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dc.contributor.authorStähler, Franken_NZ
dc.date.available2011-04-07T03:18:54Z
dc.date.copyright2006-05-05en_NZ
dc.identifier.citationStähler, F. (2006, May 5). Partial ownership and cross-border mergers. University of Otago Department of Finance Seminar Series. Presented at the University of Otago, Department of Finance, Seminar.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10523/1511
dc.description.abstractPartial ownership can be used as a screening device by a foreign firm which wants to merge with a local firm whose productivity is private information. As partial ownership is confined to sharing future merger profits, it cannot achieve true revelation in all cases but improves expected merger gains also in an equilibrium which is not fully separating. The example of a Cournot target market in which a horizontal merger reduces marginal cost demonstrates the general results. If cost reduction is exogenous, a separating equilibrium exists. If cost reduction is endogenously determined by investment of the merged firm, equilibria exist which do not fully separate but imply partial ownership.en_NZ
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.relation.ispartofUniversity of Otago Department of Finance Seminar Seriesen_NZ
dc.relation.urihttp://www.business.otago.ac.nz/finc/research/seminars_06.htmlen_NZ
dc.subjectPartial ownershipen_NZ
dc.subjectmergeren_NZ
dc.subjectmultinational firmsen_NZ
dc.subjectforeign direct investmenten_NZ
dc.subjectasymmetric informationen_NZ
dc.subject.lcshHF Commerceen_NZ
dc.subject.lcshHF5601 Accountingen_NZ
dc.subject.lcshHG Financeen_NZ
dc.titlePartial ownership and cross-border mergersen_NZ
dc.typeConference or Workshop Item (Seminar, Speech or Other Presentation)en_NZ
dc.description.versionUnpublisheden_NZ
otago.bitstream.pages29en_NZ
otago.date.accession2007-04-13en_NZ
otago.schoolFinanceen_NZ
otago.openaccessOpen
otago.place.publicationDunedin, New Zealanden_NZ
dc.identifier.eprints605en_NZ
dc.description.refereedNon Peer Revieweden_NZ
otago.school.eprintsFinance & Quantitative Analysisen_NZ
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otago.event.dates5 May 2006en_NZ
otago.event.placeCommerce 5.37, University of Otago, Dunedin, Otagoen_NZ
otago.event.typeotheren_NZ
otago.event.titleUniversity of Otago, Department of Finance, Seminaren_NZ
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