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dc.contributor.authorDyke, Heather
dc.date.available2011-06-30T02:22:21Z
dc.date.copyright2002
dc.identifier.citationDyke, H. (2002). Tokens, Dates and Tenseless Truth Conditions. Synthese, 131(3), 329–351. doi:10.1023/A:1016119503891en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10523/1744
dc.description.abstractThere are two extant versions of the new tenseless theory of time: the date versionand the token-reflexive version. I ask whether they are equivalent, and if not, whichof them is to be preferred. I argue that they are not equivalent, that the date version isunsatisfactory, and that the token-reflexive version is correct. I defend the token-reflexive version against a string of objections from Quentin Smith. My defence involves a discussion of the ontological and semantic significance of truth conditions, and of the connection between truth and reality on the one hand, and that between truth and meaning on the other. I argue that Smith's objections to the token-reflexive theory stem from his confusing these two aspects of the notion of truth.en_NZ
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen_NZ
dc.publisherSpringeren_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofSyntheseen_NZ
dc.relation.urihttp://www.springerlink.com/content/e9y1cw7782a9d39l/en_NZ
dc.rightsCopyright assigned to Springer, but archiving of author's version permitteden_NZ
dc.subjecttimeen_NZ
dc.subjecttenseen_NZ
dc.subjectlanguageen_NZ
dc.titleTokens, Dates and Tenseless Truth Conditionsen_NZ
dc.typeJournal Articleen_NZ
otago.schoolPhilosophy Departmenten_NZ
otago.relation.issue3en_NZ
otago.relation.volume131en_NZ
dc.identifier.doi10.1023/A:1016119503891en_NZ
otago.bitstream.endpage351en_NZ
otago.bitstream.startpage329en_NZ
otago.openaccessOpen
dc.description.refereedPeer Revieweden_NZ
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