speak for itself. Here, however, lurks the spectre of “individualistic decisionism.” Any degree of ethical continuity throughout history is forfeit. Other options will therefore need to be entertained.

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62 HP, 112.
63 HP, 112.
64 Moltmann’s target here is not completely clear. At one point he cites Rudolph Bultmann’s “Gedanken über die gegenwärtige theologische Situation,” in Glauben und Verstehen, vol. 3 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1960), 190-196. But the exact connection between this text and Moltmann’s criticism is ambiguous.
65 HP, 119.
66 HP, 119.
67 HP, 119.
68 HP, 118.
A potential alternative to both ahistorical mandates and super-historical decisionism is provided by Barth. For him, it is not the constancy of the created orders but the constancy of God’s guiding sovereignty over history that the commandment consists in. Moreover, despite different actions, it is the same human being that acts. This allows for both constancy and history. Moltmann summarises, “Man, in the time given him, keeps choosing a new possibility determined on the way and in this possibility he chooses and realizes himself in a new and different way.” And it is the God that remains constant in a wholly other way who brings these new historical particularities to life as human beings run their course. Yet, Moltmann is unconvinced that Barth’s ethics here can address the problem. This, Moltmann alleges, is because Barth’s focus is on the obedience of the individual in response to God, so that “the social context with the continuities and consistencies of human activity in history remains unclear.”

Moltmann thus proposes his own solution. Decisionism can be avoided insofar as ethics in differing situations share a common, eschatological horizon. Indeed, it is hope directed to the future, Moltmann argues, that establishes history as history in the first place. And this has important implications for hermeneutics. On the one hand, “all biblical commandments are related to a historical fact, to God’s covenant at Sinai, to the coming of Jesus, to the coming of faith, to the historical event of baptism, etc. They therefore do not express timeless and eternal norms; rather, the intention of God’s covenant is expressed in them.” On the other hand, however, the commandments are not lost to their respective historical particularities. Rather, each commandment takes place in “a historical event which points beyond itself into the future.” That is, the commandments cannot be abstracted from the context of promise in which they occur, the latter which is oriented to a universal future. Moreover, through the commandments, people and groups “are ripped out of their previous

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69 Moltmann discusses Barth, CD III/4, §52 in this connection.
70 HP, 121.
71 HP, 122, translation adjusted; PTh, 169.
72 HP, 123.
73 HP, 123.
attachment to home, nation, habit, etc. and are placed in a new historical process, namely, in the history of the promise.”74 It is in this way that the promise actually establishes history. And this is particularly important because it is only through this that human beings find the road to an alternative future, one ordained by God and not by human fears or fancies.

In this article, Moltmann has drawn on sociological insights in order to advance the conversation in theology. Conversely, he has also developed his own theological historicism and eschatology in order to inform sociology—even if this other side of the relationship is more implied than explicitly stated in his argumentation. In the context of this dissertation, the theological claims are particularly important. Not only does the universal, eschatological horizon of Christ’s lordship require a broader preaching schedule, but it also encourages preaching to remain faithful to the word of God and frees it from any boundedness to the historical circumstances of Scripture, in order that it may preach this same word today. First, that is, insofar as preaching orients itself to the eschatological horizon to which the historical facts of Scripture look, it remains faithful to the word’s intent to arrive at this horizon through history. Second, precisely because redemption takes place in history, it must make itself real to the present. As such, for the word to be heard today, the circumstances of yesterday do not need to be replicated exactly—though their replication is not necessarily a hindrance to this either. Rather, in encountering new historical circumstances the word also forges a new history, directing the present to a new obedience in line with the promised future. While Moltmann had attempted to make such claims in regard to historico-eschatological character of Christian faith just a year earlier in The Church Community against the Horizon of Christ’s Lordship,75 it is here that his rationale for this begins to become clear as he reflects further on the place of the eschatological horizon in Christian theology.

74 HP, 123.
75 See the previous subsection (2.2.1.).
Here, too, for the first time in any significant way, Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm appears, separating Greek and biblical outlooks. This will be a fundamental feature of his argumentation in *TH*.

I have related the theme of this 1961 essay more directly to Scripture than Moltmann himself does. Nonetheless, he takes such a path in subsequent pieces, which I will address shortly. Before doing so, however, I turn to an essay from the following year, in which Moltmann looks once more at the ecclesiological implications of historicism and eschatology.

2.2.3. 1961: “The ‘Rose in the Cross of the Present’: Towards an Understanding of the Church in Modern Society”

In this essay, Moltmann continues to develop his historicist theology, returning to the area of ecclesiology. He wants to think of the church not only in spatial terms, as a house or a place, for example, but in historical terms. Thus Christianity is neither “the process of the church growing out of the depositum fidei [i.e., deposit of faith], like a growing tree, little by little filling history and the earth (the romantic picture of church history),” nor “a series of unrelated situations, each new.” That is, Moltmann wants to reject both an ecclesiology that sees the church as the outworking of the eternal and unchanging in history, as well as an ecclesiology that emphasises historical particularity at the expense of continuity through history. Rather, the church witnesses to the resurrection of Christ, a claim which can only be answered with either faith or unbelief. That is, the claim presupposes a concrete history. It is independent of both ancient and modern worldviews. Nonetheless, the church also professes an eschatological horizon not merely for itself but for the whole world, too. There is indeed truth and falsehood, but, whereas the tradition would assert this on the basis of eternity’s having come into time, such a reality derives not from that which is already there but from the universal future that the church shares as a horizon with the rest of creation.

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76 *HP*, 143. Moltmann uses a similar metaphor in *HP*, 87 (1962).
The constancy of the church, then, is not located in its institutional nature but in its hope. Although an institution might claim constancy on the basis of tradition, the church has “no lasting city” but looks for “the city that is to come” (Heb 13:14). Insofar as the church invokes continuity through its institutional nature, it has forgotten this hope, just as others did earlier when they looked to the earthly Jerusalem or Rome. “Christianity has continuity in history as far as it, through hope, reaches out beyond itself. Not in self-preservation but in self-abandonment does Christianity acquire continuance in that which it abandons and in which it trusts.”\(^7\) Moltmann connects this to the Protestant motto of *ecclesia semper reformanda*: the church must always be reforming. The church takes on different shapes in history as it continually conforms to the goal of its hope. Significantly, this is a process of sanctification that transpires in the context of suffering. And in suffering, the church witnesses to its future because the Spirit of the resurrection who is at work within it “gives the miracle of endurance.”\(^8\)

The theme of the horizon of Christ’s lordship thus continues to develop in Moltmann’s theology, this time returning to the church to remind it of its provisional nature. Again, Moltmann demonstrates a strong interest in thinking through the implications of Christian historicism and eschatology for other areas in theology. As I will show in the following section, this will become particularly important as Moltmann turns to reflect on Scripture directly in this light.

2.3. Horizon and Exegesis

In this final section I proceed to explore two later essays where Moltmann applies his broadening eschatology to hermeneutical questions. In the first essay, the hermeneutical assumptions of Barth, Bultmann, and historical criticism are reviewed and found wanting, so that an alternative hermeneutic oriented to Christ’s coming lordship is forwarded in their stead. In the second essay, Moltmann further scrutinises

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\(^7\) *HP*, 147.
\(^8\) *HP*, 150.
existential theology and historical criticism, this time with more of a focus on preaching. Unlike Moltmann’s alternative, neither of these frameworks allow for adequate acknowledgement of history as history.

2.3.1. 1962: “Exegesis and the Eschatology of History”

In this piece, Moltmann again attends explicitly to Scripture, reflecting on the relationship between faith and historical criticism. Much of his argumentation here follows Pannenberg’s two articles on the same theme, which are cited in the middle of the essay.

Moltmann introduces his study with some comments on historical criticism in connection to tradition. Historical criticism has its origin in the increasingly fragile state of traditions, particularly Christian ones, in the seventeenth century. That is, where the claims of older institutions such as the Protestant churches could no longer be generally accepted due to the growing distance between them and the experiences of contemporary life, historical inquiry arose to examine the origins of these traditions and establish their present relevance. Yet, in doing so, “history [took] the place of tradition.” The firm foundation of tradition suddenly slipped into the ever-changing current of history. Moreover, in reclaiming the past, human beings were emancipated from tradition’s bounds so that they no longer had to dismiss their own needs and ends in favour of institutional convention. The new constant was neither tradition nor its origins but the present good of human beings, which itself, nonetheless, was and remains always in flux.

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81 HP, 57.
Moltmann proceeds to identify what he understands to be the key methodological principles of historical criticism at the time of writing this essay. First, historical investigation is a science. It is not analogous to art or poetry, for example. It seeks the *adaequatio rei et intellectus*, the correspondence between reality and intellect. Second, historical accuracy is controllable through the adherence to the right sources and correct use of the critical method for the interpretation of those sources. Third, this presupposes the reconstructible character of historical events. Yet these assumptions also lead to an “objectification” of the past, decried by certain critics. That is, in objectifying historical data, making them available to all times, such principles overlook the place of the interpreter as a human subject, threatening to “ignore and neutralize man’s own historicity and the historical conditions of his standpoint.”82 Additionally, that which has been objectified becomes dehistoricised itself so that it, too, now stands outside of history.

The objectification of historical data is made possible by yet another presupposition: that of history as a “closed nexus of effects.”83 Here it is cause and effect that govern individual historical events. But this also results in a new search for meaning, as human beings become increasingly isolated from their once living history. It is thus that existential approaches develop: “This objectification of history then gives rise to the abstract subjectification of the human being, and the well-known separation of subject and object in man’s relationship to the world and history is the consequence…. Historicism and existentialism are two sides of the same process.”84 Moreover, for theology this means that faith can no longer be grounded in the historical person of Jesus, who is now part of a causal framework that is “inviolable (even for God, if there is one).”85 In regard to exegesis, historical criticism remains a scientifically viable approach to the historical person of Jesus, albeit a theologically bankrupt one. The theological value of exegesis must then instead be found in “a supernatu-
ralism of the Holy Spirit, or inner experience, a spiritual dissolution, personal encounter.” Because God and history are forced apart, each can only be understood here in separation from the other.

For Moltmann, two solutions proposed by theology are of particular note in this connection. First, in his commentary on Romans, Barth argued that historical criticism and theological interpretation of Scripture exercise complementary functions. “The historical-critical method of Biblical investigation has its rightful place; it is concerned with the preparation of the intelligence—and this can never be superfluous…. The doctrine of Inspiration is concerned with the labour of apprehending, without which no technical equipment, however complete, is of any use whatever. Fortunately, I am not compelled to choose between the two.” In a later preface, Barth further contends that biblical commentary must not be written about Paul but with him, and that it should share his “concern” (Sache), regardless of the breadth of the historical ditch that separates the latter from the present. Moltmann responds, however, that, despite his attempts at balancing these apparently complementary approaches, Barth’s characterisation nonetheless lends itself to an inevitable dichotomisation of history and the theological subject matter, the Sache. “The question still remains open as to whether the hypothetical character of the faithful relationship which is to be entered into,” that is, the shared relationship of the reader and the original text to its common subject matter, “must not always demand historical-critical distancing as a corrective.” While there may be a danger of losing sight of the Sache through the undisciplined use of historical criticism—this being Barth’s concern—without historical criticism occupying a central place in the task of theological interpretation there is the opposite danger of projecting onto the text the reader’s a priori idea of what constitutes its subject matter.

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86 HP, 65.
88 Barth, Romans, 7, cited in HP, 67; PTh, 69.
89 HP, 68, translation adjusted; PTh, 69.
A second solution is proposed by Rudolf Bultmann. For him, against historical-critical convention, the role of the observer must be taken into account, as the reader who objectifies history does not stand outside of it but within it. No neutral interpretation of the text is therefore possible. Rather, subject and text are interrelated in the act of interpretation. Moltmann summarises, “The interpretation of history is the interpretation of self and the self-interpretation of existence occurs in the interpretation of history.” Yet Moltmann takes issue with the assumption that human beings do not stand over but within history. Surely both claims are true, he contends, distinguishing between being and having. In the same way that human beings are both bodies and have bodies, so too do they participate in history and have a history. Moltmann’s argument becomes clearer in his response to Bultmann’s claim that existence cannot be objectified. Using the example of a human promise, Moltmann replies that a person “makes himself reliable and also calculable. He objectifies himself.” This is because the promiser establishes a concrete connection between their present and future selves. They are thus objectified beyond the radical subjectivity of the fleeting moment. But neither does this kind of objectification work to dehumanise—or completely desubjectivise—the promiser. “Without a certain amount of objectification, personal relationships find no permanence.” Against Bultmann, then, a theological anthropology is required that affirms both the subjective and objective aspects of human being.

Other existentialist theologians like Wilhelm Herrmann and Gerhard Ebeling take similar approaches to that of Bultmann. They focus on Jesus’ relationship to history, which can be entered into by the reader of Scripture, and they reject investigation into the objective reality of the events of Jesus’ life as irrelevant. In

90 HP, 69.
91 HP, 71.
92 HP, 71.
93 Molmann’s relationship to Heidegger has been given little attention. Nicholas Ansell discovers affinities between the two on time in Molmamn’s later work. Nicholas Ansell, The Annihilation of Hell: Universal Salvation and the Redemption of Time in the Eschatology of Jürgen Molmamn (Milton Keynes, UK: Paternoster, 2013), 218-28. It is unclear to what extent this is a genetic relationship, however.
Heideggerian terms, it is not the actuality of Jesus’ existence that is of primary importance but the possibility inherent within it, one which the reader apprehends in existential encounter. But, Moltmann objects, there cannot be an either–or between dismissing modern subjectivity for the sake of cold, hard facts, and rejecting the facts in favour of “the whirlpool of modern subjectivity.”94 The gospel both reflects an actual state of affairs in Christ’s lordship and demands individual response in confession. Thus, “this modern dualism is alien to the New Testament, although it stems from the confrontation of Christianity with Greek thought.”95 To state this positively, Moltmann turns to eschatology. “The characteristic quality of the biblical statements of proclamation is that they reach out, beyond the historical situation in which they were spoken and heard, into the universal.”96 And this universality is located in the eschatological horizon of Christ’s return, shared by all human beings. Contra Heidegger and the existentialist theologians who appropriate him, such a connection instead indicates the ontological priority of the actual to the possible. That which is possible derives from the actual state of affairs that is Christ’s lordship over the earth. Moltmann will develop his own position in more detail towards the end of this article.

Having addressed the solutions proposed by Barth and existentialist theology, Moltmann proceeds to offer an appraisal of the underlying assumptions of the historical method.97 “Does the method which historicizes reality into a series of facts correspond to the reality that is questioned by it?”98 First, Moltmann points out that the historical method is never concerned with the facts as such but only with those which are accessible and which the method perceives to be significant. In addition, an individual fact cannot speak alone but only in relation to other facts. Put differently, the special interest in the facts means that the historical method is always already implicitly directed to the facts in their relationship to other facts, and never in

94 HP, 75.
95 HP, 75.
96 HP, 76, slightly adjusted.
98 HP, 78.
isolation. Second, the historical method, insofar as it perceives the facts in a particular relationship—whether, for example, in relationship to a certain process or development, or as part of a category such as philosophy, art, or religion—also suspends history by subjecting it to ahistorical structures which themselves are not subject to history. That is, it presupposes an unchanging idea or substance that lies behind history, to which it is related and against which it is made comprehensible.

Continuing his appraisal of the historical method, third, Moltmann probes an alternative to the projection of ahistorical structures onto the objects of historical investigation. The reason that history and idea depart is that history has not yet reached its end. In the present, the idea moves with and is shaped by history. Until that end has come, its definition and substance are open to dispute. Similarly, humanity has not yet acquired a fixed form, instead remaining open to its future. Where, against this, humanity is defined in a fixed way, these definitions, intentionally or not, are eschatological. That is, they presuppose a final, set human essence that has not yet come about. This affirmation of the eschatological provisionality of present existence entails that, in the context of religion, Christianity is only “absolute” insofar as it proclaims an eschatological horizon for history. In contrast, “the historical-positivistic fetishism of facts understands how things stand and lie, but does not understand in what direction they are moving.”

This does not mean, though, that nothing at all can be said in the present. Theology, while yet being unable to advance absolute claims—that is, claims dependent on eschatological perfection—speaks of history in anticipation of its end.

Neither, however, is such a provisional view of reality primarily cognitive. For theology, faith must seek to recognise that God has acted in Christ and thus is acting in history. In attesting this, proclamation spurs human beings on to engage with the transformation of the present in light of its eschatological goal. As Moltmann puts it, “Eschatological proclamation effects and provokes the experience of reality as history.”

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99 HP, 82.
100 HP, 84.
present leads to the historicisation of the latter, subjecting it to ongoing, radical change. The anticipatory character of eschatological knowledge lies precisely in the fact that human beings are called to live in accordance with a reality that is still coming and not yet realised.

At this point Moltmann distinguishes his own position from Bultmann’s. For the latter, the question of the end of history as a whole is no longer relevant in the modern era. What is relevant is the end of history in the individual, in whose existential encounter “historical phenomena show themselves for what they really are.”¹⁰¹ But if this were the case then the phenomena that faith meets would no longer be historical and “faith would be synonymous with perfection.”¹⁰² Rather, biblical faith looks to the as of yet outstanding future of Christ, in which the confession, “Christ is Lord,” corresponds completely with the reality faith finds itself in. Neither is the believer’s present, then, that of the absolute. It is instead one that anticipates the eschatological coming of the absolute. In this vein, the historical method, at least from a theological perspective, must turn to the past for “the hope that is remembered with it,” a hope found, namely, in the promises of God.¹⁰³ And it is these promises that continually confront the eschatological presuppositions of the historical method, defying its hasty ahistoricisations in its application of static concepts, and directing it to live presently in accordance with and for the sake of that which is yet future.

Moltmann directly addresses the interpretation of Scripture at a number of points throughout this article. Historical criticism poses a significant problem for theology as it separates God and the historical process. God cannot interfere with the latter, which is, implicitly, a “closed nexus of effects.”¹⁰⁴ Barth’s solution in his various prefaces to his commentary on Romans, a solution which attempts to bridge historical distance between the NT and today through looking at the latter’s subject matter (Sache), namely God, falls short in both accepting the fissure between God

¹⁰¹ HP, 85.
¹⁰² HP, 85.
¹⁰³ HP, 88.
¹⁰⁴ HP, 63.
and history, and insulating theology from historical criticism by assuming a fixed Sache. This Sache is decided a priori and isolated from the disciplinary work of historical criticism. Bultmann’s solution also flounders in Moltmann’s view. In seeking a meaningful exegesis that also takes seriously historical criticism’s findings, Bultmann descends into a subjectivism detached from the real workings and real future of history. Finally, historical criticism runs into its own problems insofar as it necessarily assumes the explanatory value of fixed categories when applied to history. In doing so, it inevitably forfeits the open character of history—and therefore history itself—to an ahistorical conceptual structure. Against these three paths, Moltmann suggests one that moves in yet another direction, locating the substance of history in its future, which is anticipated in the biblical promises of God, above all as they are brought together in Christ’s resurrection. Here exegesis devotes itself to the promises in order to perceive this future and live presently in accordance with it, rather than in accordance with the substance and meaning of a present derived from elsewhere and ignorant of this eschatological goal.

2.3.2. 1963: “Proclamation as the Problem of Exegesis”

In this article, Moltmann attends to the relationship between exegesis and its rightful end in proclamation. He begins, “Exegesis cannot exhaust itself in saying what is said, how it is meant and understood, but must give an answer to the question of why this must be preached.” And exegesis reveals that it is the word of Scripture itself that provides such a ground, commanding the preacher to preach. If exegesis does not attend to the question of why, the authority to preach is derived from elsewhere, such as the church, or the preacher’s individual inspiration. But where this is the case, preaching also fails, as it must fabricate the text’s relevance for today, getting into “the well-known dilemma of wanting to make a matter up-to-date, where the

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105 Originally “Verkündigung als Problem der Exegese.”
106 PTh, 113, emphasis original.
exegesis has just shown,” focussing only on the questions of what and how, “that the matter is not up-to-date.” ¹⁰⁷

Moltmann proceeds to delineate the differing approaches of the preacher and the historian to the biblical text. In contrast to tradition, for which the past remains relevant to the present, the historical method, at least in the abstract, is concerned exclusively with the past as past. The first task of the historical method is to date historical objects. Historical distance from the subject matter is necessary in order to ensure objectivity in method. As such, the method inevitably alienates the past. But, seen positively, this also means that human beings experience present liberation from their traditions. The questionable nature of the latter’s claims is revealed by historical criticism. Conversely, however, and not without irony, in alienating the past from the present the historical method “constantly destroys its own presupposition: historical memory and the living, present interest in history.” ¹⁰⁸ Tradition and historical method both uphold and undo each other.

This in turn leads to a dichotomisation of historical exegesis and theological interpretation, such as that found in seventeenth century mysticism, eighteenth century Pietism, and nineteenth and twentieth century existentialism. Complementing these movements, which, each individually, depart from the continuity between the past and the present attested in earlier traditions, is that which is responsible for their separation in the first place, historical positivism. In this context, preaching is particularly difficult, since the text it is based upon, the text of the past, has been shown to bear no relationship to the present moment, due to the historical particularity of the former. In his exegesis of OT texts, for example, Gerhard von Rad had contended that the pictures of ancient Israel given by both historical criticism and theological interpretation were each valid in their own way. “We must reconcile ourselves to both of them. It would be stupid to dispute the right of the one or the other to exist.” ¹⁰⁹ Moltmann counters, however, “Both pictures hardly allow a coexistence but

¹⁰⁷ *PTh*, 113.
¹⁰⁸ *PTh*, 114.
are in conflict with one another over the truth, which is one." Similarly, in NT scholarship since David Friedrich Strauss, various thinkers have advocated for a complementary relationship between history’s Jesus and faith’s Christ.

Moltmann follows this with a comment on the solutions proposed by Heidegger and Bultmann. Heidegger understands the task of the historical method as determining the existential understanding that is latent in past objects. The goal is neither to perceive the objects in abstraction from the present, nor to connect to them via a shared matter that concerns both them and other objects in the present. Rather, the historian is to seek the existential possibilities inherent in the past which are also available to the individual today. Bultmann, Moltmann claims, follows similar signposts, though along a theological path. While he does not go into detail, Moltmann’s main concern here is that Bultmann and Heidegger assume that human beings constitute the subject of history. But this is to obscure the meta-anthropic character of history as one that is still open and does not come to an end in human decision.

As argued in an earlier essay, it is the divine promise through which history is perceived as historical. In contrast to the historical method, which removes the rug from under its own feet in exiling from the present any data from the past that may be of contemporary significance, theological exegesis seeks to remember the past for the sake of the present. In particular, the past is of interest insofar as it is a source of both guilt and hope in the present, guilt for past wrongs and hope in past promises. Moreover, the past’s significance is a matter of contemporary dispute, as guilt is not yet resolved nor hope yet fulfilled. Moltmann cites the example of the lives of Jesus, historiographical attempts at reconstructing Jesus’ life. These are never conducted purely out of a desire to detach the past as past from the present but rather

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110 PTh, 117, emphasis original.
111 In a recent article, David W. Congdon argues that the connection between Heidegger and Bultmann is often overstated, though he also acknowledges Bultmann’s friendship with Heidegger and Bultmann’s usage of certain concepts developed by the latter. See “Is Bultmann a Heideggerian Theologian?” Scottish Journal of Theology 70:1 (2017): 19-38.
112 See 2.2.1.
113 This claim is developed in more detail in TH, 265-70 (1964).
to find a Jesus who addresses contemporary concerns. For Moltmann, though, the most promising connection between the past and the present is in the biblical hope for an alternative future. Here he adopts Hans-Georg Gadamer’s notion of horizon, writing of the historical events attested in Scripture, “Only in the ‘horizon’ of promise and hope are these historical events. Abstracted from this, they become a collection of dead facts that are calculated, or a gallery of existential decisions that can be answered.”¹¹⁴ Nor can it be simply said that this worldview has been superseded by science. Such a claim is itself eschatological and stymies imagination for alternative futures to the present state of affairs.

Although having much in common thematically with the essay I addressed in the previous subsection (2.3.1.), this latter piece is of note for its orientation to preaching. In the context of sermon preparation, the answer to the question of the circumstances that compelled the original text is to be found in the divine promise. It is not merely a matter of identifying situations in the biblical texts and contemporary life that roughly correspond, such as being persecuted, an example Moltmann suggests. History as history precludes the idea of corresponding situations and the phenomenology that it presupposes. That which biblical history and life today have in common is to be found rather in the shared horizon afforded by the divine promise. Here, too, preaching finds its justification. The promise compels the preacher to proclaim the hope it offers. Accordingly, “the faith that this sermon generates is not a historiographical judgement providing its findings, but a judgement of approval in regard to the promissio which lies in this event, and a judgement of condemnation in regard to every reality which does not yet correspond to the promissio.”¹¹⁵ A hermeneutic of promise, in contrast to the claims of historical positivism and existential


¹¹⁵ PTh, 127.
theology, affirms the historical as historical, propels the people of today into action that makes history, and recognises the distance between past and present in the current of history, as well as their kinship in sharing a common future.

2.4. Summary

Already in the few years leading up to the publication of *TH*, then, Moltmann demonstrated a definite interest in the problems of Scripture in modern theology. This tied in with the development of his overarching eschatological project and a pastoral concern for the relationship between preaching and a biblical text that the church was increasingly isolated from through historical criticism.

From the start, Moltmann seeks to situate the Bible in the broader divine economy, resisting attempts to see it in abstraction from this. Scripture must therefore be understood as a witness to Christ, and a witness not secured through arguments in support of an independent, supernatural status—such as might be found in the excesses of the doctrine of verbal inspiration—but secured only through the Holy Spirit, who confirms its testimony internally to human beings. Already at this point, then, Moltmann sets up a distinction between the words of Scripture and that to which they point—Christ. The utility of this distinction is in affirming the questions of those outside the church, such questions as arise from the fruits of historical criticism, science, and ethical discussion, yet without compromising the essence of Christian faith. That the Bible remains necessary and not a mere accessory to its core content becomes clear in Moltmann’s affirmation of the doctrine of verbal inspiration, following Barth. Moltmann writes, “It is intended to ensure that precisely in hearing the words of this and no other text we really hear the words of the eternal God’s own address to us human beings.”116 But this openness to questioning also has a positive basis in the fact that the Bible is not only given by the Holy Spirit but is a thoroughly and truly human text as well.

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Also in this early period, Moltmann emphasises to his contemporaries in the German Reformed Church the need to continually reread and reassess tradition in light of Scripture—a trait that historically distinguished the Reformed and Lutheran Churches in Germany. At this point, the important theme of Scripture’s eschatological horizon begins to emerge as well. But neither is this interest simply eschatological. Its root is christological. That is, Christ is the centre that determines meaning of Scripture and the ongoing reformation of the church. But “there is no middle without a horizon, no centre without a perimeter…, no Christ without his royal lordship in the worldly, incarnate life, without the eschatological horizon of the new world, and the redemption of the creature in the new heaven and new earth.”\(^\text{117}\) Moreover, such a universal vision has implications for preaching. The extent of Christ’s lordship requires that preaching not merely address individual and domestic life but the whole of existence, as does Scripture.

Perhaps even more significantly, this discovery of an eschatological horizon has important implications for doing theology in a world that has become increasingly aware of its compromised location in history—a history where nothing is stable and everything is subject to decay. But if theology is directed to the one horizon of Christ’s eschatological lordship, it need not resist history with the imposition of fixed concepts and theoretical frameworks. Rather, it accepts its place in history and looks instead to the horizon shared by all people, regardless of their place in history. With these commitments though, Moltmann also departs from Barthian and Bultmannian orthodoxies, as well as some of the central tenets of historical criticism. He denounces Barth for deciding on a fixed Sache of Scripture, ahead of what further exegesis might indicate to be the case. This Sache has not yet been determined completely, as history is still in motion. And Moltmann criticises Bultmann for abstracting individual existential encounter from the broader context of world history, which does not come to an end in the individual. Historical criticism is at fault, too, insofar as its conceptual categories are closed to continual revision with the flow of history.

It thus loses sight of its subject matter. Theological exegesis would seek instead to recognise the significance of the coming horizon for the present, rather than attempt to hold anything as determined ahead of its future.

Through his ground-breaking 1964 *Theology of Hope*, Moltmann will continue to reflect on and develop the basic insights of this early period, particularly in connection with the relationship between history and eschatology. This will be the theme of the next chapter, as it concerns the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology.
3. Scripture and Epiphany in Theology of Hope

The ideas appearing in outline in Moltmann’s early essays are developed in detail in his 1964 *Theology of Hope.*¹ In particular, the claim that Christian faith is thoroughly historical and eschatological is given lengthy treatment in his discussions of the promise in the OT and its relationship to Christ’s resurrection and future kingdom in the NT. The implications of this outlook for practice and mission also receive extended attention in the final chapter of *TH.* This book, Moltmann’s first major work in his “great trilogy,”² provides an abundance of material relevant to the current study. Notably, throughout *TH,* Moltmann employs a contrastive paradigm, sharply distinguishing between what he understands to be the biblical theme of promise and the extra-biblical, predominantly Greek view of the relationship between time and eternity. Whereas the former sees reality as unfinished and open to the fulfilment of the divine promise in historical events, the latter sees reality as operating according to laws that are always already fixed in eternity and thus closed off to anything new. I have already placed this in the context of Moltmann’s broader project in my introduction, above.³

In order to better understand the nature and function of this paradigm, I begin by exploring similar notions taken up by others whom Moltmann draws upon.

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² Bauckham, *Moltmann: Messianic Theology,* 1. This “trilogy,” not originally planned as such by Moltmann, also consists of *CG* (1972) and *CPS* (1975), and is followed by his six “systematic contributions to theology,” beginning with *TKG* (1980). The latter is Moltmann’s term. See *TKG,* xi. Nonetheless, *TH* was not Moltmann’s first full-length monograph. He had earlier published *Christoph Pezel (1539-1604) und der Calvinismus in Bremen* (Bremen: Einkehr, 1958); and *Prädestination und Perseveranz: Geschichte und Bedeutung der reformierten Lehre “de perseverantia sanctorum”* (Neukirchen: Neukirchener, 1961). Other earlier works are rightly listed as books because they are independent publications, but they are only article-length and thus do not constitute monographs.
³ See 1.2.
In the second section of this chapter I turn to the contrastive paradigm itself. I start by detailing that which Moltmann rejects as unbiblical under the heading of “the epiphany of the eternal present,” tracing this from its archetype, the thought of Parmenides, into the modern theology of Barth, Bultmann, and Pannenberg. In a third, related section, I expound the positive content of Moltmann’s theology of hope, which he forwards as a biblical alternative to the conclusions of these other theologians. I include a subsection on Moltmann’s implicit ontology of hope, where I consider what his theology of promise might mean for Godself. Finally, in the fourth section, I address four different hermeneutical features that are notable throughout TH. These include the relationship between historical criticism and theology, the nature of Scripture as a witness, the role of the biblical canon, and continuity and discontinuity between the two Testaments.

3.1. History and Futurity: Key Influences

In this section I will outline contributions from some of the key figures who influenced the development of Moltmann’s historicism and eschatology. Three of these, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Mircea Eliade, and Georg Picht, inform Moltmann’s analysis from at least 1960 and into TH. Around the same time, the philosophy of Ernst Bloch becomes increasingly important for Moltmann, and he treats Bloch as a central theme in at least three essays before 1964. Though playing a less prominent role in the pre-TH essays, the works of Gerhard von Rad and Ernst Käsemann also significantly

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5 HP, 126-27 n. 9.

6 See the essays reprinted in Moltmann, Im Gespräch mit Ernst Bloch: eine theologische Wegbegleitung (Munich: Kaiser, 1976), 13-31 (1960), 32-48 (1962); and RRF, 148-76. Wakefield records the latter as a translation of the 1965 appendix to the third German edition of TH. This is true, but the appendix itself is a slightly revised version of “Das ‘Prinzip Hoffnung’ und die christliche Zuversicht: ein Gespräch mit Ernst Bloch,” Evangelische Theologie 23:10 (1963): 537-57.
contribute to Moltmann’s theology in TH. For want of space, I have focussed on these six individuals, whom I think exercise the greatest influence on the development of Moltmann’s contrastive methodology.7

3.1.1. Wolfhart Pannenberg

In 1959, Pannenberg published two articles in which he argued that “history is the most comprehensive horizon of Christian theology.”8 Thus, “all theological questions and answers are meaningful only within the framework of the history... the history moving toward a future still hidden from the world but already revealed in Jesus Christ.”9 These articles are cited by Moltmann in 1960 and 1962.10 As Moltmann will go on to do in TH, Pannenberg establishes his position in opposition to Bultmann

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9 Pannenberg, Basic Questions, 1:15.

10 HP, 126 n. 9, 94 n. 23.
and Barth, though he also addresses Friedrich Gogarten and Martin Kähler. For Pannenberg, Bultmann and Gogarten prioritise human historicity over the historical reality in which humans are situated, and Kähler and Barth understand faith to be fundamentally suprahistorical. He attributes the beginnings of both positions to an attempt to insulate theology from historical investigation, where it was feared that the latter would rule out the possibility of redemptive events.

Pannenberg begins by summarising recent research on Israel’s uniquely historical worldview, claiming, “The certainty that God again and again performs new acts... forms the basis for Israel’s understanding of reality as a linear history moving toward a goal.” As this historicism developed, it eventually found expression in apocalyptic, where history spanned not only recent events but the creation of the world to the eschaton. As such, Israel “finally drew the whole of creation into history. History is reality in its totality.” Bultmann, in contrast, centres history in the historicity of the human being and finds the eschaton already present in Christ, in such a way that history is abolished in him. But this undermines the historical nature of reality, overlooking that which takes place outside the individual, and mistakes what should be an anticipation of the end in Christ for the end of history within history. Conversely, neither do the suprahistorical assumptions of Kähler and Barth, in which the history that the Bible witnesses to cannot be penetrated by secular historical investigation, do justice to Israel’s historicism that is evident in Scripture. If faith is based in God’s work in history then the nature of that work must be open to historical investigation. Indeed, historical criticism enriches theology’s understanding of its subject matter in that it reveals more about the history which is governed by the Father of Christ, the God of Israel, and thus says something of the nature of his revelation in Christ.

11 Pannenberg, Basic Questions, 1:18.
12 Moltmann follows Pannenberg in this regard in TH, 133-38.
13 Pannenberg, Basic Questions, 1:21.
Although Moltmann’s early essays demonstrate a clear dependence on Pannenberg, by the time of the publication of *TH* Moltmann has found his own voice. I will explore his departure from Pannenberg in more detail below.¹⁴

3.1.2. Mircea Eliade

Moltmann’s theology of history is also informed by the historian of religion, Mircea Eliade, as is that of Pannenberg.¹⁵ In his *Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return*, Eliade develops his claim that for the most part ancient societies conceived of time cyclically.¹⁶ Through various rituals, these societies attempted both to abolish the history that had taken place up until that point and to redeem it on the basis of some primordial archetype, free of the corruptive change that history brings. In contrast, relatively few ancient societies developed a consciousness of history, against the prevailing myths of cyclical time. In various ways, nonetheless, ancient Babylon, Egypt, and Iran demonstrated the beginnings of a historical consciousness. But Eliade shows particular interest in Israel’s prophets, whose outlook paved the way for modern historicism. For the prophets, “They [the events] not only acquired a meaning... but they also revealed their hidden coherence by proving to be the concrete expression of the same single divine will. Thus, for the first time, the prophets placed a value on history, succeeded in transcending the traditional vision of the cycle (the conception that ensures all things will be repeated forever), and discovered a one-

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¹⁴ See 3.2.2., 3.3.2.

¹⁵ For Eliade in Moltmann’s work, see *HP*, 126-27 nn. 9, 11 (1960); *TH*, 98, 100, 295; cf. the later references in *CG*, 43 (1972); *CPS*, 265-6 (1975); *FC*, 117 (1976); *GC*, 104 (1985); *CoG*, 263 (1995). Moltmann also draws upon other aspects of Eliade’s research in *GC*, 142, 302. The relationship between Moltmann and Eliade has received little attention, but see Cameron Coombe, “Another Origin of the Theology of Hope? Moltmann’s Dependence on Mircea Eliade,” *Pacifica* 30:1 (2017): 88-101. Molmann wrote to me on 6 October, 2018, in regard to this article, clarifying, “I have all of the works of Eliade in my library, but I did not study the science of religions. I took one idea of his to confirm what I had learned from Gerhard von Rad and the Prophetic traditions of the OT. Eliade is not a first-hand ‘origin’ of my ‘Theology of Hope’, but at most a second-hand origin.” Pannenberg draws upon Eliade in *Basic Questions*, 1:16-17 n. 1.

way time.” Elsewhere Eliade writes, “With the exception of Judaism, no other pre-Christian religion has set a value on history as a direct and irreversible manifestation of God in the world.” Israelite historicism was further developed in Christianity with its concept of the incarnation. In his early essays and in TH, Moltmann takes for granted the strong distinction that Eliade erects between Israelite-Christian historicism and the anti-historicism of Israel’s neighbours and of Greek thought.

3.1.3. Georg Picht

In his 1960 essay, Moltmann also draws upon Georg Picht, from whom he takes his concept of “the epiphany of the eternal present.” For Picht, the question as to the meaning of history is to be answered in the sphere of human experience (Erfahrung). But experience, as it has been conceived from Aristotle’s empeiria, through modern science’s empiricism (Erfahrungswissenschaft), to Kant’s epistemology, provides inadequate access to the meaning of history. Each of these configurations inevitably refers experience to that which is eternal. Although experience (empeiria) takes place in time, according to Aristotle it becomes a craft (technē) when human beings discover in individual experiences a consistent pattern from which they can generalise. But this generalisation requires that experiences be consistent with that which it is possible to know. And for knowledge to be knowledge and not a fantasy, it must correspond to the necessary. “The domain of knowledge that limits the domain of experience is therefore the domain of the immutable, the uncreated and imperishable, the eternal.” Modern science basically followed Aristotle, but it applied logic (logos) to

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17 Eliade, Cosmos, 104.
19 Georg Picht, Die Erfahrung der Geschichte (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1958), cited in HP, 127 nn. 9, 10, 15. Cf. Moltmann’s other references to Picht’s Erfahrung in TH, 28, 41; HP, 198 n.4 (1966); GC, 111 (1985); WJC, 371 n. 34 (1989); CoG, 357 n. 10 (1995). Moltmann’s references to Picht’s other works are too many to list here, but see esp. the indices in CoG and Moltmann, Science and Wisdom, trans. by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2003). As with Eliade, the relationship between Moltmann and Picht has been largely neglected in the literature, but see Morse, Logic of Promise, 55-57, 86-87.
20 Picht, Erfahrung, 12.
experience in order to discover that which is universally true in experience. This, however, did violence to the nature of experience, insofar as the latter was exposed to “the indeterminate endlessness of diverse circumstances,” which cannot be easily harmonised with an ahistorical logos. Kant, too, maintained the theological affirmation of divine immutability and timelessness, though now applying it to reason instead. According to Picht, here the philosopher assumed the Parmenidean notion of being, where only that which corresponds to being, to that which is immutable and eternal, is truth. This is “the epiphany of the eternal present of being,” which “distorts to this day the eschatological revelation of God.” In TH, Moltmann will take this opportunity to offer what he understands to be a biblical alternative to Hellenistic epiphany thinking.

3.1.4. Ernst Bloch

It was in 1960, while holidaying in Switzerland, that Moltmann first read Ernst Bloch’s The Principle of Hope. “So engrossed was I in the book that the beauty of the Swiss mountains passed me by unnoticed.” Moltmann was struck with the hope that Bloch saw in Scripture: “I by no means had the impression that we are aware of this biblical message or that this forward hope is something in which we can find ourselves. So I set out to search for a theology of hope…. What I was looking for was a theological parallel act to his atheistic principle of hope on the basis of the promissory history of the old covenant and the resurrection history of the new.” It was thus that Moltmann proceeded to develop a theology of hope. Because of the centrality of Bloch to Moltmann’s early theology, this subsection will be longer than those dealing with other influences on his thought.

21 Picht, Erfahrung, 17.
24 TH, 9 (1990 preface).
The significance of Moltmann’s relationship to Bloch is evidenced by the number of studies which address it. While some have noted the distinctiveness of Moltmann’s theological approach to hope, however, others have restated something to the effect of Barth’s critical comments on TH: “To put it pointedly, does your theology of hope really differ at all from the baptized principle of hope of Mr. Bloch?”

Years later, Moltmann has finally been able to offer a comeback: “I suspect that he [Barth] had in fact never read a word of Bloch’s.” But Moltmann has been critical of Bloch where critique is due, as can be seen in his 1963 conversation with Bloch, published in an appendix to the third edition of TH in German. Moltmann has elsewhere continued to offer critical comment, as well as expressing his indebtedness to

26 E.g., Francis P. Fiorenza, “Dialectical Theology and Hope, I,” Heythrop 9:2 (1968): 143-63; Gerald O’Collins, “The Principle and Theology of Hope,” Scottish Journal of Theology 21:2 (1968): 129-144; Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope, 16-9, 80-89, 106-18; Marko Matić, Jürgen Moltmanns Theologie in Auseinandersetzung mit Ernst Bloch (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1983); Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology, 7-22; Bosco Puthur, From the Principle of Hope to the Theology of Hope (Kerala, India: Pontifical Institute Publications, 1987). A more complete bibliography of relevant works up to 1987 can be found in Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology, 146 n. 18. Finally, though, note Ryan Neal’s observation: “While it is perhaps true that without Bloch the school of hope would not exist, it should not be forgotten that Moltmann’s decision to begin theology with eschatology was made prior to reading Bloch’s magnum opus.” Ryan A. Neal, Theology as Hope: On the Ground and Implications of Jürgen Moltmann’s Doctrine of Hope (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2008), 4.


29 ET in RRF, 148-76. First, Moltmann argues that Bloch presents a dualistic future of all or nothing for humanity, appropriated from apocalyptic literature. Unfortunately, whereas the literature has God as judge as the mediating factor between these, so that humanity may partake in either a future fullness of life or in annihilation, in Bloch the dualism is abstracted from this context and therefore cannot function in the same way. Second, whereas Marxism offers hopes beyond hunger and injustice, for example, it cannot offer hopes beyond such existential threats as boredom and absurdity. Third, Bloch seeks to overcome death by interpreting transience as a positive feature of human existence. Only in transience is hope for something better possible and in this hope human beings are connected to the future and become, in a sense, intransient. But Bloch’s approach cannot affirm “the deadliness of death” (168). Christian hope over death is not spiritualist but holistic. It hopes for new bodies and a new earth. Finally, Bloch differentiates between hope and confidence, the latter which he attributes to Christian theology. Whereas the future of hope is open, according to confidence the future has already been decided. Moltmann takes issue
Bloch’s thought. His observation in an introduction to Bloch’s work should also be taken autobiographically: “The reactions so far evoked by Bloch’s philosophy indicate that instead of turning into Blochians, theologians feel encouraged to go their own way.” As M. Douglas Meeks writes, “The spirits of Barth and Bloch keep compelling Moltmann’s theological odyssey. But he takes their spirits too seriously to be a disciple of either.”

Importantly, like Moltmann, Bloch believes that the Jewish and Christian Scriptures are unique in their historicist outlook. Indeed, this connection with Bloch is highlighted by Moltmann in one of his citations: “It is surprising that for a very long time among the Jews the final fear was not considered or dreamt over. This race

with this, contending that Bloch confuses Christian hope with the Constantinian hope, where the latter assumes the validity of the status quo and only promises a better future in spiritualised form. Christian hope, however, contradicts the present reality and its status quo. Bauckham has explored Moltmann’s critique of Bloch in greater detail. See his Moltmann: Messianic Theology, 14-22.


Moltmann, “Introduction,” in Bloch, Man on His Own, 27.

was as this-worldly as the Greeks, but its life was directed incomparably more towards future things, towards goals.” A short exploration of Bloch’s philosophy will help to situate this quote in context.

Bloch introduces the Principle of Hope with his theory of the Not-Yet-Conscious. Modern psychoanalysis, represented by Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung, defines the unconscious and conscious in regressive terms. That is, the unconscious and conscious are understood to be oriented exclusively to what has been, leaving no room for the new. Bloch, however, contends that this denies “expectant emotions (like anxiety, fear, hope, belief), … those whose drive-intention is long-term, whose drive-object does not yet lie ready.” Moreover, the theories of Freud and Jung reflect predominantly middle-class concerns. In Freud’s treatment of the conscious, for example, the libido is fundamental. But this ignores the priority of hunger over sexual desire in human beings, a priority overlooked because Freud and his middle-class clients hardly needed to worry about their next meal. Bloch proceeds to explore human daydreaming, which also springs from a conscious that looks forward to that which is to come.

But it is not only the conscious in which Bloch’s philosophy of the future is grounded. Bloch’s exploration of the psychological Not-Yet-Conscious leads him to reflection on a corresponding ontology, the Not-Yet-Become of matter: “Nothing would circulate inwardly either if the outward were completely solid. Outside, however, life is just as little finished as in the ego which is working on this outside. Nothing could be altered in accordance with wishes if the world were closed, full of fixed, even perfected facts.” Unfortunately, the history of Western philosophy bears little witness to the open-endedness of the world. As Bloch writes in his introduction,

33 Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 3:1125. Moltmann cites the German, which is translated by his translator, Leitch, in TH, 208. He also quotes this passage again much later in CoG (1995), 351 n. 62.
35 Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 1:44.
“The Not-Yet-Conscious, Not-Yet-Become, although it fulfils the meaning of all men and the horizon of all being, has not even broken through as a word, let alone as a concept. This blossoming field of questions lies almost speechless in previous philosophy.”\(^{37}\) Moreover, where philosophy has concerned itself with the Not-Yet-Become, it has demonstrated little interest in a real future, the genuinely new. Its own vision consists only in a future that provides a space for human beings to retrieve, relive, or reconstruct the past. These concerns are thus not with the Not-Yet-Become but rather with that which was.

For Bloch, the chief culprit in setting the direction for the Western philosophical approach to being as “Been-ness” is Plato.\(^{38}\) From him comes anamnesis, “the doctrine that all knowledge is simply re-remembering.”\(^{39}\) And such a doctrine, with its orientation to the past, persisted in philosophy after Plato. It “kept out and, in a contemplative antiquarian fashion, closed off previous philosophy, including Hegel, from the seriousness of the Front and the Novum.”\(^{40}\) Interestingly, however, Bloch demonstrates a keen interest in Aristotle’s theory of matter. For Aristotle, matter is understood according to both its objective and its real possibility. Bloch goes so far as to say that, without Aristotle, Marx would not have developed a philosophy of the Not-Yet-Become after Hegel. Nonetheless, Aristotle requires supplementation from Marx if his philosophy is to properly affirm the possible.

Bloch also provides important comment on the biblical tradition in his treatment of the Ultimum, which is related to the Novum as “the highest newness” or “a total leap out of everything that previously existed.”\(^{41}\) The Ultimum has received more attention than the Novum in the history of Western thought, whereas the Novum, which is essential to the Ultimum, “was as good as absent.” That is, “in the

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\(^{38}\) Not Parmenides, as Meeks implies in Origins of the Theology of Hope, 82. Parmenides is not a target of Bloch’s, but of Moltmann’s, following the likes of Picht and Eliade. TH, 28-32. Bloch hardly mentions Parmenides, and, if Bloch is critical of him, he is overshadowed by the later sins of Platonic anamnesis. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 2:864.


\(^{40}\) Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 1:18.

\(^{41}\) Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 1:203.
whole of Judaeo-Christian philosophy, from Philo and Augustine to Hegel, the Ulti-
mum relates exclusively to a Primum and not to a Novum; consequently the Last
Thing appears simply as the attained return of an already completed First Thing
which has been lost or relinquished.”

Jewish and Christian thinkers failed to grasp the Novum that properly belonged to the Ultimum, reverting to an implicitly cyclical understanding of time. Thus, in understanding reality as it really is, considering its Front in that which is Not-Yet-Become, “only anti-re-remembering, anti-Augustine, anti-Hegel is philosophically appropriate, anti-circle and denial of the ring-princi-
ple.”

Apparently, Bloch later reveals, quite a different tradition is attested in parts of the Bible.

Yahweh reveals the divine name to Moses, declaring, “I will be what I will be.”

This name “places even at the threshold of the Yahweh phenomenon a god of the end days, with futurum as mode of being [mit Futurum als Seinsbeschaffen-
heit]. This end- and omega-god would have been a folly in Delphi, as in every reli-
gion where the god is not one of exodus.”

Yahweh is unique amid other ancient

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44 On Bloch’s exegesis, see Walther Zimmerli, Man and His Hope in the Old Testament (Lon-
don: SCM, 1971), 151-65; Geoghegan, Ernst Bloch, 83-103; Roland Boer, On Marxism and
45 Exodus 3:14 (NRSV note). See further, for example, William H. C. Propp, Exodus 1-18: A
New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1999), 204-5, 224-6.
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1959), 2:1458. In the English TH, 16, this phrase is trans-
lated as “future as his essential nature.” Cf. TH, 30, 141. Catharine Diehl translates it as “future as the determination of his being” in “The Demand for an End: Kant and the Negative Conception of History,” in Messianic Thought outside Theology, ed. Anna Glazova and
Paul North, 107-23 (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), 255 n. 10. As can be seen
above, there is no determiner in the German so there is some ambiguity as to the nature of
the relationship between God and this Seinsbeschaffenheit. This is recognised by Frederick
Herzog in FH, 13, where he translates the phrase without any determiner as “futurum as
mode of being.” I have chosen to use this translation when discussing the phrase through-
out this dissertation as I think it better reflects the German, or, at least Moltmann’s under-
standing of it (!), than that which the English translators of Bloch’s Prinzip supply: “fu-
turum as an aspect of Being.”
religions. Only the God of the exodus is related to the future in such a way. Nonetheless, Bloch is again careful to stress the uniqueness of the discovery of the Not-Yet-Become by Marx. “Whether the concept of the future… of the ancient Israelite prophets… coincides with that which has developed since Augustine” is open to question. But “the experience of time has certainly undergone many changes, the Futurum above all has only recently been augmented by the Novum and become charged with it.”

Bloch, then, perhaps the greatest influence on Moltmann’s TH, argues that Western philosophy, including Christian theology, has almost completely overlooked reality’s shape as one of Not-Yet-Become. This omission is largely owing to the influence of Platonic anamnesis. Thus, where Christian theology might have found the new, in eschatology, it found only the old. It is really just the God of the exodus and, surprisingly, Aristotle, who alone stand out as significant predecessors to Marx’s discovery of the Not-Yet-Become. Moltmann will find other enemies, such as Parmenides, and give Bloch’s analysis further application in his discussion of Bultmann and Barth. Moreover, he will be less enthusiastic in regard to Aristotle. Significantly, it will be the God of promise for Moltmann, rather than Marx, from whom humanity properly discovers hope and the future.

Later, in his discussion of atheism and religion, Bloch also singles out the Judeo-Christian tradition for its uniquely humanistic approach to the transcendent, an approach that ultimately leads to the atheism that he commends. He writes, “Although the name of Orpheus, and also the names of natural-mythic orderer-founders, right up to the cosmomorphic Confucius, even Zoroaster, the messiah of astral light, are mentioned together with the gods, they nonetheless remain behind them, relate externally to them. The Dionysian founder turns to froth before his nature god, the astral-mythic founder fades before him, and even Buddha, the great self-redemption, sinks at the end into the acosmos of nirvana. Moses, on the other hand, forces his god to go with him, makes him into the exodus-light of his people; Jesus pervades the transcendent as a human tribune, utopianizes it into the kingdom.” Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 3:1191, emphasis original.

3.1.5. Gerhard von Rad

While Pannenberg, Eliade, Picht, and Bloch allowed Moltmann to see the rough outlines of biblical historicism against the anti-historicist elements of Greek thought, it was Gerhard von Rad who provided the substantial content of this historicism. Recently, reflecting on what he had in common with Pannenberg’s theological project, Moltmann recalled, “Through Gerhard von Rad’s Theology of the Old Testament, which appeared successively in 1958 and 1960, we became engaged in the areas of history in memories and eschatological hopes. This theology of the Old Testament was the biblical alternative to both existential hermeneutics and church dogmatics.” Significantly, Moltmann attributes his and Pannenberg’s departure from both Bultmann and Barth to von Rad’s work in biblical studies. It was von Rad above all who made the distinctly historicist worldview of ancient Israel apparent on biblical grounds.

Amid rising anti-Semitism in Germany under National Socialism, von Rad was uniquely placed to come to terms with the distinct shape of OT theology. Whereas the neo-Marcionite German Christians sought to wrest Jesus out of his OT context, von Rad defended the necessity of studying the OT for a proper understanding of who Jesus was. He published lectures such as Das Alte Testament: Gottes Wort für die Deutschen! (The Old Testament: God’s Word for the Germans), and preached to and taught members of the Confessing Church, formally joining it himself in 1939.

49 Moltmann, “Personal Recollections,” 12; cf. Moltmann’s reliance on von Rad throughout TH, esp. 95-138; and his comments in BP, 97, 101 (2006). In the secondary literature, this relationship has been treated by John Aubrey Miller in “The Eschatological Ontology of Jürgen Moltmann,” Ph.D. diss. (Emory University, 1972), 35-46; and Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope, 64-76. For the influence of von Rad on Pannenberg, see Pannenberg, Basic Questions, 1:16 n. 1; and his “An Intellectual Pilgrimage,” Kerygma and Dogma 54:3 (2008): 149-158, at 153. See also the index in TH for the many citations and mentions of von Rad. Before TH, Moltmann cites von Rad in PTh, 117 n. 5, 123 n. 19 (1963), though the latter’s influence surely goes beyond explicit citations.


Specifically, von Rad contended that revelation in the OT was inseparable from historical events. These events, such as the promise to the patriarchs, the exodus, the conquest of Canaan, and the covenant with David, together formed a narrative of Yahweh’s work in history to establish the nation of Israel as his chosen people. Israel’s insight is unique: “Looked at from the point of view of comparative religion, this idea of history made a radical division between Israel and her environment. While it is possible to recognise in her cultic celebration of the saving acts, which followed the rhythm of the year, certain continuing lines of connexion with ideas which belonged to neighbouring religions of the ancient east, with her idea of saving history she completely parted company with these religions. Not one of them understood the dimension of history in the way that Israel did!”

For von Rad, the religions of Canaan and the Ancient Near East were more interested in cyclical time. This interest derived from their observations of the rhythms of nature, which have a cyclical character. So, too, then, were their gods a part of the cosmic order that sustains life. Yahweh differed in that although he sustained a cosmological order, he was not identified with it and therefore had freedom to go beyond it. As von Rad notes in his Ritschl-esque meditation on Exod 3:14, “Nothing is farther from what is envisaged in this etymology of the name of Jahweh than a definition of his nature in the sense of a philosophical statement about his being.” Rather, Yahweh’s name points to his future with Israel. Importantly, ancient Israel’s historicism is without parallel: “The only other people in the ancient world who also wrote history, though of course in an entirely different way, were the Greeks.” Even contemporary historicist thought stands in stark contrast to that

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which the OT presupposes.\textsuperscript{55} The sharp distinction between Greek and biblical thought, then, is further consolidated for Moltmann in von Rad, who provides a more precise articulation of Israel’s historicism in its biblical and historical context.

3.1.6. Ernst Käsemann

As in von Rad he found the historicist outlook of ancient Israel, so in NT scholarship Moltmann found “the post-Bultmann apocalyptic with which Ernst Käsemann had moved Christ’s parousia… into the main thrust of the New Testament.”\textsuperscript{56} Käsemann’s essays “profoundly influenced my \textit{Theology of Hope}.”\textsuperscript{57} The biblical scholar completed his dissertation under Bultmann in 1931 and then began work as a pastor.\textsuperscript{58} He also became increasingly embroiled in political controversy. Following his application of Isa 26:13 to the political situation in Germany at the time—“O Lord our God, other lords besides you have ruled over us, but we acknowledge your name alone”—the Gestapo arrested Käsemann in 1937. Much later, he was buried with the verse on his gravestone, a verse, Moltmann writes, “that characterizes his theology of resistance in the Babylonian captivity of Christianity in this world, in its alienation from God.”\textsuperscript{59} Something more of Käsemann’s character can be seen in his 1939 monograph on Hebrews, \textit{Das wandernde Gottesvolk}, which was not simply an exegetical study but contained a “coded message,” criticising the German Christians of the time.\textsuperscript{60} He even resigned from the Westfalian Confessing Church because of the soft stance it took on German Christians.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{58} For the following, see David Way, \textit{The Lordship of Christ: Ernst Käsemann’s Interpretation of Paul’s Theology} (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), 1-4.
\textsuperscript{59} BP, 150 (2006).
\textsuperscript{61} Way, \textit{The Lordship of Christ}, 3 n. 8.
Besides Käsemann’s influence on Moltmann’s early theology, the two both worked at Tübingen and developed a friendship, though their relationship grew increasingly fragile with time. An example of this early friendship goes back to 1967, when Moltmann was looking into the chair for systematic theology in Tübingen. Käsemann “had pushed forward the invitation... and he now came and appealed to my heart in prophetic tones, and to my conscience with threatening apocalyptic warnings”! On a more serious note, when the military junta of Argentina murdered Käsemann’s daughter in 1977, it was Moltmann who officiated the funeral. Yet, “for truth’s sake,” Käsemann later broke off his friendship with Moltmann, as he had done with Bultmann, Ernst Fuchs, and Gerhard Ebeling, “because he did not like my dialogue with Judaism.”

Beyond Käsemann’s personal life and his relationship to Moltmann, the biblical scholar was also an important intellectual influence on Moltmann. In his 1962 essay, “On the Subject of Primitive Christian Apocalyptic,” Käsemann explores Paul’s response in 1 Corinthians to the “eschatological enthusiasm” of the Corinthian church. Against Paul’s “apocalyptic expectation of an imminent End” in Christ’s coming, “the dominant group in Corinth believed themselves to have reached the goal of salvation already... and Christian existence here on earth meant for them solely the temporal representation of heavenly being.” Christ’s reign is no longer hidden in the present while its future culmination remains outstanding, but it is already realised. This is evidenced, for example, by the gift of the Spirit and the rapid spread and reception of the gospel. Significantly, Käsemann consistently applies the

62 BP, 147.
63 BP, 147, cf. 223.
64 BP, 149. Moltmann writes in the same place, “The maxim of his life was the old pirate saying; ‘the friend of God and the enemy of the whole world.’”
65 Cited in TH, 156 n. 1, 158 nn. 1-2, 160 nn. 1 and 3, 161 n. 1, 214 n. 1. The influence of this essay especially, but also other essays by Käsemann, is certainly broader than the explicit citations will allow. As Moltmann’s comment indicates in TH, 155 n. 1, “I am here following E. Käsemann’s studies in exegetical theology.” For citations of Käsemann before TH, see HP, 96 nn. 56-57 (1962); PTh, 124 n. 21 (1963).
terminology of “Hellenism” to characterise the departure of the Corinthians and other early Christians from Jewish apocalyptic.\textsuperscript{68} Moreover, whereas Bultmann’s interpretation of Paul would require the latter to be placed among these Hellenists, Käsemann finds in Paul both the work of redemption in the present as well as a still outstanding future.\textsuperscript{69} For example, according to Paul, the resurrection of believers does not take place at baptism, as the Hellenists would have had it, but in baptism believers anticipate their future sharing in Christ’s resurrection. Nor is the believer’s participation in the resurrection merely a redemption open to the individual in the present, as Bultmann would have it, but Paul locates the hope of the individual in the broader context of the still outstanding victory over the powers hostile to God (1 Cor 15:20-28).

These six different figures each influenced Moltmann in different ways and to various extents. What is perhaps most notable here is that a systematic theologian, a historian of religion, a Christian philosopher, a Marxist philosopher, an OT scholar, and a NT scholar each in their own manner differentiated what they understood to be biblical outlooks from non-biblical ones, often with a particular interest in distinguishing the biblical from the Greek. As can be seen in the foregoing, nonetheless, their influence on Moltmann is not limited to the development of his contrastive paradigm. But such a paradigm was clearly well-established and in the air when Moltmann began writing \textit{TH}.

3.2. The Nature of Epiphanic Thought and Its Influence on Christian Theology

Throughout \textit{TH}, Moltmann sets his presentation of the promissory history of Israel and the church against the background of “Greek” thought in its ancient and modern

\textsuperscript{68} Cf. Käsemann, \textit{New Testament Questions}, 130, where this is connected to the biblical use of the term in Acts 6:1.

\textsuperscript{69} Käsemann is critical but appreciative: “Bultmann’s fascinating interpretation of Paul is determined by its resolute placing of the apostle’s present eschatology at the controlling centre of his thought. There is no reason not to admit that this interpretation is not merely tenable, but enables vital elements of Pauline theology to be unforgettably impressed on the mind.” Käsemann, \textit{New Testament Questions}, 131.
manifestations. Right from the very start, Christian eschatology is threatened by Greek concepts, insofar as it is a *logos* of the eschaton. This threat arises from the fact that “the Greek term *logos* refers to a reality which is there, now and always.” Such a framework leaves no room for theology to speak of something genuinely new, which would be to the Greeks “an evil out of Pandora’s box.”

In negative terms, then, Moltmann will distinguish the theology of history from the understandings of time and history offered by the religions of ancient Palestine and the various representatives of ancient Greek thought. He will also proceed to scrutinise later Christian theology, which, as he sees it, largely yielded to these non-biblical influences in its theology of history and its eschatology. Thus Bultmann, Barth, and even Pannenberg, despite the latter’s best efforts, have all fallen prey in various ways to Greek constructions of history and reality. Similarly, the Greek spirit informs secular approaches to history too—in the methodology of historical criticism. The positive alternative to these is in the God of promise and of hope in the OT and in the consummation of promise in Christ’s resurrection, which points to an as of yet unfulfilled future. Although Moltmann treats this latter, positive side throughout *TH*, I have decided to address the two elements separately, in order that the implementation of his contrastive paradigm may become all the more clear.

I begin with what Moltmann rejects as belonging to Greek thought under the heading of “the epiphany of the eternal present,” a term which I will shortly define. I then turn to modern theology and historical criticism. Moltmann enters into critical dialogue with both, arguing that major representatives in each discipline remain beholden to Greek rather than biblical ways of thinking.

3.2.1. Epiphanic Thought and Practice in the Ancient World

Moltmann does not define epiphany at any point in *TH*. In his comprehensive and influential 1924 article on the topic, Friedrich Pfister uses the concept of epiphany, “following probably the most common usage for us, which is somewhat narrower

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70 *TH*, 17. Moltmann’s explains this connection in *EH*, 16 (1970).
71 On epiphany in *TH*, see Morse, *Logic of Promise*, 31-36.
than the Greek *epiphaneia*, namely, for that form of divine revelation in which the superhuman being—a God, a hero, a spirit of death—appears in a personal and visible way among human beings.” Similar definitions, albeit broader ones, are given in contemporary scholarship. But none of these explain Moltmann’s antagonism.

The work of the NT scholar, Elpidius Pax, which Moltmann cites in *TH*, provides some hints in this direction. For Pax, the phenomenon of epiphany is attested throughout the ancient world, including in ancient Israel, Judaism, and the church. But while he departs from Moltmann in finding epiphany to be central to ancient Israelite religion, the two are united in their appreciation for the distinctiveness of the latter. Pax writes, “Whereas in the Ancient Orient, for the most part, the regular return or at least the foreseeable arrival of individual natural processes and the appearances of God bound up with these constitute a characteristic of epiphany, their possible absence being considered a disaster, the sudden and unexpected thunderstorm, bursting forth with lightning, thunder, storm and dark clouds, has always been the essential type of epiphany for Israel.” Accordingly, in contrast to Mediterranean, Egyptian, Babylonian, and Assyrian experiences of epiphany, the ancient Israelites knew epiphany to be fundamentally “eschatological epiphany” with a “historical character.”

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74 *TH*, 144 n. 2, 155 n. 2.
Another publication that Moltmann cites in TH is Hannelis Schulte’s work on revelation in the NT, where the latter devotes a short chapter to the relationship between revelation and epiphany. He presents a distinction that perhaps underlies Moltmann’s antagonistic use of the term “epiphany” in TH. For Schulte, “we have to differentiate between the usage of epiphaneia/epiphanēnai and the portrayal of epiphanies.” He continues, “The word and the thing have nothing to do with one another!” Although, through verbal similarity, the NT employs terms bearing an ostensible relationship to the concept of epiphany, revelation in the NT is an entirely different matter.

With Schulte, Moltmann’s negative use of the term “epiphany” to denote a largely non-biblical form of divine disclosure contrasts with the more neutral sense accorded it by scholars such as Pax and Pfister. The influence of Picht cannot be overlooked here either. Interestingly, Moltmann’s use of the concept of epiphany appears to be very much tied to the spirit of the TH period. The term does not appear at all in CG (1972), and in his later eschatology it is only used approvingly.

Moltmann’s rejection of epiphanic thought begins with the pre-Socratic philosopher, Parmenides, who epitomises Greek anti-historicism. As the latter claimed, “Being, it is ungenerated, indestructible, / Complete, single-born, untrembling and unending, / And was not, nor will it be at some time, since it is now, together, whole, / One, continuous.” That is, Moltmann glosses, being “has no extension in time, its

77 Hannelis Schulte, Der Begriff der Offenbarung im Neuen Testament (Munich: Kaiser, 1949), 54-66. See TH, 139 n. 1, 144 n. 2.
78 Schulte, Der Begriff der Offenbarung, 62.
79 Schulte, Der Begriff der Offenbarung, 62.
80 See 3.1.3.
81 “For the first side of this revelation we have the expressions of epiphany: the risen Christ is ‘revealed’ and lets himself ‘be seen’; the strength of his life is experienced in the Holy Spirit.” CoG, 136-37 (1995). “As epiphany of the kingdom of God in history, the church frames the vision of the world’s future.” CoG, 165.
82 Parmenides, fr. D8.8-11, in André Laks and Glenn W. Most, Early Greek Philosophy, vol. 5, Western Greek Thinkers Part 2, trans. by André Laks and Glenn W. Most (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 43-5. Moltmann cites only D8.10 (B8.5), with the translation, “Das eine Sein war niemals, niemals wird es sein, denn jetzt Ist es zumal als Ganzes.” That is, “The unity that is being never was, never will be, for now it Is all at once as a whole.” TH, 28; Ger. 23. Hermann Diels, whom Moltmann cites here, has, “Es war nie und
truth stands on the ‘now’, its eternity is present [Gegenwart].” But such a claim would be of little import unless it could be related to human experience. Its significance is found in the fact that, despite the gains, undulations, and negations of life, existence stands on the unchanging foundation of being. This is why Moltmann constantly refers to “the epiphany of the eternal present of being” in TH, adopting Picht’s term. It is not so much the claims about being itself—though Moltmann will depart from these too—but the way in which being appears or is made manifest to the human being in order to secure their eternal existence in the midst of a world that is continually degrading into non-being. That is, Moltmann’s interest throughout TH is predominantly phenomenological, rather than ontological.

In the epiphany of the eternal, “the times in which life rises and passes fade away to mere phenomena in which we have a mixture of being and non-being.” And yet, “in the present of being, in the eternal Today, man is immortal, invulnerable and inviolable.” Moltmann’s exposition of Parmenides is not an appreciative one. For the theologian, Parmenidean being negates history and as such is completely opposed to a biblical understanding of reality. Other figures, such as Plato and Aristotle, as well as systems like Neoplatonism, represent further developments in Greek anti-historicism. As Moltmann contends in a later chapter, “‘History’ was fundamentally foreign to Greek thought.”

wird nicht sein, weil es allzusammen nur im Jetzt vorhanden ist, eins und unteilbar.” Parmenides Lehrgedicht: griechisch und deutsch (Berlin: Reimar, 1897), 37. This differs also from the Picht’s paraphrase in Erfahrung, 42, whom Moltmann is following. The translation that Moltmann provides then is likely his own, relying on Diels’s Greek text.

83 TH, 28; Ger. 23. Alternatively, “its eternity is presence.”

84 Picht, Erfahrung, 42. The term appears without citation in TH, 28.

85 Thus Joy McDougall describes the work as a “prolegomena to a doctrine of God.” She explains, “Although Theology of Hope clarifies much about God’s mode of being in history as eschatological promise, the nature of the God of hope and of his coming eschatological kingdom remains quite opaque.” Joy Ann McDougall, Pilgrimage of Love: Moltmann on the Trinity and Christian Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 36. I comment on what can nonetheless be said of Moltmann’s doctrine of God in TH below, in 3.3.2.

86 TH, 28.

87 TH, 28.

88 E.g., TH, 29, 51, 141, 247, 250, 279, 281.

89 TH, 259. This includes the Greek historiographers, of whom it is Thucydides that Moltmann elects as their representative. The latter “shows profound insights into the nature of
After Parmenides, Moltmann turns to Kant, Barth, Bultmann, and Pannenberg. The argument of *TH*, then, takes the shape of ancient and modern precedent of epiphanic thought in Parmenides and Kant; the unsuccessfulness of modern theology in overcoming this, namely, in the work of Barth, Bultmann, and Pannenberg; and, lastly, in the following two chapters, a return to the ancient world in the conflict between epiphanic religion and biblical promissory history. A fourth chapter dealing largely with historical criticism reads somewhat like an excursus, ahead of the final chapter on the church in light of the promise. In treating the biblical material mostly after that of modern theology, Moltmann constructs his argument somewhat in reverse: These are the reasons we reject the conclusions of Barth, Bultmann, and Pannenberg, and, by the way, we can find further support for this in Scripture. I do not have any objections to the way that Moltmann has structured his argument here, however. I only draw attention to this because I will be addressing his discussions of the biblical material first. The conclusions made in these discussions certainly inform Moltmann’s polemics against modern theology, even if on a structural level they appear after these polemics.

In his studies of the biblical material, Moltmann begins with the ahistorical substance of the religions of ancient Palestine. These, too, entertain the epiphany of the eternal present in order to secure finite existence. They are thus “epiphanic religions.” Moltmann follows Viktor Maag’s distinction between Israelite nomadic and semi-nomadic religion, on the one hand, and Canaanite agrarian religion on the other: “The gods of the nations are locally bound. To go to a god means to visit its sanctuary…. The transmigration God of the nomads, however, is not bound territo-

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90 *TH*, 259.

90 *TH*, 95.
ially and locally. He journeys along with them, is himself on the move, and is present, wherever he wants to extend his protection.” To develop this contrast, Moltmann again turns to the works of Eliade. Through epiphany, or “hierophany” —Eliade’s term for “a manifestation [phainein] of the sacred [hieros] in the mental world of those who believed in it”— in the religions of ancient Palestine, the deity sanctifies the place or time at which or in which it appears. Subsequently, by recalling the epiphany through visiting the sacred place or participating in the sacred time, the individual can escape the destructive power of history and participate in that which history cannot touch. Here, “man’s being comes into congruence with the eternal being.” Moreover, this epiphany religion was widespread at that time, extending beyond Palestine to the rest of the ancient world. As such, Moltmann concludes, “Epiphany religion forms the presupposition and abiding foundation of the natural theology of Greek philosophy of religion, and of oriental philosophies of religion.”

Before proceeding, some comment is required in regard to Moltmann’s generalised use of the characterisation, “epiphany religion.” At the outset of his short review of Canaanite agrarian religion, he admits, “Our task is not to take the various religious ideas and forms of belief and subsume them under a general concept of religion.” Moreover, the study of Maag’s that he depends on “no doubt… contains typical ideal elements, but it does make intelligible the tension in which Israel found itself.” That is, Moltmann’s interest in epiphany religion derives not from a desire to understand the nature of this religion itself. Rather, “the contours of what is meant by promise and hope stand out most clearly in face of other religions and forms of

93 TH, 99.
94 TH, 99.
95 TH, 95.
96 TH, 97.
belief which are grappled with and contested, and for that reason can best be illu-
mined in comparison and contrast.”97 But it is not only the different elements of an-
cient Palestinian religions that are subsumed under a single heading in order to high-
light the distinctness of biblical hope. These religions stand together with Greek
thought insofar as both seek to secure human life against the threats of history by
anchoring it in eternal, unchanging being. Notably, the implication of this is that any
elements of the Christian tradition believed to have derived from Greek epiphanic
thinking are automatically subject to the same criticism directed towards Israel’s
neighbours throughout the OT. The riches of Greek thought employed by theology
are no longer church’s bounty from having “plundered the Egyptians” (Exod
12:36),98 but are rather “the gods that your ancestors served beyond the River and in
Egypt” (Josh 24:14). Regardless of whether Moltmann intended this connection or
not, it functions throughout TH to further delegitimise Christian theology that re-
 mains wedded to an epiphanic paradigm.

Moltmann returns to Greek epiphany religion in discussing the surrounding
context of the NT. This collection of texts, while not completely insulated from epiph-
any religion, nonetheless, remained at its core a witness to the Christ who was yet to
come, as its central interests lay not in epiphany but in promise. Moltmann quotes
Hannelis Schulte approvingly: “Thus although Christianity stands in the midst of
the religious life of its time, epiphany faith can influence it in the first instance only
as a formal element in its presentation. For it stands under the protection of the Old
Testament thought of God, which expects God to act uniquely and comprehensively
upon the world.”99 But this began to change as the gospel spread beyond the Jewish
world of promise to the Hellenistic world of epiphany religion. Moltmann turns to

97 TH, 95.
98 A theme employed allegorically by ancient authors such as Origen to explain Christian
use of pagan ideas. See Joel S. Allen, The Despoliation of Egypt in Pre-Rabbinic, Rabbinic and
Patristic Traditions (Leiden: Brill, 2008), e.g., 14-15, 211-33, 247-260.
99 Schulte, Der Begriff der Offenbarung, 66, cited in TH, 144, translated by Moltmann’s transla-
tor, Leitch. So Morse: “Moltmann’s thesis is not a denial that such ‘epiphanic’ elements are
there [in Scripture], but the contention that they occur within a more all-embracing bound-
ary of apocalyptic expectation.” Morse, Logic of Promise, 152 n. 44, slightly altered.
the first century Corinthian church in order to further elucidate this conflict. “The Christ event here can be understood in a wholly non-eschatological way as epiphany of the eternal present.” The resurrection of the dead had already taken place, and, as such, believers already participated in it. There was no further future to be expected of Christ. Everything was already fulfilled. The Corinthians were living in the presence of eternity.

