Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorDyke, Heather
dc.date.available2011-06-30T02:09:44Z
dc.date.copyright2003
dc.identifier.citationDyke, H. (2003). Tensed Meaning: A Tenseless Account. Journal of Philosophical Research, 28, 65–81.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10523/1742
dc.description.abstractIf, as the new B-theory of time maintains, tensed sentences have tenseless truth conditions, it follows that it is possible for two sentence-tokens to have the same truth conditions, but different meanings. This conclusion forces a rethink of the traditional identification of truth conditions with meaning. There is an aspect of the meanings of tensed sentences which is not captured by their truth conditions, and which has so far eluded explanation. In this paper I intend to locate, examine and explain this feature of tensed meaning.en_NZ
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen_NZ
dc.publisherPhilosophy Documentation Centeren_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Philosophical Researchen_NZ
dc.rightsCopyright assigned to Philosophy Documentation Center, but archiving of author's version permitted.en_NZ
dc.subjectTimeen_NZ
dc.subjectTenseen_NZ
dc.subjectMeaningen_NZ
dc.titleTensed Meaning: A Tenseless Accounten_NZ
dc.typeJournal Articleen_NZ
otago.schoolPhilosophy Departmenten_NZ
otago.relation.volume28en_NZ
otago.bitstream.endpage81en_NZ
otago.bitstream.startpage65en_NZ
otago.openaccessOpen
dc.description.refereedPeer Revieweden_NZ
 Find in your library

Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record