Abstract
This thesis reviews the political work of Sir Robert Filmer in terms of its coherence and justificatory framework. Here, I also examine Locke’s response to Filmer, in Locke’s Two Treatises of Government. I propose to revise the arguments of Filmer and Locke, in their relation to each other.
Filmer’s system, on my proposal, is coherent in its justification of political power. I observe in Filmer’s system a justification of political power isolated within the political. A moral and a legal justification is supplementary to the political.
The objective of this thesis, accordingly, is to establish a political justification of political power. This project is limited to Filmer’s system. I propose to extract from Filmer’s system a justification of the state limited to political reasons. This, I contend, is the strength of Filmer’s system.
Further, I offer a revision of Filmer’s political doctrine, in particular the critical part of his work. Within Filmer’s critique of consent theory, a positive notion of freedom and consent may, I observe, be developed. The strength of Filmer’s system also lies in a positive notion of natural freedom. This I conceive in terms of a revisionist account of Filmer’s system, on the substance of his argument.
In my approach to Locke, I limit the project to his Two Treatises of Government, where Locke is engaged in his attack on Filmer.
I discuss the limits of a political voluntarist interpretation of Locke’s political doctrine. Locke’s account of the original contract, I find, does not establish individual consent as a grounding of political legitimacy. A political naturalist interpretation, I contend, is available for Locke’s doctrine, serving it better in its justification of political power.
Now, as I observe, Locke, in his critique of Filmer, commits to a Filmerian paradigm. In his First Treatise, Locke engages Filmer’s scriptural arguments. But Locke, also, relies on scripture in his own political philosophy. As I argue, Locke not only relies on scripture but constructs his contract theory within a Filmerian paradigm. This, I find, explains Locke’s allowances for political absolutism, in his Second Treatise, as well as non-intentional (tacit) consent.
Further, Locke’s anthropological patriarchalism coheres with his contract theory, on a political naturalist interpretation, whereas a voluntarist interpretation does not fully incorporate this part of Locke’s doctrine. On the former, Locke constructs an evolutionary framework for Filmer’s patriarchal theory, in terms of which an historical view of the original contract may be illuminated.