Subsequently, the epiphanic paradigm held by the Corinthians, even if they themselves had afterwards heeded Paul’s message, only grew stronger as Christianity spread throughout the Greco-Roman world and communities replaced expectation of Christ’s imminent coming with “an ecstasy of fulfilment” and “the presence of eternity.” Everything has been made complete in Christ. Present suffering does not refute this either. The sufferer has already been delivered from their ordeal in eternity, so that all that is required is for them to take hold of this in through the epiphany of the eternal. Moreover, this form of the gospel retains an eschatology, albeit a severely dampened one. “The eschatological expectation of what has ‘not yet’ happened becomes a noetic expectation of the universal disclosure and glorification of what has already happened in heaven.” The historical working and the eschatological future of the God of Israel and Christ is thus largely obscured.

3.2.2. The Persistence of Epiphanic Thought in Modern Theology and Historical Criticism

The rediscovery of the centrality of eschatology to the NT in biblical scholarship at the end of the nineteenth century played an important role in destabilising the centuries-long hold of epiphanic thinking in the Christian tradition. Ironically, however, this scholarship was for the most part neglected by theology. As Moltmann puts it, “The so-called ‘consistent eschatology’ was never really consistent.” Even Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer, key figures in this rediscovery, recognised the alien

100 TH, 155.
102 TH, 159.
103 TH, 37.
nature of Jesus’ preaching but could not take the next step and integrate the find into their wider theological thinking. At that time, the new exegetical insights functioned to isolate liberal Protestantism from its basis in Scripture as modern christology could not be reconciled to the Christ of the NT. In contrast, for Moltmann, in line with his earlier work, this eschatological context of Jesus’ preaching, along with that of the whole Bible, is fundamental. Indeed, it is precisely this context that justifies theological interest in the words of Scripture and connects the history of the church and Israel to the present. But Moltmann’s main interest is in Barth and Bultmann, perhaps still the two most popular modern theologians in Germany at the time of writing TH. These two figures locate God or the human subject in the present, rather than in a genuinely new future in the future of Christ. Such a standpoint therefore lacks “any future that would be greater than itself.” And it replicates “the thought forms of the Greek mind,” through Kant, and, ultimately, Parmenides, rather than taking its lead from Scripture.

Having already attended to the views of the ancient philosopher, Moltmann proceeds to discuss Parmenides’ afterlife in the much later eschatology of Kant. In a short treatise on eschatology, Kant had argued that the last things “lie wholly beyond our field of vision.” And yet, “although they are transcendent for speculative cognition, they are not to be taken as empty, but with a practical intent they are made available to us.” For Moltman, this means not only a reduction of eschatology to ethics, but, as a result of this ethico-existential orientation, the last things become the “eternal, transcendental conditions for the possibility of experiencing oneself in a

104 TH, 46.
106 Despite Moltmann’s criticisms of the Enlightenment philosopher, Otto has argued that Moltmann’s theology owes much to Kant. See Otto, God of Hope, 13-16.
practical way.”

Eschatology after Kant is the human subject’s individual end in right moral action, rather than the goal of the world in the coming of Christ.

Moltmann goes on to trace this Parmenidean-Kantian legacy, mediated through Wilhelm Herrmann, to the theologies of Barth and Bultmann. Barth’s position initially shows promise, writing in the second edition of Der Römerbrief, “If Christianity be not altogether and unreservedly eschatology, there remains in it no relationship whatever to Christ.” But, Moltmann responds, Barth’s understanding of eschatology hardly conforms to that of the biblical testimonies. It lacks a historical shape. As Barth claims, “Of the real end of history it may be said at any time: The end is near!” This is not due to an apocalyptic sense of the future breaking into the present, however. Rather, the end is identified with eternity, which everywhere and always underpins the present moment. But this also means that there can be no sense of an end that brings something genuinely new. For Barth, God does not bring about anything that is not already actual in eternity. As he writes elsewhere, “What is the future bringing? Not once more a turning point in history, but the revelation of that which is.” Moltmann is not surprised, then, when Barth attributes the development of his eschatology between the first and second editions of the Römerbrief to “better acquaintance with the real orientation of the ideas of Plato and Kant.”

Kant’s Parmenidean epiphany of the eternal present appears yet again in Bultmann’s theology. In contrast to Barth, the future is not already actualised in the eternity of God but in the potential of the human subject. “The mythological pictures of hope,” the resurrection of the dead in the NT or the ascent of the soul in

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109 TH, 48.
113 Barth, Romans, 4, cited in TH, 51.
Gnosticism, for example, can be demythologised in such a way “that they speak about God’s future as of the realization of human life.”\(^\text{115}\) But in relocating eschatology to the sphere of the individual, an alternative future for the world is lost. “It is therefore just as impossible for Bultmann as for Kant that eschatology should provide a doctrine of the last things.”\(^\text{116}\) As Meeks puts it, for Moltmann “Bultmann’s existentialist view of revelation not only robbed the Christ event of its peculiar historical basis,” that is, in God’s dealings with Israel and the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ, “but also faith of its universal expectation.”\(^\text{117}\)

Interestingly, the work of Pannenberg, a figure who played a significant role in the development of Moltmann’s historicism and eschatology, is also subjected to criticism here. Seeking to establish a new understanding of the relationship between theology and history after Bultmann and Barth, Pannenberg and the biblical scholars associated with him published *Revelation as History* in 1961.\(^\text{118}\) For them, the whole of history is the sphere of God’s revelation. In each historical event God is revealed in part. At the end of history, God will be revealed in full. Yet God is revealed preformatively in the resurrection because it is in this event that the end of history has already taken place. For Moltmann, however, Pannenberg’s project rests on a subtle modification of the Greek concept of God, a concept which has its starting point in the nature of the cosmos, rather than in the God who drives history. Moltman alleges that, here, “the place of the cosmological proof of God, which argued from ‘reality as cosmos’ to the one divine arche... is taken by a theology of history which argues back in the same way from the unity of ‘reality as history’ to the one God of history.”\(^\text{119}\)

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\(^\text{116}\) *TH*, 62.


\(^\text{119}\) *TH*, 77.
is, whereas Greek cosmological thought secured the unity of reality through the unchanging being that lay behind it, Pannenberg again seeks to secure the unity of reality, this time through according it an eschatological goal.

At this point, Moltmann’s criticism of Pannenberg appears to apply to his own claims as well. Indeed, as E. Frank Tupper charges, “In Theology of Hope, Moltmann strained to distinguish himself from Pannenberg, for he not only emphasized actual points of disagreement but also constructed illusory differences between himself and Pannenberg.” Thus, the allegation that Pannenberg secures the unity of reality as history through reference to its eschatological goal might just as well be extended to Moltmann’s developing theology of the horizon of Christ’s eschatological lordship, a major theme of my previous chapter. But there is yet more to Moltmann’s criticism. For him, reality as history in Pannenberg’s thought functions as the new site of the divine epiphany. “The world will one day be theophany, indirect self-revelation of God in toto.” Moltmann continues, “As long as this theology of history regards ‘God’ as the object that is in question when we enquire about the unity and wholeness of reality, then its starting point is obviously different from that of the question about God and his faithfulness to his promises in history—a question which first arises only in the context of promise and expectation, as in the Old Testament.” Thus, Moltmann differentiates his own position from that of Pannenberg’s insofar as he perceives the latter to be interested in the revelation of God’s being—in some way analogous to the appearance of the divine in epiphany religion—rather than the confirmation of God’s faithfulness to the promise.

That Moltmann understands the relationship between his position and Pannenberg’s in this way is further consolidated with his allusion to Marx. Moltmann writes of Pannenberg, “The theologian is not concerned merely to supply a different interpretation of the world, of history and of human nature, but to transform them in

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121 TH, 79.
122 TH, 80.
expectation of a divine transformation.”\textsuperscript{123} This is a paraphrase of Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach.\textsuperscript{124} The implication is that Pannenberg’s project exhibits a predominantly intellectual concern with history, obscuring the missiological impetus central to a truly biblical epistemology. As Moltmann writes later on in \textit{TH}, “The future horizon about which the present asks cannot be understood as a horizon within which to interpret the hitherto existing reality of the world… but only as a horizon of promise and mission.”\textsuperscript{125} Additionally, revelation equated with the history of present society overlooks the strength of atheistic claims regarding the basic godlessness of history. What is instead needed is a promissory history that calls human beings out of the godlessness of the present and into the future lordship of God, a history that has not already been determined but one that remains unfinished and thus in which believers are called to action.

Finally, it is not only the Christian tradition which has ensured the persistence of epiphany religion in modern theology. Secular historicist thought is, according to Moltmann, fraught with various ahistorical presuppositions derived from Greek categories. This can be seen, for example, in the work of Ernst Troeltsch, who argued at the end of the nineteenth century that the method of historical criticism

\textsuperscript{123} \textit{TH}, 84, emphasis original. So Bauckham: “The difference of emphasis from Pannenberg at this point is Moltmann’s characteristic stress on the transforming future which divides time into what passes away and the new future which comes.” Bauckham, \textit{Moltmann: Messianic Theology}, 93-94, emphasis original.

\textsuperscript{124} Marx wrote, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.” Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” trans. by S. Ryazankaya, in David McLellan, ed., \textit{Karl Marx: Selected Writings}, rev. ed., 171-4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 173. No citation is supplied in \textit{TH}.

\textsuperscript{125} \textit{TH}, 278. Moltmann later lodges a similar criticism, addressing Pannenberg’s interpretation of the resurrection as an anticipation of the end. Moltmann writes, “This [knowledge of the resurrection] was therefore no unpartisan knowledge established on a neutral basis, but a knowledge that engaged men, claimed their allegiance and called them to the apostolate…. The resurrection of Jesus from the dead by God does not speak the ‘language of facts’, but only the language of faith and hope, that is, the ‘language of promise.’” \textit{CG}, 172-73 (1972). Conversely, Pannenberg writes, “The restoration of the apocalyptic outlook towards future fulfillment in Moltmann’s own work turned out to focus more on certain political consequences, which he and his followers derived from the eschatological hope, than on the transcendent content of the biblical hope itself.” Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Constructive and Critical Functions of Christian Eschatology,” \textit{Harvard Theological Review} 77:2 (1984): 119-39, at 120.
relies on the principle that historical phenomena are understood analogically in relation to modern society’s experience of phenomena: “Agreement with normal, customary, or at least frequently attested happenings and conditions as we have experienced them is the criterion of the probability for all events that historical criticism can recognize as having actually or possibly happened.”

For Moltmann, however, this methodological commitment entails a certain ahistorical ontology. Like the Greek view of the cosmos, in this ontology historical events are accidental to the essential core that constitutes all existence. Such a core is necessitated by the analogical principle because both historical and presently experienced phenomena are manifestations of one and the same reality.

Moreover, modern historical thinking, which has its roots in the Enlightenment, is driven by a sense of crisis. Not only does modern life consist in “infinitely new and overwhelming possibilities,” but these “are always experienced in the first instance as the crisis and collapse of the hitherto known and familiar possibilities with their traditional institutions and ways of life and methods of coping with it.”

In reaction to crisis, however, historical thinking failed to become truly historical. Rather, its aim was to generate a philosophy of history in an attempt to understand and thus control history, bolstering human beings against the horror of crisis. It formed historical concepts on the basis of reality as it currently stands, instead of an anticipatory knowledge that remains open to change in light of future possibilities. From Leopold von Ranke’s claim that the fullness of the spirit which gives life to history is expressed in the totality of epochs standing side by side, to Heidegger’s grounding of history in Dasein, the potential of finding the genuinely historical is lost to the suprahistorical: “The definition, comprehension and understanding of history inevitably brings about at the same time an abrogation, a negation and annihilation of history. When the primary question is that of the origin, substance and essence of

127 TH, 230.
history, then the concrete movements, changes, crises and revolutions which constitute history are related to some factor that does not change, always exists and has equal validity at all times.”\(^{128}\) Whereas Moltmann had earlier expressed similar criticisms of modern historicism,\(^ {129}\) these criticisms here also give his rejection of epiphany religion a broader scope and thus support his contrastive paradigm. Thus, “the science and philosophy of history are here striving to combine the Greek logos with our modern experiences of reality.”\(^ {130}\)

In this section I have explored the negative side of Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm. I began with the Greek philosopher Parmenides, the archetypical figure of epiphanic thought. This was followed by the epiphany religion that Israel encountered in Canaanite agrarian society, and which Paul encountered in a different way in Corinth. I then turned to Moltmann’s criticisms of epiphanic thinking in modern theology and historical criticism. What becomes clear throughout all of this is that, for Moltmann, the church and its theology more closely approximate the outlooks of the ancient Canaanites in OT times and the Gentiles in NT times than the biblical theology of promise.

3.3. Promissory History and the Theology of Hope

Throughout his critical surveys of the Grecian inheritance of modern theology and thought, Moltmann advances a theology of hope that aims to take seriously the historical character of the biblical outlook. In this section, first, I will explore this biblical outlook, which Moltmann addresses from the standpoint of promise. I will then turn to Moltmann’s ontological statements—statements concerning God’s being—that are present though mostly undeveloped at this stage in his career. This latter endeavour is important because it reveals some of the broader theological assumptions that underpin Moltmann’s hermeneutic.

\(^ {128}\) \textit{TH}, 258.  
\(^ {129}\) See especially “Exegesis and the Eschatology of History,” \textit{HP}, 56-98 (1962), expounded above in 2.3.  
\(^ {130}\) \textit{TH}, 258.
3.3.1. The Biblical Theme of Promise

Moltmann’s interest in hope stems first from the OT phenomenon of promise.131 Revelation in the OT is accompanied by promise and each promise “announces the coming of a reality that does not yet exist.”132 Because this promise is a divine promise, its content is not restricted to the limits set by reality as it currently stands. Hearers of the promise are thus brought into the unique history that is initiated by the promise, in which the present reality begins to give way to a future alternative reality, one that is given by God. Moreover, the future of the promise is not only unrestricted by this present reality. It also contradicts it. Hearers of the promise partake in the tension between the reality that is passing away and that which is coming. They have a degree of freedom in which they can live in accordance or discordance with the coming reality. And there is an even greater freedom on God’s part to fulfil the promise—often in surprising ways, too: “The God who is recognized in his promises remains superior to any fulfilment that can be experienced, because in every fulfilment the promise, and what is still contained in it, does not yet become wholly congruent with reality and thus there always remains an overspill.”133 Nonetheless, this does not mean that a new fatalism arises, now derived from the future. The freedom of God, and the freedom of human beings in light of this freedom, prevents such a course.

Significantly, the divine promise was the source of Israel’s experience of history. Israel lives between the memory of the given promise and the expectation of its fulfilment. In this context, events become historicised. This means that they must be seen as provisional because their future has not yet come about. Put negatively, “the facts of history can never be regarded as processes complete in themselves which

131 “In Theology of Hope the biblical hermeneutical key is Moltmann’s model of revelation as a divine word of promise in both the Old and New Testaments.” McDougall, Pilgrimage of Love, 32. For Moltmann’s concept of promise from TH leading up to CG (1972), see Morse, Logic of Promise, esp. 27-59.
133 TH, 104.
have had their day and can manifest their own truth by themselves.”¹³⁴ Thus, in reading of Israel’s past as it is narrated in the OT, we no longer seek to live in accordance with reality as we know it, but in accordance with the future of Israel’s past, a future which is given to us in the promises of the God of Israel. Promise is essential to the experience of history. Moreover, revelation must be understood in the context of promise. God is revealed through faithfulness to the promise. But because the promised future yet remains incongruent with the present, knowledge of God has a historical nature. “The truth of the promise lies not in any demonstrable correspondence with the reality which was or which is.”¹³⁵ God cannot be known in the present reality because there is not yet a reality that corresponds to the fulfilled promise. Rather, God is only known in an anticipatory manner, on the way to the future. And, yet, this is real knowledge because it derives not only from expectation but from the memory of God’s past faithfulness.

In Israel’s later history, the concept of promise was developed in the eschatological messages of the prophets, and then in apocalyptic theology. In the prophets, the dissolution of Israel’s previous life in the land at the hands of the empires of Assyria, Babylon, and Persia allowed Israel to see itself in the context of world history. As such, Israel saw the promises extended to the Gentile nations. But the nation also began to see death itself as a limit to the fulfilment of promise. This conflicted with the fact that Yahweh could not be limited by anything, let alone death. It was thus that the ultimate negation of death also fell into the sphere of expectation. In apocalyptic theology, moreover, a third important innovation in promissory history developed. While Moltmann rejects the deterministic presuppositions of this later outlook, he affirms the extension of Yahweh’s sovereignty over the nations and death to now include the whole cosmos. Notably, such a view of sovereignty brings with it the historicist framework of earlier promissory theology: “The ‘universe’ is no longer, as in pagan cosmology, a thing to be interpreted in astro-mythical or pantheistic or mechanistic terms as the sum total of the world and of our satisfaction

¹³⁴ TH, 107-8.
¹³⁵ TH, 118.
with it. Instead, it splits into aeons in the apocalyptic process—into a world that is coming and one that is passing away.”\textsuperscript{136}

Having demonstrated the centre of Israel’s historical consciousness in the OT theology of promise, Moltmann moves on to the NT, in which promise acquires a new centre in the crucified and risen Christ. This can be seen in 1 Cor, for example, where Paul expounds what Moltmann terms an “\textit{eschatologia crucis},” an eschatology of the cross.\textsuperscript{137} That is, first, the fulfilment of the promise remains eschatologically outstanding in Christ. The believer lives in anticipation of Christ’s future, which has not yet come about. Second, the believer’s expectation of this future is expressed in participating in the cross, through faith, “taking upon it the trials and struggles of obedience in the body and surrendering itself to the pain of love.”\textsuperscript{138} Importantly, as with the OT theology of promise, the future of Christ is a future that is not possible as a simple continuation of reality as it currently stands. “It is therefore out of the question to classify the resurrection event among the events of world history and apocalyptic and to give a date for his future or his coming again…. The return of Christ does not come ‘of itself’, like the year 1965, but comes from himself, when and as God wills it, according to his promise.”\textsuperscript{139}

This orientation of the NT to the future can also be seen in the missionary experience that arises from the promise. “In the front-line of present mission new possibilities for history are grasped and inadequate realities in history left behind.”\textsuperscript{140} It is thus through mission that human beings properly experience history because they partake in that which arises from and tends towards the promise. Moreover, in the call to mission, a call directed in the NT to both Jews and Gentiles, human beings are not restricted by current human limitations, bound as they are by sin, but are called in light of their future. And only in light of this future is their mission possible. This entails a correspondent historicising of the world, as the one who is called is

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{136} TH, 137.
\bibitem{137} TH, 160.
\bibitem{138} TH, 163.
\bibitem{139} TH, 194, translation adjusted; Ger. 177.
\bibitem{140} TH, 284.
\end{thebibliography}
called to a new world that is in contradiction to the old, but the world will nonetheless be brought out of the old through the power and freedom of God.

Importantly, the Christian tradition is not so estranged from biblical thought so as to have completely overlooked the historicism that the former exhibits. Thus Moltmann also draws upon the Reformers to state his case. Opening his book with an appeal to Calvin’s hope, Moltmann attempts to convince his readers of the centrality of hope not just to Scripture but to the spirit of the Reformation.\textsuperscript{141} Luther, too, had already seen that Christian hope probably required a new ontology that differed from that of the philosophers.\textsuperscript{142}

The positive content yielded by Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm in \textit{TH}, then, begins with a retrieval of the OT theology of promise. Through promise, real history is brought into motion in that a coming future which contradicts present reality also opens up new possibilities for it. It is thus that present existence moves towards a hitherto unactualised reality. Knowledge of God, too, takes the form of anticipation because the reality in which God will be known has not yet come about. Moltmann proceeds to prophetic and apocalyptic eschatologies, where the former saw the promises universalised, so that they extended to the nations, and intensified, so that the overcoming of death came within the sphere of expectation. Later, apocalyptic eschatology saw the promises extended to the whole cosmos, simultaneously historicising this cosmos so that it was open to an alternative future. Finally, in the NT the promises meet their consummation in Christ. In him the promises acquire a new future as his future, and believers suffer and hope as they join with him—suffering in his crucifixion and hoping as they are transformed in missionary calling.

3.3.2. Ontological Murmurings

Although he appears to show little interest in the inner life of God in \textit{TH}, focussing his attention on the biblical phenomenon of promise, there are nonetheless certain

\textsuperscript{141} \textit{TH}, 18-20, cf. 44.
\textsuperscript{142} See above 2.2.2.
indications that Moltmann does not want to leave such a question unaddressed either. His polemics in TH, for example, as shown above, constantly focus on his targets’ assumptions about divine being, even if his theology of hope, stated positively, appears to have a more soteriological or missiological content. Still, an important source remains for tracing the development of Moltmann’s interest in the futurity of God in TH and his subsequent theology: his analysis and rejection of theologies that proceed by way of “proofs of God,” following Hans Joachim Iwand.\footnote{See Iwand’s outline of the three proofs of God in Hans Joachim Iwand, “Die Frage der Gottesbeweise,” in idem, Nachgelassene Werke, vol. 1, ed. Helmut Gollwitzer et al., 310-15 (Munich: Kaiser, 1962). The connection is briefly noted by Meeks in Origins of the Theology of Hope, 40-41.} The greater part of modern theology no longer begins with the task of proving God, whether by reference to the cosmos, human existence, or ontologically, from Godself. Rather, modern theology proceeds from the biblical witness. And yet, the methodological starting point in the proof of God’s existence has not been abandoned but rather transfigured. That is, the proofs of God “recur in all their conceivable forms in the hermeneutic reflections in which the anterior understanding and the terms of reference for the exposition and preaching of the biblical witness to God and his actions are formulated today.”\footnote{TH, 272.} Framing the discussion as a debate over hermeneutics, Moltmann’s contribution here will also reveal something of his own hermeneutical assumptions—this being clearly of interest for the current study. My concern in the following, however, will be to draw out the ontological assumptions informing Moltmann’s criticisms. Finally, the meaning of the somewhat misleading term “proof” (Beweis), while not immediately obvious, will become clear through the following exposition.

First,\footnote{I am following the order in TH. In the same year, in his Gottesbeweise und Gegenbeweise (Wuppertal-Barmen: Jugenddienst, 1964), as well as in subsequent writings, e.g., HP, 3-30 (1966), Moltmann instead addresses the cosmological ahead of the anthropological proof} Moltmann addresses Bultmann’s existentialist hermeneutics, which is made intelligible against the background of the proof of God from human exist-
ence. Here, the exegete does not primarily seek to reconstruct the historical circumstances of a text but rather recover the possibilities of human existence that lie within it, in order to realise these in the present. They grasp the historicity of their own existence and are thus led through faith to grasp the existence of God. Put otherwise, because the proof of God from the cosmos is nowadays generally rejected, it can only be known in the sphere of human decision, decision which is ultimately motivated by God. Moltmann protests, however, that Bultmann has misunderstood the direction of the relationship between humanity and God. “It is only in the light of the biblical understanding of God that human existence experiences itself as being moved by the question of God.”

Second, in Pannenberg’s theology the ancient proof of God from the cosmos returns to the theological scene. “‘God’ is here what is asked about in the question of the one origin, the unity and wholeness of all reality.” But whereas the earlier version of this proof could not make contingency meaningful, proceeding from the Greek concept of a static cosmos, Pannenberg proceeds instead from reality as history, where the contingent is meaningful, albeit a meaning that will only become completely clear at the end of history. On the exegetical level, this results in considering the texts in light of the whole of history, as stages on the way to the end of time. Yet, while this bears obvious similarities to Moltmann’s eschatologically-oriented hermeneutic, Pannenberg also departs from him precisely in this way. For Moltmann, Pannenberg does not adequately comprehend the disjunction between the present world and the coming reign of God. The latter “is a new reality, which does not put the finishing touch to the reality of history up to then, but so to speak rolls it up.”

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146 TH, 276.
147 TH, 276.
148 See above, 3.2.2.
149 TH, 278.
Finally, Anselm’s ontological proof of God, though rejected by Kant, was taken up again in new forms by Hegel and Barth. This proof proceeds neither from human existence nor the cosmos but from Godself, insofar as “whoever conceives of God must necessarily also conceive of his existence.”\footnote{TH, 279.} Moltmann’s discussion of Barth’s thought here indicates that he finds this proof most amenable to his own theological project. For Moltmann, Barth’s hermeneutic, proceeding from the self-revelation of God, orientates itself to preaching and thus mission, the latter which Moltmann goes on to address in the following section of \textit{TH}. Mission is essential to Moltmann’s understanding of promissory history, which calls human beings into God’s future rather than simply revealing the historicity of their own existence or the historical nature of reality. Barth, too, however, in implicitly relying on a proof of God, overlooks the necessarily \textit{eschatological} nature of any definitive knowledge of God that the proofs assume.\footnote{So Meeks: “Of the three major proofs of God, Moltmann remains closest to Barth’s emphasis on the ontological argument…. But the omnipotent divinity in the assumption that ‘God is all in all’ can only be anticipated, under the conditions of history, in the raising of Christ from the dead.” Meeks, \textit{Origins of the Theology of Hope}, 64.} For Moltmann, “that God is God accordingly cannot be the eternal source and background of the proclamation of Christ, but must be the promised, but as yet unattained, future goal of Christian proclamation.”\footnote{TH, 281. In a later criticism of the ontological proof, Moltmann adds, “Taken by itself, it [the ontological proof] is as incapable of being attacked as it is of attacking,” \textit{HP}, 12 (1966). For Moltmann, although the ontological proof is successful in relieving theology of any dependence on references to things external, that is, the world or human beings, in cutting these cords the proof also becomes isolated from human discourse and is therefore indeemonstrable.} It is not merely that human beings do not yet know God, but that God has not yet become “all in all” (1 Cor 15:28). What human beings do know of God, they know in a promissory manner through which they are called to partake in God’s bringing the promise to fulfilment. As such, “we shall have to turn the proofs of God the other way around and not demonstrate God from the world but the world from God.”\footnote{TH, 90; Ger. 80, translation slightly altered.} This
criticism is similar to Moltmann’s earlier allegation, namely, that Barth reads Scripture with a predetermined notion of the biblical Sache and cuts himself off from revisions of this Sache on the basis of data produced by historical criticism.\textsuperscript{154}

With his response to Barth it becomes clear why Moltmann has characterised the methodological presuppositions of different theologians in this manner. It is not that Bultmann, Pannenberg, and Barth have all naively set out to prove God, but that in attempting to articulate the reality of God none of their methodologies adequately take into account the provisionality of anthropic being, reality, or even God’s being, all of which await the eschaton and therefore can only be loosely presupposed. “The hermeneutical principles developed from them take the presence of God which can be demonstrated, experienced or perceived,” that is, from their respective starting points, “and make it the point of reference for the exposition and appropriation of the historic witness of the Bible.”\textsuperscript{155} Moltmann’s alternative is a hermeneutic that is oriented to the future through the church’s present missionary work. He writes, “The question as to the correct exposition of the Old and New Testament scriptures cannot be addressed to the ‘heart of scripture’. The biblical scriptures are not a closed organism with a heart, or a closed circle with a centre. On the contrary, all the biblical scriptures are open towards the future fulfilment of the divine promise whose history they relate,” namely, Christ’s coming.\textsuperscript{156}

It nonetheless remains unclear at this point just what Moltmann intends to communicate with his invocation of 1 Cor 15:28. Christopher Morse introduces his section on Moltmann’s ontology with the comment, “We should not expect to find in Moltmann’s initial proposals concerning promissory revelation a comprehensive outline of an eschatological ontology.”\textsuperscript{157} Indeed, Moltmann provides little detail at

\textsuperscript{154} See above, 2.3.1.
\textsuperscript{155} TH, 282.
\textsuperscript{156} TH, 283. Moltmann treats this same insight in the context of different approaches to Scripture between the different Christian traditions in “Schrift, Tradition, Traditionen: Bericht über die Arbeit der Sektion II,” Ökumenische Rundschau 13 (1964): 104-11, at 106.
\textsuperscript{157} Morse, Logic of Promise, 109, cf. 41-7, 109-32. Daniel Castelo makes a similar claim: “Even in Theology of Hope, however, ontology is not given its due. Although not strictly Blochian or Hegelian, Moltmann’s project in TH can be viewed as a ‘foundation’ for an ontology, but by no means is this effort fully developed.” Daniel Castelo, The Apathetic God: Exploring
this stage, seeming almost to reject the terms of the question altogether. Consider, for example, this asymmetrical contrast he sets up between Parmenides and Paul: “God is not he who ‘never was nor will be, because he now Is all at once as a whole’, but God is he ‘who maketh the dead alive and calleth into being the things that are not.’” Perhaps this can be accounted for by Moltmann’s later theology, where he cautions against speculative investigation into the being of God for its potential to detract from the economy of salvation. Still, elsewhere in TH he provides statements with more explicitly ontological content: “The essence and the identity of the God of promise lies not in his absoluteness over and beyond history, but in the constancy of his freely chosen relation to his creatures.” And: “God is not somewhere in the Beyond, but he is coming and as the coming One he is present.” God’s promises “tell us who he will be.” Also relevant here is the pregnant statement of Bloch’s that Moltmann cites three times in TH. The God of Israel is a God “with futurum as his mode of being.” But these are still only glimpses into what a more robust, ontological foundation for Moltmann’s theology of promise might look like. He himself does not enter into detailed discussion of this in TH.

In this section I began by detailing Moltmann’s theology of promise, which he forwards as an alternative to epiphanic categories in modern theology and thought. The contrastive paradigm apparent in this distinction is fundamental to the role that Scripture plays in his theology. Throughout TH, the implication is that the church has forgotten its biblical hope. Reclaiming this is nothing less than seeing

the Contemporary Relevance of Divine Impassibility (Milton Keynes, UK: Wipf and Stock, 2009), 96. For other treatments of the ontological implications of Moltmann’s theology of history and eschatology, see Miller, “Eschatological Ontology”; W. Waite Willis, Jr., Theism, Atheism and the Doctrine of the Trinity: The Trinitarian Theologies of Karl Barth and Jürgen Moltmann in Response to Protestant Atheism (Atlanta, GA: Scholars, 1987), 161-65.

TH, 31, citing Rom 4:17.
159 Esp. CG, 240-41 (1972).
160 TH, 116.
161 TH, 164.
162 TH, 117.
163 TH, 16, 30, 141, translation altered; see n. 47 at 3.1.4. The claim is originally made by Bloch in The Principle of Hope, 3:1236. At this stage, Moltmann has not yet made the distinction between futurum and adventus, which I will discuss in the following chapter. See 4.1.2.
God’s work continue today, that of reforming the church in light of Scripture. I then turned to consider Moltmann’s ontology, which I thought necessary due to Moltmann’s criticisms of Barth, Bultmann, and Pannenberg that extended in various ways to their doctrines of God. While I found Moltmann’s own doctrine of God in TH to be somewhat undeveloped in this sense, I nonetheless discovered statements suggestive of an alternative doctrine of God that might attend a more comprehensive theology of hope.

3.4. Other Biblical Issues

Having addressed the central hermeneutical logic for the major claims that Moltmann makes in TH, I can now consider some of the more peripheral comments and assumptions which will help form a more complete picture of the role that Scripture plays in his theology. In the following I will look at how Moltmann conceives the relationship between historical criticism and theology, the nature of Scripture as a witness, the role of the biblical canon, and the continuity and discontinuity between the two Testaments.

3.4.1. Historical-Critical Exegesis and Theological Interpretation

When considering the role of Scripture in his theology, what is immediately notable throughout TH is Moltmann’s free use of the fruits of historical-critical exegesis. In his second chapter, exploring the theme of promise in the OT, Moltmann begins by taking up Viktor Maag’s claims regarding the syncretistic nature of the biblical texts. “Israel achieved a syncretism between the religion of the nomad and of the Canaanite peasant. It is through this syncretism that it became what it was in classical times.” This syncretism consisted in a struggle between the nomadic, historicist outlook of Israel, and the agrarian, epiphanic outlook of the Canaanites.

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164 For an account of Moltmann’s relationship to historical criticism in and around TH, see Ben Wiebe, “Interpretation and Historical Criticism: Jürgen Moltmann,” Restoration Quarterly 24:3 (1981): 155-166.
But an immediate difficulty arises with regard to Moltmann’s appropriation of Maag. The God of the Israelites here does not appear to be the sovereign Yahweh who leads and guides an ancient people. Rather, this God is presented here anthropocentrically, even atheistically—as a result of the historical circumstances of the ancient Israelite worldview. Moltmann himself seems to go down this path, writing, “The Israelite tribes took the wilderness God of promise with them from the wilderness along with the corresponding understanding of existence and the world.” Yet, it is certainly not Moltmann’s intention to reduce Yahweh to a human concept. This will become clear in the following.

A particularly significant feature of Moltmann’s treatment of historical criticism in _TH_ is found in his theology of the resurrection. His interest in the question first of all derives from the apparent distance between the centrality of the NT witness to the event and the confusion with which it has been handled in modern theology, the latter having attempted to do justice to the principles and presuppositions of the historical method. This, in turn, originates from the experience of the “death of God” in modern European thought. In response, Moltmann aims to demonstrate that the God known to be dead, the God who has become “partly superfluous, partly optional,” is indeed the same God who raised Christ from the dead. That is, this dead God is not simply a fantasy of modern atheism but the God of the gospel, having died in Christ on the cross. Insofar as atheism perceives the pervasive godlessness of the world, then, it surpasses even traditional theology, “theism.” Nonetheless, such a God remains essentially lost on atheism so long as the reality of the resurrection is overlooked.

That the question of the resurrection cannot be straightforwardly relocated from the sphere of history to that of faith or practice—the temptation that has faced

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166 _TH_, 97, emphasis mine. Otto claims that “Moltmann refuses to take the biblical accounts as intended, but rather feels compelled by the autonomy of reason to reject supernaturalism.” Otto, _God of Hope_, 74. In the following, however, I contend that Moltmann does quite the opposite, even if he is not completely consistent.


168 _TH_, 168.

169 For this claim, see 5.4.2. and 5.4.3.
modern theology since the onset of historical criticism—is evident from the start, in
the nature of the testimonies themselves. “Their statements contain not only existen-
tial certainty in the sense of saying, ‘I am certain,’ but also and together with this
objective certainty in the sense of saying, ‘It is certain.’” Further, Moltmann cau-
tions against confusing the first century controversy with the modern one. Whereas
the early witnesses to the resurrection contended that Israel’s God did indeed raise
Christ from the dead against those who rejected this, namely dissenting Jews—who
believed that God could have done so but in fact did not do so—the modern dispute
is concerned with the historical possibility or probability of the resurrection.

The historian’s first objection to the resurrection accounts deriving from a
historical reality is made on the basis of Troeltsch’s analogical principle, namely, that
the historical reality of an event can be determined with considerable accuracy on
the basis of analogous events known to human beings. This would rule out the
resurrection, as no analogy can be found for it. But, Moltmann responds, because
such a principle depends on an ahistorical metaphysic—that of the closed, recurring
world—it is inadmissible for theology. The resurrection is an act of new creation and
therefore one that cannot be accounted for at all in terms of that which already is. A
commitment to the historical method’s analogical principal a priori precludes the
possibility of God acting in genuinely new ways. This does not mean, however, that
the resurrection becomes an alternative, Christianised principle of analogy that
merely replaces the scientific one or provides a competing account of what is histor-
ically possible. Rather, the resurrection is an event analogous with the future being of
the world, and, as such, functions in an anticipatory manner. Nonetheless, it is in this
anticipation that human beings live differently, in accordance with their future. The

170 TH, 172-73. Moltmann’s claim here is overlooked by Otto, who writes, “What Moltmann
means by resurrection is therefore only symbolically understood as that which will occur in
the course of human history as God identifies with the poor and they rise up in revolt
against political monotheism and oppression.” Otto, God of Hope, 163, emphasis original.
This misreading of Moltmann, confusing his position with existentialist interpretations of
the resurrection, is advanced throughout pp.160-70.

171 But see Van A. Harvey’s contention in FH, 136-38, that Moltmann’s criticism of historicist
methodology on the basis of Troeltsch’s analogical principle is reductionist and ultimately
a straw-man.
historicality of the resurrection, then, consists primarily in its effect on history, spurring the latter on, through hope, to an alternative tomorrow.

These two very different features of Moltmann’s thought in TH—his adoption of Maag’s insights and his challenge to the principle of analogy in regard to the resurrection—demonstrate the complexity of his relationship to historical criticism at this stage in his career. On the one hand, Moltmann appears quite happy to employ the fruits of historical-critical exegesis in regard to the origins of promissory history, even going so far as to imitate language which assumes this to be a human rather than divine development. On the other hand, Moltmann takes a firm stand against this inherently atheistic methodology in his theology of the resurrection. But it is the concern expressed in this latter movement that appears to be the dominant one. Moltmann shows no interest in viewing the resurrection as merely the result of human interpretation—so that the real event was nothing more than the realisation of Jesus’ significance for the future of humanity, for example. For him, rather, the resurrection is an act of new creation that only the God of promise can bring about. In this light, Maag’s insights are serviceable to Moltmann’s project insofar as they aid in elucidating the history of promise. Indeed, they fulfil this function in demonstrating the uniqueness of Israel’s outlook in contrast with that of the Canaanites. Maag highlights the distinctive nature of the history of promise using the tools of historical criticism, though without altogether ruling out the reality of this history. Historical criticism remains valuable, even if it is hope in the God of promise that ultimately determines the direction of the hermeneutical task.

3.4.2. Scripture as Witness

Moltmann’s engagement with historical criticism raises another question, namely that of the relationship between the events that Scripture attests and the words of Scripture itself. For him, it is not simply Scripture but the whole history of Israel and Christ that should inform theology. The words of Scripture cannot be straightforwardly abstracted from the concrete historical circumstances in which they arose. It is thus that Moltmann can differentiate between Israel and “empirical Israel,” for
example. He writes, “What the New Testament understands by revelation is thus again not to be learned from the original content of the words employed, but only from the event to which they are here applied.” As the exposition of Moltmann’s earlier work in my previous chapter shows, for him, reading Scripture means identifying the hopes of ancient people expressed there and finding that we, too, live life against the same eschatological horizon that these hopes seek, the horizon of Christ’s lordship over the world. As such, “even where the historic tradition passes over into legendary tradition,” that is, where Scripture’s accounts of historical events appear to be embellished, or, yet still, to depart completely from the historical reality, “the peculiarly Israelite tradition is still dominated by the hopes and expectations kindled by Yahweh’s promise.” The truth of Scripture’s witness to God’s work in history is not to be measured by modern concerns over accurate representation of the events as they transpired. Rather, its truth is found in the extent to which it communicates the hope that is given to Israel and the church through God’s creative action.

Further insight into Moltmann’s understanding of the relationship between the biblical texts and the events behind them can be gleaned from his comments on the emerging discipline of form criticism. As he understands it, in distinction from historical criticism, “the form-critical approach no longer asks about the historically accessible events which the accounts relate…, but it enquires into the kerygmatic motives which shaped the accounts, and examines their place in the life and conduct of specific societies.” Already, then, Moltmann departs from form criticism on the methodological level, finding not only the texts but the events attested by them to be theologically significant. And although form criticism has indeed “brought out an abundance of new insights,” its linguistic orientation represents a “decisive shift in the centre of the researcher’s interest.” This is especially the case where the original

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172 TH, 102.
173 TH, 139.
174 TH, 108.
175 TH, 183.
176 TH, 183.
historical reality is no longer relevant for the believing form critic. Such an orientation, as Moltmann has consistently maintained, reduces to the individual faith of the interpreter and overlooks the universal horizon shared by the present and past. It is thus neither, strictly speaking, the words of the text, nor the situation of the human writer or community that should be primarily of interest when reading Scripture. The purpose of reading is to be found, rather, in discerning the reality to which Scripture witnesses—here the God of promise and the future hope that sets history in motion.

3.4.3. The Canon of Promise

Turning to Moltmann’s exegesis in general, it becomes evident that he leaves himself open to the charge of subsuming the biblical texts under the single heading of the theology of promise. Similar criticisms were made by Moltmann’s earliest readers. He summarises these, writing, “The first and most common charge against the ‘theology of hope’ pertains to ‘one-sidedness’; the futurist aspect of eschatology is one-sidedly emphasised against the presentist one, as is hope against faith.” But it is not only Moltmann’s broader theological conclusions that need to be considered here. The exegesis itself is conducted in such a way so as to give preference to voices in Scripture where this theme is predominant, sidelining those voices that depart from it. Naturally, Moltmann understands the theme of promise to be a pervasive one. For the biblical writers, “the stories of Israelite history—the histories of the patriarchs, of the wilderness, of David—are treated as themes pregnant with history.” And it was in Yahweh’s promises, “in the constant recalling of which and the ever new embracing and interpretation of which Israel consequently found its identity and community. These include not only the ‘basic promises’ of Exodus and the Sinaitic covenant—‘I am the Lord thy God’—but for example also the promises

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177 Moltmann summarises and responds to some of these criticisms in DTH, 205-9 (1967).
178 Moltmann in DTH, 205 (1967).
179 TH, 108.
to Abraham.”

Other texts, however, appear to resist integration into the schema of promise.

Ecclesiastes, for example, shows no interest in the promise of something new. It is much more at home in epiphany religion, where “historic events belong within the sphere of transience. They are then… transient and relative events that reflect the eternal intransience of the Deity. Then there can in principle be ‘nothing new under the sun’” (cf. Eccl 1:9). Apocalyptic literature, which includes the Book of Daniel, departs from the promissory outlook of the prophets, particularly in its “deterministic view of history.” A fatalism like this, where the destinies of the elect and reprobate have already been fixed, threatens to undermine the divine freedom for new creation, or even interest in the world at all: “Like the eighteenth century theology of saving history, apocalyptic contains perceptible traces of the distant God of de-

Nonetheless, apocalyptic remains relevant in extending the scope of prophetic promise to include not only human history but the entire cosmos. Interestingly, the Gospel of John does not appear in TH at all, apart from one allusion. As Moltmann later writes, “Only with the Trinity and the Kingdom (1980) does John’s Gospel begin to appear in the indexes of biblical references for my books. The list of references to John grows longer and longer with each volume…. The Fourth Gospel is no longer for me a book closed ‘with seven seals,’ suspect in Marburg of a certain gnostic heresy.” He continues, writing of theology in the sixties, “My generation

180 TH, 111.
182 TH, 110.
183 TH, 134, 193.
184 TH, 133.
185 TH, 135, cf. 69-76.
186 “It is not merely said that Jesus is the first to arise and that believers will attain like him to resurrection, but it is proclaimed that he is himself the resurrection and the life.” TH, 82-83, emphasis original. See John 11:25.
tried to break out of the narrows of the personalist and existentialist thinking of Martin Heidegger and Rudolf Bultmann, with the latter’s reference to the Gospel of John’s ‘present eschatology.’”

Thus, still in 1975, Moltmann remained suspicious of the book’s “unworldly hope.” It was only later when he realised the need for theological treatment of space, presence, and ecology, alongside time, history, and eschatology, that he began to show interest in John. Even John, then, falls by the wayside in TH, in order to make way for the theology of promise.

Therefore, while it becomes apparent that Moltmann’s canon in TH is not as broad as his thoroughgoing exploration of the biblical promise might suggest, there is nonetheless a logic to his “one-sidedness,” which he expounds in response to his critics. TH is “a contribution to an open dialogue that forgoes any unrealistic attempt at all-sidedness and is therefore not intended to operate in a totalitarian manner.”

As Moltmann writes in his 1990 preface, “The person who is caught up in a discussion, who wants to speak to a particular situation, cannot be complete and harmoniously balanced. In standing up for one’s own concern one must over-emphasize.” In this context, though he himself does not make this connection, Moltmann’s focus on particular texts to the exclusion of others can be understood as an endeavour to

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188 Moltmann, “God in the World,” 370. Van A. Harvey observed this already in the late sixties: “If Moltmann can support his case by interpreting Paul in a certain way and virtually ignoring the Fourth Gospel, Bultmann can interpret Paul in a different fashion and argue that the author of the Fourth Gospel sustained a systematic and full-scale assault on the idea of a future eschatological hope.” FH, 153.

189 CPS, 69.

190 Moltmann in DTH, 205 (1967).

191 TH, 11.
hear and consider what the theme of promise has to say, ahead of entertaining criticism of it. Nonetheless, Moltmann does not offer a detailed discussion of canon at this point and, as such, remains open to criticism.

3.4.4. The Continuity between the Two Testaments

A significant feature of Moltmann’s hermeneutics in TH is his approach to the relationship between the OT and NT. Whereas orthodox christology allegedly sets out from the universal God of Greek metaphysics, and liberal Protestant christology from a universal concept of human existence, neither of them require the OT for their respective projects. “Their way does not necessarily lie through it,” that is. For Moltmann, “the approach of Jesus to all men, however, has the Old Testament with its law and its promise as a necessary presupposition.” In theology proper it is Yahweh who is the Father of Christ, so that God’s being is bound up with the future of promise, and in anthropology it is the Jews of whom Jesus is a part, so that Jesus’ story must be seen in the broader context of Israel’s. These explain why Moltmann treats the OT theology of promise ahead of the resurrection. It is only in understanding the roots and development of the promise that its culmination in the resurrection and future fulfilment in the coming kingdom can be rightly understood. To further flesh out this connection, Moltmann wades into a debate between Ulrich Wilckens and Günter Klein on the continuity of the OT and NT in Rom 4. For Wilckens, the

192 TH, 141.
193 TH, 141. Regarding Moltmann’s use of the OT in TH, Otto writes, “Were Moltmann serious about grounding his theology in the Old Testament, he would give greater attention to the historic beliefs of Judaism; this however, he cannot do, since it would lead ineluctably to a closer approximation to historic Christianity than he desires.” Otto, God of Hope, 107. But not only does Otto confuse Moltmann’s approach to the OT in TH with his approach to the OT in his theology in general. Otto also seems to present “historic Judaism” as a monolithic entity, shoehorning a rich variety of interpretative traditions into a singular group. In particular, this overlooks the role that historical criticism has played in modern Jewish scholarship, as well as the new directions pursued in Jewish biblical studies and theology since the Holocaust.
Christ-event is only comprehensible against the background of the promise made to Abraham. For Klein, however, history is the sphere of the law, which faith breaks out of. He “takes ‘history’ out of the light of the promise and sets it in the light of the law.”195 History is not the realm of faith but is rather opposed to it. Thus here it is the believer’s faith that creates interest in the figure of Abraham, not the shared history of promise that encompasses them.

Yet, Moltmann responds, “Paul does not use the figure of Abraham merely to illustrate his own view of righteousness by faith, but enters into a dispute with Jews and Jewish Christians over the inheritance of Abraham.”196 The direct implication of Klein’s argument is that Christian faith is antithetical to the OT. The latter has no inherently positive importance, apart from its appropriation by the individual subject. But this would mean that “it becomes as impossible to say what is ‘new’ in the New Testament as to say what is ‘new’ in Gnosticism.”197 Both forgo their concrete foundation in the history of promise.

But neither is Christ’s coming simply to be seen in terms of fulfilment—the implication of Wilckens’s thesis. “His [Paul’s] gospel does not derive by necessity from the essence of the history of election.”198 Rather, for Moltmann, the Christ-event transpires in both continuity and discontinuity with the OT theology of promise. Christian faith finds continuity with the OT insofar as it, too, takes place in the history of promise. But it also finds discontinuity insofar as it is the Christ-event in particular that is the fulfilment of the OT promise and anticipation of the future, rather than present faith that defers to obedience to Torah and the election of Israel in place of faith in Christ.

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195 TH, 150.
196 TH, 151.
197 TH, 151, slightly adjusted.
198 TH, 152.
Moltmann briefly expands on this theme in a 1967 essay, addressing the significance of Marcion for theology. In the second century, the figure, broadly considered a heretic, attempted to wrest the NT from the OT, and, in doing so, presented the church with the problem of reconciling the two testaments in such a way that had never been encountered before. Moltmann is particularly interested in the ecstasy of the new that underpins Marcion’s theology. “For Marcion the new of Christ is without analogy. Everything which existed hitherto and was known becomes bad, evil, and pernicious in the face of the new thing which now comes.”\(^{199}\) Yet, in positing a new God in Christ, in distinction from the God of Israel, Marcion’s enthusiasm was misplaced. Nonetheless, Moltmann claims, not unprovocatively, “When the universal church excluded Marcion as a heretic, it lost for itself the category of the new.”\(^{200}\) That is, where the church responded to Marcion in emphasising the continuity between Christ and the God of Israel, at the same time it forfeited the rightly grounded (wrongly executed) messianic passion with which he had read Paul. The OT, for Moltmann, attests the history of the promise, the presupposition of the resurrection, whereas the NT attests new life in Christ, a new life that does not merely restore humanity to what it once was but ushers it into the kingdom that is yet coming.

In summary, a number of important peripheral aspects of Moltmann’s theology of Scripture are developed in \(TH\). First, Moltmann’s relationship to historical-critical exegesis becomes clearer in freely adopting those of its insights he thinks better illuminate Scripture’s theology of promise. Some tension arises here in regard to the secular register of such claims, though this is not a major problem when the wider context of \(TH\) is considered. A second tension arises when it becomes apparent that Moltmann finds both the words of Scripture and the events they attest to be theologically significant but does not provide any in-depth exploration of the relationship between these. Importantly, he contends that historical criticism is limited in its principle of analogy, which would exclude the resurrection \textit{a priori}. Third, an implicit canon of promise appears in \(TH\), where it is notable that Ecclesiastes, Daniel, and

\(^{199}\) HP, 13.
\(^{200}\) HP, 14.
John are excluded in different ways. Finally, Moltmann addresses the question of continuity between the OT and NT, finding a necessary continuity in the history of promise but also a discontinuity in faith in Christ.

3.5. Summary

My aim in this chapter has been to give a detailed picture of the role that Scripture plays in *TH*. I have focussed the majority of the discussion on Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm, in which he differentiates between a Greek outlook, characterised by epiphany and ahistoricism, and the biblical outlook of hope and promissory history. This paradigm was clearly in the air at the time of writing of *TH*, as the exposition of six different influences on the work demonstrates. Nonetheless, Moltmann goes on to make it his own, drawing a line from Parmenides, through Kant, to Barth, Bultmann, Pannenberg, and historical criticism. Each of these in their own way proceed from presuppositions that Moltmann judges to be ultimately Greek in origin, rather than biblical. For Barth, all times are equal before the eternal God. The end will not bring something genuinely new but only reveal what already is. Barth’s eschatology is fundamentally Hellenistic in this sense. In yet another way, for Bultmann, eschatology is flattened and made to fit the shape of the individual human life. That which takes place outside the individual, in the future of the world, is effectively inconsequential. And Pannenberg, despite his innovations, is found to be at fault for his Greek, noetic approach to history, where history’s value is seen in its being the realm of God’s revelation, rather than the realm in which the people of God wait in expectation for the fulfilment of the promises. Later in *TH*, it is historical criticism, here represented by Ernst Troeltsch, which also falters in this regard because it attempts to control history through the imposition of ahistorical principles such as that of analogy.

Throughout *TH*, though, Moltmann develops a theology of promise, a programme he frames as a retrieval of the biblical material, as an alternative to Hellenistic goings astray. In promise, God proclaims a new, future reality to the people, one that is in contradiction to the present. This can be seen in the nation of ancient Israel,
whose life took the shape of a history, archetypically in the exodus event. With the prophets, the Gentile nations, too, begin to come within the ambit of the promise, and the power of the latter intensifies, looking forward to the ultimate defeat of death. With apocalyptic, the breadth of promise expands even more, now encompassing the entire cosmos. This development continues into the NT, where the promise culminates in God’s faithfulness to Christ, and looks still further forward to our resurrection with him. Significantly, this biblical model entails an ever-changing present, as believers are called not to live in accordance with that which already is but with that which one day will be. Whatever important role they may have had at the time—though Moltmann’s interest here is in polemical supersession rather than reconstruction—the theologies of Barth, Bultmann, and Pannenberg all ultimately surrender this radically historical character of the biblical witness.

In relation to this, hints of a new ontology, an alternative understanding of the divine being, appear throughout TH. This is particularly clear in Moltmann’s discussion of the proofs of God. Each proof, implicit in the work of Barth, Bultmann, and Pannenberg, presupposes a particular ontology in which God’s being is complete and not open to the future. While he does not set up a competing ontology—something that appears to be all but absent in his retrieval of the biblical theme of promise—Moltmann nonetheless offers nudges in that direction, implying that the completion of God’s being is to be found in the future. The question of Moltmann’s ontology is significant for this investigation because it asks to what extent Moltmann’s theology of hope can provide not only an alternative phenomenology but an alternative doctrine of God. Because the question cannot be answered on the basis of TH alone, however, a more complete account of this ontology will be offered in my next chapter, drawing on works where Moltmann treats this theme in greater detail.

Nonetheless, the role of Scripture in TH is not exhausted in Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm. In addition to this, four features in particular are of note. These are: Moltmann’s adoption of the conclusions relating to his subject matter that were reached through historical-critical exegesis conducted by others; the emphasis on the events to which Scripture witnesses as the main sources of theological authority; the
implicit formation of a canon of promise, privileging texts that advance the theology of hope; and the different sites of continuity and discontinuity between the two Testaments.

Despite my interest in the centrality of Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm to his use of Scripture in *TH*, then, these other features demonstrate a broader array of assumptions and motivations that are at work under the surface of the book. Moltmann is not simply interested in advancing a biblically-driven programme against those compromised by their Hellenistic commitments. That is, it is not the Bible alone that demands such a confrontation. Rather, it is the very God of Scripture, the God of the promise, who lies at the centre of the text and enflames Moltmann’s imagination. It is thus that not only the recent, human endeavours in historical criticism are both radically relativised in light of the promise and taken up to serve its dissemination again today. It is thus that even the words of Scripture are to step aside for the yet more primary fact of the events that gave birth to the promise—that even the canon is not an all-equalising ocean in which texts are simply texts each for their identical role in attesting Christ, but a landscape with its own peaks and plains, where some features speak more readily of the history of promise.

Moltmann’s next major work, *The Crucified God*, will not appear for another eight years. In the meantime, in the fertile period following *TH*, he will further develop some of the key insights of this work, as well as play an important role in the new movement of political theology.
4. A Political Bible: With and after Hope

In the fertile period between the publication of his first two major works, *Theology of Hope* (1964) and *The Crucified God* (1972), Moltmann continues to reflect on the relevance of the Bible in modern theology. Additionally, other more general developments in this period are also notable for the context they provide in order to better understand the role of Scripture in his theology. This chapter is divided into two sections. First, I attend to just some of the numerous developments in Moltmann’s theology at this time, many directly concerning his theology of Scripture. Second, I draw connections between his promissory theology and the theology of the cross in *CG*, which will prepare the way for the following chapter on that work.

4.1. With Hope: The Various Legacies of *Theology of Hope*

In this section I will address some of the many pieces published in this period, focusing on Moltmann’s use of Scripture and the assumptions he holds about it. While much of the discussion will focus on seemingly miscellaneous aspects relating to this subject, most, if not all, directly concern his theology of Scripture as it has been developed up until this point in his early essays and in *TH* (1964). Besides these, however, I have tried to centre the exposition around two main themes. The first is Moltmann’s eschatological ontology. His contributions to this area in the years immediately following *TH* are important both for filling in some of the gaps from this earlier period, and for considering the relationship of this to his later, more sophisticated, trinitarian doctrine of God. The second theme is political theology. I would have addressed this at least in passing anyway, seeing as it is fundamental to understanding Moltmann’s theological development. Here, though, it is particularly important to explore the comments Moltmann makes in this area in regard to Scripture.

In this essay, Moltmann begins with the premise that churches need to be clear about what they mean by the “word of God.” Despite the wonderful grace given to the preacher in the opportunity to preach the very word of God, this person must recognise that even such a task as this “is also always bound to the misery of the word in this time,” because “preaching always employs the language of its time.” Moltmann is referring to the problem of language in his day, which contemporary philosophical and sociological discussion had identified. In particular, preaching needs to come to terms with the increasingly indefinite character of the language it employs. Moltmann cites one scholar who claims that, in the mid-sixties, as a result of the mass media, the average German person knew “roughly fifty thousand words, and if all the technical terms and product names, compounds and abbreviations are added in, the entire inventory of words could be almost ten times as large. The estimates range between three and five hundred thousand.” This is in contrast to people just sixty years earlier, who are said to have known around eight thousand words.

The result of these language changes is that, first, misunderstanding becomes more frequent because there is more material to deal with, and, second, the extent of ever-new words and word formations means that the average person becomes less and less an active participant in developing language’s meaning, and more and more a passive recipient of meanings already fixed in advance. New media, with a focus on the dissemination of fresh information, such as radio and television, has further contributed to this increasing passivity. Moltmann discovers a cognate phenomenon in the inability to speak after the atomic bomb. No words can appropriately convey such an event. Conversely, attendant to the rapid proliferation of new kinds of media come innumerable new contexts in which words are spoken and torn from the realities they attest: “The difference between word and reality grows the greater the

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1 Originally “Wort Gottes und Sprache.”
2 PTh, 93.
knowledge of various times, languages, and cultures becomes. This makes the human being richer in the multitude of views on reality and likewise makes them poorer in certainty and truth.” Language itself has become its own, secondary reality, abstracted from its destination.

The preacher must not misunderstand the problem. It is not simply a question of “whether and how modern transmissions of language, images, and experience are to be ‘responsibly’ employed.” This would be to speak an esoteric “Christianese.” Rather, preaching must contest this disjunction between word and reality, instead of simply resigning itself to it. This is because it proclaims the kingdom inaugurated in Christ, a kingdom in which the fulfilment of the promises is already taking place. Importantly, such fulfilment is the perfect realisation of the intended correspondence between word and referent, signifier and signified. Therefore, despite its present alienation, “language can find its truth and success in the preaching of this word.”

Moltmann proceeds to explore Barth’s claims that “there is no concept of the Word of God apart from the name of God,” and “in God’s revelation God’s Word is identical with God Himself.” Thus where Scripture speaks in God’s name it is God-self who speaks. And while preaching itself does not function in this way, Moltmann summarises, it takes as its starting point the assumption that “God has spoken and will speak.” Nonetheless, though it is not accorded the same prestige as Scripture, Barth can still affirm that “human speech attains an indirect identity with the word of God.” God’s word is not diminished in any way when God freely and graciously

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4 *PTh*, 96-97.
5 *PTh*, 96.
6 Admittedly, this word is not one employed by Moltmann. Nonetheless, it maps in part onto his analysis, and his analysis and criticism could also be a potentially valuable contribution in understanding and, where desirable, combating the phenomenon it designates.
7 *PTh*, 98.
8 Karl Barth, *CD*, I/1, 159, 304. See idem, *Die kirchliche Dogmatik* I/1 (Munich: Kaiser, 1932), 164, 321, cited in *PTh*, 99. Moltmann’s discussion of Barth in regard to this theme is here limited to CD I/1.
9 *PTh*, 99.
10 *PTh*, 100.
allows it to be proclaimed through human beings. In response to Barth, Moltmann first acknowledges that the great theologian’s claims are, on a fundamental level, “non-negotiable.” But he cannot accept a justification for preaching that takes a predominantly retrospective point of reference. For Moltmann, “this word must not only be understood incarnationally, but must first be understood eschatologically.”

The tension that is the disparity between the present time and Christ’s future is automatically overridden in Barth’s theological framework, where Christ is equally present in all times, though principally revealed in his life, death, and resurrection—the heart of proclamation. Pushing back on this, Moltmann contends that the preacher’s words do not have a primarily reportative function but a transformative one. They seek congruence not with that which has been but with that which will be.

Bultmann, too, runs into similar problems, albeit in his focus on the nature of the word of preaching as address to human beings. For him, the believer can find new being in the present through the decision of faith made in response to the word that addresses them. But, in reply, Moltmann again invokes the provisional state of affairs in which human beings find themselves: “The ‘amen’ that faith speaks to the word does not yet yield an anthropology of the redeemed person,” contra Bultmann, “but first a hope for the future which God will bring about.” Importantly, Moltmann wants to affirm what Barth and Bultmann claim about the word but to situate it in a broader eschatological context. Thus theirs “is not an overestimation of the word but an underestimation of the breadth and freedom into which the word wants to lead the transformation of the whole of reality.”

Detailing his proposed alternative, Moltmann returns to the relationship between preaching and language. On the one hand, the language of preaching can

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11 PTh, 101.
12 PTh, 102.
14 PTh, 107.
15 PTh, 108.
never be a special Christian language that bears little if any connection to the language of the day. On the other hand, however, neither can the language of preaching simply be assimilated to that of the world. Rather, it both takes place within the sphere of human language and impels this language towards a future in which word and reality correspond: “The word precedes the new reality. It does not illuminate the situation but introduces a new future. It calls that which it promises into present being out of the Not-Yet-Being of the future.”

Although Moltmann’s main focus in this essay is on the task of preaching and its relationship to contemporary language, his treatment of these themes also provides a more complete picture of the assumptions he holds about the nature of Scripture and its function in the church (some fundamental connection between preaching and Scripture, if not already apparent, is at least touched on in Moltmann’s discussion of Barth’s doctrine of revelation). Significantly, the promissory character of the word and its role in pointing to a future that contradicts present reality, claims already ubiquitous in Moltmann’s theology prior to the publication of this essay, are here transposed into the context of preaching and human language. This yields a concrete application for Scripture, with Moltmann seeking to persuade preachers that the value of the biblical promises will be better recognised if they do not surrender themselves to the problem of language—the disjunction between sign and signifier—attempting to bypass it in a Christian fantasy realm where this does not apply. Rather, they must acknowledge the problem and confront it with the proclamation of a new, coming reality, which God’s word, spoken from the pulpit, attests, thus stimulating the call to active and creative obedience.

4.1.2. 1966: “Trends in Eschatology”

Central to this essay is the question: “Does the present determine the future, or does the future determine the present?” Moltmann’s response to this will provide a more definite picture of the relationship between history and the future, as well as of his

16 *PTh*, 109.
17 *FC*, 20, capitalisation adjusted.
ontology—the latter especially being a helpful addition, considering its ambiguity in
*TH* (1964).\(^{18}\)

Moltmann begins by noting that eschatological thinking in first half of the
twentieth century became polarised around the question of whether the Parousia
brings to light what has already been achieved in Christ or whether that which has
been achieved in Christ anticipates the coming Parousia. In his theology, Paul Al-
thaus firmly maintained the former. But, Moltmann responds, this left little room for
the claim “that the future of Christ is a universal future.”\(^{19}\) Rather, if Althaus is to be
followed, “it merely becomes the perfected future of believers.”\(^{20}\) That is, such think-
ing leads to a future that is restricted by the particularity of the present experience
of salvation, as opposed to a future for the whole cosmos, where the particularity of
the present derives from the in-breaking of a universal future—not vice versa. Molt-
mann also claims that Althaus’s position makes it difficult to account for the gap
experienced between present salvation and its future, insofar as the former looks to
the coming reign of God from within the experience of suffering.

Althaus understood his own point of view to be in opposition to that of Barth. But, Moltmann contends, read in the context of his whole theology, for Barth, too,
“the future of Christ contains no new event in the creative sense, but... is now a
merely noetic event.”\(^{21}\) This interpretation of Barth’s eschatology is largely the same
as that of *TH*,\(^{22}\) though here Moltmann admits that a careful reading will allow for
some nuance.\(^{23}\) Moltmann proceeds to apply Käsemann’s exegesis of 1 Cor to Barth’s
theology, drawing a connection between the eschatology of the great dogmatician
and the presentist eschatology that Paul constantly sought to counter.\(^{24}\) Contra Barth,

\(^{18}\) See 3.3.2.
\(^{19}\) FC, 22.
\(^{20}\) FC, 22. As Moltmann writes a little later, “The expectation of the Parousia of Christ is like-
wise something other than the expectation that the church will reach its head and fill the
world.” *DTH*, 216 (1967).
\(^{21}\) FC, 23.
\(^{22}\) TH, 50-58. See 3.2.2.
\(^{23}\) Moltmann discusses passages from *CD* IV/3 and III/2.
\(^{24}\) Moltmann cites Ernst Käsemann, *New Testament Questions of Today*, trans. by W. J. Monta-
Paul “certainly let Christians participate in the cross in the present, but not directly in the glory of the resurrection; and he moved statements about the universal lordship of Christ not only into present hiddenness, but out of the perfect and present into the future (1 Cor 15:28).”

For Moltmann, Barth’s theology of time also runs into problems. Barth argues that the NT “confesses the One who was and is as the One who comes, who will come at the end of this time and all times, at the last day. But it does not deduce this statement from any general insight or truth. The resurrection of Jesus Christ gives us the insight that He is the Lord of time.” But while Barth’s christological rationale is to be commended, Greek rather than biblical categories still inform his theology at this point: “The temporal concept of eternity”—that is, the claim that God is equally present to all times—“as we know it from Platonism, is called upon in order to depict eschatology as being essentially a development of God’s sovereignty.” In contrast, Moltmann responds, a biblical notion of time does not assume past, present, and future to be equidistant from eternity. He cites Rev 1:4: “Grace to you and peace from him who is and who was and who is to come.” Moltmann reflects, “The third of these temporal modes is not so expressed in Rev 1:4. There this ontological concept of eternity is broken through by the expression ‘who is to come.’” There is an asymmetry between God’s past and present presence, on the one hand, and God’s future presence, on the other. In the following year Moltmann will provide further support for the contrastive paradigm that constitutes part of this argument, pointing to the ancient geographer, Pausanias. The latter records a song at Dodona, which proclaimed that “Zeus was, and is, and shall be.” But in the biblical confession, the expected “shall be” is absent and replaced with the anticipation of God’s coming.

25 FC, 25.
26 Barth, CD IV/1, 324, cited in part in FC, 26.
27 FC, 26.
28 FC, 26.
This grammatical quirk is pregnant with theological significance for Moltmann. Alongside his brief exegesis, he speaks generally of “the Old Testament expectation of the unique and final coming of God and his glory on earth,” by which “the ‘future’ gained the upper hand in the New Testament as well.” This can also be seen in the fact that the NT word *parousia* is only ever used in conjunction with Christ’s future coming. It is “never used for the coming of Christ in the flesh” and “never has the sense of return.” Instead, the NT anticipation of the Parousia looks forward to an entirely new reality, one that is not merely an answer to the gap between time and eternity in the present. Throughout the witness of the whole Bible, then, God’s being in the past and the present “is determined in the light of God’s coming in his divinity.” And “the future… is the mode of his being that is dominant in history.”

Nonetheless, despite his criticisms of Althaus and Barth, Moltmann argues that a mediating position is yet possible. The German word *Zukunft*, designating in German what *future* designates in English, has a different sense when read according to its etymology. Etymologically, *Zukunft* means a coming to, a literal translation of the Latin word *adventus*: “The ‘arrival’ or ‘coming’ of something other, something new and transforming, which had not yet been present in that form and is still not present as yet.” Moltmann finds that the Greek *parousia* also corresponds in meaning quite closely to *adventus*, thus tracing a line from the German all the way back to the world of the Bible, where the NT *parousia* finds its home among the prophetic traditions of the OT. Conversely, the contemporary sense of *Zukunft* corresponds

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30 FC, 26.
32 FC, 26.
33 FC, 27.
34 FC, 29.
more closely to the Latin futurum, which is related etymologically to the Greek physis.\textsuperscript{35} It denotes that which is going to be, arising out of that which already is. “Everything that is capable of becoming is inherently there in the basis of physis, as primal potentiality.”\textsuperscript{36} If the world had only a futurum then there could be no hope of a life beyond sin and death because the future would only be the realisation of the possibilities inherent in the present. This distinction between adventus and futurum is important because it demonstrates to what extent the concepts that theology has at hand are, according to Moltmann, already conditioned by non-biblical, Greek thinking, which does not allow any room for that which is new. To introduce the Latin distinction into German, Moltmann employs Zukunft for adventus and the grammatical term, Futur, for futurum. These are maintained in the English translation.

But neither is the future as futurum set aside in reclaiming the adventient character of the Zukunft. The adventus that has broken into history through Christ’s resurrection “becomes the germ of what is to come and gains a Futur which corresponds to this Zukunft.”\textsuperscript{37} That is, the anticipated adventus changes the course of the futurum, not only directing the present to its own possibilities that it may have overlooked, but also opening up new, previously unattainable possibilities. More specifically, the

\textsuperscript{35} From this point onwards, Moltmann also begins to adjust Bloch’s claim that God has “futurum as mode of being.” Because he had not yet made the distinction between futurum and adventus in TH, Moltmann earlier implicitly read Bloch’s statement as pertaining to an adventient future. Now, however, he realises that Bloch has only said so much and that his approach lacks the Christian hope of a coming reality that is not already inherent in the world. See FC 180 n. 53; Moltmann in FH, 12-13 (1968). I discussed Moltmann’s quotations of this phrase in TH in 3.1.4. The apparent contradiction that Ryan Neal sees here is likely an accident of language and has little bearing on the content of Moltmann’s appropriation of Bloch’s claim. See Ryan A. Neal, Theology as Hope: On the Ground and Implications of Jürgen Moltmann’s Doctrine of Hope (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2008), 25-32. In his close study of Moltmann’s doctrine of time, Nicholas Ansell points out that there is no sense of adventus in Bloch’s work. Such a concept, which Moltmann originally adapts from Emil Brunner, is found instead in Franz Rosenzweig and Walter Benjamin. “The Jewish neo-Marxist atheist [i.e., Bloch] whose work is often taken to have decisively shaped Moltmann’s theology is read here—as elsewhere—as holding to a view of the future that falls entirely within the confines of Moltmann’s futurum.” Nicholas Ansell, The Annihilation of Hell: Universal Salvation and the Redemption of Time in the Eschatology of Jürgen Moltmann (Milton Keynes, UK: Paternoster, 2013), 215.

\textsuperscript{36} FC, 30.

\textsuperscript{37} FC, 30.
adventus is the goal of God’s present work of justification and reconciliation. Not only does it come from the future, but the present moves towards it, in the same way that the present would otherwise move towards a materialistic futurum. Moltmann finds an analogous dual approach in Paul. First, in 1 Cor 15, the resurrection and Christ’s provisional reign derive from the eschatological reign of God the Father. They are what the complete, eschatological reign of God the Father looks like in the present—in a world where God has not yet become all in all. Conversely, Paul’s argument from Rom 5 onwards “deduce[s] the power of Christ’s resurrection from the power of his passion in justification and the reconciliation of man.”

The former anticipates that which is coming while the latter extrapolates from that which is experienced in the present.

Finally, it is important to note that Moltmann still wants to assign some priority to the “descent from the future to the present,” that is, to the adventus over the futurum. The two kinds of future are not of equal weight. Although the nature of this relationship is still somewhat ambiguous at this stage, however, it will become increasingly clear in Moltmann’s subsequent theology. Indeed, he addresses it in a piece from the following year, to which I now turn.

4.1.3. 1967: “Response to the Criticism of Theology of Hope”

In this essay, Moltmann responds to various criticisms made of TH (1964). Here he also clarifies his comments on the debate in eschatology as to whether the future or the present has ontological priority. In a telling comment, he notes that the debate has proceeded along similar lines as that which took place in post-Reformation theology: “At that time the Calvinists said, ‘Only the one who is chosen believes,’ and were correct ontologically. The Philippists said, ‘Only the one who believes is chosen,’ and were correct noetically.” In eschatology, simply put, the power of the Christ-event derives ontologically from God’s future reign, but the knowledge of this...

38 FC, 30.
39 FC, 31.
40 Moltmann in DTH, 214.
future, informing the church of life in accordance with it, begins with the Christ-event and the present experience of salvation. “God looks at the goal first and then the way; human beings experience the way first and then the goal.”41 This is why Moltmann had said in TH that “faith has the priority [Prius], but hope the primacy [Primat].”42 As such, Moltmann’s earlier distinction between futurum and adventus is not simply a distinction between two different concepts of the future—concepts open to further revision in light of Scripture and theological reflection. Rather, it is a distinction between how human beings see this future and how God sees it.

Also relevant here is Moltmann’s defence of his methodology in TH. Against accusations of one-sidedness—in regard to his allegedly one-sided emphasis on eschatology at the expense of the present—Moltmann maintains that a theological emphasis on the future is not one-sided but biblical. “History, then, is not the experience of transience,” as would be the case if created time were just a shadow of timeless eternity, but it is “the experience of change through the new of the future,” the new that God alone can bring.43 Here, to speak of the present is to speak of the intersection between the world as it is and the reality that is coming. In this present that is passing away, human beings seek the eschatological present of the future that is “eternally, purely, and wholly present.”44 The past, too, gains a new theological significance here. It has not evanesced into God’s eternal being, but the promises that were spoken in Israel’s history become real for the whole world in the Christ-event. Conversely, the overplus of the fulfilment of the promises in Christ is retrojected onto past promises so that that which has passed away will now find new life in the future resurrection of the dead.

