Abstract
People’s memories for traumatic events have important implications for both the criminal justice system and for clinical psychology. It is understandable, then, that researchers have attempted to understand what we can reasonably expect people to remember about their traumatic experiences. One important aspect of this work has been how coherent memories for traumatic events are, relative to memories for other events. Although there is more evidence to suggest that traumatic memories are just as coherent as (if not more coherent than) memories for other emotional events, there is nonetheless a pervasive view—and a small amount of supporting evidence—that traumatic memories are less coherent than other memories. In this thesis, we sought to better understand this discrepancy.
First, across two experiments, we investigated the extent to which people’s perceptions of the structure of their own memory were based on the objective coherence of a memory. We found mixed results—across our different measures, traumatic memories were more, less, and just as coherent as other memories. Furthermore, perceptions of memory structure were not wholly based on the objective coherence of a memory, if at all. Consequently, we sought to understand the factors that contribute to perceptions of memory structure. We put forward two factors that we believed might contribute to these perceptions—(1) the beliefs a person holds about how memories for certain types of events should be structured, and (2) the fluency of the retrieval experience.
In subsequent studies, we established that beliefs and expectations about the structure of memories differ depending on the type of event being recalled. More specifically, participants were more concerned about gaps in their traumatic memories than they were about gaps in their non-traumatic memories, and believed that it was particularly important to have—and particularly problematic to not have—complete and coherent memories for traumatic events.
We also established that the fluency of the retrieval experience can influence perceptions of memory structure. Participants rated traumatic memories as requiring more effort to recall in detail than non-traumatic memories, and these ratings helped to explain differences in perceptions of memory structure. When we experimentally manipulated retrieval fluency using the ease-of-retrieval paradigm, we found that the experience of recalling details from an event had a greater influence on perceptions of memory structure than did the information being recalled and the type of event being recalled.
Taken together, this research indicates that understanding the coherence of traumatic memories is not as simple as just asking people about their memory or analysing a written account of an event. Instead, we need to consider (1) the beliefs a person holds and how these inform their expectations about their memory, and (2) the fluency of the retrieval experience. We conclude this thesis by considering the implications that this research has for both the criminal justice system and for clinical psychology.