Abstract
When one thinks of feminist jurisprudence, one may not think of contract law as an area ripe for critique. Although there are contracts that directly involve women's interests, such as surrogacy or relationship property contracts, most contracts, even if they involve women, do not involve women’s interests. The law assumes women and men contract in the same way and for the same purposes. This dissertation will ask: is a feminist law of contract possible? How does it compare to the current state of the law?
This dissertation will explore these questions by asking whether the trends in the law of contract interpretation principles for written terms are consistent with a feminist approach. This dissertation poses a critique within contract law, with the aim of reforming it, as compared to a critique aimed at abolishing contract law. It will argue the overall shifts in the law are consistent with a feminist approach. However, because the shifts were not motivated by feminism, there are incongruencies between the present state of the law and a feminist approach. These incongruencies are particularly seen in the operation of the reasonable man interpreting contracts.