Temporal Language and Temporal Reality
Dyke, Heather

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Dyke, H. (2003). Temporal Language and Temporal Reality. The Philosophical Quarterly, 53(212), 380–391. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00319
Permanent link to OUR Archive version:
http://hdl.handle.net/10523/1740
Abstract:
It has recently been argued that the new B-theory of time argues invalidly from the claim that tensed sentences have tenseless truth-conditions to the conclusion that temporal reality is tenseless. But while early B-theorists may have relied on some such inference, new B-theorists do not. Giving tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences is not intended to prove that temporal reality is tenseless. Rather it is intended to undermine the A-theorist’s move from claims about the irreducibility of tensed language to the conclusion that temporal reality must be tensed. I examine how A-theorists have used facts about language in attempting to establish their conclusions about the nature of temporal reality. I take the recent work of William Lane Craig, and argue that he moves illicitly from facts about temporal language to his conclusion that temporal reality is tensed.
Date:
2003
Publisher:
John Wiley and Sons
Pages:
380-391
Keywords:
Time; Language; Reality
Research Type:
Journal Article
Languages:
English
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- Philosophy [55]