Abstract
Integrating information and communication technologies (ICT) in the power grid underpins sustainable development in the power industry by introducing the "smart grid". ICT capabilities have a great impact especially on low-voltage distribution networks, by optimally matching supply and demand. Load curtailment is a key demand-side energy management activity that is deployed in case of system contingencies or on economic grounds, where consumers are compensated when they partially or fully curtail their demand.
Despite the big potential of load curtailment programs targeting small-scale electricity consumers at the aggregate level, little effort has been put into investigating the different aspects of such programs (i.e. compensation, performance measurement, etc.). In this paper, we propose an approach to consumer compensation for load curtailment, viewed as a weighted voting game. We leverage the Shapley value, a solution concept from cooperative game theory, to fairly compensate a group of residential consumers who collectively reduce demand during a load curtailment event, and investigate the scalability and accuracy of our approach using three algorithms for computing the exact or approximate Shapley value. Our work, thus, provides curtailment service providers with options for rewarding consumer coalitions of different sizes.