Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorFabrizi, Simona
dc.contributor.authorLippert, Steffen
dc.date.available2012-07-05T01:32:55Z
dc.date.copyright2012-06
dc.identifier.citationFabrizi, S., & Lippert, S. (2012). Corruption and the Public Display of Wealth (Economics Discussion Papers Series No. 1202). University of Otago. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10523/2338en
dc.identifier.issn1178-2293
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10523/2338
dc.description.abstractWe build a principal-agent-client model of corruption, allowing for heterogeneity in the value of public projects relative to the cost of monitoring their execution and for uncertainty of corruptors regarding the value of a project conducted. We derive the conditions under which officials with low-value projects have an incentive to signal their projects' type, and thereby facilitate their corruption, by means of public displays of wealth. While such public displays reduce the probability with which bribes are offered to officials conducting high-value projects, they increase the probability with which these officials accept bribes sufficiently to offset any positive effect.en_NZ
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen_NZ
dc.publisherUniversity of Otagoen_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics Discussion Papers Seriesen_NZ
dc.relation.urihttp://www.business.otago.ac.nz/econ/research/discussionpapers/index.htmlen_NZ
dc.subjectcorruptionen_NZ
dc.subjectincentivesen_NZ
dc.subjectsignalingen_NZ
dc.subjectpublic displays of wealthen_NZ
dc.titleCorruption and the Public Display of Wealthen_NZ
dc.typeDiscussion Paperen_NZ
dc.date.updated2012-07-03T04:25:08Z
otago.schoolDepartment of Economicsen_NZ
otago.openaccessOpenen_NZ
otago.relation.number1202en_NZ
 Find in your library

Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record