Abstract
The argument at the centre of this dissertation is that dominant discourses inform the practice of workplace drug testing. These discourses produce drug-testing knowledge in specific ways that impose restraints on the way in which this topic is constructed. Assumptions that render managerial prerogative, scientific rationality and the disciplining effects of the body unproblematic inform particular dominant truths about drug testing. Advocates of workplace drug testing primarily argue on the grounds of increasing productivity and ensuring a working environment free from health and safety risks. Among these advocates is the New Zealand Employers Federation who published a drug-testing guide for employers, stipulating the legal responsibilities New Zealand employers have under the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992. It is this guide that forms the analytical focus of this dissertation. The practice of workplace drug testing does have opponents however who argue that it is an infringement of employees' right to privacy. Within New Zealand legislation such as the Privacy Act 1993 and the Human Rights Act 1993 are commonly cited both by advocates and opponents of workplace drug testing; advocates claim that if drug-testing programmes are introduced and administered according to clear guidelines these Acts need not be contravened; opponents argue that drug-testing programmes, sophisticated as they might be, cannot ensure a healthy and safe working environment and by the very nature of drug testing, i.e. urinalysis, it is an unnecessary intrusion into the private lives of employees.
Although these arguments are compelling in terms of the legal obligations of employers, they fail to critically analyse the assumptions that provide the foundation to the framing of drug-testing discourse. Cavanaugh & Prasad offer a critical perspective on workplace drug testing, arguing that it is a symbolic form of managerial control. Their argument is, however, simplistic and does not address the types of control that drug testing imposes, nor does it offer a convincing argument of the historical precedents that implicitly allow organisations to introduce drug-testing programmes. By employing a Foucauldian perspective, critical analysis illustrates the way in which language structures the discourse of workplace drug testing within a historical context.