Leibniz and the Problem of Change

This text is a discussion of Leibniz’s position on change. Its chapters concern his views about three solutions to the problem of change: a Parmenidean solution of denying real change, an Aristotelian solution involving a distinction between essence and accidents, and super-essentialism. The aim of the first chapter, is to show that Leibniz did not deny change in phenomena or the underlying reality. The second chapter aims to show the difficulties that Leibniz would face, if he tried to explain change via accidents while remaining committed to his other metaphysical views, for example, the principle of identity of indiscernibles. The question in chapter three is whether super-essentialism, as a widely accepted interpretation of Leibniz’s complete concept theory, could consistently coexist with the other main idea of Leibniz that monads survive change and have trans-temporal identity. It seems that super-essentialism faces too many problems to be consistently united with the monad’s trans-temporal identity. It seems, then, that none of the three positions succeeds in adequately describing Leibniz’s view on how monads change. At the end of chapter three an alternative position is suggested, which is a modified version of super-essentialism.