Abstract
This thesis is a collection of four related but self-standing chapters about memory and testimony. In Chapter 1, I argue that memory and testimony are analogous because both are reconstructive, incorporating information from sources in relevantly similar ways. In Chapter 2, I begin with the standard taxonomy of memory, according to which memory-how (procedural memory) is distinct from memory-that (episodic or semantic memory). From there, I develop an account of testimony-how by arguing that testimony need not be propositional. In Chapter 3, I turn to the curious case of the Mandela Effect and argue that it is an instance of collective confabulation, in which large groups of people develop highly similar apparent memories of events that never occurred. For at least some of these cases, I claim, testimony is an integral ingredient in the production of collective confabulations. In Chapter 4, I proceed from the analogy between testimony and memory and argue that testimonial injustice has a memorial analogue, which I call memorial injustice. I consider internalised false confessions to be an example of memorial injustice, and I identify failures of metacognition as being a key component the precipitation thereof. Ultimately, the work in this thesis leads me to the conclusion that while social epistemologists have focussed on the social factors influencing the epistemology of testimony, the ways that social phenomena influence memory and remembering are too great to ignore. I do not offer a positive account of how social epistemology ought to treat memory, but I hope that thinking about the relationship and similarities between memory and testimony offers a new perspective from which to view both.