This short exposition of some of Moltmann’s response to his critics indicates more clearly the nature of the future in his thought. Here the future begins to take

41 Moltmann in DTH, 214.
42 TH, 20; Ger. 16. In the present text Moltmann explains this, writing, “Faith is the priority [Prius] (as it is the first thing that, with us, on the ground of the cross, corresponds to the future), but hope has the primacy [Primat] (as everything in this faith is about that future in which God is God and all being is renewed).” Moltmann in DTH, 229.
43 Moltmann in DTH, 217.
44 Moltmann in DTH, 218.
on a position of priority in relationship to the present and the past. Perhaps there is an association between this and Moltmann’s earlier interest in the futurist being of God, scatteredly expressed in *TH*. But I will attend to that in the following subsection. Relatedly, in his response Moltmann defended his allegedly one-sided emphasis on the future, claiming that such an emphasis reflects the concerns of Scripture itself.

4.1.4. 1968: “Theology as Eschatology”

In this conference paper, Moltmann presents the most sophisticated and comprehensive account of his futurist doctrine of God to date.45 After 1968, as Moltmann’s theology begins to take a more cruciform and trinitarian shape, this futurist accent begins to fade, even if it never completely disappears.

For Moltmann, God’s transcendence and immanence are best represented in temporal rather than spatial terms: “God is not ‘beyond us’ or ‘in us’, but ahead of us in the horizons of the future opened to us in his promises. Thus the ‘future’ must be considered as mode of God’s being.”46 Moltmann believes that this view also allows for a way beyond the deadlock between theism and atheism over God’s existence in the present. “Eschatological theology, relativizing these antitheses”—the antitheses of being and non-being—“and taking them up, can say: God’s being is coming.”47 Moreover, Moltmann can speak of “the ontological priority of the Zukunft over other modes of time,”48 a priority which does not come about naturally but

45 For an incisive criticism and illuminating response, see Langdon Gilkey’s piece in the same volume, *FH*, 81-109. Gilkey argues that Moltmann’s preference for God’s future presence over present presence faces internal contradictions and relies on secular philosophy—chiefly Bloch—rather than biblical exegesis. Moltmann’s response can be found in *FH*, 157-60.
47 Moltmann in *FH*, 10.
which is possible “only if it [i.e., the Zukunft] is understood as mode of God’s being.”\(^{49}\) Although this seems already to be an implication of Moltmann’s distinction between *adventus* and *futurum*, a distinction which largely mirrors that between divine and human action, it is significant here that he goes one step further and explicitly situates God in an alternative future that has ontological priority precisely because it is the mode of the divine being.

Here Moltmann also develops in considerable detail his understanding of the relationship between Christ’s provisional reign through the resurrection and the reign of God that is yet to come. Following Käsemann, he observes that Paul designates Jesus as Lord, *Kyrios*, on account of his resurrection, and the Father as God, *Theos*. Jesus as *Kyrios* has a provisional role until his eschatological victory over his enemies, at which time he will hand over his kingdom to the Father (1 Cor 15:24-28). His resurrection accords him a provisional reign until the general resurrection of the dead. Such is the case that even “the New Testament titles of Christ characterize functions and are not yet qualifications of being.”\(^{50}\) Jesus functions as Lord, even if his lordship has not yet reached its eschatological completeness. That is, it has not yet been fully ontologised. But this “eschatological subordinationism”—Jesus being subordinate in terms of his ultimately conferring the kingdom to the Father—is only one side of the picture, deriving Christ’s future from his present.\(^{51}\) If the reign of Christ is instead interpreted from the vantage point of his sonship, then the coming reign of God is not one in which the mediating *Kyrios* is swallowed up but one in which Christ shares, not because he is the risen one but because he is the Son. His role as mediator, too, then, does not primarily derive from his being the forerunner of the reign of God. Rather, it is on account of his willing obedience as the Son that he takes up the provisional reign and then hands it over to his Father. Conversely,

\(^{49}\) Moltmann in *FH*, 16.
\(^{51}\) Moltmann in *FH*, 26.
because this is the reign of the Father’s Son, this requires that Christ’s present, medi-
atory reign also be seen as the reign of God the Father through the Son. Seen from
this perspective, “he is not only the forerunner of the future but also its realization.”

This same paper provides a glimpse into the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s
theology at this time. Considering the relationship between the two Testaments, for
example, he contends, “In the history of Christian theology… conscious grasp of his-
try and of eschatology was arrived at only whenever one became conscious of the
presence of the Old Testament and of Israel as a partner of the church, while explicit
or implicit rejection of the Old Testament and Israel always brought Christianity to
an uneschatological and unhistorical self-understanding.” This is because the OT
attests the history in which the church is still located. To deny or overlook this is to
lose the storied nature of Christian faith and thus, also, the eschatological hope for
an alternative future. Moltmann quotes the Mishnah in support of this claim: “In
each single generation a man is obliged to think of himself as though he had left
Egypt.”

At this point, too, the distinction between the text and the events it attests be-
comes even more pronounced and a theory of Scripture’s origins appears. Following
Gerhard von Rad, it is first of all the event of the exodus that impels ancient Israel to
develop a tradition. “Around the Exodus event and within the medium of the iden-
tification process, tradition grouped further acts of God.” But these further acts did
not emerge out of thin air. First, on the basis of the promises made to Abraham, Isaac,
and Jacob, Israel found continuity between El of Abraham and Yahweh of the exo-
dus. “In the beginning were placed the stories of the patriarchs which identified the

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52 Moltmann in FH, 27.
53 Moltmann in FH, 16.
54 m. Pesaḥ, 116b, cited and translated in FH, 17.
55 Moltmann in FH, 17. For a later, more literary approach, beginning with Abraham, see
  ExpTh, 96-98 (2000). Earlier in the same volume he writes, “All God’s words and every-
thing God says when he speaks to a man or woman have the character of promise. When
the words are positive, they evoke trust, and through the trust lead those addressed to set
out into a new, unknown future. For this the exodus of Abraham and Sarah is the proto-
type.” ExpTh, 55.
God of the fathers… with the Exodus-and-covenant God.” Next, this tradition developed forwards as the promise of freedom from slavery sought further fulfilment in the land of Canaan. “There followed the stories of the conquest of the promised land, of the judges and kings, stories which report the testing and the fulfillment of this hope.” The liberative action of God for Israel in Egypt thus extends both backwards, illuminating the traditions of the fathers which would later be relayed in Scripture, and forwards, igniting hopes and inciting action for a new history, that of life in the new land, a history which itself would later be incorporated into the biblical story of promise.

But Israel’s traditions did not stop there either. “Within the medium of the Exodus tradition, Israel projected the protological universal horizon in which the Exodus God was understood as the creator of the world from darkness, flood, and chaos.” The Yahweh whom Israel met in the exodus, on account of his power, could be none other than the Creator of the world. As Moltmann writes in 1976, “The Israelite belief in creation developed out of Israel’s historical experience of God—the exodus, the covenant, the occupation of the promised land—and is moulded by this experience.” The development of this protological boundary on the basis of the exodus also extends forward to the eschatological. Moltmann had already explored the origins of eschatology in TH (1964), locating it in Israel’s prophets and tracing its maturation through to the later apocalyptic texts, though the connection to the exodus was overlooked. In TH, “the new historic action of Yahweh in the history of the nations… is seen by them [the prophets] as being on the same level as, and even competing with, the historic acts of Yahweh in their own past as remembered in the cultus and the festivals.” Past fulfilment of promise is superseded by the prospect of yet greater action on the part of Yahweh. As such, hope for all nations now falls within the compass of Yahweh’s future action, as does hope for overcoming death.

56 Moltmann in FH, 17.
57 Moltmann in FH, 17.
58 Moltmann in FH, 17-18.
59 Moltmann in FC, 118; repeated in TKG, 100 (1980).
60 TH, 127.
and, with apocalyptic, for the renewal of the entire cosmos. In the context of the exodus, the sixth century BCE destruction of Jerusalem “negated the whole event of the conquest of Canaan and, as it were, threw Israel back behind the Exodus.” Nonetheless, the exodus is not wholly negated. The God found there is the same God “who will bring forth a new Exodus.”

Moltmann thus moves decisively from any kind of continuity based in the connections between different historical events to a continuity grounded in the God of promise. The historical memory of these events remains, but not in order for human action to build upon these and achieve its own utopia. Indeed, new exiles and — still freshly branded in Moltmann’s mind — the Holocaust forcefully demonstrate the hopelessness of such a road. Rather, the memory of these events remains in order to remind human beings of the promises given within history and orientate them to an alternative future. “The memories of salvation history no longer control the present, but they become prefigurations of the future which has put itself in contradiction to the present.”

Another point of interest in regard to Moltmann’s theology of Scripture concerns the place of God in connection to the Bible. While Moltmann does not here attend to the relationship between God and the words of Scripture, that is, in the doctrine of inspiration, it is clear that it is God who is the subject of the history that Scripture attests. “History existed for Israel at first only to the extent that God had led the way and had gone along with his people in his promises and deeds.” What is striking here, however, is that it is Yahweh acting in the event of the exodus that consolidates the unity of the OT around the theme of promise. Light from this event of liberation shoots backwards, re-illuminating and taking up El’s promises to the fathers, and disclosing the work of creation. So, too, it pushes ahead of Israel, lighting the path to the future of promise. In turn, when this history is recorded in Scripture, it is the exodus that forms the centre.

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61 Moltmann in FH, 18.
62 Moltmann in FH, 19.
63 Moltmann in FH, 19.
64 Moltmann in FH, 17.
Moltmann concludes his paper with a section on the relationship between human action and the coming reign of God. From very early on, political interests have driven his theological project. Indeed, life under the Third Reich and the legacy of the Confessing Church demonstrated the need for an ongoing, politically conscious theology. Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel, whom Moltmann met in 1949 and married in 1952, was central to this development. Her parents had been part of the Confessing Church and she herself joined when she was sixteen, developing an increasing interest in political matters. She writes in her autobiography, “His [Moltmann’s] background was in Kierkegaard and his inward-looking philosophical tradition. I brought in my social views, and we had the feeling that both our works would be expanded by such fruitful differences.” Politically motivated theologians like Barth and Bonhoeffer, as well as non-Christian political thinkers like Bloch, surely also informed Moltmann here. But Moltmann’s convictions began to take concrete shape at the beginning of the sixties when he joined the German-Polish society, the aim of which was to reconcile and unite Germans and Poles. In the mid-sixties, Moltmann continued further along this path as he participated in the Christian-Marxist dialogues of the time. As the sixties progressed, Johann Baptist Metz and Dorothee Sölle, alongside Moltmann, emerged as figureheads in the new movement

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of political theology.\textsuperscript{71} Notably, though not completely within Moltmann’s purview at this time, the black theology for which James Cone would later be known was under development in the US, while the formation of liberation theology was taking place in Latin America. Against this background, it is 1968 especially that sees an explosion of essays from Moltmann that take up political themes.\textsuperscript{72} These are interwoven with Moltmann’s developing theology of Scripture.

In the paper I am discussing presently, Moltmann proposes, “Cosmological theology must now be replaced by political theology.”\textsuperscript{73} The former likely refers to that characterised as a cosmological proof of God in \textit{TH}.\textsuperscript{74} As Moltmann writes at the beginning of his paper, “The cosmological proofs for God’s existence which related God’s divinity to world experience accessible to everyone have lost their convicting power, ever since man has no longer understood himself as a part of a world striving towards God, but has placed the world over against himself as material of his knowledge and technology.”\textsuperscript{75} It was this exchange that allowed for the development of existentialist theology, centring on the human subject as the maker of its own destiny. But Moltmann uncovers an important theodical impetus in the old cosmological worldview. In appropriating chaos to the created and order to the divine, this

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\textsuperscript{73} Moltmann in \textit{FH}, 47, emphasis original. On this section cf. \textit{RRF}, 203-7 (1968).

\textsuperscript{74} See 3.3.2.

\textsuperscript{75} Moltmann in \textit{FH}, 2-3.
worldview attempted to distinguish God from evil, and, moreover, in being grounded in such a God, secured human immortality. While this framework has now become obsolete, however, the question of evil has not, and existentialist theology does not offer anything helpful in this regard: “The question of God’s righteousness in the world cannot be reduced to an existential category and thus also proves unanswerable by an attitude of man.”

Neither does political theology, of course, offer an adequate solution to the theodicy problem. But, in the context of a theology of hope, it provides a significant advance in this direction. “In political theology the future of God is mediated in the world-changing powers of man, so that today this future makes these powers and possibilities of man legitimate in their use.” At this point, the theodical objection to cosmological theology—that God cannot exist because there is evil in the world—although it is not answered, is addressed through political theology’s “battle against human misery.”

The future as futurum becomes possible in this way because the power of the adventus has come into the present and propels the present forward through the current actions of human beings. As such, however, “the real future is not identical with the successes of our activity,” the latter which is still prone to sin and therefore awaits the divine reign to be brought about on God’s own terms. As Moltmann writes elsewhere in the same year, “All historical realizations of the future of being are ambiguous because they both realize and hinder this future of being. Possibilities are realized and at the same time also forfeited. Every historical reality has in itself the intention to be an enduring, eternal reality…. But no historical reality is already that prevailing eschatological reality.” Nonetheless, the point Moltmann is making is that real changes can take place in the present because the present is being thrust into the future of God’s promise through the present fulfilment of the promise in the Christ-event.

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76 Moltmann in FH, 4 n. 6.
77 Moltmann in FH, 47, slightly adjusted.
78 Moltmann in FH, 47.
79 RRF, 216.
This paper provides the most extensive overview of Moltmann’s main theological concerns in the late sixties. I began with his comments on God’s relationship to future. As the culmination of his gestures in this direction since TH, Moltmann at last expressly situates God’s being in the future, following Pannenberg in assigning ontological priority to the latter. The logic for Jesus’ post-resurrection reign, for example, derives from his coming, eschatological reign with God the Father. Next, I proceeded to explore the assumptions Moltmann holds about the nature of Scripture in this paper. He points to the necessity of the OT for the church, contending that without the OT faith quickly becomes uneschatological. Also of note here was Moltmann’s adoption of von Rad’s thesis that the event of the exodus constitutes the centre of the OT, not only bringing hope for the future fulfilment of promise but extending backwards to encompass the creation of the world. Finally, although appearing at this stage only in outline, Moltmann’s comments on political theology in this paper are worth reflecting on here as they help situate this new concept within his broader theology, demonstrating especially the connections to his early eschatology. At this stage, Moltmann simply advocates for a political theology on the basis of the need for an adequate theodicy. But there is much more to his political theology than this. In another essay from the same year, for example, Moltmann reflects on what a political hermeneutic might consist in. This relates more directly to the role of Scripture in his theology, and I turn to it now.

4.1.5. 1968: “Towards a Political Hermeneutic of the Gospel”

This essay, a particularly significant piece from this period, explicitly treats the issue of biblical interpretation. The theme addressed in Moltmann’s 1963 essay, “Proclamation as the Problem of Exegesis,” is revisited here. Again, he asks, “Why dialogue precisely with these texts and with this past?” But this time a different line of

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81 See 2.3.2.
82 RRF, 86, emphasis original.
response is pursued. Moltmann begins with a discussion of Wilhelm Dilthey’s theory of history. For the latter, historical texts are accessible on the basis of the reality they have in common with us, that of life. But life itself has a historical character. It cannot be grasped apart from the extreme multiplicity of experiences that it consists in, experiences spanning from the beginning to the end of time. This does not mean, however, that the historian must stand at the consummation of history in order to first comprehend the reality of life and then, finally, to be able to properly understand a single text. Rather, Dilthey’s theory is useful, Moltmann contends, precisely because it assumes the interconnectedness of all historical phenomena. In their relationship to the theoretical whole, these phenomena each have their individual significances for the future. A hermeneutic can work to identify some of these for theological ends.

Moltmann proceeds to discuss existentialist hermeneutics, turning to Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Bultmann. In contrast to Dilthey, for these figures “the totalization of all particular moments and parts of history is therefore not to be sought in a future end of world history, but is to be decided in one’s historical ability to be integral in the face of death [in dem geschichtlichen Ganzeinkönnen des Daseins angesichts des Todes entschieden].” But Moltmann rehearse the now-familiar response that this is to exchange the concrete history in which the individual is situated for the life of the individual itself. Nonetheless, he also discovers a more sympathetic reading at this point. The existentialist interest in the individual’s search for meaning does not need to be done away with if it is resituated within the wider context of world history. “Participation in history is participation in the history of mankind, in political, social, and scientific-technical history.”

In order to develop an informed political hermeneutic, Moltmann proceeds to explore Karl Marx’s comments on religion. Whereas Feuerbach had attempted to

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83 RRF, 89; PTh, 132.
84 RRF, 92.
develop an Enlightenment Christianity, updating it to meet the needs of a new age, Marx sought to direct Christianity to revolution. For him, religion offered human beings a fantasy to endure their oppression rather than the tools to overcome it. But, Moltmann argues, this need not require that religion itself be done away with. Rather, these fantasies contain revolutionary potential insofar as they suggest an alternative reality to the one at hand. The material circumstances of the oppressed and the visionary force of religion mutually criticise one another, so that the suffering are called to hope and the hopeful called to co-suffering in working for a better tomorrow.

Moltmann’s reading of Marx also has important hermeneutical implications. This becomes particularly clear when considering Bultmann’s hermeneutics in light of Marx’s criticism of religion: “As long as mythical conceptions are considered to be simply ‘expressions’ of human self-understanding and not agonizing protests against real misery, demythologizing interpretation remains in the dimension of the certainly some overlap with Marx in Moltmann’s thought, Otto overstates the case in support of his polemical conclusion: “Despite his stated concern for the identity and relevance of the Christian faith, Moltmann’s reformulation of Christianity succumbs completely to the reformulation intended by Marxism, making Christianity and Marxism one.” Ibid., 230. Rasmusson provides a much more measured assessment, writing, “Although strongly influenced by Marxism, … Moltmann has never been a Marxist and never accepted the specific Marxist understanding of history. Rather than using a specific social and historical theory, he instead merely reasoned inside the general climate that the New Left of the 1960s, so strongly influenced by Marxism, created. He developed a theology that showed parallels and was relevant to this general mood of thinking, for the purpose of helping Christians and Marxists to cooperate in the struggle for a new society.” Rasmusson, Church as Polis, 58-59, cf. 123-35. Around the same time, Jodey Derouin wrote a chapter on Moltmann and Marx, introducing it with these words: “Moltmann spends a great deal of time in conflict with Marx. In the case of Moltmann, he is neither entirely Marx’s friend or foe. This, however, is what makes Moltmann’s dialogue with Marx so interesting. He takes the challenge of Marx with a high degree of seriousness.” See Jodey Michael Derouin, “Theological Encounters with Marx: An Examination of Jürgen Moltmann’s and Juan Luis Segundo’s Dialogues with Marx” (master’s thesis, McMaster University, 1994), 33. Other helpful treatments include Gordon Clarke Chapman, “Jürgen Moltmann and the Christian Dialogue with Marxism,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 18:3 (1981): 435-50; and Daniel E. Rossi-Keen, “Jürgen Moltmann, Karl Marx and God: An Unlikely Trinity,” Toronto Journal of Theology 23:1 (2007): 47-59.
‘fantastic’ and does not approach the messianic kernel of the Christian proclamation.” 86 That is, despite his demythologisation project, Bultmann remains subject to Marx’s criticism. He simply does away with myth, overlooking its revolutionary potential. Moreover, reading the biblical texts in this manner requires that Bultmann’s locus in the individual human subject be exchanged for a broader, social framework. Indeed, the biblical texts themselves assume this framework, even if, according to Moltmann, the accent is placed on freedom from subjection to religious idols rather than political ones. The eschatological freedom anticipated in Scripture will never be fully realised unless it is realised in all spheres, including the political.

Proceeding to explore this thesis in greater depth, Moltmann offers some revealing comments on the nature of hermeneutics. He writes, “Christian hermeneutic cannot concern itself exclusively with proclamation and language because they themselves stand in the larger political and social forum of public life.” 87 Where the political contexts of proclamation and language are overlooked, the church understates the breadth of the gospel. Here, Dilthey’s theory of history is supplemented with Moltmann’s Marx-inspired model. All historical experiences are connected, yes, within the wider context of the reality of life, but this reality itself is has a socio-political constitution. Dilthey’s theory, then, via Marx, also requires “understanding all historical expressions of life within their political context.” 88

As such, the preacher must draw on an alternative hermeneutical process—one that goes beyond the circles of text and preaching: “Preaching needs the text as its basis and the dialogue of the congregation as a check. Obedience and love need the discipleship committed to Jesus as their ground and the working-out of present experience as a control. This is a hermeneutical process which encompasses the whole history of Christianity.” 89 Moltmann’s proposal is further developed in three theses, detailing the role of the text, the relationship between the text and the present,

86 RRF, 95.
87 RRF, 101.
88 RRF, 102.
89 RRF, 102.
and the role of the present—the latter which is designated “the dialogue of the congregation” in the prior quote. First, throughout history’s changes, that which remains “constant” is Christian faith’s basis in the crucified Christ. The “content and manner of proclaimed and lived freedom must be legitimized by reflections on their ground in the crucified Christ.”

Notably, it is not the biblical text itself that provides this constant but the historical person of Jesus, to whom it witnesses. The tension between theologising on the basis of the texts or the events they attest is beginning to be resolved here in favour of the events, and the single event of the crucifixion in particular. The central hermeneutical value of the crucifixion will become even clearer in Moltmann’s 1972 CG. Second, that which is “invariable” is the present orientation to Christ’s future coming, the “fantasy,” in Marxist terms, which either reinforces the status quo or anticipates a radical alternative. Third, hermeneutics finds its variables in its exegesis and the practical consequences it draws from this. Though Moltmann does not state why this is the case, it is presumably because the reader of the biblical texts seeks to speak into the problems of their time, and because the action required by exegesis changes depending on differing historical circumstances.

Questions of course remain. Moltmann’s developing political hermeneutic is at this stage highly theoretical, lacking concrete examples of just what kind of action such a hermeneutic would require and how other approaches would overlook or even stifle such initiatives—a Bultmannian one seems to be the most obvious choice considering the vast amount of attention already given to this in the essay. This ground is already well-worn in the secondary literature on Moltmann, however.

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90 RRF, 102.
91 RRF, 102. It is unclear what distinction Moltmann imagines there to be between “constant” (the first thesis, die Konstante) and “invariable” (die Invariante). Perhaps it is simply that he wanted separate points under which to treat history and eschatology. PTh, 142.
92 See the overview in Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 107-15. Moltmann originally intended an ethics to follow TH. Indeed, he writes that in the late sixties when this essay was being written, “it failed because I didn’t know whether reforms or revolution would improve circumstances.” Moltmann, “Jürgen Moltmann,” in How I Have Changed: Reflections on Thirty Years of Theology, ed. Jürgen Moltmann, trans. by John Bowden, 13-21 (London: SCM, 1997), 17. Moltmann finally wrote his ethics quite some
This essay is important for Moltmann’s hermeneutical considerations of his new political theology. He draws on the different hermeneutical traditions of Dilthey, Bultmann, and Marx in order to develop a political hermeneutic suitable for reading Christian Scripture. Marx prevails, even if Moltmann’s creative interpretation results in a Marxist hermeneutic that recognises the revolutionary potential of the biblical text. But Moltmann’s appropriation is not derived from Marx himself. It is a development of his earlier promissory theology, in dialogue with Marx. Most significantly, the biblical promises must be understood in the broadest possible way, and this means, not least, that they extend to liberation from political oppression in the present through the anticipation of an alternative, free future.

4.1.6. 1968: Review of Ernst Bloch’s *Atheism in Christianity*

Another 1968 piece from Moltmann is of note here. Published in the popular news magazine, *Der Spiegel*, under the title, “Jürgen Moltmann über Ernst Bloch: ‘Atheismus im Christentum’ und die Bibel ist doch links” (Jürgen Moltmann on Ernst Bloch: *Atheism in Christianity* and the Bible Being Leftist), the review contains important comments reflecting Moltmann’s understanding of Scripture.93

Moltmann begins by pointing out that just as it is not only Marxists reading Marx but Christians as well, so also Christians should realise that they are not the decades after TH. See Moltmann, *Ethics of Hope*, trans. by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2012). Nonetheless, concrete ethical reflection emerges at different points throughout his corpus, and *Ethics of Hope* draws on much of this. See Moltmann, “Foreword,” in Joy Ann McDougall, *Pilgrimage of Love: Moltmann on the Trinity and Christian Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), xi-xiv, at xiii-xiv. Just a few years before the publication of *Ethics of Hope* (German 2010), Timothy Harvie began work on such a similar project in *Jürgen Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope: Eschatological Possibilities for Moral Action* (Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2009).

only ones reading the Bible. Bloch’s new work is just the latest example of this. Moltmann observes, “The stories of God and sinful human beings disappear, and stories of grumbling, bickering, defiant human beings and their fickle God emerge. In this way, the Bible is a subversive and revolutionary book that can no longer live harmoniously with church authority or Christian state power.”94 But not all of these gems that Bloch discovers are to be found simply floating on the surface of the text. The philosopher “chases down the ambiguous slave language in the texts redacted by priests, finding among the words of comfort from above the primordial groans and murmurs from below, within the religious ideologies of rulers the mysterious desires of the ruled.”95

Moltmann’s first explicitly critical comment is made in regard to Bloch’s “one-sidedness,” a symptom of the latter’s distinctly Marxist reading of the text. But Moltmann is quick to add that “the question should be asked as to whether such a one-sidedness might be necessary, at least on this earth,” having undergone a similar criticism in regard to his own work.96 Instead of providing a set of criteria for what constitutes good one-sidedness and what constitutes bad, however, Moltmann proceeds to Bloch’s exegesis. For Bloch, the Bible needs to be read with the “promise” of the snake from the Garden of Eden in mind: “You will be like God” (Gen 3:5). This has its consummation in the Son of Man, who, for the atheist, attains homoousious with God. For Bloch though, “the formula no longer denotes God really becoming human, but human beings becoming fully God”!97 Moltmann’s comments are sympathetic yet critical. He shares with Bloch the desire to uncover Scripture’s forgotten promises, though just what these promises are remains a matter of dispute. The two also depart when it comes to the reality of God. “Must God, too, fall with the emperor, the God who, according to Psalm 2:4, already scoffs at those who lust for power? Admittedly, the ‘Father in heaven’ has been distorted by the pater patriae but

he was also worshipped as mystery by the One whom Rome crucified.”

Indeed, for Moltmann, this God is the source of the promise and the guarantee of its fulfilment, a fulfilment that goes far beyond the parameters imagined by Bloch. But Moltmann prefers to focus on the constructive features of Bloch’s text, perhaps because he can see the value that the Bible holds even for atheists, something which the title given by Der Spiegel surely also attempts to convey. “For Bloch, Job’s hard questions outlast shallow atheism too.”

In the context of Moltmann’s own hermeneutics, this review is of particular interest. Bloch and Moltmann, though departing on the question of God, both find that the Bible can be an important source for politically-motivated readers.

Moltmann’s interest in Bloch’s ongoing work thus remains, demonstrating for Christian readers how non-Christian interpretation of Scripture might fruitfully contribute to the hermeneutical conversation. The theme of political hermeneutics again takes centre stage, with Moltmann agreeing with Bloch on the subversive subtext of Scripture. Not surprisingly, Moltmann maintains the importance of recognising this theologically, rather than simply atheistically, as the God of Scripture cannot be so readily abstracted from the Bible’s politics.


Some years after TH (1964), Moltmann penned a retrospective introduction to the book, one that includes important insights into his understanding of the Bible. He opens with a distinction between the “context” and the “text” of the work. Regarding the first, TH was written in the context of the speeding technological development that the sixties saw and the new ecclesiastical and political hopes being realised at

the time in such events as Vatican II and John F. Kennedy’s presidency. But, Moltmann cautions, “The context is not yet the text itself.” The context changes throughout history. A completely different set of happenings, for example, surrounds Moltmann’s next book, CG. But the text is that which remains constant. It is that which remains relevant to those reading TH just six years later—though already with new concerns. “For that reason,” Moltmann proceeds, “I am not speaking about the context, but about the text of the theology of hope, namely, the Bible.”

It is this foundation in the Bible that sets true theology apart from secular thought-forms. Moltmann’s project “is not a theology about hope, but a theology growing out of hope in God.” It does not seek to delineate the nature of hope but to speak with hope and infect its hearers with a passion for God’s future. This is followed by a threefold claim: “[1.] The basis for this hope does not lie in the ups and downs of the moods of the time, but in the promise of the coming God. [2.] These promises of God have been incarnated in the promissory history of Israel and in the promissory history of Jesus of Nazareth. [3.] The writings in the Old and New Testaments comprise the history book of God’s promises.” Due to the succinctness of this claim, swiftly advancing from God to the Bible, it is easy to overlook the underlying assumptions here. A short comment will therefore aid in elucidating these. First of all, the promise that TH attests is grounded in the reality of the God who promises. Second, these promises have a concrete referent, having been realised in an anticipatory manner in the history of Israel and Christ. Third, it is in the Bible that this promissory history is found, though again some kind of relationship between the text and its referent, God’s action in history, is assumed without being further explained.

100 EH, 44, emphasis original.
101 EH, 44-45. This theme is repeated and briefly elaborated fifteen years later: TH “was about the connection between the ‘theology of the Old Testament’ as presented by Gerhard von Rad, Walther Zimmerli, Hans-Walter Wolff, Hans-Joachim Kraus and others, and the ‘theology of the New Testament’ which had been pioneered by Rudolf Bultmann and corrected and developed further above all by Ernst Käsemann.” HTG, 168 (1985).
102 EH, 45, emphasis original.
103 EH, 45, numbering mine.
Finally, Moltmann attends to the relationship between promise and fulfilment in the context of the Bible. “Some day the biblical theology of ‘it is written’ will become an ontology of ‘it has taken place.’” Scripture here is not a text fixed in time but a component of the yet unfulfilled history of promise. It is thus neither “a document of an ancient religion but still has its time ahead of it.” Significantly, Moltmann’s language here is stronger than that used in TH, revealing the new, explicitly political direction his theology took since its publication. Precisely because the Bible directs human beings to an alternative future, “it is a highly revolutionary and subversive book.” That is, it opposes the lives of comfort enjoyed at the expense of others, lives thus lived in contradiction to God’s future. The Bible, rather, “is valid for the hopeless and not for optimists. It is valid for the poor and not for the rich.”

This essay is particularly important for Moltmann’s affirmation of the Bible as the text of TH. Although the latter certainly reflects the concerns and spirit of the time in which it was written, Moltmann contends that its importance remains insofar as it is read in light of its originary text, the Bible. He also comments on the relationship between Scripture and the present, the two being bound together in sharing the promissory history that will be consummated with the coming of the kingdom.


In the midst of his developing political theology and maturing theology of promise, Moltmann remains interested in simple questions such as the role of the Bible in church practice. In this essay, he opens with the thesis that “Christian theology must be biblical theology.” But whereas the Bible appears to be at the front and centre of newer churches, perhaps reflecting “the surprises of a ‘love at first sight,’” older
churches, according to Moltmann, tend to be more interested in “philosophical theology, sociology of religion, and anthropology.” He continues, though, suggesting that this is not because the older churches are familiar with Scripture. The neglect “is based rather on a Christian tradition that leads men to expect nothing new from the Bible.” And yet there is indeed newness, a newness which derives from Scripture’s witness to the promises of God: “Every text in the Bible narrates the past in order to announce the future.”

Notably, Moltmann’s interests here are again acutely political. “It is difficult to wage a revolution without the Bible (Ernst Bloch). It is even more difficult not to bring about a revolution with the Bible.” He proceeds to cite Acts 17:6: “These people who have been turning the world upside down have come here also.” This is because the Bible does not belong to the ruling class but to “the poor, the oppressed, and the hopeless.” As such, its purpose is to be found in the liberation of human beings, and not least a political liberation. Moltmann concludes with a provocative claim: “It was not without design that the reading of the Bible was forbidden to the simple folk by pagan lords and a lordly Christian church. Have such prohibitions perhaps become unnecessary today because the church and theology have done their best to render the Bible harmless?”

Also of note here are Moltmann’s brief comments on the relationship between the two Testaments. First, “the Bible itself is not a perfectly uniform book or revelation, but rather contains the antithesis between the Old and the New Testaments.” Moltmann had explored this in some detail in TH. Such an “antithesis” is ongoing as Christian faith not only looks to the OT for its promises but also looks with the OT beyond the OT to the NT and beyond the NT, too, to the future coming of Christ.

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109 EH, 6-7.
110 EH, 7.
111 EH, 7.
112 EH, 6.
113 EH, 7.
114 EH, 8.
115 EH, 9.
116 See 3.4.4.
Where this antithesis is ignored, however, faith quickly descends into legalism. “The law remains in effect; the Old Testament dominates the New and is interpreted according to legal principles…. Then a person is a Christian insofar as certain moral restrictions are placed upon his behaviour. But what a Christian should do positively, no one any longer knows.” Morality, that is, accordance with pre-established ethical principles, becomes the centre so that faith forgets how to look forwards and live instead in accordance with its future. Although Moltmann does not equate the OT with law at this point, however, this close association, repeated in another way in CG (1972), will later result in some exegetical problems.

Moltmann’s ongoing admiration of Scripture is evident in this essay, advocating that the churches, especially older ones, do not forget to read it. Again, the Bible aligns with his political theology, inasmuch as it is written, in particular, for the oppressed. Finally, he returns to the OT, contrasting legalistic and promissory faiths. I will return at the end of this chapter to briefly summarise and further reflect on some of the many aspects of the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology between TH and CG, covered in this section. But before moving on to CG it will be helpful to examine this intermediate period through quite a different lens.

4.2. After Hope: Remembering the Crucifixion

The eight-year period between the publication of TH and CG is significant for another reason too. It marks a transition in Moltmann’s thought from a theology of hope to a theology of the cross. Some of this interest in the latter has been noted in the foregoing. But in order to gain a better understanding of just what Moltmann is doing in CG and how it relates to his previous theology, in this section I will illustrate this transition in detail. This discussion has an additional purpose, however. Recently, Ryan Neal has argued that this transition is not so much an organic development in Moltmann’s theology but a corrective to blind spots in his earlier thought.

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117 EH, 10.
118 See 5.3.3.
Yet, there are a number of problems with Neal’s thesis, which will naturally be made clear in the discussion of Moltmann’s work in this period. First, therefore, I will outline Neal’s thesis, and then, in the rest of this section, I will provide a thorough discussion of the nature of this transition.

4.2.1. Ryan Neal on the Turn to a Theology of the Cross

Ever since the publication of CG (1972), major interpreters of Moltmann’s thought have generally understood the book’s theology to be basically continuous with that of TH (1964). As Richard Bauckham observes, “The dialectic of cross and resurrection in an eschatological perspective remains the determining centre of Moltmann’s theology in both books.” And as Moltmann himself writes in a 1990 preface to CG, “After publishing Theology of Hope, the logic of my theological approach led me to work more deeply on the remembrance of the crucified Christ. Hope without remembrance leads to illusion, just as, conversely, remembrance without hope can result in resignation.” This widely accepted thesis has, however, been recently disputed by Ryan Neal. Of CG he writes, “The turn to the cross is most accurately described as a corrective manoeuvre, and indeed a qualification, of the earlier period and therefore cannot be characterized as merely a subtle shift in emphasis, still fully complementary to his earlier hope theology.” Neal bases his claim on two grounds.

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120 Richard Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the Making (Basingstoke, UK: Marshall Pickering, 1987), 53. He continues, “Once this is understood, the shift from a focus on the resurrection of the crucified Christ to a focus on the cross of the risen Christ (CG 5) is not only intelligible, but evidently an inner necessity of Moltmann’s theological development.” Ibid., 53-54.

121 CG, ix. Nonetheless, while Moltmann makes claims such as these that suggest continuity between the two works, Neal provides a number of examples demonstrating Moltmann’s understanding of a more complex relationship between the two works, an understanding that the secondary literature does not seem to have identified. Neal, “Minority Report,” 38-40.

First, Moltmann’s choice to bring the cross into the centre of his project in CG suggests that this was not the case in TH. However much the cross informed his earlier work, it was not a major feature of it. Second, Neal points to the international political disappointments of the late sixties as playing a formative role in Moltmann’s theology, directing him to an understanding of the cross that was not already inherent in the trajectory of TH. This leads Neal to conclude that “Moltmann has made two arguments which are not continuous and coterminous, but rather contradictory.” While this is not a criticism per se—Moltmann inherits a dialectical tradition that relishes in contradiction—for Neal the relationship between these contradictory aims is not sufficiently clarified by Moltmann in CG. Testing Neal’s claims will help to further elucidate the relationship between TH and CG.

4.2.2. Early Interest in the Suffering God

As early as 1960 Moltmann wrote of “the world in which God has suffered.” Alluding to Bonhoeffer, he continues, “Only the cross makes it possible to accept it in its total worldliness, through self-abandonment and sacrifice.” But it is not until 1966 that these statements begin to approach the theology of CG. Here, Moltmann writes, “In Jesus’ cross and resurrection God not only acts as the Lord, but also suffers as Father in offering up his Son.” This notion continues to take shape so that in 1968 we read: “In Jesus’ suffering God suffers; in his death, God himself tastes of damnation and death…. In the crucified one he withdraws from power and lordship and humiliates himself to the point of death.” And: “In the crucified one, we found

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123 Neal provides further support for this claim in his Theology as Hope, 19-23, 37-40.
125 Perhaps some kind of resolution can be found in Moltmann’s subsequent theology. Thus, “CPS [1975] largely maintains the dialectic presented in TH and CG.” And, “overcoming the one-sidedness of TH and CG, Moltmann’s ecclesiology [in CPS] is determined by both.” Neal, Theology as Hope, 69 n. 1 and p. 84. Nonetheless, Neal also criticises Moltmann’s later CoG (1995) for a reversion to TH where the cross allegedly does not play a major role. Neal, Theology as Hope, 217-25.
126 HP, 106.
127 Moltmann in FH, 28.
128 HP, 43.
God forsaking God and God overcoming for men the agony of God in himself.” Comments such as these in Moltmann’s early theology illustrate a subtle trajectory that later flowered into the theology of trinitarian suffering found in CG. Yet while there is little indication before 1970 of a more fully developed theology of the cross besides scattered comments such as these, important engagements with Bloch, Hegel, and Feuerbach in his earlier theology suggest that Moltmann’s thought at this stage does not exclude the possibility of this. I will attend to these engagements in the following subsections.

4.2.3. The Crucifixion in the Dispute with Ernst Bloch

Moltmann’s first critical engagement with Bloch’s thought appears in a 1960 review of *The Principle of Hope*. Although he does not yet at this point approach the cross in the central way that he does in CG, here Moltmann nonetheless starts off on a trajectory in this direction. He writes of Bloch, “If his ‘grasped’ hope is no more than a Marxism reinterpreted by way of the philosophy of history, then his own bitter realisation applies to him as well: ‘The jaws of death grind everything and the maw

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129 *HP*, 51.
of corruption devours every teleology [Moltmann: theology].” Continuing, Moltmann reveals, “Only resurrection faith overcomes this.” A similar response is given two years later in a review of Bloch’s 1961 *Natural Law and Human Dignity*. Significantly, this criticism is further developed and reappears in a 1963 article addressing the claims of *The Principle of Hope* in the context of Bloch’s wider thought, from 1965 included as an appendix to later German editions of *TH* in slightly revised and extended form.

Writing in 1963, Moltmann notes that Bloch’s atheistically conceived utopia seeks to overcome the *nihil* (negative) in human existence through the surmounting of class and its attendant oppressions. But, here, the negative nonetheless remains. “It no longer encounters us in identifiable form as hunger, misery, and injustice, but in the intangible form of boredom, of life at an ebb, and of feelings of absurdity.” That is, without “the earnestness, the pain, the patience, and the labor caused by the negative,” people are deprived of the opposition that would otherwise provide them meaning. In other words, the human being “drowns in infinite possibilities because he nowhere finds necessity.” It is the role of Christian eschatology, then, to maintain a hope for a purposeful future beyond boredom. But if this is the case then

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132 Moltmann, *Im Gespräch*, 30, citing Ernst Bloch, *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1959), 2:1301. I have taken the quote of Bloch from the ET: Ernst Bloch, *The Principle of Hope*, 3 vols., trans. by Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 3:1107. Intriguingly, Moltmann replaces *Teleologie* with *Theologie*, though this may simply be a typographical error. Little difference in meaning is acquired with the substitution, as theology, too, seeks to overcome death through teleology—only that Moltmann’s text would suggest a more decisively atheistic agenda on Bloch’s part, which, indeed, is a completely uncontroversial claim.


135 Moltmann, “Das ‘Prinzip Hoffnung’ und die christliche Zuversicht: ein Gespräch mit Ernst Bloch,” *Evangelische Theologie* 23:10 (1963): 537-57; *TH*, Ger. 313-34 (1965). An ET of the latter is available in *RRF*, 148-76. In the following I will indicate the material that is original or exclusive to the 1963 text, as well as that which only appears in the 1965 revision.


137 *RRF*, 162; only in the revised text, *TH*, Ger. 324.

138 *RRF*, 162; Moltmann, “Das ‘Prinzip Hoffnung’,” 547.
the Christian also hopes for something beyond the humanly possible. They hope for victory over death as well. Such a vision, Moltmann reflects, goes beyond the materialist Marxist tradition that Bloch is a part of and is much more at home in Hegel’s idealism. This claim will be particularly relevant to the discussion in the following subsection, below, where I attend to Moltmann’s engagement with Hegel in *TH*.

The primary relevance of this text to this study, however, lies in Moltmann’s interest in not dissolving the “deadliness of death” in philosophical and theological discourse. He summarises Bloch’s response to the problem of death, observing that, for Bloch, death can touch the “husk” but not the “core” of existence. This is because death only attacks that which is. It cannot reach that which has not yet become. “This driving, developing core of existence is therefore not subject to transience, since it itself constitutes the process of ‘dying and becoming.’” But, for Moltmann, such a claim is simply the old doctrine of the immortality of the soul, newly clothed in the language of hope. Bloch’s revision still entails that the soul “deny history and death by projecting itself into the realm of not yet and regarding the reality of life as a mere ‘husk’ which it abandons to death.”

Still, elsewhere Bloch takes a different approach to death. He affirms with Hegel that negative which resists dialectical sublation. Its negativity is so absurd, so abyssal that there is no positive within it that could allow the possibility of its own, consequent negation and thus sublation. This, Moltmann writes, is “in Hegel’s terms, the absurdity of the Peloponnesian War and the Thirty Years’ War, today that of the

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139 *RRF*, 164-65; Moltmann, “Das ’Prinzip Hoffnung,” 549.
140 *RRF*, 165; Moltmann, “Das ’Prinzip Hoffnung,” 549.
142 *RRF*, 166; Moltmann, “Das ’Prinzip Hoffnung,” 549.
143 *RRF*, 168; Moltmann, “Das ’Prinzip Hoffnung,” 551.
Fascist death camps and the atom-bombed cities.”¹⁴⁵ And yet, affirming this only creates further difficulties for Bloch. The problem remains. “Hegel’s panlogism and general faith in providence (‘who knows what good it might serve’) does not remain standing in Majdanek.”¹⁴⁶ In response, Moltmann offers the theological proposition, cut from the revised text: “But the crucified Christ and the fellowship of suffering with him [does remain standing].”¹⁴⁷ In the revised text, nonetheless, the examples provided by Hegel and Bloch are compared with biblical events: “The sacrifice of Isaac and the desolation of Job, the end of Jesus on the cross and his being swallowed up in eternal death and hell, contain within them no dialectical positive.”¹⁴⁸ For Moltmann, there seems to be some analogy between the nihilism of Majdanek and that of the crucifixion. Neither of these hells can be diminished by integrating them into a broader metaphysic. Interestingly, in the revised text, Moltmann also offers a reply along the lines of biblical hope. For Jews and Christians, “creatio and novum ex nihilo is suddenly and unexpectedly there.”¹⁴⁹ That is, the event arrives from elsewhere. It does not have an organic connection to the absurd and irretrievably negative. Moltmann continues, “Majdanek and Hiroshima find no soothing dialectical answer, but the ‘earnest expectation of the creature’ (Rom 8:18ff.) becomes a cry to God in hope that the creator ex nihilo, who raised the forsaken Christ, will make such ends the start of his beginning.”¹⁵⁰ It would be a mistake to understand these claims as contradictory, however—at least within the context of Moltmann’s own thought. This same

¹⁴⁵ RRF, 168 n. 48; only in the revised text, TH, Ger. 328 n. 48. The original reads, “As for Hegel, the ‘solely negative,’ the Peloponnesian War, the Thirty Years’ War, etc., cannot in any way fall under the productive powers of corruption, so for Bloch neither can the incinerators of Majdanek.” Moltmann, “Das ‘Prinzip Hoffnung’,” 551 n. 44.
¹⁴⁶ Moltmann, “Das ‘Prinzip Hoffnung’,” 551 n. 44; this sentence does not appear in the revised text.
¹⁴⁷ Moltmann, “Das ‘Prinzip Hoffnung’,” 551 n. 44. This sentence lacks a verb in German.
¹⁴⁸ RRF, 168 n. 48; TH, Ger. 328 n. 48.
¹⁴⁹ RRF, 168 n. 48; TH, Ger. 328 n. 48.
¹⁵⁰ RRF, 168 n. 48, slightly adjusted; TH, Ger. 328-29 n. 48.
approach is taken in CG, if only more comprehensively. Despite their absolute affront to all that is good and true, an alternative to these ruptures can still be hoped for in the future kingdom of God.

The theme of suffering continues through the text as Moltmann introduces a—perhaps somewhat overstated—criticism of Bloch’s Christian sources: “The Christian heretics and fanatics whom Bloch likes to quote among the ancestors of his thinking—such as Marcion, Montanus, Joachim di Fiore and Thomas Münzer—were all encratites, despisers of the body and the earth…. [T]hey did not know the love which accepts the earth’s pain and the suffering of obedience in love because it finds hope for the earth and for the body.” Moltmann proceeds to cite Luther’s cross-inspired words on the incarnation, contrasted with Münzer’s emphasis on the relationship of the incarnation to the deification of believers: “By the power of his humanity or (as the apostle says) of his flesh, which is exercised in faith, he conforms us to himself and crucifies us, making us no longer proud and unhappy gods, but true men, that is, miserable sinners.” Luther will become an important source of Moltmann’s theology in CG. Here already, nonetheless, his theology of the cross informs the criticism of Bloch. And if Luther’s doctrine of justification is to be followed, Moltmann observes, the individual is “drawn into the fellowship of suffering between the crucified one and the suffering of the whole sorry creation.”

Long before the publication of CG, then, and even prior to the publication of TH, Moltmann’s dispute with Bloch over the deadliness of death leads him to the beginnings of a theology of the cross. Although in TH the emphasis will certainly be

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151 See 5.5.2.
152 RRF, 171; Moltmann, “Das ‘Prinzip Hoffnung’,” 553.
153 Martin Luther, Weimar Ausgabe V, 128, cited in RRF, 171 n. 52; Moltmann, “Das ‘Prinzip Hoffnung’,” 553-54 n. 47. Moltmann only cites the Latin in the two editions of his essay, and this work of Luther’s has not yet been translated into English. The Latin and M. Douglas Meeks’s English translation, the latter which I have quoted above, are both supplied in RRF.
154 See 5.1.1.
155 RRF, 172; only in the revised text, TH, Ger. 332. According to the original, the individual would be “drawn into the fellowship of suffering of the crucified one.” Moltmann, “Das ‘Prinzip Hoffnung’,” 554.
on the future of Christ that is breaking into the present, neither does this mean that
the theology of the cross found in CG is an innovation, let alone a “corrective.” Indeed,
as the above exposition shows, Moltmann is well aware that no meaning or
purpose is to be ascribed to various irruptions of evil in the historical record. An
alternative tomorrow can be hoped for, yes, but this hope cannot retrospectively jus-
tify or even explain such evils. It is only Christ, with his horrid end on the cross, and
the community that suffers with him that are permitted not explanation but camara-
derie.

4.2.4. Hegel, Negation, and the Negation of the Negative

In addition to the theology of the cross that begins to emerge in dispute with Bloch,
the voices of Hegel and Feuerbach, especially in TH, also provide theological source
material and counterpoints in this regard for Moltmann. Indeed, Hegel’s name had
already arisen in the discussion of the shortcomings of Bloch’s philosophy of hope.
It is this same aspect of Hegel’s thought, the role of the negative in the dialectic, that
Moltmann addresses in TH, though he also draws on some of Hegel’s other contribu-
tions.156

156 E.g., TH, 27, 48-50, 231, 307-11. On Moltmann’s relationship to Hegel, cf. Francis P. Fi-
Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1974), 35-38; A. J. Co-
cyers, God, Hope, and History: Jürgen Moltmann and the Christian Concept of History (Macon,
GA: Mercer University Press, 1988), 114-20; Otto, God of Hope, 17-21; Brian John Spence,
“Von Balthasar and Moltmann: Two Responses to Hegel on the Subject of the Incarnation
and the ‘Death of God,’” Ph.D. diss. (St. Michael’s College, University of Toronto, 1996);
Idem, “The Hegelian Element in von Balthasar’s and Moltmann’s Understanding of the
Suffering of God,” Toronto Journal of Theology 14:1 (1998): 45-60; John Michael Bechtold,
“Tragic Creation – Hope for the Future: Moltmann’s Creative (Mis)reading of Hegel’s Phi-
losophy,” Ph.D. diss. (University of Denver, CO, 2018). Allegedly, “there can be no ques-
tion that the most prevalent criticism of Moltmann is his affinity with Hegel.” Otto, God of
Hope, 19. But while this is surely a prevalent criticism, it is important to note that Molt-
mann does not uncritically appropriate Hegel—as Otto acknowledges—and that criticisms
are predominantly directed against Moltmann’s methodology and conclusions, rather than
his intellectual influences.
Moltmann’s engagement with Hegel in this regard depends largely on a short passage at the end of the latter’s *Faith and Knowledge*. Here, Hegel calls for “the pure concept or infinity as the abyss of nothingness in which all being is engulfed” to “signify the infinite grief [of the finite] purely as a moment of the supreme Idea, and no more than a moment.” This means that nothingness and negation are to be philosophically incorporated into the Idea, rather than being treated separately, resulting in an unresolved dualism. To conclude, Hegel depicts the project that lies ahead using biblical imagery: “Thereby it must re-establish for philosophy the Idea of absolute freedom and along with it the absolute Passion, the speculative Good Friday in place of the historic Good Friday. Good Friday must be speculatively re-established in the whole truth and harshness of its Godforsakenness…. [T]he highest totality can and must achieve its resurrection solely from this harsh consciousness of loss, encompassing everything, and ascending in all its earnestness and out of its deepest ground to the most serene freedom of its shape.”

That is to say, for Hegel, philosophy faces the task of translating Christ’s death, up until this point restricted to the historical, into the metaphysical, so that the Idea would undergo complete negation. It is only from this negation that the Idea finds “resurrection” and therefore “absolute freedom.” Because of the relative impenetrability of these short statements of Hegel’s, it will be helpful to explore them in the context of his wider thought.

It is in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* that Hegel presents his unique approach to the being of God in detail. It should be noted that although Moltmann himself does not cite the Lectures, they nonetheless provide a more complete picture of the concept of God that Hegel assumes elsewhere in his oeuvre. In the Lectures, Hegel begins with “the Idea of God In and For Itself,” loosely corresponding, in

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158 Hegel, *Faith & Knowledge*, 190, brackets supplied by editors.
traditional theology, to the church’s doctrine of the immanent Trinity. Here God is considered apart from creation, which is finite. Godself, conversely, is infinite and universal. Nonetheless, God’s infinitude already encompasses the movement towards finitude and particularisation in the begetting of the Son, as this constitutes an eternal distinction within the Idea. Reflection of God’s being therefore cannot overlook this distinction. And yet, in the Son’s being begotten, the distinction between Father and Son is also “sublated” in the Spirit. That is, the distinction is overcome in a higher unity that upholds the distinctness of both Father and Son, as well as their oneness in their being the same God. God, already in eternity, is the movement from unity, to distinction, to distinction in unity.

For God to be truly infinite, however, an infinite that is not only in opposition to the finite, as is allegedly the case in conventional pre-Hegelian metaphysics, but one that contains the reality of the finite within it, finitude must become actual. The differentiation of the Son from the Father “is only a movement, a play of love with itself, which does not arrive at the seriousness of other-being, of separation and rupture.”\textsuperscript{161} Rather, this other-being, finitude, becomes actual in the creation of the world. This is the second aspect of Hegel’s concept of God: finitude and the world. For the infinite to be truly infinite, the finite must be actualised in the creation of the world and the infinite must participate in the finite to the extent that the infinite “arrives at its most extreme [mode of] being-outside-itself.”\textsuperscript{162} Thus, not only does God create the world but God participates in the finite being of the world in becoming incarnate in the Son. It is through this latter phase of the movement, “the most extreme estrangement and the pinnacle of divestment,”\textsuperscript{163} that the movement is complete and God arrives at death. Importantly, this is not simply death in general but the death of a criminal—for Hegel, the most finite mode of being possible. In this, then, the being of God is negated. Although, as I am about to show, this is not the


\textsuperscript{161} Hegel, \textit{Lectures}, 292.

\textsuperscript{162} Hegel, \textit{Lectures}, 91, brackets supplied by editor.

\textsuperscript{163} Hegel, \textit{Lectures}, 91.
end of God, its starkness for Hegel cannot be overlooked. The taking up of death upon Godself “is a monstrous, fearful picture, which brings before the imagination the deepest abyss of cleavage.”

The third aspect concerns the movement of the Holy Spirit, in which the first two movements are sublated into a higher unity. For Hegel this is the community, that is, something like the church, which is the concrete counterpart to the abstract sublation of the distinction between Father and Son in the Idea in and for Itself. What takes place concretely corresponds to that which has already taken place eternally, apart from the creation of the world: the Holy Spirit’s uniting of the Father and Son in their distinction. In regard to the concrete sublation, Hegel draws attention to Christ’s resurrection. This event is understood as a negation of negation, insofar as it negates the original negation that was God’s entering into finitude and death. “Christ has risen. Negation is thereby overcome, and the negation of negation is thus a moment of the divine nature.”

Although Hegel’s main focus in expounding the third movement in the Lectures seems to be on how this sublation takes shape in the community, he also comments on its meaning for God’s being. And this is where Moltmann has taken interest in his thought. Significantly, in sublation the first two movements are not negated absolutely. While “Spirit is the negativity of finite and infinite,” this negation does not leave either element completely behind. Rather, the two aspects are “conjoined… still as conflicting elements; if there were no longer any conflict, there would be no anguish. Spirit is the absolute power to endure this anguish, i.e., to unite the two and to be in this way, in this oneness.” Or, more simply, “Spirit is spirit only as the negation of the negative, which thus contains the negative within itself.” The negative is negated. God does not remain dead. And yet, in having died, the negative,

164 Hegel, Lectures, 125. Cf. the quote above from Faith & Knowledge: “Good Friday must be speculatively re-established in the whole truth and harshness of its Godforsakenness.” Hegel, Faith & Knowledge, 191.
165 Hegel, Lectures, 220.
166 Hegel, Lectures, 215.
167 Hegel, Lectures, 132.
death, remains a part of God’s being because God is the infinite that is not simply opposed to the finite but, as concretely actualised in the third movement of the divine being, God is the sublation by the Spirit of infinite and finite into a higher unity and thus contains the depths of finitude within Itself.

Having briefly outlined the role of the negative in connection to God in Hegel’s thought, I return to TH in order to determine more precisely the relationship of this to Moltmann’s theology. The first significant discussion of Hegel in this regard can be seen in the connection Moltmann draws between modern atheism and the “nihilistic discovery” of Hegel and Nietzsche—that God is dead.\textsuperscript{168} Such a connection needs to be recognised if theology is to have anything useful to say. In response to this discovery, Moltmann proposes a “theology of the resurrection,” namely, “an eschatology of the resurrection in the sense of the future of the crucified Lord.”\textsuperscript{169} This theology, Moltmann continues, ‘must accept the ‘cross of the present’ (Hegel), its godlessness and godforsakenness, and there give theoretical and practical proof of the ‘Spirit of the resurrection.’”\textsuperscript{170} Hegel’s project is particularly relevant because it affirms the godforsakenness that modern society everywhere experiences, a godforsakenness that might otherwise be overlooked by theology. Importantly, Moltmann points to the future of the crucified Christ as the appropriate course for theology, one admittedly not necessitated by Hegel but perhaps one that would have been forgotten in some quarters without his reminders. Moltmann’s formulation, emerging from his engagement with Hegel, not only points believers to the source and goal of biblical hope, Christ, but situates this hope in relation to the negation that is Christ’s crucifixion.

A few pages on, Moltmann conveys the biblical call to discipleship in Hegelian idiom: “If revelation encounters him,” that is, the recipient of revelation, “then

\textsuperscript{168} TH, 84.
\textsuperscript{169} TH, 84.
\textsuperscript{170} TH, 84, slightly adjusted. The phrase attributed to Hegel can be found in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. by H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 22. Moltmann also uses it elsewhere, such as in TH, 334; and in the title of his essay, “The ‘Rose in the Cross of the Present’: Towards an Understanding of the Church in Modern Society,” in HP, 130-154 (1961).
it does not identify him by disregarding what is negative, but opens him to pain, patience and the ‘dreadful power of the negative’, as Hegel has said. It makes him ready to take the pain of love and of self-emptying upon himself in the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead and who quickens the dead.”¹⁷¹ This develops Moltmann’s previous plea for theology to hear atheism’s witness to the world’s godforsakenness. Believers are called not out of but in the midst of suffering and the negation that is death. In calling, they accept this death, as Christ has done before them, and only then do they look to the future which hope directs them to.

But it is in his discussion of the origin and history of the concept of the death of God that Moltmann provides his clearest statements on the relationship between his theology and Hegel’s philosophy. Quoting at length the passage from Faith & Knowledge, which I briefly expounded at the beginning of this subsection, Moltmann summarises, “If the modern a-theistic world thus comes to stand in the shadow of Good Friday, and Good Friday is conceived by it as the abyss of nothingness that engulfs all being, then there arises on the other hand the possibility of conceiving this foundering world in theological terms as an element in the process of the now all-embracing and universal revelation of God in the cross and resurrection of reality.”¹⁷² But while Moltmann wants to affirm with Hegel the reality of the negative in the present, he is reluctant at this point to transpose this onto the divine being—at least in the same way as Hegel does: “The god-forsakenness of the cross cannot, as in Hegel, be made into an element belonging to the divine process and thus immanent in God.”¹⁷³ Moltmann’s reasoning here is telling. Hegel’s formulation is “only a modification of the dialectical epiphany of the eternal as subject,” thus “doing away with the historicity of the event of revelation.”¹⁷⁴ For Moltmann, conversely, the cross

¹⁷¹ TH, 91. The quote can be found in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, ed. and trans. by Terry Pinkard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 20, where it is translated as “the tremendous power of the negative.” Moltmann cites the German, and his translator supplies an older ET. On this theme, cf. TH, 337.
¹⁷² TH, 169.
¹⁷⁴ TH, 172.
does not reveal the eternally negative within God. Rather, “the cross is the mark of an eschatological openness which is not yet closed by the resurrection of Christ and the Spirit of the Church, but remains open beyond both of these until the future of God and the annihilation of death.”175 Death will be no more. It will not remain eternally in God to perpetuate the dialectic between the infinite, the finite, and their unity in distinction. Neither is this to say, though, that such a hope already negates the negative that is death. While death does not remain for eternity, it is still a feature of present experience. And although Moltmann’s main focus TH is not contemporary suffering, this does not mean that he wants to deny its reality.

Moltmann’s engagement with Hegel in TH is particularly important for understanding his latent theology of the cross at this stage in his career. The theology of hope is hamstrung if it does not first recognise the universal Good Friday implicit in atheistic assumptions about the world and existence. This is because it promises a future for the crucified Christ, the Christ who has entered into and taken on godlessness. In taking up Christ’s cross, believers, too, enter into this godlessness. That is, they are not immediately translated into a blissful eternity forgetful of earthly negations, as might be the case in epiphany religion. Nor can there be any metaphysical of theological rationale for such a state of affairs. It simply is, Christ enters into it, and believers follow him. Nonetheless, Moltmann explicitly departs from Hegel in the latter’s situating of negation in the eternal being of God, in such a way that it would never be fully negated but remain an essential constituent of the divine process. Moltmann will indeed situate negation within the trinitarian being of God in CG, but his emphasis will be on the eschatological victory over death, suffering, and evil, so that these do not remain eternally. That this move is not made already in TH likely has more to do with Moltmann’s focus on the phenomenon of promise rather than the being of God, as can already be seen in the then-underdeveloped aspects of his futurist doctrine of God.176 Even so, neither does Moltmann completely avoid such logic, as can be seen in his conflict with Feuerbach.

175 TH, 172; cf. TH, 211.
176 See 3.3.2.
4.2.5. Feuerbach’s *a priori*

In the same place that he discusses Hegel on the death of God, Moltmann addresses Feuerbach’s criticism of religion. According to Feuerbach, the Christian concept of God is merely a negative projection of human experience. The philosopher writes, “The divine being is nothing else than the human being, or, rather, the human nature purified, freed from the limits of the individual man, made objective…. All the attributes of the divine nature are, therefore, attributes of the human nature.”\(^\text{177}\) And, “God is and has exactly what man is not and has not. Whatever is attributed to God is denied to man, and contrariwise whatever one gives to man one takes from God.”\(^\text{178}\) Thus, “God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; man is absolutely negative, the sum of all negations.”\(^\text{179}\) For Feuerbach, Christianity’s concept of God is the negation of human negations, that is, of human sin, suffering, and finitude. Christianity must move forward in holding to that which with the one hand it implicitly affirms in regard to the human being in its concept of God, but which with the other it explicitly denies by predicating it of God rather than human beings. Notably, Bloch, too, takes up some of Feuerbach’s polemic, perhaps further encouraging Moltmann’s reply.\(^\text{180}\)

With Feuerbach, Moltmann affirms that Scripture expresses the hope of the resurrection in the sense of the negation of the negative, with texts such as Rev 21:4:


“He will wipe every tear from their eyes. Death will be no more; mourning and crying and pain will be no more.” Nonetheless, Christian hope cannot be reduced to this movement. Thus, against the christology that Feuerbach attributes to the church, Moltmann writes in TH that “his [Christ’s] attributes cannot be expressed by negation of the sphere of the earthly, human, mortal and transient, but only in recalling and recounting the history of his promise.” A couple years later, Moltmann articulates this relationship more clearly: “The question of God is not asked out of the universal questionability of all transitory things,” but rather out of “the concrete, contingent and special history of Israel and of Jesus Christ. This question, however, directs itself to the world and to the existence of every man.” And, “just as justification cannot be based on sin, so eschatology cannot be derived from present misery. Christian eschatology must have a theological foundation.” The identity of God is much more than simply the negation of human negation, despite the negation of the negative being a necessary step for creation to enter into its future. Nonetheless, as long as the negation of the limitations of human experience forms the core basis for


182 TH, 141.

183 HP, 19 (1966), emphasis original.

184 FC, 25 (1966). Clearer expositions of just what Moltmann means by the negation of the negative can be found in FC, 124-26 (1976); cf. the later exposition in SL, 73-77 (1991). In another criticism that applies to Feuerbach—even if he is not mentioned there—Moltmann writes, “What you grant God, you must have taken away from man, and what you grant man, you must have taken away from God. But when will we stop measuring God and man with the same yardstick?” RRF, 67-68 (1968). Beyond Hegel and Feuerbach, the concept of the negation of the negative also plays an important role in the Frankfurt School philosophies of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer. See Conyers, God, Hope, and History, 120-24.

185 Moltmann also employs the concept constructively in TH, 131.
Christianity’s concept of God, as Moltmann alleges is the case in much of the church’s traditional theology, then it is subject to Feuerbach’s critique.\textsuperscript{186} As he writes in \textit{TH}, Moltmann rejects traditional theologies in which “the divinity of God is seen in his unchangeableness, immutability, impassibility and unity.”\textsuperscript{187} Feuerbach is at work in the background here. This God is the one “for whom all men are seeking on the ground of their experience of reality.”\textsuperscript{188}

For Moltmann, then, Feuerbach’s critique, while relevant, loses its force when the proper content of theological reflection, Christ, is restored to view. Christ is not the negation of human limitedness but the positive content that is the fulfilment of divine promise. Conversely, Feuerbach’s critique is itself limited by assumptions of what is theologically or philosophically coherent when predicated of God. While the dominant Christian tradition found its concept of God by negating the human and earthly, others situated these human negations within Godself. So in \textit{TH} Moltmann cites Feuerbach responding to Hegel’s incorporation of negative elements into God, namely, matter and atheism. On this the philosopher writes, “The God who is restored from his own negation [is] hardly a true God; he is rather a self-contradictory, atheistic God.”\textsuperscript{189} But, Moltmann responds, “Here it becomes clear that Feuerbach knows only the God of dogmatic philosophy and nature religion, for it is only this God who in his abstract identity can be reduced to man.”\textsuperscript{190} Feuerbach’s criticisms may indeed apply to the concept of God as traditionally conceived from patristic theology onwards, but, Moltmann argues, they do not apply to the Christ of Scripture, who “is and remains the crucified Christ.”\textsuperscript{191}

\textsuperscript{186} I am in agreement with Otto’s interpretation of Moltmann here: “Moltmann will therefore propose his reconstruction of trinitarian theology as a way between the legitimate objection of Feuerbach to theism and the divinization of man which Feuerbach’s critique entails.” Otto, \textit{God of Hope}, 25.

\textsuperscript{187} \textit{TH}, 140.

\textsuperscript{188} \textit{TH}, 140.

\textsuperscript{189} Ludwig Feuerbach, \textit{Principles of the Philosophy of the Future}, trans. by Manfred H. Vogel (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), 34. Moltmann cites the German, which is translated by his translator, Leitch, in \textit{TH}, 171.

\textsuperscript{190} \textit{TH}, 171.

\textsuperscript{191} \textit{TH}, 171.
Considering that it is Hegel whom Feuerbach is criticising here, Moltmann’s reply is particularly significant. While Moltmann cannot accept Hegel’s placement of an ahistorical, eternal death within Godself, neither can he accept Feuerbach’s a priori exclusion of the negative from God. Indeed, Moltmann provides a biblical rationale, insisting on the permanence of Christ’s crucified body. This is not an eternal death, which Moltmann reads in Hegel, but, certainly, neither is it the allocation of God and death to two different spheres, a line of argument that Moltmann will pursue in detail in CG. But that is why, already in TH, Moltmann can say that “the experience of the cross of Jesus means for them [i.e., the disciples] the experience of the god-forsakenness of God’s ambassador—that is, an absolute nihil embracing also God.”

While the odd, almost inconsequential comment gesturing towards divine suffering can be found in Moltmann’s earlier work, then, it is above all various treatments of Bloch, Hegel, and Feuerbach that problematise Neal’s thesis of a measurable disjuncture between the thought of TH and that of CG. These, too, admittedly, as far as they concern the problems of suffering and evil, are never at the centre of Moltmann’s work in this early period, but this does not mean that they are therefore insignificant. Rather, I have attempted to demonstrate the important role they played in Moltmann’s intellectual formation. The issues he wrestles with peripherally here will become the central focus of his next major publication, a piece which was not simply a result of a sudden turn in his thinking in the late sixties.

4.3. Summary

None of the works penned in this period made quite the same impact as their predecessor, TH, nor that of their successor, CG. And yet, the importance of reading them for gaining a better understanding of the development of Moltmann’s theology in

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192 See, e.g., the criticisms of Feuerbach in CG, 38, 76-77 n. 19.
193 TH, 198.
general, and the role of Scripture in his thought in particular, cannot be denied. Two advances from this period are especially notable.

A first development in this period pertains to Moltmann’s futurist doctrine of God. Shortly after the publication of TH, Moltmann discerned a need to formulate a more detailed theology of the relationship between the present and the future. The basis for this was found in a distinction between the futurum or futur — that which will be, determined through extrapolating from the present — and the adventus or Zukunft — that which is coming and can only be anticipated in the present. Expounding this distinction over the course of a number of essays, three of which I have discussed in this chapter, it soon becomes clear that Moltmann wants to attribute some kind of priority to the adventus. That is, the adventus represents the reality that will one day be made manifest with the coming of God’s kingdom. It is in this sense the real, ontological future, even if it does not arise organically out of created time because its realisation comes only with the work of God. Moreover, as such it can only be anticipated in the present. Conversely, the futurum is a hypothetical future that arises from human calculation on the basis of present knowledge. It is not simply secular knowledge, however, a knowledge that inspires Christian action in the present, insofar as this more concrete form of the future is controlled by the fragmentary, anticipatory knowledge of the adventus.

Moltmann’s somewhat sophisticated theological chronology also suggests a particular doctrine of God. It is not simply that God knows the future, as might be the case in various traditional accounts, but for Moltmann the priority of the adventus to the present and, indeed, the past, derives from this future being the site of the divine life. The negative proposition that God is not present equally in past, present, and future, a proposition forwarded against Barth, Bultmann, and others since before TH, is here finally coupled with the positive proposition that God’s being is properly located in the future. In regard to the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology, this is an important point to note, insofar as the promise that Moltmann sees as central to Scripture now concerns not only human action and God’s faithfulness but requires an attendant reflection on God’s being. Scripture’s enduring passion for
the future must be interpreted consistently, situated even in relationship to Godself. A similar logic, though applied much more overtly, is at work in Moltmann’s theology of the cross in CG. Lastly, however, it should be noted that this early enthusiasm for all things future both reaches its peak and begins its descent in 1968. With Moltmann’s growing interest in the doctrine of the Trinity a more complex chronology starts to form.194

A second development in this period concerns Moltmann’s entrance into political theology. Here, the liberating message of Scripture extends to the political realities oppressing people today. In a particularly helpful essay, expounded above, Moltmann draws on Dilthey, Bultmann, and Marx to develop a political hermeneutic. The promises of Scripture must not be understood in such a way that they support the current political status quo, such as through providing people reason and purpose in their current suffering. Rather, their revolutionary message must be heard in that they point to an alternative future and thus provide a criticism of the world as it currently stands. Moltmann agrees with Bloch in this regard, though he departs from the atheist philosopher in seeing God, the God of the oppressed, as the essential factor in this equation. In other pieces from this time, Moltmann argues emphatically that the Bible belongs not to the powerful but the weak, not to the rich but the poor. It asks humility and repentance of the former and promises liberation to the latter.

Besides these two major developments, Moltmann’s various comments on and discussions of hermeneutics and the nature of Scripture are also of note. He draws attention to the increasingly unwieldy and ambiguous character of language, imploring the preacher to speak the biblical language of promise, which looks to a reality where words will once again correspond to the realities they signify. Moltmann also displays a continued interest in negotiating the relationship between the OT and NT. On the one hand, Christian faith is in danger of losing its eschatological impulse where it neglects the OT. On the other hand, however, it is also in danger of

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194 See 6.2.1.
descending into legalism where it neglects the NT anticipation of that which is coming. Perhaps most importantly in this regard, however, Moltmann centres the OT around the event of the exodus. God’s historical action in various events throughout Israel’s life—the exodus above all—is the subject of the OT, so much so that the events are primary to the words themselves and determine their meaning where conflicts among the witnesses might arise. A similar logic likely informed Moltmann’s slightly restricted canon of promise that I explored in the previous chapter. Here, though, Moltmann goes further, stating that it is the revelation of Yahweh in the exodus event that retrospectively encompasses the work of El among the fathers and the creation of the world, as well as pressing forward to seek the future fulfillment of the promise.

Significantly, the Bible is the *text* of *TH* and it remains, regardless of the changing contexts in which it is read. Moltmann supports this claim with a further reflection on the economy of promise. The Bible does not declare what is so much as what will be. In this sense, it shares in common with the present an orientation to a universal future which encompasses all times. But although he demonstrates an interest in this period in somewhat limiting the Bible’s role and resisting absolutisation through subordinating it to its subject matter and situating it within the broader context of salvation history, Moltmann remains keenly interested in the relevance of the Bible today and throughout time. It is here that the divine promise is heard. It is the stories of Scripture that first anticipate an alternative future and stimulate hearts in the present to reject the fates assigned for them under contemporary political orders. Churches that have forgotten the Bible have forgotten the hope of God’s ever-new work among them and their world.

In this chapter I also addressed the relationship between *TH* and *CG*. The previous near-consensus that *CG* was a natural development of the claims of *TH* has recently been disputed by Ryan Neal, who argues that the later work should rather
be understood as a corrective in regard to some of the excesses of TH. A few comments from this earlier period, though, suggest that Moltmann was not uninterested in the prospect of divine suffering. Moreover, a closer look at some passages in his work where he engages with Bloch, Hegel, and Feuerbach demonstrates the openness of his thought at this stage to his later proposals, central to CG. Thus, Moltmann can agree with Bloch on the absurdity and nihilism of recent evils, and even criticise Bloch for his inconsistency on this point. He can affirm with Hegel the universal godlessness of the modern world, albeit departing from him in making negation an eternal feature of the divine being. And he can dispute Feuerbach’s overly simplistic thesis on the origin of religion in human negation, suggesting that God can indeed embrace the negative—though this is not the last word.

God’s relationship to the negative will of course receive sustained attention in CG, the subject of the next chapter.
5. Against Apathetic Exegesis: *The Crucified God*

Perhaps his best-known work, *The Crucified God* is rich with material pertaining to the role of Scripture in Moltmann's theology.¹ From 1970 onwards, Moltmann begins to devote sustained attention to the central importance of the cross for Christian theology.² This endeavour reaches a head in 1972's CG, where a combined interest in what Moltmann understands to be Christianity's two most essential features, the theology of the cross and the doctrine of the Trinity, results in a passionate account of the Son who dies for us and the Father who grieves for him. For the purposes of this dissertation, numerous features of his argumentation are of note. But the main theme of this chapter is Moltmann's reapplication of his contrastive paradigm to his theology of the cross. As with the concept of divine futurity, Moltmann sets what he understands to be a biblical witness to divine suffering against theologies ancient and modern that cannot move in the same direction due to the restrictions of the categories they have inherited from Greek thought. It should be noted before proceeding, however, that patristic and medieval theology were not completely uninterested in the question. While, on the whole, they were extremely hesitant to situate suffering in the divine nature, they upheld the reality of God's human suffering in

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But, as will become clear in this chapter, for Moltmann such a stance does not take seriously the claims of Scripture.

