Abstract
In late 2022, Aotearoa New Zealand passed legislation to introduce three commercial ‘tobacco endgame’ policies designed to reduce smoking prevalence rapidly and equitably; however, a newly elected coalition government repealed these measures in early 2024. Although Aotearoa is a Party to the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, tobacco companies could participate in policy consultation processes and lobbied strongly against the endgame policies. Using an Official Information Act request, we obtained submissions made during the final consultation phase (on regulations that would have implemented the policies). We focused on 13 submissions made by tobacco companies, groups or individuals understood to have received industry funding (directly or indirectly), and groups that have roles within the nicotine product supply chain. We analysed arguments opposing the retail outlet reduction measure, which aimed to make smoked tobacco products substantially less accessible. Using the Policy Dystopia Model as a framework, we identified arguments that mapped to the PDM’s economic, legal and political domains. Submitters stated the policy would impose serious costs, particularly on retailers; they anticipated illicit tobacco trade escalating, a consequence they predicted would harm communities and reduce public safety. We identified two over-arching themes: unfairness and promoting self-interest. Tobacco companies’ ability to participate in consultation processes questions whether Aotearoa’s implementation of Article 5.3 of the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control adequately protects public health policy-making from tobacco companies’ influence. Stronger regulation of lobbying should set greater transparency requirements, monitor and critique industry activity, and implement a robust code of conduct.