Philosophy
http://hdl.handle.net/10523/82
2024-03-29T00:58:00ZRefining the Objective List Theory
http://hdl.handle.net/10523/16327
Refining the Objective List Theory
2023
Wilkinson, Harry Edward
According to the objective list theory, certain things are good or bad for us whether we want to have the good things or want to avoid the bad things.This thesis intends to show this theory has promise and it is a serious contender as the theory of well-being. Each of this thesis’s three chapters will argue this. The first chapter will clarify what is this thing called‘well-being’and addressingconfusion that canarise, and to address the purpose and the conception of well-being. The second chapter will do what I call ‘defuse subjectivism’. This chapter intends to show that subjectivism, roughly what is good is determined by a subject, can be defuse. This means it can have its flaws illuminated, leading to us saying that subjectivism is not promising and, incidentally, the objective list theory could be promising. The third chapter discusses objective theories. This chapter clarifies some issues when understanding the objective list theory as well as some of its benefits. This chapter will then move to discussing ways to do objective theories these being ‘monism and pluralism’ and ‘perfectionism’. This chapter will then address the most important objections to the objective list theory, these being ‘the matter of mere tastes’, ‘the arbitrary numberof goods’, and ‘the alienation argument’.
2023-11-13T20:16:57ZLooking beyond blame and praise: Analysing moral responsibility in the development and deployment of AI systems
http://hdl.handle.net/10523/16325
Looking beyond blame and praise: Analysing moral responsibility in the development and deployment of AI systems
2023
Blackmore, Briony
Artificial intelligences (AIs) are becoming increasingly complex and impressive. In some cases they are now surpassing human abilities at cognitive tasks. These AI systems learn and act independently, and many now generate their own content. It is an accumulation of these kinds of characteristics that call into question whether human agents should be responsible for the actions of AIs. This thesis considers a set of questions about moral responsibility and artificial intelligences. The aim here is twofold: to clarify how to attribute responsibility for the actions of artificial intelligences, and to then use this to help guide policy and regulation. I argue that whilst in certain circumstances human agents such as developers and deployers will be responsible for harms and benefits caused by AIs this will not always be the case. I contend that the intuition that only human agents can be morally responsible must shift. Employing a functionalist argument I maintain that certain kinds of AI may develop the capacity for moral agency and moral responsibility. I go on to argue that there will also remain a set of cases where neither human nor artificial agent can be responsible for the actions of AIs. In these kinds of cases the harms and benefits that arise should be viewed as an accident. Utilising this assessment of moral responsibility and AI, this thesis culminates in a set of policy and regulation suggestions that aim to not overburden non-responsible agents, reduce the likelihood of harms happening, and to protect victims if they do.
2023-11-13T03:48:30ZWell-being, Psychotherapy, and the Capability Approach
http://hdl.handle.net/10523/15449
Well-being, Psychotherapy, and the Capability Approach
2023
Pucci, Jerônimo Gregolini
Psychotherapy is concerned with the well-being of clients. However, most models of
psychotherapy operate without an explicit model of well-being. In the context of positive
psychology, two theories of well-being have been developed and applied to psychotherapy:
Martin Seligman’s “well-being theory”, which has inspired positive psychotherapy, and Carol
Ryff’s “six-factor model of psychological well-being”, which has inspired well-being therapy.
In the context of philosophy and the social sciences, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have
developed the capability approach as a framework that is directly preoccupied with well-being.