In the first section of this chapter, I attend to key influences on CG, namely those of Martin Luther, Karl Barth, and Abraham Heschel, each of whom in their own way contrast Greek accounts of the divine with the biblical witness. I then turn, second, to Moltmann’s first major proposal, reflected in the first two chapters of CG. This is the fundamental and essential significance of the cross to Christian faith, a central constituent of Moltmann’s methodology in this work. In my third section, I proceed to the next three chapters of CG, demonstrating that the cross is not treated in the abstract but for Moltmann takes up its rightful place in the context of christology. At this point in the discussion Moltmann also reveals important assumptions about the role of Scripture in theology. I discuss these in the latter part of this section.

Fourth, I arrive at CG’s central, sixth chapter, in which Moltmann makes his main proposals. I first attend to the negative side of his argument, detailing his critical

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handling of cognate tendencies in modern theology, alongside his dual rejection of theism and atheism. In a final section, I explore Moltmann’s positive contribution to the subject in his theology of trinitarian suffering. This section concludes with a comment on his explicit treatments of Greek thinking in CG, which are somewhat less generalised than those which informed his work in *Theology of Hope* (1964).

5.1. Trinitarian Suffering: Key Influences

In his 1990 preface to CG, Moltmann names Abraham Heschel, Franz Rosenzweig, Gershom Scholem, Kazoh Kitamori, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer as key contributors.

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5 It is possible that this is a mistake as Scholem is not cited at all outside this later preface in CG, though it is also possible that Scholem influenced Moltmann but was not cited by him. Moltmann engages with Scholem explicitly in *TKG*, 27-30 (1980). Here and in CG, 272-3, Moltmann also demonstrates his dependence on the work of Peter Kuhn.

6 It is likely that Moltmann is being generous here. Kitamori’s work on this theme was not translated from Japanese into German until 1972, the same year that CG was published. Kazoh Kitamori, *Theologie des Schmerzes Gottes*, trans. by Tsuneaki Kato und Paul Schneiss (Göttingen: Vandenhoek and Ruprecht, 1972). Nonetheless, Moltmann possibly read the English, which was translated from Japanese in 1965. Kazoh Kitamori, *Theology of the Pain of God*, trans. by M. E. Bratcher (Richmond, VA: John Knox, 1965). Only twice, however, does Moltmann refer to the work explicitly in CG, on pp.47 and 153 n. 2. The two theologians met in 1973 and realised that their respective aims were quite different. Moltmann reflects that Kitamori “was prepared to let pain touch God only externally, whereas for me it goes through God’s very heart.” *BP*, 177-78 (2006).

to his theology in CG. Others such as Martin Luther, Bernhard Steffen, Adolf Schlatter, Karl Barth, and Eberhard Jüngel are named in his autobiography. Moreover, in a short literature review at the beginning of chapter six in CG, Moltmann demonstrates his appreciation for but also critical distance from other passibilist tendencies in modern theology. Besides those already mentioned, these include the representatives of the death of God movement that grew to prominence in the sixties, as well as Karl Rahner, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Heribert Mühlen, Hans Küng, Paul Althaus, and Hans-Georg Geyer. Moreover, the theodical aspect of Moltmann’s thought, which is essential to understanding his theology of trinitarian suffering, is informed first by Moltmann’s personal struggle to think theologically after Auschwitz, second by literary sources such as Albert Camus’s The Rebel, Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, and Elie Wiesel’s Night, and third by the Frankfurt School philosophers, Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse. Finally, in his 1980 TKG, Moltmann demonstrates the pervasiveness of interest in divine suffering throughout the twentieth century. Besides those already mentioned, he explores the thought of the Anglican J. K. Mozley, Clarence Edwin Rolt, and Geoffrey


8 CG, x-xi.
10 CG, 200-4; for the literature, see pp. 278-80 nn. 1-18.
A. Studdert Kennedy; the Spanish Catholic Miguel de Unamuno; and the Russian Orthodox Nikolai Berdyaev. Although the authors discussed there do not directly influence Moltmann’s theology in the earlier CG, the possibility of indirect influence through shared, perhaps modern concerns, can also be considered. But obviously it would go beyond the scope of this dissertation to address every figure Moltmann mentions throughout his career in this connection. Because of their importance in informing Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm—a preference for what he understands to be a biblically derived theology of suffering against the tradition’s affirmation of divine suffering—I will focus only on Luther, Barth, and Heschel.

5.1.1. Martin Luther

During his early theological education, Moltmann developed an interest in Luther’s theology of the cross, thanks to the lectures of Hans Joachim Iwand. As Moltmann writes in his autobiography, “Luther’s theology of the cross, as it was embodied in Iwand, touched us profoundly, war-wounded as we were in soul and body.” In TH, Moltmann cites Luther’s comments on expectation as a theological category in Paul, which the Reformer juxtaposes with the philosophical categories at hand, being as they are oriented only to the present. Luther’s theology of the cross also plays a minor role in Moltmann’s criticism of Bloch. But it is in CG that Luther begins to

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13 TKG, 25-47.
14 Surprisingly, not much literature in English has devoted in-depth attention to Luther’s influence on Moltmann. Some may find Burnell Eckardt’s essay on Moltmann and Luther to be helpful in showing where the two depart on the theology of the cross, though Eckardt’s analysis is unfortunately hindered by the reactionary nature of his argument. Burnell F. Eckardt, Jr., “Luther and Moltmann: The Theology of the Cross,” Concordia Theological Quarterly 49:1 (1985): 19-28. Anna Madsen treats both Luther’s and Moltmann’s theology of the cross in the same work, albeit separately. The Theology of the Cross in Historical Perspective (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2007). For other accounts, see Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology, 65-67; Castelo, The Apathetic God, 78-92.
16 BP, 41 (2006)
17 Cf. 2.2.2.
18 See 4.2.3.
play a more central role in Moltmann’s theology. Especially relevant in this regard is the Heidelberg Disputation. Here Luther claims, “That person does not deserve to be called a theologian who looks upon the invisible things of God as though they were clearly perceptible in those things which have actually happened. He deserves to be called a theologian, however, who comprehends the visible and manifest things of God seen through suffering and the cross.”19 Luther is at this point indifferent to the theological recognition of divine attributes, a recognition which does not of itself bring wisdom or make a person righteous. Indeed, this knowledge is misused for evil as theologians become arrogant and exercise an insatiable desire for knowledge and power. Such a path is the path of the theology of the glory, which situates God in human notions of what is good and elevated. In contrast, Luther is only interested in the theology of the cross, as it is here that “God wished again to be recognized in suffering, and to condemn wisdom concerning invisible things by means of wisdom concerning visible things.”20

All of this is not to say that Moltmann understands Luther to be advocating something like the theology of trinitarian suffering that he presents in CG.21 Yet it is to demonstrate something of the centrality of the role that Luther plays in influencing Moltmann’s theology of the cross in CG, without which Moltmann’s theology of trinitarian suffering cannot be fully understood. Moltmann also finds in Luther an ally in overturning the Christian tradition’s Greek presuppositions. Following his exposition of Luther’s theology of the cross, he writes, perhaps alluding to Pascal, “The time has finally come for differentiating the Father of Jesus Christ from the God

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20 Luther, *Luther’s Works* 31:52.
21 But see CG, 232-35. Later, Dennis Ngien argued at length that Luther was not uninterested in such questions. *The Suffering of God According to Martin Luther’s ‘Theologia Crucis’* (New York: Peter Lang, 1995). The foreword is written by Moltmann.
of the pagans and the philosophers.” In his own contribution, Moltmann will depart even further from what he sees as the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic influences on the Christian tradition, just as understands Luther to have done in his own time. Luther’s theology of the cross will inform Moltmann’s crucicentric methodology, and the Reformer’s polemic against theologies of glory will find important expression in Moltmann’s treatment of Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas, addressed below.

5.1.2. Karl Barth

Barth has been a major figure in Moltmann’s theology from the very beginning. He writes of his theological training, “I thought there could be no more theology after Barth, because he had said everything and said it so well—just as in the nineteenth century it was said that there could be no more philosophy after Hegel.” But this impression soon began to fade in 1956 as Moltmann read the work of A. A. van Ruler and “was freed from this error.” So commenced Moltmann’s long battle to establish

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23 In the context of Luther, see CG, 71 (Aristotle), 209 (Stoicism), 215 (Plato). Cf. Moltmann’s 1995 comment: “The logic of his Christocentrism is the reason why Luther was able to free the concept of God from the categories of Greek philosophy.” Moltmann, “Foreword,” in Ngien, Suffering of God, xi-xii, at xi.
24 5.2.2.
25 5.4.2.
26 Again, as with Luther, Moltmann’s relationship to Barth is yet to be explored in detail. But see Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope, 16-19, 43-44, 59-64, 97-99; Jayne H. Davis, “Opening Dialogue: Jürgen Moltmann’s Interaction with the Thought of Karl Barth,” Review and Expositor 100:4 (2003): 695-711. Moltmann’s relationship to Barth in his early theology is considered by van Prooijen at various places throughout his second chapter. See van Prooijen, Limping but Blessed, 9-117. Moltmann himself later reveals, “Karl Barth, of course, has had a large influence upon me, but primarily by means of the critical distance from him that I have had to establish, and not by imitation.” Michael Bauman and Jürgen Moltmann, “Jürgen Moltmann,” in Michael Bauman, Roundtable: Conversations with European Theologians, 31-41 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1990), 34.
himself as a counter-voice to Barth, as can be seen in many of his early essays, including *TH* and later work. Yet neither is Moltmann wholly critical of Barth. In his autobiography he acknowledges, “I had not departed so far from Barth” in *TH*, even if he had then presented his own position as a new beginning. And in 1988 Moltmann could describe himself as “a nonconformist in that theological school to which I owe the most: the Barth school.”

With regard to the writing of *CG*, Moltmann recalls, “Karl Barth’s doctrine of predestination in his *Church Dogmatics* II/2 is based on a theology of the cross, and it made a great impression on me.” Introducing Barth’s theology of the cross, Moltmann directs his readers to quite a large amount of material, citing *CD* II/2 and IV/1-4! Throughout the rest of the paragraph, however, all but one of the references point to *CD* II/2. In particular, Moltmann is interested in Barth’s claim that “in God’s eternal purpose it is God Himself who is rejected in His Son.” God “could have remained satisfied with Himself and with the impassible glory and blessedness of His own inner life. But He did not do so.” Rather, “from all eternity He willed to suffer for us.” Barth advances these statements in the context of his doctrine of election. He discovers the need to speak not only of God’s election of Christ to salvation but of his election to suffering and death in crucifixion as well. Of note here, too, is Barth’s nod to Harnack’s Hellenisation thesis in *CD* IV/2: “The presupposition of all earlier Christology has suffered from this pride—from the fathers to both Reformed

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29 See, e.g., most of the sections in my second chapter, 3.2.2., 3.3.2., 6.3.3., 6.4.1., 6.4.4., and 7.4.4.
33 *CG*, 279 n. 11.
34 *CG*, 202-3, 280 nn. 12, 14, 16.
35 *CD*, II/2, 167, cited in *CG*, 203.
36 *CD*, II/2, 166.
37 *CD*, II/2, 165.
and Lutheran orthodoxy. This presupposition was a Greek conception of God, according to which God was far too exalted for His address to man, His incarnation, and therefore the reconciliation of the world and Himself, to mean anything at all for Himself, or in any way to affect His Godhead. In other words, He was the prisoner of His own Godhead.”

Nonetheless, to what extent or in what way God would be affected by creation in Barth’s theology is still a matter of debate among Barth scholars. Whatever the stance that may be taken in these debates, however, it is Moltmann’s understanding of Barth that must be considered for the purposes of this investigation. For Moltmann in CG, “Barth has consistently drawn the harshness of the cross into his doctrine of God.” And whether or not Moltmann is correct in his assessment, it is this very reading of Barth that will direct his own undertaking in CG—even if he will leave a lot less room for difference in interpretation! Finally, Moltmann will also find space to criticise Barth in regard to his theology of the cross, but I will return to this below.

5.1.3. Abraham Heschel

One of the most important influences on Moltmann in writing CG was Abraham Heschel, a Polish rabbi who completed his doctoral dissertation on the prophets of

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38 Barth, CD IV/2, 84-85.
40 CG, 203.
41 See 5.4.1.
the Hebrew Bible in 1932 Germany. He expanded and published his work as *The Prophets* in 1935, the style and passion of which, bleeding with Hebrew parallelism and poetry, suggests a person whose thought is thoroughly immersed in the Scriptures. Notably, one scholar claims that *The Prophets* “bears primary responsibility for the importance that divine pathos has received in biblical and theological studies.”

Heschel moved to the US in 1940, developing a growing interest in Judaism’s role in the Civil Rights and anti-war movements. He passed away in 1972, the same year that CG was published.

Moltmann first read *The Prophets* in 1969 while preparing to write CG. In regard to this he recalls, “[I] felt confirmed in my rejection of the metaphysical apathy axiom in the philosophical doctrine of God.”

In CG, Moltmann introduces Heschel’s work with the claim that “it was Abraham Heschel who, in controversy with Hellenism and the Jewish philosophy of religion of Judah Halevi, Maimonides and Spinoza which was influenced by it, first described the prophets’ proclamation of God as pathetic theology.” Moltmann continues, “As Abraham Heschel shows, in a comparison with Greek philosophy, with Confucianism, Buddhism and Islam, the

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45 CG, 270, slightly adjusted, emphasis original.
Israelite understanding of the pathos of God is unique.” 46 Moltmann is clearly enamoured by the antitheses that Heschel erects between the witness of the biblical tradition and the claims of other religions and philosophies.

Such antitheses do indeed constitute a major concern of Heschel’s. Throughout The Prophets, he is determined to emphasise the uniqueness of the God of Israel, especially in contrast to traditional Judaism, but also Christianity, that is, in contrast to “the God of the philosophers.” 47 At the beginning of his book, for example, Heschel writes, “A student of philosophy who turns from the discourses of the great metaphysicians to the orations of the prophets may feel as if he were going from the realm of the sublime to an area of trivialities. Instead of dealing with the timeless issues of being and becoming, of matter and form, of definitions and demonstrations, he is thrown into orations about widows and orphans, about the corruptions of judges and affairs of the market place. Instead of showing us a way through the elegant mansions of the mind, the prophets take us to the slums.” 48 It is not, then, that Israel’s prophets merely address the philosophical questions and arrive at different answers. Rather, their questions and concerns differ from the very start.

There is much more to be said about Heschel’s theology, taking into account his prolific career. 49 But in CG Moltmann only explicitly draws on The Prophets. As shown above, he demonstrates a keen interest in Heschel’s attempt to free the interpretation of Scripture from Hellenistic influences, represented by Judah Halevi, Maimonides, and Spinoza, following foundational figures such as Philo. But neither is Moltmann uncritical of Heschel’s contribution: “Abraham Heschel has developed

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46 CG, 271, emphasis original; see Heschel, The Prophets, 299-317.
48 Heschel, The Prophets, 3.
his theology of the divine pathos as a dipolar theology. God is free in himself and at the same time interested in his covenant relationship and affected by human history…. There is probably a hint here of the idea of a dual personality in God.”50 Moltmann does not say much more here, other than that such dipolarity finds its origin in rabbinic theology, citing Peter Kuhn.51 The key is to be found in an essay from the following year. Here Moltmann writes, “Whereas for Israel the direct presence of God is conferred in the covenant, the crucified Jesus, according to the New Testament, stands alone, mediating the fatherhood of God and the power of the spirit of sonship to sinners and the godless…. Christian theology cannot therefore be dipolar theology; it has to become trinitarian.”52 For Moltmann, Christian theology may learn from Heschel, particularly in his advocating for the uniqueness of the God of the

50 CG, 272, emphasis original.


52 FC, 71 (1973); cf. EH, 78 (1972). This feature of Heschel’s thought is perhaps also what Moltmann has in mind when addressing the doctrine of the Shekinah in his autobiography. If that is the case, this later comment is much more sympathetic, even appreciative. See BP, 290 (2006); but cf. also Moltmann, Sun of Righteousness, Arise! God’s Future for Humanity and the World, trans. by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2010), 92 (2009).
prophets, but it cannot simply take him as its point of departure.\footnote{In light of this, Hans Urs von Balthasar’s evaluation of Moltmann’s reliance on Heschel makes little sense. “Moltmann has tried to fit Heschel into his system (that is, the identity of immanent and economic Trinity), but Heschel explicitly rejects any attempt to interpret the prophetic utterances in terms of Western metaphysics…. God’s pathos has nothing whatever to do with any mythological suffering, dying and rising God (Tammuz, Osiris, and so forth). Rather, it is his ‘moral abhorrence’ of the failure of his people (or of individuals) to respond to his covenant.” Hans Urs von Balthasar, \textit{Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory}, vol. 4, \textit{The Action}, trans. by Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatiu, 1994), 344 n. 20. Against this, Moltmann explicitly highlights points of difference between his own and Heschel’s project, acknowledging correlations without being bound to the methodological presuppositions of the latter, because Moltmann’s own methodology allows him to arrive at similar conclusions. A more sophisticated criticism along these lines is advanced by Weinandy in \textit{Does God Suffer?}, 64-68.} He holds fundamentally different presuppositions about the nature of God.\footnote{Some years later, in his dialogue with Pinchas Lapide, Moltmann will take a much less exclusivist approach to the doctrine of God as it is variously conceived in Judaism. See \textit{JM} (1980).} Indeed, if Christian theology is to affirm divine suffering, as Moltmann thinks that it must, then it can only do so in an uncompromisingly trinitarian manner.\footnote{If my interpretation is correct, then Moltmann rejects this aspect of Heschel’s theology for the same reason that he criticises Rahner, Barth, and Luther. Their insufficiently “trinitarian” conceptions of the divine nature, result in paradoxical statements when it comes to divine suffering. See 5.4.1. and 5.4.4., below.}

In this section I have drawn attention to three major influences on Moltmann’s work in \textit{CG}. Luther, Barth, and Heschel, each in their own way, suggest to Moltmann the ongoing need to distinguish the God of Israel and of Christ from the God of Greek philosophy, here in the context of God’s relationship to suffering. With these and other voices in the background, Moltmann proceeds to the founding and centralising role of the cross in Christian theology.

5.2. \textit{Crux Probat Omnia: The Critical Theology of the Cross}

Whereas in \textit{TH} Moltmann had emphasised the revolutionary power of the divine promise through which God calls the present into the future, in \textit{CG} the emphasis is on the crucifixion as the historical event before which the truth of all presents and futures is measured. This results in a world in flux. Appeal to the crucified Christ, necessary to establish the validity of any ecclesiastical or theological claim, is appeal
“to the one who judges them most severely and liberates them most radically from lies and vanity, from the struggle for power and from fear.” 56 Christ’s cross “is the criterion of their truth, and therefore the criticism of their untruth.” 57 Moltmann establishes the fundamental role of the cross in theological methodology in the first two chapters of CG. I explore them in this section.

5.2.1. The Relevance and Identity of the Church

Moltmann devotes the opening chapter of CG to a practical issue in the churches of the late sixties and early seventies. Importantly, this discussion is not inessential to the main theses of CG but rather grounds them in reality and demonstrates the need for such proposals in the first place. 58 Moltmann characterises the practical issue as the “double crisis” of the “identity-involvement dilemma”: “The more theology and the church attempt to become relevant to the problems of the present day, the more deeply they are drawn into the crisis of their own Christian identity. The more they attempt to assert their identity in traditional dogmas, rights and moral notions, the more irrelevant and unbelievable they become.” 59

Regarding the first side of this dilemma, Moltmann points to the post-war generation in Germany. Many Christians found the confines of traditional ecclesiastical and theological boundaries too restrictive for the work of the gospel and thus felt the need to seek new avenues for the social change they believed they were called to, in numerous cases finding themselves not just no longer within the churches but

56 CG, 2.
57 CG, 2.
58 As Bauckham writes, “One could have thought of more direct ways into the central issues of the book, for example by raising at once the problem of suffering posed by the horrors of modern history. But Moltmann’s way-in not only reflects one of the ways by which he himself had been led through the issues raised by his own political theology in the 1960s into a theology of the cross; it also allows him to move from the actual issues posed by contemporary Christian praxis into the central theological discussion of the book and then back into issues of praxis in the final chapter.” Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology, 61.
59 CG, 7.
in opposition to them too, insofar as the churches obstructed social reform. In making such moves, however, these groups ultimately lost that through which they were called to this work in the first place, Christ. That is, they identified Christianity with a particular politics, but, in doing so, the cross that distinguishes Christian faith from all other forms of belief and thought was lost and with that so was their ability “to criticize and stand back from the partial historical realities and movements which they [had] idolized and made absolute.”

While at this stage Moltmann directs his concerns to those who seek Christ in a progressive politics, he is careful to state that churches on the opposite end of the political spectrum are likewise susceptible to losing Christ because they “associate themselves with the forces of social and political conservatism.” Thus, despite their criticism of those who prioritise relevance over Christian identity, these churches have also “chosen a particular form of relevance.” The new movement forgets Christ and his cross in its attempt to express solidarity with those suffering outside of the church. But, long before them, the old church had already done so in their “traditional solidarity… with authority, law and order in society.” This conservatism has been confused by its adherents with Christian identity, often leading to false alternatives, such as having to choose between political protest and personal faith, or between evangelism to individuals and working for social change. But God reigns over both the personal and the political.

All churches are called to conform to the image of the crucified Christ. But, citing Luke 17:33, “Those who try to make their life secure will lose it, but those who lose their life will keep it,” Moltmann argues that this conformity consists not in holding obstinately to a narrow orthodoxy but in laying down one’s identity. This results in a new identity which likely looks very different from that which certain churches expect, because “trust in the hidden and guaranteed identity with Christ in God (Col 3:3) makes possible the self-abandonment, the road into non-identity and

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60 CG, 17.
61 CG, 13.
62 CG, 13.
63 CG, 17.
unidentifiability.”64 That is, Christian identity, like Christian theology, takes a pro-
cessual rather than static form. Ever again it seeks to follow Christ to the cross in the
present. In contrast, “a church which cannot change in order to exist for the human-
ity of man in changed circumstances becomes ossified and dies.”65 So long as the
church keeps its eyes fixed on Christ and his cross, then, it will become relevant
through conformity to him, rather than through its own efforts, and nor will it stub-
bornly ground itself in an ostensibly Christian identity and thus forsake true iden-
tity, closing its ears to Christ’s call to take up the cross and follow him. In either case,
it is the cross that stands beyond these dichotomous endeavours and remains in op-
position to them in such a way that the church is called ever anew to conform to the
image of the crucified Christ.

5.2.2. The Resistance of the Cross

Having demonstrated the role of the cross in calling churches to true identity and
mission in the crucified Christ, in his next chapter Moltmann addresses some of the
various ways in which the cross has been interpreted throughout history and in the
present. As he terms it, this is “the resistance [Widerstand] of the cross against its
interpretations.”66 Here, again, as the personified language of “resistance” demon-
strates, the cross stands beyond all human endeavours, religious or otherwise. Its
own truth can never be exhausted in any single interpretation, and, as such, it ac-
tively resists these.

First, Moltmann explores humanistic objections to the association of the cross
with God or religion. And these are sorely wanting. To the members of Roman high
society, the cross was “unaesthetic, unrespectable and perverse.”67 This view was
repeated in various ways throughout history, and Moltmann points to Goethe, Nie-
tzsche, and Marx as examples of figures who recognised the scandal of the cross and

64 CG, 16.
65 CG, 12.
66 CG, 32; Ger. 34.
67 CG, 33.
subsequently criticised Christianity for losing sight of it, unintentionally spurring the church on to take the cross seriously once again.

Second, Moltmann examines “the unbloody repetition of the event that took place on Golgotha on the altar of the church,” an allusion to the Council of Trent.\(^{68}\) This repetition was one of the ways in which subsequent Christianity veneered the brute, wooden cross. Moltmann attributes it to the church’s being obliged to meet “public need for cult and sacrifice,” having superseded and taken over the place that the ancient pagan religions held in the Roman Empire.\(^{70}\) While there is some precedent in the NT for understanding the mass as sacrifice, for Moltmann the problem here is that Christ’s death becomes the archetype of the sacrifice of mass. The singly important aspect of the cross is now the sacrificial character of Christ’s death. As such, “what was unique, particular and scandalous in the death of Christ is not retained, but suppressed and destroyed.”\(^{71}\) Moreover, the mass is available only to the baptised, in contrast to the godless cross on which the Christ who ate with sinners and tax-collectors died, “outside the city gate” (Heb 13:13), “on the boundary of human society, where it does not matter whether a person is Jew or Gentile, Greek or barbarian, master or servant, man or woman.”\(^{72}\) Ironically, the church re-erects human distinctions which the cross has nullified. And it is the godless in particular who recognise this contradiction between the mass and the cross.

Third, Moltmann addresses “the mysticism of the cross,” the discovery of fellowship with Christ in the life of unjust suffering. Notably, from this point on, he

\(^{68}\) CG, 41.

\(^{69}\) “In this divine sacrifice performed in the mass, the very same Christ is contained and offered in bloodless manner who made a bloody sacrifice of himself once for all on the cross.” Council of Trent, Session 22, 17 September 1562, Teaching and Canons of the Most Holy Sacrifice of Mass, ch. 2, in Jaroslav Pelikan and Valerie Hotchkiss, ed., Creeds and Confessions of the Christian Tradition, vol. 2, Reformation Era (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 862. A few years later Moltmann writes, “Golgotha is not the equivalent of the Lord’s supper. The Lord’s supper, which can be repeated, signifies the history of Christ which has taken place once and for all and is therefore unrepeatable. Nor does Golgotha become a mere prefiguration of a ‘sacrifice’ continued on the altar.” CPS, 255 (1975).

\(^{70}\) CG, 42.

\(^{71}\) CG, 43.

adopts a more sympathetic analysis, seeking to demonstrate how the following interpretations, which he believes more faithfully witness to the cross, might be theologically valuable, while yet leaving room for the cross to remain the standpoint from which their ongoing validity is assessed. Thus, concerning the mysticism of the cross, “it is demonstrably the devotion of the poor and sick, the oppressed and crushed.”

In the middle ages, as the church began to recognise the desire of the people to know the suffering Christ of the cross, “the imperial images of Christ, the judge of the world, were supplemented in churches by images of the crucified Christ of the poor, in which no realistic detail of pain and torture was omitted.” The suffering laity who knew this Christ found relief from their sufferings because he too had suffered as they did. In modern times, Moltmann discovers a similar emphasis in Negro spirituals and in the popular theology of Latin America. Unfortunately, however, such a mysticism of the cross is all too easily abused by the representatives of the powers, routinely exhorting sufferers to accept their sufferings as their lot, to look forward to an otherworldly redemption, and not to dispute the necessity of their present state. Luther, for example, “need not have recommended the peasants to accept their suffering as their cross. They already bore the burdens their masters imposed on them.” Rather, he should have addressed the princes and nobles and called them to live a life that was more in accordance with the cross. Finally, the mysticism of the cross also falls short if it does not acknowledge the distinctiveness of Jesus’ cross, which was not a passive, fateful suffering, but one Christ actively took upon himself.

Fourth, Moltmann turns to the cruciform life of discipleship. Christ’s call is first of all a call to participate in God’s future, inaugurated in his person, but this also requires that the disciple actively follow Christ to the cross. Moltmann invokes Bon-

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73 CG, 45.
74 CG, 46.
76 CG, 49.
hoeffer here, who observed, “Even in his suffering Jesus could have been the celebrated Christ.... But Jesus is the Christ who was rejected in his suffering. Rejection removed all dignity and honor from his suffering.”

Bonhoeffer rightly understood the unrespectable and despicable character of Christ’s suffering. Moreover, while this is true in general of the demands of Christian discipleship, the individual disciple’s rejection does not entail the same abandonment by God that Jesus underwent on the cross. So, Moltmann writes, “Jesus suffered and died alone. But those who follow him suffer and die in fellowship with him.”

Moltmann will go on to provide a more complete account of Jesus’ death later on in CG.

Lastly, Moltmann attends to what he understands to be the basic significance of the cross for Christian faith: the theology of the cross. This, exemplified by Paul’s theology in 1 Cor 1, should be the point of departure for all interpretations of the cross. Both Jew and Greek, each in his own way, “cannot let God be God, but must make himself the unhappy and proud God of his own self, his fellow men, and his world.”

As such, neither of these groups—representative of all humanity—can see God in the crucified Christ. Moltmann proceeds to Luther’s 1518 Heidelberg Disputation, which has its roots in Paul. Just as Luther decried justification by works, so he confronted the theologians who sought to replace the message of Christ crucified with images of their own gods. Moltmann is not concerned about historical questions regarding the accuracy of Luther’s portrayal of his opponents. Rather, Moltmann claims, “His theologia crucis is not an attack on medieval catholic theology as such, but what he recognized in it, man’s inhuman concern for self-deification through knowledge and works.”

For all humanity, therefore, “the knowledge of the cross brings a conflict of interest between God who has become man and man who wishes to become God.”

As Moltmann has been arguing up to this point, the cross resists

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78 CG, 56.
79 CG, 70.
80 CG, 70.
81 CG, 71.
all of its interpretations, standing beyond them and never being identified with them. “Because of its subject, the theology of the cross, right down to its method and practice, can only be polemical, dialectical, antithetical and critical theory.” It is through a theology of the cross that Moltmann attempts to bring his own theology closer to the cross and speak to that which strays from it.

Despite something of a continuum from misappropriations and misunderstandings of the cross to a theology that properly recognises the centrality of the cross to all Christian thinking and doing, though, the cross’s ongoing iconoclasm applies equally to every possible position on the continuum, however cruciform they may already purport or seek to be. In this case, Luther’s own theology of the cross is also limited. For example, Luther proposed considerable church reforms, but he largely failed to grasp the significance of the cross for wider feudal society, so that the secular powers remained quite comfortable alongside the emerging Lutheran church. Importantly, this insight also requires that the distinction between the cross and its interpretations applies to Moltmann’s own theology as well. A theology of the cross is always self-critical by virtue of its namesake. And although Moltmann does not make this claim explicitly at this point, it is required by the path he takes and is, indeed, consistent with the rest of his thought. As he writes in his introduction, for example, “This book is not meant to bring the discussion to a dogmatic conclusion, but to be, like a symbol, an invitation to thought and rethinking.”

Finally, although these opening chapters of CG seem to set out with quite different purposes when compared to the role of the contrastive paradigm in Moltmann’s methodology in TH, the two works nonetheless have much in common in this area. For both it is the God of Scripture—whether understood in terms of promise or crucifixion—who forms the theological centre and thus grounds criticism of church and society alike. It is only that in CG the focus is broadened to the distinction of the cross not only from Greek contributions in particular to Christian orthodoxy

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82 CG, 69.
83 CG, 6.
and contemporary systems of thought, but from all of Christian theology—past, present, and future—as well as from non-Christian forms of thought such as humanism. Moltmann does go on to address specifically Greek influences in the Christian tradition later on in CG. His current objective, though, is to situate this theology of the cross in its broader, christological context. This will be the focus of the following section.

5.3. *Solus Christus*: Moltmann’s Christological Method

Moltmann’s thoroughgoing focus on the cross in CG makes him vulnerable to the allegation that the cross has become a methodological principle for him, abstracted from theology’s proper object, God. But this is not the case. The cross is Christ’s cross and it is he who informs Moltmann’s reading of it in CG. Interestingly, Moltmann’s later claim when looking back on his career that “up to now these questions about method have not greatly interested me” finds an important exception in CG. Following his chapters on the identity and relevance dilemma and the cross against its interpretations, Moltmann proceeds to delve into the deeper christological basis on which his argument has rested up until this point. In his third chapter, he begins with the questions asked about Jesus that guide different theological approaches. He finds certain presuppositions underpinning these questions that disqualify them for the task, pointing to the need to begin with Jesus’ own question about himself. In his fourth and fifth chapters, Moltmann reflects on Jesus from both historical and eschatological viewpoints, respectively. The one begins with Jesus’ life and proceeds to his death. The other starts with the resurrection and turns back to survey Jesus’ life in this light. Of chief importance for Moltmann in his argument throughout these chapters, however, is the centrality of the person and history of Jesus to the theological task. And this is bound with assumptions regarding the role of Scripture in theology. I will detail some of these in the final two subsections of this section, expounding Moltmann’s presentation of Jesus’ relationship to the OT and the NT.

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84 ExpTh, xiv (2000).
5.3.1. The Possibility of Christology

Moltmann had ended his previous chapter with the questions: “Is this theology of the cross in accordance with Jesus who was historically crucified? Does the word of the cross, as Paul calls the gospel, absorb the person of Jesus and the event of the crucifixion into language?” The theology of the cross finds its basis in the context of the whole “history” of Jesus.

Setting out from this christological centre, then, Moltmann proceeds in his third chapter to assess three different lines of approach typically taken in christology. The first finds its origin in the theology of the early church and has been affirmed by Christian orthodoxy throughout the centuries. Here, an a priori concept of God constitutes the starting point for discerning the nature and person of Jesus. This approach sees Jesus as “the incarnation of eternal, original, unchangeable being in the sphere of temporal, decaying, transitory existence.” But for Moltmann, such an approach is subject to Feuerbach’s criticism that human limitations such as finitude and mortality are merely negated and projected onto God. Moreover, the divine attributes assumed by this approach control its christology from the outset. In the early church, for example, working with such presuppositions, it became increasingly difficult “to demonstrate that the Son of God who was of one substance with God was Jesus of Nazareth, crucified under Pontius Pilate.” A possible solution to this problem might be found in German idealism, philosophers of which similarly set out from a priori assumptions about God to develop their christologies. Hegel is an especially notable example because, in contrast to the theology of the early church, he posited finitude and death as necessary to the divine being. Yet this has its own problems. Moltmann observes, “The idea of the incarnation of God and even the ‘fearful thought’ of the death of God can be thought necessary for the sake of

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85 CG, 73.
86 The same logic employed in this chapter underlines that of Moltmann’s earlier criticisms of the “proofs of God.” See 3.3.2.
87 CG, 88.
88 See 4.2.5.
89 CG, 89.
God… but it is difficult to deduce and not particularly easy to reconstruct his incarnation in Jesus of Nazareth and his death in the death of Jesus on Golgotha.”\(^90\) The same problem remains—that of starting out from an \textit{a priori} concept of God and then attempting to reconcile this to the historical person of Jesus.

A second approach, popularised by liberal Protestantism, is interested less in Jesus’ relationship to God than it is in his relationship to humanity. Historically, this basically resulted from a reversal of relationship of human beings to their world. With the industrial revolution and the development of modern science, “man is no longer dependent upon uncomprehended forces in nature and history, recognizing in this dependence his total reliance on the gods or on God. Instead, nature and history have become increasingly dependent upon man.”\(^91\) What guides the christological questions of modernity is no longer concern for securing anthropic being in the infinite (Feuerbach), but for living out an authentic finite existence. In contrast to traditional christology, then, which presupposes a particular notion of God, this approach presupposes a particular anthropology that the history of Jesus is supposed to conform to. Moltmann finds this, too, problematic, however, because it does not provide any reason to view Jesus differently from other great historical figures, and, significantly, “it becomes intolerable to take into account his abandonment by God to death on the cross in all its severity.”\(^92\)

A third approach is provided by the historical context of Jesus’ own life. This is particularly amenable to the task of christology because “the expectations and language which formed the background to Jesus’ life… do not simply belong to the past, but in substance are still a living reality alongside Christianity in Judaism and atheistic messianism.”\(^93\) The latter movements both seek an answer to their suffering that cannot be found in the present but must be sought in the future, a future that Moltmann proclaims is promised and anticipated in Jesus. Notably, for Moltmann this avoids the issues that arise with an \textit{a priori} concept of God or humanity: “The divine

\(^{90}\) CG, 91-92.
\(^{91}\) CG, 92.
\(^{92}\) CG, 97.
\(^{93}\) CG, 98.
world does not ascend to earth in him, nor does man, seeking his identity, find himself in him. A new future for God, man and the world in their history together is being inaugurated.” Only this third approach takes seriously the openness of both God and humanity to a common future. Moreover, Jesus’ historical particularity is thus not inessential to his person. He finds his place in the midst of Israel’s promissory history and the future fulfilment of this in God’s future.

Nonetheless, Moltmann does not want to rest even on this point. A final christological approach considers the question that Jesus himself asks: “Who do you say I am?” Moltmann reflects, “If the question of Christ, whatever form it takes, is to do justice to Jesus himself, its relationship to him must not be one of questioning, but of being questioned.” Christology has its beginning in Jesus himself. But, as such, it cannot offer any final answers while Jesus’ history is still in process. Rather, it must be continually revised in light of his history until it finds its consummation in his coming.

5.3.2. The Task of a Historical and Eschatological Christology

While Moltmann does not explicitly employ the terms adventus and futurum in CG, employed throughout his earlier essays following TH, it would be difficult to deny that the distinction underpins his project. Indeed, it is unclear why he did not use this language, as it also remains a staple of his later theology. Nonetheless, the logic underpinning this distinction appears in modified form in CG with Moltmann’s distinction between eschatology and history. He thus introduces his fourth and fifth chapters, writing, “The following two chapters deal with the historical and eschatological trial of Jesus. We shall attempt to achieve an understanding of the crucified Christ, first of all in the light of his life and ministry, which led to his crucifixion, and

94 CG, 98-99.
95 CG, 103.
96 See 4.1.2.
then in the light of the eschatological faith which proclaims his resurrection from the
dead, and in so doing proclaims him as the Christ.”98 History here refers to the events
as they are seen temporally and chronologically, beginning with Jesus’ ministry and
ending with his death.99 This is distinguished from eschatology, which works in the
opposite direction, beginning with Jesus’ future and proceeding to the events of his
earthly life.

Despite the considerable difference between historical and eschatological ap-
proaches, the two form a basic unity insofar as theological methodology is con-
cerned. “Both perspectives [historical and eschatological] must be reciprocally re-
lated to one another, if his [Christ’s] truth is to be both perceived and understood.
Here one cannot separate historical consideration from eschatological understand-
ing, nor put the two things together afterwards. The historical Jesus is not ‘half
Christ’, nor is the risen Christ the other half of Jesus.”100 Rather, christology is “a
question of one and the same person and his unique history.”101 As such, Moltmann
cannot entertain a secular, atheistic view of history. For him, “his [Christ’s] history
is a theological history.”102 Moltmann’s own faith in the risen Christ and his con-
sistent affirmation of the unity of the historical and eschatological person of Christ
make it impossible for him to see Jesus’ history apart from Jesus’ relationship to God
the Father. Additionally, for a yet more simple reason, a theological approach is nec-
essary even before the resurrection comes into consideration, as the earthly Jesus also
viewed his life theologically: “His life, preaching and ministry, and his death too,
were in his own mind theologically determined.”103

Moltmann begins his fourth chapter—that on the historical content of chris-
tology—with a discussion of the relationship between the historical figure of Jesus

98 CG, 112.
99 “The resurrection of a dead man falls outside the framework of history, which is domi-
nated by death and men’s dying.” CG, 189.
101 CG, 160.
102 CG, 135.
103 CG, 113.
and the church’s kerygma. What is of particular interest here, however, is the material at the end of the chapter on Jesus’ “godforsaken” death.\(^{104}\) In stark contrast to the accounts of the deaths of Socrates, and Zealot, Stoic, and Christian martyrs, “Jesus clearly died in a different way. His death was not a ‘fine death’.\(^{105}\) Indeed, understood in the context of his life, in which Jesus assumed a special relationship with the God of his ancestors, unprecedented in the whole history of Israel, Jesus himself, as well as his followers, “could not regard his being handed over to death on the cross as one accursed as a mere mishap, a human misunderstanding or a final trial, but was bound to experience it as rejection by the very God whom he dared to call ‘My Father.’\(^{106}\) Moltmann goes on to comment on the necessity of following the evangelists in interpreting the crucifixion theologically, preparing the way for his major chapter on the relationship between the crucifixion and the Trinity. What is already clear at this point, though, is that when historical and eschatological approaches to Christ are treated as a unity, the hope found in Jesus’ resurrection is called into question by his crucifixion. History and eschatology form something like a dialectic, so that, whereas he had earlier claimed that the \textit{adventus} comes into the present in such a way as to open up new possibilities for history, the implication of Moltmann’s proposal in \textit{CG} is that the path to this new, alternative future is also compromised by present suffering. As he writes in a paraphrase of David Friedrich Strauss, “The true criticism of faith in the resurrection is the history of the crucified Christ.”\(^{107}\)

The other side of the relationship between Christ’s history and future is elucidated in Moltmann’s fifth chapter, where he approaches the life of Christ from the standpoint of eschatological, resurrection faith. Here, Christ’s “future determines

\(^{104}\) \textit{CG}, 145.
\(^{105}\) \textit{CG}, 146.
\(^{106}\) \textit{CG}, 148.
and explains his origin and his end his beginning.”\textsuperscript{108} As such, “Christian faith essentially reads the history of Jesus back to front,”\textsuperscript{109} so that the NT writers cannot approach the meaning of Jesus’ words, miracles, and crucifixion apart from the resurrection. Moreover, if Jesus had not been raised from the dead, his memory would have been swallowed up by history, “because his message had already been contradicted by his death on the cross.”\textsuperscript{110} At this point, however, Jesus’ resurrection not only ensures the memory and right interpretation of his life on the plane of secular, historical existence, but, even more than this, “Jesus was raised into God’s future.”\textsuperscript{111} The ontological priority that Moltmann earlier ascribed to God’s future is retained here so that Jesus, understood eschatologically, “must be called the \textit{incarnation} of the coming God in our flesh and in his death on the cross.”\textsuperscript{112} That is, the resurrection necessitates that the events of Jesus’ life be understood as descending into the present from God’s future.

But an eschatological christology also raises important questions. If the coming God acted only in Christ’s resurrection, “why did he keep silent over the cross of Jesus and his dying cry? Had he forgotten him? Was he absent?”\textsuperscript{113} To answer this, Moltmann turns to 2 Cor 5:19, where Paul claims that “God was in Christ” (KJV). Moltmann reflects, “In other words, God not only acted in the crucifixion of Jesus or

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\textsuperscript{108} CG, 164. \\
\textsuperscript{109} CG, 162. \\
\textsuperscript{110} CG, 162. \\
\textsuperscript{111} CG, 168. \\
\textsuperscript{112} CG, 184, emphasis original. Moltmann makes similar comments in two essays published in 1968. The “future of God and man... has become flesh in Jesus, the crucified, and thus has become involved in the present.” RRF, 53. “There is inherent in the Christ-event a real \textit{incarnation} of God’s future. Eschatological subordinationism results only if from the particular presence of Christ one looks upon the universal future of God. If, conversely, one looks from the future of God to the presence of Christ, one finds in him the incarnation of God.” RRF, 213, emphasis original. Bauckham’s comment could be misleading here: “Moltmann moved from an early stress on the wholly future God who contradicts present reality [in \textit{TH}] to a later emphasis (in \textit{The Crucified God}) on the incarnate God who identifies with the suffering of the present.” Bauckham, \textit{Moltmann: Messianic Theology}, 41, cf. 57-58. Nonetheless, “After 1967, Moltmann dropped the attempt to define God purely as future in relation to history. However, the priority of the future remains essential to his thinking.” Ibid., 94. There is a change of focus but not a retraction. \\
\textsuperscript{113} CG, 190.
\end{flushright}
sorrowfully allowed it to happen, but was himself active with his own being in the
dying Jesus and suffered with him.”114 Even in Moltmann’s eschatological approach
to christology, then, the crucifixion carries significant theological weight, and more
than it did in TH. The cross requires that the God of the future, whom we come to
know in Christ’s resurrection, must in some sense be present in the crucifixion.

5.3.3. Jesus and the Old Testament

Fundamental assumptions that Moltmann holds about the nature of the Old and
New Testaments are made especially apparent in these christological chapters. Most
of the material in this first subsection concerns Moltmann’s claims concerning Jesus’
uniqueness in light of the OT. In the following subsection I will attend to Moltmann’s
handling of NT texts, focussing on what this reveals about the role that historical
criticism plays in his work.

In regard to the OT, Moltmann perceives his project here to be in line with
that of TH (1964), where the figure of Jesus is both in continuity and discontinuity
with the OT.115 And yet he also goes further than he did in TH, emphasising the
uniqueness of Jesus among his contemporaries, and thus bringing into sharp relief
the discontinuity between Jesus and the OT. As the disciples reported to Jesus on
how he was perceived by others: “Some say John the Baptist, but others Elijah, and
still others Jeremiah or one of the prophets” (Matt 16:14). For Peter, though, Jesus
was “the Messiah, the Son of the Living God” (16:16). And it was only God who
could show this to him. But, somewhat puzzlingly, Moltmann goes on to state, “The
claim that he [Jesus] made could obviously not be comprehended in one of the titles
of Israel’s tradition of salvation history.”116 Certainly this is the case when comparing
Jesus to other historical figures—as a plain reading of the text from Matthew demon-
strates—but Moltmann takes yet another step, rejecting even the titles of Messiah

114 CG, 190.
115 CG, 157 n. 47. See 3.4.4. But cf. here the criticisms catalogued by Bauckham—that, regret-
tably, Moltmann does not give the same level of attention to the OT in CG as he did in TH.
Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology, 158 n. 18.
116 CG, 104.
and Son of God. This does not mean, however, that Peter’s confession has no positive significance. In asking the question, “Who do people say that the Son of Man is?” (Matt 16:13), Moltmann comments, “It is as though he [Jesus] wanted first of all to draw out a recognition of himself, as if he depended upon the revelation of himself through God and those who believed in him.”\(^{117}\) That is, Peter’s confession rightly recognises Jesus for who he is, but it holds no monopoly over his identity. Thus, Moltmann continues, “The life, words and actions of the Jesus of the synoptic gospels are centred not upon himself, but on the future which is called the ‘kingdom of God’. His God and Father is to reveal him as the one who he truly is.”\(^{118}\) Jesus’ identity cannot be communicated comprehensively on the basis of the OT texts precisely because its definition lies primarily in a future that has not yet been realised.

Moltmann also draws attention to the new grace of God that Jesus demonstrated in his preaching and ministry: “It is no longer the righteousness of God glorified in the law, but that righteousness revealing itself through prevenient grace.”\(^{119}\) From a historical perspective, this can be seen in Jesus’ association with “sinners and tax collectors” and his forgiveness of sins, demonstrating a grace not yet shown to Israel throughout all its history. Similarly, in contrast to the preaching of John the Baptist and other contemporaries, Jesus proclaimed a kingdom in which God’s intention was “not to judge but to save.”\(^{120}\) From an eschatological perspective, this new grace of God is realised in Jesus’ resurrection as a blasphemer,\(^{121}\) rejected by the religious authorities; a rebel,\(^{122}\) crucified by Rome; and a godforsaken man, aban-

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117 CG, 104.
118 CG, 104.
119 CG, 105.
120 CG, 147.
121 This designation is disputed by Eugene Borowitz on the grounds that “we cannot be certain what Jewish laws, if any, Jesus broke.” Eugene B. Borowitz, Contemporary Christologies: A Jewish Response (New York: Paulist, 1980), 91. But see my next footnote.
122 Moltmann draws on Oscar Cullmann and Martin Hengel to argue for the politically agitative nature of Jesus’ ministry, leading to the perception that he was a Zealot and therefore to his consequent crucifixion: “The theological conflict between Jesus and the contemporory understanding of the law can explain his rejection as a ‘blasphemer’, and in some circumstances his condemnation by the Sanhedrin, if such a trial is historical, but does not
doned by his Father. Such a resurrection reveals decisively God’s love for the unrighteous. And it is through this resurrection that Jesus’ Father “becomes God and Father of the godless and the godforsaken.”123

Significantly, Moltmann locates this love towards the godless not in any OT promise but in the freedom of God. Indeed, divine freedom exercised a similar function for Moltmann in TH. In the prophets, for example, “Yahweh not only annuls the debts of Israel, but he annuls also the institutions of his own covenant in his unfathomable freedom to adopt new ways.”124 So, too, the prevenient grace of God in Jesus’ ministry is an exercise of divine sovereignty: “Jesus placed his preaching of God, and therefore placed himself, above the authority of Moses and the Torah. The freedom of God is unmistakably manifested in the attitude and behaviour of Jesus, in the antitheses of the Sermon on the Mount, in the call to follow him and in his sovereign transgression of the sabbath commandment.”125

Another aspect of Jesus’ uniqueness that informs Moltmann’s argument here is his addressing God as Father. “This is the expression of a fellowship with God which is not mediated through the covenant, the nation and tradition, and must explain his execution by crucifixion. Jesus did not undergo the punishment for blasphemy, which in Israel at his time, as can be seen from the death of Stephen, was always that of stoning. Jesus was crucified by the Roman occupying power.” CG, 136, emphasis mine. Such a reading both underscores the need for a political theology today and, in view of the Holocaust and anti-Semitism, attempts to emphasise Roman rather than Jewish responsibility for Jesus’ death. This is stated more plainly in WJC, 141, 163-64 (1989), following Otto Betz. Moltmann’s argument for the political character of Jesus’ ministry has been contested by Randall Otto in God of Hope, 128-30, who argues that the Jewish authorities played a major part in Jesus’ trial, following the charge of blasphemy. Quite the opposite is argued by A. Roy Eckardt, who contends that Moltmann’s comments on Jewish complicity in Jesus’ death are a form of Christian anti-Semitism. A. Roy Eckardt, “Jürgen Moltmann, the Jewish People, and the Holocaust,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 44:4 (1976): 675-91, at 677-79. While not commenting on the charge of blasphemy, C. Keith Boone nonetheless suggests that Moltmann overstates the political nature of Jesus’ death. C. Keith Boone, “Political Majesty: Promise or Peril to Contemporary Society,” Thought 56:221 (1981): 163-77, at 170-71. In my opinion, a new investigation drawing on the best of contemporary biblical scholarship would be required to assess the validity of Moltmann’s claims and the counterclaims of his detractors.

123 CG, 192.
124 TH, 127.
125 CG, 128, slightly adjusted.
therefore be termed a direct fellowship.” This leads Moltmann to adopt a striking thesis. He writes concerning Jesus’ words on the cross, which are given as a quote from Ps 22:1 in Mark and Matthew: “It is not right to interpret the cry of Jesus in the sense of Ps 22, but more proper to interpret the words of the psalm here in the sense of the situation of Jesus.” Because Jesus is not simply a covenant partner—as is the Israelite speaking the psalm—but the Son of God, these words have a completely different meaning in this context. The God addressed is not simply the God of Israel as known through the OT but the God who has shown an unfathomable, new grace to the nation through Jesus’ ministry and, moreover, the one whom Jesus has known intimately as his Father.

Elsewhere, nonetheless, the discontinuity between Jesus and the OT is transferred to the discontinuity between Jesus and his contemporaries. Moltmann is careful to highlight throughout that Jesus’ conflict is not with the OT itself but with the “guardians of the law,” or a particular “understanding of the law” (Gesetzverständnis) such as a “legalist” (gesetzlich) or “nomist” (nomistisch) one. “Thus when we have spoken of the conflict into which Jesus came with the ‘law’, this does not refer to the Old Testament Torah as instruction in the covenant of promise. The more the understanding of the Torah became remote from the promise, the more violent became the conflict with the gospel.” On the other hand, however, Moltmann is quite happy to speak of Jesus’ divine freedom to go beyond the boundaries set by Moses and the Torah, as shown above. Tellingly, he writes, “Jesus’ claim of authority had no legitimizing basis in the traditions of Israel, either in the traditions of the rabbis

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126 CG, 147.
129 CG, 128, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 141, 145, 149, 151, 175; Ger., 122, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 134 (Gesetzaußfassung: perception or grasp of the law), 138, 142, 144, 163.
130 CG, 135; Ger., 128.
131 CG, 135.
and Pharisees, or in those of the prophets and of apocalyptic.”132 This is due to the orientation of Israel’s traditions, including the OT, to human righteousness. But perhaps these twin concerns for Jesus’ conflict with his contemporaries’ understanding of the law and his freedom to go beyond the OT need not be contradictory. Certainly this must be the case if Moltmann is to place emphasis on both. Indeed, for Moltmann, Jesus’ history was chiefly in conflict with the competing interpretations of Scripture that were entertained in his day. The promise to Abraham and Paul’s reading of it is evidence that other interpretations of the OT more amenable to the person and history of Jesus are possible and necessary.133 Moreover, it is precisely the OT theology of promise which anticipates and finds its true expression in Jesus’ conflict with other interpretations in the first place. Such a position on the relationship between Jesus and the promise is especially important in Moltmann’s opinion for maintaining the shared hope of Israel and the church.

5.3.4. Jesus and the New Testament

Moltmann’s handling of Jesus’ relationship to the NT in these chapters of CG is also significant. Indeed, the NT both further legitimates Moltmann’s christological criterion and presupposes it, as the NT authors, especially those of the synoptic gospels, turned to the history of Jesus for their content. Nonetheless, this does not mean that every statement found here is automatically correct by virtue of its intended foundation in the history of Jesus. Moltmann acknowledges the work of historical criticism in challenging the church to scrutinise the relationship between Jesus and Scripture more closely. He traces a line from the christological criterion of the NT, through the Reformation’s sola scriptura, to the quest of the historical Jesus today. This third

132 CG, 130, emphasis mine.
133 Reflecting back on TH, Moltmann writes, “I have therefore related the conflict between law and gospel to the promise to Abraham, the promise of life, and have argued that through the gospel this promise was liberated from the shadow of a legalist understanding of the law and given universal force for everyone who believes, whether Jew or Gentile.” CG, 134-35.
phase is particularly significant for modern theology. Such a judgement, however, does not require that the quest’s presuppositions be accepted without question.

Moltmann characterises the quest of the historical Jesus as “a direct successor of the continuing christological revisionism set in motion by the critical theology of the Reformation.” The quest was successful in reminding theology of its true criterion, the person and history of Jesus. But it also failed to perceive the real continuity between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith. For Moltmann, differences between Jesus’ preaching and that of Paul, for example, do not chiefly derive from Paul having misunderstood Jesus, but from the changed circumstances in which Paul’s ministry took place. Thus, “Jesus speaks and acts with respect to the dominion of God which is to come and is now coming into being. Paul speaks and acts with regard to the dominion of God which has already been inaugurated in the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus.” This continuity between the preaching of Jesus and Paul is grounded in the former’s crucifixion and resurrection. His crucifixion shows the content of his preaching to be empty, but his resurrection contradicts this yet again, demonstrating that the kingdom of God has come and is coming. “The historical and hermeneutic question, how Jesus who preached became Christ who is preached, is therefore basically the christological question, how the dead Jesus became the living.” For this reason, as in the quest of the historical Jesus, it is ultimately only Jesus’ history that legitimates christology. Yet, the quest is in danger of misunderstanding this history where the contradiction of Jesus’ preaching by the cross and the contradiction of his cross by the resurrection are overlooked.

If it was the person and history of Jesus that informed the formation of the NT, the Reformation principle of *sola scriptura*, and the iconoclastic work of modern historical criticism, then his person and history remain the fundamental criterion for continued reading of the NT today. It is thus that Moltmann can speak generally of “the Jesus of the synoptic gospels,” implying a distinction between Jesus’ history

134 CG, 117.
135 CG, 120.
136 CG, 123.
137 CG, 103.
and how it is reported by the NT authors. This also allows Moltmann to make more specific judgements on the historicity of certain details in the gospels. For example, he writes, “We have very little interpretation of Jesus’ death by himself; such an interpretation occurs at best in the tentative form of the passion prophecies, if they are themselves historical.”

The tension between history and subsequent accounts of it comes to a head in Moltmann’s discussion of Jesus’ cry on the cross. Moltmann begins, “Because, as the Christian tradition developed, this terrible cry of the dying Jesus was gradually weakened in the passion narratives and replaced by words of comfort and triumph, we can probably rely upon it as a kernel of historical truth.” Thus, for Luke, “Jesus did not die ‘forsaken by God,’ but as an exemplary martyr.” And, “for John Jesus’ struggle ends with his victory and glorification on the cross.” Later manuscripts of Mark, too, provide a “watered down” version of the cry in 15:34. Conversely, the earlier reading found in Mark is supported by Heb 5:7, as well as Jesus’ distress in Gethsemane, which the other synoptics also attest. Mark’s rendering of the cry with the words of Ps 22:1 is nonetheless “certainly an interpretation of the church after Easter,” though, as I will show, this particular gap between history and interpretation is of little consequence for Moltmann. I have indicated elsewhere that there are some problems with Moltmann’s methodology here, particularly in his overlooking the potential literary or theological motivations of Mark for depicting Jesus this

138 CG, 127, emphasis mine.
139 CG, 146. This claim is perhaps in part inspired by the writings of Albert Camus. See Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology, 82-83.
140 CG, 147.
141 CG, 147.
142 CG, 147. Moltmann does not provide any formal citations here, but see, e.g., Bruce M. Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1994), 120.
143 In response to Moltmann here, Wayne Herman asks, “Can we not understand Jesus to have truly experienced the agony of abandonment by his Father, yet at the same time have died with the quiet assurance that he would be vindicated? The NT preserves for us a firm conviction by the early church that this was indeed the case (e.g., Heb 12:2; 1 Pet 2:23).” Wayne R. Herman, “Moltmann’s Christology,” Studia Biblica et Theologica 17:1 (1989): 3-31, at 28.
144 CG, 146.
way. Interestingly, however, Moltmann finds the words supplied by Mark to complement an otherwise strictly historical account of Jesus’ crucifixion. For Moltmann, while it is unlikely that Jesus spoke these exact words, the sense of the citation is true to Jesus’ situation. He was indeed “forsaken” by God. Significantly, then, Moltmann is not completely dismissive of theologically motivated retellings of Jesus’ history in Scripture. On the contrary, Mark’s retelling actually works to helpfully illuminate the real situation faced by the Jesus on the cross.

Moltmann’s presentation of the relationship between the NT and the historical Jesus is interesting and provocative. Without this methodological groundwork, his central theses on trinitarian suffering would likely not be as readily considered by his various readers. But questions also remain. While Moltmann demonstrates a definite preference for that which he deems to be more historically probable, he still shows interest in theological reflection on the historical events — reflection, first and foremost, that takes place in Scripture. In TH, the theological value of ahistorical biblical sources was justified on the basis of their connection to the history of promise. Their truth was located not so much in their correspondence to historical reality but in their correspondence to the hopes arising out of this reality. A similar logic is at work in CG, where Mark’s reading of the crucifixion is justified insofar as it captures the nihilistic force of the event that Moltmann believes to have transpired historically. And although a more definite set of criteria is lacking in order to determine just what biblical interpretations are most valuable in this sense, perhaps Moltmann neglects such a task in order to acknowledge that it does not belong to him but to the cross, which requires that all such criteria be in continual revision.

A change in Moltmann’s approach to Scripture is discernible in the move from history to eschatology. Commenting on the significance of the resurrection for the NT, Moltmann observes, “As the New Testament shows, not only in the epistles but also in the gospels, Christian faith essentially reads the history of Jesus back to

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145 Cameron Coombe, “Reading Scripture with Moltmann: The Cry of Dereliction and the Trinity,” Colloquium 48:2 (2016): 130-45. Moltmann wrote to me in response, explaining, “The priority of Mark’s passion narrative was opinio communis among the NT scholars in Germany in my time.”
The resurrection “was the only reason why his words and his story were remembered and why people were concerned with him.” Specifically, “only it [the resurrection] says who really suffered and died here.” As such, the NT does not soberly recount Jesus’ history in historical-critical terms, in order to present his life apart from resurrection hope. This would have been impossible for the early Christians and, indeed, a misunderstanding of the unity of Jesus’ historical and eschatological person. It is not only the historical underpinnings of Mark’s gospel, then, that attract Moltmann to that particular book but the eschatological perspective that pervades the Gospel of Mark: “For Paul and Mark, the theological accent is placed entirely on... the transformation of the historical sense of time into an eschatological sense of time. The risen Christ is the crucified Christ.” The tension between Moltmann’s historical and theological interests in Mark, insofar as the latter does not concern the theology of the historical Jesus but that of the post-Easter church, is thus not resolved in favour of the one or the other. Mark’s connection to the historical reality and his post-resurrection perspective work together to provide a christology that is essential for subsequent reflection on Jesus.

This dual approach also informs Moltmann’s reading of the other gospels. In the context of the historical question of what actually happened on the cross, Moltmann showed suspicion towards the accounts of Luke and John. Significantly, in his eschatological treatment of Jesus, the apparent historical failings of these gospels fall by the wayside as he finds their resurrection-inspired commentary to be theologically valuable. On the one hand, for example, the NT situates God’s glory in the crucifixion, thus closely identifying God with the event. On the other hand, “when John stresses that Jesus was glorified on the cross, the converse implication is that the glory of God was crucified in him and thus made manifest in this unjust world.” John might not capture the dereliction of the cross as well as Mark, but his interest

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146 CG, 162.
147 CG, 162.
148 CG, 182, emphasis original.
149 CG, 184.
150 CG, 169.
in the relationship between glory and the cross serves a complementary theological agenda. Moreover, John 3:16 is an important summary of the gospel message.\footnote{151 CG, 244; cf. CPS, 95 (1975).} Notably, here Moltmann associates the theology of the Fourth Gospel with that of 1 John, in particular 1 John 4:16, “God is love,” a verse that immediately follows Moltmann’s gospel citation and will grow in significance for him throughout his career.\footnote{152 See my appendix. Indeed, CG is the first place Moltmann cites 1 John 4:16, at CG, 244, 247. He also cites 4:17 at CG, 253, though his interest in this verse is comparatively short-lived.}

Luke, too, provides theologically valuable insights that inform Moltmann’s argument. The Emmaus account, for instance, consolidates the identity of the Crucified and Risen One, in Jesus’ question: “Was it not necessary that the Messiah should suffer these things and then enter into his glory?” (24:26).\footnote{153 CG, 180-81. Cf. Moltmann’s affirmative citations of Luke 4:21 on p. 121; 13:32 and 22:25-27 on p. 138; and 6:24 and 12:16ff. on p. 141.} In this vein, although Moltmann might be charged with the specific crime of setting aside Luke’s and John’s accounts of Jesus’ last moments, the more general charge of bypassing these voices altogether does not hold up in light of this other evidence. Indeed, Moltmann appears to move quite comfortably between the truth of the gospels from an eschatological perspective and the necessity of subjecting them to historical criticism. That Luke and John draw their readers’ attention away from the horrors of the cross, at least when contrasted with Mark’s account, might mean that their accounts are less historical here. It does not necessarily mean, however, that their accounts have nothing valuable to say at all at these points. As such, referring to Luke’s passion narrative, Moltmann speaks of “the martyr christology which ever since Luke has repeatedly presented Jesus as the archetype or example of faith under temptation.”\footnote{154 CG, 148.} While, in the immediate context, this appears to be a negative evaluation of the historicity of Luke, it can also be read with Moltmann’s other, appreciative comments
on martyrdom in CG. The practice has been “the closest form of following the crucified Christ” throughout history.\textsuperscript{155} Here, then, although Luke diverges from the historical reality of Jesus’ crucifixion, his presentation of Jesus’ confidence in death has functioned to give comfort and encouragement to martyrs all through the centuries.\textsuperscript{156}

Finally, Moltmann’s differentiated treatment of the historical and eschatological interests of the NT writers raises the question of divine inspiration. Over a decade earlier, he was particularly critical of the doctrine’s excesses and seemed to accept it, somewhat reluctantly, in modified form.\textsuperscript{157} But while Moltmann does not discuss the doctrine at all in CG, his pneumatology does provide some clues concerning his assumptions. First, though, it should be noted that there is something of a pneumatological deficit in CG. As Moltmann writes in 1985, “In my book [CG], however, I did not get further than seeing a binity of God the Father and Jesus the Son of God. Where was the Holy Spirit, who according to the Nicene Creed is to be worshipped and glorified together with the Father and the Son?”\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{155} CG, 57.

\textsuperscript{156} Notably, just three years later, it is the christologies of Luke and John that ground Moltmann’s friendship christology in CPS, 116-19 (1975).

\textsuperscript{157} See 2.1.1.

\textsuperscript{158} HTG, 174; cf. CPS, xx-xxi (1975); Moltmann in DGG, 184-85 (1979). Other writers have pointed this out as well. See the discussion of Moltmann’s pneumatology in TH and CG, with its maturation from the point of TKG (1980) onwards in D. Lyle Dabney, “The Advent of the Spirit: The Turn to Pneumatology in the Theology of Jürgen Moltmann,” Ashbury Theological Journal 48:1 (1993): 81-107. But cf. also the recent, positive assessment by the Pentecostal theologian, Amos Yong, in “The Coming of Spirit Theology: Moltmann, Pneumatology, and Trinitarian Eschatology for the Third Millennium,” in Jürgen Moltmann and the Work of Hope: The Future of Christian Theology, ed. M. Douglas Meeks, 53-75 (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2018). As an aside, it is worth noting David McIlroy’s claim that Moltmann’s later pneumatology remains deficient on biblical grounds: “One of the surprising things about Moltmann’s pneumatology, given the way in which he develops his christology, is the limited extent to which Moltmann explores its roots in Jewish messianic expectation. Whereas he is rightly insistent on the connection between Jewish messianic hope and Jesus Christ, his Old Testament references to the Spirit are to the ruach of God seen in the context of creation or the psalms. The connection of the Spirit of God with the law and with righteousness and holiness, to be found in the link between wisdom and Torah, and most notably in the new covenant prophecies of Jeremiah and Ezekiel are notable by their almost total absence from Moltmann’s pneumatology.” David H. McIlroy, A Trinitarian Theology...
Where Moltmann does speak of the Spirit, it is notable that he quite consistently associates it with the resurrection and the eschatological orientation of the event. Jesus’ post-resurrection appearances guaranteed the imminence of the coming kingdom to the early church. “In recognizing his ‘resurrection from the dead’, they also traced in themselves the ‘Spirit of resurrection’, the ‘Spirit which brings life’ (Rom 8:11), and waited in the ‘power of the resurrection’ (Phil 3:10) for the coming appearance of Christ in glory.”

As shown above, for Moltmann this resurrection-fervour positively impacts the evangelists’ recollection of Jesus’ history, as they read it through the lens of eschatological hope. But, Moltmann argues, the church’s post-resurrection experience of the Spirit is also grounded in and delimited by this history. “The gospels intentionally direct the gaze of Christians away from the experiences of the risen Christ and the Holy Spirit back to the earthly Jesus and his way to the cross.”

And, “as the gospels were written, the experiences of Christ and the Spirit at the present moment were subjected to criticism and linked to the history of Jesus himself.” This perhaps explains Moltmann’s critical handling of the gospels’ historicity. Although the authorial task surely proceeds in the power of the Spirit, the fruit of this is subject to the history of Jesus, whose death calls it into question—just as his death is called into question by his resurrection! It is true that Moltmann does not draw a connection between this dialectic and his hermeneutic in CG. Nevertheless, this is how his hermeneutic implicitly functions in CG, even if there are some biases to one side, namely the cross. The history of Jesus up to his death disciplines overly enthusiastic readings of his life in the post-Easter church, and the negation of his death in the resurrection disciplines overly cynical readings of his earthly end.

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159 CG, 178, slightly adjusted.
160 CG, 54.
161 CG, 115.
162 It is true that “for Moltmann, then, the criteria by which one reads and discerns Scripture is neither an external ideological framework nor a particular central idea within the Bible, a canon within the canon, but it is the history about which it testifies, and which points beyond itself.” Poul F. Guttesen, Leaning into the Future: The Kingdom of God in the Theology of Jürgen Moltmann and in the Book of Revelation (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2009), 31. Yet this does
In his fourth and fifth chapters, then, Moltmann further develops his theology of the cross in a broader christological context. He rejects traditional christologies that set out from an \textit{a priori} concept of God, as well as post-Enlightenment christologies that set out from an \textit{a priori} concept of human being, proposing instead a history in which both God and human being are ontologically open to their common future. This leads Moltmann to advocate two equally necessary and complementary approaches to the christological task, the historical and the eschatological. Such a development is not only significant in regard to Moltmann’s methodological centre—so that it is not simply the cross but the crucified Christ in historical and eschatological perspective that constitutes this centre—but is bound up with key hermeneutical commitments. In regard to the OT, the locus of Jesus’ history and identity in his future requires that his person cannot be comprehensively derived from the OT, regardless of how precise the hermeneutic might otherwise be. In regard to the NT, even here the event of the cross remains the criterion of truth for the words of the gospel writers. Nonetheless, the resurrection also illuminates and gives meaning to this history, so that the gospels do not simply recount the brute facts of history but narrate stories with a deeper, theological purpose.

5.4. The Theology of the Cross against Theism and Atheism

The most enduring feature of Moltmann’s contribution to modern theology is to be found in \textit{CG}’s sixth chapter, in which he develops an approach to the Trinity that he believes is necessitated by the cross. Following Paul Althaus’s pregnant comment, “Jesus died for God before he died for us,”\footnote{Paul Althaus, \textit{Theologische Aufsätze}, vol. 1 (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1929), 23, translation taken from \textit{CG}, 201. Moltmann does not provide a citation.} Moltmann writes, “A serious fault of earlier Protestant theology was that it did not look at the cross in the context of the relationship of the Son to the Father, but related it directly to mankind as an expiatory death for sin. Later Protestant Jesuology was even worse, as it saw his death not provide the full picture. Moltmann also finds meaning in the theological reflections and assumptions of the biblical writers themselves, and not just the history they attest.
only as exemplary obedience in suffering and the proof of his faithfulness to his calling.” As Moltmann has already argued, the cross holds a central and non-negotiable place in Christian faith and theology. From the doctrine of the Trinity, especially, it cannot be excluded. No, “the nucleus of everything that Christian theology says about ‘God’ is to be found in this Christ event.” I have divided the material pertaining to this chapter of CG into two sections. In the first section I attend to Moltmann’s criticisms of modern theology, traditional theology or “theism,” atheism, and Chalcedonian christology. In the second section I will expound Moltmann’s positive alternative in his trinitarian theology of the cross.

5.4.1. Modern Theologies of the Cross

Other modern theologians in their own way have responded to the call implicit in Althaus’s observation. Karl Rahner, for example, developed a theology of the cross that speaks of God’s death. According to Moltmann, however, his formulation is insufficiently trinitarian—even if Rahner was a major figure in the trinitarian revival of the twentieth century, and even if Moltmann himself will even give this second

164 CG, 201.
165 CG, 205.
aspect of Rahner’s thought a central role in his argument later on in the chapter!\textsuperscript{167} But Moltmann’s point is that Rahner was not consistent in his trinitarianism. As he writes of Karl Barth’s theology of the cross, and of that of Eberhard Jüngel and H. G. Geyer who followed him, such claims start to fall apart when the “simple concept of God” which these theologians presuppose results in the paradoxical statement that “God is ‘dead’ on the cross and yet is not dead.”\textsuperscript{168} For Moltmann, the problem here is that death and life are at the same time ultimately predicated of the undifferentiated divine nature, rather than of the respective trinitarian persons. Instead, Moltmann contends that each person suffers in a different way. But this is bound up with assumptions about divine unity, which I will address in detail in my following chapter.\textsuperscript{169}

Another Catholic theologian, Hans Urs von Balthasar, has also thought through the relationship between the cross and the doctrine of God, his approach being “more profound” than Rahner’s, and going beyond paradox in giving his exposition an explicitly “trinitarian” shape.\textsuperscript{170} Of course, the paths taken by the aforementioned theologians are also trinitarian—in the plainest sense of the term. For Moltmann, though, the designation in this context distinguishes what he believes to be an ultimately undifferentiated formulation of the death of God from the more persons-centred formulation of von Balthasar. Nonetheless, Moltmann argues, von Balthasar fails to give adequate attention to the character of divine mutability, passibility, and “death.”\textsuperscript{171} These latter aspects have instead been addressed by Heribert Mühlen and Hans Küng, though Moltmann does not provide any evaluative comment in regard to their work. Although in much of the book so far Moltmann has focussed on the central significance of the cross to Christian faith, here it begins to become clear that for him the Trinity, too, must take a central place in the investigation.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{167} CG, 240.
\item \textsuperscript{168} CG, 203.
\item \textsuperscript{169} See 6.3.2.--6.4.5.
\item \textsuperscript{170} CG, 202.
\item \textsuperscript{171} CG, 202. Moltmann places “death” in scare quotes.
\end{itemize}
5.4.2. Against Theism

Before developing his trinitarian theology of the cross, Moltmann directs his attention to various assumptions in the tradition that prevented theologians of former generations from recognising what Althaus later recognised. Moltmann returns to Luther’s Heidelberg Disputation, in which Luther criticised his contemporaries’ natural theology which derived from Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*. Yet, the origins of Peter’s own theology stretch back even further to the Stoics, who saw a divine Logos in nature that corresponded to the divine being. The Logos was present in a unique way in human beings, who could thus know and become like the divine. Although Peter reformulated these principles, departing from Stoic pantheism and affirming the Christian Creator–creature distinction, his break with Stoicism was, in Moltmann’s opinion, not decisive enough. Peter’s *analogia entis* brought God and creation closely together again, making God “indirectly evident and manifest through his works.” Moreover, Peter upheld an exalted form of human reason, voiding the epistemological limitations that creatureliness would otherwise entail.

