Abstract
This thesis is about the moral responsibility of individuals with psychopathy (i.e., psychopaths). Psychopathy is a personality disorder characterised by a range of antisocial personality traits and behaviours, evidenced by their consistent pattern of disregard for social, legal, and moral norms. Yet, despite their moral depravity, psychopaths can pretend as if they understand and care about the moral obligations we have to others, leading them to appear trustworthy, well-adjusted, and even morally conscientious. The conflict between their purported moral competence and actual moral depravity raises questions about the psychopath’s ability to distinguish right from wrong and translate this morally significant knowledge into action; and additionally, the extent to which psychopaths are deemed morally responsible for their immorality. In this thesis, I argue for a theory of moral responsibility influenced by the works of Gary Watson and Peter Strawson, one consistent with the role and importance of self-control and morally relevant knowledge to our social practice of assigning praise and blame. Empirical evidence on the incapacities associated with psychopathy has shown that moral reasoning and choice are relatively normal whilst moral action remains remarkably dysfunctional, suggesting an ability to recognise morally relevant considerations, form morally relevant knowledge, and yet fail to translate such knowledge into action. I take this to reflect a conative insensitivity to the normative force of moral persuasion. In response to a question around which this thesis is organised—that is, “Are psychopaths morally responsible for their immorality?”—I argue that psychopaths are inappropriate targets for moral blame in light of their conative insensitivity to the reason-giving nature of moral considerations, specifically the impact of their actions on welfare of another person. They are, however, morally responsible in a weaker sense; the morally wrong-making features of their behaviour that violate a normative standard can be attributed to their character qua practical agency, an observation from which others are entitled to organise their lives around; for instance, avoiding psychopaths if at all possible. The relevant upshot of this thesis is that psychopaths are non-moral agents on account of a conative insensitivity, not a supposed ‘moral blindness’, a position that validates the expression of certain non-moral attitudes or judgements (e.g., hate, disgust, or fear) as responses to their antisociality whilst invalidating others (e.g., resentment); given the assumptions involved with moral blame and the moral capacities of its target, psychopaths are not morally accountable.