Tokens, Dates and Tenseless Truth Conditions
Dyke, Heather

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Dyke, H. (2002). Tokens, Dates and Tenseless Truth Conditions. Synthese, 131(3), 329–351. doi:10.1023/A:1016119503891
Permanent link to OUR Archive version:
http://hdl.handle.net/10523/1744
Abstract:
There are two extant versions of the new tenseless theory of time: the date versionand the token-reflexive version. I ask whether they are equivalent, and if not, whichof them is to be preferred. I argue that they are not equivalent, that the date version isunsatisfactory, and that the token-reflexive version is correct. I defend the token-reflexive version against a string of objections from Quentin Smith. My defence involves a discussion of the ontological and semantic significance of truth conditions, and of the connection between truth and reality on the one hand, and that between truth and meaning on the other. I argue that Smith's objections to the token-reflexive theory stem from his confusing these two aspects of the notion of truth.
Date:
2002
Publisher:
Springer
Pages:
329-351
Keywords:
time; tense; language
Research Type:
Journal Article
Languages:
English
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- Journal Article [919]
- Philosophy [55]