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dc.contributor.authorBloch, Francis
dc.contributor.authorFabrizi, Simona
dc.contributor.authorLippert, Steffen
dc.date.available2011-12-06T03:19:56Z
dc.date.copyright2011-11-01
dc.identifier.citationBloch, F., Fabrizi, S., & Lippert, S. (2011). Learning and Collusion in New Markets with Uncertain Entry Costs (Economics Discussion Papers Series No. 1112). University of Otago. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10523/2066en
dc.identifier.issn1178-2293
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10523/2066
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyses an entry timing game with uncertain entry costs. Two firms receive costless signals about the cost of a new project and decide when to invest. We characterize the equilibrium of the investment timing game with private and public signals. We show that competition leads the two firms to invest too early and analyse collusion schemes whereby one firm prevents the other firm from entering the market. We show that, in the efficient collusion scheme, the active firm must transfer a large part of the surplus to the inactive firm in order to limit pre-emption.en_NZ
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen_NZ
dc.publisherUniversity of Otagoen_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics Discussion Papers Seriesen_NZ
dc.relation.urihttp://www.business.otago.ac.nz/econ/research/discussionpapers/index.htmlen_NZ
dc.subjectLearningen_NZ
dc.subjectPre-emptionen_NZ
dc.subjectInnovationen_NZ
dc.subjectNew Marketsen_NZ
dc.subjectProject Selectionen_NZ
dc.subjectEntry Costsen_NZ
dc.subjectCollusionen_NZ
dc.subjectPrivate Informationen_NZ
dc.subjectMarket Uncertaintyen_NZ
dc.titleLearning and Collusion in New Markets with Uncertain Entry Costsen_NZ
dc.typeDiscussion Paperen_NZ
otago.schoolDepartment of Economicsen_NZ
otago.openaccessOpen
otago.relation.number1112en_NZ
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