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dc.contributor.authorVanzo, Alberto
dc.contributor.editorMuchnik, Pablo
dc.date.available2011-01-20T23:08:21Z
dc.date.copyright2010
dc.identifier.citationVanzo, A. (2010). Kant, Skepticism, and the Comparison Argument. In P. Muchnik (Ed.), Rethinking Kant, Vol. 2 (Vol. 2, pp. 54–80). Cambridge Scholars Publishers.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10523/468
dc.description.abstractKant's writings on logic illustrate the comparison argument about truth, which goes as follows. A truth-bearer p is true if and only if it corresponds, or it agrees, with a portion of reality: the object(s), state(s) of affairs, or event(s) p is about. In order to know whether p agrees with that portion of reality, one must check if that portion of reality is as p states. Using the terms of the comparison argument, one must compare p with that portion of reality. This is impossible, because the only knowledge of reality we can have is in the form propositions, beliefs, or judgments, whose agreement with reality is as much in need of justification as the agreement of p with reality. Therefore, it is impossible to know which truth-bearers are true. In this paper, I reconstruct Kant's version of the comparison argument. I argue that, for Kant, the argument is sound only under the assumption of transcendental realism. Transcendental idealism avoids the sceptical consequences of the comparison argument.en_NZ
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen_NZ
dc.publisherCambridge Scholars Publishersen_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofRethinking Kant, vol. 2en_NZ
dc.subjectcomparison argument, Kant, scepticism, truthen_NZ
dc.titleKant, Skepticism, and the Comparison Argumenten_NZ
dc.typeChapter in Booken_NZ
otago.schoolDepartment of Philosophyen_NZ
otago.relation.volume2en_NZ
otago.bitstream.endpage80en_NZ
otago.bitstream.startpage54en_NZ
otago.openaccessOpen
dc.rights.statementPublished with the permission of Cambridge Scholars Publishingen_NZ
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