Abstract
Even before Tertullian coined the phrase "religious liberty" (libertas religionis) in the 2nd century AD, tensions manifested between States and religious pluralities within their borders. Part I of this chapter seeks to explicate, in broad strokes, some of the contours of tension between security, toleration, and religion, by examining conceptual and psychological ways in which they interface with one another and with (mis)trust. In this, it is suggested, lies some explanation for why security often appears to be privileged in situations of conflict with religion. Part II examines how two political-philosophical proposals on religion and the State-those of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau-both illustrate, and ultimately remain caught in, the conceptual and psychological knots outlined in Part I. Specifically, it is argued that both Locke and Rousseau exhibit attenuated or prescriptive views of religious belief, while also positing exemptions from toleration which threaten the overall viability of their proposals. With a view to better understanding the Genevan philosopher's "civil religion" (religion civile), Part III proceeds to explore one of Rousseau's understudied exceptions to toleration of religion: namely, his striking and provocative claim that those who believe their neighbours to be damned by God must be expelled from the State.