Abstract
The mistake of fact ground of review has had a tumultuous history in New Zealand administrative law. From its initial championing in 1980 by Cooke J in Daganayasi, there has been much debate regarding what is – and what should be – the ground’s scope, parameters and purpose, extending to whether a mistake of fact should constitute a reviewable error at all. The ground’s contested nature has manifested in clashes between legal commentators and inconsistent and uncertain application at all levels of the judicial hierarchy.
Such inconsistency and uncertainty creates an opportunity for the appellate courts to develop a robust mistake of fact doctrine that holds decision-makers to a high standard of factual integrity and avoids the manifest injustices that come with erroneous fact-finding. However, the ground must also not encroach on the decision-maker’s sphere of autonomy, constitute a merits-review or unduly compromise the principle of finality.