Abstract
Derek Parfit maintains in Reasons and Persons that personal identity consists in two things. Person A and person B are the same person only if:
1. A and B are psychologically very similar [R&P 216], that is, in their psychological states, including memory and desire, and also personality traits and tastes.
And:
2. A and B are connected by the “right kind of cause" [R&P 216]; that is, they have the same body over time.
Parfit also maintains, however, that personal identity does not matter, in the sense that what I care about when I have special concern for my future states does not depend on identity. Person B, really matters to Person A, in Parfit's view, only if:
1. A and B are psychologically very similar.
And:
2. A and B are connected by "any cause" [R&P 217]; that is, I may still care about a person who does not have the same body as me so long as we are very similar and connected in some other fashion. For example, a teleportation machine that destroys my body while reproducing the relevant psychological traits in another body is a cause that connects me to the other person in such a way that I will have special concern for that person.
I argue here that Parfit's second causal criterion is neither necessary nor sufficient for justifying special concern. I accept the first criterion as a necessary condition and introduce and defend a different second criterion that emphasises social connectedness. I maintain that A has justified special concern for B only if 1 obtains and:
2. Relevant social connections recognise A and B as the same person, and that person is in some way at least potentially accessible to them.
In defending this view, I present various accounts of personal identity and of what matters (Part 1 and 2), and I argue that Parfit's causal criterion for special concern fails (Chapter 3). Then, I present my account of social connectedness (Chapter 6) and defend its importance for justified special concern (Chapter 7). Finally, I give some examples that show how it works in various scenarios. (Part 3)