Abstract
Galen Strawson poses a dilemma for those who give narrative a central role in
shaping our experience. Either an account of narrativity requires narrative
self-experience, or it does not. If our account requires narrative self-experience,
it also requires diachronic self-experience. However, Strawson argues that
some people do not have diachronic self-experience as a matter of empirical
fact. Taking this horn leads to an account of narrativity that is empirically
false. If our account avoids narrative self-experience, Strawson argues, there
is nothing left for the notion of narrativity to refer to. Thus, taking the second
horn leads to a trivial account of narrativity. In this thesis, by drawing on
conceptual resources found in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Charles
Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, I suggest an account of narrativity that avoids
both horns of this dilemma. The basis for this account is Merleau-Ponty’s
notion of pre-reflective experience. I argue that locating narrativity at the level
of our pre-reflective experience gives us a substantive account of narrative that
avoids the empirical problems of narrative self-experience.