Abstract
The aim of this research is to assess and evaluate the effectiveness of Crew Resource Management (CRM) training programmes for enhancing teamwork and cooperation between flight attendants and pilots. CRM programmes have been defined as the use of all available resources to achieve a safe flight (Helmreich, Merritt & Wilhelm, 1999). CRM programmes were developed for pilots following a series of accidents in the United States in the 1970s which were attributed to ineffective (or non-existent) communication within the flight decks. CRM programmes were extended to flight attendants in the 1990s after accident investigations had determined that some crashes could have been averted if flight attendants had passed on safety critical information to the pilots (e.g., the 1989 British Midlands crash at Kegworth). Human error is attributed to 60-80% of air accidents (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2004; von Thaden, 2008). Studies 1 and 2 involved a 36-item questionnaire for flight attendants which was administered before and after the introduction of the new CRM training programme for flight attendants at a South Pacific airline. The participating airline is a major air carrier so it was possible to obtain large samples (500+) for each of these quantitative studies. The results showed that there had been a significant attitude change in the positive direction. Multivariate analyses also revealed that there were significant differences between fleet type flown, crew position flown and length of service (seniority). As predicted crews with a greater length of service displayed safer attitudes as measured by the FSAQ (Flight Attendants) Crews on the narrow-bodied A320 and B737 showed safer attitudes than their colleagues on the wide-bodied long-haul aircraft. Flight attendants in senior positions (ISD, ISC, and Purser) also displayed safer attitudes. Study 3 followed up on the significant positive attitude changes through a series of seventeen focus groups which involved 100 flight attendants. The purpose was to obtain high quality qualitative data on perceived barriers (and solutions) to communication between pilots and flight attendants. The major barrier identified was the locked flight deck door which meant that flight attendants could not see periods of high workload on the flight deck and there was difficulty in communicating safety critical information over the interphone due to noise and the lack of face-to face contact. Flight attendants suggested that one possible solution would be to install CCVT cameras so that the pilots could see that it was safe to unlock the door or see the flight attendants face. Another barrier was seen to be the lack of a whole pre-flight briefing on long-haul aircraft as flight attendants rarely had the opportunity to even see the pilots on the large B747 aircraft. A solution would be to have the whole team assemble in the area nearest to the flight deck for a quick two-minute briefing. The full briefing would still be between the Captain and the lead flight attendant who would then brief the flight attendant team. These data were then used to develop Study 4 which consisted of a 14-item questionnaire (FSAQ-Pilots) which provided data on the ways pilots viewed the barriers (and solutions) to intergroup communication. The results from this study showed that pilots safety attitudes varied according to fleet type flown, length of service, and crew position flown. Captains, pilots on narrow-bodied aircraft and pilots with a greater length of service all displayed safer attitudes than their colleagues. The qualitative data displayed the same solutions to barriers as the flight attendants had shown. The major barrier was once more the locked flight deck door and the installation of CCTV cameras was recommended. A whole team pre-flight briefing was also recommended. Study 5 followed up on these data by developing a CD Rom which contained five scenarios presented in video clip format. These short video clips involved a landing gear malfunction, drunken passengers, a medical emergency and an explosive decompression followed by an emergency landing. All these provided opportunities for both pilots and flight attendants to identify how they would show intergroup communication and cooperative teamwork. Pilots and flight attendants identified very similar patterns of communication which showed effective intergroup teamwork. Pilots and flight attendants with seven or more years experience; those in leadership roles (Captains, lead flight attendants ); and crews on B737 , B767, and A320 fleets showed significantly lower perceived ratings of danger, volatility, complexity, the role of the captain,, flight attendants and communication in the majority of the five video clips (as described in Chapter 7). Study 6 was an experimental intervention based on the social identity and social categorization theories which formed the theoretical framework for this thesis. According to these theories flight attendants would be more willing to engage in cooperative teamwork behaviours when their social (as opposed to personal) identities had been primed. Three subscales were identified through factor analysis. The subscale labeled intergroup cooperation showed significant differences between the groups when social (as opposed to personal) had been primed. Flight attendants in the social priming condition indicated that they would be more willing to engage in intergroup teamwork. The results supported the main hypothesis. Social identity theory has not been applied to flight crew teamwork previously. These data showed that joint CRM training is valued by both flight attendants and pilots, especially when joint training sessions enabled both groups to meet and hence break down barriers to communication; a major aim of CRM programmes.