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dc.contributor.authorLong, Ngo Vanen_NZ
dc.contributor.authorStähler, Franken_NZ
dc.date.available2011-04-07T03:06:03Z
dc.date.copyright2008-01-01en_NZ
dc.identifier.citationLong, N. V., & Stähler, F. (2008). A Contest Model of Liberalizing Government Procurements (Economics Discussion Papers Series No. 803). Department of Economics, University of Otago. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10523/1008en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10523/1008
dc.description.abstractThis paper models government procurements as a contest among domestic firms, and – in case of liberalization – domestic and foreign firms. Liberalizing procurements reduces wasteful domestic lobbying but also increases the likelihood that a foreign firm will capture the rent. We show that the domestic welfare change is not monotonic in the foreign firms' abilities. Domestic welfare increases only if the gross surplus generated by foreign firms is sufficiently large. Furthermore, we show that, from the global welfare point of view, domestically optimal liberalization policies can be either excessive or too restrictive.en_NZ
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.publisherDepartment of Economics, University of Otagoen_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics Discussion Papers Seriesen_NZ
dc.relation.urihttp://www.business.otago.ac.nz/econ/research/discussionpapers/index.htmlen_NZ
dc.subjectTrade liberalizationen_NZ
dc.subjecttrade in servicesen_NZ
dc.subjectgovernment procurementsen_NZ
dc.subject.lcshHB Economic Theoryen_NZ
dc.titleA Contest Model of Liberalizing Government Procurementsen_NZ
dc.typeDiscussion Paperen_NZ
dc.description.versionPublisheden_NZ
otago.bitstream.pages20en_NZ
otago.date.accession2010-10-05 20:30:54en_NZ
otago.schoolDepartment of Economicsen_NZ
otago.openaccessOpen
otago.place.publicationDunedin, New Zealanden_NZ
dc.identifier.eprints930en_NZ
otago.school.eprintsEconomicsen_NZ
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otago.relation.number803en_NZ
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