Nonetheless, the capability approach has yet to be applied to psychotherapy. In this thesis I
present the current literature on well-being in the capability approach and in positive
psychology. I then explore two questions. The first question addresses how positive psychology
and the capability approach conceptualize well-being, both in terms of philosophical
underpinnings and how they employ the concept of well-being. The second question considers
how the capability approach could be integrated into psychotherapy. Regarding the first
question, I argue that the positive psychology theories of well-being are currently misclassified
in the literature as eudaimonic theories, while the capability approach should be viewed as an
objective list theory of well-being. I also argue that the positive psychology theories of wellbeing are about well-being narrowly construed, while the psychotherapeutic models they
inspire are arguably about well-being broadly construed. The capability approach does not seem
to be committed to a single sense of the concept of well-being. I then argue that commitment
to well-being broadly construed is preferable for psychotherapy. Regarding the second question
explored in this thesis, I suggest that capabilitarian accounts of well-being can complement
different psychotherapeutic models by ways of: 1) informing views on well-being; 2)
contributing to clinical interviewing and goal setting; and 3) informing case formulation
alongside existing approaches. The proposed interactions between the capability approach and
psychotherapy provide clues about ways that well-being can be explored by future theoretical
and empirical research.
2023-06-26T22:47:38ZThe Refined Moral Problem: A Case for Knowledge Internalism
http://hdl.handle.net/10523/15403
The Refined Moral Problem: A Case for Knowledge Internalism
2023
Whittington, Seth
Michael Smith’s ‘The Moral Problem’ (1996) outlines what he takes to be the ‘central organising problem in contemporary meta-ethics’. This is a tension that revolves around a triad of plausible propositions. These propositions represent cognitivism, judgement internalism, and the Humean theory of motivation. The rejection of any one of the propositions resolves the tension and represents a different meta-ethical position. These positions are non-cognitivism, externalism, and anti-Humeanism respectively. In this thesis, I argue that we should expand this triad of propositions to a quintet, so that we can include the moral error theory within Smith’s moral problem. I also argue that we should use knowledge internalism instead of judgement internalism as one of our equally plausible propositions. I argue that knowledge internalism is preferable to judgement internalism as an independent thesis. I attempt to show that knowledge internalism fairs better against the amoralist objection, that Smith’s moral fetishism argument results in an undesirable conclusion unless we adapt it to establish knowledge internalism, and that judgement internalism is potentially an empty thesis. I also argue that knowledge internalism fits better within Smith’s rationalist conceptual framework about the nature of moral facts. I question Smith’s claim that judgement internalism is a logical consequence of rationalism. I also argue that Smith’s argument for rationalism begs the question. Knowledge internalism is able to overcome these objections.
2023-05-31T01:44:39ZCritiquing Neoliberalism: Sartrian Authenticity and the Neoliberal University
http://hdl.handle.net/10523/12966
Critiquing Neoliberalism: Sartrian Authenticity and the Neoliberal University
2022
Bramwell, Jack
This project will produce a critique of neoliberalism by applying Jean-Paul Sartre’s notion of
authenticity. It also aims to add a novel argument in support of the academic consensus that
neoliberalism is a negative ideology, set of policies, and mode of reason. I will explain how
neoliberalism has become a mode of reason that is adopted by subjects, rendering them as
neoliberalites (Brown 2015, 35-6). This has had the problematic consequence of human
capital. Alongside Foucault, and Brown, I will argue this has caused the individual to treat
themselves as a micro-business that must be invested in so to advance themselves in the
marketplace (Foucault 2008, 225, Brown 2015, 130). The general criticism of neoliberalism
is simple and utilises a modified Sartrian position on authenticity. Sartre’s work will provide
the tools of analysis with which we can identify the failing of neoliberalism. Specifically, as
neoliberalism has matured into a rationality that its subjects adopt as modes of governance
(Brown 2015, 122), they become radically limited in the possibilities that they might imagine.
Furthermore, a neoliberal logic allows its subjects to solely imagine, motivating them even, to
engage with the world in a competitive manner. These effects are problematic and mean that
neoliberalism restricts our ability to engage with the world in good faith. In fact, it pushes
subjects toward bad faith, requiring them to subjugate the other for one’s benefit.
