Abstract
This thesis began by looking at the history of campaigns to ban weapons, examining successful and unsuccessful campaigns. It then focused on the campaign to ban Depleted Uranium weapons, examining the risk communication, framing, and narrative strategies. The thesis looked at the scientific debate, the history of the international campaign, and the public image of Depleted Uranium. From there, it endeavored to look in depth at three case studies: Aotearoa/New Zealand, where the campaign to ban Depleted Uranium was not successful, and Belgium and Costa Rica, where the campaigns to ban Depleted Uranium were successful.
This thesis ultimately came to two main conclusions. First, that the success of a campaign to ban Depleted Uranium weapons is based largely on how credible the campaigners appear, especially the scientists they get to speak on their behalf. Along with good scientists, having the support of veterans is also an important factor in maintaining credibility. Second, the dedication and political strategies of the campaign’s ally in parliament is just as significant as anything the campaign does itself. If the member of parliament they side with is waning in their dedication to the issue, then grassroots pressure needs to be reapplied. The findings of this thesis are just as important to other weapons-banning campaigns, especially other toxic weapons, as they are to Depleted Uranium weapons. Although this thesis was primarily written to examine activist strategies, the findings also bolster the constructivist view of international relations, especially the idea of how a critical mass of people can change a generally accepted way of doing international relations, and the idea of a sliding scale of success for banning weapons.