Continuing in the Lombard’s tradition, Thomas Aquinas’s five ways of establishing the existence of God are especially telling here. Restating the Feuerbachian critique of religion that he appropriated in *TH* (1964), Moltmann contends that in Thomas’s first argument from motion—that is, that motion derives ultimately from a mover that is not itself moved—“God is then not thought of for his own sake but... for the sake of finite being. The heuristic interest is that of ‘securing’ God in and for finite being.” If Thomas’s argument were successful, finite being that is otherwise threatened with impending annihilation would now be grounded in the eternal and

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172 On this and the following subsection, cf. Willis, *Theism, Atheism and the Doctrine of the Trinity*, 76-115.
174 See 4.2.5.
175 CG, 211. In contrast, the theologian of the cross “does not name them [people] as they would wish out of fear of nothingness, but as they are accepted by the boundless suffering love of God.” CG, 213.
indestructible. But it cannot be successful, because it overlooks the “perverse situation of man.”

For Moltmann, then, a common being shared by creation and God, a human faculty of reason that appears largely untouched by sin, and a theological methodology compromised by its goal to overcome the limits of the finite by grounding it in the infinite—all of these demonstrate the failure of Peter and Thomas to take seriously the contradiction that is God’s revelation in the cross. Their theology begins with humanity’s epistemological ascent to God, but the theology of the cross begins with God’s descent to humanity in Christ. God descends “not so that man is divinized, but so that he is dedivinized and given new humanity in the community of the crucified Christ.”

This is what Moltmann intends to communicate with his dialectical approach to knowledge of God, introduced early on in *CG*. The dialectical approach contrasts with that of the analogical, Platonic “like is known only by like,” which was adopted early on in the church. Theology could then claim knowledge of God through analogy with creation, history, divine revelation, or the Holy Spirit. But, Moltmann argues, if this principle is applied consistently then “the Son of God would have had to remain in heaven, because he would be unrecognizable by anything earthly.” Analogy thus requires supplementation with dialectic. Following Schelling, this is expressed in the proposition that “every essence can only reveal itself in its opposite, love only in hate, unity in conflict.” Accordingly, God is revealed where there is no God: in the abandonment of Christ on the cross. Human beings must therefore surrender their desires for deification and look instead to the

176 CG, 211.
177 This is Moltmann’s interpretation of the *analogia entis*.
178 CG, 213.
179 A later, extended discussion of this concept is provided in Moltmann, *God for a Secular Society*, 135-52 (1990).
180 CG, 26; cf. Moltmann’s discussion of the genealogy of this principle on 30 n. 20.
181 CG, 27.
God who meets and justifies them in the midst of their godlessness. It is only then that they know God analogically, because they begin to become like God in being sanctified. Finally, Moltmann claims, such a corrective to traditional theological epistemology also has important ethical implications. Whereas theologies of glory seek their likeness—exalted human beings seeking an exalted God—a theology of the cross means that the church is directed to love that which is other, because God’s love is not directed to that which is already lovely, but to that which is ugly and despised.

At this point in the discussion, Moltmann introduces the term “theism” to designate the natural theology that he has been expounding. Theism “refers to that natural knowledge of God which is taken up by the Catholic and Protestant tradition in the article ‘De Deo uno’, and then more generally to monotheistic philosophy in its political, moral and cosmological significance.” The theological epistemology of natural theology, then, for Moltmann forms part of a larger structure that includes assumptions about divine immutability, impassibility, simplicity, and unity, for example, the latter which I will address in the following section of this chapter. Again, Moltmann follows Feuerbach in his criticism of theism: “As the nature of divine being is conceived of for the sake of finite being, it must embrace all the determinations of finite being and exclude those determinations which are directed against being.”

Death is thus excluded a priori from the infinite. This Feuerbachian character is theism’s most definitive aspect. It provides the negative basis for Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity in CG, where the cross and the biblical witness to the trinitarian persons provide the positive basis. That is, in contrast to theism, it must now be affirmed that death is not in contradiction to the infinite. God has taken it on in Christ. Conversely, God’s imperviousness to death is now predicable of human beings by virtue of their telos in the coming reign of God. But this latter claim differs from that of theism,

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183 CG, 281 n. 36. The dichotomy of theism and atheism is not new to CG. See RRF, 208-9 (1968). For an exploration of the theme in both Barth’s and Moltmann’s theologies, see Willis, Theism, Atheism and the Doctrine of the Trinity.
184 CG, 214.
which obviously also makes claims of eschatological human redemption. The theology of the cross requires that creation is not free from its finite limitations by virtue of its discovering its ground in the infinite. Rather, creation is becoming free because in the resurrection of the crucified the very structure of finitude has been transformed so that hope for a future that differs from the present has a real, ontological ground. Nor does this mean that creation hopes in a newfound, immanent potentiality. Creation continues to hope in the God who alone has defeated death and will bring this victory to fulfilment with the Parousia.

5.4.3. Against Atheism

It is not only theism, however, that obstructs the way to a properly crucicentric and trinitarian doctrine of God. Moltmann goes on to address its converse in atheism. Ironically, atheism is closely related to theism in that it, too, proceeds from the finite to the infinite, “but it finds no good and righteous God, but a capricious demon, a blind destiny, a damning law or an annihilating nothingness.” Yet this “protest atheism," despite suggestions to the contrary, is hardly as concerned with the existence of God as it is with seeking an end to the world’s suffering. It arises as a reaction to theism’s unconvincing and offensive solutions. Indeed, Moltmann takes the polemics of protest atheists to be made in the unconscious hope of provoking God to act. And this atheistic rebellion is exacerbated by the fact that theism proclaimed an impassible God. It made God “poorer than any man,” because “the one who cannot suffer cannot love either.”

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185 CG, 220.

186 Moltmann attributes this type of atheism (Protestatheismus) to Ivan Karamazov in Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov. He defines it as such: “The question of the existence of God is, in itself, a minor issue in the face of the question of the righteousness of the world.” CG, 221; Ger. 206. It is unclear where the term derives from, however. Searching Google Books suggests that German scholarship showed little interest in the term until the mid-seventies, and English scholarship until the mid-eighties. CG was published in German in 1972 and first translated into English in 1974. Roland Boer applies the term to Ernst Bloch, though perhaps Boer borrows it from elsewhere as I have not been able to find it in Bloch’s own writings. Roland Boer, On Marxism and Theology, vol. 1, Criticism of Heaven (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2007), 49.

187 CG, 222.
Despite its legitimate complaint, protest atheism fails when it replaces the infinite God with a divinised subsection of humanity, as the communist parties in Eastern Europe did, “saying that it [the party] is immortal, that it is always right, that it grants security and authority, etc.” Against atheistic confidence in humanity or theistic deference to the God beyond, unperturbed by all finite wastings away, however, stands the Frankfurt School philosopher Max Horkheimer. Horkheimer, well aware of state abuses committed in the name of Marx, provides a theory that “hovers between theism and atheism,” because it rejects the presuppositions of both. That is, while protest atheism cannot accept God due to suffering, Horkheimer claims that suffering, too, should not be accepted, in view of the Wholly Other. This strange, apophatic Quality is not to be identified with the God of theism, though. It is the placeholder for a future state in which suffering no longer exists. Moltmann’s invocation of Horkheimer here is presented as a challenge to atheism—that it would not surrender the ultimate triumph over suffering to human beings, but would remain open to that which it does not yet know for the eschatological vindication of the oppressed. Of course, for Moltmann the Wholly Other is quite obviously to be identified with the God whom Scripture attests, even if Horkheimer himself wants to maintain a safe distance from the latter.

This does not mean, however, that the present question of suffering, the theodical question, is simply made redundant in the hope for a future without suffering. The sufferings of the present are real sufferings. So long as humanity experiences present godforsakeness in events like Auschwitz and Hiroshima, Jesus’ question on the cross remains unanswered. Rather than attempting to answer the question, a

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188 CG, 223.
189 Moltmann draws on a 1935 essay, which has since been translated as Horkheimer, “Thoughts on Religion,” in idem, Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. by Matthew J. O’Connell, 129-31 (New York: Continuum, 1999); and a later piece, which does not seem to have been translated yet: Horkheimer, Die Sehnsucht nach dem ganz Anderen: ein Interview mit Kommentar von Helmut Gumnior (Hamburg: Furcher, 1970).
190 CG, 224. But see Langdon Gilkey’s earlier criticism of Moltmann on this point: “If the dichotomy ‘God is’ and ‘God is not’ poses for theology a fatal debate, then that fatality is not removed by transposing it into the terms of a God who ‘will be’…. For the future can be seen in as atheistic terms as can the present or past.” FH, 84.
fault Moltmann attributes to theism and atheism respectively, theology must now acknowledge the question’s open-endedness, looking to God’s solidarity with those who suffer in having taken on suffering within the divine life.  

5.4.4. Beyond Chalcedon

Finding that both atheism and theism are restricted by their seeing God and suffering to be in contradiction, Moltmann returns to address a particular fruit of theism that obstructs theological recognition of God’s suffering in Christ, Chalcedonian christology. For him, the doctrine that distinguished Christ’s human and divine natures was a necessary development in a world that assumed the divine to be immutable and the human to be subject to change and death. More than this, though, it was the hope for salvation from death into immortality that drove the doctrine. If God had taken part in any suffering, then hope for a salvation from suffering would be void. So the early church and subsequent theology located Christ’s suffering in his human nature and excluded it from God. But while the church assumed that God was not subject to change, this denial nonetheless left room for alternative conceptions of change. So, Moltmann argues, although God is not subject to external

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191 Though writing in connection to Moltmann’s later theology, Douglas Farrow’s criticism of the theodical orientation of his theology is perceptive here: “The problem that is Moltmann’s own is this: he does not place the passion and the resurrection per se at the centre, but the passion and resurrection as an answer to victimization. Here is the something gone awry, and it does of course rebound on christology, as on everything else. Theology cannot be done successfully from the standpoint of the victim.” Douglas B. Farrow, “Review Essay: In the End is the Beginning: A Review of Jürgen Moltmann’s Systematic Contributions,” Modern Theology 14:3 (1998): 425-47, at 442. I imagine Moltmann’s response would be that he is not simply reflecting on victimisation in general, however, but that particular victim of the crucifixion. And while it would be difficult to disentangle Moltmann’s christology from the modern horrors of Auschwitz and Hiroshima, it is nonetheless important to remind readers that he consistently endeavours to set out from Jesus’ cry of dereliction. As Charles Fensham writes in reply to Farrow on this point, “Moltmann does not only respond to theodicy, he also responds to the biblical text.” Charles Fensham, “Sin and Ecology: A Conversation with Jürgen Moltmann and the School of René Girard,” Journal of Reformed Theology 6:3 (2012): 234-250, at 246 n. 43.

192 This is my gloss. Moltmann never explicitly refers to Chalcedon in CG. His preferred terminology is “the doctrine of two natures.” CG, 227. For criticism of Moltmann in this connection, see Klaas Runia, The Present-Day Christological Debate (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1984), 45-46.
change, God is able to change if this change is undertaken freely. Similarly, God is not subject to suffering, but this does not require that God is incapable of suffering in freedom, especially if God is to love at all: “If love is the acceptance of the other without regard to one’s own well-being, then it contains within itself the possibility of sharing in suffering and freedom to suffer as a result of the otherness of the other.”\textsuperscript{193} Finally, if salvation leads to an eschatological life that is merely the negation of finite negations, such as death and suffering, then that life will be “terrifying and boring”\textsuperscript{194} because that which is already good in finitude cannot be affirmed in the present. It must one day be negated. Chalcedonian christology is predicated on a particular notion of human nature that resists processual or historical definition, here particularly in regard to the relationship between present and eschatological humanity.

Luther, too, adopted the presuppositions of Chalcedon, albeit with some significant boundary pushing. Contra Zwingli and Melanchthon, he claimed that the properties of Christ’s divine and human natures were not only predicated of the one divine person. Rather, the opposing properties of each nature were communicated to the other nature. So, Luther wrote, “It is true to say: This man created the world, and this God suffered, died, was buried, etc.”\textsuperscript{195} As such, Luther came close to overcoming the Chalcedonian barrier that precluded any suffering from the divine nature. Yet, as Rahner and Barth would later do, Luther fell short of a “trinitarian” theology of the cross because he did not consistently maintain the distinction between the general divine nature and the particular divine nature of the Son, again resulting in the paradox of “the God who is dead and yet is not dead.”\textsuperscript{196}

Thus Moltmann discovers in modern theology tendencies towards the rejection of the doctrine of divine impassibility and an alternative in a trinitarian theology

\textsuperscript{193} CG, 230.
\textsuperscript{194} CG, 230. See 4.2.4.-4.2.5.
\textsuperscript{196} CG, 235.
of suffering. He faults theism for attributing impassibility to God in order to secure human redemption from suffering. And he draws on the theory of Max Horkheimer to challenge atheism to look beyond the human for the eschatological vindication of those who suffer. Finally, Moltmann returns to theism to address the doctrine of Christ’s two natures in one person, affirmed at Chalcedon. He rejects such an approach for its tendency to preclude change from the divine nature and the unclear implications of an eschatological negation of human nature.

5.5. A Trinitarian Theology of the Cross

Having addressed what he understands to be the key shortcomings of theologies of the cross both ancient and modern, Moltmann can finally present his own contribution to the topic. He first establishes the non-negotiable, trinitarian shape of Christian faith, before exploring just what a theology of the cross might look like in a trinitarian framework. This is followed by a comment on the eternal significance of the Son’s humanity. In a final subsection I will comment on Moltmann’s criticism of Greek influences in Christian theology, comparing this with the contrastive paradigm he employed in TH.

5.5.1. The Relationship between Cross and Trinity: A Methodological Comment

Moltmann has already established the centrality of the cross to Christian faith. Now he also appeals to the centrality of Christianity’s confession of the triune God, “the doctrine that marked off Christianity from polytheism, pantheism and monotheism.” Islam, for example, set itself apart from Christianity in its claim that God “has not begotten, and has not been begotten.” Unfortunately, the doctrine does not hold such a central place in modern Protestantism. Moltmann highlights the antimetaphysical positions of the early Melanchthon and Schleiermacher here as key

197 CG, 235.
The Cappadocians and subsequent theologians had distinguished between the “immanent” Trinity—God’s inner life—and the “economic” Trinity—God in relation to creation. Protestant theologians increasingly abandoned the former in favour of a theology that focussed solely on the latter. Moreover, since Thomas’ distinction between natural knowledge of God, under the tractate De Deo Uno, and knowledge of God by grace, under the tractate De Deo Trino, theology proper has lost its appropriate form, the doctrine of the Trinity. It is for this reason that Moltmann takes up Rahner’s proposals: “1. The Trinity is the nature of God and the nature of God is the Trinity. 2. The economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, and the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity.”

See the following note on Moltmann’s use of Karl Rahner here. He also takes the terms “immanent” and “economic” Trinity from Rahner, now “the conventional terminology of modern Trinitarianism.” Fred Sanders, The Triune God (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2016), 144. I, too, use the terms throughout this dissertation, following Moltmann, though I agree with Sanders’s criticisms: the dichotomous construction “verbally doubles the Trinity.” And there is something vaguely Kantian in the transcendental perspective assumed by this distinction, as if the real point of any inquiry carried out in these terms were to relate the phenomenal Trinity to the noumenal Trinity and vice versa.” Sanders’s next criticism, based on the origin of the terminology in the idiosyncratic Johann August Urlsperger, however, is itself subject to the charge of genetic fallacy. See ibid., 144-48. In an earlier work, Sanders also rightly points out the confusing nature of the terminology: ‘Immanent’ suggests, to anyone with basic theological literacy, God’s presence in the world, and is routinely opposed to ‘transcendent.’ In this discussion, however” — and, indeed, in all discussions that employ this distinction between immanent and economic — “the Trinity considered as transcendent is precisely the immanent Trinity.” Fred Sanders, The Image of the Immanent Trinity: Rahner’s Rule and the Theological Interpretation of Scripture (New York: Peter Lang, 2005), 4.

CG, 240, emphasis original, citing Rahner, Theological Investigations, 4:87-102. The quoted words are Moltmann’s summary of Rahner’s essay. While I do not assume that Rahner would either accept or reject Moltmann’s reading of him, the closest thing I can find in the essay to the first thesis is this: “If the title De Deo Uno is taken seriously, we are not dealing merely with the essence and attributes of God, but with the unity of the three divine persons. It is the unity of Father, Son and Spirit and not merely the unicity of the godhead, the mediated unity, of which the Trinity is the proper fulfilment, and not the immediate unicity of the divine nature which if considered as one numerically is of itself far from providing the foundation of the three-fold unity in God. But if one begins with the treatise De Deo Uno and not with De Divinitate Una, one is concerned at once with the Father, the unoriginated origin of the Son and the Spirit. And it is then strictly speaking impossible to place one treatise after the other in the disjointed fashion which is still so common today.” Rahner, Theological Investigations, 4:102, emphasis original. Moltmann does not here cite the
cannot be undertaken outside of a trinitarian context, and trinitarian theology must find its centre in salvation history, specifically in the cross of Christ. Moltmann thus introduces his own proposal with the thesis: “The material principle of the doctrine of the Trinity is the cross of Christ. The formal principle of the knowledge of the cross is the doctrine of the Trinity.” That is, the cross provides the content for a trinitarian theology, whereas the doctrine of the Trinity provides the form of a theology of the cross. One cannot be had without the other.

5.5.2. The Cross and the Constitution of the Trinity

To begin, Moltmann turns to Christ’s being handed over to the cross in Paul’s theology, drawing attention to the word *paradidōmi*. Paul uses this word as an expression of God’s wrath on sinful humanity in Rom 1:24, 26, and 28—God hands humanity over to their idolatries and, with that, the consequences of their sins. But later on in the letter the word is used in a completely different context. God “did not withhold his own Son, but gave him up [paradidōmi] for all of us” (Rom 8:32). This same theology, Moltmann argues, is presented in stronger terms in 2 Cor 5:21 and Gal 3:13, where Jesus is made sin and a curse, respectively. He is delivered up to godforsakenness. This has important implications for Moltmann’s doctrine of the Father. First, because the Father is Father of the one who is delivered up to godforsakenness,

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201 Some commentators have pointed out that Moltmann pushes Rahner’s proposals to their limit. As Matthias Remenyi summarises their observations, “It appears that Rahner’s thesis is understood not only as a corrective in regard to a rigid dichotomy”—in accordance with Rahner’s own intention—“but as a categorical condemnation of every form of differentiation between immanent and economic Trinity.” Matthias Remenyi, *Um der Hoffnung willen: Untersuchungen zur eschatologischen Theologie Jürgen Moltmanns* (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2005), 113.

202 CG, 241.

203 On Moltmann’s exegesis in CG, see David Coffey, *Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 109-26. Coffey contests almost every exegetical move that Moltmann makes. I recommend referring to recent commentaries in order to adjudicate between the two theologians.

204 Eugene Borowitz disputes the connection between being “hung from a tree” and being cursed by God. Borowitz, *Contemporary Christologies*, 91-92. He does not mention Gal 3:13 though, which Moltmann is taking at face value here.
by virtue of Jesus’ abandonment he becomes the Father of human beings who are living in godforsakenness. Second, because it is the Father’s “own Son” (Rom 8:32) who is abandoned, “in the forsakenness of the Son the Father also forsakes himself.” But Moltmann is not advocating patripassianism here. The Father does not die on the cross. Rather, whereas the Son experiences dying, the Father experiences death, because death is not experienced by the dead but by those who remain. That is, it is not that the Father suffers when the Son suffers because their distinction is in name only so that the God behind Father and Son undertakes and undergoes the actions and passions of both in an undifferentiated way. This is modalism in general and patripassianism in particular. For Moltmann, the Father suffers the pain of the cross in the manner appropriate to his person—as grief. The Son does not suffer this grief, nor does the Father suffer dying. Their sufferings are unique to their respective persons.

205 CG, 243.
206 Those who charge Moltmann with patripassianism either overlook his careful distinction between the sufferings of the Father and the Son or misuse the term, which refers to a form of modalism. For the term, see Marcel Sarot, “Patripassianism, Theopaschitism and the Suffering of God: Some Historical and Systematic Considerations,” Religious Studies 26:3 (1990): 363-75, at 369-72. For examples of those who apply the term to Moltmann, see Rahner, “Approaches to Theological Thinking,” 127; Molnar, Divine Freedom, 411-14.
207 Another problem arises here, however. As Stephen Williams observes, “God can exist as trinity or alternatively not exist as trinity, for one who is wholly dead cannot be part of trinitarian life.” Stephen N. Williams, “Jürgen Moltmann: A Critical Introduction,” in Getting Your Bearings: Engaging with Contemporary Theologians, ed. Philip Duce and Daniel Strange, 75-124 (Leicester: Apollos, 2003), 109. And while it appears that Moltmann may have accepted such an implication at the time of writing CG, the implication is inconsistent with his later claims concerning the eternality of the Trinity. But two other hermeneutical possibilities are available. First, Moltmann could introduce a distinction between Jesus’ divine and human natures, something which he has otherwise been reluctant to do. Or, second, Moltmann could distinguish between the creaturely death, which all experience, and the christological participation in this death, which in one sense separates Father and Son but in another sense does not, insofar as they remain united in the Spirit. Though surely not without its problems, I think this second possibility is more consistent with Moltmann’s broader theology.
208 The designation in the book’s title (and in the title of its sixth chapter), “crucified God,” is used affirmatively in a few places in CG. See, e.g., CG, 33, 39, 70, 192, 201. The quotation marks surrounding Moltmann’s use of the term in many places, however, not only recall earlier usage, but suggest that he is not completely satisfied with it. This becomes clear in CG, 235, where Luther “arrived at paradoxical distinctions between God and God: between the God who crucifies and the crucified God.” See 5.4.1. and 5.4.4. below. Klaas
A key verse for Moltmann at this point is Gal 2:20, where it is not the Father but now Christ who is the subject of paradidōmi: “the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me.” This is important because it witnesses to the Son’s willingness to go to his death, a willingness in which he is thus united with his Father and his Father’s will. Father and Son are united in will and mutual love, “precisely at the point of their deepest separation,” and, indeed, in spite of it. But there is also an excess of unity and love here that transcends and thus overcomes the separation.

Moltmann expands on this a few pages later: “The fact of this love can be contradicted. It can be crucified, but in crucifixion it finds its fulfilment and becomes love of the enemy. Thus its suffering proves to be stronger than hate. Its might is powerful in weakness and gains power over its enemies in grief, because it gives life even to its enemies and opens up the future to change.” Father and Son overcome their separation in the greater unity of will that seeks the good of the other and the good of godless human beings. Although death has for the meantime overcome their direct, personal connection, it has not overcome their indirect, volitional connection. They remain in relationship in their shared will and their shared love for humanity.

It is in this excess of unity and love beyond personal connection out of which the present and eschatological justification of the godless arises. Moreover, such a redemption extends not only to individuals but to all the annihilations of human...
history, including the Holocaust. The resurrection of the godforsaken man, Jesus, provides the ground for the hope that suffering, death, and evil will not have the last word. God has taken up human suffering and miraculously transformed it in his Son. We now await the transformation of the whole cosmos. The Spirit also makes a guest appearance here, being an otherwise minor feature of Moltmann’s theology at this still early stage in his career: “What proceeds from this event between Father and Son is the Spirit which justifies the godless.”211 And the cross is “an event between the Father who loves and the Son who is loved in the present Spirit of the love that creates life.”212 For Moltmann, then, the Spirit takes on an eschatological role, effectuating the love expressed on the cross for all humanity.

Notably, the trinitarian persons are so intimately involved in the event of Christ’s crucifixion that in it “these persons constitute themselves [sich konstituieren] in relationship with each other.”213 The identities of each person are inseparable from

211 CG, 244.
212 CG, 246, slightly altered.
213 CG, 245; Ger. 232. The German sich konstituieren maps easily onto the English “constitute” and could otherwise be loosely translated as “set themselves up” (gründen), or even “bring themselves into being” (ins Leben rufen). See the entry in Duden Online, s.v., “konstituieren,” accessed 29 April, 2019, https://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/konstituieren. What is at least clear from the context is that for Moltmann the trinitarian persons undergo some kind of formation in their historical relationships to each other. John W. Cooper is thus right when he observes that, for Moltmann, “the Trinity is actualized at the cross. Without the cross there would be no Trinity.” Panentheism – the Other God of the Philosophers: From Plato to the Present (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 241. But Bauckham correctly situates this in the context of Moltmann’s wider career: “It seems as though in The Crucified God Moltmann meant to say that the Trinity is actually constituted by the event of the cross. If so, he quickly retreated from that position to the view that God is eternally Trinity.” Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 155. Others have not noticed this, unfortunately. Otto’s criticism of Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity requires that Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity does not develop after CG. Randall E. Otto, “Moltmann and the Anti-Monotheism Movement,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 3:3 (2001): 293-308, at 298-301. Stanley Grenz and Roger Olson struggle to answer the question they put to Moltmann: “Would God be trinitarian apart from the events of world history?” Stanley J. Grenz and Roger E. Olson, 20th Century Theology: God and the World in a Transitional Age (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1992), 182. The authors do not distinguish between God’s being affected by the world, and God’s being constituted as Trinity. The latter takes place at the cross in CG, but in CPS (1975) and later writings the Trinity of persons is eternal, even if taking on different configurations in participating in human history. See, e.g., 6.2.1.
this historical event. The Father, for example, is first the Father who sends the Son, second the Sonless God, and third the Father who justifies the godless in the Spirit of a love that is greater than separation. Moltmann is also careful with his use of the word “God.” God is not a metaphysical presupposition brought to bear on theological interpretation of the cross, but a retrospective concept conducive to speaking of the event of Father, Son, and Spirit that was the cross: “In that case, ‘God’ is not another nature or a heavenly person or a moral authority, but in fact an ‘event.’”

Put simply, “the Trinity is... an eschatological process open for men on earth.” Prayer, for example, is thus not an activity undertaken to God but in God. Following the NT, the Father is the one addressed in prayer, made accessible through brotherhood with Christ and in the power of the Holy Spirit.

5.5.3. The Trinity and Eschatology

A key feature of Moltmann’s theology of the cross is its eschatological aspect. Whereas he had treated the relationship between the resurrection and the eschaton in TH, here Moltmann turns to the relationship between the crucifixion and the eschaton, in conversation with John Calvin, A. A. van Ruler, and Dorothee Sölle. These three, according to Moltmann, represent a problematic trend towards constructing Christ’s humanity in merely functional terms. Christ becomes human in order to remedy human sin, but when, eschatologically, sin becomes no more, the humanity of Christ, too, becomes superfluous. He is then present to redeemed humanity solely in his divine nature because there is no longer any need for the mediatorial human

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214 CG, 247. Moltmann had earlier characterised existentialist concepts of God in the same way. HP, 10 (1966).
215 CG, 249.
216 So, later: “The Lord’s prayer is in fact directed towards the first Person of the Trinity, not the whole Trinity, as Augustine thought.” TKG, 164 (1980).
217 Richard Muller has successfully shown that Moltmann’s reading of Calvin here, which depends on that of Heinrich Quistorp, misrepresents the Reformer’s theology. Richard A. Muller, “Christ and the Eschaton: Calvin and Moltmann on the Duration of the Munus Regium,” Harvard Theological Review 74:1 (1981): 31-59. I only note this to draw attention to the shortcomings of Moltmann’s exposition. His positive contribution to eschatology in CG cannot be dismissed on this basis alone.
nature. But for Moltmann the crucified Christ plays a central role in the new creation. Redemption does not only restore creation to its original condition. If this were the case then the speculative question of when the next Fall would come about exposes a legitimate theological problem. No, Christ does not just take away sin; he takes away the possibility of sin as well. As such, he is the ground of something new and remains that ground through eternity.

Continuing his criticism, Moltmann provides some exegetical comment on 1 Cor 15:28, a verse which allegedly led to Calvin’s functional conception of Christ’s humanity: “When all things are subjected to him [Christ], then the Son himself will also be subjected to the one who put all things in subjection under him, so that God may be all in all.” Because he rejects the Chalcedonian distinction between Christ’s human and divine natures, for Moltmann Paul here cannot mean that the mediate rule of Christ through his humanity gives way to the immediate divine rule of the triune God. Rather, the distinction is between the person of the Son and that of the Father. Christ’s Sonship, which was negated in the crucifixion and reconstituted in the resurrection, looks forward to its perfection in the eschaton. “His Sonship only becomes complete as he hands over the kingdom to the Father.”

That is, the Son’s person is historical and remains incomplete as long as there is suffering in the world. Likewise, the Father awaits the perfection of his Fatherhood—negated through the loss of his Son and also reconstituted in the resurrection—when he will receive the kingdom from his Son.

5.5.4. The Crucified God and Aristotle’s Divine Stone

As with TH, in CG Moltmann has attempted to rethink Christian theology and its categories with a renewed look at the God of Scripture, this time with the crucifixion playing a central role in his methodology. But another key difference emerges. In TH, it was primarily the God of Parmenides, manifest especially in the projects of Barth, Bultmann, and Pannenberg, against whom Moltmann upheld the God of

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218 CG, 264.
promise. In CG, however, a key culprit is not so easily identifiable. There is the nebulous “theism,” and, though this designation is not treated in detail by Moltmann until chapter six, a rereading of CG will show that it is clearly presupposed in the polemics of the earlier chapters. Theism is variously defined by its rationalistic approach to theology and its concern to take hold of a God who makes up for everything that humanity lacks. Such a system also has ethical and political implications that run counter to the way of the cross. Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas are its chief representatives in CG. Theism’s ethico-political aspect is evident in Moltmann’s succinct characterisation of alternatives to the crucified God, “the gods of religion, race and class.” And then there is protest atheism, represented by Albert Camus and Dostoevsky’s Ivan Karamazov. While Moltmann appears to be in full agreement with the protests themselves, though, he rejects any implied humanistic alternative, such as those of the communist parties of Eastern Europe.

Notably, however, the Greeks still make their presence known in Moltmann’s expositions and polemics in CG. They consistently fall under the heading of theism. Thus Moltmann’s proposal for a dialectical epistemology, based on the epistemological logic he discovers in the cross, is offered as an alternative to the Platonic principle of analogy, which ultimately derives from Empedocles. Similarly, Peter Lombard’s natural theology comes under scrutiny for its connections to Stoicism, which I have treated above. But it is the Greek witness against divine suffering that demands most of Moltmann’s attention.

Having advanced his proposals in regard to divine suffering, Moltmann reflects back: “Since Plato and Aristotle the metaphysical and ethical perfection of God has been described as apatheia.” This term corresponds to the Latin-derived “impassibility,” which is more common in English. Moltmann is aware of its broad

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219 CG, 201.
220 See 5.4.2.
221 CG, 267-68.
222 See Marcel Sarot’s excellent article on terminology, “Patripassianism, Theopaschitism and the Suffering of God.” An earlier, systematic attempt to clarify the terminology can be found in Richard E. Creel, Divine Impassibility: An Essay in Philosophical Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 9-12. In my opinion, Sarot, who is critical of
semantic domain: “The word *apatheia* has many connotations. It means incapable of being affected by outside influences, incapable of feeling, as is the case with dead things, and the freedom of the spirit from inner needs and external damage.” He proceeds to treat the thought of Plato and Aristotle together, implying a considerable degree of perceived overlap between their positions. If God is perfect then God is not in need of anything. This quickly leads to the affirmation of immutability—that God does not change, because change indicates deficiency.

An additional problem arises here in connection to friendship and love. No one can be friends with God as God does not require anything of human beings. There can be no reciprocity. Moreover, friendship with God is impossible in that God cannot love human beings. Aristotle writes, “For friendship, we maintain, exists only where there can be a return of affection, but friendship towards god does not admit of love being returned, nor at all of loving. For it would be strange if one were to say that he loved Zeus. Neither is it possible to have affection returned by lifeless objects.” In excluding undesirable passions, consistency requires Aristotle to exclude love from God too. Thus, in an earlier section of the chapter, Moltmann rejected Aristotle’s God as “the beloved who is in love with himself; a Narcissus in a metaphysical degree: *Deus incurvatus in se*.” This God is the ground of human love as well as its recipient, in the form of human admiration of his perfection. But such a love is not a real love because it cannot be directed outwards to human beings.

For Moltmann, the inability to love, essential to Aristotle’s God, is also linked to the inability to suffer. “For a God who is incapable of suffering is a being who

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223 Creel’s proposals, provides simpler definitions and is better attuned to their historical employment and development. Sarot also takes Moltmann to task for his use elsewhere of the designation, “patricompassianism.” While this coinage might indeed be more trouble than it is worth, my focus in this chapter is on the more material aspects of Moltmann’s contribution, which often do not fit easily into the available categories represented by different terms.


225 *i.e.*, God curved in on Godself. *CG*, 222.
cannot be involved.” And, “if love is the acceptance of the other without regard to one’s own well-being, then it contains within itself the possibility of sharing in suffering… as a result of the otherness of the other.” This reveals a basic problem for Aristotle’s God, especially in light of modern protest atheism, because “a God who cannot suffer is poorer than any man.” Such a God may be omnipotent, but he “is in himself an incomplete being, for he cannot experience Helplessness and powerlessness.” This last observation, alongside the testimony of Scripture, likely informs Moltmann’s proposal that suffering and God are not mutually exclusive, something which theism cannot allow and atheism cannot consider.

Apatheia also found fruitful expression in the sphere of ethics, especially among the Stoics. Human beings were to imitate God, with the goal of being unperturbed by bodily or emotional concerns. Moltmann’s analysis is, strikingly, much more sympathetic at this point. He claims that the ancient ideal of human apatheia should not be confused with modern apathy. To its credit, early Christianity interpreted apatheia in light of the divine agape, love. Here, God could be impassible in the sense of being free from external forces, and this freedom was the ground for the

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226 CG, 222. Something of this idea was already present in TH, 208 (1964): “It is only in the things a man loves that he can be hurt, and it is only in love that man suffers and recognizes the deadliness of death.”

227 CG, 230.

228 CG, 222.

229 CG, 223.

230 Paul Gavrilyuk observes that, in contrast to other adherents of “the theory of theology’s fall into Hellenistic philosophy,” “Moltmann’s position is not easily classifiable, since he rightly recognizes that apatheia for the Greek authors denoted God’s freedom and self-sufficiency, rather than apathy and indifference.” And, “most proponents of the passibilist position,” including Moltmann, “admit to different degrees that there are some elements of truth in patristic understanding of the [sic] divine impassibility.” Paul L. Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 178-79. But William Hill claims, “Moltmann appears to view the apathetic God of the tradition in terms of Aristotle’s ‘Unmoved Mover,’ without noting the radical reconstruction such a concept underwent in medieval theology.” William J. Hill, The Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1982), 171.
liberation of human beings through love. “The negation of need, desire and compul-
sion expressed by *apatheia* was taken up and filled with a new positive content.”

Nonetheless, Moltmann continues, this framework remained an obstacle to properly
perceiving God’s presence in the cross of Christ.

More generalised rejections of Greek thought in this connection, however, resurface in Moltmann’s later work. In *TKG* he writes, “Christian theology acquired Greek philosophy’s ways of thinking in the Hellenistic world; and since that time most theologians have simultaneously maintained the passion of Christ, God’s Son, and the deity’s essential incapacity for suffering.... But in doing this they have simply added together Greek philosophy’s ‘apathy’ axiom and the central statements of the gospel.” And in his autobiography Moltmann claims, “It is better for Christian theology to take leave of Aristotle’s apathy axiom and to begin with the biblical axiom of the living God, and to talk about the suffering of the passionate God.” While this does not require Moltmann to forsake more nuanced treatments of the theme, it demonstrates that he still finds a generalised contrastive rhetoric useful.

For Moltmann, the Greeks, then, certainly play their part in the church’s early forays into and later full embrace of theism. Yet *CG* also goes beyond *TH* in its explicit concern with the more universal tendency, “man’s inhuman concern for self-deification through knowledge and works.”

5.6. Summary

The main purpose of this chapter has been to trace the development of Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm into a new context—that of his trinitarian theology of the cross as it is expressed in *CG*. As in *TH*, this contrastive paradigm arises from a commitment to the uniqueness of the biblical witness to God, against competing conceptions

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231 *CG*, 269-70.

232 *TKG*, 22 (1980).


234 *CG*, 70.
of God derived from elsewhere. Of course, this is not the only feature of CG pertaining
to Moltmann’s theology of Scripture. I have therefore commented on other rele-
vant material, especially in my treatment of Moltmann’s christology.

Moltmann takes inspiration from the work of Luther, Barth, and Heschel, who
each in their own way criticise the Christian or Jewish tradition for overlooking key
aspects of the biblical witness to God. For Luther and Barth, this concerns the role of
the cross. For Heschel, it is the prophetic witness to the pathos of God that has been
brushed aside.

In the first two chapters of CG, Moltmann responds to the call to situate the
cross at the centre of Christian theology. Despite all misunderstandings and misap-
propriations of its message throughout church history, the cross remains as that
which calls into question every interpretation—including those most faithful to its
own aims, whether they be that of Luther or of Moltmann himself. But here already
the scope of the contrastive paradigm is significantly broader when compared to its
application in TH. The genetic connection to various Greek figures hardly makes an
appearance at this stage, if at all. It is no longer simply the clash between biblical and
Hellenistic assumptions and worldviews, but the clash between the biblical witness
to the cross and all human systems of thought.

Importantly, this cross is Christ’s cross. Moltmann is not interested in abstract-
ing the crucifixion from its properly christological—and, in later chapters of CG, trin-
itarian—context. Chapters three to five of CG, then, treat this foundation in christol-
ogy. Here Moltmann rejects christologies both traditional and modern insofar as
they begin from a priori notions of divine and human being, respectively. A biblical
christology, rather, sees divine and human being as yet incomplete, defined in light
of their shared future. Nonetheless, this does not mean that no christological state-
ments can be made at present. Moltmann proposes a dialectical relationship between
Jesus’ person in history and his person as it comes into the present from the future.
Without such reciprocity between the two perspectives, the unity of Jesus’ person is
compromised. Importantly, Moltmann’s focus on the cross in CG means that although Jesus’ future life with God requires that the finality of his crucifixion be contested, the horror of his death remains as a contestation of divine victory.

Key assumptions that Moltmann holds in regard to the nature and role of the OT and NT are also revealed in his christological chapters. Jesus’ uniqueness, for example, deriving from his eschatological provenance, requires that his identity is not exhausted by OT texts. Essential features of this uniqueness include the grace shown to the poor and outcasts through Jesus and Jesus’ addressing God as Father. In any case, Moltmann places the accent on Jesus’ departure from how his contemporaries understood the law, even if Moltmann’s eschatological orientation leads him to also stress the provisionality of the OT witness—one which extends, not least, to the NT. In regard to the latter, Moltmann draws attention to its primary function in testifying Christ, whose person and history thus remain the criterion of its truth. On this basis, however, and with the help of historical criticism, Moltmann disputes the Lukan and Johannine accounts of the passion. Both downplay the monstrous nature of Jesus’ last moments. Nonetheless, Moltmann also understands that biblical texts do not constitute straightforward, historical recollections of the events they attest but are coloured by their missiological aims. An examination of the broader role that Luke and John play in CG demonstrates that Moltmann values their important role within the canon.

In his sixth chapter, Moltmann advances his proposals for a trinitarian theology of the cross. He begins with a series of critical discussions on figures in modern theology, traditional theology (theism), and atheism. This prepares the way for Moltmann’s alternative, informed by its orientation to the cross and shaped by a commitment to the doctrine of the Trinity. Here, the Trinity is compromised in the Son’s death and the Father’s grief. But it is also reconstituted in the resurrection, deriving from the mutual, overcoming love of Father and Son—closely associated with the Spirit—and unifying them in the reign of the risen Son. This is the positive component of Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm in CG, founded in the centrality of Jesus’ cross and the Trinity to the biblical witness. It is in conflict with all theologies and
systems that would oppose this God of the cross—represented in particular by Moltmann’s “theism” and “atheism.” Notably, although theism inherits assumptions from Greek philosophy, such as divine impassibility, in C.G. Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm has a significantly broader application. Hellenism makes its appearance at key points, but it is not the main focus of Moltmann’s criticism.

A final notable application of Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm is to what he perceives to be a sharp disagreement between the biblical witness and the theological tradition on the concept of divine unity. This will be the focus of the following chapter, in which I will draw on Moltmann’s 1980 TKG in particular.
6. The Story of the Trinity in The Trinity and the Kingdom

Three years after the publication of The Crucified God (1972), Moltmann’s third major work appeared as The Church in the Power of the Spirit (1975). It was followed by his fourth major work, The Trinity and the Kingdom (1980). CG set in motion a new project for Moltmann—that of knowing God as Trinity. Key contributions to this project are offered in CPS, but it is in the book-length work on the theme in TKG that it receives full expression. Significantly, as with other major themes in Motlmann’s theology, the development of a doctrine of the Trinity is driven by biblical texts and concerns. It is the purpose of this chapter to explore them.

I have divided the content into four sections. In the first, I attend to traces of trinitarian thinking in Moltmann’s earliest theology, proceeding to the first major influence on Moltmann in this connection, Erik Peterson. Because in the previous chapter I have already attended to Moltmann’s trinitarian theology as it is expressed in CG, I revisit this material only briefly, in order to comment on the concept of divine unity latent in the book. In a second section, I explore the important turn to a trinitarian history in Moltmann’s thought, developed first in some detail in CPS. This work is also significant for the reflections provided on the eschatological unification of the trinitarian persons. Here, too, I discuss two 1979 essays that reveal some key concerns on Moltmann’s part in regard to trinitarian theology. In the third and fourth sections of this chapter, I address just some of the many rich proposals made in TKG. I begin with methodological questions in the third section, such as Moltmann’s Orthodox influences, his rationale for a new doctrine of the Trinity, and the hermeneutics that informs underpins his project. The fourth section concerns the content of Moltmann’s trinitarian theology. I consider the material on trinitarian freedom and love, the history of the Trinity, trinitarian action, Moltmann’s polemic against Barth and Rahner, trinitarian personhood and unity, the rejection of the filioque clause, and the relationship between trinitarian and human community.
6.1. The Emerging Call to Trinitarian Theology: Moltmann’s Early Work

Already long before TKG was a twinkle in his eye, Moltmann began to conceive of a new approach to the doctrine of the Trinity. In this first section I attend to the early steps that Moltmann takes in this direction. Besides some of the more miscellaneous evidence, the influence of Erik Peterson at this stage and the concept of divine unity latent in CG are of note.

6.1.1. Hints of the Trinity

A hint of the doctrine of trinitarian unity that Moltmann forwards in TKG already appears in negative terms in TH (1964). Moltmann criticises the identification of the Father of Jesus Christ with the God of Greek metaphysics, writing, “If, however, the divinity of God is seen in his unchangeableness, immutability, impassibility and unity, then the historic working of this God in the Christ event of the cross and resurrection becomes as impossible to assert as does his eschatological promise for the future.” Interestingly, a little later in the book, Moltmann rejects modalism as well. Besides these generalised rejections, however, any positive content is implicit. As Richard Bauckham observes, “Moltmann’s doctrine of God in Theology of Hope is not explicitly trinitarian.” And Donald Claybrook cites a personal conversation with Moltmann in which he learnt of the theologian’s early lack of interest in the doctrine

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2 TH, 140, emphasis mine.
3 TH, 200.
4 Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology, 91. Contra M. Douglas Meeks: “If we look for a basic structure in the development of Moltmann’s theology, we can see clearly its trinitarian nature from the beginning.” M. Douglas Meeks, foreword to EH, xi. Nonetheless, Bauckham continues, in TH “the trinitarian truth of God is not given as the disclosure of supra-temporal truth; it is the truth of Jesus Christ who still awaits his future, of the Spirit which is the power of the resurrection of the dead, and of the God who still waits to be ‘all in all’. Theology of Hope points in the direction of a concept of the Trinity as process open to the future of God.” Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology, 92.
of the Trinity. Claybrook writes, “In his early works, viz., *Theology of Hope* and *The Crucified God*, one could not so much as even ‘glean’ a doctrine of the Holy Spirit! It was simply non-existent. In fact, when *Theology of Hope* was written, he was simply not interested in the Trinity, much less the third person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit.”

Nonetheless, Moltmann’s early theology was not completely bereft of interest in the Trinity. A clue appears in a 1959 essay, where Moltmann writes, “There is a kind of static rigidity about Bonhoeffer’s doctrine of the incarnation, with slight overtones of modalism, whereas Barth’s trinitarian thinking gives a new slant to the doctrine of the incarnation.” A section of a 1960 essay takes on a trinitarian structure, beginning with God’s faithfulness through history, proceeding to the godlessness of reality as it is revealed in the cross, and concluding with the Spirit’s work in delivering humanity into God’s future. In 1964, commenting on the *filioque*, Moltmann observes that there are “dogmatic decisions in the doctrine of the Trinity” that carry significant implications for other areas of theology. Finally, a positive anticipation of his later doctrine of the Trinity can be found as early as 1965: “In the New Testament, the trinitarian formula does not simply outline the revelation of God but finds it in a particular history, namely in the resurrection of the Son by the Father and through the Holy Spirit.” It is when he begins reading Erik Peterson in the late sixties, however, that Moltmann develops a more sustained interest in formulating a trinitarian theology.

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5 Donald Adrian Claybrook, Sr., “The Emerging Doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the Writings of Jürgen Moltmann” (Ph.D. diss., Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1983), 185, emphasis original.
7 *HP*, 103-9. This has also been recognised by A. J. Conyers in *God, Hope, and History: Jürgen Moltmann and the Christian Concept of History* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1988), 133-35.
9 *PTH*, 102.
6.1.2. Erik Peterson and the Politics of Monotheism

Reflecting later on the emergence of his trinitarian theology, Moltmann points to Erik Peterson’s “Monotheism as Political Problem” as a particularly important text in this connection. This short book, though largely historical in content, was contemporary in intent. In writing it, Peterson wanted to demonstrate how trinitarian orthodoxy undermined Reichstheologie, the theology that married the church to the designs of the Third Reich. A brief exposition will provide some context for the development of Moltmann’s theology.

Peterson introduces his argument with the claim that “for Christians, political involvement can never take place except under the presumption of faith in the triune God. This faith transcends Judaism and paganism, ‘monotheism’ and ‘polytheism’.” This is not a general monotheism, however, but rather that which ultimately derives from Aristotle and through which Christian trinitarian faith has lost its way, with dire political consequences. So, at the end of Book XII of the Metaphysics, Aristotle claims, “Being refuses to be badly administered. The rule of the many is not

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11 Michael J. Hollerich, introduction to Peterson, *Theological Tractates*, xxiv. For an extended exposition of the book’s arguments in English, and a discussion of its context against the thought of the Catholic Nazi, Carl Schmitt, see György Geréby, “Political Theology versus Theological Politics: Erik Peterson and Carl Schmitt,” *New German Critique* 105, 35:3 (2008): 7-33. Giuseppe Ruggieri, drawing on other reactions to Peterson’s work, provides some brief criticisms. For example, “not only monotheism, but trinitarian belief too has in fact been linked to a political theology used to justify the existing political order.” And, “monotheism too has in fact known relationships with the prevailing power that were not justificatory but critical.” Giuseppe Ruggieri, “God and Power: A Political Function of Monotheism?” trans. by Paul Burns, in *Monotheism*, ed. Claude Geffré, Jean-Pierre Joussa, and Marcus Lefebvre, 16-27 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1985), 18-19, emphasis original. These criticisms can also be directed towards corresponding aspects of Moltmann’s theology.

12 Peterson, “Monotheism as a Political Problem,” 68.

13 Moltmann’s polemical use of the term “monotheism,” derived from Peterson’s article, has invited sharp criticism. Nonetheless, as Stephen Williams explains, “‘Monotheism’ in theological writing usually means ‘one God’ but when Moltmann attacks it he means to attack a concept of God which is not properly trinitarian.” Stephen N. Williams, “Jürgen Molt-
healthy; let there be only one ruler.” Following Werner Jaeger, Peterson argues that this statement is placed at the end of Book XII—itself originally an individual lecture—in order to serve as a conclusion to Aristotle’s reflections on metaphysical unity. In doing this, Aristotle closely associates metaphysical unity with the rule of a single principle. Peterson also points to the development of this theme in Philo, for whom the one God corresponds with the one divine rule over the cosmos. Consequently, for Philo there is one people of God, who are thus universally significant in their priesthood to the nations. Also noted here is Philo’s view of the Hellenistic monarchy or the Roman Principate “as the truly authentic image of monarchical order in the cosmos,” established by God in opposition to “ochlocracy” (mob rule).

The influence of Aristotle’s political monotheism continues through early Christianity. Peterson finds evidence for this in figures such as Justin, Tatian, Theophilus, Irenaeus, and Tertullian. Celsus, too, points to the close connection between Christian monotheism and politics in his accusation that Christian rejection of other gods undermines the structure of the Empire, as the Empire allows for different peoples to worship their own gods. Significantly, in his reply, Origen argues that not only is it true that Christians seek the dissolution of different religious practices in the eschatological worship of the one God, but that God unified the Empire under the reign of Augustus, during which Jesus was born, to better allow for the spread of the gospel. Peterson also attends here to Eusebius, who further developed Origen’s interpretation. Eusebius, for example, saw in Augustus’s reign the fulfilment


15 Peterson, “Monotheism as a Political Problem,” 74-75.
of numerous OT oracles prophesying peace between the nations. Summarising, Peterson writes, “What began in principle with Augustus has become reality in the present under Constantine. When Constantine defeated Licinius, political monarchy was reestablished and at the same time the divine Monarchy was secured.”

Eusebius was followed by other patristic authors such as Chrysostom, Theodoret, Ambrose, Jerome, and Orosius, and his political theology also found expression in Arianism.

The word “monarchy” soon after largely lost its earthly-political connotations. Gregory of Nazianzus, according to Peterson, spoke of a trinitarian monarchy that “had no correspondence in the created order.”

Augustine, too, objected to characterising the reign of Augustus as a peace brought about by God. Indeed, Augustus waged his own wars and such war continued into Augustine’s day. Neither could the divine monarchy, in view of the doctrine of the Trinity, nor the Christian embrace of the pax Augusta, in view of eschatology, be sustained. Indeed, “a fundamental break was made with every ‘political theology’ that misuses the Christian proclamation for the justification of a political situation.” Thus, “the peace that the Christian seeks is won by no emperor, but is solely a gift of him who ‘is higher than all understanding.”

So concluded Peterson in his 1933 book, published against the background of the rise of the Nazi party.

Moltmann’s interest in Peterson can be seen in one 1966 essay, a critical exposition of the cosmological proof of God that is integral to Pannenberg’s theology of universal history. Here Moltmann invokes Feuerbach’s critique of religion together with Peterson’s critique of monotheism. Not only is the traditional theological ap-

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16 Peterson, “Monotheism as a Political Problem,” 94.
17 Peterson, “Monotheism as a Political Problem,” 103.
18 Peterson, “Monotheism as a Political Problem,” 104. Moltmann argues that “Peterson did not mean to dismiss every political theology.” TKG, 248 n. 2 (1980). He cites Peterson, who writes, “For Christians, political involvement can never take place except under the presumption of faith in the triune God.” Peterson, “Monotheism as a Political Problem,” 68.
19 Peterson, “Monotheism as a Political Problem,” 105.
proach to divine unity implicitly constructed in response to the disunity and disorder of human existence (Feuerbach), but this unity finds expression in a corresponding political reality. “Pax christiana and pax romana, Christ and Augustus, are connected in parallel by providence.” In another essay, first published in 1969, Moltmann takes up Peterson’s critique of Aristotle. If metaphysical unity and metaphysical monarchy coincide, “this could be understood as the justification of an imperialistic peace policy. The hierarchical structure of the metaphysical world was often interpreted as being the transcendent background of the political world’s hierarchical structure. Conversely, the ‘one God’ was represented by the ‘one ruler’, as in imperial ideology.” That is, this ancient monotheistic metaphysics upholds an imperialist politics, and vice versa.

It is in CG (1972), though, that Peterson’s influence is most apparent, dovetailing with the second major factor influencing Moltmann’s development of his alternative approach to divine unity, the theology of the cross—which I will discuss in the next subsection. Moltmann cites “Monotheism as a Political Problem” three times in CG, and displays a clear interest in Peterson, citing four other essays and works of his throughout the book. Following Peterson, Moltmann recounts, early Christian political theology made an apparently natural but ultimately disastrous move. Although the powers of Caesar were checked with the claim that the Caesarean attributes belonged principally to God, this also meant that divine authority was formulated “in the image of the Caesars.” As such, “the authority of the emperor was secured by the idea of unity: one God—one Logos—one Nomos—one emperor—one

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20 See 4.2.5.
21 HP, 6-8. There are no clear allusions to Peterson in Moltmann’s earlier, related critique of Pannenberg in TH, 276-79 (1964).
22 FC, 13, cf. 3, 173 n. 3.
24 CG, 282 n. 43, 286 n. 109, 339 n. 9.
25 CG, 31 n. 23, 77-78 nn. 40-41, 290 n. 164.
26 CG, 250.
church—one empire.” While earlier having subverted the logic of empire, Christian theology soon went in the opposite direction and instead absorbed it.

Peterson’s influence on the political theology of CG, alongside that of Carl Schmitt, Karl Rahner, Alfred North Whitehead, and Hendrikus Berkhof, can also be seen in Moltmann’s polemical use of the word “monotheism.” Moltmann writes, “In the ancient world of religion, the doctrine of the Trinity in the concept of God was the doctrine which marked off Christianity from polytheism, pantheism and monotheism,” and combines this with Rahner’s diagnosis: “The religious conceptions of many Christians prove to be no more than a weakly Christianized monotheism.” With no apparent irony, though, Rahner, along with Barth, is repudiated for his “simple concept of God” that shies away from too strongly distinguishing the trinitarian persons, and later occasions Moltmann’s accusations of modalism. But this is more closely related to his theology of the cross. As Moltmann writes in 1979, reflecting on the theology of CG, “If God is an indivisible, eternal subject, then he can only be either dead or not dead, and because in his unity and eternity he is also immortal, he simply cannot be dead.” Nonetheless, although already a dirty word for

27 CG, 325.
29 CG, 235. Moltmann paraphrases Peterson, “Monotheism as a Political Problem,” 68 (quoted above), but removes the reference to Judaism.
31 CG, 203; Ger. 188. This criticism is also made of Eberhard Jüngel, H. G. Geyer, and Martin Luther. CG, 203-4, 235. For clarity’s sake, it should be noted that Moltmann’s rejection of this einfacher Gottesbegriff does not assume that those who hold to it do so because of the doctrine of divine simplicity. Although he is also critical of the latter doctrine, his focus here is on theology that prioritises the divine substance as the basis for unity, ahead of the unity of persons.
32 TKG, 139-48 (1980). I will discuss this below. See 6.4.4.
33 Moltmann in DGG, 175.
Moltmann in CG, his critical use of the term “monotheism” is here mostly overshadowed by the more general “theism.”

6.1.3. Divine Unity in the Crucifixion

Moltmann’s proposed alternative to the alliance between empire and the Father of Christ anticipates the later developments in his theology: “In the doctrine of the Trinity Christian theology describes the essential unity of God the Father with the incarnate, crucified Son in the Holy Spirit.” The doctrine of the Trinity “speaks of God in respect of the incarnation and death of Jesus and in so doing breaks the spell of the old philosophical concept of God, at the same time destroying the idols of national political religions.” It is the cross especially that propels Moltmann towards a doctrine of God that takes a thoroughly “trinitarian” form. This is why he later refers to it as the second major influence on the development of his doctrine of the Trinity.

As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, for Moltmann it is not merely Christ who suffers in his human nature, nor even God who suffers on the cross, but it is the Son who experiences dying and the Father who experiences death. Thus, “it is advisable to abandon the concept of God and to speak of the relationships of the Son and the Father and the Spirit at the point at which ‘God’ might be expected to be mentioned.” And, “the unity of the dialectical history of Father and Son and

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34 Conversely, in TKG “theism” seems to disappear altogether: “I am using the term ‘monotheism’ where other people” — Moltmann himself included! — “following the ideas of the nineteenth century, talk about ‘theism’.” TKG, 240 n. 7 (1980). It should also be noted that the epiphany theology rejected by Moltmann in TH (1964) is anachronistically and thus misleadingly characterised as “the monotheism of the eternal presence” by Randall E. Otto in “Moltmann and the Anti-Monotheism Movement,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 3:3 (2001): 293-308, at 296. Moltmann did not begin to use this term polemically until he started reading Peterson in the late sixties. But Otto seems to want to attribute a single and continuous line of thought to Moltmann, making criticism of his theology a much simpler task.

35 CG, 326.
36 CG, 215.
37 ExpTh, 304-6 (2000).
38 See 5.5.2.
39 CG, 207.
Spirit in the cross of Golgotha... can be described so to speak *retrospectively* as ‘God.’” Moltmann is attempting to conceive of the doctrine of God in such a way that the trinitarian persons, if not completely conceptually prior, at least share conceptual priority with the essential divine unity in some way. Therefore, the unity of Father and Son is volitional, though Moltmann’s articulation of this claim is somewhat ambiguous at this point: “In the concepts of earlier systematic theology it is possible to talk of a *homoousion*, in respect of an identity of substance, the community of will of the Father and Son on the cross. However, the unity contains not only identity of substance but also the wholly and utterly different character and inequality of the event on the cross. In the cross, Father and Son are most deeply separated in forsakenness and at the same time are most inwardly one in their surrender.” Elsewhere in the same year he writes, “We then understand the *homoousious* in historical terms. It is not God’s essence behind or beyond history but God’s history in the Christ-event.” Positively, then, the unity of Father and Son consists in their shared history and their common will for the salvation of the earth. Moltmann will develop this concept of history more clearly in *CPS* (1975), which I attend to in the following subsection. At this stage, however, his programme is still to develop, appearing in latent form in claims such as: “The relationships in the Trinity between Father and Son are not fixed in static terms once and for all, but are a living history. This history of God or this history in God begins with the sending and delivering up of the Son, continues with his resurrection and the transference of the rule of God to him, and only ends when the Son hands over this will to the Father.”

In this context Moltmann also speaks of the Spirit, but only hints at a pneumatological basis for divine unity. Nonetheless, his scanty comments on the Spirit

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40 *CG*, 247, emphasis mine. As will be seen below, however, already with *CPS* (1975), published just three years later, Moltmann seems to show little—if any—discomfort with using the word “God.”

41 *CG*, 244.

42 *EH*, 81 (1972).

43 *CG*, 265.

44 Perhaps this omission is encouraged by Moltmann’s methodological crucicentrism: “The gospels intentionally direct the gaze of Christians away from the experiences of the risen
point to the latter’s role in redemption, which for Moltmann means the uniting of the believer with the Trinity: “What proceeds from this event between Father and Son is the Spirit which justifies the godless, fills the forsaken with love and even brings the dead alive.” Following the crucifixion, the Spirit “opens up the future and creates life,” so that the believer can be “taken up into the inner life of God.” It follows that “the Trinity is no closed circle [sich geschlossener Kreis] in heaven, but an eschatological process open for men on earth.” These claims in regard to a trinitarian history and process of unification with believers are developed more thoroughly in CPS.

Although the doctrine of the Trinity was not a key feature of Moltmann’s theology before CG, the evidence I have provided at the beginning of this section suggests that he was not completely disinterested in the doctrine either. But it is with his reading of Peterson in the late sixties that this interest begins to take any meaningful root. While it cannot yet be said that Peterson played a formative role in Moltmann’s trinitarian hermeneutics, however, his analysis of the relationship between concepts of God and support for the political status quo was deeply influential, particularly with respect to claiming the doctrine of the Trinity as the necessary alternative. Peterson thus informs Moltmann’s developing contrastive paradigm in regard to the Trinity, even if Moltmann has not established a strong connection between Scripture and the doctrine of the Trinity at this stage. It is in CG, finally, that Moltmann starts to offer his own reflections of the Trinity, placing the doctrine at the

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Christ and the Holy Spirit back to the earthly Jesus and his way to the cross.” CG, 54. Moltmann makes a more explicit statement later: “The Holy Spirit glorifies Christ in us and us in Christ for the glory of God the Father. By bringing this about, he unites us and creation with the Son and the Father, as he unites the Son himself with the Father. The Spirit is the bond of fellowship and the power of unification. Together with God the Father and through God the Son, he is the unifying God. The history of the Spirit is the history of these unifications.” FC, 91 (1975); cf. Moltmann in DGG, 185-86 (1979); TKG, 126, 169 (1980).

45 CG, 244.
46 CG, 247.
47 CG, 249.
48 CG, 249; Ger. 236, translation adjusted. Kohl has “self-contained group,” but this does not reflect Barth’s theology, which Moltmann is alluding to here. See CG, 255.
centre of his project, alongside the cross. In the present section I have focussed on Moltmann’s work in CG as it concerns his alternative approach to the doctrine of divine unity. This alternative becomes particularly important in TKG, where it is characterised as the biblical alternative to that which is offered by the tradition. But TKG is still some time away. Other significant material can be found in three texts written in the intervening years.

6.2. The Discovery of Trinitarian History

Having acknowledged the need for a thoroughly trinitarian theology in CG, Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity finds a yet more central and determinative role in his theology in CPS. This is bound up in particular with his concept of trinitarian history, where the Trinity is best understood in the context of a history spanning from before creation to the coming kingdom. Also notable here are Moltmann’s reflections on the eschatological unification of the Trinity, laying important groundwork for his approach to the doctrine of divine unity in TKG. In two shorter subsections I attend to some of the key comments Moltmann makes in regard to the doctrine of the Trinity in two pieces from 1979, preparing the way for his book-length treatment in his 1980 TKG.

6.2.1. 1975: The Church in the Power of the Spirit

Moltmann’s third major work, The Church in the Power of the Spirit (1975),

contains important content concerning his developing doctrine of the Trinity. Indeed, reflecting back on CPS and TKG in 1990, he writes, “Throughout, my purpose was to

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50 For Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity in and around CPS, see Conyers, God, Hope, and History, 125-55; and Joy Ann McDougall, Pilgrimage of Love: Moltmann on the Trinity and Christian Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 60-67. For Moltmann’s theology of trinitarian history in the context of his wider career, see Matthias Remenyi, Um der Hoffnung willen: Untersuchungen zur eschatologischen Theologie Jürgen Moltnmanns (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2005), 66-95.
understand the triune God as the God who *is* community, who calls community into life and who invites men and women into sociality with him.” But perhaps Moltmann makes too much of the benefit of hindsight here, as the language of a divine community is almost absent in *CPS*.

What is important, nonetheless, is his theology of trinitarian history and unification, important steps on the way to a doctrine of the social Trinity.

*CPS* initiates a transitional phase in Moltmann’s theology. In *TH*, his focus was primarily on the eschatological fulfilment of the promise, attended by a developing interest in God’s futurity. By the time of *CG*, the relationship being future and present, though still being negotiated, allows more room for history to speak to eschatology—particularly in the role that the crucifixion has to play in the dialectic between these two. It is in *CPS*, though, that this incorporation of earthly history and eschatological fulfilment is integrated into the wider framework of the “trinitarian history of God,” a framework anticipated in *CG*. This transitional phase is largely complete with the publication of *TKG* (1980), the first of the six “systematic contributions to theology,” in which Moltmann no longer aims “to look at theology as a whole from one particular standpoint.”

He explains this earlier methodological commitment in more detail in his 1990 preface to *CPS*: “In 1965 [i.e., *TH*] my focus was the hope that is born from the resurrection of Christ; in 1972 [CG] it was the suffering in which the fellowship of the crucified One is experienced; and in 1975 [CPS] the experience of the divine Spirit, the giver of life.”

But while it is certainly true that Moltmann employs this kind of single-standpoint methodology in *TH* and *CG*, both criticised for their “one-sidedness,” CPS on

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51 *CPS*, xv.
52 The only explicit example I have found in *CPS* is the reference to the trinitarian *koinonia* on p.62, quoted below. Conversely, Moltmann’s comment may refer predominantly to the material of *CPS*, rather than the language.
53 See the previous subsection (6.1.3.).
54 *TKG*, xi.
55 *TKG*, xi.
56 *CPS*, xiii. *TH* was originally published in German in 1964 and first translated into English in 1967. The quoted year, 1965, is mistaken.
the whole reads as a much more balanced project.\textsuperscript{58} And although Moltmann’s proposals here might be seen as radical by certain readers, such as his view on open communion,\textsuperscript{59} it is less apparent that he is “one-sidedly” treating ecclesiology from a pneumatological perspective. Indeed, it would be better to say, against his own evaluation, that Moltmann’s project at this point has more of a trinitarian focus than a predominantly pneumatological one. This finds further development in the systematic contributions, where he attempts to address various doctrines without succumbing to a one-sided focus on hope or suffering, for example. Thus Moltmann begins the contributions with the doctrine of the Trinity, then proceeds through creation, christology, pneumatology, eschatology, and theological methodology. That the doctrine of the Trinity forms the backbone of these contributions can be seen in the subject of his first volume, following Barth,\textsuperscript{60} and his publishing of a volume each on christology and pneumatology. Moltmann’s volumes on creation and eschatology also demonstrate a decidedly theocentric—for him: trinitarian—focus, with their respective titles, \textit{God in Creation} and \textit{The Coming of God}. Even his volume on theological methodology, \textit{ExpTh}, concludes with a section on the Trinity.\textsuperscript{61} \textit{CPS} almost seems to be more at home within the systematic contributions, as a trinitarian ecclesiology. As A. J. Conyers observes, “The trinitarian process of God,” that is, from \textit{CPS} onwards, “provides an inclusive symbol for the ideas of God’s promise and God’s suffering that found expression in Moltmann’s first two major volumes of theology.”\textsuperscript{62}


\textsuperscript{59} \textit{CPS}, 242-60; anticipated in \textit{CG}, 41-45 (1972).

\textsuperscript{60} See Barth, \textit{CD} I/1, 295-304.

\textsuperscript{61} \textit{ExpTh}, 303-33 (2000).

\textsuperscript{62} Conyers, \textit{God, Hope, and History}, 155.
Though obviously not as explicitly trinitarian as the later *TKG*, in *CPS*, consistent with his push for a more thoroughly trinitarian theology in *CG*, Moltmann forwards an ecclesiology shaped and informed by a trinitarian programme. This is first of all discernible on the structural level. After a short, introductory chapter, he sets out from the church in history—which, as he will go on to show, is the church situated in the context of the trinitarian history of God—proceeds through the church in the context of Christ and the kingdom in two chapters, and only then attends to the church in the presence and power of the Spirit in another two chapters. Admittedly, the ecclesiological orientation of *CPS* cannot be overlooked. But the doctrine of the Trinity nonetheless begins to take on an organising role in Moltmann’s theology at this point, and, importantly, Moltmann feels unqualified to comment on ecclesiological matters without first placing them in their proper trinitarian context.

Most of the relevant material appears at the end of Moltmann’s chapter on the church’s historical character, concluding with a section on the church in the framework of the “trinitarian history of God’s dealings with the world.”63 This means that the church cannot be “christomonist,” a danger in Reformed theology,64 and perhaps a tendency of Moltmann’s theology in *CG*. Indeed, in contrast to his project in *CG*, he is now wary of opposite danger of “the particular work of the Spirit [being] subordinated to the work of Christ.”65 On the other hand, then, this means that the church cannot become “pneumatomonist,” a danger to which Orthodox theology especially is apparently prone.66 Moltmann seeks to avoid both reductions by thinking in as broadly trinitarian terms as possible. He thus introduces his discussion of trinitarian history, writing, “Our aim will be to explore the church’s mission and its meaning, existence and functions in the comprehensive framework of the history of God’s dealings with the world…. [N]o single life can comprehend itself without

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63 *CPS*, 53. On this section in *CPS*, cf. the similar essay in *FC*, 80-96 (1975).
64 *CPS*, 37.
65 *CPS*, 73.
66 *CPS*, 37.
comprehending itself in the framework of the whole in which it acquires its significance.”

Moltmann begins with the claim that understanding the church within trinitarian history first requires attention to the origins of Christ and the Spirit: “Is the mission of Jesus a chance historical event or does it find its foundation in God himself?” Thus, the gospels present the history of Jesus in light of his being sent and commissioned by the Father. They begin from the source of his ministry. Mark opens with Jesus’ baptism, Matthew and Luke with his conception, and John with the Word before creation, “in the eternity of the Father.” Since this is the case with Scripture, “theological reflection must ask about the origin of and reason for this mission, in order to understand the particular appearance of Jesus in the context shown.” At least on this point, Moltmann is in agreement with the tradition of trinitarian theology stretching from Augustine, through Thomas, to Barth: “The missio ad extra reveals the missio ad intra. The missio ad intra is the foundation for the missio ad extra.” That is, the missions of the Son and the Spirit in the divine economy constitute the epistemological basis for the eternal processions of the Son and the Spirit within the Trinity, and the latter constitute the ontological basis for the former.

Yet Moltmann also makes an important claim here that distinguishes his own position from that of the tradition. He writes, “The Trinity in the sending [Trinität in der Sendung] reveals the Trinity in the origin [die Trinität im Ursprung] as being from eternity an open Trinity. It is open for its own sending…. It is open for men and for all creation.” Here, Barth’s “closed circle” as a picture of the Trinity is again rejected, “the symbol of perfection and self-sufficiency.” Rather, “a Christian doctrine of the Trinity which is bound to the history of Christ and the history of the Spirit

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67 CPS, 50.
68 CPS, 53-54.
69 CPS, 53; for a later discussion of this theme, see TKG, 71-74 (1980).
70 CPS, 53.
71 CPS, 54.
72 CPS, 55; Ger. 72. These terms, which sound somewhat awkward in English, are Moltmann’s designations for what he elsewhere refers to as the immanent Trinity and economic Trinity. See CG, 240 (1972); Moltmann in DGG, 180-81 (1979); TKG, 158-61 (1980).
73 CPS, 55.
must conceive the Trinity as the Trinity of sending and seeking love of God which is open from its very origin.” Importantly, this eternal openness would not be a deficiency of God, as has been alleged in the tradition, but that which derives from the fullness of love in the trinitarian life. So, too, does the trinitarian history of God derive its historical character from love, rather than being necessitated through encounter with death.

Moltmann’s foray into the originary Trinity at this point is something of a change of direction in his theology. In TH, his chief concern was with the eschatological life of God, and in CG it was with the historical and eschatological constitution of the Trinity. Here, however, Moltmann has gone yet further to contemplate the life of the Trinity before the creation of the world. The trinitarian history is that which extends from before time to beyond the reconciliation of all things in the eschatological unification of God and creation. This does not mean, however, that such a history is to be conceived in straightforwardly linear terms. Moltmann’s methodology here recalls his earlier comments on the reciprocity of historical and eschatological approaches in christology: “If we come back once again to the contemplation of the history of Christ, we discover that this history can be viewed from two sides: from its origin and from its future. If our enquiry is directed towards the past, then this history is understood in the light of the sending and mission of Christ. If we think forwards, then it is seen from the point of view of its goal…. Both perspectives belong to a full understanding of the history of Christ.” The same applies to the origin and goal of the Spirit, and thus to the whole Trinity. It is clear, then, that Moltmann intends to broaden but not supersede the eschatological orientation of his earlier theology. Jesus, Moltmann claims, though having demonstrated some interest in his eternal origin, is still “‘the incarnation of the promise’ of the kingdom,” citing

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74 CPS, 56.
75 CPS, 56. See 5.3.2.
“As the eschatological future the kingdom has become the power that determines the present.”

Significantly, it is this dialectical methodology that allows Moltmann to arrive at different conclusions to those reached in the trinitarian orthodoxy of the Western theological tradition, where “there was a one-sided interest in Christ’s origin and, casting back from his history, theologians asked about the ground of that history in time and eternity.”

An important feature of Moltmann’s eschatological investigation are his comments on the doctrine of divine unity. Viewed in light of their origin, the missions of the Son and the Spirit presuppose the divine unity from eternity. But, “eschatologically, the unity of God is therefore linked with the salvation of creation.” The eschatological picture of the divine life reveals that, out of love, God chooses creation to be “necessary to his perfection.” The open unity of the Trinity from eternity, which finds its completion in the eschatological union with creation, progresses towards perfection in the historical redemption of creation. Here, then, Moltmann prefers talk of God’s “unification” (Vereinigung) to God’s unity (Einheit). He admits that this formulation might sound odd to some but finds further support for it in Franz Rosenzweig’s interpretation of the Shema: “Confessing God’s oneness [Einheit]—the Jew calls it: ‘unifying God [Gott einigen].’” For this oneness, it is because it

77 CPS, 192.
78 CPS, 57.
79 CPS, 61. In FC, 85-86 (1975), Moltmann appropriates the Dreifaltigkeit, the threefoldness of God, to the protological Trinity, and the Dreieinigkeit, the triunity of God, to the eschatological Trinity. “Just as the Trinity in the sending is, from its very origin, open to the world and man, because it is the ‘threefoldness’ of seeking love, so the Trinity in the glorification is open for the gathering and unifying of men and creation in God, because it is the ‘triunity’ of gathered love.” FC, 91. Moltmann is later critical of Rahner’s use of Dreifaltigkeit in place of Dreieinigkeit: “The phrase of his choice is not merely modalistic but also a bad German translation of trinitas.” TKG, 146 (1980).
80 CPS, 62.
81 CPS, 61; Ger. 77. Vereinigung can also be translated as “union,” as Kohl translates it here. I think “unification” better captures the processual nature of Moltmann’s concept, however. Cf. Moltmann’s comment on the word Schöpfung in FC, 116 (1976).
becomes, it is a becoming of oneness. And this becoming is placed upon man’s soul
and into his hands. The Jewish man and the Jewish Law—there is played out be-
tween the two no less than the process of Redemption that is inclusive of God, world
and man.”82 In a similar way, Christians participate in trinitarian unification through
the Spirit’s glorifying God from within them. Notably, Moltmann’s preference for
talk of God’s unification presupposes a unity that is socially constituted: “If the unity
of God were described in the doctrine of the Trinity by koinonia instead of by una
natura, this idea would not seem so unusual.”83 But this proposal is not developed
any further at this point.

