Abstract
According to the “standard interpretation” of WRPL (favored by Wright, Boghossian, McGinn, and Goldfarb), the epistemological argumentation and metaphysical conclusion of the skeptic’s ruminations in Chapter 2 can be reconciled by viewing the overtly epistemological argumentation as merely a “dramatic device” for developing a fundamentally metaphysical argument. The epistemological challenge – to defend your claim that you know that you mean addition and your claim that you are justified in answering “5” – takes place under conditions in which you are granted ideal epistemological access to all of the sorts of facts capable of constituting your meaning addition by “+.” In this chapter, I will defend the standard interpretation against a recent attack launched by Hannah Ginsborg, and I’ll argue that the standard interpretation fits the text of Chapter 2 of WRPL more smoothly than Ginsborg’s alternative proposal. I’ll also make some comments on Ginsborg’s notion of “primitive normativity.”