Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorGillan, Stuart Len_NZ
dc.contributor.authorHartzell, Jay Cen_NZ
dc.contributor.authorStarks, Laura Ten_NZ
dc.date.available2011-04-07T03:18:53Z
dc.date.copyright2004-01-30en_NZ
dc.identifier.citationGillan, S. L., Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T. (2004, January 30). Explaining corporate governance: Boards, bylaws, and charter provisions. University of Otago Department of Finance Seminar Series.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10523/1507
dc.description.abstractWe provide arguments and present evidence that corporate governance structures are endogenous responses to the costs and benefits firms face when they choose the mechanisms that comprise those structures. In particular, an industry’s investment opportunities, product uniqueness, competitive environment, information environment, and leverage help explain its corporate governance. Examining groups of similar corporate governance mechanisms shows that firm and industry factors can have quite different associations (in strength and direction) with the monitoring capabilities of the board of directors versus the shareholder orientation of corporate charter provisions. Although industry factors play a dominant role in explaining an index of total governance, we find that firm and industry factors contribute almost equally in explaining the variation of sub-indices capturing aspects of board structure and charter provision use.en_NZ
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.relation.ispartofUniversity of Otago Department of Finance Seminar Seriesen_NZ
dc.relation.urihttp://www.business.otago.ac.nz/finc/research/seminars_04.htmlen_NZ
dc.subjectcosts and benefitsen_NZ
dc.subjectmonitoring capabilitiesen_NZ
dc.subjectboard structureen_NZ
dc.subjectcharter provisionen_NZ
dc.subjectCorporate Governanceen_NZ
dc.subject.lcshHF Commerceen_NZ
dc.subject.lcshHF5601 Accountingen_NZ
dc.subject.lcshHG Financeen_NZ
dc.titleExplaining corporate governance: Boards, bylaws, and charter provisionsen_NZ
dc.typeConference or Workshop Item (Seminar, Speech or Other Presentation)en_NZ
dc.description.versionUnpublisheden_NZ
otago.bitstream.pages48en_NZ
otago.date.accession2007-04-12en_NZ
otago.schoolFinanceen_NZ
otago.openaccessOpen
otago.place.publicationDunedin, New Zealanden_NZ
dc.identifier.eprints618en_NZ
dc.description.refereedNon Peer Revieweden_NZ
otago.school.eprintsFinance & Quantitative Analysisen_NZ
dc.description.referencesAggarwal, Raj and Andrew Samwick, 1999, The other side of the tradeoff: The impact of risk on executive compensation, Journal of Political Economy 107, 65-105. Agrawal, Anup and Charles Knoeber, 2001, Do some outside directors play a political role?, Journal of Law and Economics 44, 179-198. Agrawal, Anup and Charles Knoeber, 1996, Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31, 377-397. Bebchuk, Lucian, John Coates IV, and Guhan Subramanian, 2002, The powerful antitakeover force of staggered boards: Theory, evidence, and policy, Stanford Law Review, 54, 887-951. Bebchuk, Lucian, and Alma Cohen, 2002, Firms’ decisions where to incorporate, working paper, Harvard University. Bhagat, Sanjai, and Bernard S. Black, 1999, The uncertain relationship between board composition and firm performance, Business Lawyer 54, 921-963. Bhagat, Sanjai, and James A. Brickley, 1984, Cumulative voting: The value of minority shareholder voting rights, Journal of Law and Economics 27,339-366. Bittlingmayer, George, 1999, The market for corporate control (including takeovers), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Vol. III – The Regulation of Contracts, Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerritt De Geest, Edward Elgar and the University of Ghent. Bizjak, John, Michael Lemmon, and Lalitha Naveen, 2002, Has the use of peer groups contributed to higher levels of executive compensation?, working paper, Portland State University. Borokhovich, Kenneth A., Robert Parrino, and Teresa Trapani, 1996. Outside directors and CEO selection, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31, 337-355. Brickley, James, Jeffrey Coles, and Gregg Jarrell, 1997, Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and chairman of the board, Journal of Corporate Finance 3, 189-220. Brickley, James, Jeffrey Coles, and Rory Terry, 1994, Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills, Journal of Financial Economics 35, 371-390. Burkart, Mike, Dennis Gromb, and Fausto Panunzi, 1997, Large shareholders, monitoring and the value of the firm, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 693-798. Bushman, Robert, Qi Chen, Ellen Engel and Abbie Smith, 2000, The sensitivity of corporate governance systems to the timeliness of accounting earnings, working paper, University of North Carolina, Duke University and the University of Chicago. Coles, Jeffrey L., Michael L. Lemmon and J Felix Meschke, 2003, Structural models and endogeneity in corporate finance, working paper, Arizona State University. Danielson, Morris, and Jonathan Karpoff, 1998, On the uses of corporate governance provisions, Journal of Corporate Finance 4, 347-371. Defond, Mark, and Chul W. Park, 1999, The effect of competition on CEO turnover, Journal of Accounting and Economics 27, 269-305. Deli, Daniel N., and Stuart L. Gillan, On the demand for independent and active audit committees, Journal of Corporate Finance 6, 2000,427-455. Demsetz, Harold, and Kenneth Lehn, 1985, The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences, Journal of Political Economy 33, 3-53. Durnev, Artyom, and E. Han Kim, 2003, To steal or not to steal: Firm attributes, legal environment and valuation, working paper, University of Michigan. Durnev, Artyom, Randall Morck, and Bernard Yeung, 2001, Does firm-specific information in stock prices guide capital allocation?, NBER working paper 8093. Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1997, Industry costs of equity,Journal of Financial Economics 43, 153-194. Fama, Eugene F., and Michael Jensen, 1983, Separation of ownership and control, Journal of Law and Economics 26, 301-326. Ferris, S. P., Jagannathan, M., and Pritchard, A.C., 2002, Too busy to mind the business: monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments, forthcoming Journal of Finance. Field, Laura, and Jonathan Karpoff, 2002, Takeover defenses of IPO firms, Journal of Finance 57, 1857-1889. Frye, Melissa, and Stanley Smith, 2003, The development of corporate governance systems: Financial institutions versus non-financial institutions, University of Central Florida working paper. Gartman, Grant, 2000, State Antitakeover Laws, Investor Responsibility Center, Washington, D.C. Gillan, Stuart L., and Laura T. Starks, 1998. A survey of shareholder activism: Motivation and empirical evidence, Contemporary Finance Digest 2, 10-34. Gillan, Stuart L., and Laura T. Starks, 2000. Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: The role of institutional investors, Journal of Financial Economics 57, 275-305. Gompers, Paul, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, 2003, Corporate governance and equity prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107-155. Goyal, Vidhan K., and Chul W. Park, 2002, Board leadership structure and CEO turnover, Journal of Corporate Finance 8, 49-66. Hart, Oliver, 1983, The market mechanism as an incentive scheme, The Bell Journal of Economics 14, 366-382. Hart, Oliver, 1995, Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure, Oxford University Press. Hallman, Greg, and Jay Hartzell, 2003, The impact of the likelihood of turnover on executive compensation, University of Texas at Austin working paper. Hartzell, Jay, and Laura Starks, 2002, Institutional investors and executive compensation, Journal of Finance, forthcoming. Hermalin, Benjamin, and Michael Weisbach, 2002, Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature, FRBNY Economic Policy Review, forthcoming. Hermalin, Benjamin, and Michael Weisbach, 1988, The determinants of board composition, Rand Journal of Economics 19, 589-606. Jarrell, Gregg, and Annette Poulsen, 1988a, Shark repellants and stock prices: The effects of antitakeover amendments since 1980, Journal of Financial Economics 19, 127-168. Jarrell, Gregg, and Annette Poulsen, 1988b, Dual class recapitalizations as antitakeover mechanisms: The recent evidence, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 129-152. Jensen, Michael, 1986, Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers, American Economic Review 76, 323-329. Jensen, Michael, 1993, The modern industrial revolution, exit and the failure of internal control systems, Journal of Finance 48, 831-880. John, Kose, and Senbet, Lemma, 1998, Corporate governance and board effectiveness, Journal of Banking and Finance, 22, 371-401. John, Kose, and Semi Kedia, 2002, Design of corporate governance: Role of ownership structure, takeovers, bank debt and large shareholder monitoring, New York University working paper. Klapper, Leora and Inessa Love, 2003, Corporate governance, investor protection, and performance in emerging markets, Journal of Corporate Finance, forthcoming. Klein, April, 1998, Firm performance and board committee structure, Journal of Law and Economics 41, 275-303. Kole, Stacey, and Kenneth Lehn, 1999, Deregulation and the adaptation of governance structure: the case of the U.S. airline industry, Journal of Financial Economics 52, 79- 117. Leibenstein, Harvey, 1966, Allocative efficiency vs. ‘X-efficiency’,” American Economic Review 56, 392-415. Mitchell, Mark L., and J. Harold Mulherin, 1996, The impact of industry shocks on takeover and restructuring activity, Journal of Financial Economics 41, 193-226. Murphy, Kevin, 1998, Executive compensation, in Handbook of Labor Economics, Ashenfelter, O., and Card, D. (editors), Volume 3, North Holland. Parrino, Robert, 1997, CEO turnover and outside succession: a cross sectional analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 46, 165-197. Raheja, Charu, 2002, The interaction of insiders and outsiders in monitoring: a theory of corporate boards, working paper, Vanderbilt University. Romano, Roberta, 2003, Does confidential proxy voting matter? NBER Working Paper 9126. Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, A survey of corporate governance, Journal of Finance 52, 737-783. Smith, Clifford W., and Ross L. Watts, 1992, The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend and compensation policies, Journal of Financial Economics 32, 263-292. Titman, Sheridan, and Roberto Wessels, 1988, The determinants of capital structure choice, Journal of Finance 43, 1-19. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. Outside directors and CEO turnover, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 431-46 Welch, Ivo, 2003, Stock returns and capital structure dynamics, working paper, Yale University. White, Hal, 1980. A heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix and a direct test for heteroscedasticity, Econometrica 48, 817-838. Yermack, David, 1996, Higher market valuation for firms with a small board of directors, Journal of Financial Economics 40, 185-211.en_NZ
 Find in your library

Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record