Abstract
This thesis will argue that the requirement of fresh consideration for contractual variations should be strictly enforced.
I will contend that the doctrine of consideration is normatively justified by the principle. This will be supported by reference to the requirements of consideration, the form that consideration takes (mutual exchange of benefits), relevant judicial dicta, and bargain theory.
Proceeding to the requirement of fresh consideration for variations, I will argue that the requirement should be retained because it performs important substantive functions, acts as a useful filter on the enforceability of promises, ensures coherency with bargain theory, and offers significant practical advantages when compared to alternative doctrines.
To ensure that this requirement is not undermined, I will argue that the pre-existing duty rule should be retained. Additionally, I will argue that the practical benefit rule should be abolished, as practical benefits provide illusory consideration, and thus undermine the requirement of fresh consideration for variations, and the doctrine of consideration as a whole.