In CPS, a subtle advance on Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity in CG (1972) is
the anthropological consequences that such an understanding of trinitarian unity en-
tails.84 Thus, “because the fellowship of the table unites [vereinigen] believers with
the triune God through Christ, it also causes men to unite with one another [die Ver-
einigung der Menschen untereinander] in messianic fellowship.”85 This hearkens back
to Moltmann’s claims expounded above in regard to the historical and eschatological
unification of God. In his discussion of the Lord’s Supper, Moltmann also contends
for an open communion, which is not “preceded by a ‘test’ of the individual’s wor-
thiness or unworthiness.”86 It is an openness grounded in the theology of the cross
developed in CG and which continues to inform Moltmann’s conclusions in CPS.

82 Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, trans. by Barbara E. Galli (Madison, WI: Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 433. Moltmann cites the German, which Kohl translates
directly from in CPS, 61. I have quoted an extra sentence to provide further context. For
the German, see Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung, ed. Albert Raffelt (Freiburg im
dok.uni-freiburg.de/fedora/objects/freidok:310/datastreams/FILE1/content. The original
German text of Rosenzweig, reproduced in this open access edition, is identical to that
which Moltmann quotes.

83 CPS, 62.

84 Nonetheless, already in CG: “Man develops his manhood always in relationship to the
Godhead of his God…. Theology and anthropology are involved in reciprocal relation-
ship.” CG, 267. Cf. by far the best study currently available study in English of Moltmann’s
theological anthropology: Ton van Prooijen, Limping but Blessed: Jürgen Moltmann’s Search
for a Liberating Anthropology (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004).

85 CPS, 257; Ger. 283-84.

86 CPS, 245.
Because it is Christ who rises from the dead, the blasphemer, the political rebel, and the one forsaken by God, the church cannot impose human prerequisites for participation in his meal. The unification of human beings, then, has its foundation in the unification of the Father with the crucified Christ through the resurrection. Moltmann had earlier polemicised against the alliance between imperial and divine unity, following Peterson. The alternative understanding of divine unity that he advocates here apparently leads to a significantly different politics and anthropology.

Also potentially relevant here are Moltmann’s comments on the trinitarian basis for both the communal and individual callings of Christians—even if this relationship to the Trinity remains a little ambiguous. If, on the one hand, all Christians are called to the same church ministry—Moltmann has the priesthood in mind—then they lose that which the Spirit has given them alone as individuals. If, on the other hand, the call to ministry is usurped by the bishopric and priesthood, then Christians in general, all of whom have received the Spirit, are obstructed from responding to their call. Rather, “it is only the trinitarian understanding of the commissioned community and the commissions in the community which is in a position to express the dignity, both of the people as a whole, and of its special ministries.”

A clue to just what Moltmann might intend by the “trinitarian” form of this alternative is given in his characterisation of the opposing approaches to ministry. The hierarchy that obstructed the charismatic ministry of the whole church depended on a “monarchical justification of the ministry…: one God, one Christ, one bishop, one church.” But this is thinking “in quite a one-sided way from Christ to the office, and from the office to Christian fellowship.” Conversely, “the development of the monarchical episcopate led to a quenching of the Spirit” so that “Christian spiritualism grew up parallel to it.” It is only when the church recognises its place in the trinitarian history of God that neither the particular priestly call in Christ nor the

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87 CPS, 306.
88 CPS, 305.
89 CPS, 305.
90 CPS, 305.
universal call of believers in the Spirit is sidelined. But it is only later that Moltmann’s anthropology and ecclesiology are grounded in a more explicitly and thoroughly trinitarian rationale.

6.2.2. 1979: Jewish Monotheism and Christian Trinitarian Doctrine

Before moving on to TKG (1980), two texts from 1979 are also of note. The first is Moltmann’s dialogue with the Orthodox Jewish thinker, Pinchas Lapide, Jewish Monotheism and Christian Trinitarian Doctrine. While increasingly allergic to the term “monotheism,” Moltmann here demonstrates some sympathy for its descriptive utility when applied to Judaism or Christianity. Even so, he finds it difficult to disentangle from the “philosophical monotheism,” “monarchism,” and “monism” of Aristotle. Indeed, “the concept of Jews and Christians is to be distinguished from the God of Aristotle through the historical experience of the passion and suffering of their God.” Moltmann supports this claim in repeating from CG (1972) his exposition of Abraham Heschel’s The Prophets. He adds here, though, following Heschel, that the

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91 A similar logic underpins Moltmann’s analysis of the relationship between the doctrine of the Trinity and politics in TKG (1980), which might elucidate the passage from CPS discussed above: “If we take our bearings from the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, personalism and socialism cease to be antitheses and are seen to be derived from a common foundation. The Christian doctrine of the Trinity compels us to develop social personalism or personal socialism. For, right down to the present day, the Western cult of the person has allied itself with monotheism, whereas the basis of the socialism of the Eastern countries, if we look at it from a religious viewpoint, is not so much atheistic as pantheistic…. Today it is vitally necessary for the two to converge in the direction of a truly ‘humane’ society; and here the Christian doctrine of the Trinity can play a substantial role.” TKG, 200.

92 See 6.4.7.

93 JM, 46, emphasis original. This is a rare positive statement from Moltmann on the term “monotheism,” suggesting that he could regard his own theology as monotheistic, even if largely rejecting the term. Nonetheless, the statement is not representative of his other theology and likely has more to do with the nature of the dialogue as a Jewish-Christian one. Others have criticised his general rejection of monotheism in this very connection—concerning Jewish monotheism. See Eugene B. Borowitz, Contemporary Christologies: A Jewish Response (New York: Paulist, 1980), 94-95; Otto, “Moltmann and the Anti-Monotheism Movement,” 298.

94 See 5.1.3.
Hebrew Bible shows that “every self-communication [of God] presumes a self-distinction.” For further support, Moltmann also appeals to Peter Kuhn, Gershom Scholem, and Franz Rosenzweig. He then turns to the self-distinction of God in Christianity, though most of the content of this section is already covered in CG and CPS. An important comment is of note at this point, though: “The Trinitarian self-distinction of God in the death of the Son on the cross is so deep and so broad that all those lost and abandoned will find a place in God.” It is on the cross that Father and Son are so distinguished that the gap between them here encompasses all that is good and evil in the world, taking this into themselves and thus overcoming it through their unification by the Spirit in the resurrection, and, ultimately, in their eschatological unification.

Moltmann also comments on the doctrine of divine unity in his discussion. For him, a divine unity that is not prior to but coincident with the trinity of persons better allows for the possibility of creation’s eschatological inclusion in that unity. Creation will not merely participate in the divine essence but in the distinction between the trinitarian persons. Therefore, “the unity of God is to be thought of in the self-distinction of the Father and the Son.” Moreover, in response to Lapide’s objection that his reading of the biblical texts does not adequately uphold the mystery and incomprehensibility of the divine unity, Moltmann clarifies that this is indeed something that he would like to maintain: “The unity of God appears to me to be the greatest mystery.” Nonetheless, he does not make any apologies for rejecting a numerical formulation of divine unity: “Numerical unity is indeed itself no number but is the foundation of all numbering. The numerical figures two, three, four, five, and so on always proceed out of numerical unity. One must not hold up before Christians

95 JM, 49.
96 JM, 53. This echoes the line from Adrienne von Speyr that is quoted in FC, 91 (1975); CPS, 60 (1975); and two years after TKG in HTG, 87 (1982): “The distance separating Father and Son has been widened to embrace the whole world.” Adrienne von Speyr, The Word: A Meditation on the Prologue to St John’s Gospel, trans. by Alexander Dru (London: Collins, 1953), 26.
97 JM, 64.
98 JM, 64.
the notion that they would have a multiple God if they did not understand God as a monarch and if they reject the concept of numerical unity as the mystery of God.”

6.2.3. 1979: “Response to the Criticism of The Crucified God”

A second notable text is Moltmann’s later response to various reviews of and interactions with CG. Here he responds to the allegations of both Klaus Rosenthal and Pannenberg that his theology in CG leans towards tritheism. But, Moltmann counters, tritheism in the Christian tradition has never actually existed because nobody has ever claimed that there were three gods. Rather, the charge of tritheism functions as a diversion to direct attention away from the modalistic tendencies in the critic’s own theology. Moltmann points to Calvin and Barth as examples of this, the latter whose “reification of the three persons into three ‘modes of being’ corresponds to the rehabilitation of Sabellianism through Schleiermacher”! It is modalism and not tritheism that is the true threat: “The Christian doctrine of the Trinity seems to have two dangers: the emphasis on the three persons can lead to tritheism, and the emphasis on the unity of God can lead to modalism. The first danger is fictitious; the second danger, however, has been real for a thousand years.” Reformed theology’s

99 JM, 64.
100 This is a persistent criticism of Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity, especially after TKG. See the examples provided by Remenyi in Uml der Hoffnung willen, 107-8. For some further examples and a defence of Moltmann against such charges, see Neal, Theology as Hope, 107-11.
101 This claim, repeated in TKG, 243 n. 43, has been contested. See Paul D. Molnar, Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity, 2nd ed. (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2017), 386 n. 28. George Hunsinger’s witty reply is also worth noting in this connection: If it is true that there have never been any actual tritheists, “then one can only conclude that Moltmann is vying to be the first. Despite the evident scorn with which he anticipates such a charge, The Trinity and the Kingdom is about the closest thing to tritheism that any of us are likely to see.” George Hunsinger, review of The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God, by Jürgen Moltmann, The Thomist 47:1 (1983): 129-39, at 131.
102 Moltmann in DGG, 182. Seinsweise might otherwise be translated as “way of being.” The common English translation of this term in the context of Barth’s theology unfortunately gives inadvertent support to Moltmann’s critique, which is not based on the word but on the concept the word represents and how this functions in Barth’s theology. See the editor’s note in CD, I/1, vii. I attend below to Moltmann’s later, extended criticism of Barth on this point, at 6.4.4.
103 Moltmann in DGG, 182.
allegedly modalistic approach to divine unity originates in its desire to uphold the sovereignty of God. But this goes back further still. The early church sought the monarchy of the single divine essence in order to achieve a unified world. Here, again, Peterson’s influence is clear: “If the starting point is in a monotheistic world monarchy that is in need of salvation, then the unity of the ruling subject must be so strongly emphasised that the divine self-differentiation recedes in the three persons or ends up functioning merely to serve this divine sovereignty.” Such a monotheism, however, would not be a Christian doctrine of the Trinity, but rather the Neoplatonic concept of divine emanation, in that the three persons are incidental, not essential, to the divine unity.

Later in the same essay Moltmann responds to criticism that the theology of CG was pneumatologically deficient, largely agreeing with this. He attempted to make up for it in CPS, explaining some of the thinking that underpinned this work and anticipating the proposals of TKG. The deficient pneumatology of CG was informed in part by Moltmann’s methodology. Even if the Spirit is accorded the role of uniting Father and Son despite separation in the crucifixion, its personhood is not thereby articulated. The only way to properly acknowledge the personhood of the Spirit is to be found in according the Father a passive role within the Trinity. And just this is what Moltmann discovered writing CPS, when he began to reflect theologically on the Spirit’s glorification of the Father and the Son. It is necessary to take such a direction in order to arrive at an account of the Spirit as a distinct, acting subject, which, as Moltmann will argue in TKG, is itself necessary to arrive at a concept of divine unity that reflects the true sociality of the Trinity.

Finally, Moltmann reflects on the language of the “Trinity in the origin” and “Trinity in the sending” that he employed in CPS. Not only do these correspond to what others have called the immanent Trinity and economic Trinity, but, in Molt-

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104 Moltmann in DGG, 183.
105 CPS, 57-60.
106 See 6.4.2.
107 See above, 6.2.1.
mann’s theology of trinitarian history they represent different stages or configurations of the Trinity: “In the comprehensive trinitarian history of God, the trinitarian relationships of the divine persons also change.” Thus, “we can speak of the Trinity in the origin, the Trinity of sending, the Trinity of abandonment, the Trinity of glorification, and the Trinity in the perfection.”108 But Moltmann is not here proposing numerous new categories into which the doctrine of the Trinity can be newly divided. Rather, he is problematising a slavish adherence to the sometimes dualistic categories of immanent and economic, categories which obscure the rich variety of trinitarian configurations that he sees in Scripture.

Moltmann’s fertile activity between CG and TKG lays important groundwork for the latter. CPS is particularly important in this regard, as it is here that Moltmann begins to develop in some detail his concept of trinitarian history. Here, too, his proposals concerning the eschatological unification of the Trinity are implicitly contrasted with doctrine of divine unity offered by the tradition—a point to be made explicitly throughout TKG. In the context of this dissertation, this is another significant application that Moltmann makes of his contrastive paradigm. In this section I also attended to two texts from 1979 which reveal notable advances in Moltmann’s trinitarian thinking at this time. He displays an interest in rejecting numerical forms of divine unity, preferring to ground unity in the relationships between the persons. But Moltmann rejects the charge of tritheism as hollow and distracting, and proposes a more sophisticated pneumatology that will take into account the active work of the Spirit.

108 Moltmann in DGG, 181.
6.3. *The Trinity and the Kingdom*: Methodological Questions

*The Trinity and the Kingdom* was first published in German in 1980, though its basic claims, Moltmann states, had been in development since 1975, the year *CPS* was published. I have attempted to demonstrate the extent of this in the foregoing. But *TKG* differs from the previous works in being the first of Moltmann’s systematic contributions to theology, intended to be free from the methodological constraint to a particular standpoint—such as the resurrection (*TH*), the crucifixion (*CG*), or Pentecost (*CPS*). As systematic contributions, Moltmann aims in these works to treat the theological material “in a particular systematic sequence.” But as systematic contributions, on the other hand, he also seeks to depart from the close-endedness that he perceives to be a feature of various theological systems: “Systems save some readers (and their admirers most of all) from thinking critically for themselves and from arriving at independent and responsible decision. For systems do not present themselves for discussion.” In contrast, Moltmann seeks to participate in ongoing theological dialogue with proposals that stimulate rather than stifle new ideas.

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110 *TKG*, xv.
112 But see my comments on *CPS* at 6.2.1.
113 *TKG*, xi.
114 *TKG*, xi. Richard Clutterbuck identifies a tension in Moltmann’s theology at this point: “There is a major tension… between the disavowal of ‘doctrine’, ‘dogma’, ‘tradition’ and ‘system’ as helpful concepts, and the strongly doctrinal and systematic content of Moltmann’s theology.” And, “there have been few theologians who have made such specific proposals for key Christian doctrines.” Richard Clutterbuck, “Jürgen Moltmann as a Doctrinal Theologian: The Nature of Doctrine and the Possibilities for Its Development,” *Scottish Journal of Theology* 48:4 (1995): 489-505, at 489, 490-1. Despite Moltmann’s claims throughout his corpus that he is offering theological suggestions, Clutterbuck mounts a strong argument to the contrary, namely that Moltmann elsewhere demonstrates an expectation that his proposals be taken up and former doctrines be set aside or radically reimagined.
I have divided the material in TKG into two sections for ease of reading. In this first section I attend to key methodological issues. I begin with the influence of Dumitru Stăniloae and the theology of other Orthodox figures, proceed to Moltmann’s opening chapter in TKG on the possibility of developing a new trinitarian theology, and finish with a discussion of Moltmann’s explicit comments on the role that the Bible plays in his theology of trinitarian history.

6.3.1. The Influence of Dumitru Stăniloae and Orthodox Theology

Moltmann later mentions the theology of Dumitru Stăniloae, whom he first met in the 1979 Klingenthal Conference, as the third formative influence on the formation of his doctrine of the Trinity, following that of Peterson and the theology of the cross.\(^{115}\) Their relationship developed to a point that Moltmann could later refer to Stăniloae as a “fatherly friend”: “After my teacher Karl Barth, the encounter with Professor Dumitru Stăniloae was my greatest theological discovery.”\(^{116}\) Moltmann notes the significance of Stăniloae’s participation in the 1979 conference, concerning the ecumenical problem of the filioque: “On the 23-27 May 1979 we met for the second time in Klingenthal and reached a successful agreement. Above all, we owed this to Dumitru Stăniloae, who, together with his then assistant Daniel, today Patriarch of the Orthodox Church of Romania, took part.”\(^{117}\) Daniel Munteanu also sees Stăniloae’s influence in Moltmann’s perichoretic concept of divine unity in TKG, though he does not account for the development of Moltmann’s theology in this direction before meeting Stăniloae.\(^{118}\) Moltmann, too, however, hints at this relationship when

\(^{117}\) Moltmann, “Dumitru Stăniloae,” 32.
he writes, “For me, the Klingenthal Conferences were historic moments of true, substantial ecumenical theology. As a result, I developed a ‘social doctrine of the Trinity.’”

In the above statements, however, it is perhaps more likely the case that Moltmann wishes to honour Stâniloae, rather than name him as a key influence in the formation of his doctrine of the Trinity. A few factors suggest this as a possibility. Moltmann first met Stâniloae just one year before his next major work, TKG, was published. While, as I will show below, other Orthodox figures surely influenced Moltmann’s theology in this area, the influence of Stâniloae is much less certain and demonstrable. Moreover, no explicit citations of Stâniloae appear in TKG. The earliest reference to Stâniloae that I have been able to locate appears in 1982. Finally, Moltmann names Stâniloae in connection to the resolution of the problem of the filioque. But the nature of this connection can be determined by reading the papers originally presented at the 1979 Klingenthal Conference, later published in 1981. Moltmann’s contribution, written independently of Stâniloae, is barely distinguishable from the material in TKG. Stâniloae presents the concluding paper, offering


constructive evaluations of the papers presented by Jean-Miguel Garrigues and Moltmann, and situating them in the context of an Orthodox understanding of patristic theology. Moltmann’s appreciative comments are thus best understood in this context—as thanks to Stăniloae for his warm reception of the paper and his important role in the conclusion of the discussion. Moltmann’s retrospective comment, then—“Stăniloae convinced me that the filioque addition is superfluous and detrimental”—citing Stăniloae’s paper, cannot refer to the development of Moltmann’s own proposal on the filioque but to the confirmation that the concerns of the Orthodox are legitimate.

Notably, evidence of Moltmann having drawn on other Orthodox thinkers can be found in TKG. As Moltmann writes in a later preface, “The Orthodox tradition offered more help for this social doctrine of the Trinity than did its Western counterpart.” Throughout TKG he engages with numerous Orthodox figures who clearly inform his conclusions. These include Nikolai Berdyaev, Boris Bolotov (a much more likely candidate for the source of Moltmann’s response to the filioque), Boris Bobrinskoy, and Vladimir Lossky. Andrei Rublev is especially significant here. His famous icon of the Trinity guided Moltmann in his reflections throughout the course of writing TKG. Commenting on the icon, Moltmann reveals, “Through their tenderly intimate inclination towards one another, the three Persons show the profound unity joining them, in which they are one…. Anyone who grasps the truth of this picture… understands that people only arrive at their own truth in their free and

Lukas Vischer, 164-73 (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1981); TKG, 178-87. Alternatively, it is possible that Moltmann revised his 1979 paper before its 1981 publication, on the basis of his 1980 work in TKG.


124 TKG, viii (1990). Nonetheless, it remains unclear which representatives of the Orthodox tradition led Moltmann in this direction.

125 TKG, 42-47.

126 TKG, 180, 184-85; Moltmann, “Dumitru Stăniloae,” 31, 33-34.

127 TKG, 184.

128 TKG, 245 nn. 72-73, 246 n. 84.
loving inclination towards one another. It is to this ‘social’ understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity that this book is an invitation. “ Whereas premodern Western art typically depicts the Spirit as a dove and the Father and Son in a humanlike way, for Moltmann this convention “expresses a duality rather than a Trinity.” “ Rublev’s icon is a notable exception,” and likely contributed to Moltmann’s interest in developing an alternative approach to the personhood of the Spirit. Two years after the publication of TKG, Moltmann also writes approvingly of Nicolai Fedorov, along with F. D. Maurice and Nicolai Grundtvig, who promoted the principle, “The Holy Trinity is our social programme.” Here Moltmann attributes his familiarity with Fedorov to Paul Evdokimov’s Christus im russischen Denken (Christ in Russian Thought), which he also cites three times in the earlier TKG. But Moltmann’s interest in Fedorov’s claim, for which Miroslav Volf is better known today, can already be seen in TKG, as Moltmann contends for the surpassing significance of the perichoretic divine life in connection to human society.

The relevance of Orthodoxy’s influence on Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity is less immediately clear when considering the role of Scripture in his theology. Erik Peterson contributes to his contrastive paradigm, so that Moltmann can seek what he understands to be a doctrine of divine unity that is more faithful to the biblical texts than that which allegedly derives ultimately from Aristotelianism. And the cross, as in CG, in a central focus of biblical witness. Here, too, Scripture works to chasten theological approaches to the Trinity that derive their logic from elsewhere. But Moltmann’s concerns in his engagement with Orthodox figures and the connection of these concerns to exegetical ones is not obvious. Indeed, it could be said that

130 TKG, 169.
132 I am not aware of any ET.
133 TKG, 229 n. 71, 234 n. 33, 244 n. 63.
the opposite is the case. Thus, in his first major criticism of Moltmann’s theology, one of Richard Bauckham’s many charges against TKG concerns the exegetical basis for its claims. He decries Moltmann’s “unfounded speculation” and inability “to find a real basis in the biblical history for the kind of speculation in which he engages.”

In his proposal for the filioque, for example, Moltmann “falls back on the traditional Greek patristic and Orthodox reliance on the text John 15:26, with no reference to the fact that all modern exegesis sees in that text no reference to the pre-temporal origin of the Spirit from the Father…. Clearly Moltmann is here the victim of his too respectful immersion in the tradition”! Bauckham concludes, “This is hermeneutical responsibility in the service of speculation which, whatever its value for ecumenical politics, surely lacks any real theological interest.”

The connection between Moltmann’s Orthodoxy-inspired claims and the conclusions informed by reading biblical texts, however, need not be completely cast aside. The development of an alternative concept of divine unity, latent in CG and built upon in CPS, derives predominantly from the need for a trinitarian theology faithful to the cross and the biblical witness. It is also encouraged by Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm and his broadening rejection of Greek philosophical sources for Christian theology. Moltmann’s exposure to Orthodoxy—a tradition otherwise opposed to theological innovation based on a distinction between the witness of Scripture and that of the Fathers—only reinforces the aims of his own programme in providing support in the form of church tradition for his reading of the Bible. That is, although Orthodox figures do not play a major role in Moltmann’s hermeneutical judgements, they lend support to and provide latitude for the creative expression of these. It is in this connection that I have attended to them here.

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137 Bauckham, *The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann*, 168. *Pace* Bauckham, the implied distinction between “ecumenical politics” (!) and “theological interest” is surely a false one.
6.3.2. A Contemporary Prolegomena

TKG opens with a reflection on the state of trinitarian theology at the beginning of the 1980s. Among those without theological training there are a variety of opinions on the significance of the doctrine of the Trinity. For many, “whether God is one or triune evidently makes as little difference to the doctrine of the Trinity as it does to ethics.”138 In contemporary academic theology, too, “the doctrine of the Trinity has very little essential importance.”139 Moltmann proceeds to address what he understands to be the two main sources for either explicit opposition to or implicit reservations regarding the doctrine of the Trinity in the church and theology. The first is experience. As Schleiermacher had earlier discovered, modern humanity finds “statements about God which do not include statements about the immediate self-consciousness of the believer belong to the realm of speculation, because they are not verifiable by personal experience.”140 It is thus that Schleiermacher saw the trinity of persons as “superfluous,” secondary to the one God of Christian experience. But, contra Schleiermacher, the anthropological centre of this question, “How do I experience God?” overlooks its theological reverse, “How does God experience me?”141 For the authentic experience of God, the question of reciprocity must also be addressed, though without assuming that God experiences us and we experience God in the same way. Significantly, the divine experience can only be understood in a trinitarian way, as Moltmann had argued in CG through his theology of divine suffering. Moreover, such an investigation will aid in overcoming the narcissistic orientation of modern society.

The second source of opposition and reservation is the modern concern with pragmatism. This might be expressed as such: “What does not turn into act has no value. It is only practice that verifies a theory.”142 On similar grounds, Kant rejected

138 TKG, 1.
139 TKG, 2.
140 TKG, 3.
141 TKG, 3. This question had already been addressed in CPS, 62-64 (1975), though in a different context. Cf. also the more sympathetic reading of Schleiermacher in CG, 238 (1972).
142 TKG, 5-6.
the doctrine of the Trinity as completely irrelevant for enlightened humanity. “Here the transcendental definition ‘God’ is sufficient; for moral monotheism is enough to provide the foundation for free and responsible conduct.”\textsuperscript{143} But these assumptions continue into contemporary life. Liberation theology, for example, among other movements, has made theological reflection secondary to Christian praxis. Despite its important role in directing the church to live out its faith, Moltmann responds, “Christian love is not merely a motivation, and Christian faith is more than the point from which action takes its bearings.”\textsuperscript{144} Contemplation is necessary in order to avoid the meritocratic pragmatism of modern society. Positively, through contemplation the Christian practitioner receives from God new possibilities for action. And, insofar as it is contemplation of the one who was crucified, nor does this contemplation stifle action. The two are reciprocal. Moreover, in contemplation the triune God is worshiped, a point Moltmann will develop later in \textit{TKG}. Importantly, for Moltmann, neither of the contemporary concerns with either experience or pragmatism can be adequately met outside of a trinitarian framework.

Moltmann addresses the latter section of his introductory chapter to what he understands to be the three main ways that God has been conceived of in the Western tradition: supreme substance, absolute subject, and triune God.\textsuperscript{145} First, God has been conceived of as supreme substance. Here, again following Feuerbach, the nature of God is determined on the basis of the negation of the cosmos’s finite limitations. Moltmann points to the five ways of Thomas Aquinas as an example: “They

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{143} \textit{TKG}, 6.
\item \textsuperscript{144} \textit{TKG}, 7.
\item \textsuperscript{145} The first two of these correspond respectively to the cosmological and anthropological proofs for God that Moltmann treated in \textit{TH}, 273-79 (1964), and to the questions of Jesus’ divinity and humanity addressed in \textit{CG}, 87-98 (1972). Contrast the more ecumenical proposal of \textit{GC}, written just five years later: “The supreme New Testament statement ‘God is love’ can only be understood if God is thought of not merely as supreme substance but also as subject; and, again, not merely as absolute subject, but also as supreme substance.” Nonetheless, “Both possible metaphysical ways of thinking are integrated and excelled by the trinitarian justification and interpretation of this ‘practical definition’ of God: \textit{Deus est caritas} [i.e., God is love].” \textit{GC}, 86 (1985).
\end{enumerate}
start from general phenomena in the world and enquire about their ultimate foundation, beyond which nothing can be asked at all.”

If, however, human understanding of the cosmos changes, the conception of the supreme substance of God that derives from it must change too. And this is what happened in modern thought from Descartes onwards, leading to the second major concept of God, God as absolute subject: “Once man makes himself the subject of his own world by the process of knowing it, conquering it and shaping it, the conception of the world as cosmos is destroyed.” The ontological centre of the modern world is no longer the supreme substance, God, but the human subject. Yet God is not thereby done away with. Rather, the human subject now requires a God to ground him in a true humanity, that is, “the infinite, perfect and absolute subject, namely the archetype of himself.”

The western tradition has also conceived of God as triune, though Moltmann argues that this conception was incompatible with the other two. Since Thomas, theology in the west has treated the doctrine of God first under the treatise De Deo uno and then under De deo trino. But because God’s unity is primarily understood according to the divine substance, the nature of which is derived from the negation of finite limitations, a properly biblical understanding of God’s trinitarian unity is lost. So, too, since Hegel the absolute subject of God has been treated as primary and the trinity of persons as secondary. Moreover, the concept of person stands in contradiction to the absolute subject, because it “also contains the concept of the subject of acts and relationships.” In contrast to the unity of both the supreme substance and the absolute subject, Moltmann seeks a concept of divine unity that better

146 TKG, 12.
147 TKG, 13.
148 TKG, 15.
149 Moltmann here juxtaposes the Einheit (unit, oneness) of the divine substance with the Einigkeit (accord, unity) of the triune God. The comparison might otherwise be translated as Kohl does, the “unity of the divine essence” against the “union of the triune God.” TKG, 17; Ger. 32-33. Later in the text, Kohl provides a short commentary-translation of die Einigkeit des drei-einigen Gottes as “the unitedness, the at-oneness of the triune God.” TKG, 150; Ger. 167. It should be noted though that Einheit in theology does not usually need to take the restricted, almost numerical sense that Moltmann gives it here for the sake of comparison.
150 TKG, 18.
reflects the biblical testimony to God’s trinitarian history. The substantial concept of God is no longer possible, due to the changed nature of humanity’s relationship to the cosmos. And, with time, it will also become increasingly difficult to affirm that God is absolute subject, not only due to growing interest in the relational nature of the human subject, but due also to the biblical witness to the relationships between the trinitarian persons and their relationships to the world and humanity. What is needed, then, is a “social doctrine of the Trinity.”

6.3.3. The Bible and the Trinity

Scripture plays a central role in Moltmann’s trinitarian proposals in TKG. In the introduction to his third chapter, Moltmann enquires into the origins of the patristic doctrine of the Trinity with Adolf von Harnack. He writes, “If we turn back from this dogmatic acknowledgement of the Trinity to the proclamation of God as we find it in the New Testament, we feel the hermeneutic difference, and ask: are the seeds of the development that ended in the church’s doctrine of the Trinity already to be found in the New Testament? Or is this doctrine merely the result of a subsequent dogmatization on the part of the Christian faith?” The spectre of the Hellenistic contamination of the gospel once again emerges. But this does not mean that the doctrine itself is in conflict with Scripture. Although Moltmann perceives a disjunct

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151 TKG, 19.
152 Moltmann’s intentions are widely acknowledged. E.g., “Moltmann seeks to develop his trinitarian thinking from the Bible and thus to give it a biblical basis.” Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 138. “Scripture therefore narrates what for Moltmann is the trinitarian history of God.” Kurt Anders Richardson, “Moltmann’s Communitarian Trinity,” in Jürgen Moltmann and Evangelical Theology: A Critical Engagement, ed. Sung Wook Chung, 17-39 (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2012), 31. But, as Bauckham’s criticism demonstrates, discussed above in 6.3.1., the success of carrying out these intentions is another matter. So J. Matthew Bonzo alleges that Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity is “itself more a construction than a result of exegesis.” He continues, “There is a fine line between testifying about the Trinity as revealed by scripture and espousing an ideology rooted in a metaphysical construct.” J. Matthew Bonzo, Indwelling the Forsaken Other: The Trinitarian Ethics of Jürgen Moltmann (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2009), 9-10.
153 TKG, 61.
between the biblical witness and later trinitarian theology, he also rejects the “irreconcilable contradiction” that theologians in the tradition of Harnack discover between this witness and the Trinity itself. Moltmann contests the assumptions that inform this trend in liberal Protestantism, namely, that the relevance of Jesus’ message for today consists in its moral implications. Metaphysical projections such as the doctrine of the Trinity are nothing but distractions.

One alternative to this Harnackian dismissal might be found in Karl Barth, where the doctrine of the Trinity provides the necessary framework for apprehending God’s revelation. But Barth grounds the doctrine of the Trinity in the divine lordship, prompting critical questions from Moltmann: “Is God’s lordship really what has to be interpreted, and is the Trinity merely its interpretation? Does the sole sovereignty of the one God precede the divine Trinity? Is it not the reverse which is true?”154 This response anticipates a more extensive reply from Moltmann, appearing later in TKG, which I expound below.155 At this stage it will be enough to note that Moltmann discovers a common problem in Harnackian and Barthian hermeneutics: “Every monotheistic interpretation of New Testament testimony,” here, Barth’s, “finds itself in a similar dilemma to the moral interpretation. It too has to reduce the history to which the Bible testifies to a single subject.”156 But “according to the testimony of the New Testament it is not God who reveals himself, but the Son who reveals the Father (Matt 11:27) and the Father who reveals the Son (Gal 1:16).”157 That is, the NT consistently speaks of three interdependent subjects. “For Moltmann, one pattern of trinitarian activity cannot adequately convey the activity detailed in the New Testament.”158 Harnack’s criticism fails because it bypasses the Trinity completely, though an essential feature of the biblical witness, but so does Barth’s reformulation and the doctrine upheld by the greater part of the tradition, insofar as the oneness is made prior to the trinity of God.

154 TKG, 63.
155 See 6.4.4.
156 TKG, 63.
157 TKG, 64.
158 Neal, Theology as Hope, 77.
It is important to comment on the location of Moltmann’s remarks regarding the relationship between the doctrine of the Trinity and Scripture. These remarks are offered in the conclusion of a very brief discussion of liberal Protestant theology and Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity. At least in connection to Barth, they are developed in much more detail later on in TKG. My concern here is simply to follow Moltmann in providing this brief context as an introduction to his alternative: a doctrine of trinitarian history that attempts to remain faithful to Scripture in reflecting on the three unique, interdependent, and historical subjects of Father, Son, and Spirit.

Barth’s “monotheism” cannot recognise “the history of the reciprocal, changing, and hence living relationship between the Father, the Son and the Spirit.” It is in conflict with the NT, which “talks about God by proclaiming in narrative [erzählend verkündigen] the relationships of the Father, the Son and the Spirit, which are relationships of fellowship and are open to the world.” Or, as Moltmann writes later on in TKG, “History shows us that it is in the abstractions that the heresies are hidden. The foundations of orthodoxy, on the other hand, are to be found in narrative differentiation [erzählende Differenzierung].” Significantly, there is a conceptual connection between history (Geschichte) and narrative (Erzählung) here that English does not carry. This is because in German Geschichte can designate either history or story. Such an observation is particularly important in regard to the role that Scripture plays in Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity. It is not merely the history preceding the Bible to which the latter is a witness, but the narratival, storied character of this witness is valuable in itself. Moltmann seeks to reflect this in his doctrine of the Trinity, which only comes into its own in narrative form. As Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz puts it, for Moltmann “the doctrine of the Trinity is basically not a ‘doctrine’…; rather, it is about the telling, or better the retelling, of God’s history.”

159 TKG, 65.
160 TKG, 64; Ger. 80.
161 TKG, 190; Ger. 206.
162 So Ernst Conradie: “Moltmann’s theology is deeply (hi)storical.” Ernst M. Conradie, *Saving the Earth? The Legacy of Reformed Views on “Re-Creation”* (Zurich: Lit, 2013), 278.
163 Müller-Fahrenholz, *The Kingdom and the Power*, 142, emphasis original. So McDougall: For Moltmann “the biblical witness does not yield a doctrine of the Trinity that can be fixed in
This necessarily narratival character of the doctrine is not new to TKG. Indeed, already in 1968 Moltmann observes, “Christian theology speaks of God historically. It speaks of the ‘God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,’ and of the ‘Father of Jesus Christ,’ and unites the proclamation of God with the memory of historical persons. It speaks of the ‘God of the exodus,’ as in the First Commandment, and of the ‘God who raised Jesus from the dead,’ as in the Easter kerygma, and unites with faith in God the memory of historical events. The hermeneutical starting point of Christian theology is therefore the concrete history witnessed to in both the Old and New Testaments.”164 Later, Moltmann’s CG (1972) can be seen as a modern recounting of the story of the cross. Thus, in the year following CG, Moltmann writes that the doctrine of the Trinity “is nothing other than the shortened version of the history of Christ’s passion.... Anyone who talks about God must tell [erzählen] this history [Geschichte].”165 In CPS (1975), too, Moltmann follows Scripture in telling the story of God’s future unification. He reflects, “In the Old Testament God’s self-manifestation is always associated with a story [Geschichte] which has to be told [erzählen] in order to say who God is.”166

In this section I have explored three features concerning the methodology and assumptions underpinning Moltmann’s project in TKG, with a focus on their relationship to his use of Scripture. Moltmann’s rejection of the concepts of “absolute substance” and “absolute subject” prepares the way for his alternative approach to divine unity, which is intended to more faithfully represent the biblical witness. This

static terms or be subsumed into a metaphysical formula.” McDougall, Pilgrimage of Love, 12. David Kelsey already recognised this perhaps even long before Moltmann himself. Concerning TH (1964), Kelsey writes, “For Moltmann too, biblical narrative is the authoritative aspect of scripture because, precisely as narrative, it gives an identity description of Jesus Christ in the only apposite way.” David H. Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1975), 54. I have not engaged with Kelsey elsewhere in this dissertation as his interaction with Moltmann totals about one page in his famous work. In my introduction (1.1.) I briefly discuss two dissertations that apply the body of theory developed by Kelsey and others in the so-called Yale School to Moltmann’s work.

164 RRF, 203.
166 CPS, 209; Ger. 234. For later comments on narrative in Moltmann’s theology, see e.g., GC, 119-20, 257 (1985); SL, 100-3 (1992).
alternative is closely related to his framework of trinitarian history. Here Moltmann seeks to follow Scripture in speaking of three interdependent subjects, distinct but unified. I attend to these proposals in greater detail in the following section. A question also arose at the beginning of this section, however, in regard to the relationship between ecumenical concerns and more exegetically-informed conclusions. I will treat this in greater detail in my discussion of Moltmann’s alternative to the filioque clause, below.\footnote{See 6.4.6.}

6.4. A Social Doctrine of the Trinity

Understanding the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity requires moving beyond methodological considerations to the proposals themselves. In this section, then, I turn to the content and construction of Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity as it appears throughout TKG. For want of space, I have not commented on every claim that Moltmann makes, but I have focussed my attention on the nonetheless expansive passages that are most instructive in regard to the role that Scripture plays in his theology. I begin with Moltmann’s discussion of trinitarian love and freedom, then proceed to his developed concept of trinitarian history. The latter raises questions of trinitarian action and personhood, which Moltmann presents in the context of his criticisms of Barth’s and Rahner’s doctrines of the Trinity. His reflections on these topics conclude with a perichoretic concept of divine unity and an alternative to the filioque clause added to the Nicene Creed. In a final subsection I expound the last chapter of TKG, in which Moltmann draws connections between the Trinity, politics, church, and society.

6.4.1. Freedom, Love, and the Creation of the World

Moltmann’s first substantial and positive contribution to a doctrine of the Trinity appears in the second chapter of TKG. After expounding various trends in twentieth century theology that help to situate his own theology of trinitarian theology as it was
developed in CG, Moltmann briefly rehearses his earlier conclusions and then proceeds to reflect on trinitarian love and freedom in light of the cross. Moltmann begins with a rejection of the “nominalist doctrine of decree,” namely that “God is free. He is compelled to do nothing. He can do and leave undone whatever he likes.”\(^{168}\) The act of creation, for example, is free in such a way that God could have chosen not to create the world. Again, Moltmann turns to Barth in order to anchor his discussion: “Karl Barth tried to get over the nominalist doctrine of *potentia absoluta*, especially in his criticism of Luther. None the less, in his doctrine of God’s primordial decision a nominalist fringe remains.”\(^{169}\) For example, Barth had written: “He could have remained satisfied with Himself and with the impassible glory and blessedness of His own inner life. But he did not do so.”\(^{170}\) In conceding that God “could have remained satisfied” without creating the world, Barth maintains a nominalist understanding of freedom.

In response, Moltmann points to the NT witness to God’s unassailable faithfulness and intra-divine love, citing 2 Tim 2:13: “He remains faithful—for he cannot deny himself.” That is, there can be no question of a decision to create the world on God’s part, at least insofar as such a decision implies the possibility of choosing not to create. For Moltmann, “God’s freedom cannot contradict the highest good which constitutes his essence,” namely loving faithfulness,\(^{171}\) “He does not have the choice between being love and *not* being love.”\(^{172}\) The biblical witness to God’s love is to be the point of departure for any reflection on divine freedom.\(^{173}\)

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\(^{168}\) TKG, 52.

\(^{169}\) TKG, 52.

\(^{170}\) Barth, *CD* II/2, 166, cited in TKG, 52.

\(^{171}\) TKG, 53.

\(^{172}\) TKG, 54-55, emphasis original.

\(^{173}\) Molnar advances the somewhat odd-sounding criticism that “if God is not his own prisoner he is certainly the prisoner of love which by its very nature must freely create another in order to be true to its own nature.” Molnar, *Divine Freedom*, 399. For Moltmann, however, this “must” is not in conflict with God’s freedom but essential to it. God’s freedom would not be loving freedom if it did not result in the creation of something other than God. Critics of Moltmann on this point would do well to remember that various necessities are already conventionally predicated of God, such as that God necessarily exists, is triune, and cannot create a square circle, for example. None of these limit who God is but are rather essential to God’s being and, indeed, freedom. Moltmann’s claim that the act of
is, and who God freely is. But Moltmann’s propositions here do not yet establish a necessary connection between God’s essential love and the act of creation. This relationship is explored in Moltmann’s following section on love itself.

Considering this intra-trinitarian love in more detail, Moltmann proposes six theses:

1. “Love is the self-communication of the good.” It does not communicate anything destructive. 2. “Every self-communication proposes the capacity for self-differentiation.” The lover communicates itself to another in such a way that it is the lover who both communicates and is communicated. This process, as such, assumes identity and differentiation. If God is to love the world, then God must be trinitarian: “An individuality cannot communicate itself: individuality is ineffable, unutterable. If God is love he is at once the lover, the beloved and the love itself.”

3. Love, rightly understood, leads naturally to the creation of the world. For God not to create would be a denial of the love God consists in because “love not only has the potentiality for this, but the actual tendency and intention as well.”

The trinitarian logic of this love is developed more explicitly in the following theses: 4. A distinction must be made between the “necessary love” of Father and Son, and the “free love” of the trinitarian persons for the world. The first is constitutive of the trinitarian being. It consists in “the love of like for like,” as Father and

creation is essential to divine love might be criticised on other grounds, but his application of some form of necessity to the Trinity—a necessity which is in no way in the same class as those necessities that restrict human freedoms—is not in itself problematic.

These theses, while not developed in great detail in TKG, underpin much of Moltmann’s subsequent theological work. For an exposition and criticism, see Farrow, “Review Essay,” 435-41.

TKG, 57.

TKG, 57.

TKG, 57.

TKG, 58.

TKG, 58. Molnar rejects Moltmann’s characterisation of the relationship between the Father and Son as necessary, arguing that “any such necessity would make the love of God subject to a higher law encompassing his actual free love.” Molnar, Divine Freedom, 402. But Moltmann simply wants to say that God cannot be other than triune. God is necessarily triune. As Barth, whom Molnar attempts to closely follow, wrote, “He cannot not be Father and cannot be without the Son. His freedom or aseity in respect of Himself consists in His freedom, not determined by anything but Himself, to be God, and that means to be the Father of the Son. A freedom to be able not to be this would be an abrogation of His
Son share divine being, even if as distinct persons. But “like is not enough for like.” This intense, capacious love seeks to go beyond the like to the unlike as well. Thus, the necessary love of Father and Son naturally leads to the free creation of the world. It cannot be otherwise. But with the act of creation, self-humiliation and divine suffering are initiated, that is, if at least creation is to remain free. Because trinitarian suffering is linked to the creation of the world, however, this also means that the world’s redemption, secured already in love, takes place within the broader context of the redemption of God from suffering.

The briefness of the exposition in this subsection reflects the length of Moltmann’s own treatment. In my opinion, these claims are somewhat underdeveloped, though there is a certain beauty to them that should not be denied. Besides these immediate reflections, however, the content addressed here is important for two reasons. First, although the major focus of this chapter is on Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm as it concerns his proposals on divine unity in particular, its application here to nominalist concepts of freedom—and especially to Barth’s presentation of divine freedom—provides yet another example of this paradigm at work. The same pattern of confronting a non-biblical culprit with a biblical alternative is clearly discernible in Moltmann’s aim to supplant a certain concept of freedom with one informed by Scripture’s witness to God’s love. Second, though, the somewhat speculative, propositional character of the second section, in which Moltmann presents his six theses, while inspired by 1 John 4:16, is a departure from much of the other material in TKG that bears a closer relationship to exegesis. Of course, such speculation has its own merits. The main problem here is that Moltmann does not at this stage provide an explicit rationale for approaching the subject matter in quite a different manner.

freedom.” Barth, CD I/1, 434. Unfortunately, Molnar’s polemical orientation prevents him from understanding Moltmann here.

TKG, 58.

TKG, 59.
6.4.2. The Trinity in the History of Christ

Trinitarian proposals with a closer relationship to the narrative of Scripture are offered in Moltmann’s third chapter, “The History of the Son.” Having laid the biblical foundations, addressed above,\(^\text{182}\) Moltmann proceeds to reflect on his subject matter, the Trinity, setting out from the person of the Son. He writes, “In order to grasp the Trinity in the biblical history, let us begin with the history of Jesus, the Son, for he is the revealer of the Trinity.”\(^\text{183}\)

Moltmann divides the material into four sections: Christ’s sending, surrender, exaltation, and future. The first pertains to his baptism, ministry, and divine origin; the second to his road to Jerusalem, Gethsemane, and Golgotha; the third to his resurrection, resurrection appearances, and Pentecost; and the fourth to his Parousia. Significantly, in each section, Moltmann discovers a different form of the Trinity. And in each form, different divine persons are the subjects of different actions. In Jesus’ sending, for example: “The Father sends the Son through the Spirit. The Son comes from the Father in the power of the Spirit. The Spirit brings people into the fellowship of the Son with the Father.”\(^\text{184}\) The three persons are differentiated by their respective roles in the history of the Son. Here, the Father sends, the Son comes, and the Spirit gathers.

Because the trinitarian persons share a history, their identities are also historical. They take on different roles at different points in this history. A different form of the Trinity can thus be discerned in Jesus’ surrender, for example. Moltmann writes, “The Father gives up his own Son to death in its most absolute sense, for us. The Son gives himself up, for us. The common sacrifice of the Father and the Son comes about through the Holy Spirit, who joins and unites the Son in his forsakenness with the Father.”\(^\text{185}\) Simply put, the Father offers the Son, the Son offers himself, and the Spirit unites the two.

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\(^{182}\) See 6.3.3.

\(^{183}\) TKG, 65.

\(^{184}\) TKG, 75. Moltmann provides bullet points which I have not reproduced here.

\(^{185}\) TKG, 83. Moltmann provides bullet points which I have not reproduced here.
In identifying different forms of the Trinity at different stages in the history of the Son, Moltmann seeks to affirm the historical shape of the Trinity that he sees attested in Scripture. Additionally, however, such a project also allows him the opportunity to respond to the pneumatological deficit in his previous work. Responding to criticisms of this deficit before writing *TKG*, Moltmann had said, “The situation only changes if it is possible to speak of an event where the Father is passive and all activity within the trinitarian life of God comes from the Spirit.”

This event, considered in *CPS* (1975), turned out to be the eschatological glorification and unification of the Trinity. In *TKG*, though, Moltmann applies this logic even more explicitly. He writes, “In eschatology, all activity proceeds from the Son and the Spirit; the Father is the receiver of the kingdom.” And, “in eschatology the Holy Spirit is the actor equally,” that is, equally with the Son, so that “he glorifies the Father through the praise of all created beings who have been liberated by Christ’s rule. The Father is the One who receives. He receives his kingdom from the Son; he receives his glory from the Spirit.”

Summarising his findings, Moltmann notes, “Father, Son and Spirit do not only combine or work together according to a single pattern.” Rather, the divine persons act upon one another and receive one another’s actions in different ways, according to the different stages in the trinitarian history. Moltmann strengthens this claim with reference to his contrastive paradigm: “Up to now, however, dogmatic tradition has only worked with a single pattern. And in the West this pattern has always been Father—Son—Spirit.” That is, for Moltmann the biblical material requires a much more fluid account of the Trinity—indeed, a historical one—than that which is offered by the tradition.

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187 See 6.2.1.
188 *TKG*, 93.
189 *TKG*, 94, cf. 125-26, 204.
190 *TKG*, 94.
191 *TKG*, 95.
Finally, Moltmann offers two preliminary proposals on the nature of the divine unity. First, the historical shape of the Trinity coincides with an openness for the eschatological inclusion of humanity and creation into the divine life. Second, God’s actions are not the work of a single subject but of three subjects, the trinitarian persons, who act upon and are acted upon by the others in various ways. It follows that “the unity of the divine tri-unity lies in the union [Einigkeit] of the Father, the Son and the Spirit, not in their numerical unity [Einheit]. It lies in their fellowship, not in the identity of a single subject.”

Moltmann finds further support for this in Jesus’ claim: “The Father and I are one” (John 10:30). The word “one” [eins] here is *hen* in Greek, not *heis* — the latter which would justify the traditional concept of divine unity and have Jesus say, “I and the Father are one and the same [einer].” Moltmann also appeals to John 17:21, where Jesus prays that his disciples will be one just as the Father is one with him. This requires that the divine unity is not complete from the beginning but is open to the inclusion of creation within it.

6.4.3. Trinitarian Action

In chapter four, having reflected on the Trinity through the different stages of the Son’s history, Moltmann proceeds to offer a complementary reflection oriented to the works conventionally appropriated to the different persons: creation to the Father, incarnation to the Son, and glorification to the Spirit. But Moltmann explicitly rejects this Augustinian concept of appropriation, in which these works are works of the whole Trinity and only appropriated to particular persons. Here, for example,

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192 TKG, 95, emphasis original; Ger. 111. Note that Moltmann moves on from the language of Vereinigung applied to the Trinity in CPS (1975). Vereinigung is instead appropriated to the eschatological unification of creation with God. “The union [Einigkeit] of the divine Trinity is open for the uniting [Vereinigung] of the whole creation with itself and in itself.” TKG, 96; Ger. 111. Cf. the “unification of the whole creation” on 127 and 157; Ger. 142, 174; and “the uniting of isolated individuals” on 216; Ger. 233.

193 TKG, 95; Ger. 111. This is how Kohl translates Moltmann’s distinction between eins and einer. In its first sense, einer might be seen to preclude plurality because it refers to one within a group, for example, *einer der Götter*; one of the gods. In its second sense, it could preclude trinitarian distinction insofar as it refers to a single, personal subject, for example, *da hat das einer hier gelassen*: someone left this here.
creation would be an undivided act of the whole Trinity, while theology could appropriately speak of the work of creation as being a work of the Father—on the basis of his intra-trinitarian generation of the Son and spiration of the Spirit, even if Son and Spirit share equally in this act as being the one actor, God. Because Moltmann rejects the premise that God is a single subject, however, he also rejects the logic of appropriation.

Moltmann’s trinitarian doctrine of creation provides one example of his alternative conception of trinitarian action, going beyond the parameters set by the doctrine of appropriation. In this, the Father is the subject of creation, and “creates the world by virtue of his eternal love for the Son.”194 Admittedly, Moltmann follows the tradition in drawing a connection between the act of creation and the Father’s active relationship to the Son within the Trinity, grounded in his eternal act of begetting the Son. But for Moltmann the act of creation is not simply appropriate to the person of the Father. Rather, it is his in a much more direct way, insofar as it originates with him and is carried out uniquely and actively by him—not in an undifferentiated manner by the whole Trinity. This does not mean that Son and Spirit are excluded from the act, however. They, too, participate in creation, albeit each in their own way. Thus, for the Father’s initiating love the Son offers his own, responsive love, which provides the ground for creation to freely give itself back to its Creator. The Father also creates not merely out of nothing but “out of the powers and energies of his own Spirit.”195 So, too, then, is the Spirit active in the work of creation through giving life to all created things. As Moltmann will write a few years later, “Creation exists in the Spirit, is moulded by the Son and is created by the Father. It is therefore from God, through God and in God.”196 Creation is an act of the one God, but this act is accomplished in the interrelated workings of the three persons of the Trinity, and not by the one God as a single subject.197

194 TKG, 112.
195 TKG, 113.
196 GC, 98 (1985).
197 In view of Moltmann’s rejection of the doctrine of appropriation, the charge of modalism is particularly perplexing. Molnar writes, “When Moltmann follows Rolt and attempts to
6.4.4. Modalism and Modern Theology

Moltmann opens his fifth chapter with “a criticism of Christian monotheism.” The doctrine of the Trinity was formulated in the context of various heresies that questioned Christ’s unity with God. Arianism conceived of God apart from Christ, whereas Sabellianism (or modalism) swallowed up Christ within God. For Moltmann, these heresies are both “monotheistic” rather than trinitarian, attempting to insulate the unity of God from trinitarian differentiation. Importantly, moreover, they “are by no means historically fortuitous and a thing of the past. They are permanent dangers to Christian theology.” But Moltmann is not speaking of fringe movements that are not taken seriously by Christian orthodoxy. As he later reveals, “Whereas throughout the history of the church Arianism was always tainted with ‘liberalism’ and heresy, Sabellian modalism was at times established church doctrine.” After a brief comment on Tertullian in this connection, Moltmann proceeds to offer criticisms of Barth’s and Rahner’s doctrines of the Trinity. His critique of deduce the eternal divine nature from Christ’s passion, he asserts, … ‘What Christ, the incarnate God, did in time, God, the heavenly Father, does and must do in eternity.’ Here we have a specific avowal of modalism which cannot distinguish the Father and Son in eternity.” Molnar, Divine Freedom, 411. What Molnar does not acknowledge is that Moltmann is summarising and not following C. E. Rolt here. This statement is not representative of Moltmann’s own position, as even a cursory reading of TKG demonstrates. The same charge from William Hill has more ground to stand on because it is directed against CG (1972): “The consistent disallowing of a conception of the Trinity as a strictly divine reality in the sense of an eternal preexistent koinōnia, in favor of an eschatological process towards the world, can be interpreted as carrying modalistic overtones.” William J. Hill, The Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1982), 172-73. Hill goes on to discuss the problem of tritheism in Moltmann’s theology, writing, “It is not unusual for trinitarian thought with modalistic strains to veer over into tritheism as a corrective maneuver.” Ibid., 173. Hill is more careful than Molnar, though the validity of his criticisms remains an open question.

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198 TKG, 129.
199 TKG, 129.
200 TKG, 136.
201 Cf. the essay on Barth in HTG, 130-35 (1987). Later, the theology of Hendrik Berkhof is also described as modalist, though “unlike Barth, Berkhof also surrenders the three divine modes of existence. Instead of a Trinity, he asserts a binity of Father and Son.” SL, 13 (1991).
these two figures is closely related to his rejection of God as absolute substance and absolute subject in the first chapter of *TKG*, treated above.\textsuperscript{202}

Moltmann situates Barth in the German Idealist tradition which characterised God as absolute subject and thus “the subject of his own being and his own revelation.”\textsuperscript{203} In his first chapter, Moltmann had argued that this development arose in the context of early modernity and humanity’s newfound powers over nature. A new concept of God thus appeared, corresponding to the new conditions the human subject found itself in. But this emphasis on the single subject of God also had consequences for trinitarian theology: “If the subjectivity of acting and receiving is transferred from the three divine Persons to the one divine subject, then the three Persons are bound to be degraded to modes of being, or modes of subsistence, of the one identical subject.”\textsuperscript{204} Father, Son, and Spirit, in being made modes of being in Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity, forfeit the character of active subjectivity and thus, for Moltmann, of distinct personhood. Moltmann takes further issue with other aspects of Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity, such as his having made the divine lordship logically prior to the Trinity;\textsuperscript{205} his adoption of Anselm’s formulation of the personal distinctions as repetitions—a “holy tautology”;\textsuperscript{206} and his pneumatology in the tradition of Augustine, where the Spirit is understood as the love between the Father and the Son, but as such, in Moltmann’s view, lacks real personhood.

As he had done earlier,\textsuperscript{207} Moltmann also criticises Barth for drawing attention to an apparently non-existent tritheism in order to divert attention away from his own “modalism.”\textsuperscript{208} Indeed, the tritheism Barth is referring to is probably the

\textsuperscript{202} See 6.3.2.
\textsuperscript{203} TKG, 139.
\textsuperscript{204} TKG, 139.
\textsuperscript{205} Moltmann is consistently critical of Barth’s approach to the divine freedom and lordship. TKG, 52-56, 63, 156, 158.
\textsuperscript{206} TKG, 141.
\textsuperscript{207} See 6.2.3.
\textsuperscript{208} Moltmann places the reference to Barth’s “modalism” in scare quotes in TKG, 243 n. 43. He is also careful to say that the charges of modalism and non-Christian monotheism “are certainly only dangers if these ideas are taken to their ultimate conclusion.” TKG, 139. The polemical nature of the critique, however, makes it is easy to overlook these qualifying statements.
“triadology of the Eastern church.” To characterise this established church doctrine as tritheism, a heresy, is a polemical decision on Barth’s part—perhaps only matched by Moltmann’s polemical attribution of modalism to Barth himself! Nonetheless, Moltmann is not wholly critical of Barth. He is appreciative of Barth’s trinitarian theology in the later volumes of the Church Dogmatics, where Barth reflects on the biblical witness to God’s covenant and develops what Moltmann characterises as a theology of “mutual relationship… in which God does not merely speak and decree, but also hears and receives.”

Rahner goes down a similar path to that of Barth, designating the trinitarian persons as “distinct modes of subsistence” of the one divine subject. He, too, polemises against an apparently non-existent tritheism, but goes even further to say that “this danger looms much larger than Sabellian modalism.” Following again in the German Idealist tradition, Rahner takes particular issue with applying a modern concept of personhood to the Father, Son, and Spirit. Yet, Moltmann responds, the target of Rahner’s objection is “extreme individualism,” so that Rahner overlooks the contributions of modern personalist philosophy. According to the latter, there is no I without Thou. The concept of person is a relational one. Unfortunately, this oversight means that the individualistic concept of person, albeit rejected when applied to the trinitarian persons, is now resituated by Rahner within the sphere of the one divine subject.

Moltmann provides a short conclusion for this first section of his chapter. Church history shows that philosophical terms took on new meanings in theology to make room for their subject matter. He cites the concept of person as an example. Comparatively little progress, however, was made with the concept of divine unity.

209 TKG, 243 n. 43.
210 TKG, 144.
211 TKG, 144.
213 TKG, 145.
But a hint is provided in the Nicene Creed. Here, Father, Son, and Spirit are *homoousios*, so that they share the same substance. They do not necessarily constitute a single subject, as in Barth and Rahner. This leads Moltmann to propose the following thesis, where his contrastive paradigm is especially evident: “If the biblical testimony is chosen as a point of departure, then we shall have to start from the three Persons of the history of Christ. If philosophical logic is made the starting point, then the enquirer proceeds from the One God.” That is, Scripture suggests a doctrine of the Trinity that does not share Thomas’s point of departure in absolute substance, nor Barth’s or Rahner’s in the absolute subject. A biblical doctrine of the Trinity will have to reflect the active, interrelated, and distinct personhoods of Father, Son, and Spirit. Moltmann has made steps in this direction already. To complete his proposal he will need to reflect more deeply on the unity of the three persons.

An important caveat warrants mention at this point, however, before Moltmann proceeds to unfold his alternative concept of divine unity in detail. Theological reflection that begins with the three persons does not require that their unity is an afterthought. Rather, “the unitedness of the trinity is already given with the fellowship of the Father, the Son and the Spirit.” As Moltmann later writes, “The unity of God is to be found in the triunity of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. It neither precedes that nor follows it.” Perhaps anticipating charges of tritheism, Moltmann contends that the divine unity is concurrent with the trinity of persons,

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214 TKG, 149.
215 TKG, 150, slightly altered.
216 TKG, 190. Here Randall Otto’s criticism is misguided. He argues that Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity cannot sustain itself because the persons are merely relations, lacking substance. But for Moltmann the relationships between the persons constitute the substance. It is neither posterior nor prior to them. See Randall E. Otto, “The Use and Abuse of Perichoresis in Recent Theology,” *Scottish Journal of Theology* 54:3 (2001): 366-84, at 372-77. A little later on, Otto cites CoG, 298 (1995). In context, the passage reads, “In the doctrine of the Trinity it is not sufficient just to talk about the divine Persons and relationships; their reciprocal indwellings must be perceived as well. Only then do we understand their trinitarian fellowship and their unique divine Being. This is perfect, requiring no other Being in which it can exist—not even a common divine substance.” Otto cites only the last two clauses in “Use and Abuse,” 381, suggesting that Moltmann wants to do away with divine being altogether. But this is a misunderstanding. Moltmann only seeks to ground divine being in the concrete persons and their interrelationships.
insofar as each is always already volitionally and ontologically intertwined with the other. But there is yet more to say of trinitarian unity.

6.4.5. Divine Personhood and Unity

Later in his fifth chapter, Moltmann goes on to address the identities of the divine persons within the life of the Trinity. First, the Father must be understood primarily as the Father of the Son. If his Fatherhood is rather conceived of chiefly on the basis of his relationship to the world, namely, that he is its origin, then he becomes an almighty power indistinguishable from that principle which has traditionally sanctioned the prevailing religio-political order. Instead, his fatherhood of the world is to be understood on the basis of his Fatherhood of Christ, for whose sake he adopts human beings as his children. Moltmann also claims that the concept of divine origin (archē) can be helpful in bringing clarity to theological thinking, though only insofar as the “equally primordial character of the trinitarian Persons,” that is, of the Son and Spirit who find their origin in the Father, is also upheld. If the Father is presented as origin in any other sense then the doctrine of the Trinity is again lost to monotheism. The Father’s personhood is therefore relational, in that it cannot be defined apart from the Son, as well as distinct, in that the Father alone is the origin of the Son and the Spirit. This will also have important implications for Moltmann’s proposed solution to the problem of the filioque. So, too, the Son’s personhood is relational, in that it cannot be defined apart from the Father, as well as distinct, in that the Son alone is begotten of the Father. Finally, neither can the Spirit be defined apart from the Father and the Son. But the Spirit is also distinct from the other persons in that it proceeds from the Father rather than being begotten by him. Moltmann will treat this in greater detail in his section on the filioque clause. Before doing so, he offers some further reflections on divine personhood and unity.

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217 TKG, 166.
218 “If the Father is only named as the ‘origin’ of the divinity of the Son and the divinity of the Holy Spirit, then the specific difference between the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit is blurred.” TKG, 188.
Taking up Boethius’s definition of personhood, Moltmann offers the following thesis: “The trinitarian Persons are not ‘modes of being’; they are individual, unique, non-interchangeable subjects of the one, common divine substance, with consciousness and will. Each of the persons possesses the divine nature in a non-interchangeable way; each presents it in his own way.”\(^{219}\) But this personhood is not to be confused with self-sufficiency or isolation. Rather, “their particular individual nature is determined in their relationship to one another…. It is in these relationships that they are persons.”\(^{220}\) It is both the personhood of the individual substance after Boethius and the relational personhood beginning with Augustine that must be upheld. This means, moreover, that neither can the persons be identified exhaustively with the relations.\(^{221}\) That would be modalism. For Moltmann, “here there are no persons without relations; but there are no relations without persons either.”\(^{222}\) Put differently, as Moltmann later writes, “The trinitarian concepts of person, relation, perichoresis and illumination must be noted in the doctrine of the Trinity…. [N]o concept may subsume another and be made a generic term including the other.”\(^{223}\) Finally, however, the concept of divine personhood would still be incomplete if it did not take into account the historicity of each person, following Hegel. This is one of the most distinctive aspects of Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity, which I have been exploring throughout this chapter of the dissertation. Father, Son, and Spirit are not only personal and relational, but their persons and relations undergo change in history.

\(^{219}\) TKG, 171.
\(^{220}\) TKG, 172.
\(^{221}\) Moltmann attributes such a move to Barth. TKG, 246 n. 79.
\(^{222}\) TKG, 172. Moltmann draws remarkably similar conclusions on human personhood in his 1959 exposition of Bonhoeffer’s theology. E.g., “Personal spirit in its individual manifestation lives only in virtue of sociality. Yet, on the other hand, the ‘social spirit’ comes into being only in individual form. This authentic sociality is impelled toward personal unity, but so far from suppressing or annihilating that unity, it actually constitutes it and brings it to life. There is no question of priority, but only of reciprocal relationship.” No reference to the connection between human and divine personhood, however, a key assumption in TKG, is discernible here. Moltmann, “The Lordship of Christ and Human Society,” 36.
\(^{223}\) HTG, 85 (1982).
Next, Moltmann turns to the patristic concept of perichoresis, or circumincessio. Here “the Persons do not only subsist in the common divine substance; they also exist in their relations to the other Persons.”\(^{224}\) That is, the persons are one through their intimate indwelling within one another. “By virtue of their eternal love they live in one another to such an extent, and dwell in one another to such an extent, that they are one.”\(^{225}\) Moltmann finds this concept to be particularly helpful in upholding both the trinity of persons and their unity. Because unity is only to be found in the interrelationships of the three, the trinity of persons is constitutive of this unity. It is a social unity, so that the unity of persons cannot be comprehended apart from the persons. This differs from “a general concept of divine substance,” which, if upheld, “would abolish the personal differences.”\(^{226}\) Moltmann has already laid such a charge against Barth and Rahner.

Thus, Moltmann seeks to ground the divine unity in the perichoretic interrelationships between the persons. The unity of God is therefore always already a trinitarian unity, and cannot be arrived at independently of the three persons—such as in notions of absolute substance or absolute subject. Notably, Moltmann turns to Boethius, Augustine, and Hegel in this section in order to develop a concept of personhood as individual, relational, and historical. His discussion of perichoresis finds its starting point in John of Damascus, even if Moltmann has well and truly made the concept his own by the end of the discussion. This is to say that while the narrative of Scripture encourages Moltmann to depart from traditional concepts of divine unity, this narrative is not the only source of his alternative doctrine of the Trinity. He takes what he needs from key voices in the tradition in order to reflect more deeply on the biblical logic. I argued above that a similar thing transpires in Moltmann’s engagement with Orthodox theologians.\(^{227}\) This will also be a feature of his discussion of the filioque clause, to which I now turn.

\(^{224}\) TKG, 174.
\(^{225}\) TKG, 175.
\(^{226}\) TKG, 175.
\(^{227}\) See 6.3.1.
Moltmann goes on to propose a solution to the problem of the *filioque*, the clause which was later included in the Nicene Creed and affirmed that the Spirit “proceeds from the Father *and the Son.*” Accepted by the churches of the west, it occasioned the 1054 Great Schism between the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches. Until the late nineteenth century, little progress was made in attempts to resolve the theological conflict. Moreover, Moltmann contends, neither can ecclesial disunity be resolved through the simple removal of the clause from the creed. A shared doctrine of the Trinity needs to be sought.

In pursuit of a shared doctrine of the Trinity, Moltmann points to common ground between the theologies of east and west in that both acknowledge the priority of the Father in the Spirit’s procession, even if in different ways. That is, the Father remains the only unoriginate person of the Trinity. Importantly, moreover, western readers must not misunderstand the east’s rejection of the *filioque*. Moltmann argues that although the Spirit owes its existence to the Father alone in Orthodox theology, the form of relation it takes within the Trinity is determined through the Father *and* the Son. Origin and relation must be differentiated. Having established these basic claims, Moltmann turns to the work of Boris Bolotov in order to develop his proposal. The Spirit does not proceed from a nameless person but from the Father, and the fatherhood of this Father derives from his relationship to the Son, not from his relationship to all things. Thus, the Spirit’s procession “presupposes, firstly, the

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229 “The Filioque was never directed against the ‘monarchy’ of the Father, even though this formula was supposed to ward off tendencies toward subordinationism in trinitarian doctrine.… It has never been denied in the West that the Son (John 16.27) and the Holy Spirit (John 15.26) proceed from the Father, each in his own way; and that therefore the Father is—in different ways—the ‘origin’ of them both…. The Father, being himself without origin, was always the first Person in the Trinity.” *TKG*, 182.
generation of the Son; secondly, the existence of the Son; and thirdly, the mutual relationship of the Father and the Son. The Son is the logical presupposition and the actual condition for the procession of the Spirit from the Father; but he is not the Spirit’s origin, as the Father is.”230 Put succinctly, the Son is “not uninvolved” in the Spirit’s procession.231 This can be expressed positively, too, if the distinction between origin and relation is observed: “The Holy Spirit has from the Father his perfect, divine existence (hypostasis, hyparxis) and receives from the Son his relational form (eidos, prosopon).”232 And although the latter is also eternal, it presupposes the Spirit’s procession, which is logically prior.

In order to offer a thoughtful response to the scandal surrounding the filioque clause, Moltmann again departs from the task of simply reading and reflecting on Scripture—something he is criticised for by Bauckham.233 But I think this is a false dichotomy. The Bible does not provide an answer to every question. Although Bauckham would obviously be aware of this fact, he has not applied its truth to Moltmann’s proposal here. Moltmann’s reflections on trinitarian personhood, action, and unity attempt to follow the narrative of Scripture closely as a source for trinitarian doctrine. But this does not mean that Moltmann closes himself to thought outside the Bible that aids him in communicating the biblical witness to the Trinity in the context of the concerns of his own time and place. The problem of the filioque is one of those concerns, being a focus of the ecumenical movement in particular. It is to Moltmann’s credit that in his treatment of trinitarian unity he has sought a corresponding ecclesial unity. This connection is already made in John 17. Thus, while the finer details of Moltmann’s proposals are rightly considered, examined, and even contested, his entry into the discussion over the filioque, ostensibly a departure from NT concerns, is to be celebrated.

230 TKG, 184.
231 TKG, 184.
232 TKG, 186. He does not receive his form from the Son alone, however, as this quote might suggest. So, Moltmann concludes this section, the Spirit “receives his form from the Father and the Son.” TKG, 187.
233 See 6.3.1.
6.4.7. Trinitarian and Human Community

In the final chapter of *TKG*, Moltmann offers some reflections on the significance of a social doctrine of the Trinity for human community.\(^{234}\) Whereas historical forms of monotheism, including Christian ones, legitimated oppressive political and religious orders, Moltmann argues, the doctrine of the Trinity, rightly understood, leads to freedom in politics and religion: “A community of men and women without supremacy and without subjection.”\(^{235}\) Moltmann had already begun to move the discussion in this direction in his previous chapter. Thus, the nineteenth century theologians Richard Rothe, Isaak A. Dorner, and Martin Kähler had developed a concept of God as “absolute personality.” This concept corresponded to “the fully developed human personality of the bourgeois world.”\(^{236}\) Here, in light of the God who is absolute subject, the human being who is made in God’s image develops its personhood in self-relationship. If, however, God is triune, then the human being is only truly personal in community with other persons. Barth and Rahner, therefore, who inherit the nineteenth century approach, are also subject to this criticism.

Moltmann opens this last chapter with a discussion of “political monotheism.” Peterson’s influence is again especially clear here, as Moltmann traces the correspondence of the one emperor to the one God in early Christian theology. But Moltmann also addresses the undeveloped claim of Peterson’s that the “the European Enlightenment preserved nothing of the Christian belief in God except ‘monotheism,’ a result as dubious in its theological substance as in its political consequences.”\(^{237}\) Thus contributions to the Huguenot doctrine of royal absolutism began to appear in the seventeenth century. It was the king above all others who represented God in his majesty and *aneuthunia*, his “non-accountability towards anyone

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\(^{234}\) For this subsection, see Bauckham, *The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann*, 179-82.


\(^{236}\) *TKG*, 155.

\(^{237}\) Peterson, “Monotheism as a Political Problem,” 68; German cited in *TKG*, 195.
else.” The nominalist aspects of Calvin’s approach to divine sovereignty found their political expression here. And while the king’s accountability to God alone was intended to prevent tyranny, in practice it actually sanctioned it. With the French Revolution this doctrine basically met its end, though it was maintained by various Catholic and Protestant thinkers. Moltmann locates its modern manifestation in dictatorships, where the religious rationale finally becomes superfluous.

Significantly, Moltmann also departs from Peterson on a central claim. Whereas Peterson saw an end to Christian political monotheism in the trinitarian theologies of Gregory Nazianzus and Augustine, Moltmann argues that “trinitarian dogma left this particular dogma,” that is, divine monarchy, “untouched.” Therefore, “as long as the unity of the triune God is understood monadically or subjectivistically, and not in trinitarian terms, the whole cohesion of a religious legitimation of political sovereignty continues to exist.” For Moltmann, the Father’s almightiness does not correspond to the almightiness of the monarch because the Father’s almightiness is in his power of suffering love. God’s glory does not correspond to royal and victorious human glories but to the glory of the crucified Christ and thus to that of those who are his brothers in their suffering. God’s power does not correspond to human progress and power but to power in the “shadow of death,” where the Spirit of the resurrection is found. Finally, neither can there be any legitimation of an oppressive political order if the social unity of the Trinity is properly taken into account: “The Trinity corresponds to a community in which people are defined through their relations with one another and in their significance for one another, not in opposition to one another, in terms of power and possession.”

But it is not only political monotheism that has been a feature of Christian history. Moltmann seeks to go beyond Peterson, applying the latter’s analysis to “clerical monotheism.” Indeed, this is perhaps a subtle comment on Peterson’s conversion to Catholicism. As Moltmann later writes, “Peterson did not even notice the clerical

238 TKG, 196.
239 TKG, 197.
240 TKG, 198.
241 TKG, 198.
Moltmann places the origins of clerical monotheism in Ignatius of Antioch’s theology of the episcopate, which centred church unity in the bishop. This “certainly brought unity into the Christian churches, but it did so at the cost of eliminating the charismatic prophets.” Moreover, those in the community who departed from episcopal opinion risked excommunication. The theology of episcopal unity later developed into papal unity, and ultimately into the doctrine of papal infallibility. But all of this, Moltmann argues, overlooks the biblical basis for ecclesiastical unity in Jesus’ prayer in John 17, where the unity of the church corresponds to the unity of the Father with the Son. If the Trinity instead provides the basis for ecclesiastical unity, then a non-hierarchical order is instead adopted, such as in presbyterial and synodal models.

