Abstract
Purpose The authors empirically examine the impact of the stand-alone risk committee on corporate risk-taking and firm value. Design/methodology/approach The authors argue that the existence of a stand-alone risk committee enhances the quality of corporate governance, which reduces corporate risk-taking and strengthens the firm value that might improve investor protection. Findings The authors find corporate risk-taking decline significantly for firms that have a stand-alone risk committee compared with firms that have a joint audit and risk committee. The authors also find that the presence of a stand-alone risk committee is positively associated with firm value. Practical implications The evidence is consistent with the proposition that firms with a stand-alone risk committee can effectively evaluate potential risks and implement a proper risk management system. Originality/value This is the first paper that investigates the association between the existence of a stand-alone risk committee and firm risk-taking in a multi-industry setting. Also, our research extends the association between a stand-alone risk committee and firm value.