Abstract
In New Zealand ownership of interests in land is established by registration. Section 81 of the Land Transfer Act 1952 conferred upon the Registrar a power to correct the register. The extent of this power seemed inconsistent with the orthodox understanding of the doctrine of indefeasibility, which suggests that entry upon the register is conclusive. This article critically re-examines the leading cases establishing this doctrine of indefeasibility: Gibbs v Messer [1891] AC 248 (PC), Assets Co v Mere Roihi [1905] AC 176 (PC), Boyd v Mayor of Wellington [1924] NZLR 1174, and Frazer v Walker [1967] NZLR 1069 (PC) and suggests that they advance a more sophisticated view of indefeasibility than is currently attributed to them, and which is consistent with the s81 power of correction.