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dc.contributor.authorGillan, Stuart Len_NZ
dc.contributor.authorHartzell, Jay Cen_NZ
dc.contributor.authorParrino, Roberten_NZ
dc.date.available2011-04-07T03:19:04Z
dc.date.copyright2006-06-14en_NZ
dc.identifier.citationGillan, S. L., Hartzell, J. C., & Parrino, R. (2006, June 14). Explicit vs. implicit contracts: Evidence from CEO employment agreements. University of Otago Department of Finance Seminar Series. Presented at the University of Otago, Department of Finance, Seminar.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10523/1536
dc.description.abstractWe report evidence on the choice between explicit (written) and implicit contracting for a sample of agreements between CEOs and their firms. Fewer than half of S&P 500 CEOs have explicit contracts. Evidence on the determinants of whether a CEO’s contract is explicit or implicit is consistent with contracting theory. The likelihood that a CEO has an explicit employment agreement is positively related to the investment in human capital required of the CEO and the expected loss to the CEO if the firm reneges on the agreement and negatively related to the degree of uncertainty surrounding the relationship and the firm’s labor market reputation. These factors are similarly associated with the duration of explicit agreements.en_NZ
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.relation.ispartofUniversity of Otago Department of Finance Seminar Seriesen_NZ
dc.relation.urihttp://www.business.otago.ac.nz/finc/research/seminars_06.htmlen_NZ
dc.subjectexplicit employment agreementen_NZ
dc.subjectCEOen_NZ
dc.subjectfirm’s labor market reputation. implicit employment agreement,en_NZ
dc.subjectHuman capitalen_NZ
dc.subject.lcshHF Commerceen_NZ
dc.subject.lcshHF5601 Accountingen_NZ
dc.subject.lcshHG Financeen_NZ
dc.titleExplicit vs. implicit contracts: Evidence from CEO employment agreementsen_NZ
dc.typeConference or Workshop Item (Seminar, Speech or Other Presentation)en_NZ
dc.description.versionUnpublisheden_NZ
otago.bitstream.pages47en_NZ
otago.date.accession2007-04-12en_NZ
otago.schoolFinanceen_NZ
otago.openaccessOpen
otago.place.publicationDunedin, New Zealanden_NZ
dc.identifier.eprints609en_NZ
dc.description.refereedNon Peer Revieweden_NZ
otago.school.eprintsFinance & Quantitative Analysisen_NZ
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otago.event.dates14 June 2006en_NZ
otago.event.placeCommerce 5.37, University of Otago, Dunedin, Otagoen_NZ
otago.event.typeotheren_NZ
otago.event.titleUniversity of Otago, Department of Finance, Seminaren_NZ
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