Abstract
I defend the Buddhist position, argued for by Albahari and Garfield among others, that our basic experience of selves is non-veridical. I will do so by engaging with Zahavi and Thompson, who present modern objections which elicit insightful points of discussion. Unlike historical interlocutors who expounded a bold self-substance such as an atman or soul to claim the veracity of our ordinary experience of selves, a modern manoeuvre is to dispute what our ordinary experience of the self is like, to claim its veracity. Both are (contrary) attempts to deny or lessen any discrepancy between experience and reality. I believe that an engagement with a modern discourse presents an opportunity to advance or test the Buddhist position in areas traditionally unexplored.
This thesis argues for 1) the experiential claim that humans predominantly and instinctively experience the self as a simple entity, and 2) the ontological claim that there is no such entity. Thus, I argue for a no-self or error theory.[1] At the centre of my argument will be an attempt at close observations of our phenomenology and concept of the self – of oneself and others. If my argument is successful, it will reveal and cement as a fact of our psychology that what we take to be the self is, under analysis, surprisingly fantastical. I attempt to clarify our misapprehension of the self, bringing into relief its non-veridical features.
By claiming that the ordinarily experienced self does not exist, I am not arguing for eliminativism, i.e. abandoning all talk and thought of subjects. Eliminativism for most if not all error theorists is unjustified and too costly. Unfortunately I do not have the space to discuss the positive program of how we might avoid eliminativism, which has been discussed extensively in the literature. This thesis will be a negative program of showing that our experience of the self is of a simple entity, and this is in error.
[1] The term ‘no-self’ is vulnerable to misinterpretation and can be a misnomer. Although the no-self view could be interpreted as rejecting all forms of a self, it is debatable if this is what a Buddhist position amounts to. It is at least not what Buddhist thinkers intend. Therefore, I prefer ‘error theory’.