Abstract
This thesis concerns well-being in nature. In particular, it investigates dynamics and scope of prudential value in natural ecosystems, focusing on the lived circumstances of free-living wild animals. The scientific study of well-being is pre-paradigmatic: outside of contexts involving humans, we know very little about its natural distribution, which entities have it, or what factors influence its development over time. Because we lack sufficient methods to study well-being at scale, this thesis’ investigations are exploratory; rather than defending a specific premise about the nature of well-being, I argue for a theory-agnostic approach highlighting sentience as a precondition for well-being subjecthood. In doing so, the thesis synthesises existing empirical and theoretical research from a wide range of fields, including evolutionary biology, animal welfare science, the philosophy of well-being, and consciousness science.
Chapter One opens by introducing the central problem, background, and motivation of this thesis: what is the state of well-being in the world? In Chapter Two I describe common circumstances present in natural ecosystems (e.g., resource scarcity) and the evolutionary strategies wild animals have evolved in response to them. Chapter Three then considers how these circumstances interface with common accounts of animal welfare and well-being, in addition to the possible harms caused to animals by dying prematurely. I ultimately argue that the idyllic view of nature – according to which the well-being of wild animals is generally positive – is theoretically and empirically unsubstantiated.
To clarify the scope of well-being in the world, Chapter Four considers how to determine which entities are well-being subjects according to the conditions posited by different accounts of prudential value. I argue for a sentience requirement on well-being subjecthood, which I expand upon in Chapter Five where I consider which classes of entities are, or could be, sentient in response to common views about consciousness. Given two plausible ontological assumptions underpinning my definition of sentience – consciousness realism, and binding realism – I argue that only organisms are sentient, excluding entities such as computer programs and populations. Chapter Six then addresses the epistemological problem of identifying sentience across the phylogenetic tree of life. I argue that conscious states (e.g., pain) can be inferred on the basis of empirical evidence plus assumptions about their causal significance, on which basis I argue that only animals are sentient – most vertebrates, and some invertebrates. Chapter Seven concludes by summarising my investigations throughout this thesis and speculating upon the long-term future of well-being.