Moltmann goes on to provide some more generalised comments on the nature of human freedom, preparing the way for his adoption of the trinitarian theology of Joachim of Fiore, with which he concludes the book. Human freedom, insofar as it is understood as freedom from necessity—resulting simply in the freedom to choose—is not yet full freedom. Moltmann quotes a German proverb: “The person who chooses has the torment of choice.” That is, freedom of choice does not guarantee the proper exercise of that freedom. A second aspect of freedom thus emerges, the freedom “to do what is good as a matter of course,” joyfully and without compulsion. This is freedom in community, not merely the freedom of the individual—the latter which, though it ostensibly recognises the freedoms of others, is always already in competition with these others to gain more freedom from necessity. For Moltmann, “I become truly free when I open my life for other people and share with them, and when other people open their lives for me and share them with me.” Finally, Moltmann introduces a third aspect. The freedom of the human community

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243 TKG, 200.
244 TKG, 213.
245 TKG, 214.
246 TKG, 216.
takes place in history. Here, freedom is found in the pursuit of a common future, because at present freedom has not yet reached its full potential. Nonetheless, the freedom of the community that pursues a common future is still perfectly at home within an atheistic framework, a framework that assumes that God and freedom are contradictions. Moltmann thus proceeds to demonstrate the close relationship between the doctrine of the Trinity and human freedom.

Joachim of Fiore developed a trinitarian schema of the kingdom of God, often overlooked in dogmatics, that differentiated between the kingdom of the Father, then of the Son, then of the Spirit, and then of the whole Trinity, corresponding to different ages in world history. And here Moltmann begins, though he departs from “Joachim’s modalistic attempt to divide the history of the kingdom chronologically into three successive eras.” The nature of Moltmann’s alternative reading will become clear in the following. First, the kingdom of the Father pertains to the relationship between God the Father and his creation, over which he is Lord, and which, as creation, is completely dependent upon him. Nonetheless, in being called to service, human beings are exalted above the rest of creation. The servant of God “fears God alone and nothing else in the world.” Second, the kingdom of the Son pertains to the new relationship of human beings to God in Christ. Here, human beings call upon God as Father. They are no longer servants but children. Third, the kingdom of the Spirit pertains to friendship of God through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. “God does not want the humility of servants or the gratitude of children for ever. He wants the boldness and confidence of friends, who share his rule with


248 TKG, 209.

249 Kohl translates Herr as the lowercase “lord,” perhaps reflecting Moltmann’s consistent attempts to overcome the centrality of lordship in the doctrine of the Trinity after Barth, though somewhat awkwardly alongside the capitalised “Creator”: “God is the Creator and lord of those he has created.” TKG, 219; Ger. 236. It is unlikely that this is a typographical error as other instances of the lowercase “lord” applied to God appear in this passage.

250 TKG, 219.
Rather than being conceived of as different periods of history, however, for Moltmann these kingdoms better correspond to the experiences of freedom in the human encounter with God, so that he speaks of a general “trend” from servant to child to friend. Finally, there is the eschatological kingdom of the Trinity, which has not yet come. Here at last servanthood, childhood, and friendship find their fulfilment in “unhindered participation in the eternal life of the triune God himself.”

Moltmann’s application of his doctrine of the Trinity to politics, the church, and human relationships raises some important questions concerning the role of Scripture in TKG. Although the discussion appears at the end of his book, this does not necessarily mean that its conclusions are controlled by the foregoing, more exegetically-oriented proposals. Indeed, Moltmann’s interest in the Trinity effectively began with his reading Peterson. That is, his original motivation for formulating a trinitarian theology was not directly biblical but instead negatively propelled by the close association between the tradition’s monotheism and the political order. The claims made in the last chapter of TKG—extending to the church and human community—are essentially developments in the trajectory already set by this earlier discovery. But neither do I think this requires the judgement that Moltmann’s work here is wholly abstracted from the biblical narrative. First, his political theology is bound up with biblically inspired concerns, such as the liberation of the poor. I have discussed this connection in an earlier chapter. Second, Moltmann’s applied trinitarian theology here is surely not devised independently of his hermeneutical findings. Though finding its initial impetus in Peterson’s analysis, it is shaped by the project of TKG as a whole, which, as I have shown throughout the last two sections, is intended as a contribution consistently informed by the witness of Scripture.

In summary, a number of creative contributions to the doctrine of the Trinity are made on Moltmann’s part throughout TKG, though with different relationships to Scripture. There are the more speculative reflections on the trinitarian freedom

251 TKG, 221.
252 TKG, 221.
253 TKG, 222.
and love; the concept of trinitarian history, seeking to do justice to the narrative depiction of the trinitarian relationships in the NT; the discussion of trinitarian action that arises out of this notion of history; the rejection of Barth and Rahner as modalist, revealing again Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm; the positive reply to these two figures in an alternative formulation of divine personhood and unity; and, finally, Moltmann’s proposals in regard to the filioque and the significance of a social doctrine of the Trinity for human community, both of which, while departing from a directly biblical rationale, are not unrelated to the concerns of Scripture.

6.5. Summary

In this chapter I have explored different aspects of Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity and its relationship to Scripture, attending to traces of the doctrine in his earlier work, its development in CG (1972) and CPS (1975) especially, and its mature formulation in TKG (1981). As with the theology of promise in TH, and the theology of trinitarian suffering in CG, here, too, Moltmann employs a contrastive paradigm to distinguish what he understands to be the “trinitarian” witness of Scripture from the “monotheistic” doctrines of the tradition. Nonetheless, the paradigm’s role in Moltmann’s argumentation appears to be less pronounced in TKG. For example, he does not consistently draw an explicit connection between his proposals and the biblical witness. While this might be problematic for some, I do not think that venturing into extra-biblical territory is in itself problematic. As Karl Barth wrote, “The text of the doctrine of the Trinity is at every point related to texts in the biblical witness to revelation. It also contains certain concepts taken from this text. But it does this in the way an interpretation does. That is to say, it translates and exegeses the text. And this means, e.g., that it makes use of other concepts besides those in the original. The result is that it does not just repeat what is there. To explain what is there it sets something new over against what is there.”

254 Barth, CD I/1, 309.
feature of Moltmann’s theology, then, is not to suggest criticisms but to provide a more complete picture of the role that Scripture plays in his project.

In addition to some hints of the Trinity in Moltmann’s early theology, his interest in the doctrine begins to develop with reading Erik Peterson in the late sixties. Peterson’s analysis of the relationship between emphasis on the divine oneness and support for the political order administrated through a single emperor or king, for example, will later be a key influence in Moltmann’s rejection of traditional approaches to divine unity in favour of what he understands to be a more biblical, trinitarian approach. Just a little later, Moltmann’s explicit turn to a doctrine of the Trinity in CG is accompanied by some preliminary proposals for what this alternative might look like. But these are yet to be formulated in any great detail.

It is with CPS that Moltmann responds to this call, situating a theology of the eschatological unification of the Trinity within the context of a trinitarian history. Indeed, the development of a theology of trinitarian history is significant in itself. While in CG Moltmann closely associated the constitution of the Trinity with the event of the cross, in his trinitarian history the persons find their origin in eternity and undergo changes in identity and relation over the course of their own history. With the coming of the kingdom, the Spirit works to unify the Father and Son with creation so that the world, too, is ultimately incorporated into the life of the Trinity. This alternative concept of divine unity might be said to presuppose a social doctrine of the Trinity. But this connection is not explored in detail until TKG.

Before the publication of TKG, two texts from 1979 are of note, in which Moltmann comments on various aspects of his trinitarian theology. Although not especially significant as far as they concern his major proposals, these contributions provide an important glimpse into the development of Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity prior to TKG.

With TKG, Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity finds its full expression. First, though, a number of methodological decisions and assumptions are of note. Moltmann points to Dumitru Stăniloae as the third key influence on his trinitarian theology. But an examination of the available evidence suggests that the essential content
of this theology was already in place when Moltmann first met Stăniloae. Nonetheless, a definite connection can be established between other figures in the Orthodox Church and Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity. In two different places in TKG, Moltmann also reveals various considerations that will direct the proposals offered in the work. The first of these is a rejection of the concepts of God as absolute substance or absolute subject, as Moltmann views these to be incompatible with a doctrine of the Trinity. The second concerns the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theological construction. Significantly, the traditional approaches to divine unity that he rejects do not only obstruct trinitarian conceptions of God, but depart from Scripture’s witness to God in three persons. For Moltmann, a doctrine of the Trinity will need to take into account the changing and historical identities and relationships of Father, Son, and Spirit, as they are narrated in the biblical story. This claim is also important because it reveals that Moltmann does not just value the history that Scripture attests but the narratival character of its witness.

Moltmann forwards proposals pertaining to many different areas of the doctrine of the Trinity throughout TKG. I have not provided an exhaustive appraisal in this chapter but have directed my attention to those developments that I deem most revealing in relation to the role that Scripture plays in TKG. Moltmann’s discussion of trinitarian freedom and love, for example, seems to be somewhat abstracted from the biblical material, but neither does this require that the discussion be labelled un-biblical—as the quote from Barth at the beginning of this section suggests. On the other hand, however, there is a speculative quality to Moltmann’s argumentation here. I do not mean this in a negative sense. Moltmann’s speculations have their own value and I will consider them in greater detail in the following chapter.255

Quite a different connection between Moltmann’s theological construction and the witness of Scripture can be observed in his theology of trinitarian history. Here, he seeks to take as his starting point the changing identities and relationships of the trinitarian persons throughout the history of the Son in the NT. Such an undertaking

255 See 7.5.
reveals a Trinity that adopts different forms throughout this history, where different persons act on the other persons and receive from them in different ways in different events. Additionally, a more active pneumatology can be secured, a picture of divine unity that has a social rather than substantial foundation begins to emerge. This also leads to an alternative conception of trinitarian action. Divine acts are not acts of the one, undifferentiated divine substance, then appropriated to distinct persons, but acts of each person, carried out interdependently with the other persons. The theology of trinitarian history that occasions these conclusions, Moltmann believes, better represents the complex multi-subjectivity of God’s actions in Scripture.

All of this implies a particular doctrine of divine unity that is not yet fully developed. Proceeding further in this direction, Moltmann turns first to Barth’s and Rahner’s doctrines of the Trinity. His criticisms will constitute the negative side of his contrastive paradigm, paving the way for his positive alternative. In a polemically charged denunciation, Moltmann accuses both Barth and Rahner of the heresy of modalism. For him, both fail to acknowledge the persons as distinct, acting subjects, locating action instead in the single divine subject. Moreover, the opposite danger of tritheism, highlighted by Barth and Rahner, and later directed against Moltmann’s own work in CG, is dismissed as a smokescreen devised to divert attention from the modalist character of their own positions. Taking the biblical narrative as his starting point, Moltmann turns to the patristic concept of perichoresis in order to develop an alternative proposal. Here, the divine persons are already united in their relationships with one another. A substantialist notion of unity is thus at best superfluous.

Another notable feature of Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity in TKG is his rejection of the filioque clause in favour of a doctrine that maintains the procession of the Spirit from the Father alone—as in Eastern Orthodox theology—but also affirms that the identity of the Spirit is shaped by the Son in its procession. The basis for this is found in the fact that the Father who spirates is always already the Father of the Son. While Moltmann’s interests here again appear to be a departure from the biblical material, though, they remain important insofar as this development is informed
by other developments in his trinitarian theology that assume a much closer relationship to Scripture, and they go beyond the direct concerns of the Bible in order to speak to contemporary issues. The same might be said of Moltmann’s final chapter in *TKG*, pertaining to the connection between trinitarian and human relationships. Although the impetus for this exploration likely originates with Moltmann’s reading of Peterson, Peterson does not set the terms for the discussion. Rather, Moltmann seeks to apply his reading of the biblical narrative to other areas that are not treated in as much detail—or even at all—by Scripture.

In a final chapter I attend to some key themes and developments in Moltmann’s use of the Bible in his later theology.
7. Towards a Hermeneutics: Later Theology

Up until now I have been attempting to uncover the biblical logic of the major proposals that Moltmann makes in the first half of his career. There is a significant degree of feet-finding on his part, leading up to the publication of *The Trinity and the Kingdom* (1980), as Moltmann searches for a vantage point to meditate on the God of Scripture. In *Theology of Hope* (1964) he experimented with an eschatological vantage point, and in *The Crucified God* (1972) with a crucicentric one. His explorations in political theology in the late sixties might be suggested as another search for this vantage point. But it is the concept of trinitarian history, developed in some detail in *The Church in the Power of the Spirit* (1975) and finding a central place in *TKG*, that finally constitutes the fundamental framework of Moltmann’s project—not least because it provides a ground for articulating his earlier eschatological, political, and crucicentric concerns in one place. Thus, a secondary purpose of my exposition so far has been to trace the development of Moltmann’s hermeneutic and theology of Scripture, alongside the overarching themes of his thought. With his chief aims and trajectories now basically established in his mature doctrine of the Trinity, Moltmann possesses a sophisticated theological schema in which to address issues and themes concerning the contemporary church and society, even if these treatments are not always explicitly related to the doctrine of the Trinity.

Because the basic shape and concerns of Moltmann’s theology have now been established, there is some freedom in this final chapter to explore some of the various features of his project in the latter half of his career that reveal the place of Scripture in his theology. Indeed, this place remains a central one, as the conclusion to a 1985 autobiographical piece demonstrates: “If I were to attempt to sum up the outline of my theology in a few key phrases, I would have at the least to say that I am attempting to reflect on a theology which has: a biblical foundation, an eschatological orientation, a political responsibility.”¹ This biblical foundation—which, not insignificantly, is mentioned first—can be discerned throughout Moltmann’s career, from

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¹ *HTG*, 182, formatting adjusted.
beginning to end. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, it will continue to inform his project into the early 2000s.

In the following, attending to his work after TKG, I begin with two examples of Moltmann’s understanding of Scripture in the eighties. In a second section I attend to some of the various roles that the Bible plays in his work The Way of Jesus Christ (1989), and in a third section I discuss his rejection of biblicism in The Coming of God (1995). Finally, I explore the mature hermeneutical programme that Moltmann sets forth in Experiences in Theology (2000).

7.1. The Theology of the Bible in the Eighties

Moltmann continues writing after TKG, with a steady output into the eighties. The second in his series of systematic contributions, God in Creation appears in 1985, followed by the third volume, WJC (1989). I have selected one essay to explore in this section, where Moltmann provides a critical analysis of the doctrine of verbal inspiration. I then proceed to comment on the role that Scripture plays in GC. Because of the wealth of relevant material in WJC, I devote an entire section to that work, in order to treat the material in detail.


In an important passage from this essay on pneumatology, Moltmann discusses the doctrine of biblical inspiration, a topic he has not addressed in detail since 1959.\(^2\) Unfortunately, it remains unaddressed in his volume on pneumatology, SL (1991), but receives more extended attention in his ExpTh (2000), which I will address below.\(^3\) Perhaps this neglect demonstrates Moltmann’s basic disinterest in the subject—indeed, something of this disinterest will become clear in the following. Notably, much of the discussion in this essay echoes claims made in his earlier theology, particularly in regard to the centrality of promise and the eschatological openness of

\(^{2}\) See 2.1.1.
\(^{3}\) See 7.4.3.
Scripture to the coming kingdom. There is also new content, however, most of which can be traced to the pneumatological innovations presented in TKG. The section on verbal inspiration, which I address here, thus appears in an essay on pneumatology, where Moltmann aims to overcome “reductions and one-sidedness in pneumatology,” namely Protestant pneumatology, without sacrificing the place of Scripture as the norming norm of theology.⁴

Moltmann begins with a few comments on “the post-Reformation, old Protestant doctrine of verbal inspiration.”⁵ His initial assessment appears to be wholly negative. This view that upheld “inspiration down to the Masoretic punctuation of the Old Testament texts led to Protestant biblicism and evangelical fundamentalism.”⁶ Moltmann’s disdain for the apparent excessiveness of the doctrine is apparent in his description of it. The doctrine assumes that “Scripture is the ‘perfect’, ‘exhaustive’, ‘clear’, ‘inerrant’ revelation of God.”⁷ Rather than scrutinise every aspect of the doctrine, however, Moltmann offers some critical reflections on its assumptions.

⁴ HTG, 65.
⁵ HTG, 65. Old Protestantism is not mentioned in this connection in Moltmann, “Die Bibel als Gotteswort und Menschenwort: Eine biblisch-theologische Betrachtung anhand von 2. Kor 4,1-6,” in Die Bibel – Gotteswort oder Menschenwort? Dargestellt am Buch Jona und am Apostolat des Paulus nach 2 Korinther 4, ed. Hans Walter Wolff, Jürgen Moltmann, and Rudolf Bullmann, 36-48 (Neukirchen: Neukirchener, 1959). Moltmann’s target there is rather “the fact that, as has been consistently claimed out of fear of doubt since the time of the early church’s Apologists (Athenagoras), the Bible possesses a tangible, heavenly quality that is demonstrable to everyone and automatically given with its origin.” Moltmann, “Die Bibel,” 44.
⁶ HTG, 65. Moltmann is further critical of fundamentalist readings of Scripture in Christopher A. Hall and Jürgen Moltmann, “Stubborn Hope,” Christianity Today, 11 January, 1993, 30-33. In another interview, however, he differentiates between evangelical and fundamentalist hermeneutics, writing, “I do not know enough about American evangelicals to speak about them with much authority or insight. But I do know this: the advantage of American evangelicals is that they start with the biblical tradition, while many of the liberal Christians and theologians just start with their own religious feelings…. If, however, we are speaking of American fundamentalists, then I believe that they do not understand what they read!” Michael Bauman and Jürgen Moltmann, “Jürgen Moltmann,” in Michael Bauman, Roundtable: Conversations with European Theologians, 31-41 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1990), 38.
⁷ HTG, 65.
The first issue with this doctrine is a christological one: “There is no longer any difference between the Word of God and its written form because scripture according to God’s will contains this Word of God completely and fully.” The claim of Scripture’s exhaustiveness quietly edges Jesus himself out of the picture. A second, pneumatological problem also emerges. As the Spirit took a central role in the Word’s incarnation, so, too, is it fundamental to the Word’s inscripturation in the Bible, and to the Word’s reception in human hearts. But for Moltmann this would require that “the Holy Spirit is none other than the effectiveness of the Word of God.” The distinct person of the Spirit is lost to the Word, which, in turn, is lost to Scripture. Thus, “there is no revelation of the Holy Spirit outside scripture or beyond it.”

These deficiencies result in problems for anthropology, too, because anthropology is sustained by christology, pneumatology, and the doctrine of the Trinity. As such, verbal inspiration here takes a “monarchical orientation,” where God relates to humanity one-sidedly through domination. Scripture is an authority representative of the divine power, to which recognition and obedience is the only appropriate response. Moltmann takes the problems with this kind of understanding of the Trinity to be self-evident, having already developed his social doctrine of the Trinity in TKG (1980). He does, however, provide some comment on God’s one-sided relationship to human beings here: “Holy Scripture is not just testimony to the Word of God but at the same time also testimony to the human answer.”

8 HTG, 66.
9 HTG, 66. Later, Moltmann writes, “The Spirit is the subject determining the Word, not just the operation of that Word.” SL, 3 (1991). In another place, he claims, “The Protestant order of things—first the word and then the Spirit—is one-sided and wrong unless we think the converse too: first the Spirit, then the word.” Moltmann, The Source of Life: The Holy Spirit and the Theology of Life, trans. by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1997), 94. The groundwork for this kind of mutual working between the Son and the Spirit is laid in Moltmann’s pneumatology in TKG, esp. 125-27 (1980), and his Spirit christology in WJC (1989), introduced on 73-78 and informing Moltmann’s christology throughout the whole work.
10 HTG, 65.
11 HTG, 66.
12 See 6.4.7.
13 HTG, 66.
identifies this aspect of Scripture with an existentialist hermeneutic, which is not contradictory but complementary to understanding Scripture as revelation, such as that found in the theology of Barth: “The parallel exegesis of scripture as the testimony of human beings encountered by faith, i.e. existentialist interpretation, need not conflict with the exegesis of scripture as the revelation of God.” But neither is this human response merely human. In responding to the Word of God, human beings are moved by the Holy Spirit both to give thanks and to lament. Indeed, alluding to Rom 8:22-27, Moltmann contends that these are not just our own laments but those of the Spirit too. As such, “through scripture not only does God speak to human beings but human beings also speak to God.”

Lastly, the testimony of Scripture is both final and open to the future. “With regard to revelation, one can regard Holy Scripture literally as final proclamation, in so far as it attests the one through whom God has spoken to us ‘last of all’... (Heb 1:2).” On the other hand, though, Scripture does not attest the whole work of the Holy Spirit, which is still taking place, both in human beings and the whole of creation. In this sense, the Bible is “closed christologically but open pneumatologically to the future of the kingdom of glory.” For Moltmann, the doctrine of verbal inspiration is thus only one side of the picture, looking back to the Christ-event but obscuring the forward-looking, eschatological orientation of Scripture to the coming kingdom. “Holy scripture is no self-contained system of a heavenly doctrine, but promise open to its own fulfilment.”

7.1.2. 1985: God in Creation

In God in Creation, Moltmann appeals to the literary and theological contexts of Gen 1:28 in order to combat various misreadings. In Moltmann’s words, Carl Amery, for

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14 HTG, 66.
15 HTG, 67.
16 HTG, 67.
17 HTG, 67.
18 HTG, 67.
example, argued that “the biblical charge given at creation… lays the intellectual foundations for today’s ecological crisis: unlimited reproduction, over-population of the earth, and the subjugation of nature.” But while this may be true historically of the church and society’s application of the text, Moltmann contends that the text itself does not give such a charge. For him, “the charge is a dietary commandment: human beings and animals alike are to live from the fruits which the earth brings forth.” Where the charge to rule is given in v.26, it “can only be a rule of peace,” as the rule of human beings is to correspond to the rule of God. And here Moltmann reveals an important assumption that underpins his hermeneutic: “It always causes misunderstanding when biblical texts are torn out of their proper context in the biblical tradition, and are used to legitimate other concerns.” He cites the second creation story in Gen 2:15 where humans are to “till and keep” the garden. That is, the commands given to humanity in Gen 1, if read in isolation from the second creation story in Gen 2, are in danger of being misunderstood. Indeed, the entire canon must be taken into account. “For a biblical doctrine of creation we have to draw on the whole testimony of Scripture, not merely on Genesis 1 and 2.” Moltmann will later also consider the importance of the NT witness in this connection.

Here, too, Moltmann makes an important distinction. He wants to pursue a “biblical” theology, not a “fundamentalist” or “biblicist” one. The latter develops into creationism, which is “nothing but a retreat to the doctrine of creation of a past

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20 GC, 29.
21 GC, 29, emphasis original.
22 GC, 30.
23 GC, 30.
24 GC, 53, emphasis original. “The stories about creation in the Priestly Writing and in the Yahwist’s account do not as yet present a Christian doctrine of creation.” GC, 55, emphasis original.
era.”\(^{26}\) It does not take seriously new advances in the sciences, and nor does it consider the gravity of the ecological crisis. Against this, the biblical text “must be exposed to the criticism of the present day, so that it may arrive at its own origins.”\(^{27}\) Wooden, creationist readings attempt to protect Scripture from the modern world, but, in doing so, they overlook the original concerns of the text. In particular, these interpretations ignore the open-endedness of creation and its eschatological orientation. “The biblical—and especially the messianic—doctrine of creation fundamentally contradicts the picture of the static, closed cosmos, resting in its own equilibrium or revolving within itself. Its eschatological orientation towards a future consummation accords far more with the concept of a still incomplete cosmic history.”\(^{28}\) The theory of evolution reminds the church of this biblical outlook, dissuading it from static or anthropocentric views of creation that might otherwise be taken for granted in a creationist outlook.

Another significant distinction Moltmann makes is that between a doctrine of creation derived solely from the OT and a specifically Christian one: “The starting point for a Christian doctrine of creation can only be an interpretation of the biblical creation narratives in the light of the gospel of Christ.”\(^{29}\) Importantly, however, “this Christian understanding does not contradict the statements about creation which were arrived at through Israel’s experience of salvation. The Christian understanding is the messianic interpretation of these statements.”\(^{30}\) Thus, Christ, who is the ground for the salvation of both the cosmos and humanity, is found to be the ground and origin of all existence as well. Moltmann points to texts such as 1 Cor 8:6; Col 1:15; and John 1:3, which also make this inference. As Source and Saviour of creation, Christ is its Sustainer too. In this connection, the Christian doctrine of creation considers the role of the Spirit as well. For the church, “the experience of the eschatological reality of the Spirit leads to the conclusion that this is the same Spirit in whose

\(^{26}\) GC, 22.
\(^{27}\) GC, 22.
\(^{28}\) GC, 196, emphasis original.
\(^{29}\) GC, 53-54, emphasis original.
\(^{30}\) GC, 94.
power the Father, through the Son, has created the world, and preserves it against annihilating Nothingness.”31 Again, then, biblical texts must be read in the context of the whole of Scripture, which here includes the trinitarian witness of the NT.

In this section I have treated one essay and some relevant passages from Moltmann’s GC, indicating some of the concerns regarding the role of Scripture in his theology in the eighties. The first pertains to the doctrine of verbal inspiration and the relationship of this to pneumatology, the second to reading biblical texts in their literary and canonical contexts, with some attendant criticisms of biblicist fundamentalism.

7.2. New Christological Readings of Scripture in The Way of Jesus Christ

Moltmann’s work in his 1989 The Way of Jesus Christ is ripe with new proposals that reflect the role of Scripture in his theology.32 I will address four in this section: first, his radical affirmation of the Jewish “no” to Jesus; second, his general criticism of creedal theology on the basis of Scripture; third, his critical assessment of the doctrine of the virgin birth; and, fourth, his dialectical hermeneutic of text and audience.

7.2.1. The Jewish No to Jesus

The sustained attention Moltmann gives to the relationship of Jesus to the OT in WJC is one of the book’s most promising features.33 He opens his first chapter, writing, “There is no such thing as a christology without presuppositions; and its historical presupposition is the messianic promise of the Old Testament, and the Jewish hope which is founded on the Hebrew Bible.”34 For Moltmann, the latter two—Christian

31 GC, 96.
32 On this work, see Richard Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann (London: T&T Clark, 1995), 199-212; Müller-Fahrenholz, Kingdom and Power, 167-81.
34 WJC, 1.
and Jewish hope—are inseparable. Insofar as christology presupposes the OT, it presupposes the Hebrew Bible and the people of Israel. He proceeds to chart a narrow course between the messianic understanding of Jesus in Christianity and Judaism’s open view of its messiah. Thus, while Moltmann is “not presupposing that the Old Testament messianic hope points simply of itself to Jesus of Nazareth,” he is “assuming that Jesus understood himself and his message in the expectation categories of this messianic hope, and that his followers saw him in these categories.”

Importantly, this is to say that Jewish messianism is not exhausted in the figure of Jesus. “Christian christology is a particular form of Israel’s hope for the messiah, and it is still related to, and dependent on, the Jewish forms of the messianic hope that antecedced Christianity and run parallel to it.”

To begin, Moltmann attends to the origins of messianic hope. He follows Martin Buber in tracing them to the early development of Israel’s monarchy. With David, the ark is brought to Zion and God is given a dwelling place there. Consequently, David’s kingship is purposed to represent that of God. But, Buber argues, with the transfer from charismatic leadership to dynastic rule under David, and the attendant failure of the Davidic line, the possibility of realising the theocratic ideal in this sphere was compromised. It was thus that people began to develop a messianic appetite. In addition to Buber’s analysis, Moltmann contributes his own observations, noting that “if dynastic rule is to remain enforcible, it is bound to be directed towards the legitimation, safeguarding and increase of its own power.” This contrasts with the precedent set by the exodus, where kingship under Yahweh should be one of “defending the rights of the poor, having compassion on the humble, and liberating the oppressed.”

These early messianic hopes, in part realised, in part circumvented by the Davidic dynasty, nonetheless persisted. Against the background of the dissolution of

35 WJC, 2.
36 WJC, 2.
37 WJC, 7.
38 WJC, 7.
the Northern Kingdom through the Assyrian Empire, Isaiah and other prophets proclaimed the hope for a figure who would be anointed by Yahweh to rule Israel and defeat her oppressors. But this should not be seen simply as an idealisation of the past. “There is more in the new messianic David than there ever was in the historical David of old.”

Hope for this figure looks to a new, alternative future. It is not only a reclamation of what once was. Another tradition of messianic hope appears in Dan 7 and apocalyptic literature—that of the son of man. This tradition is in tension with the particularist hope for a Davidic messiah: “In the visions of the son of man in Daniel 7:1-14, Israel does not appear—neither historical Israel, nor ‘true’ Israel. ‘The Ancient of Days’ has none of the features of the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; nor is the countenance of the son of man an Israelite countenance.”

Though perhaps somewhat overstated, Moltmann’s point remains. There is a tension between the particular figure of the messiah and the universal figure of the son of man, a tension that is theologially fruitful and should be upheld: “Any dispersion of the messianic hope in the apocalyptically universal expectation of the son of man would mean a disastrous dissolution of Israel. The converse is also true: any transformation of the apocalyptically universal expectation of the son of man into Israel’s messianism would put an excessive and destructive strain on Israel.”

And yet, “both figures are also provisional and passing.” Messianic hope does not replace hope in the coming of God. Rather, the messiah points beyond himself to this final coming.

Having briefly outlined the development and content of some of the messianic traditions in the OT, Moltmann returns to the question of the relationship between Jesus and the figure of the messiah. Is Jesus the messiah? “Is the Jewish ‘no’ anti-Christian? Is the Christian ‘yes’ anti-Jewish?” Buber provides one way of looking

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39 WJC, 10.
40 WJC, 15.
41 WJC, 17.
42 WJC, 17.
at the question from a Jewish perspective, writing, “The church rests on its faith that Christ has come, and that this is the redemption which God has bestowed on mankind. We, Israel, are not able to believe this.”44 For Moltmann, this is a profound answer. He comments, “It is not a question of unwillingness, or hard-hearted defiance. It is an ‘inability to accept’.”45 Buber, among others such as Schalom Ben-Chorin and Gershom Scholem, takes issue with the Christian claim that redemption has come in Christ. The world must either be redeemed in full or it has not been redeemed at all. But this leads Moltmann to pose a counter-question. “Can God already have a chosen people, chosen moreover for the purpose of this redemption? Does Israel’s election not destroy Israel’s solidarity with unredeemed humanity?”46 That the world is not yet redeemed thus problematises Jewish claims too. Moreover, Moltmann contests the spiritualistic notions of redemption that Buber and others attribute to Christianity, where human beings are redeemed internally while the external world remains unredeemed. This “is certainly true to a particular kind of historical Christianity; but it does not fit Jesus himself.”47 Rather, “Jesus of Nazareth, the messiah who has come, is the suffering Servant of God, who heals through his wounds and is victorious through his sufferings. He is not yet the Christ of the parousia, who comes in the glory of God and redeems the world.”48 In this sense, the Christian yes to God is an anticipatory one. The Jesus who has come is not God’s final answer to the unredeemed world but a gift so that humanity may share in Israel’s hope for a new creation.

The provisionality of the Christian yes leads, conversely, to the soundness of the Jewish no. “Israel’s ‘no’ is not the same as the ‘no’ of unbelievers…. It is a special ‘no’ and must be respected as such.”49 Through an exegesis of Rom 9-11, Moltmann argues that Israel’s heart was hardened not because she was rejected by God but so

44 Martin Buber, Der Jude und sein Judentum. Gesammelte Aufsätze und Reden (Cologne: Melzer, 1963), 562, cited in WJC, 28, emphasis Moltmann’s—not found in Buber’s original.
45 WJC, 28.
46 WJC, 30.
47 WJC, 30.
48 WJC, 32.
49 WJC, 34.
that the gospel might go to the Gentiles, “in order to make my own people jealous” (Rom 11:14). With Israel’s no, the Gentiles are given a mission to Israel—not one of convincing her to accept Jesus as her Lord but one that consists in “the reminder to the Jews of their own gracious election, and its promise for humanity.”

This, then, is what it means for Moltmann to take the OT seriously as an integral part of Christian faith. The OT as read by Christians and, thus, too, the Hebrew Bible as read by Jews, compels the church to rediscover its hope for the coming messiah, to whom it still looks for the fulfilment of God’s promises. If the Jewish no is rejected as the no of unbelievers, then the church’s connection to these promises is compromised. It no longer seeks alongside Israel new acts of God heralded by the OT and Hebrew Bible but not yet consummated in the NT. Of course, this kind of hope constituted Moltmann’s basic appeal in TH. Here he has further developed this view in arguing that the church needs to look to Israel and her reading of the Scriptures to be reminded that even with the crucifixion and resurrection, all has not yet been made new.

In a related discussion, Moltmann addresses the relationship between the gospel and Israel’s Torah. He identifies two common approaches. First, the gospel relates to Torah as its antithesis: “faith in the gospel frees people from the requirements of the Law.” Second, the gospel is the fulfilment of the Torah. Following the Sermon on the Mount, however, Moltmann argues for yet another possibility, that the gospel is “the messianic interpretation of the Torah for the Gentile nations.” Jesus’ preaching on the mountain to the people mirrors Moses’ giving of the Torah to Israel on Sinai, now extended to the Gentiles. According to Moltmann, the word used for people here, ochlos, designates “the poor, oppressed, lost.” This is not to say that there were necessarily Gentiles in the audience, but, rather, that the make-up of the audience demonstrates that “the Sermon on the Mount is popular preaching, not instruction

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50 WJC, 36.
51 WJC, 122.
52 WJC, 124, emphasis original.
for an élite.” As such, it ultimately seeks a universal scope, pushing out beyond the bounds of elected Israel to the *ochlos* of the world. In framing this relationship in terms of interpretation, then, Moltmann is careful not to posit the gospel as the replacement of the Torah—an inference that might be made from his earlier handling of this question in *CG* (1972). The gospel instead presupposes the Torah, which is interpreted and adhered to in a new, messianic way in the church. Interestingly, Moltmann presents his view as a departure from Reformation theology. For him, not only did the Reformers’ antithetical construal of the relationship between Torah and gospel fail to capture the complexity of Paul’s theology, but “the Pauline identification of *nomos* and *torah* was not called into question.” In drawing on the theology of the Gospel of Matthew, Moltmann seeks to decentre this Pauline bias in Protestant theology and at the same time propose a Christian approach to the Torah that is more amenable to dialogue with Judaism.

### 7.2.2. The Creeds in Light of Scripture

Moltmann is also critical of the role the Bible played in patristic theology. In contrast to his own project in *WJC*, “christology’s pre-history in the Old Testament’s history of promise did not play any constitutive role in the christology of the patristic period.” With this, the unity of christology and eschatology—something Moltmann argues was also inherited from the OT’s messianism and was integral to the NT—gradually eroded as well. And, in another apparent departure from the NT, “the proclamation and ministry of Jesus between his birth and his death are never mentioned in the christological dogmas.” As such, Moltmann presents a sustained treatment of Jesus’ conception, birth, baptism, reception of the Spirit, mission to the poor,

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54 *WJC*, 124.
55 See 5.3.3.
56 *WJC*, 123. This is, of course, a very generalised and unnuanced assessment on Moltmann’s part. He does not differentiate between the views of the various Reformers; nor does he provide any literature to back up his broad-brush claim.
57 *WJC*, 70.
58 *WJC*, 70. But see Ryan Neal’s comment: “Ironically, this same judgment can be lodged against his [Moltmann’s] earlier work, which focused strongly on the resurrection and the
healing ministry, embrace of outsiders, ethical teaching, and messiahship, among other features of his life. For Moltmann, the creedal focus on the incarnate, crucified, risen, and exalted Christ sidelined a fundamental feature of the gospels—their witness to his ministry. Moltmann thus proposes an addition to the creeds. Notably, “the intention is not to alter the words of tradition; but one must know what has to be added in thought.” He suggests that the following appear after “and was made man” in the Nicene Creed and after “born of the Virgin Mary” in the Apostles’ Creed:

Baptized by John the Baptist,  
filled with the Holy Spirit:  
to preach the kingdom of God to the poor,  
to heal the sick,  
to receive those who have been cast out,  
to revive Israel for the salvation of the nations, and  
to have mercy upon all people.

Turning to Scripture to address the creeds themselves, for Moltmann the NT functions here as the impetus for ongoing reform not only in contemporary christology but in the use of ancient and authoritative christological sources as well.


59 WJC, 150.

60 WJC, 150.

61 Around the same time Moltmann reveals, “I do believe that we need a new creed”—that is, in light of the Nicene Creed. “As a Reformed theologian I do not believe that the Christian faith can be adequately captured by, or expressed by, any one creed for all time. The church needs to remember (and not be afraid of) the fact that to confess our faith is an ongoing process, one that must be carefully related to whatever situation we find ourselves in at the moment. Because that situation is always changing, the precise form of our confession and of our apologetic must change as well.” Bauman and Moltmann, “Jürgen Moltmann,” 33-34. A few years later he proposes a similar approach, albeit one that takes seriously the claims of the creeds: “According to my Reformed understanding of creedal confession, the creeds are a manual for faith today. Therefore, we should rewrite these creeds and confessions, without neglecting the tradition behind them.” Hall and Moltmann, “Stubborn Hope,” 33. Moltmann notes the Barmen Declaration (1934) as an example of the writing of a new creed for today.
7.2.3. A Criticism of the Doctrine of the Virgin Birth

Moltmann’s proposal for biblically motivated revision of the creeds does not mean, however, that the NT itself should not be subjected to critical questioning. This becomes particularly clear in his discussion of doctrine of the virgin birth. Moltmann begins, writing, “At no other point is the difference between the doctrine of the Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches and that of the New Testament as great as in the veneration of Mary, theological mariology, and the marian dogmas.”\(^62\) The early church’s developments in mariology had more to do with the Diana cult in Ephesus than “Jewish Bethlehem.”\(^63\) Nonetheless, where the NT does present a virgin birth, namely, in Matthew and Luke, “it is not one of the pillars that sustains the New Testament faith in Christ.”\(^64\) Rather, it is a relatively unimportant claim, made in order to complement the glory ascribed to Jesus through his exaltation in the resurrection. As such, the claim is effectively superfluous. But there is more. “In the literary sense, the stories about the announcement of the virgin birth are legends. They are deliberately told in such a way that no mention is made of either witnesses or historical traditions.”\(^65\) In this way, they differ from the accounts of Jesus’ resurrection appearances. This does not mean, however, that they are of no value at all theologically. The accounts of Matthew and Luke prepare their audiences for the majesty of the figure of Christ by projecting it backwards from his resurrection, onto his conception and birth. With his rejection of the historicity of the virgin birth, though, it is apparent that Moltmann is still interested not simply in the text itself but the history that lies behind it.

7.2.4. Between Text and Audience: A Dialectical Hermeneutics

Another notable feature of the role that Scripture plays in WJC can be seen in Moltmann’s rejection of christologies derived wholly from a “hermeneutics of origin.”\(^66\)

\(^{62}\) WJC, 79.
\(^{63}\) WJC, 79.
\(^{64}\) WJC, 79.
\(^{65}\) WJC, 81.
\(^{66}\) WJC, 43.
Such a hermeneutics, he explains, considers the origin of christological claims and requires, at least in Protestant theology, that they be in accordance with Scripture. “But,” Moltmann counters, “if christology were to confine itself to this ‘origin’ hermeneutics, it could rapidly become sterile, however much it was ‘in accordance with Scripture’.”\(^{67}\) He thus argues that this hermeneutics must be undertaken alongside a “hermeneutics of its [i.e., christology’s] effects.”\(^{68}\) This is not to say that the latter should replace the former, however, because then it would no longer be speaking of Christ. Moltmann is simply restating in different terms the dialectic of identity and relevance that he developed in \(CG\) (1972)\(^{69}\) Christology must not only consider Scripture but its destination in the lives of people today. In particular, Moltmann is concerned that, historically, christology concentrated on the “metaphysical wretchedness of human beings,” to the detriment of “physical and moral, economic and social wretchedness.”\(^{70}\) If christology today is to faithfully address the latter, it must consider, for example, the significance of Christ for the threats of nuclear annihilation and ecological catastrophe. A christology that attempts only to restate what the Bible itself has said, without considering contemporary relevance, becomes isolated from society and speaks only to itself.

### 7.3. Universalism against Biblicism in *The Coming of God*

For want of space, I have set aside comment on Moltmann’s next major work, *The Spirit of Life* (1991)—an otherwise deeply innovative and theologically stimulating book—in order to focus on what I understand to be the most significant developments in connection to the role of Scripture in his theology from this period. I now turn, then to his 1995 *The Coming of God*.\(^{71}\) I focus on scattered comments throughout the work where Moltmann again speaks of his aversion to “biblicism.” Notably, im-

\(^{67}\) WJC, 43.  
\(^{68}\) WJC, 44.  
\(^{69}\) See 5.2.1.  
\(^{70}\) WJC, 45.  
\(^{71}\) On this work, see GWBAA; Müller-Fahrenholz, *Kingdom and Power*, 200-18.
plicit in his criticisms is an alternative approach to Scripture, though such a herme-
neutic is not developed at length. Moltmann proceeds to demonstrate the internal
contradictions of a biblicist hermeneutic in his discussion of universalism. Richard
Bauckham has also taken issue with some of Moltmann’s treatments in CoG. In a
second subsection I discuss this criticism and Moltmann’s response to it.

7.3.1. Against Biblicism

The first reference to Biblicism in CoG appears in Moltmann’s introductory discus-
sion to the theme of death in the Bible. He writes, “The Bible is a collection of testi-
monies to the living God, testimonies too about life, but it is not a theological text-
book for conceptualities about life and death. So there is no ‘biblical concept’ of
death.”72 The purpose of the Bible is to witness to the living God. Moltmann down-
plays any role it might otherwise have in making claims about the nature of life and
death in themselves, or at least in isolation from the God who gives life.

In another place, Moltmann addresses the use of the Bible as a “divine com-
mentary on divine acts in history.”73 Scripture, interpreted rightly, would here pro-
vide a map to the outworking of God’s plan in different historical periods, accurately
predicting the time of the end of the world. Such a view derives from early Pietism
and Enlightenment deism, though it finds more recent expression in strands of fund-
damentalism and dispensationalism.74 But this hermeneutic is particularly problem-
atic for Moltmann. “In that case the testimonies of the Bible would in no way be the
self-revelation and self-communication of God; they would merely be the revelation
of God’s providence.”75 Scripture’s primary purpose as witness to God would be
compromised. Further contrasts follow. The Bible “is the source for a historical the-
ology in testimony, assailment, struggle and suffering, not for a speculative theology

72 CoG, 78.
73 Gottfried Menken, “Über Glück und Sieg der Gottlosen” (1795), in Schriften, vol. 7 (Bremen: I. G. Heyse’s, 1858), 82, quoted in CoG, 145. Moltmann’s criticism here goes back as
74 CoG, 158-59.
75 CoG, 145.
of universal history and a divine plan for salvation.”76 In short, the theology of hope found in Scripture “is a theology of combatants, not of onlookers.”77 As Moltmann writes in a later chapter, “Jewish and Christian apocalypses... do not talk like Cassandra; nor do they interpret humanity’s crimes and cosmic catastrophes religiously, so that people may accept them, collaborate with them, or simply resign themselves to them.”78

7.3.2. Biblicism and Universal Salvation

The best illustration of Moltmann’s position, however, is perhaps found in his discussion of universalism.79 Although not his chief aim, Moltmann will demonstrate the shortcomings of biblicism in his contention that the doctrine of universal salvation cannot be either established or denied on the basis of proof-texts.

Moltmann begins with a short historical assessment of universalism. While Origen sought to see all humanity and the devil, too, ultimately redeemed, it was Augustine’s theology of a double outcome at the last judgement that ultimately prevailed in the church tradition. Interestingly, though, when universalism re-emerged in early modern Protestantism, it took its cues from Scripture. Thus, “it was his own biblicism, not secular humanism, that convinced the influential Württemberg theo-

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76 CoG, 145-46.
77 CoG, 146.
78 CoG, 203.
ologist Johann Albrecht Bengel (1687-1752) of the truth of the doctrine of *apokatastasis.*” 80 From Bengel, Moltmann traces the development of Protestant universalism through Friedrich Christoph Oetinger and the Blumhardts. Karl Barth, too, stands in this tradition, though he was accused by Emil Brunner and Gerhard Ebeling of going beyond Scripture. But, Moltmann responds, “The decision for one or the other cannot be made on the ground of `scripture,’” as both “universal salvation and a double outcome of judgment are… well attested biblically.” 81

Moltmann finds biblical support for universalism in Eph 1:10, where God’s plan has been made manifest in Christ, namely, “to gather up all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth.” A similar hope is expressed in Col 1:20: “Through him God was pleased to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, by making peace through the blood of his cross.” Moltmann comments, “Not only all human beings and earthly creatures but the angels too—evidently the disobedient ones, since for the others it is unnecessary—will be reconciled through Christ.” 82 Related claims appear in Paul’s undisputed letters. “For as all die in Adam, so all will be made alive in Christ” (1 Cor 15:22; cf. Rom 5:18). And, “for God has imprisoned all in disobedience so that he may be merciful to all” (Rom 11:32). Indeed, “the great chapter on the resurrection, 1 Corinthians 15, makes no mention at all of a judgment with a double outcome.” 83

Conversely, such a double outcome is evident elsewhere in Scripture, “especially in Matthew’s Gospel.” 84 Various texts speak of judgement leading to condemnation, such as Matt 7:13: “Enter through the narrow gate; for the gate is wide and the road is easy that leads to destruction, and there are many who take it.” The parables of the wise and foolish virgins and the judgement of the nations, both in Matt 25, provide lengthier treatments of this theme. Mark 9:45 presents a picture of hell,

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81 CoG, 241, emphasis original.
82 CoG, 240.
83 CoG, 240.
84 CoG, 241.
“where their worm never dies, and the fire is never quenched.” Other contrasts between the saved and the condemned appear elsewhere in the gospels, such as in Luke 16:23 and John 3:36. Additionally, Moltmann finds a link with Paul’s theology of the “lost”85 in Phil 3:19; 1 Cor 1:18; and 2 Cor 2:15.

Having argued that both options can be located in the biblical material, Moltmann acknowledges that hermeneutical options are still available to those who think the question can be answered on the basis of different texts. “If one presupposes that scripture does not contradict itself… one can then try to resolve the contradiction in the sense of the one side or the other.”86 For the universalist, damnation can be conceded but understood to be temporary rather than eternal. The fires of hell would be rehabilitative and not strictly punitive. For the adherent of the doctrine of eternal damnation, the universal possibilities in God’s offer of salvation might be conditional on the individual’s response to this offer, that is, their faith. Thus, “we have to ask whether God’s grace is still free grace if at the end all human beings are bound to be saved.”87

Moltmann does not attempt to resolve this “dispute about the Bible,” as he refers to it in the heading which introduces his discussion.88 It is only in his following subsection that he addresses “the theological argument.”89 Here he begins to show his explicit preference for universalism. The implication is that not only do both sides find support in Scripture but that no conclusive case for either can be made with a merely biblicist hermeneutic, that is, one that collects various texts on the theme in order to demonstrate unified, biblical support for its argument. A case that takes broader theological commitments into consideration must instead be made. For Moltmann, such a case rests first of all on the character of God as revealed in Christ. “If Jesus is the judge, can he judge according to any other righteousness than the law which he himself manifested—the law of love for our enemies, and the acceptance

88 CoG, 240.
89 CoG, 243.
of the poor, the sick and sinners?” God’s anger is always executed in love, in order that the wrongdoer may be made new. Conversely, the doctrine of eternal condemnation “is the expression of a tremendous self-confidence on the part of human beings,” because it places the decision for salvation “in the hands of human beings.” Moreover, “God’s function is reduced to the offer of salvation in the gospel…. Christ becomes a person’s Saviour only when that person has ‘accepted’ him in faith.” To conclude, Moltmann takes up Luther’s theology of Christ’s descent into hell, discovering a more thoroughly christological basis for universalism. Notably, however, the theological commitments that inform his rejection of arguments against biblicism that are made on the basis of proof-texts—these commitments themselves arise from the biblical witness, namely in the company that Jesus kept and testimony to human weakness.

7.3.3. A Response to Richard Bauckham

In 1997, Moltmann travelled to St Andrews in Scotland for a conference on his eschatology, following the publication of CoG. The discussion of his exegesis is particularly relevant to the aims of this dissertation.

In regard to the biblical basis for Moltmann’s theology of time and eternity, Richard Bauckham alleges, “It has to be said that Moltmann leaves it wholly unclear how he knows that Jesus and the early Christians understood the relation of time and eternity the way he does…. What little exegesis he offers tends to be remarkably ignorant and incompetent.” Bauckham provides three examples. First, Moltmann

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90 CoG, 236.
91 CoG, 244.
92 CoG, 244-45.
93 Bauckham in GWBAA, 179. On this, cf. Bauckham’s comments made a couple years beforehand: “Whereas his earlier work was carefully rooted in current biblical scholarship, his use of biblical material in the later work seems rather often to ignore historical-critical interpretation and to leave his hermeneutical principles dangerously unclear…. [W]hereas his earlier work at its best moved between the concreteness of the biblical history and the concrete situations of the modern world, he seems more recently to have been increasingly drawn into the concerns of the theological tradition for their own sake (or, in some cases, such as the Filioque issue, by ecumenical discussions).” Bauckham, _The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann_, 25-26. Quite the opposite position is taken by Robert Walton: “Like the theology
reads Rev 10:6 as saying, “Time shall be no more.” But the meaning of the verse is rather that “when the seventh angel blows his trumpet there will be no more time left before the completion of God’s purposes.” Bauckham finds support for this reading in “virtually all modern exegetes (followed by most modern translations).” Second, Moltmann takes Rev 5 to mean that “the unfurled times of history will be rolled up like a scroll.” For Bauckham, this “requires an exegesis that no hermeneutic, however pre-modern or post-modern, could conceivably support.” Finally, Moltmann contends that “the verb used in Rev 21:5—[is] not ‘Behold, I will create’ (Hebrew bara'), but ‘I will make (Hebrew asah) all things new.’” This, again, is “a blatant example of demonstrably erroneous exegesis.” Not only is Revelation not written in Hebrew, but its Greek verb, poiēō, is used to translate bara’ in Gen 1:1. Moreover, the verse echoes Isa 65:17, which also uses bara’. If the Hebrew ’asah underlies any NT text, it is not this one.

Interestingly, despite Bauckham’s discussion of Moltmann’s theology of time and eternity being over seventy pages, most of Moltmann’s response is directed to the criticisms expressed in this one paragraph. This is perhaps because—as Moltmann reveals—“my relationship to the Bible and to professional exegesis has been subjected to critical questions by other people too.”


94 CoG, 280.  
95 Bauckham in GWBAA, 179.  
96 Bauckham in GWBAA, 179; cf. Rev 10:6-7, NRSV.  
97 CoG, 294-95.  
98 Bauckham in GWBAA, 180.  
99 CoG, 271, emphasis original.  
100 Bauckham in GWBAA, 180n.52.  
101 Moltmann in GWBAA, 229. Unfortunately, Moltmann does not reveal the particular culprits!
Although it is not until the end of his response that Moltmann addresses the particular texts noted by Bauckham, I will attend to this part of his response first, for ease of comparison.\textsuperscript{102} In regard to Rev 10:6, Moltmann understands his own reading to be an implication of Bauckham’s more basic reading. “In the realm of God’s eternal presence, chronos can surely have just as little power as death.”\textsuperscript{103} The completion of God’s purposes, immediately following the seventh angel’s trumpet blast, coincides with the end of created time as we know it, the latter being renewed and transformed with the rest of creation. Next, Moltmann replies that his reference to the times being “rolled up like a scroll,”\textsuperscript{104} in connection to Rev 5, is not exegetical but rather illustrative, borrowing an image from Revelation in order to depict a theological claim established on other grounds. Lastly, for Rev 21:5, Moltmann notes that poieō in the Septuagint not only translates bara’ but ‘asah as well. The rationale behind his preference for ‘asah is that it presupposes something that is already there (e.g., Gen 2:2), whereas bara’ is used only of bringing things into being. Moreover, Moltmann argues, whereas Isa 65:17 refers to the creation of a new heaven and new earth, the theology of Rev 21:5 depends on a subtle difference, referring rather to heaven and earth being recreated. Whatever the accuracy of Moltmann’s exegesis, though—and his exegetical conclusions are rightly questioned and debated—in my opinion it is his comments on the hermeneutical task that are most valuable here.

Ahead of these finer, exegetical points, Moltmann begins his reply to Bauckham by introducing a distinction between the “literal exegesis” of modern biblical scholarship and the role of Scripture in systematic theology. He writes, “Theology is not a commentary on the biblical writings, and commentaries on the biblical writings are not a substitute for theological reflection.”\textsuperscript{105} Rather, whereas exegesis determines the meaning of the text in its original context, theology seeks to hear the concern of


\textsuperscript{103} Moltmann in \textit{GWBAa}, 232.

\textsuperscript{104} \textit{CoG}, 295.

\textsuperscript{105} Moltmann in \textit{GWBAa}, 230.
the text in a contemporary context. Moltmann’s words are worth quoting at length here:

That [i.e., hermeneutics] is not simply a problem of translation. Hermeneutics is not restricted to the renovation of ancient buildings. Theology has to do with the theological concern which the biblical texts are trying to talk about in their own way and in their own time. So as a theologian I begin by reading the texts, then ask what they are saying, and turn to their subject and concern, trying to understand it with my own mental categories, which are the categories of my own time. After that I come back to the biblical text and ask whether it brings out adequately the subject or concern as I have understood it with the help of the text itself…. From this a thematic criticism of the texts emerges which is committed to their concern.106

Alongside other kinds of biblical criticism, then, such as textual, form, and literary criticism, Moltmann advances a “thematic criticism.”107 Here, exegesis is not primarily concerned with understanding each word and sentence, nor reconstructing the history of the text’s development, nor even with determining the meaning of the text as a whole. Rather, it seeks the overarching concern of the text—its theme—and asks what it would mean to undertake theology today if this concern were to be taken up.

Following this, Moltmann again mentions the doctrine of inspiration. “Questionings as to whether the theology is ‘in conformity with Scripture’ seem to me to

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106 Moltmann in GWBAA, 230. Moltmann’s words are helpfully paraphrased by Jeremy Law, who writes, “Moltmann will always frustrate exegettes, just as he has been frustrated by them... because he will always want to go beyond the text, from, as he says, what it meant to what it means.” Jeremy Law, “Jürgen Moltmann’s Ecological Hermeneutics,” in Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical and Theological Perspectives, ed. David G. Horrell, et al., 223-39 (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 237, emphasis original.

107 Moltmann’s responses were originally written in German and translated by Margaret Kohl. The German versions have not been published and I cannot find any instances of this term elsewhere in his corpus. Nonetheless, the immediate context provides a strong indication of the likely meaning of the term. While there is some resemblance to Sachkritik, it remains unknown whether Moltmann uses this term or another. Cf. Robert Morgan, “Sachkritik in Reception History,” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 33:2 (2010): 175-90. (Moltmann is cited in the article, though only peripherally and not in direct relationship to the notion of Sachkritik) Indeed, the biblical Sache over and against the text itself is of central importance to Moltmann’s theology of Scripture in ExpTh, which I treat below in the following section (7.4.2.-7.4.3.).
be a remnant left over from the old doctrine of verbal inspiration.”108 He mentions Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, Barth, and Tillich as examples of theologians whose works were not merely written as “disciplined exegesis.” For instance, “Barth’s dialectical doctrine of predestination cannot be found in this form in the Bible, nor can the magnificent structure of his doctrine of reconciliation.”109 Moltmann clearly sees a similar relationship to Scripture in his own theology. He writes, “I am a theological partner in dialogue with the texts I cite, not their exegete.”110 That is, Moltmann does not try to erase himself and his own context in order to read the texts objectively. Rather, he embraces these as legitimate and valuable factors in the conversation with Scripture, especially insofar as these situate the conversation in a contemporary context. Notably, Moltmann’s response might be read back onto earlier uses of Scripture in his theology, such as in TKG, where Bauckham made a similar criticism.111

CoG and the associated conference, then, provide much insight into Moltmann’s concerns regarding Scripture at this late stage in his career. His rejection of biblicism, indicated in GC (1985),112 is here further developed in the context of the debate over universalism. Proof-texting is not enough to establish theological truth. The discussion must take broader theological commitments into consideration. Moltmann’s response to Bauckham touches on similar concerns, with his distinction between commentary and theological reflection anticipating his mature hermeneutics in ExpTh.

108 Moltmann in GWBAA, 230.
109 Moltmann in GWBAA, 231.
110 Moltmann in GWBAA, 231. As Moltmann later writes, “Other people have ironically criticized my use of the Bible as a ‘use à la carte’, although it is no different in principle from the way Karl Barth or Basil the Great used Scripture—except in the deficiency of my biblical knowledge.” ExpTh, xxi (2000).
111 See 6.3.1. and 6.4.6.
112 See 7.1.2.
7.4. A Long-Awaited Hermeneutics: Moltmann’s *Experiences in Theology*

It is in his 2000 *Experiences in Theology* that Moltmann finally begins to develop his hermeneutics and theology of Scripture at length.\footnote{On Scripture in *ExpTh*, see David N. Field, “The Theological Authority of the Bible and Ecological Theology,” *Scriptura* 101 (2009): 206-18, at 208-10; Poul F. Guttesen, *Leaning into the Future: The Kingdom of God in the Theology of Jürgen Moltmann and in the Book of Revelation* (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2009), 26-37; Sung Wook Chung, “Moltmann on Scripture and Revelation,” in *Jürgen Moltmann and Evangelical Theology*, ed. Chung, 1-16.} This is because this work is the final instalment in the systematic contributions to theology, treating—not without irony—the theme of theological methodology at the end of his career. But neither is this without design. As Moltmann writes in his introduction to this volume, “Up to now these questions about method have not greatly interested me, because I first wanted to get to know the real content of theology.”\footnote{ExpTh, xiv.} In excluding extended discussion of theological methodology up until this point, Moltmann is already making a methodological statement. It is the theological content—the last things, the crucifixion, the God who lives in loving Trinity—that primarily drives the methodology, and not vice versa. And while the work in *ExpTh* can certainly at times provide an interesting retrospective on earlier stages of Moltmann’s career, readers should be careful to heed Moltmann’s message here and not take *ExpTh* as their starting point.\footnote{I do not intend this as a major criticism, but, with respect, see for example, Guttesen, *Leaning into the Future*, 26-37; and Chung, ed., *Moltmann and Evangelical Theology*. This is symptomatic of the deeper problem of treating Moltmann’s theology synchronically rather than diachronically—understandable when presented for a popular-level audience, and to some degree necessary in more thematically oriented analyses, but generally dissatisfactory in academic monographs and articles where reading the material in its developmental context should be increasingly prioritised in view of Moltmann’s long career.} In the following then, I aim to treat *ExpTh* as a later, separate contribution, rather than as a guide to understanding earlier works.

This section will be the largest of the current chapter, reflecting the relative breadth of relevant material in *ExpTh*. I begin with Moltmann’s comments on Scripture in his earlier theology, proceed to his proposal for a promissory hermeneutics, and then address his comments on the nature of Scripture and its relationship to the
Trinity. Lastly, I attend to Moltmann’s criticism of patriarchal features of the biblical texts, drawing on excerpts from his other works.

7.4.1. Reflections on Earlier Theology

In the preface to *ExpTh*, Moltmann looks back on the use of Scripture in his earlier theology, recollecting the influence of Gerhard von Rad and Ernst Käsemann. But his interest in biblical scholarship did not last long. He writes, “Sometime in the 1970s, the exegetical discussion became hazy and confused for me, and the hermeneutic discussion even more. I found it more of a hindrance in listening to the biblical texts.” While “historical criticism disappeared almost entirely,” however, hermeneutical programmes looked to various human experiences to ground their reading of Scripture—following from existential theology’s hermeneutical centre, human historicity. Nonetheless, Moltmann did not ultimately lose interest in the texts, despite the ongoing developments in the scholarship. “Finding myself at a loss, I then doubtless developed my own post-critical and ‘naive’ relationship to the biblical writings.” Consequently, he continues, “I discovered how much at home I felt in the Bible, and how gladly I let myself be stimulated to my own thinking by different texts.” And yet, Moltmann also became “critical and free” towards the texts. “It is ‘the matter [Sache] of scripture’ that is important, not the scriptural form of the matter.” Moltmann advances a hermeneutics on this basis in later chapters. Importantly, though, these comments demonstrate that he will not be proposing an entirely new method. Although the explicit formulation of it will be new—and, attendant to this, surely some minor innovations as well—the core hermeneutical assumptions have been with Moltmann across his career, informing his conclusions throughout.

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116 *ExpTh*, xxi.
117 *ExpTh*, xxi.
118 *ExpTh*, xxi.
119 *ExpTh*, xxi.
120 *ExpTh*, xxii.
121 *ExpTh*, xxii; Ger. 17.
7.4.2. Promissory Hermeneutics

In view of his career, it is not surprising that Moltmann holds to the claim that “all God’s words and everything God says when he speaks to a man or woman have the character of promise.” This extends to Scripture as well. Moltmann can thus write with agreement, “According to the Reformers, the correlative to Christian faith is actually God’s promise…. And by God’s promise what was meant was the essential content of the biblical traditions.” Moreover, as in TH (1964), these promissory interactions with human beings say something about God’s “essential nature,” namely, that it “is not timeless eternity; it is his identity in time—his faithfulness.” Moltmann proceeds to cite 2 Tim 2:13: “If we are faithless, he remains faithful—for he cannot deny himself.” Scripture’s content is the divine promise. And Scripture’s content is the God of Israel, the Father of Jesus Christ. These two claims stand side by side in Moltmann’s theology: The promise comes from God and this God gives the promise. They come together in the framework of trinitarian history, which I expounded in the previous chapter. That is, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are inseparable from the history they share with human beings, the history of promise. Keeping this in mind, Moltmann will nonetheless focus the conversation on the promise itself, the connection to the Trinity being presupposed.

Such a “hermeneutics of promissory history” reads Scripture in order to discover the promised future, an alternative future for the present, revealing new possibilities and stirring readers to action. So far, this is nothing new in Moltmann’s thought. Here, though, he also universalises this hermeneutic so that it is extended to all human history, not just biblical history. Of course, the notion that the past can be reread in order to discover hopes for the present “is true especially of the unique character of the biblical history of promise”—so the particular biblical witness is not

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122 ExpTh, 55.
123 ExpTh, 61. Moltmann proceeds to provide short comment on various biblical texts relating explicitly to this theme on pp.96-98.
124 ExpTh, 55; Ger. 61. Kohl supplies the English adjective, “essential,” in her translation of Wesen here. On TH, see 3.3.2.
125 See 6.3.3.
126 ExpTh, 105.
simply relativised, being interchangeable with other historical texts.\textsuperscript{127} But neither does the witness stand above other histories so that they remain abstract from it. Rather, the hermeneutic that Moltmann uncovers in the promissory history enables related hermeneutical endeavours. He asks, for example, “What past did the Reformers see as their past? And what future for the church and Christian society did they have as a goal when they entered upon reformation?”\textsuperscript{128} It is not only the particular events attested in Scripture, then, but other historical events, such as those connected to the Reformation, which can stimulate action towards an alternative future. That is, the promissory nature of the Bible functions to remind us of forgotten hopes in other histories, working, seeking, and waiting for their fulfilment as well in the coming kingdom.

Another feature of Moltmann’s promissory hermeneutics in ExpTh is the way he relates it to Judaism. The Bible is distinctive in being made up of both the OT and the NT. “This links Christianity indivisibly with Judaism, since for Judaism this Old Testament is its own Tenach.”\textsuperscript{129} Building on his earlier work on the relationship between Judaism and Christianity,\textsuperscript{130} Moltmann contends that the two are united in their orientation to a common future. The church has not yet seen the fulfilment of all of God’s promises in the coming of Christ and the outpouring of the Spirit. God is not yet all in all. The church shares with Israel, then, the hope for the coming kingdom and the universal rule of God. And this has implications for how the Bible is understood, as well as for the relationship between the two peoples: “If the future of Scripture is apprehended in the symbol of the kingdom of God, then this becomes the scarlet thread of a biblical theology which does not just read the Old Testament in light of the New, and the New Testament in light of the Old, but reads both in the light of God’s coming to his whole creation.... Then, together with the Jews, Christians testify ‘to all nations’ and to the whole of creation on earth the righteousness,
justice and peace of God’s coming world.” This “future of Scripture” is to be differentiated from the Reformation “centre of Scripture,” the latter concept which Moltmann finds unhelpful because it primarily directs the reader’s gaze backwards, rather than both backwards—to God’s faithfulness—and forwards—to the fulfillment of the promise—with both Scripture and Israel.

Moltmann further develops his promissory hermeneutic in conversation with the Reformation principle that “‘Holy Scripture is its own interpreter.’” This mantra had a double significance. First, it confronted the church with the claim that “it is not the church which interprets scripture but scripture which interprets the church.” Second, it reminded other human interpreters that their reason alone was insufficient for their task. Moltmann does not voice any protest at this point. Indeed, his subsequent reflection on the principle reveals a significant degree of admiration for the Bible: “Throughout the whole of church history, the Bible has continually made its own way, in opposition to the interpretative authority of the church, among the Waldensians as well as at the Reformation, in the Catholic Bible movement today as well as in the Pentecostal movement in Latin America. That is why the church repeatedly forbade the laity to read the Bible for themselves…. The Reformation was a Bible movement, and is the proof that scripture does in practice interpret itself. It comes close to all who read it and who can form their own judgment.”

This raises an important question, however: “But does that make it [i.e., the Bible] a kind of Protestant pocket-pope, infallible and inerrant?” Moltmann responds by indicating that there is still a distinction between text and interpreter, and declares that “scripture has to be tested” against the “matter [Sache] of scripture.” These two claims, that Scripture interprets itself and that individual texts are to be

132 ExpTh, 127.
133 “Scriptura sacra sui ipsius interpres.” Martin Luther, Weimar Ausgabe VII, 97, cited and translated in ExpTh, 128.
134 ExpTh, 128.
135 ExpTh, 128-29.
136 ExpTh, 129.
137 ExpTh, 129; Ger. 123.
read against a broader Sache, are also connected in that “if a text ‘interprets [auslegen] itself’, there is evidently something in it [i.e., Scripture] which thrusts and ferments, something which has to come out and must be e-lucidated [aus-gelegt], because it cannot remain within itself.”  And this something, for Moltmann, is the history of promise. He has already argued that the promise is the Sache, the hermeneutical centre of Scripture, albeit in different words. Here Moltmann points out that it belongs to the biblical promise to speak again to readers in different generations, reminding them of the hope that Scripture attests, and precluding interpretations that deny this hope. “What is in the process of becoming event,” that is, the promise, “and is only comprehensible if the comprehension sees itself as a function of that event, is told from generation to generation, so that in the telling the reader is drawn into the event that is still incomplete.” With the promise, then, the reader does not stand outside of Scripture but within it, insofar as both reader and text stand within the same history of promise.

Yet, because the history of promise extends into the present, this hermeneutic must consider another factor: the contemporary context. And this context does not seek knowledge alone. Through Scripture, readers are led to an alternative praxis. “The road of hermeneutics does not merely lead from text to preaching (important though this is for preachers); it leads from a text springing from a past praxis to the praxis of our own lives today.” Conversely, the context of the reader plays a determinative role in their reading of the text. “As is evident from the history of Israel since the Exodus from Egypt, and the history of Christ from the manger to the cross, there is a continuing, ongoing ‘preferential option’ for the poor on God’s part. God’s promises are understood best by those without hope.” This leads Moltmann to two conclusions. First, no hermeneutic that excludes the poor, oppressed, and marginal-

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138 ExpTh, 129; Ger. 123. To legen something is to read it, whereas to legen something aus—literally: to read it from or to from-read it—is to interpret it.
139 ExpTh, 129.
140 ExpTh, 131.
141 ExpTh, 131.
ised from its reading is true to the *Sache* of Scripture. Second, neither can such a hermeneutic be satisfied with a purely noetic reading. Because it stands within the history of promise, it must also seek a praxis—an ethics and politics.

7.4.3. Defining Scripture

Having established a hermeneutic, Moltmann proceeds to look more closely at the nature of Scripture itself. Considering scriptures in general—not only Christian ones—he begins with the question, “What makes writings ‘holy scriptures’?” One of two answers might be given. It is either the community of readers that makes texts holy through their usage, or that holy thing which the texts represent and are thus holy through association. In the Christian context, this question takes the form of whether the church or the Bible is prior to the other. It can be argued that Scripture is a product of the church, insofar as the latter writes it, employs it in worship, and canonises it. Conversely, it can be argued that it is the *Sache* of Scripture that precedes the church, determines the oral traditions, and leads to the writing, usage, and canonisation of sacred texts.

Moltmann is reluctant to favour one definition of Scripture over the other. Rather, “Scripture and church have to be seen in a dialectical process, where the salient point is the understanding of ‘the matter of scripture’. For either scripture or the church to stand alone has far-reaching consequences.” Scripture stands apart from the church, for example, “in the various doctrines about the verbal inspiration of scripture.” In particular, Moltmann is referring to the developments in post-Reformation theology, though precedents for these can be found in patristic and Reformation theology as well. These doctrines limit the *Sache* of Scripture to the words themselves, severing the line between the historical promise and the Spirit’s work in actualising this today. Yet it is not just the biblical texts but the whole creation that

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142 *ExpTh*, 134.
143 *ExpTh*, 136.
144 *ExpTh*, 136.
is being sanctified. Conversely, the church stands apart from Scripture insofar as it
determines what counts as Scripture, who is to read it—the clergy, for example—and
how it is to be read—according to the lectionary, for example. While not all of these
actions are necessarily opposed to God’s purposes, Moltmann is wary of the ways
that the Sache of Scripture can be obscured through human interaction with Scrip-
ture. “It is ‘the matter of scripture’ which alone prompts the desire to read the scribes,
understand them, live in accordance with them, and proclaim them.”

Briefly departing from the main discussion, Moltmann turns to the concept of
scripture in some interfaith feminist communities. Whereas Christian feminist the-
ology initially sought to criticise various biblical texts in light of the Sache of Scrip-
ture, communities are now emerging that seek to adopt new texts and canons based
not on this Sache but on the basis of their own needs as marginalised people. But
Moltmann expresses some criticism at this point: “If the determining subject is the
community of people which produces these scriptures and then sanctifies them, then
this community could just as well express itself in other ways—poetically, dramati-
cally, ideologically or scientifically. It would thereby avoid handicapping itself in its
productivity through the ‘sanctification’ of particular writings.” Yet, neither does
Moltmann completely dismiss the approach. Such a process of canonisation can be
viewed theologically, insofar as it rests on “the divine authority of the oppressed and
suffering people who hunger to be free for life and for their full humanity.”

This requires some additional exposition before attending to Moltmann’s conclusion.

146 ExpTh, 137.
147 Here, Moltmann only cites Pui-Lan Kwok and Elisabeth Schüessler-Fiorenza, ed., Women’s
148 ExpTh, 138.
149 ExpTh, 138.
150 “Black theology knows no other authority than the misery of the oppressed and is there-
fore not prepared to maintain any biblical or theological doctrine ‘which contradicts the
black demand for freedom now’.” ExpTh, 212, quoting James H. Cone, Black Theology and
Black Power (New York: Seabury, 1969), 120. “It follows from what the texts say, first, that
the theological location of the texts must be looked for among the poor, to whom the prefer-
ential option of the church applies. But in addition the original subject of the theology must
be sought for in the ‘commitment of these people’ and in ‘their struggles to become free
In part three of *ExpTh*, Moltmann explores several critical theologies, namely, black, liberation, minjung, and feminist theologies. His aim is to accurately represent these perspectives (which, he admits, are nonetheless varied in themselves) and let them speak into and challenge prevailing dominant theologies. Throughout each exposition, Moltmann is rarely critical of his subject matter. In a concluding chapter, however, he presents a number of “unanswered questions” that have occurred to him over the years. The questions are as follows: First, “If praxis is the criterion of theory, what is the criterion of praxis?” Second, “If the crucified people are to redeem the world, who then redeems the people?” Third, “If the goal of liberation is to make people the determining subject of their own history, what is the goal of that history?” And fourth, “Does liberation theology lead to the liberation of the poor and women from Christian theology?” Moltmann provides further commentary, though the meaning of the questions is largely self-explanatory. Interestingly, a common theme is discernible throughout—one that goes back to the identity and relevance dilemma expounded in *CG*. With each question, Moltmann’s concern is to uphold the priority of faith in Christ. Where critical theologies tend away from the *Sache* of Scripture and eventually replace it with another hermeneutical authority, they are in danger of forgetting their original, specifically Christian character, and becoming indistinguishable from other human agendas. They make themselves vulnerable to confusing their own victories with the work of new creation, the latter which is not yet complete. But this is not to outright reject the methods and conclusions of these respective approaches. Moltmann is cautious in his formulation of them as questions (not “criticisms”), acknowledging that it is not his place to make ultimate evaluations on the theologies of the marginalised. Rather, his questions are intended to probe human beings’.” *ExpTh*, 232, emphasis original, quoting Gustavo Gutiérrez, *We Drink from Our Own Wells: The Spiritual Journey of a People* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1984), no page given.

151 *ExpTh*, 293-99.
152 See 5.2.1.
153 “I can well imagine that some theologians, men and women both, who have become involved contextually in one way or another, will feel criticized by these questions. I can also
some basic, common assumptions and contribute to ongoing dialogue between different groups and individuals.

