Abstract
This study contributes to the ongoing debate on corporate social responsibility (CSR) by exploring how mandatory standards-based climate-related financial reporting impacts organisational activities through the lens of Institutional Theory. In this study, ESG reporting is examined as a regulatory instrument through which CSR commitments are increasingly formalised. Over the last two decades, environmental, social, and governance (ESG) reporting has shifted toward standardised, mandatory practices (Pitrakkos & Maroun, 2020). This trend strengthened during the 2010s with increasing global harmonisation towards standardising reporting practices through IFRS S1 and S2 by the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) (Busch et al., 2022; Krueger et al., 2020). Notably, New Zealand’s new 2023 climate reporting law is now officially the world’s first standardised mandatory jurisdiction for ESG reporting. The process of implementing standardised, mandatory CSR reporting in this small market is still in its early stages. This context offers new insights into the essential information needed for effective implementation.
The design used is mixed-methods, combining an event study of stock market reactions (quantitative) with interviews with reporting entities and institutional investors (qualitative). Quantitative findings show no statistically significant market reaction following mandatory reporting. In contrast, qualitative findings reveal differing levels of organisational engagement, from symbolic compliance to substantive shifts in governance and risk management practices.
Anchored in Institutional Theory and supported by Stakeholder Theory, these findings show that regulatory pressure is not yet producing investor reaction but is driving substantial organisational change. Companies are starting to reorganise governance, allocate resources, and incorporate climate-related risks, not just to satisfy compliance standards, but to enhance internal resilience, build legitimacy, and respond to evolving stakeholder expectations.
This gap reflects how firms respond to pressure to “do the right thing” even in the absence of immediate capital-market feedback. It suggests that long-term transformation is quietly underway, shaped more by internal adaptation to institutional and stakeholder dynamics than by near-term investor signals.