Abstract
Michael Smith’s ‘The Moral Problem’ (1996) outlines what he takes to be the ‘central organising problem in contemporary meta-ethics’. This is a tension that revolves around a triad of plausible propositions. These propositions represent cognitivism, judgement internalism, and the Humean theory of motivation. The rejection of any one of the propositions resolves the tension and represents a different meta-ethical position. These positions are non-cognitivism, externalism, and anti-Humeanism respectively. In this thesis, I argue that we should expand this triad of propositions to a quintet, so that we can include the moral error theory within Smith’s moral problem. I also argue that we should use knowledge internalism instead of judgement internalism as one of our equally plausible propositions. I argue that knowledge internalism is preferable to judgement internalism as an independent thesis. I attempt to show that knowledge internalism fairs better against the amoralist objection, that Smith’s moral fetishism argument results in an undesirable conclusion unless we adapt it to establish knowledge internalism, and that judgement internalism is potentially an empty thesis. I also argue that knowledge internalism fits better within Smith’s rationalist conceptual framework about the nature of moral facts. I question Smith’s claim that judgement internalism is a logical consequence of rationalism. I also argue that Smith’s argument for rationalism begs the question. Knowledge internalism is able to overcome these objections.