Returning to Moltmann’s discussion of what constitutes Scripture, his concluding paragraph is particularly noteworthy. Here, Moltmann reveals his own position on whether or not the canon is open. He finds fault with both the fundamentalism and interfaith feminism examined above, in that their focus is on the texts themselves. This results in either a closed canon, or a canon open to other texts on the basis of the community’s concerns. “But if we look at the scriptural texts from the angle of ‘the matter of scripture,’ then the canon remains open: we can, for objective [sachlich] reasons, judge the Epistle of James to be ‘an epistle of straw,’ as Luther did, and might prefer to exclude the book of Revelation; but we can also preach from non-biblical texts if they accord with ‘the matter of Scripture.’”¹⁵⁴ That is, for Moltmann, it is not a question of which texts are or are not in the canon but of the relationship between the Sache and particular texts.¹⁵⁵ The textual accounts of the exodus and the resurrection, for example, are not valid on their own. In relation to the Sache, the promise, they function as witnesses to God’s promissory history. The processes of writing Scripture and the church’s canonisation of it are part of this history insofar as they contribute to this witness, but they do not replace the history itself, which precedes these processes and continues long after they have been completed. In this way, the Sache cannot be changed, as it can be in Moltmann’s example of interfaith feminism. But the texts are also subject to the approval and criticism of the Sache, something which, for Moltmann, is lost in a fundamentalist doctrine of Scripture.

¹⁵⁴ ExpTh, 138; Ger. 130. By “sachlich reasons,” Moltmann means reasons that are in accord with Scripture’s Sache.
¹⁵⁵ Elsewhere, however, Moltmann notes the ecumenical value of a shared canon of particular texts. “A shared theology of all believers in the different cultural and economic contexts still seems a long way off, except that—as every ecumenical conference shows—the text of the biblical message is the same everywhere.” ExpTh, 13. “Every Christian theology, however conditioned it may be by its context, kairos and culture, follows and interprets the text of the biblical writings.” Exp‘Th, 60.
A more complete picture of the relationship between Sache and text appears when reading Moltmann’s introductory comments on hermeneutics. Earlier on in ExpTh, he claims that in the hermeneutical process “the text and the thing it talks about will not be able to remain unchanged.”\textsuperscript{156} After hearing and understanding the text, we, as readers, are to consider “the way the text talks about the matter [Sache] we have in common.”\textsuperscript{157} (This Sache is later identified as the promise, as shown above, though Moltmann leaves it undefined at this earlier point) Such a consideration may result in altering the text—not permanently, that is, but for the sake of translating its Sache into the present. “The ‘anti-Jewish’ pronouncements of the early Christian communities which were being persecuted by Jewish synagogue are an example. To take these pronouncements over and repeat them unchanged in the twentieth century would not be in conformity with ‘the cause [Sache] of Christ’ which we have in common.”\textsuperscript{158} Moltmann continues, writing, “The androcentric and patriarchalist texts in the Bible, which are humiliating to women, are a further example.”\textsuperscript{159} If the Sache of Scripture is to be heard today, then anti-Jewish and anti-woman statements in the texts must be criticised in line with it. I will discuss the issue of patriarchy in detail below. Here it will be enough to note, though, that while the persecution of Christians at the hands of Jewish authorities may—at least in part—explain the origins of anti-Jewish sentiment in first century Christian texts, there is no comparative persecution of Christians at the hands of women to explain anti-woman sentiment in Scripture.\textsuperscript{160} Prioritising the Sache, then, does not necessarily mean that the texts as originally written or canonised were perfect witnesses to their subject-matter. From the start, they contained elements that compromised faithful representation of the Sache, though the Sache itself was not thereby compromised.

\textsuperscript{156} ExpTh, 124.
\textsuperscript{157} ExpTh, 125; Ger. 119.
\textsuperscript{158} ExpTh, 125; Ger. 119.
\textsuperscript{159} ExpTh, 125.
\textsuperscript{160} Of course, there are oppressive female figures in Scripture, such as Jezebel (e.g., 1 Kgs 18:4; 21:1-16) and the “cows of Bashan” (Amos 4:1). But even if—despite the ideological location of the texts—these testimonies are accepted, they cannot speak for the entirety of anti-woman sentiment expressed in Scripture.
7.4.4. Scripture in the Context of Trinitarian History

While such presuppositions can already be seen in his comments on the relationship between Sache and text, Moltmann proceeds to discuss the human quality of the biblical writings. Later Protestantism, especially in Reformed theology, found an analogy between the Word’s incarnation and inscripturation. Here, “the Bible is no less than ‘Jesus Christ existing as scripture.’”\footnote{ExpTh, 139, quoting Helmut Kirschstein, Der souveräne Gott und die heilige Schrift. Einführung in die biblische Hermeneutik Karl Barths (Aachen, Germany: Shaker, 1998), 211. Moltmann also wrote the foreword for this book.} Moltmann proceeds to the example of Karl Barth, who understood the Sache to be the sovereign God, rather than the history of promise. Unlike his forbears, Barth did not identify the Sache with the text itself. But, because of Barth’s conception of the divine unity, something which Moltmann had earlier criticised as “modalist,”\footnote{See 6.4.4.} Moltmann contends that Scripture is tied too closely to God’s being in Barth’s theology. “On the basis of the identifications in the sovereign movement of God’s self-revelation and self-communication, we can then say: scripture is God’s Word, God’s Word is God himself. Barth always stressed the unity of the subject of the self-revealing and speaking Person of God.”\footnote{ExpTh, 140, emphasis original.} Consequently, the unity of the OT and NT is also secured in this way—a unity which is “not wrong” considering that it is the same God who speaks, but nonetheless problematic insofar as “the differences between the human vehicles of the writings are no longer taken seriously.”\footnote{ExpTh, 141.} A unified Scripture assumes a unified people of Jews and Gentiles, but this unified people has not yet come about.

An alternative approach to the unity of the OT and NT is found in existentialist theology.\footnote{Somewhat atypically, Moltmann does not mention Bultmann at all at this point but instead cites Gerhard Ebeling and refers to the “motley variety of further methods” that were developed in subsequent hermeneutics. ExpTh, 142. Moltmann points to Anthony C. Thiselton’s coverage of the latter in New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading (London: HarperCollins, 1992).} The OT and NT are unified with each other and human beings today not
through the divine unity but rather through the constancy of the “historicity of human existence.” What varies is how this historicity is interpreted by different readers in different times. Later hermeneutical approaches, though departing from existentialist interpretation, shared with existentialism this interest in the human speaker of the text, as the opposed to the message of the text itself. “While a congregation gathers together for worship, the hermeneut investigates its social status. While a person praises God, the androcentricism or misogynist sexism of which he is unconscious is probed.” Interestingly, Moltmann finds that there is some theological precedent for this approach. In the Bible, “there are also many stories to be told, and prayers, psalms, hymns and doxologies to be prayed, sung and danced, and where God is extolled…. [I]n these writings people do not only listen to God’s Word; they also want to open their hearts before God.” Nonetheless, neither does Moltmann want to base the value of these texts on “the assumption of anthropological constants.” Indeed, elsewhere he criticises the assumption of these alleged constants for overlooking the open-endedness and thus inconstancy of human existence.

Moltmann concludes his discussion, rejecting Barth’s approach, which represents a “hermeneutics from above,” as well as rejecting that of existentialist theology and various subsequent schools of interpretation—the “hermeneutics from below.” He writes, “In actual fact both hermeneutics… live from the same monistic premise: history is the work of a single determining subject.” Moltmann has advanced this criticism before. Here, however, he wants to emphasise that history is perichoretic, driven by three divine subjects—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—interpenetrating both one another and created subjects. This trinitarian conception of history

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166 ExpTh, 142.
167 ExpTh, 142, spelling corrected.
168 ExpTh, 142-43.
169 ExpTh, 143.
170 See Moltmann’s criticism of the anthropological proof for God, expounded in 3.3.2.
171 ExpTh, 144.
172 See 6.3.2. and 6.4.4.
makes it possible to express history’s polycentric course. Conversely, neither hermeneutical approach treated above, adequately accounts for the three divine subjects and the human subject, which co-determine one another—though this is always voluntary and in love on part of the divine subjects—and are yet incomplete, looking to the perfection of their unity in the coming kingdom. Moreover, a trinitarian conception of history requires a differentiated approach to Scripture. On the one hand, “scripture is closed and complete,” insofar as there is an “eschatological finality” to Christ’s death and resurrection (cf. Heb 1:2). But on the other hand, Scripture is incomplete in that it needs to be “continually interpreted afresh” to address different periods in the history of promise, until it finds its fulfilment in the coming kingdom.

This leads Moltmann to name the Spirit as the “real interpreter” of Scripture. Such a view finds support in the theology of John 14-16, where after Jesus’ death the Father will send the Paraclete, the Spirit of truth, who “will teach you everything, and remind you of all that I have said to you” (John 14:26). Moltmann reflects, “This is formulated as if it were a limiting condition, but what it means is the very reverse…: the person who knows Christ and believes the God who raised him from the dead is illuminated by God the Spirit, and enters into the eternal light.” That is, the Spirit’s illuminating role should not primarily be seen as a contradiction of the efforts of human reason but as a gift that is given in order to know Christ.

Here, too, Moltmann makes an interesting turn in the discussion. The Spirit’s role is to be seen in terms of giving life—“life that is healed, freed, full, indestructible and eternal,” a life that people “experience with all their senses.” Moltmann continues, “From this we can conclude that a ‘spiritual interpretation of scripture’ has to be a biographical interpretation.” The Spirit does not just awaken and renew

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173 ExpTh, 144.
174 ExpTh, 144.
175 ExpTh, 145.
176 ExpTh, 145-46.
177 ExpTh, 146.
178 ExpTh, 146, emphasis original.
one part of life, such as human reason, but the whole life, resulting in a much richer hermeneutics than one that is informed merely by the illuminated faculty of reason.

Unfortunately, Moltmann does not pursue the suggestion of a biographical hermeneutic any further, though his subsequent thoughts on the scope and nature of the Spirit’s vivifying work are stimulating. Nonetheless, I have found three examples from elsewhere in *ExpTh* that are obliquely related to what might be called a biographical hermeneutic, even if they do not directly concern the life-giving ministry of the Spirit. First, Moltmann recalls the hermeneutical method he developed in his early days as a pastor. Reading the text at the beginning of the week, Moltmann writes, “I… took it with me in my way through the parish—and then knew what I had to say in my sermon.”179 His interactions and conversations with those in the community were what shaped and determined the content of the sermon, alongside the text. Second, commenting on Luther’s biographically-informed theology—the Reformer’s fear of damnation having played a significant role in his understanding of justification—Moltmann writes, “Reading, reflection and understanding of Scripture have to be accompanied by this [i.e., Luther-like] personal wrestling with God, so that theology becomes not just a scholarly study which teaches, but also a wisdom which makes wise out of the experience of God.”180 In that case, it is not just any life-experience that informs the hermeneutic but, in particular, the experience of suffering.181

A third example of potential material for a biographical hermeneutic appears during an aside on feminist hermeneutics. Moltmann affirms that “a human being’s natural constitution as woman or man must be taken into account when we try to understand the past and its historical testimonies.”182 Of course, he admits, masculinity and femininity are culturally conditioned, but this conditioning still results in differentiated ways of experiencing the world. Thus, Moltmann can write in a later

179 *ExpTh*, 5.
180 *ExpTh*, 24, emphasis original.
181 Cf. Moltmann’s theology of experience in *SL*, 5-8, 17-82 (1991), where suffering is not the only focus.
182 *ExpTh*, 122, emphasis original.
chapter, “Through feminist exegesis, I read the Bible with my own eyes and theirs, and noticed to my shame how much—and how much that was important—I had simply overlooked, because it had never struck me.” A related hermeneutic was in development much earlier in Moltmann’s theology, namely reading the Bible “through the eyes of the poor.” None of these, however—a hermeneutics of parish ministry, of suffering à la Luther, nor of women’s experiences—fully executes what seems to be a promising but as of yet unfinished thought for Moltmann: that of a biographical hermeneutics. And he does not develop the concept at all in the chapter in which he introduces it. In any case, it should be noted that Moltmann’s stance on these differing approaches is affirming, in contrast to his critical evaluation of the various manifestations of a “hermeneutics from below.” This is because it is not merely the human subject at work here, as might otherwise be the case in a hermeneutics from below, but the human subject in the midst of the trinitarian history, illuminated by the Holy Spirit. Even where Moltmann does not engage pneumatology explicitly in the three examples given, it would be inconsistent with the rest of his theology if he were affirming any interpretation isolated from the all-encompassing Spirit of Life.

What Moltmann does develop in some detail from this focus on the Spirit’s vivifying work, though, is a hermeneutic that reads “the biblical texts as furthering life.” With such a hermeneutic, “we shall work out what in the texts furthers life, and we shall subject to criticism whatever is hostile to life.” Moltmann proceeds to list a number of examples. This hermeneutic will, for example, affirm human life in both individual and social forms, foster love for life, lead to healing and liberation, and develop hope for new beginnings. Importantly, “what furthers life is, first and last, whatever makes Christ present,” namely the crucified, risen, and coming

183 ExpTh, 270.
184 ExpTh, 132. See 4.1.7-.4.1.8.
186 ExpTh, 148.
187 ExpTh, 149, emphasis original.
Christ. While Moltmann does not explicitly relate this discussion to his hermeneutic of the *Sache* of Scripture, the promissory history, the two approaches are clearly complementary. The gift of the Spirit that drives a life-centred hermeneutic is itself an event in the history of promise, looking back to the promises of the Spirit in the OT. As it is the promise and not the text itself that determines what is to be taken up for the sake of hope, so, similarly, the Spirit as life-giver determines what in the text is valuable in order to further life.

7.4.5. A Critical, Feminist Reading of Scripture

Moltmann’s exploration of feminist theology and the accompanying exegesis in *ExpTh* provides a good example of where he is confident to be critical of biblical texts on the basis of a more fundamental *Sache*.189

Moltmann attributes the origin of his interest in feminist theology to his wife. “I did not come to feminist theology. It came to me through the discoveries of my wife, Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel.”190 When Moltmann-Wendel began to show interest in feminist theology from around 1972 onwards, Moltmann’s own outlook began to change too. “It was not always easy for me personally to understand the necessity for taking this road… but I was curious enough to go along with it.”191 This extended, not least, to his reading of Scripture. Moltmann also observes the perennial attempts of male theologians to address feminist agitations in the church. Unfortunately, these thinkers proceeded “as if the problem was ‘the new woman,’ not the man in his traditional dominating roles.”192 Thus, “the biblical models based on the

188 *ExpTh*, 150.
190 *ExpTh*, 268.
191 *ExpTh*, 269.
192 *ExpTh*, 272.
creation accounts and the apostolic letters were to be actualized, because their au-
thority as the Word of God must not be infringed, even though they after all derived
from a pre-democratic and pre-modern culture.”193 Beginning with CPS in 1975,
Moltmann takes an alternative direction. Since his interest in a feminist hermeneutic
extends back far beyond ExpTh, it will be helpful to attend to some precedents in
other parts of his corpus before addressing the latest material.

Following this developing interest in feminist theology, Moltmann had no
difficulty identifying traditions in Scripture that caused women harm throughout
history. In CPS (1975), he observed, “The Hebrew and Christian traditions have often
taught the subordination of women as an order of creation and the result of the Fall:
the woman was created ‘second’ and was ‘the first’ to fall a victim to sin; and this
legitimated her double subordination,” an allusion to 1 Tim 2:13-14.194 That Molt-
mann is referring to Scripture here and not simply its reception in the Jewish and
Christian traditions becomes even more clear a little later, in his discussion of Gal
3:28: “There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no
longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus.” Whereas the first two
pairs, “Jew or Greek” and “slave or free,” attend to religious and economic differ-
ences, “the third pair, ‘man or woman,’ goes back to the creation of mankind as ‘man
and woman’ and reaches beyond the order of creation to a new order of these rela-
tionships.”195 That is, whatever allegedly sexist assumptions underlie particular bib-
lical texts, this key text in Galatians goes beyond these and requires them to be reas-
sessed in light of their Sache, the history of promise. New life in Christ is the begin-
ing of the end of patriarchal domination.

Later comments further demonstrate Moltmann’s reluctance to endorse
kephale [i.e., head] theology of 1 Cor 11:3 shows a corresponding derivation of male

193 ExpTh, 272.
194 CPS, 184; cf. Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel and Jürgen Moltmann, Humanity in God (New
195 CPS, 188.
primacy over the woman.” Moltmann discovers a similar logic at play in Eph 5:22-23. He continues, “The derivation in Heb 12:5-10 must also be called patriarchalist. Karl Barth… developed a theory of female subordination out of Paul’s *kephale* theology which rightly met with astonishment and opposition.” A year later, in 1981, referring again to Paul’s theology in 1 Cor, Moltmann writes, “The God of patriarchy is often portrayed through Christian forms in terms of the head and the body.” The Yahwist’s account of creation is also implicated here. Genesis 3:12 “includes the first male disclaimer [i.e., denial] of guilt,” when Adam blames Eve for giving him the fruit. Moltmann points to an alternative, however—the Priestly account of the fall in Gen 6, where the earth’s corruption derives from widespread human violence and not a misdeed attributed to a single woman. Nonetheless, the Yahwist framing is “unfortunately” to be found “in the New Testament as well,” in 1 Tim 2:13-14. And the potential harm of these passages is only exacerbated by later theological interpretation, such as that of Augustine, Thomas, and Barth.

In a 1983 discussion, Moltmann presents a slightly more detailed criticism of patriarchal assumptions in particular texts. In the NT, “the theology of the head presupposes a hierarchical gradation of relationships between head and body. Even though these are modified by Christ’s role as a servant, they are nevertheless maintained and are further stabilized by it. The ‘head’ theology, too, is theistic, not trinitarian, in conception.” Strikingly, then, Moltmann views the apostle’s own statements as departing from the God of the NT. It was this trend towards a christological or trinitarian reading of Scripture that informed Moltmann’s earlier juxtaposition of 1 Tim 2:13-14 and Gal 3:28, noted above. Such a trend is also observable in his 1991 introduction to *HTG*: “The New Testament shows no unanimity over the practical

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196 *TKG*, 250 n. 24.
201 *HTG*, 21.
consequences of belief in God the Father.” 202 Whereas Paul grounds his headship theology in God’s fatherhood, the Synoptics develop an “anti-patriarchal ethic,” based on following Christ. 203 “By contrast, Jesus is essentially superfluous for the Christian patriarchalism of the household codes…. In terms of content they say almost nothing that has not already been said by Jewish wisdom and Stoic-Cynic di- abtribe.” 204

Finally, in another 1983 article, Moltmann is critical of “the way in which since Paul congregations have been addressed as ‘Dear brothers.’” 205 Related to this is Paul’s language of “sonship” for believers. Moltmann suggests a connection here to headship. “Are women to feel like ‘sons’ before God the Father or are they to be subordinated to the ‘sons of God’ as their heads?” 206

It is in ExpTh, though, that Moltmann first provides a detailed exploration of his hermeneutical assumptions in regard to these texts. “No one has to adopt the social concepts and the patriarchal sexual hierarchies of the Bible. If that were so, for biblical reasons we should have to reintroduce slavery into Christianity, revert to absolute monarchy instead of democracy, and so forth.” 207 Moltmann notes, however, that this immediately raises the question as to what pertains to the context of the time and what pertains to the central message of the Bible. Responding to this, he writes, “The God who is present to his people in promise, Exodus, covenant and law is, in my view, the first objective criterion [das erste Sachkriterium] in the Tenach or Old Testament.” 208 Every biblical claim must be assessed against the background of this God. Moltmann perceives a way forward through the concept of the image of

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202 HTG, 15.
203 HTG, 15.
204 HTG, 16.
205 HTG, 2.
206 HTG, 2.
207 ExpTh, 279.
208 ExpTh, 280, emphasis original; Ger. 249. Only Sachkriterium is italicised in the German. What Moltmann means here is that the God of promise is the erste criterion (primary in importance and/or in terms of the order of the biblical narrative) for reading Scripture in line with its Sache.
God. Both men and women are created in this image, so that any other image is inadequate and human beings are thus forbidden to fashion one (Exod 20:4). Importantly, this also means that God is neither male nor female. “So if we know that God is neither the one nor the other, we can say: God is like a father, and like a mother, like the old and like a child, like an Almighty Being and like a co-sufferer, and so forth.”209 For Moltmann, the God of Israel cannot be bound to a single analogy, and certainly not a gendered one. This holds true for the NT as well, where the way Jesus relates to women in the gospels and the pouring out of the Spirit on both women and men provide the hermeneutical centre from which to read biblical texts that hold patriarchal biases. Moltmann’s answer to the question of distinguishing between context and message, text and Sache, then, has the reader look first to God of the Bible.

In this connection, Moltmann also highlights the human side of the biblical texts and canonisation. “Because the biblical traditions were all written by men, with the experiences and opinions of their time, and because these traditions were also gathered together by men into the canon of ‘holy scripture’, a critical feminist hermeneutics is necessary.”210 And because the Bible has these sources and this history, feminist hermeneutics takes up a hermeneutics of suspicion, asking not just what the texts say but what motivations informed their being written and compiled. This leads Moltmann to another criterion implicit in his own reading of Scripture. “Do they [i.e., particular texts] serve to legitimate domination or to liberate from oppression?”211 Indeed, “that is not just a contemporary secular interest, but the Bible’s very own concern [Interesse] too.”212 It derives from the history of promise, in which God dwells among the oppressed and gives them hope for an alternative future.

Moltmann develops his theology of Scripture and hermeneutical programme in greatest detail in ExpTh. In this section, I have explored his reflections on his previous theology; his articulation of a hermeneutics centred on the divine promise; his

209 ExpTh, 280, translation slightly adjusted; Ger. 249.
210 ExpTh, 282.
211 ExpTh, 282.
212 ExpTh, 282; Ger. 251. Moltmann does not use Sache here, as the ET might suggest.
definition of Scripture, particularly in dialogue with feminist theology; and the relationship of the Bible to Christ and the Spirit in the trinitarian history. In a final subsection I focussed on Moltmann’s treatment of texts that he deemed to run contrary to Scripture’s liberatory concern, here in connection to the liberation of women.

7.5. Moltmann’s Methodology: Challenges and Prospects

Ahead of a concluding chapter, a final aspect of the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology warrants attention. Throughout the decades, various commentators have criticised Moltmann’s work and hermeneutic for their methodological looseness. As I noted at the beginning of the previous section (7.4), it was not until the end of his systematic contributions that he addressed methodological questions in detail. In addition to this, nonetheless, Moltmann provides brief comment on his methodology in various places in his earlier works, especially in the prefaces. In this section I will consider some of the criticisms made of Moltmann’s general and hermeneutical methodology and his replies to these. Then, following Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz, I will propose that Moltmann can be read fruitfully as a speculative theologian.

7.5.1. Moltmann’s Methodological Commitments

Over the course of writing his major works, Moltmann claims to have been driven by two different sets of methodological commitments. In his first three works, \( TH \), \( CG \), and \( CPS \), Moltmann employed a programmatic methodology, treating “the whole of theology in a single focus.”\(^{213}\) The resurrection, the cross, and Pentecost, respectively, provided points of departure for theological construction in each volume. In the latter six works, \( TKG \), \( GC \), \( WJC \), \( SL \), \( CoG \), and \( ExpTh \), however, Moltmann adopted a different approach:

\begin{quote}
I no longer presented the whole of theology in a single focus but now viewed my ‘whole’ as a part belonging to a wider community, and as my con-
\end{quote}

\(^{213}\) TKG, vii (1990).
tribution to theology as a whole. I know and accept the limits of my own existence and my own context. I do not claim to say everything, as earlier dogmatic and systematic theologians once did, in their summas and systems. What I should like to do, however, is participate in the great theological dialogue with theologians of the past and present.... These contributions are not offered in the form of a dogma or system; they are suggestions. They are not intended to conclude discussions; they are meant to open new conversations.  

This later preface to *TKG*, written ten years after the original publication in German, provides a helpful summary of Moltmann’s original aims for the series. He sought to recognise the contextual nature of his theology, which always—whether implicitly or explicitly—reflects the concerns of the author’s time and place. But this also meant that he had to forsake any claim to comprehensiveness or perfect objectivity.

In addition to the negative rationale—the inevitability of a contextual theology—Moltmann reveals two theological reasons for his particular approach. First, “humanly speaking, truth is to be found in unhindered dialogue.” Here Moltmann distinguishes his dialogical contributions from “theological systems and assertive dogmatics,” which allegedly “exert coercion” and “leave the individual mind little room for creative fantasy.” In contrast, “it is only in free dialogue that truth can be accepted for the right and proper reason—namely, that it illuminates and convinces as truth.” The way to truth does not lie in the prowess of an individual, gifted thinker, but in the dialogue that takes place between teacher and student, man and woman, black and white, rich and poor, first world and third world. Second, ahead of the coming of Christ, truth remains an unfinished process. Though not a major feature of the prefaces to *TKG*, this assumption is apparent in Moltmann’s work from

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214 *TKG*, vii-viii, emphasis original.
215 The same commitments are evident in the original preface and are presented there in greater detail. *TKG*, xi-xvi (1980).
216 *TKG*, xiii (1980).
217 *TKG*, xiii.
218 *TKG*, xiii, emphasis original.
219 These are Moltmann’s categories. The teacher-student and man-woman relationships are assumed in *TKG*, xiii. For the others, see *ExpTh*, 189-292 (2000).
the beginning.\textsuperscript{220} He provides further comment in subsequent prefaces. Thus \textit{WJC} (1989): “The knowledge of Christ remains a provisional knowledge. It has to be formulated as a promise, which can only thrust forward to the seeing face to face.”\textsuperscript{221} And \textit{ExpTh} (2000): “The divine promise and the awakened hope teach every theology that they must remain fragmentary and unfinished, because it is the thinking about God of men and women who are on the way and, being still travellers, have not yet arrived home. That is why the mediaeval cathedrals and minsters also had to remain unfinished, so that they might point beyond themselves.”\textsuperscript{222}

Besides these commitments and assumptions that shape his systematic contributions from the beginning, Moltmann later reveals another feature of his theological approach that he apparently applies to his whole theological career.\textsuperscript{223} He opens \textit{ExpTh} with the admission: “Up to now these questions about method have not greatly interested me, because I first wanted to get to know the real content of theology.”\textsuperscript{224} He continues, “For me, theology was, and still is, an adventure of ideas. It is an open, inviting path. Right down to the present day, it has continued to fascinate my mental and spiritual curiosity. My theological methods therefore grew up as I came to have a perception of the objects of theological thought.”\textsuperscript{225} M. Douglas Meeks puts it well when he writes, “Moltmann’s theology reads less like a hyper-self-consciously methodological philosophy than a dense novel that inserts one deeper into relationships of lived history by the imaginative drawing of heretofore unrecognized relationships.”\textsuperscript{226} Together with its contextual, dialogical, and eschatologically open character, then, Moltmann’s theology should be viewed in retrospect as methodologically light. That is, he has sought to engage material from the Bible, tradition, contemporary theology, and his own experiences of suffering and hope as a stimulus

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{220} See, e.g., 5.2.2.
\bibitem{221} \textit{WJC}, xiv.
\bibitem{222} \textit{ExpTh}, xvi.
\bibitem{223} Perhaps only the work of the late fifties and early sixties on historical Reformed thinkers is to be excluded here.
\bibitem{224} \textit{ExpTh}, xiv.
\bibitem{225} \textit{ExpTh}, xv.
\end{thebibliography}
for creative theological thinking. His theology is not without method, but neither is methodological rigour a primary concern of his.

Notably, while each of these commitments can be found generally in Moltmann’s methodology, they are also apparent specifically in his use of Scripture. The Bible is always read in a particular context, such as in the context of being a woman. It represents a dialogue through time as different authors and communities are met with the divine promise. This promissory history remains incomplete so that Scripture must point beyond itself to the future. And, especially with the beginning of the systematic contributions, Moltmann developed his “own post-critical and ‘naive’ relationship to the biblical writings,” reading and reflecting on them without strict controls in place.

7.5.2. Criticisms of Moltmann’s Methodology

Over a long career, Moltmann has provided his readers with plenty of material to understand many of the various methodological commitments that drove his theological construction. I have outlined what I view as the most important and obvious ones in the previous subsection. Nonetheless, Moltmann’s explicit comments on methodology were often made in response to criticism. Indeed, even after having written on his methodology at length in *ExpTh*, older criticisms persist and new criticisms have since been made. I will consider some of these in this subsection.

First, there is the general criticism of ambiguity. Stephen Williams writes, “To many of us who have read his work over the years, it is frequently not clear (and just because undeclared by Moltmann) whether language is being used literally, univocally, symbolically, analogically, metaphorically, not quite any of the above, or some

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227 See 7.4.4. and 7.4.5.
228 The biblical testimonies “were the beginning of an unbroken, still incomplete, and uncompletable dialogue in history.” *TKG*, xiii (1980), emphasis original.
229 See 7.4.2.
230 *ExpTh*, xxi. See 7.4.1. and Moltmann’s response to Bauckham’s criticisms, discussed in 7.3.3.
of the above in some combination.” As Bauckham summarises, “Many critics, especially in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, find Moltmann’s work lacking in philosophical analysis and logical rigour. This is a question of theological style, and Moltmann’s way of doing theology has other merits, such as breadth of vision, which more analytical treatments lack. But it is true that it sometimes obscures conceptual problems in his work which could otherwise come to light and be overcome more quickly.”

Don Cupitt thus puts it curtly: “I do not understand how an academic can be content to be so deeply ambiguous and evasive as this.” Out of the three criticisms I will outline, I find this one the most convincing and am happy to share in the frustration of others who have puzzled over certain passages and concepts in Moltmann’s work! Nonetheless, it can also be overstated, and Bauckham provides the best articulation of it in my opinion.

Second, there is the criticism of speculation, particularly regarding Moltmann’s claims about God and the Trinity. So Paul Wells frets, “One of the most infuriating things about his idealistic constructions regarding the divinity is their lack of theological humility…. Such assurance in charting the depths of God’s inner life is unjustifiable in the light of the mysteries of Scripture. He seems to talk about God like one might talk about other human beings.” And Tim Chester can quip, “One is left asking from where Moltmann gets his special knowledge of the trinitarian

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231 Williams, “Moltmann on Jesus Christ,” 122.
233 Don Cupitt, review of The Future of Creation, by Jürgen Moltmann, Theology 83:693 (1980): 215-16, at 216. Cupitt continues, “My hypothesis is that the blame for this deplorable state of affairs lies with neo-orthodoxy. Neo-orthodoxy seemed to say that you do not actually need to prove your theological statements nor to explain in philosophical language what their status is. It is enough to invoke the concept of revelation, and it will give you carte blanche. Similarly Moltmann, like so many other theologians, seems to think that it is not necessary even to attempt to prove that the New Testament christological confession is a true verdict upon Jesus of Nazareth. The NT christology is just accepted dogmatically, as if merely by existing it had established a claim to be taken seriously.” Clearly Cupitt is working with quite a different set of assumptions to Moltmann!
life!”²³⁵ Ryan Neal takes yet another step, stating that Moltmann displays “a self-assured confidence that disallows mystery; there are no dark corners of theology, everything is clearly in view.”²³⁶ This criticism merits further comment and I will attend to it in more detail in the following subsection.

A recent, third criticism has been advanced by Randal Rauser from the perspective of analytic theology, concerning Moltmann’s quest for a theology in the form of dialogue. Not unprovocatively, Rauser applies Harry Frankfurt’s category of “bullshit” to “Moltmann’s view of theology as perpetual conversation.”²³⁷ That is, because Moltmann’s emphasis is on the openness of the conversation and not on the truthfulness of the contributions, the overall quality of conversation is compromised. There is a place for conversation, an anything-goes “bull session,” which functions as a space for experimenting with new ideas and approaches. Rauser admits as much. But, he adds, the conversation is only valid insofar as “one is committed to closing the loop by discerning which of the results are worth keeping and which should be discarded.”²³⁸ Yet Moltmann does make definite judgements throughout his career, outright rejecting various contributions from Bultmann, Barth, and Rahner, or Thomas, Augustine, and Paul, among many others! The problem for Rauser is that such judgements are out of step with Moltmann’s stated commitment to theology as dialogue. Thus, “when necessary, Moltmann strikes out on tactical sorties to demolish contrarian positions, but then when the polemic is turned back on him,

²³⁵ Tim Chester, Mission and the Coming of God: Eschatology, the Trinity and Mission in the Theology of Jürgen Moltmann and Contemporary Evangelicalism (Milton Keynes, UK: Paternoster, 2006), 27.
²³⁶ Neal, Theology as Hope, 208.
he beats a hasty retreat back behind the wall of congenial conversation.” Finally, this alleged double standard in Moltmann’s approach is further exacerbated by his ambiguous style. In contrast, in analytical theology, “the appeal of your rhetoric, impenetrability of your prose, and security of your reputation matter nothing if your arguments are poor. It is on this egalitarian and iconoclastic ground that upstart Bertrand Russell could write his famous 1903 letter shooting down Frege’s Basic Law V. Now try to imagine this dazzling exercise of analytic reasoning if Frege had written with Heideggerian obfuscation. In such a climate, Russell could easily be dismissed as a smarmy upstart whose temerity to challenge such a profoundly difficult thinker could only come from youthful ignorance.”

Rauser criticises Moltmann’s theology on the grounds that Moltmann places emphasis on the dialogical process to the detriment of the results; the appeal to conversation allows him to resist scrutiny; and the general ambiguity of his style disallows straightforward, analytic assessment. I do not think much can be gained here from contesting Rauser’s judgements. From the perspective of analytic theology, he offers valuable criticism. And if the future of theology is to be an analytical one, then there is likely little that Moltmann has to offer. But the future remains open, the

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239 Rauser, “Theology as a Bull Session,” 84. Richard Clutterbuck observes a similar dissonance in Moltmann’s work. “Moltmann has to be called a doctrinal theologian for his proposals are never expressed merely as theological opinions; they are addressed to the churches and are claimed as necessary doctrinal adjustments for the corporate life of the Christian community.” Richard Clutterbuck, “Jürgen Moltmann as a Doctrinal Theologian: The Nature of Doctrine and the Possibilities for Its Development,” *Scottish Journal of Theology* 48:4 (1995): 489-505, at 491. It should be noted that Moltmann admits in his preface to *CoG*, “My own propositions are intended to be a challenge to other people to think for themselves—and of course they are a challenge to objective refutation too.” *CoG*, xiv (1995).

240 I have ordered the points of Rauser’s argument differently for succinctness.

241 Rauser, “Theology as a Bull Session,” 84. Rauser continues, “Hence, Moltmann’s dismissal of carefully reasoned analysis as a hubristic power grab could easily become a means to indemnify the academic elite against criticism.” Ibid., 84. But Rauser confuses Moltmann’s rejection of fortress-type theological systems (see the previous subsection, 7.5.1.) with a rejection of “carefully reasoned analysis.” Moltmann does not reject the latter. He only claims that such systems, though internally coherent, isolate themselves from the broader, global and intergenerational theological task.

242 On analytic theology, see the other essays in the same volume. Crisp and Rea, ed. *Analytic Theology*. 
world still reads poetry, the church still needs its hymn writers, and people still dream.\textsuperscript{243} As Oliver Crisp writes, analytic theology is “one way in which a faith seeking understanding approach to theology might be had.”\textsuperscript{244} The implication is that analytic theology is not the only approach. This does not mean that Moltmann’s theology should be immune to criticism by virtue of the different commitments that inform it, but neither does it require that his theology be rejected wholesale on the basis of these commitments.\textsuperscript{245}

There will surely be other criticisms of Moltmann’s methodology that I have not covered here.\textsuperscript{246} Moreover, there is some overlap among those outlined above, and different readers who voice similar criticisms do so with a different degree of fairness or nuance. Some tend towards an unwillingness to hear what Moltmann is saying at all, apparently rejecting his conclusions before having attempted to understand him, while others offer more measured responses, celebrating some of Moltmann’s proposals and questioning others—or at least affirming the intentions behind his work. Despite criticisms, though, I do not think that Moltmann’s methodological commitments prevent constructive readings of his claims. In this last subsection, I turn to

\textsuperscript{243} Add to this the political and practical orientation of Moltmann’s theology. I cannot agree with Michael Rea, who writes the introduction to the volume which Rauser’s work appears in, that Scripture and not theology should lead to the cultivation of wisdom. For Rea, “if philosophy as a discipline (or theology) were to aim its efforts at the production of a self-contained body of wisdom, or at a general theory of right living, it would (I think) be aiming at the production of a rival to scripture…. [T]he right theoretical task for Christian philosophers and theologians to pursue is in fact one that involves clarifying, systematizing, and model-building.” Michael C. Rea, “Introduction,” in \textit{Analytic Theology}, ed. Crisp and Rea, 1-30, at 19-20, emphasis original. But in my opinion this is a false dichotomy. One of theology’s chief tasks is to translate the practical wisdom of Scripture into new contexts.

\textsuperscript{244} Oliver D. Crisp, “On Analytic Theology,” in \textit{Analytic Theology}, ed. Crisp and Rea, 34-54, at 45. On the whole, Crisp’s essay is less defensive than Rea’s, and less offensive than Rauser’s! To their credit, the editors include three essays critical of analytic theology in a final section of the volume. Perhaps these account for the respectively protected and polemical approaches of Rea and Rauser.

\textsuperscript{245} It is not clear that Rauser rejects Moltmann’s theology wholesale. Nonetheless, his assessment is predominantly negative.

\textsuperscript{246} See, e.g., the criticism of “one-sidedness” advanced against \textit{TH} (1964) and \textit{CG} (1972) in particular, briefly summarised by Bauckham in \textit{The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann}, 23-24. For Moltmann’s own responses to this criticism, see \textit{DTH}, 205-9 (1967); and \textit{DGG}, 165-67 (1979).
Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz’s characterisation of Moltmann as a speculative theologian in order to provide a positive point of departure for Moltmann’s future readers.

7.5.3. Moltmann as Speculative Theologian

Towards the end of his book on Moltmann’s theology, Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz characterises Moltmann’s project as a “speculative theology.” Although the term is commonly used in a negative sense, Müller-Fahrenholz means something different. Appealing to the term’s application to figures such as Origen and Thomas Aquinas, Müller-Fahrenholz links speculation to “sensual or historical experience,” which “becomes the ground for the development of more complex connections.” Thus, Müller-Fahrenholz writes a little earlier, “Precisely because Moltmann is aware of the deep mystery which we cannot fathom with our knowledge, he says everything that he thinks as he thinks it, trusting that in the community of seeking and questioning Christians this may be accepted as his voice and his contribution.” In Moltmann’s own words: “Some people have critically remarked that I think I know more about God and his future than human beings can ever know. They counsel me to more silence before the unfathomable, nameless Mystery, and to more negative theology in ‘the missing of God’ (J. B. Metz’s phrase). I am enough of a mystic to understand what they mean. But just because the disclosed mystery of God’s name is unfathomable, one can’t get enough of wanting to know about it. The Spirit searches everything, even the depths of God…” Moltmann does not equate his proposals with knowledge of God but rather characterises them as reflections that arise in the

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247 Müller-Fahrenholz, *Kingdom and Power*, 236. So, too, Meeks, though I think his characterisation of Moltmann’s critics is a bit unfair: “The most frequent charge against Moltmann’s theology has been that it is ‘speculative.’ This criticism comes from those who feel it is impossible to experience God in either the history of Jesus as scripturally narrated or the experiences of the sufferings of these times.” Meeks, “Jürgen Moltmann’s Systematic Contributions,” 96.

248 Müller-Fahrenholz, *Kingdom and Power*, 236. Another connotation of the word in contemporary usage is that of financial speculation. Some may view this as positive connotation. I do not intend such a connotation here, however.

249 Müller-Fahrenholz, *Kingdom and Power*, 218.

250 *ExpTh, xxi* (2000), quoting 1 Cor 2:10, ellipsis original.
act of “wanting to know” God. And this is why he is to be called a speculative theologian, in the best sense of the term. His experiences of the presence of God in hope and suffering, and his imaginative readings of Scripture and tradition yield theological conclusions whose primary goal is to stimulate and inspire further thought and action, even if—or, perhaps, especially because—they lack a disciplined methodology. In my opinion, this central feature of Moltmann’s thought, can be retrospectively located not only in his systematic contributions but in his early programmatic works too—*TH* and *CG*.251

Moltmann still can and should be read critically. His theology can and should be judged against the biblical witness. What I want to suggest here, though, following his own indications, is that the main point of reading Moltmann should not be to accept or reject his proposals. As he himself writes, “What I do wish, however, is for my suggestions to be taken seriously in the theological community—that they should not simply be met with agreement or disagreement, but that they should stimulate theology’s ongoing dialogue.”252 Here Moltmann provides a retrospective key to reading his corpus. Does the theology of hope spur the church on or burden it? Does the crucified God invoke feelings of compassion or disgust? Does the social doctrine of the Trinity inspire loving community or domestication of the divine mystery? How can readers speak to these from their own contexts, and even speak these into their own contexts? How might or might not Moltmann’s work in his own time and place provide a model for future theological thinking? This, I think, is what it means for Moltmann to be a speculative theologian. He is the storyteller or lyricist, the painter or sculptor who uses his imagination to engage not only the head but the heart too, enabling his audience to hear and see Scripture in new ways and inspiring them to new thinking and action. Like C. S. Lewis’s Narnia or Rublev’s icon, Moltmann’s theology is subject to criticism—indeed, more so, due to its textual medium and academic register—but to end there would be to misunderstand his project.

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251 Earlier, I argued that *CPS* (1975) is closer in approach to the systematic contributions than it is to *TH* or *CG*. See 6.2.1.
252 *ExpTh*, xvii.
7.6. Summary

In this chapter I have explored various aspects of Moltmann’s use of Scripture in the latter half of his career. Following Moltmann’s own hint at the beginning of this period that the key to his theology is its biblical foundation, two examples from the eighties are particularly noteworthy. In a first essay, biblical inspiration, a rare topic in his corpus, is treated in light of his recent theology. He rejects approaches to verbal inspiration that implicitly equate Christ with Scripture, and also confuse the person of the Spirit with that of Christ. Moreover, such approaches tend to have little to say about the human character of Scripture and its open nature in view of the future work of the Spirit. Further important reflections on the Bible are offered in the 1985 work, GC. Here, Moltmann makes a plea for reading the creation stories within their wider canonical context, in order to stave off harmful misappropriations of the text, such as using it to justify ecological domination. Moltmann also rejects conservative readings of the creation stories that conflict with the claims of modern science, particularly in the theory of evolution. Rather than inhibit a properly biblical understanding of human origins, science provides a new context within which to hear afresh the concerns of Scripture.

In the third volume of his systematic contributions, WJC (1989), Moltmann advances a number of proposals in creative conversation with the biblical material. Thus, in dialogue with Judaism, Moltmann suggests that the OT be read not simply as a testimony to Jesus but to the messiah—a figure that is not exhausted in the person of Jesus. While this by no means requires that Jesus is dissolved into the general figure of the messiah, it does allow space for affirming the Jewish rejection of Jesus as their messiah, hearing their concerns for a world that has not yet been redeemed. Another aspect of Moltmann’s use of Scripture in this work is his rereading of the Nicene Creed and Apostles Creed in light of the biblical text, focussing especially on the neglect of Jesus’ ministry in each creed. Interestingly, such revision extends to Scripture itself, so that Moltmann rejects the doctrine of the virgin birth as a distraction from the core claims of the gospel. Finally, Moltmann briefly comments on the
need for hermeneutics to look not only to the origin of christological claims in Scripture but their future in engaging the issues of today, such as the nuclear and ecological crises.

Scripture continues to play an important role in the fifth volume of the systematic contributions, *CoG* (1995). Here Moltmann again reveals his distaste for bibliicism, criticising approaches to the text that treat it as a source of detailed knowledge about the future, rather than as a witness to the divine promise. This criticism is further developed in the discussion about universalism. In Moltmann’s opinion, a bibliclist approach fails here because the question of whether all people will eventually be saved cannot be resolved on the basis of biblical texts alone. The question needs to be explored in the context of broader theological commitments—and Moltmann argues that this naturally leads to affirming the reality of universal salvation. In another connection, Bauckham is critical of Moltmann’s exegesis of biblical texts in *CoG*. Moltmann’s response is helpful because it reveals key assumptions underpinning his hermeneutic. His aim is not simply to understand the meaning of the texts but to uncover the concern that informs them and speak it again in the contemporary context.

It is in his *ExpTh* (2000) that Moltmann sets down an extensive hermeneutical programme. Looking back on earlier work, he comments on advances in biblical criticism that he found increasingly alienating, ultimately seeking instead to reflect on the texts in his own way, in accordance with the concern (*Sache*) with which they were written. Moltmann identifies this *Sache* with the history of promise. The role of interpreters is to locate themselves within this history and hear the promises of the Bible for their generation and context—a context which itself forms part of the history of promise. Defining Scripture by a *Sache* quickly leads to identity problems, however, if the *Sache* is confused with the community that is reading the text. The unique history of promise, attested in the biblical text and anchored in the person of Christ, remains the measure of what constitutes Scripture. Nonetheless, this also entails that elements of traditional canons that run contrary to the *Sache* also need to be
read critically in light of it. Such a critical approach can be seen throughout Moltmann’s career, for example, in his treatments of biblical texts that hold patriarchal assumptions about women and womenhood. These texts should not be read literally but rather in light of the liberating history of promise.

Promissory history in Moltmann’s theology effectively overlaps with the notion of trinitarian history. In accordance with this, then, Moltmann develops a trinitarian hermeneutic in another part of ExpTh. Most notably, he points to the work of the Holy Spirit as interpreter for the human reader. The Spirit brings together the life experiences of the reader with the text of Scripture in order to illuminate it through these experiences. These interpretations can be illuminating for other readers as well, and Moltmann points to the new understanding with which he read Scripture after becoming familiar with feminist hermeneutics.

In the final section of this chapter I offered a proposal for reading Moltmann. I identified various methodological commitments, evident particularly in his systematic contributions. These included a self-consciously contextual approach, conducting theology as dialogue, remaining open in light of the future coming of God, and prioritising content over formal methodology. But Moltmann’s readers have also been critical of his methodology and style. Three themes in the criticism stand out, namely charges regarding ambiguity, speculation, and a lack of conclusiveness. While I do not dismiss these criticisms, I encourage readers to read Moltmann as a speculative theologian in the best sense of the term, being inspired by his creative decisions to develop their own theologies in their own contexts.
8. Conclusion

In the preceding chapters I have provided a study of the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology. At the end of each chapter I have summarised the exposition and discussion, and I refer the reader to these larger summaries for Moltmann’s use of the Bible at different stages in his career. I briefly rehearse them here in order to provide an outline of the project.

In CHAPTER ONE I discussed previous studies that attended to various aspects of the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology. Despite many excellent projects undertaken ahead of the present one, I noted the need for an investigation that was general, inductive, and diachronic. I then identified what I have termed Moltmann’s “contrastive paradigm,” his ongoing endeavour to differentiate theological claims derived from Scripture, and those that allegedly run contrary to the biblical witness. In CHAPTER TWO I began my exposition proper with a study of Moltmann’s writings in the late fifties and early sixties. A number of significant themes were identified, including Scripture as a witness to Christ, the shortcomings of the doctrine of verbal inspiration, and the ongoing need to revise tradition in light of the Bible. The most pervasive theme found in this period, however, was that of the eschatological horizon of Scripture, the horizon of Christ’s lordship. Moltmann rejects Barthian, Bultmannian, and historical-critical endeavours to locate the centre of Scripture in anything other than this future.

In CHAPTER THREE I turned to Moltmann’s first major work, Theology of Hope (1964). Here I drew attention to an early application of his contrastive paradigm—the contrast that Moltmann perceives between the eternal present of God in the tradition and Scripture’s witness to the historical being of God. I also identified six individuals whose work had played a decisive role in forming Moltmann’s articulation of the paradigm at this stage in his career. Besides this, I explored other aspects of the role of Scripture in TH, namely Moltmann’s relationship to historical criticism, the character of the Bible as a witness to Christ, the canon in TH, and the continuity between the two Testaments. In CHAPTER FOUR I did two things. First I attended to
the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology during the late sixties. I traced his development of a distinction between two kinds of future, adventus and futurum, which informs the contrastive paradigm of TH, and I discussed his use of the Bible in his political theology at this time. Second, I responded to Ryan Neal’s argument that Moltmann’s second major work, The Crucified God (1972), represents a significant departure from the claims of TH. I saw much more continuity between the two works, which would shape my investigation in the next chapter.

In CHAPTER FIVE I proceeded to CG. I focussed on a second application of Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm—the contrast between the tradition’s concept of a God who does not suffer and the crucified God that Moltmann finds in Scripture. A key finding here was that the bogeyman in TH, Greek influence on the Christian tradition, had now been universalised to encompass all thought that departed from the biblical witness. I also discussed other aspects of the role of Scripture in CG, particularly the relationship between Christ and the OT, and that between Christ and the NT. In CHAPTER SIX I turned to Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity, discussing his third major work, The Church in the Power of the Spirit (1975), and giving particular attention to his fourth major work, The Trinity and the Kingdom (1980). My main concern was with a third application of his contrastive paradigm—the contrast between the “monotheistic” God of the tradition, a term of disparagement in Moltmann’s vocabulary, and the trinitarian God of the Bible. Here I also outlined criticisms of Moltmann’s hermeneutic, preparing the way for my final chapter.

In CHAPTER SEVEN I attended to Moltmann’s use of Scripture in his later work: God in Creation (1985), The Way of Jesus Christ (1989), and The Coming of God (1995). The majority of this chapter, however, was given to Experiences in Theology (2000), where Moltmann develops a detailed theological methodology—and attendant hermeneutic—for the first time. I concluded with a response to criticisms of his methodology, a response that I will revisit shortly.

While I set out in the introduction with the intention of identifying the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology, at this point in the discussion it is perhaps better
to speak of the roles that Scripture has played throughout his career. Certainly, common themes emerge. But, in view of the decades-long programme that is Moltmann’s theology—its ever-new embarkments, stopovers, and anticipated homecomings, its contextual and dialogical, *ad hoc* and speculative character—it is difficult to trace consistent exegetical and hermeneutical commitments, or a consistent theology of Scripture. Each of these evolve as Moltmann engages his subject matter, whether that be the promise, the cross, or the Trinity—to name some of the ones featured in this dissertation. Nonetheless, one thing is at least clear at this point. Scripture plays a central and non-negotiable role in the construction of Moltmann’s theology. He cannot be properly understood apart from this commitment. There are also two themes from the foregoing which I want to highlight here.

Throughout this dissertation I have often commented on the contrastive paradigm Moltmann employs. This is a fundamental element in his theology of Scripture, and it manifests in different ways at different stages in his career. I have drawn attention to three of these in particular. The first is developed at length in *TH*, where Moltmann contrasts the historical and promissory nature of biblical revelation with allegedly Greek-influenced approaches to revelation in traditional and modern theology, approaches which locate God in an eternity separate from history. The second finds its major articulation in *CG*. Again, Moltmann points to an unwelcome Hellenisation of Christian doctrine in the church’s commitment to divine impassibility. This is contrasted with a theology of the cross that Moltmann closely associates with the NT message. Even so, his scope is broadened to encompass the universal—and not simply Greek—trend of human beings towards self-aggrandisation as the negative side of his contrastive paradigm. The final application of this paradigm that I discussed in some detail is presented in *TKG*. Here Moltmann contrasts the biblical witness to the Trinity with the ancient world’s conception of God as absolute substance and modern theology’s conception of God as absolute subject. The latter two are dismissed as modalist, unable to accommodate the three trinitarian subjects of the NT.

The other theme I wanted to highlight is addressed at the end of the preceding chapter (7.5). Drawing on Moltmann’s own reflections, from *ExpTh* in particular, his
final major work, I proposed that his corpus can be read retrospectively as a speculative theology. There are indeed ends that it will serve, as indicated by the various criticisms levelled against it, but this should not be grounds for discounting it as a whole. Rather, as a speculative theology it provides material to stimulate readers to develop theologies appropriate to their own contexts. Nonetheless, Moltmann still can and should be read critically, especially as his proposals are negotiated in new contexts and in dialogue with other thinkers. I bring attention to this basic aspect of Moltmann’s theology in a dissertation on his use of Scripture as I think it also provides a constructive point of departure when considering this aspect of his work. This is largely in response to Richard Bauckham’s comments at various points that Moltmann’s biblical hermeneutic acquires a certain looseness with the systematic contributions. Instead of viewing Moltmann as an exegete—a title he himself rejects—it is more fruitful to read him as a theological interpreter of Scripture, as a storyteller or artist communicating biblical themes with creative means. Again, this does not disqualify criticisms of his use of Scripture but only asks his critics to acknowledge the broader context in which Moltmann’s readings are made.

As I indicated in my introduction, I intended this dissertation to be a general study of the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology. The reason for this was, simply, that no book-length, general study of this theme has yet appeared—previous studies nonetheless helpfully attending to particular aspects of Moltmann’s use of the Bible. But with generality I have also had to refuse certain lines of inquiry. I have not been able to treat specific periods in Moltmann’s career in as much detail as I would have liked, as I wanted to explore the role that Scripture has played throughout his whole career. Perhaps this dissertation will be a useful resource for those undertaking more focussed studies. Relatedly, though I have made minor remarks throughout, I have not offered any extended criticism of Moltmann’s methodology and claims, concentrating instead on exposition. My main reason for doing so was to allow Moltmann to be heard on his own terms, ahead of hasty denouncements.

1 See above, 6.3.1., 6.4.6., and 7.3.3.
that seem to be all too common in the secondary literature. Future studies will be able to devote more critical attention to the finer points of Moltmann’s exegesis, hermeneutics, and theology of Scripture. Before closing, however, there is yet space for some critical comment.

I noted in my previous chapter some critics that charged Moltmann with issuing quite definite judgements on those he disagreed with but then defended against judgements on his own conclusions by invoking the experimental, open-ended character of his theology. Such dissonance is perhaps evident here, too, in my comments on Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm and reading his theology speculatively. Does a speculative theology not entail some kind of level playing field, where the God unaffected by time and suffering, in substance and subject one, is just as valid an option for this kind of mystical reflection on the biblical witness?—Or, perhaps even more valid in light of earlier mystical reflection in the tradition? Moltmann’s speculative theology is not only an enthusiastic yes to lavish visions but a decided no to earlier developments in the tradition—a no informed not simply by the freedom of the spirit to soar to ethereal heights but reason (albeit an impassioned one) that measures other contributions to the conversation against the biblical witness. I do not think that it is unfair to say that there is some degree of incongruity between the mystical and rational poles in Moltmann’s thought. But neither do I want to end this study on a negative note.

There is no one way to approach reading Moltmann’s theology and understanding the role that Scripture plays within it. In this conclusion I have pointed to his use of a contrastive paradigm, proposed reading him as a speculative theologian, and then briefly commented on the potential contradiction of these themes. I think that reading Moltmann as a speculative theologian is a constructive way to understand him, but I do not think that such an approach can be applied to every aspect of his theology, as suggested in the previous paragraph. Acknowledging the limits

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2 See the discussion of Randal Rauser under 7.5.2.
of reading Moltmann in this way, then, I want to consider what his contrastive paradigm might offer future theology. Of course, I am writing quite abstractly, and this paradigm is rightly understood first in its specific articulations. Moreover, Moltmann does not only draw contrasts. He is a theologian of connections, bringing Marxist, Jewish, Orthodox, liberation, feminist, black, and Pentecostal voices, among others, into conversation with his proposals. Where Moltmann does employ his contrastive paradigm, however, readers are confronted with the question: To what extent is this theological commitment compatible with Scripture? Should we cling to divine timelessness and impassibility or revise earlier commitments like these as our context allows us to understand Scripture in new ways, and, conversely, to understand traditional claims within their own contexts? Without following Moltmann in making judgements on these particular issues, I at least want to follow his line of questioning: What does a theology look like that is in accordance with the Scriptures?
Appendix: Scripture Index to Moltmann’s Works in English

Abbreviations

Works by Moltmann

BP  A Broad Place.
CJF  Creating a Just Future.
CoG  The Coming of God.
CPS  Church in the Power of the Spirit.
EB  In the End – The Beginning.
EG  Experiences of God.
EH  The Experiment Hope.
EthH  Ethics of Hope.
ExpTh  Experiences in Theology.
FC  The Future of Creation.
FJC  Following Jesus Christ in the World Today.
GC  God in Creation.
GL  The Gospel of Liberation.
GSS  God for a Secular Society.
HD  On Human Dignity.
HP  Hope and Planning.
HTG  History and the Triune God.
HumB  On Human Being.
JCTW  Jesus Christ for Today’s World.
LG  The Living God and the Fullness of Life.
M  Man.
LaD  Is There Life after Death.
PDDP  The Politics of Discipleship and Discipleship in Politics.
PL  The Passion for Life.
PP  The Power of the Powerless.
RRF  Religion, Revolution and the Future.
SL  The Spirit of Life.
SoL  The Source of Life.
SRA  Sun of Righteousness, Arise!
SW  Science and Wisdom.
TH  Theology of Hope.
TJ  Theology and Joy.
TKG  The Trinity and the Kingdom.
TT  Theology Today.
TP  Theology of Play.
WJC  The Way of Jesus Christ.
### Co-Authored and Edited Works

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>Bryan, ed.</td>
<td><em>Communities of Faith and Radical Discipleship.</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>FF</td>
<td>Metz and Moltmann</td>
<td><em>Faith and the Future.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHH</td>
<td>Moltmann-Wendel and Moltmann</td>
<td><em>God: His &amp; Hers.</em></td>
</tr>
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<td>GWBAA</td>
<td>Bauckham, ed.</td>
<td><em>God Will Be All in All.</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>Runyon, ed.</td>
<td><em>Hope for the Church.</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>HG</td>
<td>Moltmann-Wendel and Moltmann</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSTB</td>
<td>Moltmann and Weissbach</td>
<td><em>Two Studies in the Theology of Bonhoeffer.</em></td>
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The reader will note that I have not italicised abbreviated book titles, as I have elsewhere in the dissertation. This is a deliberate aesthetic choice. The index is easier to follow with all text in roman.

### Introduction

Up until this point, only three of Moltmann’s works in English have been published with a Scripture index, namely TSTB, HTG, and SL.\(^1\) In his 1978 doctoral dissertation, Steven Phillips compiled an index to the English editions of TH, HP, RRF, TP, CG, and CPS.\(^2\) I have developed these indices here, my contribution being not only the inclusion of works previously not indexed but the inclusion of uncited references and allusions to Scripture in Moltmann’s works in English. These uncited references and allusions are indicated with asterisks in the respective entries.

Works included in this index are arranged according to the year of their original publication in English and then alphabetically for works published in the same year: TH (1967), TSTB (1967), RRF (1969), FH (1970), HP (1971), M (1971), TP (1972),

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1. The most recent German editions of TH, CPS, GC, WJC, SL, CoG, and ExpTh also include biblical indices.

Some works have been excluded from this index, namely The Open Church, which is identical in all but title to PL, and the Collected Readings, the corresponding passages for which are easy to track down in Moltmann’s other works. Six obscure works have also been excluded. The only difference between M and HumB other than the title is the new preface in the latter, which has been indexed. Otherwise, the pagination is identical. For the rest of HumB, then, readers should refer to entries under M. Most of the text of TP and TJ is identical, but because the pagination differs

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in each I have indexed both works. This is also the case with sections of FJC, HD, and PDDP. Elsewhere, duplicates of essays or passages appearing in separate works have been included because of pagination and translation differences. In works with contributions by other authors I have only indexed the references and citations to Scripture that appear in Moltmann’s contributions. In co-authored essays I have indexed all references and citations, unless the text is structured so that the distinct contributions of each author can easily be identified.

Where Moltmann provides a single f. following a citation, the full citation is supplied here. Rom 2:1f. becomes Rom 2:1-2. The only exception to this is when the f. follows a chapter number. Rom 2f. thus remains as it is. An ff. also remains as it is, because the extent of the passage that Moltmann is citing is not always clear. Where Moltmann provides a par. following a citation, indicating that there are parallel passages to the one cited, I have only supplied the cited passage. Mark 14:25 par. is indexed under Mark 14:25 and not Matt 26:29 and Luke 22:18 as well. Next, where a lowercase letter follows a citation, drawing attention to a particular part of the verse, I have omitted the letter. 1 Cor 15:3b is indexed under 1 Cor 15:3. This is because the convention is hardly used consistently by Moltmann, so that often no letter is supplied when only part of the verse is under discussion, and my omitting the letter will avoid needlessly lengthening an already lengthy index. Finally, where Moltmann has cited two verses and separated them with a comma, a potentially confusing convention for some English readers that is often unfortunately carried over into the translations, I have indexed these verses as continuous rather than discrete, unless the context suggests otherwise. John 1:3, 4 is thus indexed under John 1:3-4.

I have indexed Moltmann’s citations of the Masoretic Text according to English versification, indicating such citations with a superscript E following the entry. For example, I have supplied CG 146E under Psalm 22:1 where Moltmann cites MT Psalm 22:2. Other versification traditions such as 2 Cor 13:14 for 2 Cor 13:13 have been standardised and are noted in the footnotes. I have also corrected citation errors that I have detected and noted these in the footnotes. Tim 2:13 is indexed under 1
Tim 2:13, for example. I have not checked every one of Moltmann’s citations for accuracy, however. Additionally, I have also indexed citations and references appearing in passages that Moltmann quotes. I have done this to indicate Moltmann’s potential debt to particular authors for the use of certain passages. But biblical citations that form part of the title of a work that Moltmann cites have not been included.

Moltmann often highlights uncited references with inverted commas. For example, he writes in the introduction to TH, “Everywhere in the New Testament the Christian hope is directed towards what is not yet visible; it is consequently a ‘hoping against hope’.”6 I have indexed this as an uncited reference to Rom 4:18. Elsewhere Moltmann will quote biblical texts without either citing them or enclosing them in inverted commas. For example, in his bibliography he writes, “The Son of man who came to seek that which was lost must himself take their lostness on himself.”7 I have indexed this as an uncited reference to Luke 19:10. Moltmann will also refer to passages of Scripture such as the Ten Commandments, the Sermon on the Mount, Deborah’s Song, or a particular parable. I have included references such as these in the index as well. Finally, I have included entries for various strong allusions to biblical texts, such as when Moltmann writes of “the new creation, in which there will be no more sorrow, no more crying and no more tears,” an allusion to Rev 21:4.8

Where possible, I have indexed references appearing in Hebrew, Greek, and Latin phrases and quotations.

Uncited references that appear more than once in the Pentateuch are indexed according to their first appearance in the canon. Uncited references to the Ten Commandments, for example, are indexed under Exod 20:2-17, and not Deut 5:6-21. Uncited references that appear more than once in the Gospels are indexed according to their first appearance in Mark, then Matthew, Luke, and John, unless the context suggests otherwise. Although Moltmann’s preference for a certain Gospel likely changes with the time and purpose of his writing, I am following his early preference.

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6 TH, 18.
7 BP, 195.
8 CG, 173.
for Mark and early reticence towards John. But, depending on the context of the reference, I have not followed this pattern consistently. If Moltmann cites a passage from Luke that can be found in the other synoptics, and then quotes it a few pages later without providing a citation, for example, it will be indexed under Luke. Finally, phrases that appear in both Testaments have been indexed on a case by case basis. For example, the allusion to Rev 21:4 that I quoted above might also be taken as an allusion to Isa 65:19. Because of the prominence of Rev 21 in Moltmann’s theology, however, I have taken this to be an allusion to Rev 21:4. Elsewhere, the context suggests an allusion to Isaiah, as Moltmann is paraphrasing the words of a Rabbi. Moltmann himself sometimes cites different texts in different places for the same biblical quote. With citations such as these, I have provided a cross-reference in the notes. I have not done this with parallel passages in the synoptics though, as the index would soon be flooded with footnotes. Common biblical phrases such as “kingdom of God” or “I will be with you” have not been indexed, unless the context suggests that Moltmann has a particular passage in mind.

Caution should be taken when using this index. The trends visible here may give some insight into Moltmann’s preference for certain texts, but there are a number of limitations. First, I have only indexed English publications. Many of Moltmann’s works, essays, and sermons, etc, are yet to be translated. Second, of that which has been translated I have not indexed all of Moltmann’s essays, such as those that appear in journals and not in collections. Third, as noted above, various indexed works repeat essays and passages from elsewhere in Moltmann’s corpus. In some cases, then, apparent trends will result from an essay or passage appearing in more than one place in English. Fourth, although I have outlined a rough methodology

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10 M, 115.
above for determining references and allusions, this task remains incomplete, especially insofar as it relies on verbal clues alone. I am thinking of Richard Hays’s words to readers of the Gospel of Matthew:

We must reckon with a Matthean hermeneutical program considerably more comprehensive than a collection of a dozen or so prooftexts.... There are at least sixty explicit Old Testament quotations in the Gospel. That means that the formula quotations constitute, even by the most generous estimate, only one-fifth of Matthew’s total. And that does not even begin to reckon with the hundreds of more indirect Old Testament allusions in the story.

Above and beyond the question of citations of particular texts, we must reckon also with Matthew’s use of figuration, his deft narration of ‘shadow stories from the Old Testament.’ Through this narrative device, with or without explicit citation, Matthew encourages the reader to see Jesus as the fulfillment of Old Testament precursors, particularly Moses, David, and Isaiah’s Servant figure. And at a level still deeper than these narrative figurations, Matthew’s language and imagery are from start to finish soaked in Scripture; he constantly presupposes the social and symbolic world rendered by the stories, songs, prophecies, laws, and wisdom teachings of Israel’s sacred texts.11

Matthew’s and Moltmann’s works were of course penned in vastly different contexts. The basic insight remains, however. Insofar as this index provides a picture of Moltmann’s overall use of Scripture, it does so “through a glass, darkly.” Finally, because of the extent of this project I have not checked every entry. I have likely missed some citations and references, and incorrectly indexed others. In light of all of this and the above, I recommend that readers treat this index as a rough guide and, as always, read citations and references in the context of the works in which they appear.

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**Scripture Index**

**Old Testament**

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² Cf. 1 Cor 13:12.

³ Exod 33:2, corrected.
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5 Cf. Psalms 18:19; 31:8.
6 Job 2:16, corrected.
7 Unclear, perhaps Psalm 11:14.
8 Unclear, perhaps Psalm 146:7.
10 Psalm 30:11, corrected.
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18 Matt 5:6, corrected.
Moltmann writes of “the revelation formula in Matt. 11:28f.” TKG, 70. But Matt 11:27-29 or 11:27-28 is likely meant, as Matt 11:27 is the “revelatory saying” on TKG, 73.
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40 2 Cor 6:9, corrected.
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41 2 Cor 13:10, corrected.
42 Cf. Exod 33:11.
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| 15:26-28 | TH 163, 201, 224*, 278*; RRF 61, 207*; FH 5n.6*, 27; HP 26*, 87*, 215; TP 112*; CG 101, 255, 257, 261*, 264, 265, 287n.132, 355*; RPS 29*; EH 30, 66, 166; EG 78; TKG 29*, 82*; 92, 105, 109*, 110, 138* |
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| 15:26-28 | FC 94 |
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| 15:23ff. | FH 24; CoG 151 |
| 15:24 | RRF 34*, 68; CG 264, 287n.133, 329*; CPS 104; 350; JM 55, 77; PP 124; WJC 194, 285; FF 104*, 142; BP 65; SRA 56; EthH 204 |
| 15:26-28 | FC 94 |
| 15:27 | CG 288n.134 |
| 15:28 | TH 163, 201, 224*, 278*; RRF 61, 207*; FH 5n.6*, 27; HP 26*, 87*, 215; TP 112*; CG 101, 255, 257, 261*, 264, 265, 287n.132, 355*; RPS 29*; EH 30, 66, 166; EG 78; TKG 29*, 82*; 92, 105, 109*, 110, 138* |
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43 1 Cor 1:24, corrected.
44 2 Cor 15:28, corrected.
45 It is possible that 1 Cor 15:26 is intended instead: “This is the hope for the annihilation of death itself (1 Cor. 15:28).”
46 1 Cor 15:23, corrected.
47 2 Cor 15:28, corrected.
48 1 Cor 1:28, corrected.
49 1 Cor 1:28, corrected.
15:35ff. TH 215; GC 302
15:3650 GL 135; WJC 248
15:38 WJC 261
15:39-42 WJC 262
15:42 JCTW 84
15:42-44 GC 269; WJC 248; CoG 66; LaD 19; LG 76
15:42ff. TH 224
15:43 CPS 356
15:44 TH 213n.1*; GC 67*
15:45 TH 211*; CG 56*, 252*;
CPS 236, 295, 360*; FC 124*, 162*, 169*; TKG 89, 92*, 122, 197*, 198*; HG 81*, 124*; CPS 101
15:49 CG 266; CPS 101
15:50 GWBAA 83
15:51 HP 167*; CPS 203; CoG 82
15:52 EG 76; WJC 35*, 239, 326; JCTW 127*; CoG 19, 70, 102, 103*, 279, 292, 293; LaD 49, 50*; SW 52, 81, 102; EB 112*, 162; SRA 45, 62, 165, 182, 226n.81
15:53 WJC 262; JCTW 23; CoG 29; SoL 22; LaD 18; PGR 61; GSS 241; GWBAA 83; SRA 51, 63
15:53-54 EB 160; LG 76
15:5452 RRF 16*, 163*; HP 23; CG 217*; FJC 23*, 45*; HD 64*, 84*; SL 112*; CoG 65, 70, 83, 110*, 294*; GWBAA 118*; SW 52; EB 48*;
15:45ff. TH 224
15:54-57 PP 122
15:55 HP 217; CG 170; PP 119;
15:56 WJC 356n.54; GH 67;
15:56 JCTW 67, 145; CoG 196;
15:56 GWBAA 46; ExpTh 26;
15:57 TH 205; FC 108
15:55-57 TP 29; TJ 51; CPS 110; PL 74; GC 90; FF 104; LaD 25
15:57 JCTW 67, 145; CoG 83, 253
15:58 RRF 220*; FH 48; HD 44
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1:14 WJC 322
1:19 TKG 87; HG 80
1:20 TH 147, 228; CG 155n.33; FC 33*; CoG 197; ExpTh 100, 126; BP 102; EthH 38
1:2254 TH 68*, 162*, 211*, 222*, 224*, 326*; HP 22*, 150*; CPS 34, 131*, 191*, 234*, 354*; FC 54*, 90*; TKG 89*, 124, 211*, 217*, GC 96;
1:25 HTG 98*; SL 66*, 69*, 74, 162*; CoG 330*; SoL 11, 34*; ExpTh 100*; EthH 38
1:24 PL 49; LG 94
2:15 CoG 241

50 Cf. John 12:24
51 1 Cor 15:32, corrected.
54 Cf. 2 Cor 5:5; Eph 1:14.
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55 Cf. 2 Cor 1:22. 56 Cf. Rev 21:5.
An earlier version of this text in EG, 49, has 2 Cor 7:10 instead.

Cited as 2 Cor 13:14, an alternative version tradition.
3:28 \textsuperscript{59} TH 142, 329*; RRF 11, 141*; GL 91; CG 52*, 194*; CPS 84, 106, 188, 292, 338, 339*, 342*, 386n.94; FC 79, 124, 159*, 162*; PL 119; HC 33, 38; TKG 215*; HG 63*; HD 16, 21, 32; GC 99, 238; WJC 262, 374n.63; SL 117; FF 144; ExpTh 125, 191, 281, 345n.5; SW 44; EB 14, 137; BP 326*; EthH 76; LG 112

3:28-29 CPS 316; TKG 165; PP 111; HTG 16, 23, 25; FF 127; SoL 97, 101; GWBAA 281

3:29 TH 146; CPS 84*, 188, 386n.94; GC 320; ExpTh 55; EB 77

4:3 HP 106*; CPS 293

4:4 CPS 54; TKG 72; HG 74; WJC 91

4:4-5 CG 191; CoG 267

4:4-6 CPS 53; FC 83, 84

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4:7 GC 320

4:8 PL 77

4:8-10 GC 293

4:10 CPS 271

4:11 HD 43

4:25 CoG 310

4:26 CoG 310

5:1 TP 29; TJ 59; CPS 292; FC 102; EG 34*; TKG 211; HG 61; SL 113, 114; SW 42; LG 107

5:1ff. CPS 271, 278; PL 77

5:5 TH 205; RRF 46; FH 5n.6; FC 166; SL 149

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\textsuperscript{59} Cf. Col 3:11

\textsuperscript{60} Cf. 2 Cor 1:22.
2:12 RRF 136
2:14 GL 100*; CF 29; JM 91; FJC 103; HD 128; PDDP 65, 144; BP 257
2:14-16 CPS 145
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2:15 RRF 5*, 137*; CPS 108*, 279*, 292*
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62 Cf. Gal 3:28

63 1 Thess 3, corrected.
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64 Tim 2:13, corrected.
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70 Rev 1:1-6, corrected.
71 Cf. Isa 25:8; Rev 7:17.
72 Cf. 2 Cor 5:17.
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73 Rev 2:19ff., corrected.
74 Cf. 1 Cor 16:22.
Gospel of the Hebrews

Frag. 2 HTG xiv*; SL 158*
Frag. 3 HTG 64-65*; SL 158*

Gospel of Philip

SL 265*

Gospel of Thomas

77 JCTW 107; SoL 116; GSS 103; SRA 31; EthH 251n.25
101 WJC 84*; GHH 36*; SL 158*

Jubilees

1:17 FC 159
2:19-24 GC 290
19:9 PL 58*; LG 123*

Sibylline Oracles

3:290 FC 159
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