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dc.contributor.authorJulien, Benoîten_NZ
dc.contributor.authorKennes, Johnen_NZ
dc.contributor.authorKing, Ianen_NZ
dc.date.available2011-04-07T03:06:04Z
dc.date.copyright2005-12en_NZ
dc.identifier.citationJulien, B., Kennes, J., & King, I. (2005). Directed search without price directions (Economics Discussion Papers Series No. 518). University of Otago. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10523/1009en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10523/1009
dc.description.abstractWe present a simple directed search model of the labour market in which workers’ outside options play a key role. Two versions of the model are considered: one exact, with finite numbers of workers, and one in the limit where the number of workers approaches infinity. The second version is an approximation of the first. We examine the effects of a set of government policy parameters and find that most of the influence of these parameters occurs through the channel of workers’ outside options. This channel is fundamental in this model, and absent from others in the literature.en_NZ
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.publisherUniversity of Otagoen_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics Discussion Papers Seriesen_NZ
dc.relation.urihttp://www.business.otago.ac.nz/econ/research/discussionpapers/DP_0519.pdfen_NZ
dc.subjectdirected searchen_NZ
dc.subjectmatchingen_NZ
dc.subjectunemployment theoryen_NZ
dc.subjectpublic policyen_NZ
dc.subject.lcshHB Economic Theoryen_NZ
dc.titleDirected search without price directionsen_NZ
dc.typeDiscussion Paperen_NZ
dc.description.versionUnpublisheden_NZ
otago.bitstream.pages27en_NZ
otago.date.accession2006-02-02en_NZ
otago.schoolEconomicsen_NZ
otago.openaccessOpen
otago.place.publicationDunedin, New Zealanden_NZ
dc.identifier.eprints205en_NZ
otago.school.eprintsEconomicsen_NZ
dc.description.referencesBinmore, K., A. Rubinstein and A. Wolinsky, (1986). “The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling”, Rand Journal of Economics, 17, 176-188 Hosios, A., (1990) “On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment”, Review of Economic Studies, 57, 279-298. Julien, B., J. Kennes and I. King (2000) "Bidding for Labor", Review of Economic Dynamics, 3, 619-649. Julien, B., J. Kennes and I. King (2002) “Auctions Beat Posted Prices in a Small Market” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 158, 548-562. Julien, B., J. Kennes and I. King (2005) “Ex Post Bidding and Efficient Coordination Unemployment”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 38, 174-193. Julien, B., J. Kennes, and I. King (2006) “Residual Wage Disparity and Coordination Unemployment”, International Economic Review, (forthcoming). Katz, L., and D. Autor (1999) “Changes in the Wage Structure and Earnings Inequality”, in Handbook of Labor Economics, vol 3, O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Elsevier Science B.V., chapter 26. Kuhn, P., and A. Sweetman (1998) “Unemployment Insurance and Quits in Canada”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 31, 549-572. Kultti, K., (1999) “Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices”, Games and Economic Behavior 27, 106-113. McAfee, P., (1993) “Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers”, Econometrica, 61, 1281-1312. Mortensen Dale (1982) "Efficiency of Mating, Racing and Related Games", American Economic Review, 72, 968-979. Pissarides, C., (2000) "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory" 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press. Shi, S., (2001) "Frictional Assignment I: Efficiency", Journal of Economic Theory, 98, 332-260.en_NZ
otago.relation.number518en_NZ
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