Abstract
This dissertation attempts to understand and bridge the gap between Reason and Intuition within Spinoza’s philosophy. For Spinoza, Reason is the adequate knowledge of common properties of things, focusing solely on their commonality. Intuition is the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. Focusing on the essence, it pertains the particularity of things. To put this gap simply, it arises when we try to move from knowledge of what is common to knowledge of what is particular.
The dissertation begins with an account of what I take to be the metaphysical principle of human knowledge for Spinoza: the human mind perceives A, if and only if God has an idea of A insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind. Then, I discuss the psychophysiological account of human knowledge, showing its conditions and limitations, not with respect to God, but to other modes.
Having built these interpretive resources, I begin to examine Reason and Intuition. I argue that common notions, on Spinoza’s account, are not universal notions, abstractions, or beings of reason. Thus, any attempt to bridge the gap through these ideas is infeasible. Then, I argue that there are different levels of common notions: universal common notions and proper common notions.
Moving to Intuition, I explore the meanings of what it is that we are supposed to know in intuitive knowledge, with a focus on ‘singular things’ and ‘essence’. I argue that the nature of bodies is essential to Intuition and that both the simplest and composite bodies, i.e., individuals, are singular things. While discussing ‘essence’, I examine two pairs of concepts: first, formal and actual essence, and then individual and species essence. I argue that the formal essences of things are eternal, in contrast to the durational actual essence. I argue that an individual essence can sometimes be seen as a species essence. Then, I attempt to prove that species essence can also be seen as the formal essences.
From these accounts of Reason and Intuition, I then move on to a discussion of how human minds might bridge the gap between them. I propose that it is best to take two perspectives on this task. From a purely epistemological perspective the human mind can, from ideas of Reason, attain an adequate understanding of the essences of some few, but not all, things, a result that might seem to be disappointing. From a perspective that emphasizes the ethical value of knowledge, however, we can assess the value of what we can come to know from Intuition and understand that this knowledge, however slight, makes blessedness and freedom possible. This knowledge is sufficient, then, for Spinoza’s principal purpose in the Ethics.