• Corruption and the Public Display of Wealth 

    Fabrizi, Simona; Lippert, Steffen
    We build a principal-agent-client model of corruption, allowing for heterogeneity in the value of public projects relative to the cost of monitoring their execution and for uncertainty of corruptors regarding the value of ...
  • Due diligence, research joint ventures, and incentives to innovate 

    Fabrizi, Simona; Lippert, Steffen
    The decision to cooperate within R&D joint ventures is often based on ‘expert advice.’ Such advice typically originates in a due diligence process, which assesses the R&D joint venture’s profitability, for example, by ...
  • Learning and Collusion in New Markets with Uncertain Entry Costs 

    Bloch, Francis; Fabrizi, Simona; Lippert, Steffen
    This paper analyses an entry timing game with uncertain entry costs. Two firms receive costless signals about the cost of a new project and decide when to invest. We characterize the equilibrium of the investment timing ...
  • Suggested retail prices with downstream competition 

    Fabrizi, Simona; Lippert, Steffen; Puppe, Clemens; Rosenkranz, Stephanie
    We analyze vertical relationships between a manufacturer and competing retailers when consumers have reference-dependent preferences. Consumers adopt the manufacturer’s suggested retail price as their reference price and ...