Abstract
Chinese state-owned enterprises were the dominant force in China's national economy. Since the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee, the government has actively promoted the mixed ownership, and "mixed ownership”. As of 2019, more than two-thirds of state-owned enterprises have transferred to mix of state-owned and non-state-owned capital at the level of property rights. However, it is not clear how the introduction of mix-ownership affects performance and what are the new driving-forces of performance in these mix-ownership firms.
Drawing on the principal-agent theory, the thesis attempts to examine the environment of mixed-ownership state-owned enterprises. Specifically, I examine how shareholders’ type and shareholding ratios of non-state-owned to state-owned influence firm performance. I use a sample of the listed state-owned mixed-owned companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2013 to 2019. The results show that in mixed-ownership enterprises, shareholder identity and shareholding ratios are postitive associated with company’s financial performance. Specifically, I distinguish shareholder identity between individual, private legal, foreign-funded legal and state-owned shareholder. The results demonstrate that state-owned shareholders negatively affect the firm’s financial performance while other non-state-owned shareholders are positively associated the firm’s financial performance. Furthermore, I conducted a case study with China Unicom. The results of case analysis also support the assertion that in a mixed-ownership enterprise, non-state-owned shareholders has a positive effect on financial performance. This research generates both theoretical and managerial implicaitons.