Abstract
Religious beliefs are often singled out for special treatment in secular liberal societies. Yet if a legal exemption is granted for a belief with a religious foundation, the question arises whether a similar, but non-religious belief must also be granted an exemption. This thesis examines the comparative status of religious and non-religious exemption claims. The aim is to determine whether or not the present tendency to favour the petitions of religious claimants over their secular counterparts is morally justifiable. Three distinct sets of arguments which are commonly used to validate the practice of awarding religious exemptions are analysed. The first chapter focuses upon psychological harm approaches, which concern the role of religious beliefs in the lives of their holders. The second chapter examines the substantive content of religious beliefs. Finally, the third chapter considers the place of these beliefs within secular liberal democracies. Each set of arguments gives rise to a strong justification for awarding religious exemptions. However, the arguments each fail to provide a convincing moral case for drawing a distinction favouring religious beliefs over analogous non-religious beliefs. This thesis contends that belief-based exemptions ought therefore to be awarded equally to all claimants who meet the moral criteria for special treatment. This conclusion applies regardless of whether the relevant belief is founded in religion or not.