Abstract
This note is about the relationship between mind and metaphysics, examined through the lens of a recent paradox due to Williamson (2002). An apparent consequence of two popular doctrines - the Russellian account of structured propositions and the modal logic S5 - is that everything, of necessity, exists. If this paradoxical conclusion is at all acceptable, then there must be some notion of existence that makes it so. Call this minimal form of existence, the bare logical notion, there exists xistence. We show that, if applied to the original arguments for the paradox, there exists xistence is too weak to make the argument valid to begin with. Reading the argument in terms of there exists xistence highlights the limitations of both the ontological import of propositions and how quantifiers are interpreted in first-order modal logics. The there exists xistential status of propositions is identified as a distinctive marker of the boundary between mind and metaphysics.