Abstract
A.J. Ayer (1910–1989) was famous above all as the author of
Language, Truth and Logi
c (1936), the English manifesto of Logical Positivism, in which he deploys the Verification Principle to eliminate metaphysical utterances as inherently meaningless and to dismiss moral claims as lacking in truth‐value and hence objectivity. Theological propositions are among the chief casualties since they are denounced as mere nonsense without even the consolation prize of containing some residual, noncognitive content. Ayer's argument can be formulated as follows: (i) factually meaningful (true‐or‐false) propositions are either analytic and true, self‐contradictory and false, or synthetic and verifiable; (ii) theological “propositions” such as “God exists,” if they are propositions at all, are synthetic; (iii) but theological “propositions” are not verifiable; Therefore, (iv) theological “propositions” such as “God exists” are not factually meaningful. This has an odd consequence. Since “God exists” is not factually meaningful, “God does not exist” is not factually meaningful either and the utterances of the atheist are as meaningless as the utterances of the theist. Is it plausible to suppose that theological propositions (or atheistic propositions) are totally devoid of meaning? And can Ayer's argument be faulted? The answers are “No” and “Yes.”'