2022-06-21T00:13:56ZA Limited Defence of Semantic Normativism
http://hdl.handle.net/10523/12908
A Limited Defence of Semantic Normativism
2022
Cao, Phuong (Rachel)
Most philosophers of language, especially those intrigued by Kripke’s Wittgenstein, would grant that for an expression to mean anything at all, there must be conditions under which it applies correctly, such that to apply it otherwise would be incorrect (or amount to a misapplication). If the uses of a sign, symbol, or word cannot be adjudged correct or incorrect, then it must be meaningless. Given that meaning implies conditions for correct use, if correctness is inherently normative, then semantic normativism is true: meaning has normative implications. My aim is to defend this very argument against some objections made by Anandi Hattiangadi, thereby revealing a plausible interpretation of semantic normativity that she has not duly considered. While possibly not prescriptive, the implications of meaning ascription – correctness conditions – may well be evaluative, and thus genuinely normative. That is, whether or not any ‘oughts’ are involved, meaning ascription has to do with value. Once some context for the normativity of meaning as well as an exposition of the said argument and Hattiangadi’s objection is presented, such an interpretation will surface out of my attempted response to her, before getting examined for the ‘argumentative weight’ expected of the normativity constraint.
2022-05-29T21:55:29ZThe Narrative Shaping of the Human World
http://hdl.handle.net/10523/12667
The Narrative Shaping of the Human World
2022
Sampson, Nathan
Galen Strawson poses a dilemma for those who give narrative a central role in
shaping our experience. Either an account of narrativity requires narrative
self-experience, or it does not. If our account requires narrative self-experience,
it also requires diachronic self-experience. However, Strawson argues that
some people do not have diachronic self-experience as a matter of empirical
fact. Taking this horn leads to an account of narrativity that is empirically
false. If our account avoids narrative self-experience, Strawson argues, there
is nothing left for the notion of narrativity to refer to. Thus, taking the second
horn leads to a trivial account of narrativity. In this thesis, by drawing on
conceptual resources found in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Charles
Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, I suggest an account of narrativity that avoids
both horns of this dilemma. The basis for this account is Merleau-Ponty’s
notion of pre-reflective experience. I argue that locating narrativity at the level
of our pre-reflective experience gives us a substantive account of narrative that
avoids the empirical problems of narrative self-experience.
2022-01-20T20:05:31ZIdentity and What Matters in Survival: Cause, Content or Continuity?
http://hdl.handle.net/10523/12544
Identity and What Matters in Survival: Cause, Content or Continuity?
2021
Rutherford, Andrew Barnes
Derek Parfit maintains in Reasons and Persons that personal identity consists in two things. Person A and person B are the same person only if:
1. A and B are psychologically very similar [R&P 216], that is, in their psychological states, including memory and desire, and also personality traits and tastes.
And:
2. A and B are connected by the “right kind of cause" [R&P 216]; that is, they have the same body over time.
Parfit also maintains, however, that personal identity does not matter, in the sense that what I care about when I have special concern for my future states does not depend on identity. Person B, really matters to Person A, in Parfit's view, only if:
1. A and B are psychologically very similar.
And:
2. A and B are connected by "any cause" [R&P 217]; that is, I may still care about a person who does not have the same body as me so long as we are very similar and connected in some other fashion. For example, a teleportation machine that destroys my body while reproducing the relevant psychological traits in another body is a cause that connects me to the other person in such a way that I will have special concern for that person.
I argue here that Parfit's second causal criterion is neither necessary nor sufficient for justifying special concern. I accept the first criterion as a necessary condition and introduce and defend a different second criterion that emphasises social connectedness. I maintain that A has justified special concern for B only if 1 obtains and:
2. Relevant social connections recognise A and B as the same person, and that person is in some way at least potentially accessible to them.
In defending this view, I present various accounts of personal identity and of what matters (Part 1 and 2), and I argue that Parfit's causal criterion for special concern fails (Chapter 3). Then, I present my account of social connectedness (Chapter 6) and defend its importance for justified special concern (Chapter 7). Finally, I give some examples that show how it works in various scenarios. (Part 3)
2021-12-05T21:06:10Z